KAERl/CM-204/97

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Development of the Cold Neutron Source

Cryogenic Technology Review of Cold Neutron Source Facility For Localization DISCLAIMER

Portions of this document may be illegible in electronic image products. Images are produced from the best available original document. KAER1/CM-204/97

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Development of the Cold Neutron Source

Cryogenic Technology Review of Cold Neutron Source Facility For Localization 1998. 2.28. (J-

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– xii – ... – X111- – xiv – SUMMARY

I. Project Title

Cryogenic Technology Review of Cold Neutron Source Facility

for Localization

11, Objective and Importance of the Project

Tilf2 concept design for cold ~eutmn so~rce facility of HALNARO was

completed as the first step. Before the basic and detailed designs proceed

further, local technology environments as well as the safety and licensing

of facility should be investigated to ensure viable and successful

installation and to examine the potentiality of localization.

CNS facility includes the sophisticated cryogenic, gas control and

vacuum technology, Gas control and vacuum technology, together with

semiconducting industry, have developed highly. However, despite the Pact

that cryogenic technology including helium refrigerator and cryogenic

assembly, the core parts of CNS, is one of the main branches of the 21st

century’s cutting technology, systematic research group is not even established domestically.

The purpose of this R&D is to investigate, compare and examine the domestic and the advanced countries’ CNS facility technologies, to

–xv- determine the field of technology to be imported from the advanced countries and the possible field of localization, to actively induce the participation of the domestic specialists, to secure a leading role for the domestic specialists in the installation of CNS facility, and to eventually foster the development of local technology through the technology transfer and R&D.

HI. Contents and Scope of the Project

This R&D, which examines the technology of HANARO CNS facility, and the potentiality of installation by designing and manufacturing domestically, as well as reviewing the safety and licensing of the reactor, consists of PART I. Local cryogenic technology for CNS facility, and

PART II. Safety and licensing of CNS facility.

In PART I, the technology of CNS facility is reviewed with respect to cryogenic and warm part separately, with reference to the concept design report of CNS done by PNPI of Russia in corporation with KAERI and the examination report by technicatome of France. The local cryogenic equipments being developed in companies, government funded research institutes and universities are investigated extensively and the level of local cryogenic technology is examined. The technology of CNS installed in NIST of U.S.A. and Kyoto university of Japan is investigated in depth.

The cryogenic companies of U.S.A., Japan and Europe are also investigated and the level of technology is examined. Further, the level of local CNS technology, cryogenic part such as helium refrigerators, vacuum insulated

– xvi – pipes, condenser, cryogenic fluid tubes and moderator cell, and warm part such as gas control, vacuum and gas analysis, are compared with that of the advanced countries, which will serve as a reference to determine whether localization plan for HANARO CNS facility is viable.

In PART II, the safety standard in domestic nuclear power regulations is compared with that of the foreign countries, and the relative relations with the sa’fety of HANARO reactor is examined. The necessary safety conditions for CNS facility design are investigated and elements of possible accidents are analyzed, compared with similar elements “of other facilities.

The system failure and its influence are also examined. In addition, the licensing method for HANARO CNS facility is discussed, based on the review of current domestic licensing system and comparisons with examples of foreign countries.

IV. Results

PART I. Review of Domestic Cryogenic Technology for CNS facility

CNS facility consists of cryogenic and warm part. Cryogenic part consists of a helium refrigerator and vacuum insulated pipes outside a reactor and a condenser, a cryogenic fluid tube and moderator cell inside or outside a reactor. The warm part consists of hydrogen gas line such as a hydrogen buffer tank, gas control equipments and a gas analyser, the safety and thermal insulation part such as nitrogen and helium gas supplying systems, and vacuum system. Therefore, sufficient level of

- xvii - cryogenic, gas control and vacuum technology are necessary to localize

CNS facility.

1. Current status of domestic cryogenic technology

Daesungsanso co., ltd. and Korea gas corporation are the on]y companies which perform R&D specialized in designing and manufacturing cryogenic equipments. Other than those, there are some companies in this

field, but their sizes are small and they lack sufficient level of technology.

Cryogenic research institute of Daesungsanso co., ltd performs R&D to localize the main facility, the so-called air separation unit, producing industrial gases, as well as a variety of equipments. They have developed vacuum insulated pipes, cryogenic valves, cryogenic gas pumps, LGC and cryogenic tanks. They are now developing a pulse tube refrigerator and low temperature cryostat. They also poses a lot of know-how and capability in the areas of cryogenic process calculations, design and manufacture through many years of R&D.

Korea gas corporation established the R&D center to do research and development of LNG equipments, as a government funded company which imports and distributes LNG. They succeeded to develope membranes, which are used in the inner vessels of LNG storage tanks, and now are on the process of planning to manufacture their own LNG storage tank. CVE is manufacturing passive cryogenic equipments, on ordering basis, such as liquid helium cryostat and vacuum vessel

Basic research in cryogenic temperature is being conducted actively in government funded research institutes. Many government funded research

... - Xvlll - institutes keep superior specialists and high technology equipments in cryogenics and conduct sophiscated researches in the fields of cryogenic properties of materials, superconductors, MRI, cryogenic refrigerators.

Korea institute of machinery and materials has developed small size refrigerators such as GM refrigerators, GM/JT refrigerators, cryopumps, pulse tube refrigerators. Korea institute of science and technology has develo~ed S“tirling refrigerators and recently has undertaken to develope hydrogen liquefying system and storage tank for hydrogen which attributes clean energy as well as alternative energy in the future. Korea electrotechnology research institute developes cryogenic equipments to commercialize MRI magnets and superconductors. Korea basic research center, a branch of Korea standard research institute, is developing a dilution refrigerator which is a high-tech cryogenic equipment.

Current research status of universities is very weak compared with industrial companies and government funded research institutes. The research of universities is being done in physics and mechanical engineering departments, but it remains at a basic level except for superconductor research, because of limited research funds and shortage of researchers. Recently, the number of researchers in cryogenic field is increasing because the importance of liquid hydrogen, LNG and cryogenic refrigerators is recognized.

Unlike cryogenic part, the technology of warm part is at a considerably high level as a result of the extensive effort of many companies, due to the domestic boom of semiconductor industries and the expansion of international semiconductor market. Also, there are many companies with high technology manufacturing storage tanks and pipe lines. Therefore, there is a good possibility to localize warm part of CNS facility.

Even though it is already recognized that cryogenic technology will be the important base of the cutting-edge science in the 21st century, a very limited number of companies is involved in doing R&D since this fact is not re~ogniied generally and the domestic market is small. Even though it is fortunate that government funded research institutes and universities realized recently the importance of cryogenic technology, which is well behind that of the advanced countries, the interest and investment of government and companies are disparately needed.

2. The estimation of the localization potentiality for CNS facility

The potentiality of localization is examined based on the technological capability of each research institute in regards to each part of CNS facility, and the result is presented in table 3-12-1 and table 3-12-2.

Assuming that the technology of CNS facility consists of basic process calculations, design according to calculations, manufacturing, construction and installation, it is possible to do locally construction, installation, and a part of design and manufacturing. While almost all the parts of warm part are possible to localize, cryogenic part ‘is well behind the advanced countries. Therefore, important parts such as a helium refrigerator and a heat exchanger should be imported, and we need a R&D effort to localize a cryogenic fluid tube and a moderator cell.

–xx– 3. CNS facility & current status of cryogenics of advanced countries

NIST in U.S.A. and Kyoto university in Japan use the similar process and method for moderator celi, cryogenic fluid tube and condenser on CNS facility. While NIST uses a material of aluminum series, Kyoto university uses stainless steel. They utilize the same configuration of a coaxial fluid tube for connecting a moderator cell in the horizontal hole inside the reactor to a condenser outside the reactor., but there is difference in the geometric pattern. While NIST considers space -saving primary, Kyoto university gives more consideration to the smooth flow of hydrogen vapor and liquid.

The advanced countries, i.e. U.S.A, Japan and Europe, started very early to do R&D for cryogenic technology, and monopolize the world market of cryogenic equipments, and especially industrial gases by developing air separation unit with cryogenic technology. BOC in England, AirLiquide in

France, Air Product in U.S.A. and Nipponsanso in Japan are the representative companies producing industrial gases, as well as marketing the most of the cryogenic equipments such as large-sized helium refrigerators, cryogenic refrigerators, hydrogen liquefiers, cryogenic storage tanks, cryogenic pumps, etc.

Helium refrigerators occupy an important part in cryogenic technology and require a lot of know–how. There tie not many companies that manufacture helium refrigerators with large cooling powers as a CNS facility requires. Linde in Germany and AirLiquide in France are well known for the gas-bearing type of expansion turbines for helium gas, the main part in helium refrigerators. And together with CVI or KOCH, branches of PSI, in U.S. A., they are considered as being on a similar level of technology in helium refrigerators with cooling power higher than 2

Iov.

4. Suggestion for localization of CNS facility

CNS facility contains cryogenic, vacuum, gas control technologies. Since it is believed that the warm part such as vacuum and gas control systems can be localized without much trouble, it is imperative that a lot of research and investment be focused on cryogenic part. Even though there will be a lot of difficulties to localize CNS facility due to the weak background of domestic cryogenic technology, it may be feasible if R&D is performed for some period. of time.

Considering the current status of domestic cryogenic technology, we should import a helium refrigerator, a heat exchanger for condenser and materials for a moderator cell and a cryogenic fluid tube. Since the process calculation is feasible, the cryogenic assembly, the main equipment of cryogenic part, may be designed by deep analysis of methods used in advanced countries and in consultation with domestic specialists. After that, the design may be examined by specialists in advanced countries whether it is workable.

After manufacturing the cryogenic assembly according to design, it should be tested and simulated sufficiently in an environment similar to the real situation. If it is successful, the installation of that equipment in the reactor may be seriously considered. If it is not successful, the problem may be solved by consulting with foreign specialists. In the worst case

– xxii – scenario, if the problems still remain, only a cryogenic assembly may be bought and installed together with the existing helium refrigerator. At this moment, though it is difficult to be certain that the localization of CNS facility will be successful, it will be worth while to try the localization, considering the current economic situation.

PART 11. Review of Safety and Licensing of CNS Facility

1. Licensing Approach

Presently in Korea, safety criteria for power reactors are mostly applied

for the licensing of research reactors. Therefore, there are many obstacles

during the research reactor licensing stage. During the operation of research reactor, addition or modification of peripheral experimental facilities is required frequently for the flexibility of research. It is

inefficient to submit the licensing application for each facility modifications or experiments applying same rules as reactor construction or operation licensing.

The existing atomic law and related regulations don’ t specify the appropriate rules which incorporate these operational characteristics of research reactor. Such inefficiency should be avoided by the establishment of reasonable licensing system through the cooperation between regulatory agency and HANARO operator KAERI.

As a conclusion, the best procedures and methods for the licensing of

Cold Neutron Source” (CNS) facility under the present licensing environment is;

... – Xxlll – A. Licensing criteria for CNS should be established prior to the start of

CNS basic design. The regulatory body should conduct preliminary

review of the design criteria document prepared by KAERI. The

document should describe the safety principles, safety criteria, safety

analysis methodologies, acceptable criteria and their backgrounds.

During this process, it is recommended for KAERI to submi~ the

project schedule- and to reach agreement on the licensing schedule.

B. In parallel with or prior to above activity, the establishment of basic

licensing regime is required. The new regime categorizes the KAERI

internal approval issues and regulatory body approval issues for the

future facility changes or experiments. It is recommended to adopt the

IAEA guides as a principal structures of ‘such regime. HANARO Center

or KAERI should be responsible for this attempt. c. The basic and detail design should be proceeded after the completion of

review and discussion on the design criteria. Safety analysis will follow

as the next stage. The activity flow during this stage should be

iterated several times as shown in figure 2-3-1.

D. The documents submitted for licensing of CNS should be simplified into

three documents ; a) Change Application Forms, b) Impacted parts of

existing HANARO Safety Analysis Report, and c) Impacted parts of

existing HANARO Operating Procedures: It is not necessary to submit

whole volumes of SAR and Operating Procedures including unimpacted

parts. During the Safety Analysis Report preparation, it is recommended

to keep the level of detail consistent with the existing Safety Analysis

Report for the easiness of SAR control. The details of analysis such as

- xxiv – calculation sheets should be maintained as separate documents. They

can be submitted upon the request of regulatory body.

2. Safety principles, design principles and design criteria

It’s necessary that safety principles and design criteria should follow the safety regimes of HANARO. The reasons are; 1) CNS is one of the

HANARO’s “peripheral, 2) It is very natural to follow the safety regimes of

HANARO which is already licensed and under operation, 3) The existing

HANARO’s regimes can accommodate design, fabrication and CNS operation.

It is recommended that the principles of IAEA Safety Series No. 35 -G2 for research reactors should be used for CNS. It is reasonable to establish the design criteria of CN-S appiying the safety classification system of

HANARO as followings.

CLASSIFICATIONS SYSTENL’’EQUIPMENT SAFETY SEISMIC QUALITY

1. Equipments in Reactor Pool NNS II T (UD to the isolation valve)

2. Hydrogen System )1 1/ // (after the isolation valve)

3. Helium Svstem [t Non-seismic s

4. Vacuum System 1! 1) It

5. Shield Structure of CNS Guide N/A 11 T

6. Aux. Experimental Facilities t! N’on-seismic s

7. Utility NNS // 1/

8. I&C System II // 1!

– xxv – 3. Safety Analysis Methods

The spectrum of initiating events which can induce accidents should be selected in order to perform the safety analysis of CNS. The preliminary list of initiating events were developed as followings referring the cases of cold neutron facility in Brookhaven National Laboratory

CATEGORY INITIATING EVENTS 1) Events which 1) Hydrogen related events could cause a a. Introduction and Accumulation of Air on breach in any of Cold Surfaces the fission product b. Ozone Formation barriers. c. Formation of Hydrogen and Air lMixtures in the Hydrogen System ~) Events which d. Hydrogen System Over-pressurization

could adversely e. Release of Hydrogen within the Reactor Hail affect engineered f. Hydrogen-Air Reaction Outside of the safety features or Containment System and its Effect on the In-pile Portion control system g. Hydrogen Entering the Cold Helium System features. h. Hydrogen Entering the Process Vacuum System i. Failure of the Hydrogen Vent and Purge Operation j. Major Breach of Both the Helium Containment and the In-pile Vacuum Casing k. Change in Reactivity due to Liquid Hydrogen 2) Release of Helium Refrigerant 3) Change in Reactivity with Light Water Flooding of Beam Tube

– xxvi – CATEGORY INITIATING EVENTS

3) Events which could 1) Release of the Helium Refrigerant create radiological a. Release in the In--pile Vacuum System risks due to b. Release in the Out-pile Vacuum System radiation fields or 2) Loss of Refrigeration unconfined 3) Loss of Coolant to the Plug radioactive material. 4) Shutter Malfunction 5) Plug Over-pressurization 6) Tritium Formation and its Accidental Release 9 Events relating to 1) Potentially adverse interactions resulting interactions with from the use of common electric circuits other experiments and suppliers and common portions of fluid or with operational system such as manifolds for cooling activities. water, vent, or drain systems. 2) initiating events of HANARO

4. Risk Assessment Although the FMEA analysis ndicates that cold neutron source facility is judged to be safe because of vacuum pressure vessel and helium blanket installed around hydrogen system, a mixture of hydrogen and air can be generated by the loss of mechanical integrity of pressure vessel or helium blanket. In this case, propagation to the hydrogen explosion could be assumed. Therefore, mechanical integrity program for the vacuum pressure vessel and the helium blanket should be verified.

The consequence analysis for the explosion after instantaneous release

– xxvii – of whole inventory of liquid hydrogen contained in the moderator system indicates that peak overpressure of 1 psig(6,895 Pa) is applied at 30m distance. 1 psig of overpressure does not impose any adverse effect to person or structure, but can induce glass breakage and partial demolition of houses. 1 psig of overpressure is generally applied as a criteria for the structure protection in the nuclear power plant, so that this amount of overpfessure should be Considered in the design and arrangement of the cold neutron source facility.

These analysis were performed during the conceptual design phase. The detailed analyses should be performed in the future based on actual design informations. And the quantitative risk analysis should be carried out to estimate the likelihood of hydrogen explosion probabilistically. When the operating procedures are fully developed additional analysis should be carried out taking account of startup and shutdown risk

The consequence of a hydrogen explosion depends on the location of explosion and the volume of hydrogen involved in the explosion. As the design of the cold neutron source facility depends on the results of the consequence analysis} more careful discussion for the consequence analysis is required.

Consequence analysis in this report is for the worst case scenario based on very conservative assumptions. Since the result of this analysis shows that an explosion can impose highly adverse impact to the safety of the reactor depending on the location of the explosion, all aspects of the risk I assessment should be scrutinized during the initial stage of basic design.

In conclusion, it is recommended that higher priority should be assigned

... – XXVIII -

I to the prevention of the pipe rupture at the line exposed to air between equipment room and reactor pool by upgrading the piping design.—

V. Utilization Plan

The importance of technology is emphasized as never before with entrance into unlimited competition in technology as heralded by WTO and the current economic crisis in our country. We cannot deny that only technology can be the driving force of national progress in our country which lacks natural resources and so depends on import of raw materials.

Even though we know the fact that the level of domestic cryogenic technology is quite low, in order to foster domestic technology progress, this R&D report is expected to be used as follows.

- Serve as a reference to determine whether localization plan for

HANARO CNS facility is viable,

- Induce extensive participation of domestic companies and specialists,

- Arrange domestic companies or specialists to attain transfer of

technology when the technology is imported,

- Examine the potentiality of localization without the help of foreign

companies, and

- Ensure that domestic specialists play a leading role in negotiating

the import of technology with foreign companies.

– xxix – CONTENTS

PART I. Review of Domestic Cryogenic Technology for

CNS facility

Chapter 1. Introduction ...... 3

Chapter 2. Cold neutron source facility ...... ~

Section 1 Basic Concept of CNS facility ...... ~

Section 2 Technology of cryogenic part ...... 8

Section 3 Technology of warm Part ““”””””””””””””””””””.-”””.””..-... 17 Chapter 3 Current status of domestic cryogenic technology ...... 20

Section 1 Introduction ...... 2O

Section 2 Daesungsanso Co.; Ltd, Cryogenic Research Institute . ~.~~ 22

Section 3 CVE ...... 37

Section 4 Korea Gas Corporation, R&D Center ...... -...... 40

Section 5 Korea Electric Power Corporation, Research Institute . ~..~.~~.44

Section 6 Korea Institute of Science and Technology ..-.....-...... -.....49

Section 7 Korea Standard Research Institute

and Korea Basic Science Center ...... 56

Section 8 Korea Institute of Machinery & Materials ...... 61

Section 9 Korea Electrotechnology Research Institute ...... 69

Section 10 Current status of universities ...... 74

Section 11 Hanyang Engineering Co...... -...... 76

Section 12 Conclusion ...... 78

- xxx _. Chapter 4 CNS facility and cryogenic technology in foreign countries ~~~85

Section 1 CNS facility of NIST in U.S.A...... -...... -...... 85

Section 2 Current status of cryogenic technology in U.S.A...... 100 Section 3 CNS facility of Kyoto university .....-..102 I Section 4 Current status of cryogenic technology in Japan ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~108

Section 5 Current status of cryogenic technology in Europe ...... 111

Section 6 Summary ...... 117

Chapter 5 Utilization plan of R&D results ...... 119

Section 1 CNS facility technology of cryogenic and warm part ~.. ~119

Section 2 Suggestion for localization of CNS facility ...... 121

Section 3 Utilization plan ...... 125 I Chapter 6 Reference ...... 126

Appendix ...... 129

1. Cryogenic companies of U.S.A...... 130

2. Cryogenic companies of Japan ...... 134

3. Cryogenic specialists in Korea ...... - 137

4. Physical properties of hydrogen ...... - 140 I

– xxxi - PART H. Review of Safety and Licensing of CNS Facility

Chapter 1 Introduction ...... I

Chapter 2 Review of Safety Criteria ...... 3

Section 1 Review of Applicable Domestic Regulations ...... 3

Section 2 Review of Foreign Referencing Criteria ...... 13

Section 3 Review of Inter-relations with HANARO ...... 30

Section 4 Review of Interfaces with Safety of HANARO ...... 42

Chapter 3 Establishment cf Safety Regimes of CNS ...... 43

Section 1 Design Goal of CNS ...... 43

Section 2 Safety Regimes of Design ...... 44

Chapter 4 Selection and Analysis Methods of Accidents ...... -...... 57 I Section 1 Composition of CNS Facility ....-...... 57

Section 2 Selecting Principles of Initiating Events ...... --...... 67

Section 3 Examples of Similar Facility .-.-..-.-...... -...... -....-..68

Section 4 Methods of CNS Accident Analysis ...... -...-...... 84

Chapter 5 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis of CNS .-----..-...... 90

Section 1 Introduction of Risk Assessment ...... 9O

Section 2 Risk Assessment Methodology ...... -.....-....-...... 92

Section 3 Scope of Risk Assessment ...... 104

Section 4 Results of Risk Assessment ...... 105

Section 5 Conclusion ..+...... +...... 111

– XxXii - Chapter 6 Review of Approach Method of Licensing ...... 113

Section 1 Review of Existing Korean Licensing Regime ...113

Section 2 Review of Foreign Practices ..-..-...... -.114

Section 3 Review of Domestic Examples ...... 117

Section 4 Licensing Method of CNS ...... 119

Chapter 7 Conclusion ...... 121

Chapter 8 References ...... l25

Appendix Failure Mode and Effect Analysis Worksheet ...... 127

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– xli - I – ~jii - PART I

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= 35.11 [cc/secl

-14- Helium compressor +QR, “e ? - . ‘He ~

J& d I I /LN, . bath 1 ti Makeup ‘He ]kmh )f . gas T- ———. . +--LN2 + I UT n- Main compressor

[ w.

I -(m–m,)r

L==l1– — –1 “pander rnf – ciqu~ --l I

-15- -16- ’21X+= P1%+ Process Systems International, Inc+ 3 21~ ~ ~}1! CVI,

-17- M cl-,() = [{5.0 + 0.510} x 0.9 + {10 x 0.1}1 x 34.63

+ {2.951 + 10 X 0.9} X 0.82

= 216.2 [mole]

Mr,,,,rn= {2000 + 7.399} X 0.0532

= 106.8 [mole]

P = {216.2 + 106.8} X 8.21 X 10--2 X 293.15 / 2025.86

= 3.84 [atml

-18- -19- -20- -21- -22- -23- -24- -25- -26- I

I 1

-27- -28- -29- -30- I

I

I

I

-33- 1 -34- LOWPRESSURE COLUMN FREON COOLER EL LIQUID OXYGEN

LIQUID NITROGEN

SEPARATOR/ 1 IIIL J ADSORPTION IF TOWER w HIGH PRESSURE COLUMN E~ANSION TURBINE

-35- --36- I

I

-37- -%- I

I

I

-39- -40- /$2”!I ,

“’ <>’~pended ceiling ‘ - -1-’”- Insulating panel ~.- ;17?;Ij.::*;.:::-’ — ~—...... :_ :2 :; ,, ,. Membrane _—— ------.,,! - 1‘:.1 . .. .x —--——-’— ---- :’, ‘ ‘1 .“ “’ “ -“- n Fixation stud “ spit “. 1 I- II[= ---...1 ——--- ... .— .}-1 ~~414q,’:fl’”-=”---=l~~I~TAnchoring piece

YE!!

-41- -42- -43- -44- -45- Fee DdDT ~------, DTO ,

, 8

-

, t — ,

0

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F===l PEl

-4(- -47- 1

-48-

! Q- ~g

I.

II.

III.

-49- T=const 2 1

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A \ Entropy s

Iv — —1 — —rf — — m — — Iv 5

9

6 7

6 -- 8 ----

0 h--—.T 1 2 3 4

-50- -51-

praawa gauge MFC

M temperaturesensor m 3-wayvaka ~ @ 1- ‘“w” MLI r------f-’_l- — radialbnshield Vaculml 1,2,,,5 No. d sansas 1 gauge m GH2 line El 1 0 I I 1 vacuumpump

GM Rafrtgaretor ,eed~

Iletible heliumha

L do

H ‘Wuum - vawm pump

-53- -54- I

I

I

-55- 1 /ql~] ~zs+ g +9>

(dilution refrigerator),

-56- -57- Z ~ 3–7–1 ~‘+ ~ % 71 (dilution refrigerator, Oxford)

-58- -59- -60- -61-

-63- -64- -65- -66-

-68- -69- -70- -71- -72- I

-73- -74-

-76- -77- -78- -79- -80- -81- -82- ) -84- -85- X 4-1-1 DESIGN CONDITIONS Design Pressure Allowable Pressure (psid) (psid)

Internal External Internal External Moderator 74 15 119 48 Vac~um Insulating System o 17 64 46 Helium Containment System 1800-burst 125 139 235 Heavy Water Cooling Jacket 125 15 141 19 Hydrogen Condenser(H~ side) 143 Hydrogen Condenser(He side) 300 Hydrogen Ballast Tank 74 17 74

234-1-2 NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS

COLD PART WARM PART Pressure Temp. Pressure Temp. (MPa) (K) (MPa) (K) Vlcderator 0.15 21.672 0.30 330 Vacuum Insulating System

Moderator Vessel: Weight(grams) Inner sphere: 0. D.=28cm, 0.020” wall. Outer sphere: 1.D.=32cm, 0.063” wall. Moderator chamber assembly 1900( est.) Liquid HZ capacity: 4.7 liters. (@21.672K,10%void) m total 2230

-86- Vacuum Vessel: Elliptical Head: 0.100” wall; ratio= l.2:1. 2404 Cylindrical Section: 0.100” wall. 4239 Spherical End Cap: 0.100” wall. 2549 I total 9192 Outside Diameter= 18.70” ,Vessel Length=34.5” ,v01=128649 cm3

Helium Containment Vessel: Elliptical Head: 0.375” to 0.250” wall; ratio= l.2:1. 9780 Cylindrical Section: 0.375” wall. 15940 Spherical End Cap: 0.250” wall, 8159 Adapter Ring: 0.375” wall. 14371 Flange: 12792 total 61042 Outside Diameter= 19.75” ,Vessel Length=35.6”

Water Coolirw Tacket: Elliptical Head: 0.250” to 0.125” wall; ratio=2:l. 6080 Cylindrical. Section: 0.250” wall. 21642 total 27722 Outside Diameter=21.50” Annular Space: 0.625” cylindrical, 0.250” head gap. Water Capacity: 40.3 kg; flow rate= 25gpm for 10”C delta T. D20 cooling water supply temperature=308.15K(35 “C)max. HzO cooling water supply temperature=305.15K( 32”C)max.

Tube:

Hydrogen Liquid: 0.50” OD x 0.035” wall. Hydrogen Vapor: 1.25” OD x 0.095” wall. Vacuum Insulation: 2.00” OD x 0.065” wall. Helium Containment: 2.50” OD x 0.125” wall.

-87- o-own -DwLu

“ w,- py :/1Mom!! ti-s.ilvii-fu* 3LnuLsl TnKuw n f?x%01 m :0 ,,, 1-l , ‘;k U& II UmsmlWm 6’73*7w — 1 1. Llll

h-.CL. I ..ww - C%J w -W-- * .* -- 5 UIiiii+ L..-. —.——.—.—..J I

I

-89- -90-

-92- -93- -94- g #- . --—.-\_-.____. -_-__— --__g- WYT_T----

1 I !

I %d I I .-f’!i%a! + I I

I 1

-=/ I I ill

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-@ I I 4 I d, j --— --—--_--—__—-.—_-—_-—- 6 -.— - -i “ii c9-ii

-95- -96-

1 I

-97- 31 4-1-4 Cold Source Alarms

Alarm No. Alarm Condition 1 Gross Lost Vacuum, 100 mtorr 2 HD1 Hydrogen Detector > 10% LFL 3 HD2 Hydrogen Detector > 10% LFL I 4 LHz Dryout I

5 No AC Powerj VG-1 and VG-2 t 1~ / DzO Flow - A <5 gpm I 17 I DzO Flow - B <5 gpm I I 8 \ P-5 Ballast Tank Containment I 9 I P-8 Pump ‘A’ Containment P-9 Pump ‘B’ Containment i 10 i 11 P-11 Vacuum Valve Containment 12 P-12 Moderator Containment 13 P-13 Condensor Containment 14 VG-1 > 1 mtorr I 15 VG-2 > 1 mtorr I 16 I Pi-A not 70-150 kPa I 17 I Pi-B not 70-150 kPa I I 18 I Pi-A < 400 kPa, Warm I 19 I P1 -B < 400 kPa, Warm 20 PLC Rack Fault 21 P-3 < 400 kPa, Warm

-98- -99-

1 - 100- - 101 - r

TOR

M MNIJAL VALVE @ MASS ANALYSER

& ELECTRO PNEUIIATIC VALVE @ PRESSURE INOICATOR

~ ELECTRO PNEUMATIC CONTROL VALVE 0 TEMPERATURE INOICATOR

@ PRESSURE CONTROLLER t% ELECTRIJ CONTROLVALVE @ TEMPERATURECONTROLLER #l NEEOLE VALVE EGASCNRMLATCUWWICSWCTROMETER :@ VACUW ALARM AND INOICATOR

- 102 - I

- 103-

Mderatcr transfer rube (Dmble-wulled ccxmtercurren; flow tube) Slit ““-w “k” Liquidtubewith SIits arrangedoveraII lergth on the wall 1 I l-—M .4. L -,54-- 4 k- 154 -“ -- Vertical view Plain view

I ge:t( -’ ‘ ‘ AA 6) m[.1[.>\ \~1~%--ID-----J ‘V’Jvw \lllll rhemol shield B%&&+ ]f lead 2 W#ator transfer “~

Remtor EE?E!El

/

- 105- L

-1o6- - 107-

f - 108-

- 110- omp

\eat ne wheel

‘?=’-==7

“7 & .—J,= ----- .- .,

_.. _—_ , - ——.. -.

“cartridge

- 111 - — 112 - - 113- . 3

Coolant inlet

-- Brake cooler

Coolant outlet

Brake compressor impeller Thrust bearing

Bearing cartridge Y ...... Shaft coolant connection ‘L -- ~ ‘“”’ Speed sensor

Turboexpander runner

‘‘ Radial bearing

- 114 - - 115- I

- 116- - 117- - 118- - 119- - 120- I I

- 121 - I

I

~q 5.2.1

- 122-

I - 123- - 124 - - 125- - 126- 1. %%- q, “HAN~R()~] Qj~~~ X} % %~~1Q] ‘s~la 9132 7]s4 7~E”, KAERI/RR-1598/95, a%~z}~Q?&, 1995.

~, q~~+ q, ‘t~ ~~~ x}Q 71~~”, IaERI/RR 1728/96, @%fJ X} q g -?4,

1996.

3. “Desingn Review of Hanaro Cold Neutron Source Conceptual Design

Report”, technicatome, France, 1997.

4. Rene A. Haefer, “Cryopumping theory and practice”, hflonographs on

cryogenics 4, Oxford, New York, 1989.

5. Graham Walker & E. R. Bingham, “Low-capacity cryogenics

refrigeration”, Monographs on cryogenics 9, Oxford, New York, 1996.

6. Randall F. Barron, “Cryogenic systems 2-rid cd.”, Monographs on

cryogenics 3, Oxford, New York, 1985.

7, Guy K. White, “Experimental techniques in low-temperature physics

3-rd cd.”, Monographs on the physics and chemistry of materials 43,

Oxford, New York, 1979.

8. A. Arkharov, I. Marfenina & Ye. Mikulin, “Theory and design of

cryogenic systems”, Mir publishers, Moscow, 1981.

9. Thomas M. Flynn, “Cryogenic engineering”, hlarcel Dekker, New York,

1997.

10. Martin Moskovits & Geoffrey A. Ozin, “Cryochemistry”, John Wiley &

Sons, 1976.

11. Frederick J. Edeskuty & Walter F. Stewart, “Safety in the handling of

cryogenic fluids”, The International Cryogenics Monograph Series,

-lz7- Plenum, New York, 1996.

12. B. A. Hands, “Cryogenic engineering”, Academic Press, 1986.

13. Randall F. Barron, “Cryogenic systems”, McGraw-Hill, 1966.

14. Klaus D. Timmerhaus & Thomas M, Flynn, “Cryogenic process

engineering”, The International Cryogenic Monograph Series, Plenum,

New York, 1989.

15. Graham Walker, “Cryocoolers part 1 : fundamentals”, Plenum, 1983.

16. Graham Walker, “Cryocoolers part 2 : applications”, Plenum, 1983.

18.

19.

20. 4$H%R, “EfE%#Mi!”, WtiEA~+tikJ@?, 1987.

21. Advances in cryogenic engineering, - Vol. 41, Plenum.

22. Cryocooler, - Vol 9, Plenum.

23. Robert E. Willians and J. Michael Rowe et al, “Benchmark of the

nuclear heat deposition in the NIST liquid hydrogen cold source”, Proc.

9th Int. sym. on Reactor Dosimetry, Prague, Sept 2, 1996.

24. J.M. Rowe et al, “Summary description of the proposed liquid hydrogen

source in the NBSR’, NIST proposal, 1994.

25. J.D. Siegwarth et al, “Thermal hydraulic tests of a liquid hydrogen cold

neutron source”, NISTIR 5026, 1994.

26. T. Kawai et al, “Self-regulating characteristics of a cold neutron source

with closed–themosiphon”, Nuclear Instruments and Method in Physics

Research A276, 408, 1989.

27. T. Kawai et al, “Measurements of neutron intensity from liquid

- 128 - deuterium moderator of the cold neutron source of KUR”, Ann. Rep.

Res. Reactor Ins., Kyoto Univ., Vol 23, 158, 1990.

28. Kenji Yoneda et al, “Radiographic measurements of cold neutron guide

output from KUR–CNS”, Ann. Rep. Res. Reactor Ins., Kyoto Univ., Vol

23, 37, 1990.

29. ‘T. Kawai et al, “Instrument for polarizing cold neutrons with a

wavelength of 9A”, Ann. Rep. Res. Reactor Ins., Kyoto Univ., Vol 27,

235, 1994.

30. T. Kawai et al, “Cold Neutron facility on KUR - Its construction and

test operations outside the reactor”, Ann. Rep. Res. Reactor Ins., KyOtO

Univ., Vol 13, 105,.1980.

w. T. Kawai et al, “Suction pumping method through Ar attenuation tanks

for reduction of Ar dose rate”, Ei*E%:FZ@@:~, Vol 31, No 7, 837, 1989.

31 ‘M?E%, “{lIEZ’PJE”7”?M/&i: 16 4M43}2”Y40 )Jgs%’pl-y}%”, ~~[j~&~

-T-@i~.%k%, %31El~41RiW!&t!2, 3-12, 1997.

32. K. Maeda et al, “Stress states in quenched SiC/Al particulate

composites examined by neutron diffraction”, Scripts Meterialia, VO1 36,

No. 3, 335, 1997.

33. T. Kawai et al, “Numerical simulation of self-regulating characteristics

of a cold neutron source with a closed–thermosiphon”, Nuclear Inst.

and Methods in Phys. research A285, 520, 1989

34. Proceedings of The International Workshop on Cold Neutron Utilization,

hold at KAERI in Korea, Dec. 3, 1997.

- 129 - - 130- @ 3+/q _& Ability 708/331-0025 1 Engineering Tech. 708/331 -5090 Inc.

ACME 215/966-4488 2 Cryogenics, Inc. 215/966-5533

American 414/549-1878 3 Cryogenics, Inc. 414/549-4320 APD 610/791-6700 4 Cryogenics, Inc. 610/791 -0440

BABCOCK & 804/948-4616 5 WILCOX 804/948-4747

BARBER- cryogenic blower, circulator, pum~ 303/421-8111 6 NICHOLS, Inc. and compressor 303/420-4679 cryocooler: 508/262-8040 7 BOREAS, Inc. B100([email protected]) ~ B1OO-R 508/262-8001

CONDUCTUS, 619/559-2700 8 INC. 519/550-2799

308/686-3636 9 CRYOFAB, Inc. 308/686-9538

- 131 - g% ~A\~ ~A} 427] X-Jiq./q &

qSL%-”1] A}-8-~5 cryogenic 619/450-6868 10 CRYOGEN, Inc. catheter 7]%} ~~1] 619/450-3187

Cryogenic 1~%% 7}5q ~i%~, %Et, 708/485-2060 11 Craftsman ol+~}~lq Ajxl, xil~;, +X1, M.+ 708/485-2070

xj8*4q7}& %=, 371E4~J~l, Cryogenic 909/696--7840 12 sampler, A * ~ % %lfil, %%}71, Industries 909/698-7484 cylinder S Z ‘I X1, turboexpander

315/455-2555 13 CRYOMECH, Inc. ~~~ G-M ~%71 ~ cryostat 315/455-2544 Cryomedical 301/417-7070 14 ~i~% + %t%- ‘$tl q 7i%~qxl] Science, Inc.

@1371-5%=, %~i+?-~%71, CVI 800/828-7381 15 LNG @l471, LNG fuel system, - PSI 21a=l A} 614/876-5648 cryopump Gardener 610/264-4523 16 ~~~% ‘1 +44 ~1’J, “1+%~~1 Cryogenics 610/266-3752 International 800/886-2796 5}= o = 17 o 0 -r-r, ?37 74 4=4- ‘?4%B1 317,297_79w Cryogenics, Inc.

~j$ +~~+j- ~++, ~j$ %x: LAKE SHORE 614/891-2243 18 xl%%~~l, 4Q14 ‘il~<, ~1~ Cryogenics, Inc. 614/891-1392 ~ ~ %}H1,GM ~ %7], cryopump

LEYF30LD 603/595-3270 19 Cryogenics GM q% 7] %! CryOpUrnp 603/595-3280 -North America

L&S 7..+, x~q q ~k~-’+ %-~1 713/370-3399 20 Cryogenics, Inc. A)+q ~ cryogenic pumping %}~1 713/251-4505

- 132 - W3 ~A} +,]

Meyer Tool & cryostat, cryogenic storage dewar, 708/425-9080 21 MFG., Inc. cold box, ‘2jm%7], zd% ~~ 708/425-2612

MMR 800/227-8766 22 Technologies, Inc. 508/975--0093

612/853--9600 23 MVE, INC. 612/853-9661 -— PHPK seal–off valve, transfer line ~ ~, 614/436 -911~ 24 Technologies, Inc. reciprocating cold compressor 614/436-5816

Poly Cold Systems 415/479-0577 25 International 415/499-0927

Premier 708/396-2349 26 Cryogenics 708/396-0309 Pretex Alloy 214/748-7837 27 Fabricators, Inc. 214/748-7850

Pressure Systems 1.5 K O]~} &E8 pressure 304/865- 1243 28 Incorporated transducer 304/766-2644

Process Systems 508/36&9111 29 International, Inc. 508/870-5930

910/282-6618 30 PROVAC, LTD. 910/288-3375

REGO Cryo-Flow 910/226-3244 31 Product 910/226-3220

- 133 - I I @z qA}qj +A} 47H XJ q/q+

~i~zl=wq, 7+% ~js zl~j: Scientific silicon diode, ruthenium oxide, 407/881 ““8500 32 Instruments, Inc. gallium arsenide, platinum, 407/881 --8556 Rermanium @~j 33 Southern Research, ~ ~7}& ~j ~j~ 71, cryogenic 941/643 --6565 Inc. coupling device 941/643-6579

Statebourne ~~ak, &+, %Z, %!s ~j%% 191/416--4104 34 Cryogenics, Ltd. q= q o]~zt]aq 191/415-0369

Taylor Wharton refrigerator, dewar, freezer, 717/763-5060 35 International, Inc. O+~7}A xl XO)~ =, ~ ‘J cylinder 717/763-5061

- 134- 708/331-0025 708/331-5090

3~J244-5111 3/3244-5131

6/267-3206 3 6/267-3307

775/82-3773 4 775/82-8321

3/3435-2959 5 3/3578-1573

276/61-8096 6 276/61-8781 I 3/3685-7782 7 wimYF.T.(%k) 3/3682-7176

JECK(ti) 492/25-7555 8 E4ti&*m 492/25-7558

-135 - I

- 136- - 137- - 138- - 139- - 140 - = ?-4-1 Heat of Conversion from Normal Hydrogen to

Parahydrogen

Temp. Heat of conversion (K) J/g cal/mol 10 527.139 253.9865 20 527.140 253.987 20.39 527.138 253.986 30 527.138 253.986 33.1 527.138 253.986 40 527.117 253.976 50 526.845 253.845 60 525.531 253.212 70 521.770 251.400 80 513.932 247.623 90 500.757 241.275 100 481.671 232.079 120 427.248 205.857 150 322.495 155.385 200 163.774 78.91 250 70.524 33.98 298.16 28.558 13.76 300 27.562 13.28

- 141 - X %-4-2 ~ % %&H ~1~j Ortho-Para Hydrogenq heat of conversion

Heat of conversion 8 S (K) para-Hz, % para-Dz, % [calj(~”ml)] 10 99.9999 0.0277 338.648 20 99.821 1.998 338.649 20.39 99.789 . 338.648 23.57 — 3.761 30 97.021 7.864 338.648 33.1 95.034 — 338.648 40 88.727 14.784 338.634 50 77.054 20.718 338.460 60 65.569 25.131 337.616 70 55.991 28.162 335.200 80 48.537 30.141 330.164 90 42.882 31.395 321.700 100 38.620 32.164 309.440 120 32.99 32.916 274.475 150 28.603 33.246 207.175 200 25.974 33.327 105.20 250 25.264 — 45.31 298.16 25.075 33.333 18.35 300 25.072 33.333 17.71 350 25.019 — — 400 25.0Q5 — — 500 25.000 —

- 142- E %-4-3 Fixed point Properties of Normal Hydrogen

‘rri~le~Oillt Normalboilingpoint Critical Standml conditions

Property Solid LiciuidVauor Liauicl \raoor .P0int2. .... STP(O”C) N’rllx)”c )“ Temperature K) 13.957 13.957 13:957 ‘X).390_ :. 20.390 33.19 273.15 293.13 Pressure(mm Hg) 54.04 54.(XI 54.04 760 760 9865 760 760 Density (mrWcm’+) 43.01 38.30 0.0644 35.20 ().6604 14.94 ().04460 0.04155 ~ ~~;

Specific volume (cm3/moD ~ 103 ().()2325 0.026108 15.519 0.W8409 1.5143 0.M694!) ~~.<~:{ 24.(X56 Compressibility factor, ~ . pv/’[~~ 0.001621 ().9635 0.01698 (),9051 0.3191 1.00042 1.00049 Heats of fusion and vaporization (j/mol) 117,1 911.3 - 899.1 () Specific heat [.1/(n]ol“ K)] Co, at saturation 5.73 13.85 -46.94 18.91 --33.28 (Iargd Cp 13”23 21.22 19.70 24.60 (large) 28.59 ‘?g,~g Cv 9.5? ]252 11.60 13.2 (19.7) ~():y) m 40 Specific heat ratio, - 1.388 1.695 1.698 1.863 (large) 1,408 1.416 y = crr/cv Enthalpy(J/mol) Y21.6 438,’7 1350.0 548.3 1447.4 1164 7749.2 834,1 Internal energy 317.9 435.() 1234.8 545.7 1294.0 5477.1 5885.4 (.J/mol) Entropy (J/mol . k) 20.3 28.7 93.6 34.92 78.94 54.57 139.59 141,W Velocity of sound 1!l~~ 307 1101 357 1246 I~9’4 (m/s) Viscosity, p

N . s/m2 x I@ -- 0.026 0.00074 0.0132 O.wll (0.0035) 0.00839 0.(X)881 centipoise 0.026 0,00074 0.0132 0.0011 (0.0035) 000839 0.LXX?81 Thermal conductivity, k [mW(cm . K)] 9.0 0.73 0.124 0.99 0.169 1.740 1.8% F’randtl number, 2,24 0.623 1.29 0.809 0.6849 0.6848 Npr = ,uCP/k Dielectric const, .s 1,~~7 1.253 1.00039 1.231 1.0040 1.0937 1S)00271 1.000253 Index of refraction, 1.134 1.119 1.0W196 1.1093 1.C020 1.0458 1.000136 1.000126

n=JE Surface tension(N/m) - 3.00 - 1.94 0 ~ ~~1 Equiv. vol./vol. Iiquid ().8184 ().9190 546.3 1 53.30 2.357 789.3 847.1 at Nf3P

- 143 - S %-4-4 Fixed Point Properties of Parahydrogen

Triple pOint Normal boiling point Critical Stanclmd conditions PrOperty Sofid Liquid Vapor Liquid Vapor t>~in~~ S’l’l)(()”(.’)N’W(X)”(’} ‘1’emperature(K) 13.803 13.803 13.803 20,268 20.268 32,976 273.15 ‘,X):3,1~ Pressure(mm Hg) ~~,82 52+32 52.85 760 760 9696.8 760 760 Density(mol/cm”) 42.91 38.207 1,ffi23 35.11 0.6636 15.59 0,545!) 0.041.55 ~ ~o’l Specific volum,e (cm:+/mol) x 10:] 0.02330 (),026173 16.057 0.028482 1.5069 ().C64144 Z?.425 24.069 Compressibility factor, I ~ . p~~~ ().CO16(E ().98-5() 0.01712 ().9(X31 ().3wi 1.()()05 1.()()()6 Heats of fusion and vaporization(j/mol) 117.5 905.5 898.3 o Specific heat [.1/(mol“ K)] Co, at saturation 5.73 13.t15 -46.94 18.91 -33.28 (Vwy largcl . 30.[)2

Cp 13.13 21.20 19.5:3 24.50 (Vm Iarg?) 30.35 21.70 Cv 9.50 12.52 11.57 13,11 19.7 21.87 1.3iM Specific heat ratio, Y ‘ cu/cv 1.382 1.693 1,688 1.869 (Large) 1.388 8260.6 Enthalpy(J/mol) -740.2 --622.7 282.8 -516.6 381,7 77,6 7656.6 .53220 Internal energy (J/mol) -740.4 -622,9 169.8 -519.5 229.0 5.7 538435 129.90 Entropy (J/(mol “ K)] 1.49 10,OU 75.63 16.08 60,41 35.4 127.77 1294 Velocity of 1273 305 1093 355 350 1246 sound(m/s) I Viscosity, p N . s/mz X l(j] ().026 ().00074 0.01%! 0.()()11 ().()035 ().(X)839 0.00881 centipoise ().026 0.00074 0.0132 ().(X)11 0.0035 0.00839 0.00881 Thermal conductivity, k[mW(cnl . K)] 9.0 0.73 0.124 ().99 0.169 1.841 1.914 Prandtl number, Npr 2.24 0.623 1.29 0.809 ().6866 0.6855 ‘ LLcw’k Dielectric ccmstant, s 1.?86 1.252 1.00ow ],~~(-) 1.0040 1.098 1,(XXY27 1.(X)026 Index of refraction, 1.134 1.119 1,00019 1.109 1.0020 1.048 1.00013 1.00012 n, ~-E Surface tension(N/m) 1.93 () x lo? Equiv. vol./vol. liquid 1.8181 0.9190 563.8 1 52.91 2.252 787.4 845.1 at NF3P

- 144- E %-4-5 Physical Constants of the isotopic Forms of Hydrogen

20,39 20.39 Normal Equilibrium Normal Equilibrium hydrogen, hydrogen, deuterium, deutenum, 75% 0.21% 66.67% 97.8% Hydrogen

O–HZ 0–H2 o-r)? O–DZ deuteride Triple point temp., K 13.96 13.81 18.72 18.69 16.60 Triple point pressure atm 0.07105 0,0695 0.1691 0.1691 0,122 kpa 0.07197 0.0704 0.1713 0.1713 0.124 Normal boiling point, K 20.39 20.27 23.57 23,53 22.13 Critical temp., K 33.19 33.1 38.3 35.9 Critical temp., K atm 12.98 12.8 16.3 14.6 kPa 13.15 13.1 16.5 14,8 Critical volume, cm

X S-4-6 Heat of Vaporization (hv) of Normal hydrogen

Pressure Temperature hv (atm) (K) (caUg) 0.12 15.0 108.6 0.6 17.8 106.7 0.87 19.7 106.0 1.0 20.5 105.5 1.5 22.0 103.3 2.0 23.0 102.0 3.0 24.75 98.0 4.0 26.2 94.3 5.0 27.3 89.0 6.0 28.3 84.0 8.0 30.0 71,2 10.0 “31.3 57.1 12.0 32.6 33.0 12.98 33.19 0

- 145- E %-4-7 JouIe-Thomson Inversion Curve Data for Parah ych-ogen

Temperature_ Pressure Density — K MPa atm usia mol/cms x 103 lbm/f~ 28 1.000 9.87 145.1 30.06 3.783 29 1.525 15.05 221.2 29.90 3.763 30 2.035 20.08 295.1 29.73 3.742 31 2.534 25.01 367.6 29.56 3.720 32 34)”3 29.85 438.7 29.40 3.700 34 3.968 39.16 575.5 ~9,05 3.656 36 4,870 48.06 706.3 28.70 3.612 40 6.545 64.59 949.2 27.99 3.523 50 10.02 98.93 1454 26.16 3.292 60 12.60 124.4 1828 24.30 3.058 80 15.55 153.5 2256 20.58 2.590 100 16,35 161.4 2372 17.04 2.145 120 16.42 162.1 2353 14.12 1.777 140 14.24 140.5 2064 10.86 1.367 160 10.36 102.2 1502 7.176 0.9031 Ml) 5.165 50.97 749.1 3.321 0.4179 200 0.0547 0.54 _ 8.6 0.036 0.0045

X %-4-8 Dielectric Constant for Parahydrogen

Density (g/cm’) Dielectric constant, E 0.005 1.01515 0.010 1.03046 0.015 1.04594 0.020 1.06158 0.025 1,07739 0.030 1.09336 0.035 1.10950 0.040 1.12580 0.045 1,14226 0.050 1.15889 0.055 1.17569 0.060 1.19265 0.065 1.20977 0.070 1.22705 0.075 1.24449 0.080 1.26210

- 146- PART II .

I - 149- - 150- I - 151 - -152- (4)

-m3- - 154-

- 157- “158- 2.

L3. - 160- - 161 - - 162!- 2-J

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7) - 164- - 165- - 166- - 167- - 168- I

- 169- - 170 - I

I

- 171 - - 172- I

- 173- I - 174- I ......

I ...... i..

...... , . .... ; ~At ~

m

...... 3QI...... i

r-a--l

- 175- - 176-

- 178- - 179- KtJ K z qll

\

\

- 1/30 - - 181 - - 182- I

I

-183 - -184 - OTHER CATEGORIZATION SCHEMES EVENT FREQUENCY PLANT RANGE CONDITIONS NRC ANS (per reactor-year) CATEGORIES RG 1,48 RG 1.70 51.1 52.1 53.1 10CFR ASME Code Rev.2 (N18.2) (N212) (N213)

Plant Planned Condition Normal Pc-1 Normal Normal Normal Condition Operations I PPC A Anticipated Moderate Condition Plant PC-2 Frequent ~~-1 Operational Upset ----Frequence...... H...... Condition PPC Occurrence Infrequent Condition B PC-3 ...... Incidents III 10-2 ...... Infrequent Plant ppc Condition Emergency ...... c...... ~~-, PC-4 ......

~@l Accidents Lkniting Condition Limiting Plant Faults Iv 1(J5 PC-5 PPC Condition Faulted D ~~-6 Not Considered - 186- Power Plants.”

- RG 1.28, “Quality Assurance Program Requirements(Design and

Construction.”

- 187- RG 1.29, “Seismic Design Classification.”

RG 1.143, “Design Guidance for Radioactive Waste Management

Systems, Structures and Components Installed in Light--Water-

Cooled Nuclear Power Plants.”

ANSI/ANS 51.1, “Nuclear Safety Criteria for the Design of

Stationary PWR Plants.”

ANSI/ANS 58.9, “Single Failure Criteria for Light Water Reactor

I

(1)

(2)

(3)

I - 189- “ 190- - 191 - - 192- - 193 - - 194- - 195- qAq.

7).

+. I

‘=%.

- 196-

I (1)

(2)

“ 197-

- 199- 1-

I I I

- 200- -201 -

- 203- I I

-204-

I - 205-

-208- lb \

UCN storage experinen 1

.. ..‘ z., . .“. ..

r- “...... ,.““l >. .: .”, , . ...’...... “ -. . . . pump . P “1.“ :0 ‘refrigerator Y- .. b hydrogen I.1 box \ :. hield F

,. ,.”. $..,,,... .., ,...,. .’ ...... :. ,.,...... \ .,...... ,.- ...... $.’,.’.. . :,, , :.”: ..:.’,. ..,,, ...... L.. ... , ., ,.”’,’,,......

-209- B c

‘...,\ $...,.. Iii

5150

#270

- 210-- “& J!

..—..- ....-- —.— — .

—

I ● I,@r b \-1 ...... , ..—-.. -— .. —.. .—— - . .-— -...... ~..=;:: ,, -..,,., . i.: ...... ---...... -”-...:----- ..-> 1 z I

-211 - J/

I I Ja2uPu3xa

. 2)2 - m Vamlm box

Pumping station a a m

Helium blanket supply u

- 213- f?

- 214- -1 I

-1

- 215- x13zil -Fw-+wl Ql +4]

I

- 217 - I -218- - 219 - - 220- - 221 - -222- I (7}) A}7j7]s.

- 224 - -225-

- 227- - 228- I

-229- I - 230-- - 231 - - 232- I

- 233- I

1

-236- - 237- - 238- -239- -’240 - -241 - ~. “d%HEffects ~% Consequences)

-242- n}. 7] AJ~ jM} aJ (Recommendation)

-243-

-245- 0.03 Large glass windows which are already under strain broken. 0.04 Loud noise. Sonic boom glass failure. 0.15 Typical pressure for glass failure.

0.3 95% probability of no serious damage.

0.5-1 Large and small windows usually shattered. 0.7 Minor darnage b house structures. 1 Partial demolition of houses, made uninhabitable.

1.3 Steel frame of clad buildings slightly distorted. 2-3 Non-reinforced concrete or cinder walls shattered.

2.3 Lower limit of serious structural darnage.

3 Steel frame building distorted and pulled from foundations. 3-4 Rupture of oil storage tanks.

5 Wooden utility poles snapped. 5-7 Nearly complete destruction of houses. 7 Loaded train wagons overturned. 9 Loaded train boxcars completelydemolished. 10 Probable total destruction of buildings

-2,16- 1000.0, —: M

\l 1 I 1 1 I !1 1 t L I , , , 11 , , i I 111111 I Iltml n 0 i-l I 1 I I t , , r , I I I I Ii-i I n II i I I II 10.0

L -i t m m I 1I , , , , , 1>1 1 I II i I I ltll 1 I i I m-t-l

1.0

0.1 I 1 llli~~ 1 HJJ.UI 10 100 i $00 Scoled Distance (m/kg’”)

-247- 5000

1000

100

ICI

1 10

8

6 ., .= n g L 4

2

0 0 10 2C)304053WJ 70 ED 93 lCXI Percentages %012345 6’789 0 — 2.67 2.95 3.12 3.25 3.36 3.45 3.52 3.59 3.66 10 3.72 3.77 3.82 3.87 3.92 3.96 4.01 4.05 4.08 4.12 20 4.16 4.19 4.23 4.26 4.29 4.33 4.36 4.39 4.42 4.45 30 4,48 4.50 4.53 4.56 4.59 4.61 4.64 4.67 4.69 4.72 40 4.75 4.77 4.80 4.82 4.85 4.87 4.90 4.92 4.95 4.97 50 5.00 5.03 5.05 5.08 5.10 5.13 5.15 5.18 5.20 5.23 60 5.25 5.28 531 5.33 5.36 5.39 5.41 5.44 5.47 5.50 70 5.52 5.55 5.58 5.61 5.64 5.67 5.71 5.74 5.77 5.81 80 5.84 5.88 5.92 5.95 5.99 6.04 6.08 6.13 6.18 6.23 90 6.28 6..34 6.41 6.48 6.55 6.64 6.75 6.88 7.05 7.33 Yo 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 99 7.33 7.37 7.41 7.46 7.51 7.58 7.65 7,75 7.88 8.09

- 250- Causative Probit Parameters Type of Injury or Damage Variable kl k2 Fire: Bum deaths from flash fire t.Iedj3/ld -14.9 2.56 Bum deaths from pool burning tI:’3/ld -14.9 2.56 Explosion:

Deaths from lung hemorrhage P“ -77.1 6.91 Eardrum ruptures P“ -15.6 1.93 Deaths from impact J -46.1 4.82 Injuries from impact J -39.1 4.45 Injuries from flying fragments J -27.1 4.26 Structural damage P“ -23.8 2.92 Glass breakage P“ -18.1 2.79 Toxic release: ~p75T Chlorine deaths -17.1 1.69 Chlorine injuries c -2,40 2.90 ~p75T Ammonia deaths -30.57 1.385 t. = effective time duration(s) 1, = effective radiation intensity( W/m2) t = time duration of pool burning( see) 1 = radiation intensity from pool buming( W/mz)

P“ = peak overpressure(N/mz) J = impulse(Ns/m2) C = concentration(ppm) T = time interval(min)

-251 - - 252- I

I

I

-253- X144 Wl+lw} @l-

-2M - -255- 119,950 K.1/Kg m TN~ = 15.63 Kg = 0“61 ‘g x 4,680 KJ/Kg

r Ze = 1/3 = m TNT’ (15:3) E = 2:5

- 256- 1,Cco,cco

Iix,m

10,C03

1,m

lCO I 10 103 Icco Distance (m)

-257” I -258- 4154 2-s

-259-

1 - 260- 4]1%! 7]$ %-UP I Wlmlpll z!= I

I

- 261 -

I - 2622- I

I

I

-263- -264- I

-265- - 266- -267- - 268- - 269-

-271 - - 272- 1. %x}% q, 1996.12.30

2. azq q ~]%! % , 1995.10.19

3. s~}a?l 4 =ji?a, 1990.1.4

4. 4q~7]~2.j, “=} L-J-= ~%A3X-% 7H%301 +lz~ $S? =l%~=i”,

KAERI/RR- 1728/96, 1997.9

5. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulation, Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of

Production and Utilization Facilities.”

6. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulation, Part 100, “Reactor Site Criteria.”

7. Regulatory Guide 1.26, “Quality Group Classifications and Standards for

Water-, Stearr-, and Radioactive-waste-containing Compon- ents of

Nuclear Power Plants.”, USNRC, Feb. 1976.

8. Regulatory Guide 1.28, “Quality Assurance Program Requirements

(Design and Construction).”, USNRC, Aug. 1985.

9. Regulatory Guide 1.29, “Seismic Design Classification.”, USNRC, Sep.

1978.

10. Regulatory Guide 1.143, “Design Guidance for Radioactive Waste

Manag - ement Systems, Structures and Components Installed in

Light-Water- Cooled Nuclear Power Plants.”, USNRC, Dct. 1979.

11. Regulatory Guide 2.2, “Development of Technical Specifications for

Experiments in Research Reactors.”, USNRC, Nov. 1973.

12. Regulatory Guide 2.4, “Review of Experiments for Research Reactors.”,

USNRC, May, 1979.

13. Regulatory Guide 1.91, “Evaluations of Explosions Postulated To Occur

-273- on Transportation Routes Near Nuclear Power Plants”, USNRC, Feb.

1978.

14. American National Standard, “Nuclear Safety Criteria for the Design of

Stationary PWR Plants.”, ANSI/ANS 51.1, 1988.

15. American National Standard, “Single Failure Criteria for Light Water

Reactor Safety Related Fluid System.”, ANSJ’ANS 58.9, 1987.

16. IAEA Safety Series No. 35-G1, “Safety Assessment of Research

Reactors and Preparation of the Safety Analysis Report.”, IAEA

Vienna, 1994.

17. IAEA Safety Series No. 35-G2, “Safety in the Utilization and

Modification of Research Reactors.”, IAEA Vienna, 1994.

18. C. Y. Kimura R. J, Budnitz, “Evaluation of External Hazards to

Nuclear Power Plants in the United States”, NUREG/CR-5042, USNRC,

Dec. 1987

19. C. Y. Kimura, P. G. Prassinos, “Evaluation of External Hazards to

Nuclear Power Plants in the United States”, NUREG/CR- 5042

Supplement 2, USNRC, Feb. 1989

20. RMP Offsite Consequence Analysis Guidance, USEPA, May. 1996

21. D. A. Crowl, J. F. Louvar, “Chemical Process Safety : Fundamentals with Applications”, Prentice Hall Inc., 1990. I 22. 13rookhaven National Laboratory, “Final Safety Analysis Report on the

Cold Neutron Facility for the Broohaven HFBR.”

23. Z1-!l-JdQl, “=~q~a,.q.,q~~~tl] ?gz] s-g- q *Jq7} 71+%% ~1~ %xo~

- 274 -

I Failure Mode

and

Effect Analysis Worksheet

- 275- Umt Cold Neutron Source Facllit!es FMEA Study Drawing No. Figure 4-1-3 Desmipbon Hydrogen Moderator System

Ic ompvrwntI Funcbon I F81ium Mode I Eff ects I S8feguWd I Recommendation I Oomments VI TO allow gaseous H2to Spuriously closed Increased pressure If cryogenic P1/Pvl Consldec accident analysis for the hydrogen buffer tank system faded RD1 case of He injection failure given Possible hne rupture He injected in vacuum pressure cryogenic system failed vessel when cryogenic system f, ilw+ RD1 To ellow gaseous H2 to Fails to rupture on Increased pressure PIIPVI Consider acc!dent analysis for the hydrogen buffer tank when demand Possible he rupture He injected in vacuum pressure case of He injecbcm failure given V1 closed during moderator vessel when cryogenic system cryogenic system failed. varmri,atinn failed Premature open No effect(Vl line IS normally open)

V2 To isolate hydrogen system Spuriously open He introduced into hydrogen system P2/pv2 Check operating Facility shutdown P1/Pvl pressure of tine between V2, V3 and V*A V3 To isolate hydrogen system Spuriously open He introduced into hydrogen system P21PV2 Check operating Facility shutdowm PIIPV1 pressure of Ime between V2, V3 and V14 I V4 To auppiy He into the space Spuriously closed Water introduced into gap (space) P4 Consider locked open during N between vacuum pressure Decreased cold neutron flux normal ODeratlOn +3 Fa~ 03 R4 To control He pressure in Spuriously closed Water introduced into gap (space) P4 I the space between pressure Decreased cold neutron flux vessel and insert Fa~w” Spuriously open He introduced into reactor water tank P4 Facility shutdown

V5 To supply H2 to the Spuriously open No sign, flcant effect(Not used during Double block hydrogen system normal operation and double block)

V6 To supply He to the Spuriously open No significant effect(Not used during Double block hydrogen system normal operatmn and double block)

V7 To supply He to the He Spuriously closed Loss of pressure control in blanket blanket for H2 injection Ihnes Possible facility shutdown

V8 TO supply He to the He Spuriously closed Loss of pressure control in blanket blanket for hydrogen buffer Possible factlity shutdown

RI To control H2 pressure of Spuriously open No significant effect(Not used during Double block charging hydrogen normal operation and double block)

Page 1 of 3 Unit Cold Neutron Source Facilities FMEA Studv Drawing No. Figure 4-1-3 Description Hydrogen Moderator System omponent 1’. ” Funct!on l-allureMoUe Effects Saf eguard Recommendabon Comments Ic I I 1’ I I Spuriously closed No significant effect(Not used during Double block normel operation and double block)

R2 To control He pressure in Spuriously open Increaeed pressure in the He blanket P71P8 the He blanket Loss of He thru purge line due to rupture of RD3 FFU~wn Spuriously closed Loss of pressure control in blanket P7/Pff Possible facility shutdown

RD3 To release He in case of He Fails to rupture on Increased pressure in the He blanket P7/Pi meesure increase in blanket Jemand Poss ible fa~own Premature rupture Decreased pressure in the He blanket P7/Pf3 Loss of He thru purge Ime Facility shutdown

V9 To supply N2 Spuriously open No significant effect(Not used during Double block normal operation and double block) I R3 To control pressure of N2 Spuriously open No significant effect(Not used during Double block m + for H2 purge Me normal operation and doubla block) 4

I Spuriously Closed No significant effect(Not used during Double block normal operation and double block)

Vlo To supply He frem cylhder Spunousiy closed Loss of pressure control in blanket P71P8 Possible facility shutdown

Vll To supply D2 from cylinder Spuriously open No significant effect(H2 will be used instead of D2)

V12 To supply H2 from cyhnder Spuriously open No significant effect(Not used during Double block normal operation and doub!e block)

V13 To supply N2 from cylinder Spuriously open No significant effect(Not used during Double block normal op%ration and double block)

V14 To eupply H2 to hydrogen Spuriously open Loss of He layer between V2, V3 and P3 moderator system VI 4 Possible facility shutdown

V15 To purge when system Spuriously open No significant effact(Not used during Double block pressure greater than normal op%ration and double block) a Page 2 of 3 Unit Cold Neutron Source Fachbes FMEA Study Drawing No. Figure 4-1-3 Description Hydrogen Moderator System omponent / Funcbon Fadure Mode Ic I I Eff ects I Safeguard I Recommendation Comments V16 To sample for gas analyzer Spuriously open No significant affect(Not used during Double block normal operation and double block)

V17 To extract for vacuum pump Spuriously open No significant effect(Not used during Double block normal operation and double block)

VI 6 To extract for metal, Spuriously open No significant effect(This line hydrida, storage unnecessary if HZ used instead of D2)

Moderator To moderate neutron to Rupture Moderator(HZ) vaporized m vacuum Hydrogen buffer tank vessal make cold neutron pressure vessel Facility shutdown

Vacuum To blanket moderator Rupture Moderator(HZ) vaporized P4” Review mechanical integrity pressure system Increaaed pressure in the moderator P7/Pt3 program for vacuum pressure vessel system He blanket vessel Possible line rupture Facd!ty shutdown 1 Hydrogen To accommodate gaseous Rupture Moderator(HZ) vaporized P7/P6 Review mechanical integnty 2 ~r tank HZ Facmtv shut down He bIanket moaram fo r hvdmaen buffer tank CO He blanket TO blanket vacuum pressure Rupture Moderator vapor!zed P4 Review mechanical integrity I vessel, hydrogen buffer tank Increased pressure m the moderator P71P8 program for He blanket and and HZ injection hnes system consider detailed accident Posalble line rupture analySls (hydrogen explosmn) Poaaible HZ explosion given total HZ inventory m

Page 3 of 3 Unit Cold Neutron Source Facihties FMEA Studv Drawing No. Figure 4.I -I description Iefium system for H2/He heat exchanger ~omponenl t unction t-ailure Mode II II Meels II Saf eguerd II Recommendation II Comments Ieat o cooldown moderator I Inside plate rupture lHe and H2 mixed I Review accident scenario due to I xch?nger mixture of He and H2 in detail Outside plate rupture He leaked into vacuum pressure PIIPV1 vessel Loss of vacuum in vacuum pressure vessel Moderator vaporized Possible line rupture

:otd BOX o axpand He Function failure (High Poor(insufficient) heat exchange in T1 /T2 temperature of He) the heat exchanger Fa~flnwm Function failure (LfJw Excessive heat exchange in the heat T1 IT2 temperature of He) exchanger Facility shutdown

vressure o control Ha pressure Function failure Facility Shutdown Control I k-’-Helium BuffeI D accommodate He Rupture Loss of He Vessel Facility Shutdown 2 CD 011Removal D ramove oil from He gas Function failure Poor heat exchange in heat T1/T2 System exchanger Facihty shutdown

d-Compraasor a compress He gas upto Fails to run Cryogenic system down Stages i bars Facility shutdown

Aftarcooler I remove heat from Rupture Loss of He ]mpressed He gas Facility Shutdown

Water supply atop Cryogenic system down F Facility shutdown

Page 1 of 1 Unit Cold Neutron Source Facilities WA Study Drawing No. Figure 4-1-5 ascription Vacuum System Funclton Fatlure Mode Ht ects Safeguard R%ommendatron Comments >om~nent I I 1I I I I I il To isolate vacuum box Spuriously open He injected into vacuum pressure P1/Pv veaael Facility shutdown

Fails to open on demand Increased pressure m the moderator P 1lPv system Possible hne rupture Facility shutdown

To isolate ton pumps Spuriously closed Loss of vacuum Pv Moderator vaporized Poaalble Ime rupture Facility shutdown

W3 To isolate vacuum box Spuriously open He released to the atmosphere P2 possible loss of vacuum Possible line rupture Facilty shutdown

V4 To Isolate vacuum pump 1 Spuriously open or No significant effect(Not used during Double block closed no rmal operation and double block) 115 To isolate vacuum pump 2 Spuriously open or No significant effect(Not used during Double block closed -al ODerat!on and dq&&J&k) w3 To isolate He blanket supply Spuriously closed Loss of He blanket m the vacuum box P3 Moderator vaporized Possible line rupture Facility shutdown

To supply He from cylinder Spuriously closed Loss of He blanket between WI and P2 Consider locked open during W3 normal operation Moderator vaporized Possible Ihne rupture !=..c!,l~ To control He pressure in Spuriously open Increased He pressure in Ikne P2 He blanket between W1 between WI and W3 and W3 Poss!ble line rupture Moderator vaporized Fac[hty shutdown

Spuriously closed Loss of He blanket between WI and P2 W3 Moderator vaporized Possible tine rupture Facility shutdown

Page 1of 2 Unit Cold Neutron Source Facilities FMEA Studv Drawing No. Figure 4-1-5 Description Vacuum System om ponent ~ .’ ‘.~~: t-urn Ion Failure Moda eels -safeguard Retmmmendabon Ic I I En I I II comments I Vacuum box To blanket vacuum system Rupture Loss of He blanket in vacuum box P3 Moderator vaporiied Possible line rupture Facility shutdown

1P1 To maintain vacuum in Fails to run Loss of vacuum Pv vacuum pressure vessel Moderator vaporized Standby ion pump Possible line rupture Facility shutdown

IP2 To maintain vacuum in Fails to run Loss of vacuum Pv vacuum pressure vessel Moderator vaporized Standby ion pump Possible line rupture Facility shutdown

Vacuum To make vacuum in vacuum Spuriously running No significant effect(Not used during Pump lf2 pressure vessel normal operation)

I

Page 2 of2

BIBLIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SHEET Performing Org. Sponsoring Org. Standard Report INIS Subject Report No. Report No. No, Code KAERI/CM-204/97 Title/Subtitle Cryogenic Technology Review of Cold Neutron Source Facility for Localization Project Manager I Lee, HyunCheol / Daesung Cryogenic Research Institute and Demrt~ment Researcher and Daesung Cryogenic Research Institute: D.S. Park, M.H. Man Department Y.P. Soon, H.S. KanE, S.H. Choi, B.H. Park lJnited Pacific Technology, Inc.: J.H. Kim Publication Place Ansan Pubhsher

Page “: II: ?- I Note I I

Classified Open(o), Restricted ), _Class dot. Report Type Research Report

BIR==EkildAbstract This research is performed to localize the cold neutron source(CNS ) facility in HANARO and the report consists of two parts. In PART I, the local and foreign technology for CNS facility is investigated and examined. In PART II, safety land licensing are investigated. CNS facility consists of cryogenic and warm part.[ Cryogenic part includes ‘“a helium refrigerator, vacuum insulated pipes, condenser, Icryogenic fluid tube and moderator cell. Warm part includes moderator gasl control, vacuum equipment, process monitoring system. Warm part is at high Ilevel as a result of the development of semiconductor industries and can bel localized. However, even though cryogenic technology is expected to play a ,. important role in developing the 21st century’s “’-cuttin’g technology, it lacks of /specialists and the research facility since the domestic market is small and thel research institutes and government do not recognize the importance. Therefore, it takes a long research time in order to localize the facility. The safety standard iof reactor for hydrogen gas in domestic nuclear power regulations is compared with that of the foreign countries, and the licensing method for installation of CNS facility is examined. The system failure and its influence are also analyzed. status of cryogenic technology in Korea, moderator cell,

~ cold neutron source facility, cryogenic fluid tube, condenser, safety, licensing