Soft Power, Ngos, and the Us War on Terror
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University of Wisconsin Milwaukee UWM Digital Commons Theses and Dissertations December 2012 Soft oP wer, NGOs, and the US War on Terror Layla Saleh University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.uwm.edu/etd Part of the International and Area Studies Commons, Political Science Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons Recommended Citation Saleh, Layla, "Soft oP wer, NGOs, and the US War on Terror" (2012). Theses and Dissertations. 66. https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/66 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by UWM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UWM Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SOFT POWER, NGOS, AND THE US WAR ON TERROR by Layla Saleh A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science At The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee December 2012 ABSTRACT SOFT POWER, NGOS, AND THE US WAR ON TERROR by Layla Saleh At The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2012 Under the Supervision of Professor Steven B. Redd Bringing together foreign policy literature and INGO (international non-governmental organization) scholarship, this dissertation seeks to explain geographic and temporal variation in the US government’s use of hard, soft and smart power in the War on Terror. Making an important theoretical contribution, I revise Nye’s concept of soft power, more rigorously conceptualizing it as a consciously-utilized strategy employing methods other than hard power (military or economic sanctions) to influence a target government or population to enhance US interests. Soft power is a strategic means of achieving a foreign policy goal. I conceptualize smart power as including both soft and hard power, whose proportions will vary by context. I argue that the US executive begins its counter-terrorism strategizing with an assessment of the terrorist threat from a particular country. The US executive will use hard power to fight a short-term terrorist threat, soft power to fight a long-term terrorist threat, and smart (i.e., combined) power to fight a combined threat. The political, economic, and NGO regulatory context of a country also influence the kind and degree of soft power the US executive uses in countries posing a long-term or combined threat, ultimately influencing the smart power makeup of US counter-terrorism strategy in such countries. I examine a particular form of US soft power: government funding of NGOs. I explore the theoretical and empirical interest of NGOs, arguing that US soft or smart power utilizing NGOs will be impacted by their goals, capabilities, and the government’s ii relationship with them. Employing qualitative methods, I provide a big-picture overview of US strategy in the War on Terror, as well as country case studies of US strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This project presents and tests a relevant, innovative, integrated theory of US foreign policy strategizing, making theoretical and empirical contributions to foreign policy and INGO literatures. iii This dissertation is dedicated to my husband Abdullah Alkeilani, my parents Bilal and Abida Saleh, and my two sons, (the younger) Bilal and Omar. Abdullah, I could not have begun, let alone completed, this part of the journey without your constant support, encouragement, and reminders that along with hard work, faith in God helps make the challenging possible. Mama and Baba, you instilled in me the ambition and the necessity of dreaming big to fulfill our duty as caretakers of this Earth, and to make our mark on this flawed world. Bilal and Omar, I do this for you and your future. And finally, to the bleeding, wounded, but steadfast and undefeated people of my beloved Syria: may this be a first step, God willing, enabling me to contribute to your dreams of liberty, freedom, and basic human dignity. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………vi List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………………………………………...…viii Chapter1:Introduction…………….………………………………………………………………………………………1 Chapter 2: Literature Review: Soft, Hard, and Smart Power……………………………………….……11 Chapter 3: A More Rigorous Theory of Soft, Hard, and Combined Power…………………….…...39 Chapter 4: Overview of US Strategy in the War on Terror…………………………………………….…86 Chapter 5: US War on Terror Strategy in Afghanistan…………………………………………………...155 Chapter 6: US War on Terror Strategy in Pakistan…………………………………………………………213 Chapter 7: Conclusion: Soft Power, NGOs, and the US War on Terror.………………...…………..255 References…………………………………………………………………………………………………………...……...276 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Soft, Smart, and Combined Power Decision-Making…………………………………………..42 Figure 2: Total War Funding by Operation…………………………………………………………………….138 Figure 3: Estimated War Funding by Agency…………………………………………………………………139 Figure 4: Estimated State/USAID War Funding………………………………………….………………….140 Figure 5: Estimated War Funding by Agency…………………………………………………………………140 Figure 6: Estimated War Funding by Operation…………………………………………………………….141 Figure 7: US Aid to Middle East, S. and C. Asia through NGOs/Civil Society…….………………148 Figure 8: US Aid to S. and C. Asia through NGOs/Civil Society………………………….……………..148 Figure 9: US Aid to Middle East through NGO/Civil Society……………………………………………149 Figure 10: US Aid to Iraq through NGOs/Civil Society……………………………………………………149 Figure 11: US Aid to Afghanistan through NGOs/Civil Society………………………….……….……150 Figure 12: US Total Aid to the Middle East………………………………………………………..…………..151 Figure 13: US Total Aid to South and Central Asia………………………………………………..………..152 Figure 14: Federal Funding to USAID-Registered PVOs………………………………………..………..153 Figure 15: US Troops on the Ground in Afghanistan……………………………………………..………..165 Figure 16: US Aid to NGOs and Civil Society in Afghanistan…………….……………………...………171 Figure 17: USAID-Managed Afghanistan Budget by Sector, 2009……………………………...…….175 Figure 18: USAID-Managed Afghanistan Budget by Sector, 2010………………………………...….176 vi Figure 19: USAID-Managed Afghanistan Budget by Sector, 2011………………….………………..176 Figure 20: US Assistance to Pakistan Through USAID…………………………………………………….230 Figure 21: US Aid through NGOs and Civil Society to Pakistan……………………………………….231 Figure 22: US Civilian Assistance to Pakistan……………………………………….................…………….237 Figure 23: US Flood Response Aid to Pakistan……………………………………………………...............238 vii LIST OF TABLES Table 1: USAID/Afghanistan FY2002-FY2006 Budget…..………………………………………….…….172 Table 2:USAID/Afghanistan FY2007-FY2011 Budget…….………………………………………….…...173 Table 3: International Aid to Pakistan By Sector, 2002-2009…………………………………………234 viii 1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: SOFT POWER, NGOS, AND THE US WAR ON TERROR Under what conditions is the US executive likely to use force, also known as hard power, against a particular threat to the country? Alternatively, under what conditions is the US executive likely to address specific threats through other methods, such as soft power? And when will the US executive decide to use a combination of the two kinds of power? These questions have been significant so long as the US has faced any sort of security threat and the executive has had to deal with such threats—in other words, for as long as the United States has existed as a sovereign nation. However, these questions as they have been framed here, with respect to hard, soft, and combined power, have been particularly significant since Joseph Nye (2004a) popularized the notion of “soft power.” The uniqueness of “soft power” lies in the contrast Nye (2004a) draws between it and the “hard power” used by various actors, usually states. He defines soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments [the latter being “hard power”]” (x). This concept of soft power has since become quite popular among academics and policymakers alike, but categorizing what we might call the non-use of force against particular targets cannot account for the conditions under which the US executive will decide to use soft power in a particular context. Even Nye’s (2008b) hybrid concept of “smart power,” which puts forth the possibility that both hard and soft power might be used concurrently, clarifies only that soft and hard power may be employed as complementary methods. We are still left wondering when or why the US would use hard, soft, or combined power and against whom. Nye’s notions of soft and smart power leave an enormous gap, both theoretical and substantive, regarding the US’s use of various forms of power in 2 innumerable contexts, and this dissertation is an important theoretical and empirical step to fill that void. Purpose This dissertation attempts to do the following: 1) re-conceptualize Nye’s soft power framework as a consciously-utilized strategy employing methods other than hard power, aimed at target countries to enhance US interests, 2) theorize about the conditions under which the US is likely to use hard, soft, and smart power in the specific context of the War on Terror, and 3) test this revised theory through empirical examinations of the War on Terror in general, but also through case studies of the US War on Terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Because Nye’s concept of soft power is rather vague and does not lend itself to empirical testing, re-conceptualizing the concept was of paramount importance. Furthermore, putting together