Greed and Grievance: the Role of Economic Agendas in the Conflict in Solomon Islands Matthew Allen

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Greed and grievance: the role of economic agendas in the conflict in Solomon Islands Matthew Allen

This article investigates the applicability of the influential Matthew Allen is a economics of civil war literature to the case of the conflict which PhD scholar with the occurred in Solomon Islands between 1998 and 2003. It is argued Asia Pacific School of that a modified version of the greed thesis resonates with Economics and Government at The particular aspects of the situation in Solomon Islands, particularly Australian National during the latter phases of the conflict when a variety of actors, University. including politicians, businessmen and ex-militants, were clearly benefiting from the instrumentalisation of violence and disorder. The underlying causes of the conflict have much to do with historical patterns of uneven development which have created overlapping boundaries of social-economic inequality and ethnicity. As is the case with other recent armed conflicts in Melanesia, issues of land, identity, ethnicity and socioeconomic justice were central to the conflict.

Since the late 1980s, development economists argument is that young men are motivated have become increasingly involved in the to rebel by the opportunity to predate on field of conflict studies. An influential lootable primary resources, and also by the literature has emerged which argues that opportunity cost of not doing so. Greed, economic motives are the primary drivers of rather than grievance, is regarded as the main contemporary civil wars. According to motivational force behind conflict. The so- econometric modelling, civil wars are called ‘greed’ thesis has generated statistically most likely to occur in countries considerable debate amongst social with a high dependence on the export of scientists. A nascent ‘beyond greed and primary commodities, a high proportion of grievance’ literature acknowledges the poorly educated young men in the populace, importance of economic agendas in civil and slow economic growth (Collier 2000; wars, but widens the narrow analytical lens Collier and Hoffler 1998, 2001). The of neoclassical economics to include

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consideration of political, cultural and deployment of the Australian-led Regional historical factors and contexts (see Cramer Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 2002; Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Pearce (RAMSI) in July 2003. 2005). This emergent literature is also placing It is argued that, with significant small wars in the context of weak and failing modification, elements of the greed-driven states, and wider processes of globalisation. model of conflict resonate with particular In this broadened perspective, state and aspects of the conflict in Solomon Islands. A commercial actors are also viewed as range of actors, including ex-militants, potentially important conflict actors. politicians and Honiara businessmen, The socioeconomic characteristics of benefited financially from the violence and Solomon Islands, with its dependence on disorder, particularly during the post coup primary commodity exports and its large phase of the conflict. Much of the economic demographic youth bulge, make it an ideal gain flowed directly from government coffers candidate for a greed-driven conflict or as a consequence of the pervasive corruption ‘resource war’. The objective of this article is of the compensation and demobilisation to examine the relevance of the economics of processes. Under these circumstances, it is civil war literature in the case of the recent the state, rather than ‘lootable’ primary conflict in Solomon Islands. resources, which is the subject of predation. This conflict commenced in late 1998, However, the greed thesis cannot provide when Guadalcanal militants, collectively a solely satisfactory explanation for the known as the Isatabu Freedom Movement origins and dynamics of the conflict in (IFM), set about a violent campaign of Solomon Islands. The assumption that harassment which saw the eviction of large individuals will always behave in a rational numbers of migrant settlers from their homes and benefit-maximising way obscures on the Guadalcanal Plains and around important social and cultural influences on Honiara, most of whom originated from the individuals’ motives for participating in densely populated island of Malaita. A rival collective violence. The comparative regional militant group, the Malaita Eagle Force literature encourages us to see socioeconomic (MEF), formed between late 1999 and early inequality and ethnicity as potent drivers of 2000. Comprising ex-policemen, men who conflict in Melanesia,1 particularly in had been evicted from their homes on situations where socioeconomic cleavages Guadalcanal and so-called ‘angry young coincide with the fluid and pliable men’ from the streets and settlements of boundaries of ethnic identity. As has been Honiara, the MEF formed a ‘Joint Operation’ the case with the armed rebellions in Fiji and with the paramilitary Police Field Force and, Bougainville, it would appear that ethnicity in June 2000, staged a coup d’etat after raiding became polarised around underlying issues the national armoury. Whilst the fighting of socioeconomic justice, particularly escalated dramatically after the coup, the concerning the distribution of the benefits of military-style armed conflict effectively development. Moreover, the largely ended with the signing of the Townsville geographically based socioeconomic Peace Agreement in October 2000. However, inequalities which have developed between the Agreement did not bring about peace as and within groups in Solomon Islands have low-level violence and lawlessness roots stretching back to the early contact continued to characterise various parts of the period, and were further reinforced during country, particularly Honiara and the remote the British protectorate period. After the Weather Coast of Guadalcanal, until the Second World War, expressions of island and

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area-wide ethnic solidarities emerged as a formulation of the greed thesis, downplaying means to voice grievances concerning the role of motive in favour of a focus on the perceived injustices at the hands of the ‘opportunity for rebellion’. colonial administration. The list of grievances The work of Collier and his colleagues has expanded since independence in 1978 to resonates strongly with the ‘resource curse’ include widespread dissatisfaction with post- literature. Numerous studies suggest that colonial governments, which have overseen states that depend heavily on the export of corruption, mismanagement and wastage, natural resources, particularly oil, gemstones particularly in the lucrative forestry sector, and minerals, tend to suffer from a variety of and have failed to deliver services to the rural conditions including slow economic growth, populace. high poverty rates, high levels of corruption and authoritarian governments (see Ross 2004 for a summary of these studies). Other Greed and grievance: neoclassical studies, including those by Collier and his economic models of intrastate colleagues, link at least one of these resource conflict curse conditions with the incidence of civil war. Ross concludes that the ‘effect of natural The ‘greed and grievance’ approach has been resource dependence on conflict may be part developed by Paul Collier and his World of a larger phenomenon: the resource curse’ Bank colleagues who classify numerous (Ross 2004:350). possible ‘causes’ of civil war under two broad The greed thesis also resonates with the headings: ‘greed’, meaning the pursuit of literature concerning the relationship profit; and ‘grievance’, meaning the redress between youth bulges and conflict (see Urdal of injustice (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2001; 2004). This literature, which is also Collier 2000). They analysed data on internal influential within World Bank policy and conflicts during the period from 1965 to 1999 research circles, sees demographic factors, against a range of economic, demographic particularly the presence of large youth and socio-cultural variables to determine cohorts, as the primary predictors of domestic which variables were most closely associated armed conflict. The risk of conflict is said to with the occurrence of civil war. Their general increase when youth bulges occur in the conclusion was that ‘objective grievances’, context of economic stagnation and limited such as inequality, political repression and options for out-migration. However, as is the ethnic and linguistic divisions have little case with the neoclassical economics models bearing on the likelihood of the outbreak of of civil war, precise causal mechanisms conflict. By contrast, ‘economic remain unclear. characteristics’, particularly dependence on While the youth bulge hypothesis in primary export commodities, a high general is supported by empirical proportion of poorly educated young men, evidence, the ways that youth bulges and slow economic growth, are powerful influence conflict propensity still predictors of civil war. The reasoning is that remain largely unexplored empirically rebel groups are motivated to wage war in (Urdal 2004:16). order to profit in a material sense through Two possible causal relationships are the capture of lootable primary resources or proposed in the youth bulge literature. The trade networks, a process described as first focuses on unemployment, resulting ‘predation’. More recently, Collier and from oversupply in the labour market, as a Hoeffler (2001) have presented a weaker cause of grievance for young people.

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Grievances are intensified by the raised For others, the greed thesis provides a largely expectations of youth brought about by unsatisfactory explanation for particular expanded educational opportunities and conflicts in Melanesia. Regan applies the their inability to influence or participate in greed and grievance framework to the case the political system. The second causal of the Bougainville conflict and finds it to be relationship is Collier’s ‘opportunity for inadequate in two key regards. First is the rebellion’ model, which sees unemployment fact that the motives of Francis Ona and the as increasing the opportunity cost of not Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) rebelling. In other words, faced with no could not be regarded as greed: ‘…the key option but unemployment and poverty, issue for Ona was socioeconomic justice’ young people are likely to seek income- (Regan 2003:156).3 Second is that, aside from earning opportunities through participation some looting of mine assets at the start of the in rebellion. Whilst Collier sees close linkages rebellion, the rebels did not ‘predate’ upon between poorly educated youth, unemploy- the mine and mining wealth did not prolong ment and conflict, Urdal argues that higher the conflict. Indeed, part of the rebel’s agenda educational levels actually produce youth included permanent mine closure.4 Regan grievances, particularly in developing finds that Ross’ (2003) hypothesis concerning economies that are unable to absorb a rapid the relationship between separatist conflicts increase in well-educated youth.2 and ‘unlootable’ natural resources is more helpful in explaining the origins of the Bougainville conflict Greed and grievance in Melanesia …the grievances of local people—both landowners and semi-skilled mine The lexicon of greed and grievance has well workers—to receive a ‘just’ share of the and truly entered the debate concerning the mine revenue triggered acts of violence causes of armed conflict in Melanesia, that precipitated the conflict (Regan including Solomon Islands. Indeed the 2003:157). socioeconomic characteristics of Solomon Looking again at Melanesia more Islands, West Papua, and Papua New Guinea broadly, Banks argues that whilst the entice the application of the resource war Melanesian countries ‘conform to at least and greed-driven models of conflict. some of the explanations linking resources Commentators are divided, however, as to and conflict’ the resource war models are their relevance in the particular context of ultimately unhelpful (Banks 2005:188). Melanesia. For some economists, a modified Building on research in anthropology and version of the greed thesis provides the best human geography, mostly from Papua New model for explaining armed conflict Guinea, Banks prefers to see resource throughout the ‘arc of instability’. conflicts in Melanesia (defined as conflicts The civil unrest derives from which occur around resource developments, competition for the natural resources particularly mines) as ‘more centrally about in an environment of weak states and the changes that occur in relationships hence poorly designed and enforced between individuals, groups and local property rights, and moreover, the large environments’ (Banks 2005:190). Four pool of under-employed provides particular processes are identified which ample scope for the creation of increase the potential for resource conflict to grievances to back up the claim for occur. These relate to the relationship between resources (Duncan and Chand 2002:1). land and identity; the altering of regional

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notions of balance and association; the demobilisation processes and had vested disruptive social impacts of in-migration; and interests in the prolongation of the intra-group conflict concerning distributional lawlessness and disorder. It is also known issues (Banks 2005). All of these social and that selected local business houses were cultural factors are clearly important in the awarded duty remissions and tax case of the conflict in Solomon Islands. exemptions during this period (Dinnen 2002), and it is alleged that the backroom dealings also extended to the issuance of new logging Greed and grievance in Solomon concessions to Asian companies.5 In these Islands circumstances, the state itself becomes a lootable resource to be predated on by a range The socioeconomic characteristics of of conflict actors. Solomon Islands are perfect for greed-driven Opinions differ concerning the motives conflict. Primary resources, particularly raw behind the coup of June 2000. Some regard it logs and fisheries, have accounted for 30–40 as the outcome of then Prime Minister per cent of GDP since the early 1990s Ulufa’alu’s failure to manage the situation (Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs that had developed over the preceding 20 and Trade 2004); and, in 1999, the time of the months or so, particularly in regard to most recent census, 41 per cent of the compensation, and his inability to ‘play the population were under the age 15 (de Bruijin political game’ more broadly. Others see the 2002). Several commentators have highlighted coup as either an opportunist or the applicability of the economics of civil war premeditated attempt to seize power for the literature to the conflict in Solomon Islands. explicit purposes of economic gain. Chand McDougall, for example, rejects the import- presents what he describes as a ‘stylised ance of economic agendas in the Bougainville model’ of the source and dynamics of the conflict, but finds that they were important conflict in Solomon Islands. in the Solomon Islands’ case A genuine grievance seeds the process …it is also clear that various of revolt that the authorities fail to individuals and groups benefited from resolve. An opportunist capitalises on the breakdown of the state in that the state’s oversight to muster support situation: rogue elements in the police, and widen the grievance, often for certain businessmen and politicians, personal gain. It is important to note local militia leaders such as Harold that the opportunist is motivated Keke on the Weather Coast of principally by greed but has strong Guadalcanal (McDougall 2004:352). incentives to couch this in terms of the Indeed, there is a strong consensus in the grievance of the instigating group. The academic literature on the conflict that dynamic takes its own path from here economic agendas were clearly evident in the on; the number and seriousness of the post-Townsville Peace Agreement phase of grievances multiply with the support the conflict (in particular, see Dinnen 2002; base (Chand 2002:157). Fraenkel 2004; Moore 2004). Ex-militants, Read in the broader context of Chand’s particularly from the MEF, became discussion, one could reasonably assume indistinguishable from criminal gangs; and that ‘opportunist’ is intended to refer to those both ex-militants and politicians benefited who perpetrated the coup, ostensibly to seek from the abuse of the compensation and redress for the grievances of Malaitans who

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had been displaced from settlements on obtain numbers for a parliamentary vote of Guadalcanal.6 Certainly it was those who no confidence, these vested interests sought had been voted into the caretaker Sogavare to stir up trouble on Guadalcanal in order to government (and their MEF backers)—in an create a situation in which a coup would be atmosphere of fear and intimidation—who seen as legitimate. According to Ulufa’alu, were the biggest winners in the compensation the ‘militancy option’ had been in place since saga.7 Furthermore, the Kemakeza govern- the early 1990s, and would have been used ment, though legitimately elected, to depose then Prime Minister Billy Hilly in nevertheless had strong connections with the 1994 had he not been forced to resign as a MEF and its members continue to be consequence of a number of defections from implicated in illegal activities. Whether his cabinet.9 From Ulufa’alu’s perspective, regarded as conspiracy or opportunism, the militancy has for some time been regarded situation that ensued in the aftermath of the by some elements within Solomon Island’s coup lends weight to the thesis that it was state and society as a reserve option when strongly motivated by economic, as well as democratic processes fail.10 purely political, agendas.8 Another direct There would appear to be some merit to outcome of the coup is that it returned to power this argument, at least as it relates to the coup. a group of politicians who had grown used to Fry, reflecting on similarities between the the spoils of corruption in the forestry industry coups in Fiji and Solomon Islands, states for much of the 1980s and 1990s. Fraenkel …in both coups we note the importance argues that it was these men who initiated of the middle class businessmen and the MEF, whilst another politician, Ezekiel politicians whose personal wealth and Alebua, initiated the Isatabu militants. status are tied up with who controls the Insurgent movements, such as the state….In the Solomon Islands, as in Isatabu and Eagle forces, may have Fiji, the Ulufa’alu Government was attracted a groundswell of under- introducing anti-corruption regulations employed youths from Guadalcanal which would upset established and Malaita, but both were initiated business connections (Fry 2000:302). by ex-national politicians who found Indeed, the SIAC Government’s Policy and in them convenient new weapons to Structural Reform Program, a mix of home- deploy in their challenges to the grown and donor-inspired initiatives, went government of the day. In both cases, much further than tackling corruption the younger commanders and foot- (Bennett 2000). The government reduced the soldiers who had been summoned up number of government ministries, down- from the streets or villages soon became sized the public service by 10 per cent, and deeply disenchanted when they saw implemented significant reforms in the long- the fruits of their pyrrhic victories suffering forestry sector, including the (Fraenkel 2004:186). drafting of a new Forestry Act and the According to the ‘opposition conspiracy’ establishment of a Forestry Board and a thesis, the reformist Solomon Islands Forestry Trust. These reforms Alliance for Change (SIAC) government …would have not only reduced the presented an unacceptable challenge to a logging quota to a more sustainable powerful coalition of vested interests, level, but also would have seen much including politicians, public servants, Asian more regulation of the industry logging companies and criminals. Unable to (Bennett 2002:10).11

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Class, ethnicity, culture and history The fact that many of these perceived socioeconomic injustices have occurred Whilst economic agendas may explain some between different ‘culture’ groups enabled aspects of the conflict in Solomon Islands, the conflict to take on a potent identity or there were clearly many other factors at play. ethnic dimension such that at times it The causes of the original Isatabu uprising, resembled ‘a civil war…mainly between which saw the violent eviction of over 35,000, Guadalcanal and Malaitan people’ (Bennett mostly Malaitan, settlers from their homes 2002:1). Indeed, many would argue that around Honiara and on the Guadalcanal conflict is most likely to occur in situations Plains, appear to have much to do with long- where class and ethnic cleavages overlap standing and deep-seated grievances and reinforce one another. Larmour concerning land, access to employment (1994:68), for example, employs this opportunities, the distribution of the benefits perspective in the case of the 1987 Fiji coups; of development projects, and cultural and Wesley-Smith and Ogan (1992) see the differences between settler and landowning coinciding boundaries of ethnicity, class and groups. Although there was widespread age as an important cause of the Bougainville looting and ransacking of abandoned houses conflict. Several commentators on the and government and commercial Solomon Islands’ conflict regard ethnic infrastructure, no attempt was made to take differences as having been polarised around over the operation of the Gold Ridge mine, underlying economic inequalities, both real nor the oil palm and cocoa plantations of the and perceived.12 Guadalcanal Plains. It is beyond the scope of this article to Moreover, whilst it is easy to dismiss the present a detailed theoretical discussion of professed objectives of the MEF-backed coup, the concepts of class and ethnicity, nor is it people from Malaita have a long list of the intention to review the often polemical grievances concerning their historical debate concerning the respective roles of class isolation from development opportunities and ethnicity as causes and drivers of and their mistreatment at the hands of both conflict in Melanesia. With regard to class, it colonial and post-colonial governments. The is suffice to say that Marxist accounts have situation on Guadalcanal is further their limitations in the Pacific context due to complicated by both intra and inter-group the continuing obscurity of societal and conflict concerning land and the distribution cultural structures, and the importance of the of the rents and royalties that flow from it. subsistence economy and customary forms Whilst many of these disputes would appear of land tenure, which raise doubts about the to be motivated by greed, in the Melanesian central importance of the capitalist mode of context they ‘are interpreted locally in terms production assumed by Marxist scholars (see of traditional modes of distribution’ (Banks Larmour 1992, 1994; Wesley-Smith and 2005:190). As argued by Regan (2003) in the Ogan 1992). However, the notion of class is case of the Bougainville conflict, a central frequently synonymous with socioeconomic issue for many involved in the Solomon inequalities and disparities, and in this Islands conflict, particularly the young men regard it remains a useful analytical concept. who swelled the ranks of both the IFM and With regard to ethnicity, few credible MEF, appears to be socioeconomic justice; scholars subscribe to the primordialism of receiving a ‘fair’ share of the proceeds of the populist ‘ancient hatreds’ perspective, development, including better access to which has characterised media portrayals services, especially education. of the conflict in Solomon Islands. However,

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whilst most informed observers would tion for the key economic activity of the day, regard ethnicity as more of a constructed— coconut plantation development. People rather than a primordial—factor in the from areas which were deemed unsuitable conflict, few attempt to situate their analyses for plantation development, and which in the ‘constructionist’ or ‘soft’ perspective offered minimal prospects for small-scale of ethnic conflict directly (see Horowitz 1998 cash cropping, had only one option for for a review of the typology). This perspective participating in the ‘new’ economy: to regards ethnic affiliations as problematic, temporarily leave their homes in order their malleable and easily manipulated: ‘they are sell their labour on the plantations (Bennett a convenient resource to be manipulated by 1987). Honiara was chosen as the new site elites’ (de Soysa 2001:8). A notable exception for the capital after the Second World War is Reilly (2005), who discusses the ways in because of its proximity to the Guadalcanal which identity construction has been a Plains, which were regarded as vastly more central feature of the armed rebellions in Fiji, suitable for agricultural development projects Bougainville, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. than the environments of Tulagi and Reilly also notes that ‘ethnic identities are neighbouring islands in the Florida group never static: indeed, they can be created to (Bennett 2002:6). This area became serve particular goals and ends’ (2005:4).13 …a magnet for people seeking work There could be much to be gained in more and the majority were Malaitan—first closely examining the roles of socioeconomic for the large rice-growing projects of inequalities and ethnicity as drivers of the 1960s and then the CDC oil palm conflict in Solomon Islands. Judith Bennett’s project and small industries such as expansive history, Wealth of the Solomons breweries and sawmills (Bennett (1987), traces the division of Solomon 2002:13). Islanders into ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ as a From 1997 until its closure during the consequence of early contact with European conflict, the Gold Ridge mine to the east of traders and the subsequent development and Honiara was also a significant source of labour policies of the colonial employment opportunities (Dinnen 2000). administration. These historical inequalities The heavily populated island of Malaita had a strong ecological and geographical has historically been one the most basis, disadvantaged parts of Solomon Islands. Of [b]ut some, especially in the eastern the 30,000 or so Solomon Islanders who were Solomons, were disadvantaged recruited between 1870 and 1910 to work on because their natural resources were the sugarcane plantations of Queensland, scant or because they were remote from Fiji and Samoa, and in the nickel mines of direct contact with traders. So anxious New Caledonia, more than 50 per cent came were many of these for the new goods from Malaita (Corris 1973; Price with Baker that they traded years of their labour, 1976:2). The Weather Coast of Guadalcanal the only commodity they had that the also shares many of the historical economic white man wanted (Bennett 1987:78). disadvantages of Malaita. Both places were In the early colonial period (from the isolated from the early trading and pre war 1900s to the 1920s) those areas with suitable plantation economies, leaving their environments, notably the western islands populations no choice but to sell their labour and the northeast plains of Guadalcanal, during the blackbirding era and, were privileged by the colonial administra- subsequently, on plantations in other parts

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of Solomon Islands. Similarly, after the War, After the Second World War, perceptions large numbers of men from south of socioeconomic inequality and neglect by Guadalcanal, as well as Malaita, went to the colonial administration fuelled the work in and around Honiara and on the creation of island and area-wide ethnic Guadalcanal Plains (Bennett 1987). As was solidarities. The Maasina Rule movement the case with Malaitan migrants, these which emerged on Malaita immediately after movements became increasingly permanent the War rapidly expanded to include an over the past 30 years or so. estimated 96 per cent of Malaitans (Keesing This history of uneven development 1982:359). A fundamental objective of the created a complex matrix of economic movement was to ‘codify an agreed version cleavages operating both between and within of Malaitan kastom which the administration groups and at local and national levels. The would have to accept as legitimate’ (Keesing history of settlement, land transactions, 1982:360). Another objective was to represent employment and economic activity on the the interests of all Malaitans through Guadalcanal Plains is widely regarded as ‘collective bargaining’ with the colonial having created divisions between settler and government in regard to ‘the terms of landowner groups and also within administration, plantation labour and law’ landowning groups.14 However, there are also (Keesing 1982:359). Frazer’s (1990) analysis broader inequalities at play. Following Frazer of Maasina Rule argues that it was concerned (1997a, 1997b) and Scales (2004), a not only with anti-colonial nationalist fundamental distinction can be made between objectives, but also with posing a ‘working the ‘Honiara élite’ and the vast majority of the class’ challenge to the inequities of the population (around 85 per cent) who reside colonial plantation economy. in rural areas (and also those who live in Similarly, the Moro movement—which Honiara but are unemployed or hold poorly appeared on the Weather Coast in the late paid jobs). The urban élite consists of public 1950s—was formed in response to feelings servants, businessmen, professionals and, of isolation and economic disadvantage perhaps most importantly, national Members brought about by years of neglect by the of Parliament. Contributions by Frazer (1997a, central government; frustrations that were 1997b), Kabutaulaka (1997), Dauvergne compounded by the relative proximity of the (1998a, 1998b) and Bennett (2000) have region to Honiara. The movement’s agenda documented the deepening collusion between was to seek ‘a new order based on local self- foreign-owned logging companies and sufficiency and a revival of old customs’ corrupt politicians, which has seen the over- (Bennett 1987:316). The recent conflict in the exploitation of Solomon Islands’ lucrative Solomon Islands also witnessed the re- forestry resources over the past 20 years or so emergence of a dormant secessionist to the benefit of a miniscule Honiara-based movement in Western Province—where élite.15 Moreover, as Scales demonstrates in the much of the commercial logging has taken case of Western Province, the logging industry place—which, according to Scales, had much has also produced cleavages at the local level to do with the distribution of the economic …a cross-cutting stratification and benefits of logging (2004). fractionation of island society that Indeed, the recent conflict has also drives the political emergence of new highlighted the ongoing influence of both the associations for island resources Maasina Rule and Moro movements. governance (2004:4). Commentators have drawn continuities

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between the cultist and millenarianist predation was predominantly on the state aspects of these movements and the itself, particularly through the corrupted behaviour and apparel of militant groups compensation process. The post coup during the conflict (Herlihy 2003; Moore situation has been described by some 2004). It is these motivations, more than any commentators as akin to the ‘instrumentalis- other, which defy the rationality of economic ation of disorder’, which characterises models of conflict. According to Herlihy, conflict in certain African contexts (Dinnen [r]itual and cultist activity during the 2002; Fraenkel 2004). This perspective sees crisis, of the more traditional type, was political élites and their armed clients as reported from both sides. Father Terry having a vested economic interest in the Brown, Bishop of Malaita, reported promulgation and prolongation of violence that there was certainly cultic activity and disorder. by the IFM. Many of their fighters wore However, it has also been argued that traditional Guadalcanal kabalato (loin economic factors alone cannot fully account cloths) and a traditional string around for the origins and dynamics of the conflict. the neck (like the Moro Movement). The reasons individuals participate in They used various forms of magic to collective violence cannot be reduced to mere make themselves immune from greed and economic self-interest. In the case gunfire…There was certainly some of the conflict in Solomon Islands, class and cultic activity by MEF—some use of ethnicity are influences which transcend the traditional sacrifice, magic, etc. The ‘myth of rational choice individualism’ and founder of the phallus-worshipping inform the ‘social and historical features of ‘Only You’ sect in Honiara in the change’ highlighted in the ‘beyond greed and eighties joined the MEF and was said grievance’ literature (Cramer 2002:1,857). As to collect Guadalcanal skulls for his has been the case with other recent armed shrine in bush above Honiara. He conflicts in Melanesia, ethnicity or identity displayed some in the Auki market became polarised around underlying issues (Herlihy 2003:25–26). of socioeconomic justice, both real and perceived. To understand the ways in which these Conclusion inequalities and identities have developed we must look into the history of Solomon It would appear that a modified version of Islands from the early contact period. the greed thesis of intrastate conflict has Ecological and geographic expediencies some resonances with particular aspects of meant that particular parts of the archipelago the conflict in Solomon Islands. It has been were privileged first by the early European seen that a range of actors benefited traders and later by the development policies financially from the corruption and of the colonial administration. Two of the criminality that characterised the post coup areas that are central to the conflict, the island phase of the conflict. Moreover, it seems likely of Malaita and the Weather Coast of that economic agendas were a motivating Guadalcanal, are perhaps the most force behind the coup itself. While there are underdeveloped and historically neglected allegations of illegal logging and the parts of Solomon Islands. In the post war improper granting of logging concessions period, people from these and other areas during the course of the conflict, the economic repeatedly voiced their grievances at what

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they regarded as injustices at the hands of Notes both colonial and post-colonial governments, particularly in regard to the distribution of 1 Whilst acknowledging the difficulties inherent the benefits of development. These in attempting to identify ‘culture areas’, grievances have been compounded by the following Knauft (1999:1), Melanesia is emergence of an élitist post-colonial political delineated as the region stretching from New culture, which, for the most part, has been Caledonia in the southeast to the island of closely associated with the notoriously New Guinea in the northwest. Included are the post-colonial nations of Papua New corrupt logging industry. While the militant Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji, groups quickly fractured after the Townsville the French colony of New Caledonia and the Peace Agreement, and struggled to maintain Indonesian province of West Papua. cohesion even before then, the conflict in 2 In the case of Solomon Islands, it appears Solomon Islands was nevertheless that both processes are at work (see Fraenkel characterised by a polarisation of ethnic 2004:184). In the mid 1990s, limited secondary identities along a confrontational ‘us versus school places meant that 6,000–7,500 students them’ axis. per year left the education system at the There is considerable scope for further primary school level. Moreover, whilst 1,000– analysis of the causes and dynamics of the 1,500 secondary school graduates were entering the labour market each year, the conflict in Solomon Islands. An important number of new jobs was only expanding at issue that has not been discussed here is the around 700 per year. However, there are ‘demonstration effect’ of the Bougainville other possible sources of rising youth conflict. Over 9,000 people from Bougainville expectations that are thought to be important came into the Solomon Islands during the in the case of Solomon Islands. Ted Gurr course of the Bougainville conflict (1988–98), discusses these as ‘demonstration effects’ with most of them settling on Guadalcanal (1970:92). Most are the consequence of the for long periods of time. Kabutaulaka argues increasing exposure of non-Western peoples that the Bougainvilleans would have shared to the material culture of the West as a result with the Guadalcanal people their story of of modernisation, urbanisation and internal migration. According to Gurr, ‘…exposure evicting the ‘hated “redskins” (PNG to modernisation raises expectations for Highlanders)’ from their island and shutting welfare and interpersonal values—economic down one of the world’s largest copper mines goods, personal development, status, the (2001:17). One wonders how these stories pleasures of urban social life. The affected the motivations of the young Isatabu demonstration effect also operates with militants. Indeed, the voices of the young men respect to power values’ (1970:97). who swelled the ranks of both the IFM and 3 In an earlier article, Regan gives greater MEF remain conspicuously absent in the emphasis to the role of criminal motives academic discourse on the conflict. This is amongst elements of the BRA:‘The strongest unfortunate because it is, after all, the greed support came from frustrated young men with few economic opportunities for whom of men such as these that is said to drive membership of the BRA gave power and violent conflict in developing nations status. There was considerable continuity throughout the world. between criminal activity by raskols and BRA activity’ (Regan 1998:277). 4 This has led Ware (2004) to refer to the Bougainville conflict as ‘the only green civil war’ and one that therefore cannot be explained through the use of econometric

models. Unfortunately, Ware restricts her the Are’are speaking peoples of Marau Sound exploration of the youth bulge thesis in the in eastern Guadalcanal, whose ancestors Pacific to the Bougainville conflict (because originated from Malaita) and the MEF she does not see the Solomon Islands case as Supreme Command (Fraenkel 2004b:105). qualifying as an armed conflict). However, again it was the political and 5 During the period of the conflict the militant elements of the MEF who benefited production and export of all primary export the most from the Townsville Peace Accord: commodities declined but, proportionately, ‘Its provisions reflected the interests of the log exports declined the least and recovered militant groups above all else and, in the most rapidly (Central Bank of Solomon particular, those of the more powerful MEF Islands 2005). In 2003, the value of log exports and its political and business associates’ exceeded pre-conflict levels, which lends (Dinnen 2002:291). some weight to allegations that several new 8 According to Fraenkel, ‘the coup was less logging concessions were awarded after the about capturing state power and more about coup in ‘back-door’ dealings (Seminar ransacking the state’ [original emphases] presented by Bartholomew Ulufa’alu at The (2004:106). 9 Australian National University, 15 July 2004; Like the SIAC government, Francis Billy taped interview with B. Ulufa’alu, 25 July Hilly’s National Coalition Partnership (NCP) 2004; personal communication, Tony Jansen, was attempting to reform the long-suffering 10 September 2004). It has also been alleged forestry industry, which had become so that illegal logging activities increased during corrupted under the governments of the period of the conflict (UNDP 2004). Solomon Mamaloni (for details of the reforms see Frazer 1997a, 1997b; Dauvergne 6 Alternatively, the opportunist could be 1998, 1998/99; Bennett 2000). The NCP barely Ezekiel Alebua who was the Premier of had a chance to implement the reform Guadalcanal Province when the troubles program before it was brought down by a began in late 1998. Whilst Alebua’s series of cabinet resignations and defections involvement in the origins of the violence in October 1994. It was later proven that five remains unclear, it is alleged by some, cabinet ministers of the NCP government including Weather Coast militants, that he had defected to join Mamaloni’s Solomon almost single-handedly orchestrated the Islands National Unity and Reconciliation uprising. According to Fraenkel: ‘A more Party (SINURP) after receiving bribes from plausible conspiracy theory—backed, for a Honiara businessman (Kabutaulaka example, by Police Commissioner Frank 1997:488). Once in office, the SINURP Short—was that Guadalcanal provincial government immediately set about leaders, and in particular Guadalcanal dismantling the reform program and it was premier Ezekiel Alebua, had planned the quickly back to business as usual for rural eviction campaign together with key Mamaloni, who was the director of a logging GRA militant leaders, including Harold Keke company, and his ministers, most of whom and Joe Sangu, at a meeting held at the were also involved in the logging industry Tambea Resort in March 1998’ (2004:64). (Frazer 1997a, 1997b). 7 Note, however, that the Sogavare 10 Seminar presented at the Australian National government’s ‘chequebook approach to University, 15 July 2004; taped interview with peace making’ saw the dispensation of B. Ulufa’alu, 25 July 2004. ‘compensation’ payments to provincial and 11 The present status of the reform of the militant representatives from both Malaita forestry sector is unclear. Ulufa’alu alleges and Guadalcanal (Dinnen 2002:289). Similarly, that Asian logging companies actually numerous parties benefited from the ‘peace expanded their logging concession areas dividend’ of the Townsville Peace Accord in during the ‘crisis’ (taped interview); and it October 2000, including Guadalcanal militants appears that the new Forestry Act is yet to and politicians, Marau fighters (representing be debated by Parliament.

12 Fry presents the perspective that the by a section of the ruling élite for their own democratic system had been ‘captured by benefit and in the short-term interests of the middlemen…who could manipulate the post-colonial state’ (1997a:318). system for their own interests but whose interests were served by playing on ethnic division’ (2000:300–1). Reilly (2005) finds a References similar process, which he calls ‘identity construction’, at play in the Bougainville Amnesty International. 2004. Solomon conflict and the Fiji coups, as well as in the Islands: Women confronting violence. Solomon Island’s conflict. Available online at http:// 13 Measuring ethnic diversity is problematic. web.amnesty.org. Accessed 10 Reilly (2005) employs language as a readily quantifiable measure, which can be used for December 2004. comparative purposes in the South Pacific Ballentine, K., 2003. ‘Beyond greed and context. Following this logic, there are at least grievance: reconsidering the economic seven languages spoken on Guadalcanal and dynamics of armed conflict’, in K. ten on Malaita, with a total of more than 80 Ballentine and J. Sherman (eds), The across the whole of the archipelago (Wurm Political Economy of Armed Conflict: and Hattori 1981, cited in Dinnen 2002:285). However, the true number of ethnic groups beyond greed and grievance, Lynne is arguably greater than this as many of the Rienner, Boulder and London:259–83. languages have multiple dialects and, at least Ballentine, K. and Sherman, J., 2003. in pre-contact times, different groups sharing ‘Introduction’, in K. Ballentine and J. the same the language lacked ‘political Sherman (eds), The Political Economy of cohesion’ and were frequently ‘at odds with Armed Conflict: beyond greed and one another’ (Bennett 1987:6). grievance, Lynne Rienner, Boulder and 14 This history is examined in some depth by Fraenkel (2004). The internecine conflict London:1–15. referred to here is intergenerational conflict Banks, G., 2005. ‘Linking resources and within Guadalcanal landowning groups. The conflict the Melanesian way’, Pacific present generation of young men feel that, Economic Bulletin, 20(1):185–91. in selling land rights to settlers, their fathers squandered their inheritance (see Kabutalaka Bennett, J., 1987. Wealth of the Solomons: a 2002). This situation is reminiscent of the history of a Pacific archipelago 1800– origins of the Bougainville conflict (as 1978, University of Hawaii Press, observed by Dinnen 2002), where inter- Honolulu. generational disputes within Nasioi Bennett, J., 2000. Pacific Forest: a history of landowning groups concerning royalty resource control and contest in Solomon payments from the Panguna mine are Islands, c. 1800–1997, The White Horse thought to have sparked the initial violence (Filer 1990; Regan 1998, 2003). Another Press and Brill Academic Publishers, important dispute on Guadalcanal concerns Leiden. the claims of Weather Coast people as the ——, 2002. Roots of conflict in the Solomon ‘true true’ landowners of all of Guadalcanal. Islands. Though much is taken, much According to Brown, ‘customary land abides: legacies of tradition and colonialism, ownership of the [Gold Ridge] mine is still State Society and Governance in disputed…with Weather Coast people continuing to exert their claims’ (2003:4). Melanesia Discussion Paper 2002/5, 15 Frazer characterises the nature of the logging Research School of Pacific and Asian industry since independence in 1978 as ‘a Studies, The Australian National barely controlled form of mining sanctioned University, Canberra.

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Acknowledgments I am grateful to Ben Reilly for his comments on an earlier draft, and to Sinclair Dinnen, Peter Larmour and Michael Morgan for ongoing discussion of the ideas contained in this article.