15

ENERGY PERSPECTIVES IN SWITZERLAND: THE POTENTIAL OF NUCLEAR POWER

K. Foskolos, P. Hardegger

In 2004, discussions were started in Switzerland concerning future of energy supply, including domestic electricity generation. On behalf of the Federal Office of Energy, PSI undertook a study to evaluate the potential of future nuclear technologies, covering electricity demand, with a time horizon up to 2050. It has been shown that nuclear power plants (NPPs) of the Third Generation, similar to the ones currently under construction in several other countries, built on the existing nuclear sites in Switzerland, have the potential to replace, at competitive costs, the existing nuclear plants, and even to cover (postulated) increases in electricity demand. Because of their late maturity (expected at the earliest around 2030), NPPs of the Fourth Generation, which are currently under development, cannot play a major role in Switzerland, since, with the exception of the Leibstadt NPP, all decisions regarding replacement of the current Swiss NPPs have to be taken before 2030.

1 INTRODUCTION Following the start of construction in Finland (Olkiluoto III), and the decision to construct a similar plant in Electricity production in Switzerland is practically France (Flamanville III), particular importance is CO -free. This is due to the high proportion of hydro 2 attributed to the European Pressurized (Water) and nuclear power (56% and 40%, respectively, in Reactor (EPR), a Generation III concept of about 2003) in the total electricity budget. Maintaining an 1600 MW , developed by Framatome ANP, and electricity mix with low CO emissions will be essential e 2 based on proven, standardized French (N4) and – at least in the mid-term – in achieving current German (Konvoi) reactor concepts. climate protection objectives, e.g. those of the Kyoto

Protocol. Consequently, in 2004, the Swiss Federal Office of Energy initiated a broad study to assess the Double Containment potential of the different energy carriers to provide a with Ring Space Venting Melt spread secure energy supply, while continuing to satisfy the surface Swiss environmental criteria. PSI has provided Containment contributions to this study in regard to renewable Heat Removal System energies and new nuclear power plants. The main findings for the nuclear energy part of the report are summarized in this paper. EPR 2 CURRENT NUCLEAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 4-fold Integrated Flooding Pool / Sump Safety The development of nuclear technology can be Redundancy conveniently subdivided into generations. Prototype and demonstration plants from the 50s and 60s belong to Generation I. Some technological lines, Fig. 1: EPR and its main safety-related innovations. mainly water-cooled reactors, became commercially successful in the 70s and 80s, and today constitute In the field of gas-cooled reactors, there are currently the bulk of the world’s current nuclear park: these developments of concepts involving a direct helium reactors belong to Generation II. More than cycle, and helium turbines. In South Africa, a decision 10 000 reactor·years of cumulative operational to start construction of the PBMR, a gas-cooled, experience, together with the lessons learned from the pebble-bed modular reactor, is expected shortly. two major nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island and Recent press articles have underlined the importance Chernobyl, have led to a significantly improved safety of the EPR as a potential replacement for existing level for the Generation II reactors. reactors in Switzerland. Although this hypothesis is New safety and system approaches were developed plausible, no concrete decisions have yet been made in the 90s, and integrated into the advanced reactor regarding any particular technology line. Such concepts comprising Generation III. Generation III is decisions necessitate extensive and time-consuming characterized by the innovativeness of the evaluations of different criteria, including existing approaches; for example, those integrating passive operational experience. It may be assumed, however, safety systems and inherent safety mechanisms. that in the case of a nuclear option for the Those allowing for shorter construction times, lower replacement of existing plants, Light Water Reactor O&M costs and increased efficiency, are often (LWR) technology will remain the first consideration. designated Generation III+ reactors. However, the distinction between the two is not unambiguous, and the two concepts are therefore taken together here. 16

3 FUTURE NUCLEAR ENERGY including, in the event of core damage, a very low TECHNOLOGIES: GENERATION IV likelihood of significant radioactivity releases to the environment, thus eliminating the need for off-site To meet future energy needs, ten countries emergency response. Finally, the Generation IV (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Japan, the reactors aim at drastically reducing the proliferation Republic of Korea, the Republic of South Africa, risk of weapon-grade materials, and provide high Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States) levels of protection against acts of terrorism. and one organisation (Euratom) have agreed on an international cooperative research framework for an More than 100 experts from the GIF partner countries advanced generation of nuclear reactor: Generation have evaluated the 100 or more concepts for IV. The eleven partners assembled for the first time in Generation IV systems proposed by the worldwide 2001 to form the Generation IV International Forum R&D community, and selected the six most promising (GIF). Though recognized as an organisation with a lines: the Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor, the Lead-Cooled long-term perspective, at least some of the Fast Reactor, the Molten Salt Reactor, the Sodium- Generation IV nuclear energy systems could be Cooled Fast Reactor, the Supercritical Water-Cooled available by the year 2030, the time at which many of Reactor, and the Very-High-Temperature Reactor. the currently operating nuclear power plants in the Table 1 provides a summary overview of these six world will be at, or near to, the end of their operating Generation IV systems. In assembling the data, the lifetimes. two extra important considerations of electricity generation ― hydrogen and process heat production, The points of focus for the development of new and actinide management ― were addressed. In this systems are sustainability, economics, safety and process, the range of national priorities and interests reliability, resistance to proliferation, and physical of the individual GIF countries has been taken into protection. The Generation IV systems should meet account. the clean-air objectives, and promote effective fuel utilization. The issues of minimization of nuclear Common trends for most of the selected systems are waste, and reduction of long-term burden of the use of a closed, fast-neutron nuclear fuel cycle, monitoring for future generations, are also being including reprocessing, recycling and transmutation of addressed. The systems target clear life-cycle cost actinides, and the high operating temperatures of the advantages over other energy sources, at a reactor coolant, ensuring high thermal efficiency and comparable level of financial risk. In addition, they the possibility of efficient process-heat applications. prescribe excellence in terms of safety and reliability, Table 1: Overview of the Generation IV Systems.

Neutron- Fuel Size System Abbrev. Coolant Temperature Pressure Fuel Use spectrum cycle (MWe)

Gas-cooled U-238 electricity closed, fast GFR fast helium 850°C high & 288 & in-situ reactor MOX hydrogen

50- Lead-cooled U-238 150, electricity fast reactor closed, LFR fast Pb-Bi 550-800°C low & 300- & (liquid-metal regional MOX 400, hydrogen cooled ) 1200 electricity Molten salt fluoride UF in closed, MSR epithermal 700-800°C low 6 1000 & reactor salts salt in-situ hydrogen

Sodium- U-238 300- cooled fast SFR fast sodium 550°C low & closed electricity 1500 reactor MOX

Supercritical water- thermal/ open (th) SCWR water 510-550°C very high UO2 1500 electricity cooled fast closed (f) reactor Very high hydrogen temperature VHTR thermal helium 1000°C high UO2 open 250 & gas reactor electricity

17

The boundary conditions for the possible replacement A transition to fast neutron spectra, and thereby an of the nuclear power reactors in Switzerland are not increase in fuel utilization by a factor 50-100, will favourable to any of the Generation IV concepts. become possible only with Generation IV systems. Assuming that the existing NPPs will be replaced at Reprocessing is still a controversial issue. The new the end of their technical lifetimes, and that licensing, Swiss Atomic Law imposed a 10-year moratorium on planning and construction of new NPPs would require reprocessing, starting in 2006. Recycling through at least ten years, it is evident that Generation IV reprocessing of spent fuel in any case saves 15-20% systems will not be commercially available, or of the uranium, and reduces the final storage capacity. adequately proven, at the time the decision for the replacement of Beznau I, Beznau II, Mühleberg and Waste disposal is progressing worldwide: several Gösgen has to be taken: all before 2030. The use of a repositories for low-level and short-lived/medium-level Generation IV system to replace Leibstadt (around waste are already in operation, and first repositories 2045) is theoretically possible, provided that the most for high-level waste and spent fuel are under advanced systems at that time can demonstrate construction. In Switzerland, basic geological and convincingly, positive commercial operational technical aspects have been clarified, but site experience. According to current plans, and assuming selection and licensing processes remain political that no major delays occur, the two systems foreseen issues, and are still pending. to become commercially available the earliest are the Non-proliferation is an international issue. With few VHTR and the SFR. The negative feelings relating to the sodium technology (specifically, Swiss opposition exceptions, the international community is bound by regulations that ensure efficient and thorough control to Superphénix in France, and the adverse press of nuclear material, which almost eliminates any generated by the Monju accident in Japan) make a misuse of fissile elements. To date, misuse of choice in favour of the SFR improbable. Thus, if a Generation IV system is ever to be implemented in sensitive materials from peaceful nuclear applications Switzerland on the time-scale here considered, this has always been in the framework of national military programmes, with the “blessing” of the ruling could only be the VHTR. government. 4 SOME ASPECTS OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL 5 WORLD-WIDE NUCLEAR ENERGY CYCLE DEVELOPMENTS Availability of resources is a central issue. Assuming a constant consumption rate, the known and estimated Several international organisations, including the reserves of nuclear fuel are sufficient for 400 years; OECD/IEA, OECD/NEA, IAEA and IPCC, provide regular updates of energy demand estimates, based with moderate consumption growth, they can still on forecasts for demographic evolution and cover demand for 120 years. Exploitation of currently assumptions for world economic development (Fig. 2). uninteresting deposits, even at higher uranium prices, The time horizon is usually to the middle or end of the can be an additional option, since nuclear generation costs show little sensitivity to fuel price. century. Because of the threat of global climatic changes, and the related efforts to reduce Utilization of fuel can be slightly improved through Greenhouse-Gas emissions, many of the more recent increases in burn-up, and the Swiss NPPs have an studies assume that considerable growth of installed excellent record in this regard. Further increase is nuclear capacity will take place. limited by current regulatory limits on uranium enrichment.

5'000 Forecasts Nuclear Energy World 4'000

3'000 IIASA/WEC B 2'000

1'000 IAEA High Installed Capacity [GWe] IAEA Low 0

0 0 0 0 0 50 01 020 03 040 0 06 08 090 10 2000 2 2 2 2 2 2 2070 2 2 2

Fig. 2: Forecasts for the deployment of nuclear energy in the world [1,2]. 18

Some of the bolder forecasts [3,2] postulate an In the half-year winter period, domestic capacity is installed capacity of 10 000 GW by the year 2100; i.e. not sufficient to cover domestic demand. For this a 30-fold increase over present levels. Starting reason, along with domestic production, the Swiss immediately, this would imply an additional capacity NPP operators own subscription rights in foreign of 100 GWe, or about 60 EPRs per year. This is NPPs. Currently, these rights amount to about 14-15 about twice the rate of build-up seen in the mid-80s, TWh/a, or the equivalent of the production of two during the peak in installation of new nuclear 1000 MWe units like Gösgen. However, the total capacity. annual domestic consumption is lower than the total annual domestic production, and allows for net More moderate scenarios, compiled by the IAEA, exports. The export surplus has fluctuated over the foresee a growth in capacity of 7% (Low Case) to last 10 years, depending on the weather, between 60% (High Case) by the year 2030. The latter implies 2% (1996) and 19% (1994); in 2003 it was 5%. the addition of 200-300 GWe in total, or 5 to 7 EPR units annually. When the first Swiss NPPs (Beznau, Mühleberg) In Europe, long-term planning of energy needs has were built, a cautious operational lifetime of 30 years recently begun in many countries, including the was assumed, which fixed the write-off time also to replacement of existing NPPs, while in other 30 years. Periodic inspections and tests have shown, countries, for political reasons, a phase-out of nuclear however, that the ageing of heavy components which energy has been decided. This situation does not cannot be easily replaced, in particular the reactor give indications of any major increase in currently pressure vessel, is less rapid than expected. On the installed capacity. IAEA assumes a constant level, or basis of these data, safe operation may be expected a slight increase (+20% by 2030) of nuclear power for at least 40 years. This lifetime had been fixed generation for Western Europe, and a rather steeper from the very beginning for the last two NPPs built in increase (+30-80% by 2030) for Eastern Europe. Switzerland (Gösgen and Leibstadt), and was considered as standard in most earlier analyses. 6 POTENTIAL FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY IN The long operational experience, together with SWITZERLAND detailed model computations, allow current lifetime forecasts for the safe and economic operation of 6.1 Current situation older plants to be about 50 years, and about 60 years The Swiss nuclear park was built between 1969 and for the newer plants. These lifetimes have been 1984 (Table 2). In the 1990s, the installed capacity assumed for the different scenarios given in this was increased, by means of upgrading programmes, study (see Section 6.2). In the USA, operational by 10%. The overall excellent state of the plants, and licenses up to 60 years are granted by the safety efficient revision times, has led to high levels of authority (NRC) as standard, following thorough availability (generally above 90%), and high power examination of the plant. Today, operation beyond output (currently about 26 TWh/a). this time horizon appears less attractive, because of expected backfittig costs, and because of the Table 2: The Swiss Nuclear Power Plants technical obsolescence of the installations. (operational life assumed to be 50-60 6.2 Scenarios for the future years). In principle, the future of nuclear energy in NPP

Switzerland could follow three routes: complete phase-out, maintaining the status-quo by the

replacement of the existing plants at the end of their

[MWe] lifetimes, and expansion. The phase-out option, as well as the proposal of a moratorium on new [MWe] construction, were rejected by popular vote in the Spring 2003. This result, along with the recent perceivable will to discuss openly the nuclear option, Power 2003 Production 2003 Production [TWh] Commissioning Commissioning Decommissioning / Replacement Powercommis- at sioning was the main reason not to vigorously pursue the phase-out option. Likewise, the expansion path is not Beznau I 1969 2019 350 365 2.9 being actively pursued, since additional NPPs at new sites do not currently appear to be politically feasible, Beznau II 1971 2021 350 365 3.0 and because foreseeable demand in the long-term (i.e. beyond 2050) does not appear to justify it. Mühleberg 1972 2022 320 355 2.8 Consequently, we examine here only the path concerning the replacement of the existing plants, but Gösgen 1978 2038 920 970 7.9 with different scenarios regarding installed capacity.

Leibstadt 1984 2044 990 1165 9.2 The basic assumptions made here are that, following the end of the operational lifetimes of the existing NPPs, nuclear power will continue to provide its Total 2930 3220 25.8 current share of domestic electricity production, and 19 that the existing nuclear sites will also be used for Beznau and Mühleberg plants, for example at the any new nuclear units. Because of the general trend Beznau site, necessitates, for the equivalent power of the Generation III systems towards larger units (no level (1000 MWe, Scenario 1) about 15% additional further designs at the 300 MWe level), it can also be cooling capacity and, at higher power (1600 MWe, assumed that the three older Swiss NPPs (Beznau I, Scenarios 2A and 2B), about 86% more. The Beznau II and Mühleberg) will be replaced by one average warming up of the water of the river Aare as single, large NPP. This assumption is common to all a consequence of the cooling of NPP is currently the scenarios examined below. Further, both a 1.6°C; the limit is 3°C. This implies that both replacement at the same total capacity level, and one scenarios can utilize river cooling, but the cooling with higher capacity, are assumed possible. potential in practical terms will be exhausted for Scenarios 2A and 2B. At the same time, however, the The replacement of three small units by a single large thermal load to the river will be reduced at the one implies a higher cooling capacity than that Mühleberg site, due to the assumed closure of the existing previously at the specified site. The cooling plant. issue has a history: opposition to nuclear power in Switzerland became synonymous with opposition to The basic assumptions employed for the scenarios river cooling, as was planned for the Kaiseraugst and investigated are summarized in Table 3. Leibstadt NPPs in the 1970s. The replacement of the

Table 3: Summary of the scenarios.

Path 1: phase-out, with decommissioning Not investigated after 50-60 years

Scenario 1: replacement at constant total capacity

Path 2: status quo, with replacement of the Scenario 2A: replacement with full exploitation of existing sites existing NPPs (EPR) Scenario 2B: replacement with full exploitation of existing sites (EPR/Gen IV)

Path 3: expansion, with new sites Not investigated

Scenario 1: replacement at constant power levels. by units of 1000 Mwe and 1200 MWe, respectively. The evolution of nuclear power generation in In this scenario, the NPPs at Mühleberg and Beznau Switzerland according to this scenario is shown in Fig. are replaced by a single unit of about 1000 MWe 3; note that there is no particular intention to capacity. The same occurs subsequently with the homogenize the nuclear park. reactors at Gösgen and Leibstadt, which are replaced

50'000

45'000

40'000 Potential for electricity production from nuclear power in Switzerland 35'000 Scenario 1

30'000 Replacement Leibstadt Replacement Gösgen 25'000

20'000 Leibstadt Replacement M BI BII

15'000 Gösgen 10'000 Net Annual Production [Mio kWh] 5'000 Beznau II Beznau I - Mühleberg

0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 8 8 9 99 00 00 01 1970 1975 19 19 19 1 2 2 2 201 202 202 203 203 204 204 2050

Fig. 3: Scenario 1: replacement of the existing NPPs with plants of the same total power level, merging the Beznau and Mühleberg sites. . 20

Scenario 2: replacement with full exploitation of possible synergies: evaluation, construction, operation existing sites. and maintenance. Additional advantages may arise through synergies with the French EPR programme. This scenario assumes that the existing NPPs at the The scenario represents an increase of domestic Beznau, Gösgen and Leibstadt sites are replaced with nuclear production of 16% by 2035, and of 47% by new, state-of-the-art units of the same total power. 2050. The evolution of nuclear power generation in Here, two cases can be distinguished. In Scenario 2A, Switzerland for this scenario is shown in Fig. 4. it is assumed that an EPR is built on all three sites. This has the advantage of homogeneity, with all

50'000

45'000 Replacement Leibstadt 40'000 Potential for electricity production From nuclear power in Switzerland 35'000 Scenario 2A Replacement Gösgen 30'000

25'000 Replacement M BI BII

20'000 Leibstadt

15'000 Gösgen 10'000 Beznau II 5'000

Net Annual Production [Mio kWh] Beznau I Mühleberg -

0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 7 9 1 3 4 99 02 03 19 197 198 198 19 1 200 200 201 20 202 2 2 20 204 20 205

Fig. 4: Scenario 2A: replacement of Beznau and Mühleberg by a single EPR 1600, and replacement of Gösgen and Leibstadt by two EPR 1600 units.

In Scenario 2B, it has been assumed that, at the time for example, a park of 6 to 8 VHTRs. The increase in of the replacement of the Leibstadt NPP, proven annual nuclear generation capacity for Scenario 2B is Generation IV systems will have become the same as for Scenario 2A up to 2035; by 2050, this commercially available. Because of the higher thermal would increase by 72%. The evolution of the annual efficiency of these systems, more electrical power can power generation in Switzerland according to this be generated from the same thermal power (and scenario is shown in Fig. 5. Table 4 and Fig. 6 thereby the same cooling capacity). A total generating summarize the results for the different scenarios. power of 2000 MWe is envisaged: one option being,

50'000 45'000 Replacement Leibstadt 40'000 Potential for electricity production from nuclear power in Switzerland 35'000 kWh] SzenarioScenario 2B Replacement Gösgen Mio 30'000 Replacement M BI BII 25'000

20'000 Leibstadt

15'000 Gösgen 10'000 Net AnnualProductionNet [ Beznau II 5'000 Beznau I Mühleberg - 5 0 5 5 5 5 10 20 40 970 980 98 990 00 00 0 0 02 03 0 04 050 1 1975 1 1 1 1995 2 2 2 2015 2 2 2030 2 2 2 2

Fig. 5: Scenario 2B: replacement of Beznau and Mühleberg by a single EPR 1600; replacement of Gösgen by an EPR 1600, and replacement of Leibstadt by a Generation IV system.

21

Table 4: Summary of the total installed power; all scenarios.

Installed power [MWe] Mühleberg Beznau I/II Gösgen Leibstadt Total Current 355 2x365 970 1165 3220 Scenario 1 - 1000 1200 3200 Scenario 2A - 1600 (EPR) 1600 (EPR) 1600 (EPR) 4800 Scenario 2B - 1600 (EPR) 1600 (EPR) 2000 (Gen IV) 5200

50'000

45'000 Total replacement EPR/GEN IV 40'000 Potential for electricity produktionproduction 35'000 from nuclear power in Switzerland

[Mio kWh] 30'000 Total replacement EPR 25'000 Total replacement constant 20'000 Production 15'000 Total without replacement 10'000

5'000 Net Annual Annual production [Mio kWh] 0

0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 98 99 00 197 19 1980 1 1990 1 2000 2 2010 201 2020 202 2030 203 2040 204 2050

Fig. 6: Total nuclear electricity generation in Switzerland; all scenarios.

6.3 Potential of nuclear power by new types of nuclear power reactors: in Scenario 2A, capacity increases by 16% up to 2035, and by The aim of the present study was not to examine (or 47% by 2050. In Scenario 2B, the potential increases to establish demand forecasts for) electricity by 72% up to 2050. production in Switzerland using as a basis for comparisons either the current level of electricity Table 5 summarizes the potential (in the different consumption (in the year 2003) or the mean value expressions) of nuclear generation in Switzerland up from the Vorschau 95 study by the Swiss utilities. to the years 2035 and 2050, and for the different Rather, the potential for nuclear power has been given scenarios investigated. Despite the postulated a broader basis, and expressed in four different forms: increase in the nuclear power generation potential, 1. s an absolute contribution (in TWh) to the annual and assuming a moderate increase in demand Swiss electricity generation; (average from Vorschau 95 study), a shortfall in supply cannot be excluded for the future. 2. as an increase (in %) against the current production level of the Swiss NPPs; In the case of Scenario 1, after 2020 there will be a 3. as a relative contribution (in %) to the total shortage of about 5 TWh per decade. This implies that generation, taking the current generation level as a 600-700 MWe additional capacity per decade will be basis; and required. Should the existing sites be fully exploited, a 4. as a relative contribution (in %) to the total supply gap will appear only around 2050. Additional generation, taking the evolution of average capacity will therefore only be needed in the years demand according to Vorschau 95 study. 2050 to 2060. Depending on the current political boundary Should the increase in demand be steeper than conditions, the potential for nuclear power can evolve estimated, additional capacity will be needed sooner, in very different ways. In the current climate, a total and at higher increments: each additional percent phase-out, which would reduce the potential for increase in demand corresponds to 7 TWh per nuclear energy to zero by 2050, seems improbable. decade, or some 800 MWe additional capacity. To However, it is important to keep in mind that nuclear cover this additional demand by nuclear power, one energy will not contribute at all to domestic supply additional reactor of the EPR class (1600 MWe) would after 2045, unless a suitable, and timely replacement be needed every 20 years. Current trends are strategy is set in place. somewhat on this path: between 1995 and 2003, electricity consumption increased on average by 2% Scenario 1 represents a continuation of the current per year, or 0.5% more than the increase in mean potential. Scenario 2 explores the possibilities offered consumption as postulated in Vorschau 95. 22

Table 5: Nuclear power generation in Switzerland: current (2002); scenario to 2035; scenario to 2050.

2002 2035 2050 [TWh] [TWh] [TWh] [%] [%] [%] [MW] [MW] [MW] [TWh] [TWh] Share Share Share Share Share [TWh] [% 2002] [% 2002] [% VS95] [% VS95] Increase Increase Capacity Capacity Capacity VS95 VS95 total Production Production Production Production Consumption Consumption Without replacement 3220 65 25.7 40% 2135 78 17.3 27% 22% -33% 0 87 0.0 0% 0% -100% Replacement constant 3220 65 25.7 40% 3220 78 25.8 40% 33% 1% 3285 87 25.9 40% 30% 1% Replacement EPR 3220 65 25.7 40% 3735 78 29.9 46% 38% 16% 4800 87 37.8 58% 43% 47% Replacement EPR/GEN IV 3220 65 25.7 40% 3735 78 29.9 46% 38% 16% 5600 87 44.2 68% 51% 72%

Table 6: Comparison of current and future generation costs in Rp/kWh (conversion rates used: EUR/CHF 1.55; USD/CHF 1.30; GBP/CHF 2.30). Plant / Source Current Future Reference / Remarks Beznau/Mühleberg 4.5 < 4.5 Information Beznau Gösgen 4.06 4 [4] Leibstadt 5.3 < 5 [5] CH (baseload) 4 - 5.3 4 - 5 CH: Prognos 1999 6 5.3 [6] Kroeger/Fischer 1998 4.9 - [7] Germany Konvoi-Type 4.5 2.3 [8] (2.3 after complete amortisation) OECD 4.5 3.2 - 4.3 [8] OECD/IEA Japan 9 7.5 [8] OECD France 5 4.2 [8] OECD UK 5.3 - [8,9] OECD USA Production 2.2 - [10] USA DOE (55% Capital) 4.9 4.3 [8,10] USA New Plants FOAKE - 6 - 9 [11] First-of-a-Kind costs USA New Plants Series - 4 - 6 [11] Costs series EPR Finland (current: BWR) 2.8 3.7 [12] EPR France - 3.5 - 4 [13] EPR CH - 4 - 5 Æ higher waste disposal costs GEN IV - 2.5 - 3.5 [14]

7 CRITICAL FACTORS which there has not been sufficient operational experience at the time of decision will not be The future evolution of nuclear energy in Switzerland, considered. This means that the additional potential and the extent to which its potential can be exploited, of the highly efficient Generation IV systems will not depends on several important factors. be able to be exploited if they cannot demonstrate Public acceptance of nuclear energy plays a central good practical experience by 2034. A change in the role in its future development. It will be imperative, in technology choice after the general licence is the long term, and at international level, that no major accepted is theoretically possible, but improbable in incident occurs which would escalate public fears. In practical terms, since the referendum necessary to Switzerland, both the proof of the need for a new approve the licence will have to be conducted around power plant, and proof of feasibility of the final waste a concrete technological proposal. Delays in the disposal plan, are essential pre-requisites for a development programmes of the Generation IV general nuclear licence. The general economic reactors will make their installation in Switzerland situation will also have a major impact on practically impossible. Also, on a point of principle, an acceptance, although it is not clear in which sense a intention to homogenize the Swiss nuclear park good or a bad economic situation would influence the would be inconsistent with an isolated Generation IV issue. plant in Leibstadt. Competitiveness will be one of the most important factors influencing future electricity Timing of the technology decision is ten or more generation capacity. From a current perspective, years before commissioning. For the Swiss NPPs, nuclear energy remains largely competitive. this implies that such decisions should be taken as Generation costs are today between 4 and soon as 2009 for Beznau/Mühleberg, by 2028 for 5 Rp/kWh. Although there is a broad belief that Gösgen, and by 2034 for Leibstadt. Systems for 23 electricity from Swiss NPPs is expensive, their existing facilities (ABWR, Japan), even though first- generation costs are in fact comparable with of-a-kind is always more expensive than a series international levels. Financial reserves and product. In the case of Generation IV, estimates are economies have, to a large extent, been used till now merely target values that have to be attained for the to improve the safety of nuclear energy. Although concept just to have a chance to enter the market, safety will remain a first priority in the future, it has and are consequently somewhat less reliable. Table now reached such a level that future safety related 6 gives an overview of generating costs from different costs should not overcompensate economic sources. improvements. Furthermore, a homogenization of the The possible implementation of a CO -emission tax nuclear park in Europe could allow synergies that 2 would further increase the competitiveness of nuclear would help reduce investment and operation costs. energy. As recent studies have shown (ecoinvent), As part of a general trend, one could expect lower CO emissions from nuclear plants are very low, generating costs in the future. However, a 2 even when the full life-cycles of the units are comparison between the generating costs of current considered. Figure 7 makes clear that CO emissions and future NPPs is difficult. For existing plants, firm 2 derived from nuclear power are in the same range as estimates do exist. However, for Generation III/III+ those from hydro power, and may thus also be plants, estimates are based on detailed economic characterized as formally CO -free. analyses, on concrete tenders (EPR, Finland), or on 2

2.0

Rest of chain

1.5 Power plant operation ) / kWh 1.0 -equiv. 2

0.5 kg(CO

0.0

Fig. 7: Comparison of greenhouse gas emissions for different energy chains, expressed in terms of CO2 equivalent.

8 CONCLUSIONS technological advancement, on the solution of the waste issue, and on the general economic situation. By exploiting the potential for nuclear energy production at the existing NPP sites, it is possible to REFERENCES maintain a practically CO2-free energy mix in Switzerland. New NPPs of the Generation III/III+ and [1] Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates Generation IV series have a much lower probability of for the Period up to 2030, International Atomic a core-melt accident than Generation II plants, and Energy Agency (IAEA), Wien, 2003. are designed in such a way that the effects of even [2] Global Energy Perspectives (ed. Nebojsa), the most severe accident would remain confined within the plant itself, and have no impact on the International Institute for Applied Systems environment. A release of radioactivity from modern Analysis (IIASA), Laxemburg / Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. NPPs is practically impossible. Reprocessing and recycling in combination with Generation IV [3] Emission Scenarios (ed. Nebojsa), International technologies also help to reduce substantially the Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Cambridge amount of radioactive waste for disposal. University Press, Cambridge, 2000. A decisive factor for the exploitation of the potential of [4] Kernkraftwerk Gösgen-Däniken AG, 30. Ge- nuclear energy will be its acceptance by the public. schäftsbericht 2002, Olten, 2002. Such acceptance relies heavily on the level of trust in 24

[5] Kernkraftwerk Leibstadt AG Geschäftsbericht [9] The costs of generating electricity, Royal 2002, Leibstadt, 2002. Academy of Engineering (RAE), London, 2004; Online version: [6] Prognos AG: Szenario zur Entwicklung http://www.raeng.org.uk/news/temp/ ausgewählter Energiepreise in der Schweiz, cost_generation_report.pdf. 1999. [10] Various informations from the Nuclear Energy [7] Kröger W., Fischer P.: Balancing Safety and Institute (NEI), Washington DC, 2004; Online Economics, TopSafe ‚98, Valencia, 1998. version: http://www.nei.org/. [8] Various information from the Uranium

Information Centre (UIC), Melbourne, 2004; Online version: http://www.uic.com.au/.