METEMPSYCHOSIS (TANASUKH) IN MULLA SADRA'S THOUGHT* Shigeru KAMADA** I The idea of metempsychosis (tanasukh)(1) with its complicated manifesta- tions appeared in the various aspects of Islamic thought and gave rise to heated controversies on its position in the Islamic framework among Muslim scholars. The idea can be divided into two types.(2) The first is that on its separation from a body one's soul takes a different form by its new at- tachment to another body of a higher or a lower species according to one's conduct in the life just ended. This type is found in Indian and Greek thought, which may be termed as metempsychosis in a general sense. The second is that the divine soul permeates through and indwells in all or particular existents in the physical world, which may be termed as metempsychosis in a special sense. The latter type of the metempsychosis often finds its expression in extreme Shi'te thought (ghulat) and Islamic mysticism, the manner in which it appears is that the Imam inherits a spark of the divine light (nur ilahi) through his preceding prophets or Imams from the first prophet Adam, or embodies Divinity through the incarnation (hulul) of the divine spirit in him.(3) The idea of incarnation gave birth to a series of incarnationists condemned among Islamic mystics.(4) The main purpose of this paper is to clarify Mulla Sadra's concept of metempsychosis. Mulla Sadra (d. 1050/1640) was a mystic philosopher in Safavid Iran.(5) First we would like to survey the common understanding of metempsychosis in Islam before our reading of Mulla Sadra's text. Al-Sayyid al-Sharif al-Jurjani (d. 816/1414), a theologian with a bent towards philosophy and mysticism, explains the word tanasukh in his ta'rifat as follows: Metempsychosis signifies the attachment of the spirit (ruh) to a body ** Associate Professor, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo Vol. XXX-XXXI 1995 119 (badan) after its separation from another body without time intervening between the two attachments on account of the essential affection bet- ween the spirit and the body (jasad).(6) Muhammad A'la al-Tahanawi, an encyclopaedist in eighteenth century India writes, metempsychosis is "the transmigration of the rational soul (al-nafs al-natiqah) from one body to another" and clarifies the view of the metempsychosists, who reject the idea of bodily resurrection (ma'ad jismani) in the following manner:(7) The rational soul reaches the sacred world ('alam al-quds) when it frees itself from bodily restrictions and attains perfection. On the contrary, the soul which has not attained perfection is made to return to a human body and transmigrates from one body to another until the soul reaches its goal. The transmigration of souls limited to human bodies is called naskh. Transmigration of souls downwards into animal bodies is called maskh, raskh when souls go down to vegetative bodies, and faskh when souls descend further into mineral bodies. Thus, souls are divided into two groups: (1) those which ascend to reach the divine world, and (2) those which descend to migrate into different bodies. Tahanawi categorises souls with regard to the type of metempsychosis. The first category is that of the perfect souls (nufus kamilah), which have reached human bodies after their transmigration among various bodies and attain enough perfection in both knowledge and morality to enter the world of intelligence ('alam al-'uqul), free from bodies. The second is that of the intermediate souls (nufus mutawassitah), which reach the level of the celestial bodies and the imaginative forms (ashbah mithaliyah) without attaining pecfection. The third is that of the deficient souls (nufus naqisah), which remain in animal bodies. Al-Biruni (d. 440/1048), who is well-known for his rich knowledge of comparative religion particularly Hinduism, mentions metempsychosis (tana- sukh) as the cardinal feature of the Indian religion just as the "profession of faith" (shahadah) for the Muslims, the Trinity (tathlith) for the Christians and the observance of Sabbath (isbat) for the Jews. Biruni gives a detailed description of Indian tanasukh with a brief comparative comment on the theory of Greek and Islamic mystics.(8) Within the tradition of Islamic theology a number of heresiographers give various accounts on the occurrence and theories of metempsychosis.(9) Among them, Abu al-Muzaffar al-Isfarayini (d. 471/1078), a Sunni heresio- 120 ORIENT METEMPSYCHOSIS (TANASUKH) IN MULLA SADRA'S THOUGHT grapher-theologian in his al-Tabsir fi al-din(10) divides the upholders of metempsychosis among the heretical groups (ahl al-bida') into four: (1) Ancient philosophers before Islam such as Socrates, (2) the Qadarites (Qadariyah) and the extreme Shi'ites (ghulat al-rawafidah) in the Islamic times, (3) the dualist Manichaeans (Mani al-thanawi), and (4) Jews.(11) He presents one of the theories expressed by Ahmad b. Khabit,(12) a Qadarite thinker, as follows: God created men in a world beyond this world with true knowledge (ma'rifah) and ordered them to thank Him. Some men were completely obedient to Him and kept their status in the primordial world. Some were completely disobedient to Him and were expelled into hellfire. The others who were partially obedient to Him were sent down to this world with physical bodies whose forms are different from each other according to their degree of disobedience. Their souls continue to transmi- grate from one body to another until they reach their goal. Their goal is either the primordial world for those who have successfully erased their disobedience or hellfire for those who have failed in their obedience. Thus, the theory metempsychosis of infiltrated the field of Islamic theology and formed a 'heretical' sect, which held the transmigration of soul into different bodies, higher or lower in degree, as the result of man's good or bad conduct in his previous life. The group is regarded as one of the Qadarite groups, for their concept of reward and punishment is formed based on their previous conduct according to their free will. Ibn Sina (d. 428/1037), the master architect of the Peripatetic philosophy in Islam, refers to metempsychosis and refutes its doctrine in the manner outlined below.(13) The soul comes into existence and multiplies in accordance with the readiness (tahayyu') of bodies. Therefore, whenever a body is ready, a soul must emanate from the separate causes. If we assumed that a soul which has separated itself from a previous body should attach itself again to another by way of metempsychosis, then this body would have two different souls in it at one and the same time. The first would be present through metempsychosis and the second by the body's readiness. The rela- tionship ('alaqah) between the soul and the body is understood in such a way that the soul is conscious of the body which in turn is influenced by it. Every living being is conscious that it has a unique soul, which governs and controls it. Therefore, if there is another soul of which the living being is not conscious, neither is it conscious of itself nor does it occupy Vol. XXX-XXXI1995 121 the body exclusively. Thus, the soul has no relationship with the body, because the relationship is to be understood in the above mentioned way. In such an argument Ibn Sina maintains the impossibility of metempsychosis. Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1210), a philosopher-theologian also refutes the idea of metempsychosis.(14) He introduces Ibn Sina's arguments against metempsychosis, which are rearranged under two headings. The first argu- ment is as mentioned above, that a body would have two souls if soul's transmigration were accepted. The second is an argument concerning the time interval between the two attachments of the soul. If there is a time interval between the soul's separation from a body and its attachment to another, the soul would have to remain suspended (mu'attilah) for a time. This is absurd, for there is no suspension in nature (tabi'ah). If this is not the case, the number of those passing from the world would have to be same as that of those coming into the world, which is against our common knowledge. Razi points out several shortcomings in these arguments which he ascribes to Ibn Sina, and adds the third argument against metem- psychosis, on which, he claims, all theologians depend. That is to say, if our souls had governed other bodies, we should know the states of our previous existence, but in reality we have no knowledge of our previous lives. Therefore, it is certain that our souls had never existed in other bodies. From the discussion above it is clear that many thinkers in Islam were certainly acquainted with the idea of metempsychosis found in non-Islamic religions and some "heretical" branches within Islam, and that they do not accept the idea of metempsychosis as orthodox at all. II As for the idea of metempsychosis, Mulla Sadra seems to accept a cer- tain type of it at least from a point of view. Those who accept metem- psychosis in Islam naturally refer to the Qur'an and hadith as a support of their claim. Mulla Sadra cites the following passages from the Qur'an(15) as alluding to the possibility of metempsychosis when he discusses the subject. There is not an animal in the earth, nor a flying creature flying on two wings, but they are peoples like unto you. We have neglected nothing in the Book (of Our decrees).(16) 122 ORIENT METEMPSYCHOSIS (TANASUKH) IN MULLA SADRA'S THOUGHT Worse is he of whose sort God hath turned some to apes and swine, and who serveth idols.