16 Sept 1997
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Liberal Democrat History Group Newsletter 16 September 1997 £2.50 Contents Newsletter 16: September 1997 So How Well Did We Do? A critical look at the Liberal Democrat performance in the election; by John Curtice. Why Didn’t the Liberal Party Die? History Group meeting report (William Wallace). The Labour Party and the Pursuit of the Liberal Vote, – Labour made a determined effort to absorb the Liberal vote when the party seemed to be in terminal decline after ; by Peter Joyce. Liberal/Tory Pacts: Partnership of Principle or Struggle for Survival? History Group meeting report (Michael Kandiah). Liberal Party Archives at the BLPES Archive sources guide; by Sue Donnelly. Labour replaced the Liberals as the main opposition party in the s. Two articles in this issue examine the relationship between The Unknown Prime Minister Labour and Liberal votes – in the s (Peter Joyce, page ) Book Review: Mount, Umbrella; by To ny Little. and the s (John Curtice, page ). A Liberal Democrat History Group Fringe Meeting From Beveridge to Blair: Reform of the Welfare State with Frank Field MP (Minister of State, DSS) and Nick Timmins. Chair: Archy Kirkwood MP. 6.15pm, Monday 22 September (Eastbourne); for full details see back page. So How Well Did We Do? A critical look at the Liberal Democrat performance in the 1997 election; by John Curtice. Taken by surprise at the scale of ‘New Labour’s’ election systematically lower swing against the government which victory, few media commentators have paid much attention has nothing to do with tactical voting.) It is easy, however, to the Liberal Democrats’ achievements in the general to miss the evidence of tactical voting. After all, Labour’s election. Yet with seats, the party emerged from the vote rose by more than the Liberal Democrats’ did in every election with its largest Westminster army since . It was kind of seat. But what matters is that Labour’s vote rose on little short of the kind of outcome of which the SDP/Liberal average by – points less in those seats where the Liberal Alliance had dreamed in the heady days of the early s. Democrats started off in second place and not more than So just what should we make of the Liberal Democrat % behind Labour, while the Liberal Democrat performance in ? And where might the party go from performance was – points better. This clearly suggests that here? some voters in these seats who would otherwise have voted There is certainly much for the Liberal Democrats to Labour opted instead to back the Liberal Democrats in order cheer about in the election result. Some key elements in to defeat the Conservatives. the party’s election strategy were clearly successful. It Not that tactical voting happened everywhere where benefited from tactical voting, aided and abetted by the the Liberal Democrats started off in second place. In those strategy of targeting. Local election success helped to seats where the Conservatives had more than a point contribute to parliamentary success. And in apparently finally lead, voters appear to have decided that the Liberal breaking the seemingly impregnable barrier posed by the Democrats had little chance of winning. In seats too where single-member plurality electoral system, the party has Labour started off not far behind the Conservatives, such as helped to raise new questions about the value of a system Aberdeen South and Bristol West, voters often appear to which it has long wanted to change. have decided that Labour rather than the Liberal Democrats It is important to be aware just how much the party’s had the best chance of winning locally. Even amongst those haul of seats was far greater than could have been anticipated. seats where the Conservative lead was less than points, If the movement of votes had been the same in every tactical voting was by no means universal. It was evident in constituency, the Liberal Democrats would have won most seats where the Liberal Democrats started off less than seats, not . But the movement of votes was anything but % behind, but thereafter it was to be found in some places uniform. Rather, voters tended to opt for whichever and not in others. opposition party they reckoned could best defeat the local Where Labour started off second, in contrast, tactical To r y. switching from the Liberal Democrats to Labour occurred The pattern is quite clear from Table . Here we look at almost everywhere, irrespective of how far behind the Labour what happened in those seats where the Tories started off party started. Evidently voters took account of the position with at least a third of the vote, and divide these seats up of the two opposition parties in the polls and came to the according to their tactical situation. (Seats where the Tories conclusion that Labour were worth backing almost started off with less than a third of the vote experienced a anywhere. But they generally needed more convincing about the effectiveness of voting Liberal Table 1: Tactical Voting Democrat. There is a clear lesson here; Change in % voting tactical voting is more difficult to stimulate Tactical Situation Con Lab LD No. seats if you are down in the national polls. But what helped to convince voters that Lab seats; Con >33.3% –12.6 +9.6 –0.3 107 the party was indeed strong enough locally Con/Lab seats –12.6 +13.0 –3.0 181 to defeat the incumbent Tory? Here two LD seats; Con >33.3% –10.6 +9.6 +1.6 8 strategies, one traditional in the party, the Con/LD; Con lead <30% –11.8 +6.5 +1.9 80 other rather less so, both appear to have Con/LD; Con lead >30% –13.5 +10.0 –0.8 60 played their role. Tactical voting was notably more prevalent in those constituencies Three-way marginals –11.6 +10.9 –2.3 18 which had been targeted for up to four (Three-way marginals: Con 1st, LD 2nd in 1992, but Lab within 6% of LDs) years beforehand by providing national support for the local campaign. In those 2 Liberal Democrat History Group Newsletter 16: September 1997 seats where the party started off less than % Table 2: The Relationship between Seats and Votes behind the Conservatives, its vote rose by .% % Votes Seats on average in those seats it targeted, but fell Swing to Con Lab Con Lab LD Other by .% elsewhere. Targeted constituencies Con were strongly encouraged to emphasise in their literature that the party was ahead of 0% 31.5 44.4 165 419 46 29 Labour locally, and it is notable that it was 2% 33.5 42.4 187 403 41 28 Labour rather than the Conservatives who 4% 35.5 40.4 220 374 37 28 under-performed in these seats. 6% 37.5 38.4 252 345 33 29 Good local election performances also 6.5% 38.0 37.9 259 338 33 29 seem to have advanced the party’s credibility 7.2% 38.7 37.2 270 329 32 28 as an effective challenger. For example, in 8% 39.5 36.4 280 320 31 28 the South of England, the party’s local 9.8% 41.3 34.6 301 300 29 29 election record in the last parliament was 10% 41.5 34.4 306 295 29 29 generally far better south and west of a line 11.5% 43.0 32.9 330 272 27 30 from Bristol to Oxford to Brighton than 12% 43.5 32.4 341 263 26 29 immediately to the north and east of it. That 13% 44.5 31.4 352 254 24 29 pattern was also evident in the general (Others include 18 seats elected in Northern Ireland.) election. In those seats in the south-western corner where the party started off between % and %, its vote rose on average by .%; to the between alternative governments. That implies that it should north and east it fell by .%. Beyond the south of England, treat the two main parties, at least, in an even-handed fashion. some of the party’s most spectacular gains, such as Harrogate But in the electoral system exhibited a strong bias and Sheffield Hallam, followed upon significant local against the Conservatives and in favour of Labour. This is election achievements. shown in Table , which shows what the outcome in seats But if voters’ willingness to vote tactically was influenced would be at the next election if there was a uniform swing by the party’s position in the national polls, then the party’s from Labour to the Conservatives across the whole country. success in raising its support during the campaign from just On this basis the Conservatives would secure an overall –% at the beginning to % by the end (and % on majority only if they were ten points ahead of Labour. polling day) also played an important role in the result. True, Labour, in contrast, could still win an election while more Liberal Democrat support often rises during an election than % behind the Conservatives. Such figures will raise campaign, but there is no inviolate rule that says this is always new questions about the single-member plurality electoral so. In , for example, an ill-directed campaign stymied system at a time when the government is committed to by the differences between Steel and Owen saw support holding a referendum on its future. fall. But in emulating the campaign with a pledge to Table does. though. also indicate one reason for caution increase taxes and spend more on education, the Liberal amongst Liberal Democrats about their performance.