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'Guilty Women,' Foreign Policy, and Appeasement in Inter- War Britain

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'Guilty Women,' Foreign Policy, and Appeasement in Inter- War Britain ‘Guilty Women,’ Foreign Policy, and Appeasement in Inter- War Britain Also by Julie V. Gottlieb FEMININE FASCISM Women in Britain’s Fascist Movement, 1923–1945 THE CULTURE OF FASCISM Visions of the Far Right in Britain (edited with Thomas P. Linehan) MAKING REPUTATIONS Power, Persuasion and the Individual in Modern British Politics (edited with Richard Toye) THE AFTERMATH OF SUFFRAGE Women, Gender and Politics in Britain, 1918–1945 (edited with Richard Toye) ‘Guilty Women,’ Foreign Policy, and Appeasement in Inter- War Britain Julie V. Gottlieb Senior Lecturer in Modern History, University of Sheffield, UK © Julie V. Gottlieb 2015 Corrected Printing 2015 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6– 10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identifi ed as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2015 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978-0-230-30430-7 ISBN 978-1-137-31660-8 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-137-31660-8 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. Typeset by MPS Limited, Chennai, India. Contents List of Illustrations vi Acknowledgements viii List of Abbreviations xi Introduction— Guilty Women? Gendering Appeasement 1 1 British Women and the Three Encounters: International, European, and Fascist 13 2 Women’s War on Fascism 38 3 ‘Guilty Women:’ Conspiracy and Collusion 61 4 ‘Guilty Women:’ Powers behind Thrones 82 5 ‘To Speak a Few Words of Comfort to Them:’ Conservative Women’s Support for Chamberlain and Appeasement 101 6 ‘Women Are the Best Friends of Mr Chamberlain’s Policy:’ Gendered Representations of Public Opinion 152 7 ‘Anyway Let’s Have Peace:’ Women’s Expressions of Opinion on Appeasement 185 8 ‘Don’t Believe in Foreigners:’ The Female Franchise Factor and the Munich By- elections 212 9 The Women Churchillians and the Politics of Shame 235 Notes 266 Bibliography 313 Index 329 v List of Illustrations 1 Peace delegates on their way to the International Congress of Women at The Hague in 1915 to campaign for a resolution to the international conflict 131 2 Women MPs elected in 1931 131 3 Targeting the ‘Woman Voter’: 1935 National Conservative General Election poster emphasizing what were presumed to be women’s priorities of peace and security. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive: Shelfmark Poster 1935–14 132 4 Feminist pacifist and internationalist Vera Brittain became a leading member of the PPU and was committed to an anti- war position throughout World War II 132 5 ‘Red’ Ellen Wilkinson, Labour MP, Popular Front supporter, feminist anti- fascist, whom Richard Baxter regarded as one of the very few women who was not guilty 133 6 Lady Nancy Astor, first woman MP to take her seat in the House of Commons in 1919, and by 1937 hostess of the so- called Cliveden Set 134 7 Cliveden House, seat of the Astor family and centre of the activities of the so- called Cliveden Set 134 8 David Low, “Where Our Foreign Policy Comes From,” Evening Standard, 23 March, 1938 135 9 Virginia Woolf, whose feminist pacifist Three Guineas had been published in June, experienced the Munich Crisis as an emotional cycle, concluding that 30 September, 1938, was “a very fine day” 136 10 Eleanor Rathbone, feminist, anti- fascist, and anti- appeasement ‘Glamour Girl’ 136 11 The Munich Agreement was described as ‘poisonous as Snow White’s apple,’ referencing the block- buster Disney film Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs (1937) that was still playing at cinemas during the Munich Crisis 137 12 David Low, “The Dashing Young Man and the Flying Trapeze,” Evening Standard, 2 March, 1938 137 13 Poster- father of Peace: “The Man of To- day” poster with Neville Chamberlain on the steps of an aeroplane prior to his departure for his second meeting with Hitler, 22 September, 1938 138 vi List of Illustrations vii 14 David Low, “Mein Kampf,” Evening Standard, 24 September, 1938 139 15 Neville Chamberlain declaring “peace in our time” upon his return from the Four Powers Conference in Munich 140 16 The Adulation of the Women of Britain: Anne Chamberlain in front of 10 Downing Street after the signing of the Munich Agreement, 30 September, 1938 141 17 The world’s gratitude: postcard of Neville Chamberlain [September, 1938] 142 18 Public Support for the Munich Agreement: Car procession and cheering crowds in London, 30 September, 1938 142 19 The Roaring Crowd: Neville Chamberlain arriving back at 10 Downing Street in the evening after seeing the King at Buckingham Palace, greeted by large crowds 143 20 The Vox Populi on Appeasement: Anne Chamberlain greeted by large crowds on Downing Street before her walk in St. James’s Park after the signing of the Munich Agreement, 30 September, 1938 143 21 Neville Chamberlain helping Anne Chamberlain out of car on his return to Downing Street (Central Press Photos Ltd) 144 22 For the Mothers and the Children: Before leaving for Chequers, Neville and Anne Chamberlain talking to a girl outside 10 Downing Street, 1 October, 1938 145 23 Neville and Anne Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, Edouard Daladier and others on an official visit to France, November, 1938 146 24 Ever popular with the French people, Anne Chamberlain presented with flowers on a visit to France in November, 1938 146 25 Mother and child wearing gas masks (1939). Populations were preparing themselves for, as Viscount Halifax put it when he addressed the House of Lords on 2 October, 1938, a European war in which “men, women and children would have to take part in the dance of death” 147 26 Neville and Anne Chamberlain outside 10 Downing Street buying a flag from Lady Malcolm on Trafalgar Day, 21 October, 1938 148 27 David Low, “Low’s Christmas Dream,” Evening Standard, 24 December, 1938 149 28 David Low, “All Behind You,” Evening Standard, 14 May, 1940 150 29 Poster for Mrs Miniver (1942), the film based on Jan Struther’s columns in The Times 151 Acknowledgements As befits a book with such a judicial- sounding title, I begin with a small confession. The first thing I read when I open a book are the acknowledg- ments. This must have something to do with the fact that the writing of the dedications is as close as most academic writers will ever get to performing an Oscar acceptance speech. For my part, what draws me to the front piece first is that it offers a potted, albeit ramekin- sized, autobiography of the author, and a bildungsroman of the book. So here it goes, a short account of my ‘guilty women years.’ First, I would like to thank the following for making my journeys through archives and libraries straightforward and rewarding, and for permission to quote from collections: Keelan Carr for permission to quote from, and Jeremy McIlwaine for guiding me through, the Conservative Party Archive; Guy Baxter and Caroline Benson at the Nancy Astor Collection, University of Reading, with special thanks for permission to reproduce images; Susan Worall, Director, Neville Chamberlain Papers, Cadbury Archive Centre, University of Birmingham, for permission to reproduce images, and for the help of the special collections team who were always most courteous and informative; the University of Kent Cartoon archive and Solo Syndication for permission to publish cartoons by David Low; and the staff at the Special Collections, University of Liverpool, for the use of a photo portrait and for access to this rich archive. Extracts from the works of Sir Winston Churchill are reproduced with permission of Curtis Brown, London, on behalf of the Estate of Winston S. Churchill. Extracts from the Mass- Observation Archive are reproduced with permission of the Curtis Brown Group Ltd, and on behalf of the Trustees of the Mass- Observation Archive. I am also grateful to librarians and archivists at the Labour History Research Centre, Manchester; the Women’s Library, London; Jacky Hodgson at the Special Collections, and Clare Scott, University of Sheffield Library; the John Rylands Library, University of Manchester, and the Manchester Central Library; the British Library; the National Archive, Kew; the Churchill Archive Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge; the Vera Brittain Collection, McMasters University; and the Catherine Marshall Collection, Cumbria Record Office. Further, I thank the Department of History and the University of Sheffield for kindly subsidizing research travel and conference attendance, contributing towards copyright fees, and for providing me with periods of study leave; the British Academy for a small research grant; and the University of Paris- Diderot for inviting me on two separate occasions as a visiting professor— in fact, the last edits were completed in Paris in the springtime, when it unseasonably drizzled.
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