Kellman, P. J., & Arterberry, M. A. (2006). Infant Visual Perception. in D. Kuhn & R. S. Siegler
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CHAPTER 3 Infant Visual Perception PHILIP J. KELLMAN and MARTHA E. ARTERBERRY THEORIES OF PERCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 110 Edge Detection and Edge Classification 135 The Constructivist View 110 Detection and Classification of Contour Junctions 136 The Ecological View 112 Boundary Assignment 137 The Contemporary Situation in Perceptual Theory 113 Perception of Object Unity 137 BASIC VISUAL SENSITIVITIES IN INFANCY 114 Perception of Three-Dimensional Form 142 Visual Acuity 114 Perception of Size 145 Contrast Sensitivity 116 FACE PERCEPTION 146 Orientation Sensitivity 119 Preference for Facelike Stimuli 146 Pattern Discrimination 119 Perceiving Information about People through Faces 148 Color Vision 120 Mechanisms of Face Perception 149 Motion Perception 124 CONCLUSION 150 SPACE PERCEPTION 126 Levels of Analysis 150 Kinematic Information 127 Hardwiring versus Construction in Stereoscopic Depth Perception 129 Visual Development 151 Pictorial Depth Perception 131 Future Directions 152 OBJECT PERCEPTION 134 REFERENCES 152 Multiple Tasks in Object Perception 134 How visual perception develops has long been a central less sensations. Coherent, meaningful, visual reality question in understanding psychological development emerges only through a protracted learning process in generally. During its emergence as a separate discipline which visual sensations become associated with each in the late 1800s, psychology was focused primarily on other and with touch and action (Berkeley, 1709/1963). how human knowledge originates (e.g., Titchener, 1910; Through most of the twentieth century, even as psy- Wundt, 1862), an emphasis inherited from concerns in chology increasingly emphasized findings of empirical philosophy. Much of the focus was on the relation be- research, this primarily philosophical view cast a long tween sensation and perception, especially in vision. shadow. Its influence was so great as to be essentially a The prevailing view, inherited from generations of em- consensus view of development. William James (1890) piricist philosophers (e.g., Berkeley, 1709/1963; Hobbes, echoed its assumptions in his memorable pronouncement 1651/1974; Hume, 1758/1999; Locke, 1690/1971), was that the world of the newborn is a “blooming, buzzing, that at birth, a human being experiences only meaning- confusion.” Modern developmental psychology, shaped greatly by Piaget, incorporated the same ideas. Although Preparation of this chapter was supported in part by research Piaget combined contributions of both maturation and grants R01 EY13518-01 from the National Eye Institute and learning in his theories, his view of the starting points of REC 0231826 from the National Science Foundation to PJK. perception was standard empiricist (e.g., Piaget, 1952, We thank Heidi Vanyo for helpful assistance. 1954). He did place greater emphasis on action, rather 109 110 Infant Visual Perception than mere sensory associations, as the means by which ment. These serve as valuable reference points in under- meaningful reality emerges from initially meaningless standing how recent research has changed our concep- sensations. tions of how perception begins. This basic story about early perception and knowl- edge persisted, in part, because researchers lacked The Constructivist View methods for investigating these topics scientifically. The arguments of Berkeley and others were primarily logical The term constructivism here refers to the view that per- ones. Claims about the origins of knowledge in the asso- ceptual reality must be constructed through extended ciation of sensations initially came from theory and learning. Choosing one term to label this idea is effi- thought experiments. Later, a few experiments with cient, but also unfortunate, as this set of ideas has many adults were used to make inferences about aspects of names. In philosophy, this kind of account is most often perception that might be based on learning (e.g., Wal- called empiricism, emphasizing the role of input from lach, 1976) or not so based (e.g., Gottschaldt, 1926). experience in forming perception. If, as is usually the Finding a more direct window into perception and case, associations among sensations are held to domi- knowledge of a young infant seemed unlikely. As Riesen nate perceptual development, the position may also be (1947, p. 107) put it: “The study of innate visual organi- aptly labeled associationism. In the earliest days of psy- zation in man is not open to direct observation in early chology as an independent discipline, the merging of infancy, since a young baby is too helpless to respond current and remembered sensations to achieve objects in differentially to visual excitation.” the world was called structuralism (Titchener, 1910). In thetime since Riesen’s (1947) observation, the sci- Helmholtz (1885/1925) is often credited with applying entific landscape in this area has changed entirely. Al- the label constructivism to the idea that sensations are though the development of visual perception is among the combined with previously learned information using un- most long-standing and fundamental concerns in the conscious inference to achieve perceptual reality. This field, it is also an area that is conspicuous in terms of re- pedigree, along with Piaget’s later emphasis on inputs cent andrapid progress. Beginning in the late 1950s, the from the learner’s actions in constructing reality, make door to progress has been the development of methods for constructivism perhaps the best term to characterize studying sensation, perception, and knowledge in human modern versions of this view. Unfortunately, the term infants. The results of scientific efforts, continuing to the has been used elsewhere with different shades of mean- present, have changed our conceptions of how perception ing. In considering issues in learning, developmental and begins and develops. These changes, in turn, have gener- educational psychologists often contrast constructivism ated important implications about the early foundations with associationism, where constructivism emphasizes of cognitive, linguistic, and social development. the active contributions of the learner. Although a com- In this chapter, we consider current knowledge of mon thread extends through the uses of constructivism, early visual perception and its development. Besides de- its use here will be confined to the notion that percep- scribing the origins and development of these perceptual tion is constructed from sensations and actions through capabilities, we use them to illustrate general themes: learning. Our primary concern in addressing perception the several levels of explanation required to understand is to consider, not particular modes of learning, but perception; the roles of hardwired abilities, maturation, whether basic perceptual abilities are learned at all. For and learning in perception; and some of the methods this reason, and others, the verdict on constructivism in that allow assessment of early perception. These themes this domain may differ from the fates of constructivisms all have broader relevance for cognitive and social in other studies of development. development. The constructivist account of how perception devel- ops is familiar to many. The key assumption is that at birth, sensory systems function to produce only their THEORIES OF characteristic sensations. Stimulation of the visual sys- PERCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT tem yields sensations of brightness and color, along with some quality (a “local sign”) correlating with a position As a backdrop for considering research in early vision, on the retina. Stimulation of the auditory system pro- we describe two general theories of perceptual develop- duces loudnesses and pitches, and so on. Of course, per- Theories of Perceptual Development 111 ceptual reality consists not of disembodied colors and that perception must be learned. From an evolutionary loudnesses, but of objects arranged in space, relations perspective, it might also be considered curious that hu- among them, and events, characterized by motion and mans have been so disadvantaged, beset with a frail and change within that space. On the constructivist view of complicated scheme for attaining what mountain goats perceptual development, all these commonplace occu- possess from birth. pants of adult perceptual reality—any tangible, material The preceding questions are not meant to be critical object existing in the external world and, indeed, the ex- of generations of serious thinkers who have held the con- ternal spatial framework itself—are hard-won construc- structivist position. Asking these questions helps to tions achieved by learning. What allows construction of highlight what the issues were and how things have now external reality is associative processes. Experiences of changed. The key fact is that the constructivist position visual sensations coupled with touch, according to was embraced nearly universally because the arguments Berkeley (1709/1963), allow creation of the idea that for it were logical. If valid, these arguments admitted seen objects have substance. Connecting the muscular few alternatives. We can better understand current views sensations of reaching with visual sensations allows the if we briefly review these logical arguments, sometimes creation of depth and space. Sensations obtained from described as the ambiguity argument and the capability one view of an object at a given time are associated by argument (Kellman & Arterberry, 1998). contiguity in space and time, and by similarity.