Chapter 2 Understanding Insurgency And
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Lowy Institute Paper 28 confronting the hydra BIG PROBLEMS WITH SMALL WARS Mark O'Neill First published for Lowy Institute for International Policy 2009 Mark O’Neill was the inaugural Chief of Army Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy. Mark is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Australian Army with PO Box 102 Double Bay New South Wales 1360 Australia 25 years service. He has had operational service in Somalia, www.longmedia.com.au Mozambique and Iraq, where he was Senior Advisor at the [email protected] Multi-National Force Iraq’s Counterinsurgency Center for Tel. (+61 2) 9362 8441 Excellence. Lowy Institute for International Policy © 2009 ABN 40 102 792 174 Mark has worked on counterinsurgency issues with the Australian, US, British, South African and Iraqi Armies; All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part including fieldwork and teaching about counterinsurgency of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means (including but not limited to electronic, from the small team to Corps Headquarters level. During mechanical, photocopying, or recording), without the prior written permission of the 2007 and 2008, he was a member of the editorial panel copyright owner. that produced the Australian Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine. Cover design by Longueville Media/Nina Nielsen Typeset by Longueville Media in Esprit Book 10/13 National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Author: O'Neill, Mark. Title: Confronting the hydra : big problems with small wars / Mark O'Neill. Edition: 1st ed. ISBN: 9781921004391 (pbk.) Series: Lowy Institute Paper ; 28. Notes: Bibliography. Subjects: Counterinsurgency--Australia. Operational readiness (Military science) Australia--Defenses Australia--Military policy. Australia--Strategic aspects. Other Authors/Contributors: Lowy Institute for International Policy. Dewey Number: 355.033594 Printed and bound in Australia using fibre supplied from plantation or sustainably managed forests. Inks used in this book are vegetable based (soy or linseed oil). Dedication To the soldiers of the Australian Army who have fought, and continue to fight, Australia’s wars. vi vii Disclaimer Executive summary The views expressed herein are the author’s and not necessarily those of the Australian Army or the Department of Defence. The Australia needs to worry a little less about the small problems it has Commonwealth of Australia will not be legally responsible in contract, with big wars, and address some of the big problems that it has with tort or otherwise for any statement made in this publication. small wars. Small wars, such as insurgencies, became the most prevalent form of conflict globally in the middle of the 20th century. The 2009 Australian Defence White Paper predicts that intrastate conflict will remain the most common form of war in the period to 2030. Australia has a long record of involvement in such conflicts, although participation has always been a matter of choice. But the fact that these are wars of choice for Australia, and that it frequently only plays a bit part, does not mean that they are insignificant in cost and political impact. And history demonstrates that small wars of choice can become wars of necessity. Australia’s interest as a democratic middle power that chooses to engage in counterinsurgency conflicts requires the development of sound strategic policy approaches and capabilities to defeat the insurgency Hydra. Despite this, the focus of Australia’s national strategic policies has remained on conventional, interstate warfare. Examples from Australian experience highlight the difficulties that arise from adopting a primarily tactical approach to counterinsurgency and the enduring nature of counterinsurgency as a policy problem. Insurgency itself is not a tactical action — it is a holistic strategy, aimed at a political outcome. So countering insurgency must be a viii ix CONFRONTING THE HYDRA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY strategic action, irrespective of whether carried out by a host nation • Further development of the defence capabilities required or a middle power acting as a member of a coalition. for successful counterinsurgency campaigning. Key areas of This paper identifies five effective ways for a democratic middle investment must be human intelligence, electronic warfare, power such as Australia to conduct counterinsurgency: population surveillance, psychological warfare, information operations, focus, an indirect approach, pre-emption, information activities civil-military affairs and unconventional warfare. and the use of adaptive measures. These provide a framework for • Australia must improve upon its ability to assist friendly the development of an appropriate counterinsurgency strategy for foreign counterinsurgency forces. This should be done through Australia’s circumstances. development of the capability to train, mentor and, if necessary, Eight policy recommendations are made to support the development lead indigenous counterinsurgency forces. Such a capability will of a strategic approach to Australia’s involvement in counterinsurgency have utility far beyond the current fight in Afghanistan and will conflicts: assist Australia with an indirect approach to counterinsurgency. • A greater role for the Australian Federal Police in • Defence White Papers must provide adequate policy guidance, counterinsurgency campaigns, beginning with the present rather than narrative, about Australia’s ongoing concern with campaign in Afghanistan. counterinsurgency. A policy framework must be stipulated (a population focus, an indirect approach, pre-emption, information activities and the use of adaptive measures) to inform Australian national policy relating to the conduct of counterinsurgency. • Development and publication of a whole-of-government counterinsurgency doctrine. • Identification, training, education and deployment of a cadre from across relevant government departments to enable a true whole-of- government approach to counterinsurgency. Implicit in this recommendation is the requirement to prepare such a group for possible employment alongside Australian Defence Force, Coalition and Afghan National Government organisations in Afghanistan. • Creation of a national counterinsurgency centre of excellence that is focused on whole-of-government, regional and coalition approaches. • Development of more robust educative mechanisms to support decisions made about counterinsurgency by the National Security Committee of Cabinet and higher political decision-makers. x xi Contents Dedication vii Disclaimer viii Executive summary ix List of boxes, figures and tables xv List of acronyms xv Acknowledgements xvii Chapter 1: Setting the scene 1 Aim 1 The Hydra 2 Australia as a case study 2 Outline and scope 5 Meanings matter 5 Insurgency and counterinsurgency defined 6 The issue of terrorism and insurgency 7 On the asymmetric nature of insurgency 8 Chapter 2: Understanding insurgency and counterinsurgency 9 Introduction 9 War, but different 11 Violence and criminality 14 The vitality of ideas and narrative 17 Human and social issues 20 Material issues and practicalities 29 xiii Chapter 3: The Australian example: an enduring List of boxes, figures and tables policy problem 37 Introduction 37 Figure 1 Map showing locations of Australian counterinsurgency A problem in the past 38 case studies A problem in the present 39 Figure 2 Regional map showing current insurgencies A problem in the future 43 Costs and risks 46 Box 1 Pre-Federation conflicts Policy is inadequate 49 Box 2 The Second Boer War Conclusion 52 Box 3 The Malayan Emergency Box 4 Confrontation Chapter 4: Defeating the Hydra: a strategic approach 55 Box 5 The Vietnam War Introduction 55 Box 6 Bougainville Policy is king 56 Box 7 Timor-Leste Strategy 63 Box 8 The Solomon Islands Ways 66 Box 9 Iraq Means 75 Conclusion 83 Table 1 Australian expenditure, A$ million, select conflicts, 1999-2009 Policy recommendations 85 List of acronyms Notes 93 Bibliography 115 ADF Australian Defence Force Lowy Institute Papers: other titles in the series 125 AFP Australian Federal Police ANZAC Australian and New Zealand Army Corps ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations AusAID Australian Agency for International Development AQI al-Qaeda in Iraq BCE Before the Christian era BIG Bougainville Interim Government BRA Bougainville Revolutionary Army CNAS Center for a New American Security CORDS Civil operations and rural development support CRA Conzinc Rio Tinto Australia DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade xiv xv GWOT Global War on Terror HN Host Nation IDG International Deployment Group INTERFET International Force East Timor IO Information operations ISAF International Security Force Afghanistan JAM Jaish Al Mahdi LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam MCP Malayan Communist Party MRLA Malayan Races Liberation Army Acknowledgements MNF-I Multinational Force Iraq NSA National Security Adviser NSCC National Security Committee of Cabinet This paper would not have happened without the Chief of Army Visiting NSS National Security Statement Fellow position at the Lowy Institute for International Policy. I am grateful OAS Organisation Armée Secrète to the Chairman, Mr Frank Lowy AC; the Institute’s first Executive OEF-P Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines Director, Mr Allan Gyngell AO; Professor Alan Dupont and Lieutenant OMS Office of the Martyr Sadr General (retd) Professor Peter Leahy AC for the opportunity to have