Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi
What role for the European Union?
May 2018 1 Acknowledgements Cover photo: EurAc would like to thank Commission Justice View from Bujumbura-Rural, et Paix Belgique for its support in producing Burundi, 2014 this report. Credit: Giuseppe Cioffo Note from the Editor This report was made possible thanks The drafting of this report was concluded to the support of Belgian Development by 3 May 2018 and as such does not take Cooperation. However, the EurAc network into account any developments in Burundi bears sole responsibility for the analysis or any related European Union actions that and content of this report. occurred after this date. Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi
What role for the European Union?
May 2018 Contents
Introduction...... 3
PART I Grave human rights violations: Covert elimination of dissident voices, with total impunity...... 6
PART II Authoritarian legislative abuses and the undermining of the gains of Arusha...... 15
PART III What are the risks to peace and security in Burundi?...... 23
PART IV A power under siege: the AMISOM pot of gold...... 29
Recommendations: Courses of action for the European Union and its Member States...... 33
On the political and diplomatic level...... 33
On the issue of the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights ...... 34
On the security level...... 36
On the humanitarian level...... 36
List of abbreviations...... 37 Introduction
Dans la version PDF, les textes de cette couleur sont interactifs.
1. Report of the Since the political crisis erupted in former FAB (Burundian Armed Forces), Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, thirty-sixth Burundi in 2015, when the President of but also of civil society, the media and session of the Human the Republic Pierre Nkurunziza decided the civilian population more broadly. Rights Council, 11 August 2017. to stand for a third term in violation of The different abuses, fuelled by hate both the Constitution and the Arusha speech with ethnic overtones promoted 2. The United Nations Commission of Inquiry Peace Agreement, a campaign of sys- in particular by state officials, are often on Burundi was set up on 30 September 2016 tematic repression against dissenters, perpetrated by high-ranking agents of in order “to conduct a disproportionate use of force during the National Intelligence Service (Service thorough investigation into human rights violations protests, sexual and gender-based vio- National de Renseignement - SNR) and and abuses…since April 2015” and “to identify lence and other grave and large-scale the Burundian National Police (Police alleged perpetrators”, human rights violations have been taking Nationale Burundaise – PNB) and the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, United place in the country. The situation has military, as well as members of the youth Nations Human Rights worsened since the announcement last league of the ruling party, commonly Council, September 2017 1 December that a controversial constitu- known as the Imbonerakure. Many 3. Oral Briefing by tional referendum was being organised, Burundians, in particular civil society Fatsah Ouguergouz, Chair of the Commission which aims to substantially change the actors and journalists, are choosing to of Inquiry on Burundi, thirty-fifth session of the 2005 Constitution and thus backtrack in escape repression through exile. Human Rights Council, particular on the gains made at Arusha. Interactive dialogue on Burundi, 14 June 2017 Since the end of 2016, the testimonies Indeed, to the initial political crisis collected by the United Nations (UN) 4. Burundi: Commission of has progressively been added a serious Commission of Inquiry on Burundi inquiry calls on the human rights crisis: following the 2015 (hereafter: the Commission of Inquiry)2 International Criminal Court to investigate elections the repression of any form of demonstrate that from that time onwards possible crimes against humanity Human Rights dissent by the security forces has become human rights violations have been car- Council, 4 September 2017. Report available wide-scale and brutal, and sometimes ried out in a more clandestine but still here: Report of the deadly. Cases of summary executions, brutal way.3 In their report published on Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, thirty-sixth arbitrary arrests and detentions, forced 4 September last year, the Commission session of Human Rights disappearances, intimidation, harass- of Inquiry indicates that, in its opinion, Council, 11 August 2017 ment, torture and other forms of cruel, there are reasonable grounds to believe 5. Statement by inhuman or degrading treatment, as well that crimes against humanity have been the President of the 4 Assembly of States as ransoms demanded for the release of committed. This situation has been Parties on the process hostages, are multiplying. These viola- aggravated by the generalised impunity of withdrawal from the Rome Statute by tions are being perpetrated in defiance which now prevails in Burundi, as well Burundi, International Criminal Court, 18 October of all critical voices, including those as the lack of an independent judicial 2016 of political figures such as the main system and the recent withdrawal of Human rights leaders of opposition political parties Burundi from the International Criminal violations in the DR 5 Congo and Burundi: (in particular the MSD -Movement for Court (ICC). what role for the Solidarity and Democracy and the FNL - International Criminal Court? (in French), National Forces of Liberation), and of The highly contested re-election of Commission Justice et Paix, April 2018 the military, such as members of the President Nkurunziza has thus paved
3 the way for a hardening of the regime On the political level, the country is stuck
6. Draft Constitution and increased the country’s isolation in a stalemate which could have signifi- (in French), Republic of internationally, as well as contributing cant security repercussions if the current Burundi, December 2017. Understanding the to an alarming deterioration in the daily dialogue process, mediated by the East revised Constitution. Key innovations (in quality of life of the population. There African Community (EAC), is not rap- French) Government of is no sign of the situation improving idly re-launched in a constructive and Burundi, December 2017 in the near future, with the President inclusive manner. Since the 2015 crisis, 7. Burundi’s showing a clear desire to keep a hold armed struggle has organised and gained constitutional amendment: what do on power and to guarantee this by leg- force, including the appearance of new we know so far?, Institute of Development Policy, islative and constitutional means. On 12 rebel groups. For now, their operational University of Antwerp, December 2017, the President launched capacity is relatively limited in particular November 2017 an information campaign regarding the due to a lack of clear external support 8. Oral statement of constitutional referendum due to take and common leadership. However, the FIACAT, co-sponsored by the CCPR Centre, place on 17 May 2018 with the objec- continuation of the crisis, the current OMCT and Trial 6 International (in French), tive of adopting a new constitution stalemate in the dialogue process, the thirty-seventh session which would allow him the possibility presence of hundreds of thousands of of the Human Rights Council, joint meeting of running for a fourth term in the next refugees in neighbouring countries, and with the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi and the presidential elections in 2020, and of the radicalisation of those in power could oral account of the High remaining in power until 2034.7 Since lead to a new and dangerous dynamic in Commissioner, 13 March 2018 December 2017, the brutal, not to say relation to peace and security in Burundi murderous, repression of dissidents, or and in the Great Lakes Region. 9. Law No. 1/02 of 27 January 2017 regulating those perceived as such, and in partic- the functioning of non- ular of the referendum’s opponents, In addition, the country and its citi- profit associations (in French), Government of has significantly and once again visibly zens face an alarming humanitarian Burundi, 27 January 2017 increased. In addition, during the month crisis. The UN High Commissioner for
10. Law No. 1/01 of 23 of February 2018 alone, ACAT Burundi Refugees (UNHCR) today reports a January 2017 modifying 11 Law No. 1/011 of 23 June (Action by Christians for the Abolition of total of 430,478 Burundian refugees 1999 modifying Decree- Torture in Burundi) reported “23 assas- in neighbouring countries, the majority Law No. 1/033 of 22 August 1990 regulating sinations and forced disappearances, 95 of whom live in overcrowded camps the cooperation between the Republic arbitrary arrests and illegal detentions, where minimum standards of human- of Burundi and foreign and 28 cases of violations of physical itarian assistance cannot be met. The non-governmental 8 organisations (in integrity”. Several controversial laws UN Development Programme (UNDP) French), Government of Burundi, 23 January 2017 have also been adopted and introduced, has also announced that one in three such as the law on local non-profit Burundians will need humanitarian 11. Refugees from Burundi: Total, UN High associations (Associations locales Sans assistance in 2018, an increase of 20% Commissioner for Refugees, But Lucratif - ASBL)9 and the law on compared with 2017.12 consulted 26 April 2018 foreign non-governmental organisations 12. Third of Burundi (Organisations non gouvernementales In the face of this extremely worrying population need 10 humanitarian aid, News étrangères - ONGE), laws which are situation, and despite continuous warn- 24 - AFP, 21 February 2018 part of the same logic that has brought ings from local and international civil
13. Democratic about political lockdown, restriction on society, including the European Network processes and political fundamental freedoms and the strength- for Central Africa (EurAc) and its stalemate in the Great 13 Lakes region: for a ening of the power of the current pres- members, the European Union (EU), stronger engagement from the European idential majority. All of this threatens, while having adopted a fairly strong Union in Burundi, the in a deeply worrying way, the important position immediately following the 2015 DR Congo and Rwanda, EurAc, 7 June 2017 progress made in relation to peace and crisis, has opted since mid-2017 for the social cohesion since the signing of the dangerous route of disengagement, Arusha Agreement. abdication and a wait and see approach,
Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi 4 What role for the European Union? maintaining almost total silence when confronted by increasing cases of grave violations. This position is also totally at odds with the strong and symbolic decision made by the EU in March 2016 to suspend all financial aid to Burundi. This report thus aims to analyse the cur- rent security, humanitarian and human rights situation in Burundi, in particular following the announcement of the constitutional referendum, which is being organised in a climate of heighte- ned tension and repression. This analysis will help to create an understanding of recent worrying developments in a country which is still largely absent from the international, and in particular the European, agenda. In this report, EurAc thus also intends to propose courses of action and concrete recommendations to European decision-makers with the objective of guaranteeing their increased and effective commitment to peace, res- pect for human rights and development in Burundi.
5 PART I – Grave human rights violations: Covert elimination of dissident voices, with total impunity
14. Report of the Commission of Inquiry a. Violations of fundamental Iteka), the majority of the alleged per- on Burundi, thirty-sixth session of the Human human rights on the increase petrators of these violations, as well as Rights Council, 11 August and getting worse of the other violations mentioned below, 2017 are members of state institutions, i.e. 15. The figures provided in this report come from i. Violations of the right to life the Burundian National Police (PNB), different reports by and physical integrity in particular some of the specialist units Burundian civil society organisations that have such as that charged with protecting been operating in secret for fear of their lives. Since the eruption of the crisis in the institutions (Appui pour la Protection spring of 2015, murders and summary des Institutions) and the riot police 16. Report of the executions have continued to rise. It is (Brigade anti-émeute), or the National United Nations Independent extremely difficult for international and Intelligence Service (SNR), but also Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB) local organisations to obtain up-to-date the Imbonerakure acting together with established pursuant to figures due in particular to the fact that members of the security and defence resolution S-24/1 of the Human Rights Council, the UN Commission of Inquiry has not forces, mainly from the police and SNR Human Rights Council, 20 14 September 2016 been permitted to enter the country, and to a lesser degree the army and and that the main Burundian civil soci- administration officials. 17. 2016 Annual Report (in French), ety organisations have had to flee violent APRODH, January 2017 repression and growing insecurity or, if It is important to highlight the brutal
18. 2017 Annual they are still present in Burundi, have to character these violations have assumed Report (in French), carry out their work in secret.15 Still, the since 2015, in particular targeted assassi- APRODH, January 2018 crisis is estimated to have cost the lives of nations, the decapitation of dead bodies,
19. Burundi: at least 564 people between April 2015 the execution of several members of the suspected mass 16 graves of victims of and August 2016, at least 480 people same family or the murder of parents in 11 December violence, in 201617 and at least 504 people in 2017 front of their children. Amnesty International, 29 January 2016 and according to the Association Burundaise Burundi: Abductions, Killings, Spread Fear, pour la Protection des Droits Humains The UN High Commissioner for Human Human Rights Watch, 25 et des Personnes Détenues (Burundian Rights, as well as several human rights February 2016 Association for the Protection of organisations,19 have also drawn atten-
20. 2017 Annual Human Rights and Detained Persons tion to the existence of mass graves, Report (in French), APRODH, January 2018 – APRODH), totalling nearly 1,200 in particular that discovered on 20 people since 2015.18 These figures do January 2017 on the Makamba hill, in 20 21. Idem not take into account the considerable Mwaro province, or those discovered numbers of disappeared, meaning that in Bubanza province and in Kanyosha real numbers must significantly exceed (Bujumbura municipality).21 this conservative estimate. ii. Violations of the right to According to the Commission of Inquiry liberty and personal security as well as the Ligue burundaise des droits de l’Homme Iteka (Burundian Human Numerous arrests and arbitrary deten- Rights League Iteka, hereafter: Ligue tions have been and continue to be
Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi 6 What role for the European Union? reported and have led, for many, to provisional liberty granted.25 more violations, in particular extrajudi- cial executions, forced disappearances, Ligue Iteka also notes the practice of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading ransom which affects the population: treatment, as well as sexual and gen- inhabitants are arbitrarily arrested on der-based violence. Very often, those the pretext of checking the household 26 arrested are accused of “putting internal ‘notebook’; most are released after a 22. Report on the 27 human rights situation state security at risk”, an offence fre- ransom has been paid. 26 April 2015-26 April quently invoked by the security forces 2018 (in French), Ligue Iteka, 2018 in order to justify the arrest of alleged iii. Forced disappearances regime opponents, such as real or sup- 23. 2017 Annual Report (in French), posed members of opposition parties The environment surrounding arrest and APRODH, January 2018 and civil society actors. According to detention in Burundi allows for forced Ligue Iteka, at least 8,442 people have disappearances, as does the non-identi- 24. Report no. 119 of SOS-Torture/Burundi been arbitrarily arrested since April fication and non-exhumation of bodies published 24 March 22 2018 (in French), SOS- 2015. by the authorities, both of which would Torture Burundi, 25 March allow people reported as missing to be 2018
Since the adoption by the presidential traced. 25. Idem cabinet on 24 October 2017 of a bill to 26. Every family in revise the Constitution, a veritable terror Since April 2015, Ligue Iteka reckons Burundi must have in campaign has been unleashed in order to there have been at least 483 cases of their home a ‘cahier des 28 ménages’ (household force the population to vote ‘yes’ in the forced disappearances, including at notebook) in which the head of household must referendum of May 2018 which aims to least 74 cases of people reported missing write the name, identity approve this bill; besides repeated intim- in 2016,29 and at least 89 in 2017.30 It is card number, date and place of birth, profession idation and death and torture threats, important to point out that these forced and telephone number of all family members many people have been arrested on the disappearances can concern public fig- living in the household, grounds that they do not wish to register ures or alleged opponents, some better as well as those of passing visitors. Bujumbura or that they are preventing others from known than others, but also members reforms its household notebook system to doing so (see Part II.a.ii). of the ruling party, the Conseil national enhance monitoring pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces (in French), Radio France Internationale, 22 July 2017 With regard to cases of arbitrary deten- de défense de la démocratie (National tion and the prison situation, APRODH Council for the Defence of Democracy 27. Annual Report Jan-Dec 2017 (in French), estimates there are around 6,000 politi- Forces for the Defence of Democracy – Ligue Iteka, 2018 cal prisoners currently detained in pris- CNDD-FDD), or ordinary citizens. 28. Report on the ons in Burundi. What is more, APRODH human rights situation 26 April 2015-26 April documents highly concerning detention For example, the Forum pour la con- 2018 (in French), Ligue conditions in its reports, in particular science et le développement (Forum Iteka, 2018 in secret, overcrowded, cells, where for Conscience and Development 29. Annual report on prisoners are crammed together.23 SOS- – FOCODE) highlighted the disap- human rights violations in Burundi in 2016 (in Torture Burundi has also denounced pearance on 8 February 2018 of two French), SOS-Torture many cases of extended illegal deten- women, Mrs Théodesie Ahishakiye Burundi, March 2017 tion. For example, some detainees in the and Mrs Rehema Kaneza. The latter 30. Annual Report police cell in the commune of Buganda is a member of the CNDD-FDD but is Jan-Dec 2017 (in French), Ligue Iteka, 2018. (Cibitoke province)24 may have been regarded as suspicious by certain people held for over 6 months, far longer than in power, because she is believed to have the legal preventive detention period of Rwandan origins; she also owns many 15 days, after which the law stipulates successful businesses coveted by some that detention should be confirmed or CNDD-FDD members. An investigation
7 into their forced disappearance was 2018 after refusing to register to vote for
31. Disappearance of opened but quickly suspended following the upcoming constitutional referendum Théodesie Ahishakiye the release of one of the main suspects, for religious reasons that prohibited him aka “Aimée Ncuti” 35 and Rehema Kaneza an SNR official, at the request of the from registering or voting. aka “Maman Aicha” 31 (in French), Ndondeza Public Prosecutor. More recently, on campaign, 31 March 2018 the 13 April 2018, the car of Rodrigue v. Sexual and gender-based Nzeyimana, a young executive of a violence 32. Rodrigue Nzeyimana still missing cement company, was found abandoned (in French), Iwacu, 13 April 2018 on a street in Bujumbura and until now According to Ligue Iteka, between he has not been found.32 January and December 2017 at least 33. Report on the human rights situation 77 people were victims of sexual and 26 April 2015-26 April iv. Torture and other cruel, gender-based violence36 perpetrated by 2018 (in French), Ligue Iteka, 2018 inhuman or degrading the police or the Imbonerakure, often treatment during the arrest of a male member of 34. Oral Briefing by 37 Fatsah Ouguergouz, their family. Chair of the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, The Commission of Inquiry, in its final thirty-fifth session of the report published in September 2017, In their June 2017 report, the Forum Human Rights Council, Interactive dialogue on mentioned numerous cases of torture for the strengthening of civil society Burundi, 14 June 2017 and other cruel, inhuman or degrading (Forum pour le renforcement de la
35. Report no. 119 of treatment carried out by the security société civile – FORSC) provides several SOS-Torture/Burundi forces, in particular during detention. examples of cases of women raped by published 24 March 38 2018 (in French), SOS- According to Ligue Iteka, at least 542 the Imbonerakure. According to tes- Torture Burundi, 25 March 2018 people have been tortured since April timonies received by the Commission 2015.33 of Inquiry as well as by other human 36. Annual Report 39 Jan-Dec 2017 (in French), rights organisations, sexual and gen- Ligue Iteka, 2018 The Commission of Inquiry also col- der-based violence may also have been lected many testimonies of the use, committed against relatives of regime 37. Burundi 2017/18 annual report, Amnesty during torture sessions, of clubs, rifle opponents, in particular by people International, 2018 butts, bayonets, iron bars, metal chains assumed to be from the Imbonerakure.
38. A population and electric cables, the injection of Since the beginning of the crisis in April living under a regime of violence and human unidentified substances into the bodies 2015, this latter group, as well as the rights violations (in of victims, nails being ripped off with police, have also carried out repeated French), FORSC, June 2017 pliers, burns and numerous abuses gang rapes of women believed to be 39. Conform or inflicted on the genital organs of detain- linked to the opposition, according to flee: repression and 40 insecurity pushing ees. In several cases, acts of torture and Human Rights Watch. Burundians into exile, rough treatment were accompanied by Amnesty International, September 2017 violent insults and death threats, includ- For example, one woman was raped by 41. Oral Briefing by ing threats of an ethnic character.34 four presumed Imbonerakure members Fatsah Ouguergouz, 40. Burundi: gang Chair of the Commission rapes by ruling party because her children were members of an of Inquiry on Burundi, youth, Human Rights thirty-fifth session of the Watch, 27 July 2016 In addition, SOS-Torture cites the recent opposition party and had participated in Human Rights Council, example of Simon Bizimana, who died the 2015 demonstrations.41 Interactive dialogue on Burundi, 14 June 2017 41. Oral Briefing by on 17 March this year after being sub- Fatsah Ouguergouz, Chair of the Commission jected for a whole month to torture and of Inquiry on Burundi, thirty-fifth session of the cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment Human Rights Council, perpetrated by SNR and police agents Interactive dialogue on Burundi, 14 June 2017 who accused him of “impeding the elec- toral process”. Witnesses report that Mr Bizimana was arrested on 14 February
Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi 8 What role for the European Union? Main cases of human rights violations in Burundi Estimated number of people
Cases of murder and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, since April 2015* 1 200
Cases of arbitrary arrests, since April 2015** 8 442
Cases of forced disappearances, since April 2015** 483
Cases of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, since April 2015** 283
Political prisoners, as of December 2017* 6 000
Burundian refugees in neighbouring countries, as of 26 April 2018*** 430 478
Sources : * 2017 Annual Report (in French), APRODH, January 2018. **Report on the human rights situation 26 April 2015-26 April 2018 (in French), Ligue Iteka, 2018 ***Refugees from Burundi: Total, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, consulted 26 April 2018
9 42. In total, 34 people are subject to international b. Violations of civil and working in Burundi is a major cause for arrest warrants issued by the Burundian authorities. political rights and concern. They and their family mem- Some Burundian human fundamental freedoms: bers are the target of assassinations or rights defenders are still under an international shrinking political space and attempted assassinations attributed to arrest warrant issued by the Burundian courts back the repression of political SNR agents or the police: the president in October 2015. These actors of APRODH, Pierre Claver Mbonimpa, include Pierre Claver Mbonimpa from APRODH, currently a refugee in Belgium, suffered Pacifique Nininahazwe from FOCODE, Armel i. Attacks on freedom of an assassination attempt on 3 August Niyongere, a lawyer expression, association and 2015, and his son, Welly Nzitonda, was from ACAT Burundi, and Vital Nshimirimana from assembly killed on 6 November 2015. What is FORSC. more, since the beginning of the crisis,
43. Burundi : UN The severe restrictions on civil liberties several human rights defenders have experts raise alarm at observed in 2015 are still in place. Today, been subject to arrest and arbitrary growing repression of NGOs and human the key leaders of opposition parties and detention, followed by political trials rights defenders, United Nations Office of the High many journalists and civil society mem- leading to highly worrying convictions: Commissioner for Human bers remain in exile, some subject to as in the case for instance of three mem- Rights, 6 February 2017 international arrest warrants.42 Those bers of PARCEM (Parole et Action pour 44. Burundi: three still in Burundi are forced to work in le Réveil des Consciences et l’Évolution civil society activists sentenced to 10 years in secret, in a context of heightened repres- des Mentalités – Word and Action for prison (in French) Radio sion and insecurity, and within a legal the Awakening of Consciousness and France Internationale, 10 March 2018 framework described by UN human the Evolution of Mentalities), arrested in rights experts as “obstructive, repressive June 2017 and sentenced on 8 March last 45. Burundi: new 43 accusations against and stigmatising”. to 10 years in prison for “attacks on inter- Germain Rukuki, nal state security”,44 but also of Nestor irregularities in the trial process and Indeed, key human rights organisations Nibitanga, ex-member of APRODH, continuation of his arbitrary detention (in have been suspended or de-registered by arrested on 21 November 2017, as well French), International the government (see Part I.b.ii) and the as that of Germain Rukuki, ex-accoun- Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), 15 February situation of human rights defenders still tant from ACAT Burundi, arrested on 2018; FIACAT demands 45 the immediate release 13 July 2017 and sentenced on 27 of Germain Rukuki 46 (in French), FIACAT, 13 April 2018 to 32 years in prison, both February 2018 49. Report on the of whom were accused of “attacks on monitoring of human rights violations in internal state security”, in particular for 46. Burundi. A 32-year Burundi: “Burundi’s sentence for defending ‘Calvary’ referendum” having worked with two associations human rights an insult (in French), ACAT Burundi, that had been de-registered by the gov- to justice, Amnesty March 2018 International, 27 April 2018 ernment in October 2016.47 Diplomats 50. Law No. 1/01 of 23 present in Burundi were denied access to 47. Oral statement of January 2017 modifying FIACAT, co-sponsored Law No. 1/011 of 23 June one of Germain Rukuki’s “public” hear- by the CCPR Centre, 1999 modifying Decree- 48 OMCT and Trial Law No. 1/033 of 22 ings by the Ministry of the Interior International (in French), August 1990 regulating and the defence condemned the flagrant thirty-seventh session the cooperation 49 of the Human Rights between the Republic violations of penal code rules. Council, group meeting of Burundi and foreign with the Commission of non-governmental Inquiry on Burundi and the organisations (in Furthermore, in January 2017 Burundi oral account of the High French), Government of Commissioner, 13 March Burundi, 23 January 2017 adopted a new law on foreign non-gov- 2018 ernmental organisations (ONGE),50 51. Burundi: UN raising serious concerns regarding the 48. Report on the experts raise alarm at trial of Germain Rukuki, growing repression of government’s intentions to increase con- human rights defender, NGOs and human rights 51 (in French), RFI 14 defenders, UN News trol over their work (see Part II.b.ii). February 2018 Centre, 6 February 2017
Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi 10 What role for the European Union? 52. Report of the Opposition parties and their members Finally, the amendments to the Penal Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, thirty-sixth are also targets of this brutal and mur- Code and Criminal Procedure Code, session of the Human derous repression: on 23 May 2015 the already called into question by the Rights Council, 18 September 2017 president of opposition party l’Union Commission of Inquiry before their 59 pour la paix et le développement (Union adoption, are highly worrying: they 53. Oral presentation of M. Fatsah for Peace and Development – UPD permit the security forces to carry out Ouguergouz, President Zigamibanga) Zedi Feruzi was assassi- searches without warrants, including of the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, nated.52 On 4 April 2017, the govern- at night, increase control over e-mails thirty-fifth session of the Human Rights Council, ment announced a six-month suspension and facilitate the seizure of digital Interactive dialogue on of one of the main opposition parties, information.60 Burundi, 14 June 2017 the Mouvement pour la solidarité et la 54. The seven démocratie (Movement for Solidarity suspended parties are PIT, ii. Violation of the freedom of VERT-INTWARI, CGP, 53 and Democracy – MSD) and on 12 the press NADDEBU, SONAVI, RUSANGI and ABAHUZA. July 2017, seven other parties were 54 suspended. In addition, according to The main private media outlets remain 55. Report no. 120 of SOS-Torture Burundi, SOS-Torture, SNR agents arrested Aloys suspended. As of now, only two of the published 31 March Baricako and Pierre Kugirwa in Gitega radio stations closed down in April 2018, (in French), SOS- Torture Burundi, 3 April town on 26 March last. Both men are and May 2015 have been permitted 2018 political opposition leaders: Mr Baricako to broadcast again in Burundi: radio 56. Report no. 118 of is president of Rassemblement national REMA FM, which is close to the ruling SOS-Torture Burundi, published 17 March 2018 pour le changement (National Rally for party, and Radio Isanganiro, a private (in French), SOS-Torture Change – RANAC) and Mr Kugirwa radio station. Following the re-opening Burundi, 18 March 2018 is member of the Conseil des patriotes of the latter, one of their programmes 57. Annual Report (Council of patriots – CDP). Likewise, was suspended in November 2016 after Jan-Dec 2017 (in French), on 19 March, police are said to have broadcasting a song entitled “Human Ligue Iteka, 2018 61 arrested Herman Ntakarutimana and rights for journalists”. On 13 July 58. Report of the Anatole Bayubahe, two activists from 2017, the Minister of the Interior also Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, thirty-sixth the opposition party FNL affiliated to announced the suspension of l’Associa- session of the Human Rights Council, 18 MP Agathon Rwasa, accused by the tion Radio Publique Africaine (African September 2017 regime of leading a “vote no” campaign Public Radio Association - RPA), which 59. Oral Briefing by in in the lead up to the May 2018 con- owns the station “Radio Publique Fatsah Ouguergouz, 55 Chair of the Commission stitutional referendum. FNL activists Africaine”, one of the main independent of Inquiry on Burundi, have been frequent victims of arbitrary radio stations in the country.62 Lastly, on thirty-fifth session of the Human Rights Council, arrests since the government launched 11 April, the Conseil national de la com- Interactive dialogue on the bill to revise the Constitution (See munication (National Communications Burundi, 14 June 2017 56 Part II.a.ii). A trend of forcing the Board) decided to suspend the “com- 60. Bill adopted to population to register as members of ments” section of the website belonging toughen the Criminal Procedure Code (in the ruling party has also been observed. to the IWACU newspaper, attacking French), Radio France Internationale, 19 April Ligue Iteka cites examples of school stu- one of the last remaining “small win- 2018 dents forced to go to the headquarters of dows of freedom and of expression”63 61. Oral Briefing by the CNDD-FDD and register to become left in Burundi. Fatsah Ouguergouz, members of the party.57 According to Chair of the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, the many testimonies collected by the thirty-fifth session of the 58 Human Rights Council, Commission of Inquiry, any resistance Interactive dialogue on 63. Press release: Burundi, 14 June 2017 can later serve as a pretext for human shutting down of rights violations and abuse. dialogue space on IWACU website (in 62. 2017 Annual French), IWACU, 11 April Report (in French), 2018 APRODH, January 2018
11 c. The instrumentalisation of justified or explained the situation on the ethnicity and hate speech basis of an implicitly ethnic analysis. In on the part of Burundian his tweet of 26 April 2015, at the start of officials the protests, he questioned why Musaga, Ngagara, Mutakura and Cibitoke were These human rights violations are the only areas where protests were reinforced by hate speech and incite- organised; which is another way of ment to violence spread by some state presenting the protests as being led from 68 64. Hate speech: officials and members of the ruling and focused in majority Tutsi areas. In Burundian authorities attack “demons” and party, frequently with ethnic conno- the same vein, in October 2015, during a “vampires”, (in French), tations, as part of an attempt by the speech given in Kirundi, the President of FORSC, October 2017 regime to instrumentalise ethnicity for the Senate, Révérien Ndikuriyo, made a 65. Idem political ends. thinly veiled reference to the Rwandan genocide by appealing to party activists 66. Idem In their reports, FORSC lists different gathered there to wait for the signal to
67. CNDD-FDD examples where hate speech was used “work”: “Wait, on the day we will tell Communiqué No. 006/2016 of 26 March by state authorities, in particular the you to ‘work’, you will see the differ- 2016 (in French), CNDD- President of the Republic. Indeed, at ence! The police are now hiding to take FDD, 26 March 2016 the end of 2016, the President made a shelter from grenades, but you will see
68. Hate speech: most alarming public declaration widely the difference on the day they receive the Burundian authorities 69
69. Fears of violence attack “demons” and interpreted as a warning of large-scale message to work.” in Burundi after the “vampires”, (in French), massacres to come.64 In March 2017 President’s speech FORSC, October 2017 (in French), Le Monde, 6 in Bujumbura, he made another speech Also, according to FORSC, in a tweet on November 2015 69. Fears of violence exhorting his party members to “actively 29 September 2017 the Ambassador of in Burundi after the President’s speech protest against Burundi’s enemies”, by Burundi to the African Union (AU) char- (in French), Le Monde, 6 going out into the streets to defend the acterised civil society leaders as “vam- November 2015 country and defeat these enemies.65 pires”.70 The international community,
70. Hate speech: and in particular the EU and Belgium, Burundian authorities attack “demons” and Several vicious hate speeches have Burundi’s former coloniser, are also “vampires”, (in French), also been given by the Secretary of marked out as targets of this discourse. FORSC, October 2017 the CNDD-FDD, General Evariste Since October 2015, hate speech towards 71 71. Third term of Ndayishimiye, who stressed in particular Belgium has intensified. For example, Pierre Nkurunziza to the beat of institutionalised that the leaders of the Catholic Church during a meeting on 26 November 2016, hate speech (in French), were now supporting the enemy. He also the Secretary-General of the CNDD- FORSC, August 2016 violently attacked those “Burundian trai- FDD presented Belgium as the root tors who have sold the country” while of all Burundi’s evils. During another indicating they would not succeed.66 speech given on 14 January 2017 he Alongside these speeches, the ruling furthermore attacked the EU, accusing it party very frequently publishes written of opposing Burundi, and explained that statements filled with dangerous and the UN police represented an underhand worrying rhetoric.67 means for the international community to recolonise the country. In addition, Since the start of the crisis, several he reiterated the idea that ethnic groups Burundian officials have also used hate had been introduced by the Belgians in speech with ethnic connotations. For order to divide the Burundian people. example, Willy Nyamitwe, spokesper- Interior Minister Pascal Barandagiye son and communications advisor for and Defence Minister Emmanuel President Nkurunziza, has frequently Ntahomvukiya were present while this
Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi 12 What role for the European Union? speech was being made.72 non-governmental organisations since the beginning of the crisis in 2015, the In the current referendum context, many EU has adopted, over the years and as public authority figures have made the crisis has worsened, a wavering shocking pronouncements. Recently, position: strong and coherent from the Melchiade Nzopfabarushe, CNDD- beginning of the crisis to the start of FDD member, promised those who 2016, then increasingly reserved, dis- opposed the referendum that they would tant, even contradictory and incoherent, “feed the fish of Lake Tanganyika”.73 in particular as it reversed its suspension In a video extract disseminated74 on of funding towards the salaries and 72. Hate speech: social networks on 30 January 2018, allowances of the Burundi contingent of Burundian authorities Revocat Ruberandinzi, deputy mayor African Union’s peacekeeping mission in attack “demons” and “vampires”, (in French), of Butihinda commune and head of the Somalia (AMISOM) (see part IV.b.i) FORSC, October 2017 local CNDD-FDD branch, appealed 73. Verbatim: to his audience to “hand him up” all On October 1st 2015, the EU decided “Feeding the fish of Lake Tanganyika with those calling for a “no” vote, adding to apply individual restrictive measures opponents” (in French), that: “we will break the teeth of those (travel bans and freezing of assets) with Iwacu, 29 April 2018 dissenters”. On 13 February last, Désiré respect to four individuals “whose acti- 74. Ntibasame Bigirimana, administrator of the com- vities are undermining democracy or Thierry’s tweet (in mune of Gashoho, in Muyinga province, obstructing efforts to achieve a political French), 30 January 2018 also urged those present to “hit on the solution to the current crisis in Burundi, 75. A leader from the head” anyone opposed to a “yes” vote particularly through acts of violence, ruling party calls for beating up of opponents and to let him know when they had been repression or incitement to violence, (in French), France 24, 15 February 2018 “tied up”.75 Finally, on 21 April 2018, including acts which constitute serious 77 the organisation SOS Média Burundi human rights violations.” These 76. Muyinga (north- east of the country): reported on social media that the pro- targeted sanctions were renewed on “castrate enemies” vincial secretary of the CNDD-FDD for 29 September 201678 and 23 October said CNDD-FDD official 79 during a rally (in French), the province of Muyinga had appealed 2017 for a duration of one year each SOS Media Burundi, 21 to the Imbonerakure present to “castrate time. April 2018 76 the enemy”. 77. Burundi: the On the 14 March 2016, following mon- EU adopts sanctions against 4 individuals, The Imbonerakure is equally responsi- ths of murderous and systematic repres- Council of the EU, 1 ble for this hate speech and incitement sion of those opposed to the re-election October 2015 to violence, sowing fear and slowly of Pierre Nkurunziza in July 2015, the 78. Burundi: EU indoctrinating the population with pro- EU finally decided to activate one of the renews sanctions until 31 October 2017, Council paganda that threatens the still fragile last available and symbolically strong of the EU, 29 September social cohesion of Burundi (see Part levers in its diplomatic arsenal. Thus, 2016
III.b) considering that Burundi had not res- 79. Burundi: EU pected its obligations under the Cotonou renews sanctions until October 2018, ReliefWeb, agreement in relation to respect for 23 October 2017 d. Timid and contradictory human rights, democratic principles and responses from the EU the rule of law, the EU decided to end the consultation process with Burundi Faced with such worrying develop- under Article 96 of the agreement ments, documented above all in repeated and to temporarily suspend its direct alarming reports by the UN, which financial support to the Burundian echoed the constant warnings issued by government and its institutions. This different Burundian and international EU Council decision was confirmed by
13 EU High Representative Ms Mogherini programme is extended, that the funds and the European Commissioner allocated to it are increased and that they for International Cooperation and can be accessed by other Burundian civil Development Mr Mimica in a letter society organisations in exile, but also addressed to the Burundian President by any of their members who continue on 22 February 2018,80 which outlines to work on the ground. in particular the lack of substantial progress made by the government in In light of the extremely alarming poli- 80. Letter of the EU High Representative relation to respect for human rights and tical and security developments in the F. Mogherini and of the Commissioner N. Mimica the opening up of democratic space. country, EurAc believes that the time has to President Nkurunziza come for the EU and its Member States (in French), 22 February 2018 After the enacting of these diplomatic to take a much stronger position and in measures, the strength of the EU posi- particular to adopt additional restrictive 81. Statement in response to information tion has progressively abated and, apart measures against those responsible for about the release of 740 prisoners as a result of from some declarations of principle and violence and grave human rights viola- a presidential pardon (in occasional denunciations81 of some of tions. The EU must demonstrate its firm French), EU Delegation to Burundi, 22 March 2018 the regime’s repressive practices, such commitment to supporting democracy
Statement by the for example as the recent response of and the protection of human rights in spokesperson on the EU parliamentary sub-committee Burundi, ideals that constitute the true Burundian political dialogue European on human rights to the sentencing of added value of European cooperation External Action Service, 15 December 2017 human rights defender Germain Rukuki compared to the other international to 32 years in prison,82 no new concrete partners, and in this way avoid a new, Statement in response to information measures have been taken to increase more serious and large-scale, humani- about the release of some members of pressure on the regime; meanwhile the tarian and security crisis in the Great the MSD party and situation is deteriorating from day to Lakes region. demonstrators (in French), EU Delegation to day. On the contrary, the EU has since Burundi, 26 January 2017 made decisions that are contradictory Statement of the and incoherent with its prior strong posi- spokesperson on the de-registration of Ligue tion, such as the decision to re-start the Iteka in Burundi (in French), EU Delegation to financial assistance it had suspended in Burundi, 6 January 2017 March 2016 to the Burundi contingent
82. Burundi: DROI of AMISOM, following an agreement Subcommittee chair between the AU and Burundi that the EU Panzeri calls on authorities to release had deemed acceptable (see Part IV.b.i) human right defender Rukuki, European Parliament, 2 May 2018 What is more, the biannual programme for the protection and support of human 83. Local statement in response to accusations rights defenders and key Burundian civil of intention to destabilise Burundi (in society actors in exile, currently funded French), EU Delegation to by the EU, will end in December 2018. Burundi, 7 June 2017 With regard to this programme, the EU has actually been accused by the regime of wanting to destabilise Burundi, an accusation it rejected in a statement issued in June 2017.83 The EU should absolutely maintain its strong commit- ment in relation to its support of human rights defenders. It is essential that the
Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi 14 What role for the European Union? PART II – Authoritarian legislative abuses and the undermining of the gains of Arusha
The human rights crisis in Burundi, as – without success – to change certain 84. Arusha Peace 87 and Reconciliation described above, has been alarmingly provisions of the Constitution in 2014, Agreement, 28 August exacerbated as a result of President it appears that the 2018 referendum 2000 Pierre Nkunrunziza’s intention to hold will enact such reforms for good. The 85. Decree No. onto power and to guarantee this by conditions in which the referendum is to 100/027 of 18 March 2018 on the call both legislative and constitutional take place are also highly questionable. for voters for the means. It is now concerning to note 2018 constitutional referendum (in French), that the regime’s authoritarian abuses, i. Contents of the reform and Republic of Burundi, 18 March 2018. in particular through the development what is at stake of a whole arsenal of laws, continue 86. Constitution of the Republic of Burundi (in to stifle political and public life and The Arusha Agreement and the two French), 18 March 2005 could undermine the gains of the comprehensive ceasefire agreements of 84 88 Arusha agreement , which guarantees 2003 and 2006 brought an end to the 87. Burundi: the social cohesion and peace in Burundi. civil war that had devastated Burundi bill for the revision of the constitution is between 1993 and 2000. The Arusha rejected in Parliament (in French), Radio France Agreement formalises the recognition Internationale, 21 March a. The constitutional reform bill of different groups within Burundian 2014
and the general elections of society (Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa) and 88. Global Ceasefire 2020 sets up a power-sharing arrangement by Agreement between the Transitional which each of these groups is afforded Government of Burundi and the National Council Having been granted the title of “Eternal representation and participation in for the Defence of the Guide” by his party in March 2018, the running of public affairs. The fun- Democracy-Forces for the Defence of President Pierre Nkurunziza is striving damental principles of Arusha were Democracy (CNDD-FDD), 2003 & Comprehensive to perpetuate his position as head of enshrined in the 2005 Constitution of Ceasefire Agreement state. This honorary title presents him as Burundi. In this way a consociational between the 89 Government of Burundi the representative of the Word of God, power-sharing model was put in and the Palipehutu - thus bestowing on him a high degree of place. This model enables a pluralistic FNL, 2006 moral authority. Wishing nevertheless to society to adopt a democratic mode of 89. Consociational enshrine his power in law, the President administration while still guaranteeing democracy, Arend Lijphart, World Politics, has chosen to organise a national ref- necessary representation to the country’s Vol. 21 N°2, January 1969. erendum on 17 May 2018,85 when demographic minorities. The key prin- 90. Consociational Burundian citizens will be asked to ciple is that simple majority rule for poli- theory and power 90 sharing in Burundi (in decide on a proposed reform of the tical decision-making is abandoned French), Cahier/2006.04, Constitution of 18 March 200586. It is and quotas are established for political University of Antwerp, 2006. important to stress that the reform bill and community representation in the has not been made publicly available by various branches of state (administra- any official government source and that tive, judicial, political and security). no parliamentary debate taken place, Thus the current Constitution provides thus making the process very opaque. for a maximum of 60% Hutu and 40% While the President had already tried Tutsi in government (Article 129), state
15 enterprises (Article 143) and the natio- Article 97 of the constitutional reform nal assembly (Article 164). In the senate, bill,93 which regulates the role of the two delegates are elected per province, president. The president will, from each one belonging to a different ethnic now, be allowed to serve a seven-year group (Article 180). A system of co-op- term renewable for up to two successive tation is also in place to guarantee Twa terms. These changes appear to give representation. Similarly, specific provi- the incumbent president the possibility sions in relation to ethnic balance apply of standing in the 2020 elections, and to the two vice-presidents (Article 124), potentially of remaining in power until the judiciary (Article 217), and local 2034. He could then hand over the reins community authorities (Article 266). for a while and later come back and The security arms of the state – the army, potentially serve other terms. And there the police and SNR – are also organised is ambiguity in the fact that no transi- 91. Requiem for the Arusha agreement, in this way (Articles 245 and 247), with tional provision in the constitutional bill reflexions on the constitutional reforms a maximum representation of 50% from regulates the position of the current pre- in Burundi (in French), any one ethnic group permitted in each sident or specifies the possibility or not IFRI briefing note, September 2017. of these bodies. The ministers of defence of his running as a candidate in 2020. and of the police should equally come This creates a kind of vagueness which 92. Constitutional bill (in French and Kirundi), from two different groups (Article 130). favours the current president as well as Republic of Burundi, December 2017 The provisions relating to the security anyone else from his party who may in forces, considered unique to Burundi, the future aspire to the position, and it 93. All articles cited below are in accordance have been praised for the fact that they mitigates the risk of insurrection from with the numbering system enable equal representation of Hutu and within the CNDD-FDD.94 of the new constitutional bill. Tutsi, thus warding off fears of extermi- nation of the Tutsi by the Hutu, or vice The nationality, age and residency 94. Burundi’s 91 constitutional versa. requirements for different offices have referendum: consolidating the also been changed: a candidate for the fait accompli in the Many constitutional changes are presidency for example will have to be run-up to the 2020 elections, Constitution. included in the constitutional reform bill at least 40 years old (the former limit Net, International IDEA, 23 92 January 2018 that will be put to a referendum vote, was 35) and be resident in Burundi at seemingly with two main aims. The the time of his/her registration as a can- desire of the presidential party to create didate. This provision thus excludes all guarantees enabling him to remain head opponents currently in exile from the of state is evident in some of the new pro- 2020 elections (Article 98). visions. What is more, the reform allows for some of the principles of the Arusha Another major reform is the restructu- system to be called into question. The ring of the executive with the creation of implementation of equal power-sharing the post of prime minister. The president arrangements has enabled peace to be was previously assisted by two vice-pre- preserved in Burundi for nearly 15 years. sidents, one in charge of political and It is therefore of great concern to note administrative issues, the other social that the proposed constitutional reform, and economic ones. In the new bill, only as well as other recently adopted legis- the post of first vice-president is main- lation, could undermine the invaluable tained. The prime minister will come gains of that agreement. from the majority party and the same ethnic group as the president. The post One of the biggest issues with the of vice-president will be relegated to the constitutional change is to be found in opposition but stripped of all its powers.
Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi 16 What role for the European Union? The reason for this change is understood and judiciary. This provision creates to be, amongst other things, the desire a breach that could lead to the end of to appease tensions and to address the equal power-sharing and in due course ambitions of some members of the favour the party currently in power, CNDD-FDD.95 which is majority Hutu. Even though it is not impossible that the provisions In addition, the proportional represen- of the Arusha Agreement could in the tation of the different political forces in future evolve as Burundian society evol- the country, a fundamental principle of ves, this change nevertheless comes at a the consociational model, is also called very inopportune moment. In a context into question by, for example, the pro- of political tension and in the face of the posal that ministers will no longer be recent setbacks in relation to fundamen- appointed on the basis of their party tal freedoms and civil and political rights, having received a certain number of but also in terms of reconciliation and votes, but will be directly chosen by the social cohesion, backtracking on these president (Article 109). arrangements for co-existence could 95. The African Union and the constitutional prove to be a very dangerous exercise. review process in Burundi, Institute for The ethnic balance provided for in the Security Studies, 12 March 2005 Constitution is rolled back in seve- Significant reforms to the judicial system 2018 ral ways. Whereas the provisions rela- are also proposed in the constitutional 96. Burundi’s ting to power-sharing between the police reform bill, which for the first time intro- constitutional referendum: force and the army are maintained, it is duces ethnic quotas for the judiciary consolidating the 97 fit accompli in the noteworthy that the SNR is no longer (60% Hutu, 40% Tutsi) (Article 213). run-up to the 2020 cited as part of the country’s “security This change suggests a move to politi- elections, Constitution. Net, International IDEA, 23 and defence forces”. This de facto cize the judiciary to the same degree as January 2018 excludes this agency from the minimum political functions. The separation of 97. Article 208 of the requirements regarding the represen- powers is also called into question, in current Constitution stipulates only that: “The tation of different groups amongst its particular by changes in the make-up of judiciary is structured members. The chance of not having a the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature so that its composition reflects the whole of the mixed intelligence service raises impor- (Supreme Council of the Judiciary - population. It is imperative that recruitment and tant issues in relation to the security and CSM) and to the procedures for the appointment procedures for independence of this agency. What is appointment of its members (Article the judiciary are carried out in the spirit of promoting more, guarantees for minority groups 222). The head of the body would from regional and ethnic balance to influence political decisions are also now on be named by the President of the and gender equity.” undermined by the fact that, from now Republic, the minister of justice as well on, laws will be passed based on an as by – and here is where the novelty absolute, and no longer a two-thirds, lies – the president of the Supreme Court majority both in the national assembly (Article 223), who is also nominated by (Article 180) and in the senate (Article the president. Previously the Supreme 191). Court president had no role in the mat- ter. It should be noted that the CSM is Lastly, a very controversial provision in the highest disciplinary authority for the the constitutional bill (Article 289, also judiciary, that it guarantees the indepen- known as the “nullity clause”96) stipu- dence of judges and is the only body with lates that, within five years, members the power to dismiss them. Finally, the of the senate can evaluate the appro- terms of office of Constitutional Court priateness of maintaining the system of members would be increased from 6 to ethnic quotas in the executive, legislative
17 8 years, non-renewable (Article 232). In questions and taints its legitimacy other daily activities: to access school, an unstable political context, the exten- and credibility. What is more, it does hospital or even in case of police arrest 107. Speech of 98. Human rights sion of these terms may invite criticism not appear to adhere to the provi- all citizens must be able to show their President Pierre violations in the DR in relation to the ability or not of this sions contained in Article 299 of the registration document, without which Nkurunziza at the Congo and Burundi: launch of the campaign 104 what role for the institution to play an independent and Constitution, which stipulate that “no they are to be pursued. A veritable on the constitutional International Criminal referendum (in French), Court? (in French), impartial role. revision can be carried out if it threatens propaganda campaign has begun inside Presidency of the Republic Commission Justice et Paix, national unity and the cohesion of the country (including in schools),105 of Burundi, 12 December April 2018 2017 Lastly, another new element has been the Burundian people”. Indeed, some spreading the idea that anyone who loves 99. Open letter introduced into the constitutional text changes described above (in particular their country cannot but vote “yes” in 108. Referendum: the to Ambassador Electoral Commission Anatole Bacanamwo in the form of religious references, in relating to the representation of mino- the referendum. Suspected opponents calls on population to on the subject of check voter lists (in the constitutional particular in the preamble which now rities) threaten the short-term stability are threatened, abused and tortured. French), IWACU, 3 April referendum (in French), 2018 Agence Bujumbura News, states: “We, the Burundian people, of the country, as well as the tried and National representatives have publicly 15 March 2018 conscious of our responsibilities tested model for running the country. incited violence against such people (see 109. Letter to the before God…”, but also in the oaths Part I.c).106 President Pierre Nkurunziza President of the 100. Burundi: National Assembly (in constitutional reform of allegiance applying to the different Is it possible to organise a referendum at himself issued threats when the refe- French), OLUCOME, 26 bill should respect January 2018 pluralism, states UN political mandates (Articles 107, 126 a time when the country is experiencing a rendum information campaign was Special Envoy (in French) UN News, 26 February and 138). The introduction of religious serious political and security crisis, when launched: “We take this opportunity to 2018 references into the Constitution, com- almost all opposition representatives are warn all those who may try to frustrate bined with the mystic tendencies of the in exile and when numerous Burundian this project, either in words or in deeds.
101. Understanding the 107 revised Constitution. presidential couple, as well as the recent citizens are also refugees in other coun- Such acts constitute a red line.” Key innovations (in French) Government of proclamation by his party of President tries? The UN Secretary-General has Burundi, December 2017 Nkurunziza as “Eternal Guide”, raises stressed that the current context is not iii. The 2020 General Election questions about intentions to pave the suitable for the carrying out of such 102. Burundi: upsurge in violence in the lead way for re-establishing of the monarchy. a significant reform: the referendum The organisation of the referendum lays up to the constitutional referendum (in French), This possibility is allowed for under the is not inclusive, there is no consensus the groundwork for the 2020 General FIDH – Ligue Iteka, February 2018 current Constitution (Article 4). regarding a unifying project and it does Election. Indeed, thanks to the referen- not allow every person to express them- dum process, what is in effect a popula- 103. Press release (in In addition, the draft bill explicitly selves freely.100 tion census has taken place, which has French), CNARED, 14 February 2018 stipulates that no Burundian can be effected people’s registration on electo- extradited in case of conviction (Article In reality, a veritable terror campaign ral lists. More than 5 million Burundians 104. Burundi: 108 Repression Linked to 50). This new provision, at a time when has been taking place since the referen- had been registered by April 2018. If Presidential-term Vote, Human Rights Watch, 17 an investigation has been opened by the dum was announced in December 2017. the constitutional bill is adopted, the April 2018 ICC in relation to human rights viola- Despite the fact that campaigning is not current president could eventually run tions in Burundi, is questionable. The allowed to start before 1 May 2018, i.e for a fourth consecutive term given the 105. January 2018 monthly report (in impunity of perpetrators of grave crimes two weeks prior to the referendum, the absence of an explicit provision to the French), APRODH, February 2018 has significant consequences for victims, authorities began implementing their contrary (see Part II.a.i). but also for society as a whole and “yes” campaign in December. Under 106. A leader from the ruling party calls for in particular for social cohesion, peace the guise of a citizen information cam- In order to guarantee Burundi’s inde- beating up of opponents and stability.98 paign101 people are subject to enormous pendence with respect to the inter- (in French), France 24, 15 February 2018 pressure: first to register on electoral national community, the Burundian Burundi in Denial as Rights Abuses Continue ii. Process and context for lists so that they can participate in the authorities have appealed to the popu- with Impunity, HRW, 13 the organisation of the referendum but also with regard to the lation to contribute financially to the March 2018 Burundi: upsurge in referendum actual ballot paper. Numerous non-go- organisation of future elections. These violence in the lead up 102 to the constitutional vernmental organisations (NGOs) so-called “voluntary contributions” referendum (in French), The legality of recourse to a referendum and opposition parties103 have spoken have been strongly criticised by civil FIDH – Ligue Iteka, 109 February 2018 to change the Constitution is open to out against the forced registrations in society who highlights that the popu- debate,99 but it is mainly the context the face of people’s reluctance. Proof of lation, economically bled dry, struggle in which it is taking place that raises registration also serves as a pass for all to meet its “obligations”. In reality the
Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi 18 What role for the European Union? other daily activities: to access school, contributions are in no way voluntary, hospital or even in case of police arrest because the decree stipulates specific 110 107. Speech of all citizens must be able to show their tariff structures/rates. This contradic- President Pierre registration document, without which tion, as well as the illegal nature of the Nkurunziza at the launch of the campaign 104 111 they are to be pursued. A veritable decree, have also been contested by a on the constitutional referendum (in French), propaganda campaign has begun inside group of opposition members of parlia- Presidency of the Republic the country (including in schools),105 ment,112 who have expressed their sur- of Burundi, 12 December 2017 spreading the idea that anyone who loves prise at this strategy given that funding their country cannot but vote “yes” in for the 2020 elections has been included 108. Referendum: the Electoral Commission the referendum. Suspected opponents in the state budget for the past two years. calls on population to check voter lists (in are threatened, abused and tortured. This has led them to believe that these French), IWACU, 3 April National representatives have publicly funds, whose traceable and transparent 2018
incited violence against such people (see management and monitoring has not 109. Letter to the Part I.c).106 President Pierre Nkurunziza been detailed in the decree, will directly President of the 113 National Assembly (in himself issued threats when the refe- benefit the presidential party. This French), OLUCOME, 26 rendum information campaign was measure attests to a bankrupt and hard- January 2018 launched: “We take this opportunity to pressed government, seeking to bring 110. Official site of the Government of Burundi warn all those who may try to frustrate cash into state coffers by any means. (in French), December 2017 this project, either in words or in deeds. Such acts constitute a red line.”107 The bill to revise the Constitution and 111. Report for the month of February the next elections are the cause of serious 2018 (in French) Coalition Burundaise pour la CPI iii. The 2020 General Election concern amongst civil society, members (Burundian Coalition for the International of the opposition, as well as the inter- Criminal Court), February The organisation of the referendum lays national community.114 They call into 2018: “Article 159 of the Constitution stipulates that the groundwork for the 2020 General question democratic gains and the prin- public revenue is under the domain of the law and Election. Indeed, thanks to the referen- ciples of the rule of law, and pose a grave no other person, even a dum process, what is in effect a popula- threat to the future of the country. The member of the Government, is legally empowered to tion census has taken place, which has UN Secretary General has thus stated make a decision creating a public revenue stream unless effected people’s registration on electo- that: “The adoption of constitutional it is made by Parliament”. ral lists. More than 5 million Burundians amendments that would reverse provi- 104. Burundi: 108 112. Deputies from the Repression Linked to had been registered by April 2018. If sions of the Arusha Agreement would, Amizero y’Abarundi (Hope Presidential-term Vote, of Burundians) coalition Human Rights Watch, 17 the constitutional bill is adopted, the under the current circumstances, bear April 2018 current president could eventually run the risk of plunging the country back 113. January 2018 for a fourth consecutive term given the into armed conflict, with unpredictable monthly report, (in 105. January 2018 115 French), APRODH, monthly report (in absence of an explicit provision to the repercussions for the region.” February 2018 French), APRODH, February 2018 contrary (see Part II.a.i). 114. Burundi: UN Commission of Inquiry 106. A leader from the In order to guarantee Burundi’s inde- b. A series of repressive denounces intimidation ruling party calls for campaign in view of beating up of opponents pendence with respect to the inter- legislative reforms the constitutional (in French), France 24, 15 referendum (in French), February 2018 national community, the Burundian UN News, 13 March 2018; Burundi in Denial as authorities have appealed to the popu- Even though the constitutional reform Proposed Constitutional Rights Abuses Continue Amendments in with Impunity, HRW, 13 lation to contribute financially to the represents without doubt the height of Burundi, press statement, March 2018 U.S. Department of Burundi: upsurge in organisation of future elections. These Burundi’s current authoritarian abuses, Statement, 1 May 2018 violence in the lead up to the constitutional so-called “voluntary contributions” we should not overlook the significant referendum (in French), 115. Report of the have been strongly criticised by civil legislative changes being implemented Secretary General on FIDH – Ligue Iteka, 109 February 2018 society who highlights that the popu- alongside this and affecting other areas Burundi, United Nations Security Council, 23 lation, economically bled dry, struggle of public life. These changes are part of February 2017 to meet its “obligations”. In reality the the same logic that has brought about
19 political lockdown, restriction on free- sensitive issues. If any doubt remains doms and the strengthening of the power as to this interpretation, one only need of the current presidential majority. Two look at the definition of the term “poli- laws in particular demand our attention: tical activities” in the law: “any activity the law on local non-profit associations aimed at taking power and at openly (Associations Sans But Lucratif - ASBL) challenging institutions” (Article 3). and the law on foreign NGOs. Since the beginning of the crisis in 2015 many organisations have already been i. Law regulating the suspended – Ligue Iteka, SOS-Torture, functioning of local non- la Coalition de la société civile pour le profit associations monitoring électoral (The Civil Society 116. Law No. 1/02 of 27 January 2017 regulating Coalition for Electoral Monitoring – the functioning of non- profit associations (in Unanimously adopted by the National COSOME), la Coalition burundaise French), Government of Assembly on 28 December 2016, the pour la CPI (the Burundian Coalition Burundi, 27 January 2017 law regulating local non-profit associa- for the International Criminal Court 116 117. Unanimous tions henceforth replaces that of 1992, – CB-CPI) and l’Union burundaise des adoption of new law on local non-profit which according to the government was journalistes (the Burundi Journalists’ associations, Burundi AG no longer fit-for-purpose in a globalised Union – UBJ) – or else permanently de-re- NEWS, 1 January 2017 world.117 The ASBL law enshrines signi- gistered, such as FORSC, FOCODE, 118. Democratic ficant changes in the running of these ACAT Burundi, APRODH and Réseau processes and political stalemate in the Great associations, which seriously undermine des citoyens probes (Network of Honest Lakes region: for a the fundamental principles of the free- Citizens – RCP).118 stronger engagement from the European dom of association. Union in Burundi, the DR Congo and Rwanda, The provisions of this new legislation EurAc, 7 June 2017 Requirements for the recognition of strengthen the executive’s discretionary
119. Law No. 1/01 of 23 these associations have been made more power to control civil society organisa- January 2017 modifying complicated and are at the discretion of tions, even though the majority of them, Law No. 1/011 of 23 June 1999 modifying Decree- the relevant minister. It is he/she who fearing for the security of their staff, Law No. 1/033 of 22 August 1990 regulating grants legal status to these organisations have already been forced into exile. the cooperation (Article 20). Once awarded, registration between the Republic of Burundi and foreign certificates must be renewed twice a ii. Law regulating cooperation non-governmental organisations (in French), year, placing a significant administrative between the Republic of Government of Burundi, 23 burden on the smaller of these organi- Burundi and foreign NGOs January 2017 sations. Furthermore, the associations’ 119 120. Burundi: activities are regulated, approved and This law, enacted in January 2017, is Parliament passes a law to enhance control monitored by the authorities (Article a reaction by the government to foreign of international NGOs 82). The minister reserves the right to NGOs, which it accuses of contributing (in French), Radio France 120 Internationale, 23 December oversee and evaluate the activities on to “chaos and disorder”. Important 2016 the ground (Article 25). Worse still, the changes have been made to the current interior minister can suspend any asso- legislation. As with the changes applying ciation that deviates from its objectives, to local organisations, they reveal the without any recourse to judicial process government’s intention to control poten- (Article 86). tial dissenters, but also bear witness to the vulnerable financial situation This law demonstrates the authorities’ in which the country now finds itself. desire to restrict and discourage the ini- Lastly, the law threatens the provisions tiatives of civil society organisations, in of the Arusha Agreement and related particular those working on politically issues of ethnic quotas.
Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi 20 What role for the European Union? The activities of foreign NGOs are now Burundi (Article 16). Lastly, a unique strictly regulated by the Burundian tax regime is applied to the salaries of authorities. First of all, they must follow Burundian staff employed by foreign strict – but very vague121 - procedures NGOs (Article 39). The reason for these for certification and registration, over different provisions is the great financial which the government has the final say. difficulty the country is currently facing; Alongside this, the government closely Burundi being indeed considered one of controls the activities of foreign NGOs, the poorest countries in the world. As a which must henceforth be “in harmony result of economic sanctions, very little with government programmes and foreign currency now enters the country. priorities” (Article 6) and “collaborate As such the money of foreign NGOs closely with ministries relevant to the represents a significant financial windfall sector and activities” (Article 10). These for the authorities. provisions are used by the government to monitor the activities of NGOs, a control In addition, foreign NGOs, being further strengthened by strict reporting accused of favouring the recruitment requirements (Article 22), all of which of people of Tutsi background, who severely hinders freedom of association are considered regime opponents, must and undermines NGO independence. By henceforth comply, for the recruitment obliging NGOs to align with government of Burundian staff, with the “ethnic and priorities, issues sensitive for the govern- gender balance outlined in the Burundian ment such as human rights, the rule of Constitution” (Article 18). This implies 121. Comments on law, governance and justice are de facto that NGOs should hold records of the Burundi’s general framework for cooperation excluded. The provisions heighten fears ethnic identity of their employees on between the Republic of that some organisations working on the basis of which the authorities can Burundi and foreign non- governmental organizations, these issues will be expelled or censored, allow or disallow new recruitments. ICNL, 2017 or even forced to self-censor. In addition, The inclusion of an ethnic quota for the they undermine the independence of recruitment of staff to foreign NGOs NGOs, which are as a matter of prin- has been very negatively perceived and ciple “non-governmental”. interpreted as intending to divide and destabilise these organisations, as well Other provisions, of a financial charac- as increase the power of control of the ter, relating to the activities of foreign authorities, whose interference would NGOs clearly hint at the government’s henceforth extend to the private sphere. intention to create difficulties for these The law never envisaged that ethnic organisations but also at its own finan- quotas, inspired by Arusha, would apply cial problems. Every foreign NGO that to the private sector or to independent wishes to register and work in Burundi professions. Foreign NGOs have rejected will henceforth have to pay a fee of 500 this new provision en masse and have US dollars (Article 9). It is compulsory for made their opinions known through each organisation to open an account in “Réso” (a coalition of foreign NGOs), the National Bank and deposit one third which has entered into negotiations with of its budget there before a cooperation the Burundian authorities. In the face of agreement can be signed. What is more, obstruction and a lack of agreement, they are required to limit their opera- foreign NGOs now fear this article will ting costs to 35% of their total budget, be implemented by means of a presiden- while the remaining 65% is “effec- tial decree, thus de facto eliminating all tively” allocated to the development of possibilities of debate and challenge.
21 Finally, direct access by foreign NGOs to the population is also limited since from now on it is required that all meetings be held in Kirundi and any training be given in the local language and exclusively by Burundian people.
If they do not comply with these provi- sions, foreign NGOs are vulnerable to sanctions, ranging from non-renewal of visas for their expatriate staff to ending their activities and being expelled from the country. These laws strengthen the control and interference of the govern- ment on key sectors and considerably reduce the autonomy and viability of civil society organisations (both local associations and foreign NGOs).
These constitutional and legislative abuses are all the more worrying consi- dering that a peaceful resolution to the political crisis seems to be becoming more elusive by the day.
Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi 22 What role for the European Union? PART III – What are the risks to peace and security in Burundi?
a. Stalemate in the political – CNARED), were not present, not dialogue having been invited as such. Neither were the majority of civil society actors On a political level, Burundi is currently in exile, most of whom are still under an at a total impasse which could have arrest warrant issued by the Burundian significant security repercussions if the authorities and fear for their security on current dialogue process is not rapidly Tanzanian territory. re-launched in a constructive and inclu- sive manner. However, 32 registered political parties, civil society organisations, media, and Indeed, the inter-Burundian dialogue women’s, youth and religious groups, being conducted under the auspices of except for the Catholic Church, par- the East African Community, facilitated ticipated in the session. Leaders of by Benjamin Mkapa, former President opposition parties based in Burundi, 122. CNARED of the United Republic of Tanzania, including Léonce Ngendakumana of statement regarding the Arusha session and in which Ugandan President Yoweri the Sahwanya-FRODEBU party as from 27 November to Museveni is mediator, has now com- well as Agathon Rwasa and Evariste 8 December 2017 (in French), CNARED, 9 pletely stalled. The conclusion of the Ngayimpenda from the Amizero y’Aba- December 2017 4th dialogue session, which took place rundi coalition, were also present. These between 27 November and 8 December opponents confirmed that the security 2017, without any agreement or final situation in Burundi was worrying, statement, illustrated the degree of that attacks on human rights conti- deadlock in the process. Having conti- nued, and that the socio-economic and nuously refused, in the earlier sessions, humanitarian situation in the country to sit at the same table as opposition was disastrous. At the conclusion of the members, this time Bujumbura was consultations, held without the possi- represented by the permanent secretary bility of any meaningful dialogue and of the Interior Ministry, whose weak in the absence of a final statement, the decision-making power illustrates the facilitator presented a list of points of Burundian President’s lack of will in convergence and divergence, including relation to the process. For their part, in particular the amendments to the members of the opposition in exile, Constitution and the abolition of the brought together in the Conseil National requirement for a two-thirds majority pour le Respect de l’Accord d’Arusha in parliament. In response, CNARED pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au issued a statement122 calling on the Burundi et la Restauration de l’Etat de presidents of East African nations to Droit (National Council for the Respect increase pressure on Pierre Nkurunziza, of the Arusha Agreement and for Peace including through an embargo, and and Reconciliation in Burundi and the on the international community to do Re-establishment of the Rule of Law likewise through economic sanctions
23 and targeted sanctions aimed at actors condemnation in November 2017 of implicated in the crisis. CNARED also the ICC decision to open investigations warned of the risk of “generalised into the Burundi crisis,128 are at the very conflict” in Burundi posed by a lifetime least a source of concern. Finally, the presidency of Pierre Nkurunziza. presumed arrest and disappearance of four members of the Forces Populaires 123. Government statement following the For its part, the Burundian government, du Burundi (Popular Forces of Burundi 4th inter-Burundian dialogue session in in a statement issued on 11 December – FPB) in Tanzania in October 2017, Arusha (in French), 11 2017,123 thanked the facilitator for his and their possible extradition to December 2017 inclusive invitation to political actors Burundi, continues to cast doubt on 124. Burundi: who were not being pursued by the judi- a mediation process that increasingly withdrawal of AU-UN statement denouncing cial authorities, reiterating that Burundi shows signs of favouring one of the par- Bujumbura’s was not in crisis and even less in a politi- ties to the conflict.129 intransigence (in French), Radio France cal stalemate, and that this would be the Internationale, 16 April 130 2018 last session held outside the country; the In the face of this situation, the EU has next ones should take place in Burundi. remained very timid, limiting itself to a 125. Macocha Tembele: “news of the During the 19th EAC summit at the end short declaration reiterating its support facilitator’s resignation of February 2018, Benjamin Mkapa for the mediation process and appealing nothing but rumours”, Iwacu, 23 February 2018. presented his report and the challenges for the sincere and serious engagement of in relation to successfully conducting a all stakeholders. Yet the failure, for over 126. CNARED statement regarding dialogue process characterised by a lack two years now, to create a meaningful the Arusha session from 27 November to of clear will on the part of the Burundian and inclusive political dialogue increases 8 December 2017 (in government to include in discussions the the risk of a recourse to violence and French), CNARED, 9 December 2017 various actors implicated in the crisis. of the radicalisation of opponents of The facilitator seems not to enjoy the Pierre Nkurunziza’s regime. A proactive 127. Tanzanian leader urges Burundian exiles clear and explicit support of the different and preventive approach in the face of to go home, News24, 21 July 2017 heads of state of the EAC, having despe- the danger of violence in the country rately tried and failed to organise a 5th should be adopted by the whole of the 128. Museveni and dialogue session at the end of April.124 international community, and in parti- Magufuli: “the ICC decision kills Burundi Benjamin Mkapa appears at best to be cular the EU. In addition, the mistrust peace initiatives” (in French), Iwacu, 12 in a position of weakness and defeat, expressed by different parties to the November 2017 as suggested in particular by rumours conflict in relation to the current facili-
129. Tanzanian of his intention to step down from tation should prompt the international mediation compromised 125 by the arrest of FPB the process, and at worst as a community and the EU in particular to leaders (in French), Radio Burundian regime “sympathiser”, as consider a resumption of the mediation Publique Africaine, 25 126 October 2017 stated by CNARED. process by an actor who, under the aegis of the AU, is perceived as more legitimate 130. Statement by the spokesperson on The impartiality of EAC mediation in and neutral. Burundian political the face of the Burundian crisis is in dialogue, EEAS, 15 December 2017 fact open to question: the remarks made by Tanzanian President John Pombe b. Hate speech, incitement Magufuli, standing beside President to violence and to armed Pierre Nkurunziza, in July 2017, encou- conflict raging Burundians in exile to go back home and saying that “those who go The deadlock in the dialogue process is around preaching that Burundi is not at particularly worrying in a country where peace should stop their gospel”,127 fol- the wounds of the past remain open. lowed by mediator Yoweri Museveni’s Burundians are currently facing the
Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi 24 What role for the European Union? challenge of dealing with the memory of human rights violations (see Part I), the this past and while the Arusha Agreement Imbonerakure constitute a very worrying had helped to re-establish a degree of threat to peace and security in Burundi. harmony amongst the population, the The recent exchanges of fire between undermining of the Agreement, together this militia and the Burundian military with a climate of hate and ethnic pola- in Cibitoke province, resulting in four risation exploited by the government injured, worryingly demonstrates the draw Burundi back to the darker threat posed by the existence of a group 131. Genocide: Beate moments of its history. of armed civilians alongside a regular Klarsfield fears for Burundi (in French), Radio army, provoking potential misunders- France Internationale, 4 The current climate of hate has made tandings and frustration between these February 2018 certain commentators fear the worst.131 two entities, both of which, in parallel, 132. Burundi Watch Although those in power and CNDD- are responsible for guaranteeing the Update, Atrocities Watch Africa, Mars 2018. FDD party members are the key expo- security of the country.135 Controlling nents of this hate speech (see Part I.c), it the whole territory, specifically by means 133. Hate speech: Burundian authorities has also been adopted by certain sectors of patrols and night-time displays of attack “demons” and of the population. For example, during force,136 these armed and trained youth, “vampires”, (in French), FORSC, October 2017 the commemoration of the International who take their orders directly from the Day of women’s rights, on 31 March President’s office, act as a local police 134. Idem 2018, members of the National Women’s force, harassing all alleged opponents 135. Report No. 123 of Forum performed songs describing of President Pierre Nkurunziza and his SOS-Torture (in French) colonisers, Europeans and opponents of referendum. Even though opponents of SOS-Torture, 21 April 2018
Pierre Nkurunziza as venomous snakes the present regime comprise both Hutu 136. Burundi: the that deserved to be decapitated before and Tutsi, the Burundian authorities and Imbonerakure militia shows its strength the end of 2018. The women present the Imbonerakure foment distrust and three weeks before the referendum (in French). also threatened to hang “enemies of the hate towards the Tutsi in particular, who La Libre Afrique, 23 April CNDD”.132 Incitement to violence and are classified as natural opponents and 2018 hatred is also widely resorted to by the enemies of Pierre Nkurunziza’s “reign”. 137. The displaced Imbonerakure, for example during offi- As such, those displaced in 1993 are par- from the 1993 war – a population under cial visits by Burundian authorities such ticularly subject to intimidation, threats house arrest without any humanitarian as the visit of the President of the Senate and harassment of a political-ethnic assistance (in French), to Kayanza province on 1 April 2017, nature, and their movements outside the FORSC, 7 April 2018 during which hundreds of Imbonerakure sites designated for the displaced is scru- 138. Report of the marched into Kayanza stadium chanting pulously controlled, not to say forbid- Secretary-General on the Situation in Burundi, 133 137 hate songs. A video also circulated den, by the Imbonerakure. A recent S/2018/89, UNSC, 25 on social networks, showing around intensification of paramilitary training January 2018
100 Imbonerakure singing a song calling among the Imbonerakure reported by 139. Analysis on people to “impregnate opponents so civil society organisations has stirred up and adoption of bill establishing a that they give birth to Imbonerakure”; fears within the population at large.138 Burundian national volunteer force (in the term “impregnate” translated Finally, the adoption in March 2018 of French), National Assembly directly from Kirundi could also mean a bill establishing a Burundian national of Burundi, 4 April 2018 “to knock up” or even “to rape”.134 volunteer force that seems to create a According to FORSC this song is widely legal framework for the actions of the sung and repeated at each rally such as Imbonerakure has also provoked serious that of Saturday 6 May 2017, during concerns amongst various Burundian which thousands of new members civil society actors.139 were welcomed into the CNDD-FDD in Bujumbura. Accused of grave
25 Alongside the Imbonerakure’s omni- preventive approach, exercising added presence, with its hate-filled ethnic pressure on the Burundian government discourse, the “clean-up” of the secu- to enable conflict prevention mecha- rity forces, implemented by the regime nisms to be put in place, such as the following the failed coup of March deployment of a contingent of UN police 2015, is intensifying (see Part 4.a). This officers, as envisaged by UN Security undermining of ethnic balance within Council (UNSC) Resolution 2303. The the defence forces is of great concern, EU should also provide concerted sup- even more so because it is coupled with port for civil society programmes aiming the use, by those in power, of specialised to promote peaceful coexistence and units with a strong Hutu representa- strengthen social cohesion, in order to tion, both within the police, such as avoid the spread of hatred and division the riot police (established in 2015) which could lead to the outbreak of vio- and the Appui pour la Protection des lence and another conflict. 140. Repression and Genocidal Dynamics in Institutions (unit in charge of protecting Burundi, FIDH and Ligue Iteka, November 2016 state institutions), and within the army, This seems all the more important as such as the Brigade spéciale pour la pro- despair and fatigue in the face of the 141. Burundi: Ezechiel tection des institutions (Special Brigade current stalemate in the dialogue pro- Nibigira, former head of the Imbonerakure, for the Protection of Institutions), who cess risk pushing a growing number to become Minister of Foreign Affairs (in appear to report directly to the President of Burundians towards viewing armed French), Jeune Afrique, 20 via parallel chains of command.140 The conflict as the only solution. April 2018 appointment of Ezechiel Nibigira, for- 142. Political crisis in mer leader of the Imbonerakure, as head In fact, armed conflict is already the Burundi: “the risk of genocide has passed of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is fur- chosen option for some individuals, but killings continue” (in ther evidence of the hard and brutal line in particular following the 2015 crisis, French), Jeune Afrique, 6 141 February 2018 being taken by those in power. Even when various armed groups hostile to though, officially, increasing numbers Pierre Nkurunziza’s regime saw the 143. Burundi: The Army 142 in Crisis, International of observers from Burundian and light of day. Without going into detail Crisis Group, 5 April 2017 international civil society appear to have regarding the numerous Burundian ruled out the risk of genocide, no doubt armed groups, it is nonetheless impor- 144. Burundi: a facade of normality? (in French), in order to avoid magnifying the impact tant to consider two of them that have France Culture, 20 April 2018 of the ethnic rhetoric used by those in focussed their struggle exclusively on power to cause divisions among the maintaining the constitutional order population, increase repression and thus and bringing about the fall of those consolidate their power, the recourse currently in power, namely Résistance to hate speech as well as the policy of pour un État de droit (Resistance for terror and repression on the part of the the Rule of Law – RED-Tabara), mainly Imbonerakure in particular are extre- composed of youth who are against a mely worrying signs for peace and secu- third mandate and victims of repression rity in Burundi. Given that Burundi is who were subsequently radicalised, as not (yet) in a situation of open civil war, well as the Forces Républicaines pour le but rather of low intensity conflict143, Burundi (Republican Forces for Burundi with the government trying to maintain a – FOREBU), largely composed of former facade of normality,144 it is essential that members of the army and police who in the international community and the EU August 2017 reassembled within the in particular do not passively stand by as Forces Populaires du Burundi (FPB). the situation deteriorates before taking These two groups grew significantly action, but that they adopt as of now a between 2015 and the end of 2016,
Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi 26 What role for the European Union? increasing attacks in Bujumbura and camps in the DRC. FOREBU (now FPB) other provinces. Efforts to coordinate was then presented as “the most relevant the two movements appear to have been Burundian armed group operating in the under discussion since the beginning of Democratic Republic of the Congo”.147 2016, and in August 2017 RED Tabara Nevertheless, it is difficult for them to released a statement announcing its establish a secure rear base in this area, intention to develop a strategy for joint with the Forces Armées de RDC (Armed action in the armed conflict.145 Forces of the DRC – FARDC) and some Maï Maï groups exerting more and Nevertheless, even if various meetings more pressure on them. Uganda, which 145. Burundi: joint and exchanges appear to have been does not have any common border with rebel action envisaged against President organised with a view to developing a Burundi and is not strictly speaking Nkurunziza (in French), possible coalition, this appears compro- a preferred area of retreat, appears AA, 30 August 2017 mised by the lack of common leadership. nonetheless to have tolerated the training 146. Tanzanian This leadership crisis has grown further of members of RED Tabara on its soil mediation compromised by the arrest of FPB since the disappearance of the main FPB during 2016, but this appears no longer leaders (in French), Radio 146 Publique Africaine, 25 leaders in October 2017 in Tanzania, to be the case officially. Lastly, Rwanda, October 2017 but also following the alleged arrest accused by the Group of Experts of in August 2017 of the chief of staff having trained and armed Burundian 147. Letter dated 4 148 August 2017 from of RED Tabara, Melchiade Biremba, refugees in February 2016, does not the Group of Experts extended pursuant who is said currently to be detained in seem, for now, to be prepared to take to Security Council Kinshasa. Weakened and divided, for the diplomatic risk associated with this resolution 2293 (2016) addressed to the moment these two key groups seem kind of support. Hence there appears the President of the Security Council, Security to have little grip on a territory that is no risk, in the short term, of conflict Council, 10 August 2017 criss-crossed and totally controlled by erupting as a result of external rebellion. the Imbonerakure, creating an obsta- However, regional geopolitical stability 148. Great Lakes: contents of the cle for even the slightest movement of is currently very fragile. An outbreak of confidential report of the UN Group of Experts troops on Burundian soil. These groups ethnic violence, orchestrated by those (in French), Jeune Afrique, also currently lack substantial external in power in Burundi, could for example 6 February 2016 support in terms of arms or consistent provoke direct or indirect reactions from 149. Refugees financing. Ultimately and above all, the Rwanda and Uganda, in the form of from Burundi: Total, United Nations High FPB as well as the RED Tabara do not support to rebel armed groups. Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), consulted 26 have a solid rear base in a neighbou- April 2018 ring country. The current collaboration between Bujumbura and Dar es Salaam c. A forgotten refugee crisis 150. Burundi risks becoming forgotten does not allow for a strong presence of refugee crisis without support, UNHCR, 6 these groups in Tanzania. True, the eas- In this context, the sensitive issue of February 2018 tern Democratic Republic of the Congo refugees represents an additional risk (DRC), in particular Fizi and Uvira ter- to stability in the region. According to ritories in the province of South-Kivu, UNHCR figures, in April 2018 there have historically been preferred areas of were 430,478 Burundian refugees149 in retreat and recruitment for Burundian neighbouring countries, including more armed groups. Indeed, in August 2017, than 250,000 in Tanzania, about 90,000 the UN Group of Experts for the DRC in Rwanda and 47,000 and 40,000 in (hereafter: Group of Experts) reported DRC and Uganda respectively.150 The the ongoing mobilisation of these two UNHCR also points out that an increase groups in the region, and the recruitment of about 50,000 new refugees is expec- of new members in Burundian refugee ted in 2018, given that regional efforts to
27 resolve the country’s political crisis have slowly becoming a forgotten crisis. The not made significant progress. In her EU should allocate a significantly higher briefing of 6 February 2018,151 UNHCR amount towards the Burundian refugee Regional Coordinator for Burundian crisis and to the humanitarian needs refugees Catherine Wiesner underlined of the Burundian population. It should that the UNHCR and its partners also pay particular attention to the way were not promoting or encouraging in which humanitarian programmes are refugee returns to Burundi. Alluding implemented, ensuring in particular that to diplomatic efforts by Bujumbura to they are conflict sensitive. Indeed, if the convince third countries to repatriate the current situation provides fertile ground Burundian refugees on their territory, for recruitment and infiltration by armed she also appealed to the region’s states groups, as has been the case on many to honour their international responsi- other occasions in the region, it could bilities and not to force any Burundian also see suffering and frustration turn to 151. Idem refugee to return to their country against violent tensions, in particular between 152 152. Idem their will. The majority of these refugees and host populations, as well as refugees live in overcrowded camps when groups of refugees return to their 153. Idem where minimum standards of huma- country of origin. 153 154. Situation of nitarian assistance cannot be met. Burundian refugees living in the dioceses of Butare, The situation is just as appalling for Kabgayi, Kibungo, Kigali urban refugees, especially in Rwanda, and Nyundo, CJP-Caritas Rwanda-CRS, November where they face specific challenges in 2017 (in French) particular due to the lack of information 155. Third of Burundi or an exchange channels regarding the population need humanitarian aid, AFP, support provided by the UNHCR and 21 February 2018 its partners who are mainly active in the 154 156. Humanitarian camps. Action Plan of ECHO 2018, ECHO, 2018 In the face of this alarming humanita- rian situation, the UNHCR launched a 391 million dollar appeal to support Burundian refugees, stressing that only 21% of the required funds had so far been mobilised, making the Burundian refugee crisis the world’s least funded refugee crisis. The UNDP has also stated that one in three Burundians will need humanitarian assistance in 2018, an increase of 20% compared with 2017.155 In light of this crisis, the EU has planned a 33 million euro assistance package in 2018 for all of the countries in the Great Lakes region, including the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania.156 This amount is well below what is needed to meet the needs highlighted in this paper and demons- trates the extent to which Burundi is
Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi 28 What role for the European Union? PART IV – A power under siege : the AMISOM pot of gold
157. True cost of The African Union’s peacekeeping mis- resources to both the government and world’s most dangerous peacekeeping mission sion in Somalia (AMISOM) is the largest to individual soldiers. It has permitted shockingly high, The East peacekeeping mission on the African a substantial increase in salaries (800 African, 25 January 2018 continent. It is also one of the most US Dollars on average per month 158. Impact of EU dangerous mission’s in Africa, with the for a Burundian soldier deployed in funding dynamics on AMISOM, Institute for number of fatalities amongst its deploy- Somalia, compared with 40 US Dollars Security Studies, December ments estimated at more than 4,000.157 in Burundi) and a “death in service” 2017.
The EU contributes to the allowances benefit of 50,000 US Dollars, a fortune 159. Paying for of AMISOM troops to the value of 25 in Burundi.161 AMISOM veterans have AMISOM: Are Politics and Bureaucracy million US Dollars a month, through invested in property, sometimes building Undermining the 162 AU’s Largest Peace the European Development Fund (EDF), new residential districts. Participating Operation?, IPI Global specifically via the African Peace Facility in the Somalia mission also opens up Observatory, January 2017. 158 163 (APF). Since the initial deployment prospects for international careers. 160. Burundi, African of the mission in 2007, the EU has The EU-funded contributions are also Union Mission in Somalia transferred more than 1.5 billion Euro an important source of revenue for the 161. Burundi: The Army to the AU for AMISOM. The financial government, which withholds 20% of in Crisis, International Crisis Group, 5 April 2017. contribution of the EU constitutes a salaries for “administrative costs”.164 significant source of income for many of 162. Idem the troop contributing countries. It is the ii. Political and diplomatic 163. Idem governments of the countries contribut- benefits ing to AMISOM that decide the amount 164. Paying for AMISOM: Are Politics and frequency of transfers to their con- Burundi has acquired significant poli- and Bureaucracy tingents. Ethiopia, for example, only tical and diplomatic clout as a result Undermining the AU’s Largest Peace transfers 50% to its soldiers and uses the of its large contribution of troops to Operation?, IPI Global remaining half for other purposes.159 AMISOM. Indeed, from a political Observatory, January 2017
perspective it permits the government 165. Impact of EU funding dynamics on to keep a hold on power and ensure the AMISOM, Institute for a. Burundi and AMISOM loyalty of the armed forces by offering Security Studies (ISS), December 2017 them lucrative positions abroad, even Burundi re-joined AMISOM in 2007. if a large part of the allocated funds is 166. Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: With six rotating battalions, i.e. 5,432 withheld by the government (see below). Burundi, Providing for soldiers, it is the second biggest troop On a diplomatic level, a reputation peacekeeping, October 2016 contributor to AMISOM.160 Even as regional peacekeeper strengthens though the security situation is highly Burundi’s international image while precarious, it still brings significant ben- diverting attention away from its inter- efits to the country and its troops. nal crisis.165 This strengthened political leverage at a regional level is likely to be i. Financial advantages one of the main reasons why the country was admitted into the AU Peace and AMISOM provides important financial Security Council.166
29 iii. Benefits for the integration repression of protests against Pierre process in the Burundian Nkurunziza running for a third term, army several of Burundi’s partners suspended their cooperation with the state security Participation in AMISOM has also had forces. Belgium and the Netherlands a positive impact on the integration suspended their security sector reform process in the Burundian army and on programmes171 and the United States 167. The Burundian 167 army’s dangerous strengthening its “esprit de corps”. suspended its ACOTA pre-deploy- over-reliance on Indeed the decision to provide troops to ment training.172 The suspension of peacekeeping, African Arguments, September 2017 the mission was taken at a time when the ACOTA programme also had the rebel groups and the Burundian army unintended effect of putting an end to 168. Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: (FAB) merged and when the majority of the supervision of troops deployed to Burundi, Providing for peacekeeping, October members of the former armed forces had AMISOM. 2016 been forced to demobilise. Deployment in Somalia temporarily interrupted the The most significant impact of the inter- 169. Idem demobilisation process, thus alleviating national response to the repression in 170. Burundi: The Army the grievances of the ex-FAB.168 Burundi was the suspension, in March in Crisis, International Crisis Group, 5 April 2017. 2016, of all direct financial support to iv. Institutional benefits the government of Burundi by the EU 171. Belgium suspends its police cooperation and its Member States. This suspension, with Burundi and its The significant contribution to AMISOM a result of the failure of consultations support to the electoral process (in French), Press contingents also opened up opportuni- held under Article 96 of the Cotonou release from Alexander de Croo, 10 May 2015 ties for training and capacity building Agreement with Burundi, also brought in the Burundian army, thus increasing about a review of EU financing to 172. U.S. suspends 173 Burundi peacekeeping its professionalism and strengthening AMISOM. In the words of the training over protests, the integration process. Pre-deployment Council of the EU, the “financing condi- Reuters, 23 May 2015 training given by ACOTA (Africa tions and the procedures for payment 173. COUNCIL Contingency Operations Training and of allowances to Burundian military DECISION concerning the conclusion of Assistance), funded and managed by the personnel taking part in the AMISOM consultations with the US State Department and supported by Mission, as well as the contribution Republic of Burundi under Article 96 of the the United States Africa Command was paid to the Government of Burundi for Partnership Agreement, 169 Council of the European highly important in this regard. pre-deployment costs (financed by the Union, 8 March 2016 EDF under the APF), will be reviewed
174. Idem and adjusted in consultation with the b. Reactions of the African Union.”174 Until an agreement 175. Paying for AMISOM: Are Politics international community and had been reached between the EU, the and Bureaucracy in particular the EU following AU and Burundi on the ways of paying Undermining the AU’s Largest Peace the 2015 crisis, and their the salaries of the Burundian contingent, Operation?, IPI Global Observatory, January 2017 impact on AMISOM funding the troops no longer received EU-funded contributions. As a result, in December The crisis that erupted in April 2015 had 2016 President Nkurunziza threatened a profound impact on the Burundian to withdraw the Burundian troops from army. The failed coup attempt of May AMISOM if their salaries were not paid, 2015 led to a series of purges and repri- and also threatened the AU with legal sals, including several assassinations action on the issue.175 of former FAB and rebel leaders, all of which destabilised the fragile internal Faced with the threat of troop wit- cohesion.170 In response to the violent hdrawal and legal action, the AU and
Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi 30 What role for the European Union? Burundi agreed in January 2017 that the i. “Voluntary” contributions AU would directly transfer the soldiers’ transferred by AMISOM salaries into personal bank accounts ope- soldiers to the government ned in their name in a private Burundian bank instead of transferring them to the The implementation of the agreement government. The EU accepted this prin- reached in January 2017 between the ciple and imposed a special audit process EU, the AU and Burundi has proven to verify that the salaries were indeed more complex than expected. The agree- being paid directly to the soldiers. In ment was meant to prevent the central this way, it appeared that AMISOM government from benefitting from EU would be able to continue its mission funds while guaranteeing direct pay- in Somalia and that Burundian troops ment of allowances to the Burundian would keep their allowances, while the troops in AMISOM. However, instead Burundian government was prevented of the allowances being transferred to 176. Burundi, AU from benefitting directly from European individual soldiers’ accounts, they were resolves AMISOM pay 176 dispute, AFP, 16 February funds. However, many Burundian deposited in the Coopérative d’Epargne 2017 and international observers expressed et de Crédit pour l’Autodeveloppement serious doubts, highlighting instances of (CECAD), a military cooperative run by 177. Mystery 179 surrounding new misappropriation of AMISOM funds by the Defence Ministry. Even though presidential jet (in French), Iwacu, 23 October the regime. individual accounts for each soldier 2014 deployed to AMISOM had indeed been opened in CECAD, some soldiers clai- 178. Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: c. Allegations of corruption and med only to have received 80% of their Burundi, Providing for peacekeeping, October misappropriation of AMISOM allowance, suggesting that the govern- 2016 funds ment continued to levy administrative 179. Burundi : the costs of 20%. When questioned by government is still Indeed, the lack of transparency with Radio France Internationale (RFI), the taking a 20% cut from Amisom soldiers’ regard to the management of AMISOM Burundian army spokesperson, Colonel salaries (in French), RFI, funding has prompted several corrup- Gaspard Baratuza, replied that the sol- 23 June 2017 tion allegations. In 2014, the Burundian diers voluntarily offered to transfer 20% 180. Idem anti-corruption watchdog OLUCOME of their allowances.180 However, these accused government officials of having voluntary contributions now appear to bought a new private jet for President be more of an established rule and ever Nkurunziza with AMISOM funds.177 In less voluntary. In an interview given to 2016, the national budget made reference the Burundian news agency Iwacu in to 3 billion Burundian francs as “extraor- February 2018 Gaspard Baratuza, reac- dinary revenue from AMISOM”. This is ting to accusations that AMISOM funds a huge drop compared with 2014-2015, were being used to organise the 2020 when 29 billion was included in the same presidential elections, explained: “That budget line, raising additional questions is not true (…) We have decided to put about corruption and misappropriation all our military personal on an equal of AMISOM funds.178 footing. Those who earn a lot will have to contribute more. To do this, we have introduced an agreement procedure. Whoever wants to can sign up and trans- fer 500 US Dollars per month. Whoever refuses will be replaced by someone who understands our reasoning. But
31 this has nothing to do with funding for the army through the offer to Burundian the elections, which will be withheld soldiers of handsomely paid positions from the local salaries of all military in Somalia as well as the possibility personnel.”181 of personal enrichment through the Kumena amaso system. Thanks to a ii. The system of Kumena sophisticated and well-organised system amaso and the greasing of of coercion, ironically called “voluntary palms to secure a place in contributions”, the Burundian govern- AMISOM ment benefits directly from EU funding to AMISOM’s Burundian troops. Such a Some Burundian human rights organisa- practice, which consists of withholding tions have documented even more unde- “contributions” on allowances paid by rhand methods of organised corruption the EU, is at odds with the letter and linked with EU-funded allowances to spirit of the EU Council conclusions of 181. Administrative 183 procedures to blame (in AMISOM troops. They have reported a 14 March 2016 suspending all direct French), Iwacu, 16 February 2018 widespread practice of soldiers seeking financial support to the Burundian deployment in Somalia who grease government and also with the agreement 182. Enforced the palms of officials charged with between the EU and the AU regarding disappearance of Alexis NGABONZIZA, Ferdinand recruitment in order to secure a place in new payment modalities for Burundian HAVYARIMANA and Corporal-Chef Jean AMISOM. According to this practice, troops in Somalia. What is more, in NDAYIZEYE, FOCODE, 3 March 2017 called Kumena amaso (meaning ‘to turn the current context in Burundi, mar- a blind eye’): “a soldier can pay between ked by grave human rights violations, 183. Burundi: EU one million (1,000,000) and five million the participation of Burundian troops closes consultations under Article 96 of the (5,000,000) Burundian Francs to be on in AMISOM allows the Burundian Cotonou agreement, Council of the European the list of participants in peacekeeping government to assume a respectable Union, 14 March 2016 missions. These payments go through image and to have significant diploma-
184. Evaluation of the “sub-commissionaires”, usually corpo- tic influence in particular in relation to implementation of the rals close to the military administration, international mediation efforts. This African Peace Facility as an instrument located in different military regions. was also acknowledged and highlighted supporting African efforts to manage Since it is often difficult to collect such in the final external evaluation report of conflicts on the a sum at a time, the soldiers seek money the EU APF.184 Furthermore, with the continent, ECDPM, 1 December 2017 lenders, civil or military, who charge suspension of ACOTA pre-deployment them exorbitant monthly interest rates, training by the US, which included a i.e. 50% per month or ask for the sharing programme for the supervision and of monthly allowances once deployed in vetting of Burundian troops deployed the mission.”182 to AMISOM, it is now practically impossible to verify whether Burundian soldiers in Somalia are responsible d. The lack of coherence in for human rights violations. It is also continued EU support to the impossible to verify whether members Burundian contingent of of militia groups like the Imbonerakure AMISOM are compensated for “services rendered” in acts of repression by being deployed The financial support which enables (and well paid) in Somalia. Burundian participation in AMISOM gives the Burundian President conside- rable power and influence, in particular by allowing him to buy the loyalty of
Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi 32 What role for the European Union? Recommendations: Courses of action for the European Union and its Member States
On the basis of the analysis presented in this report (see Introduction, Part I, Part II, Part III and Part IV), EurAc wishes to propose the following courses of action and recommendations to the various European decision-makers: to the EU Member States, in particular when meeting as the Council of the European Union, to the European Commission (EC), in particular the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) and the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO), to the European External Action Service (EEAS) and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP).
On the political and diplomatic level
Council of the EU - EEAS
• Given the flagrant lack of improvement in the human rights situation in the country, characterised in particular by the brutal repression of dissident voices in the lead-up to the referendum and by the recent adoption of re- pressive laws on foreign NGOs and local non-profit associations, renew the decision to suspend direct support to the Burundian government as agreed in the EU Council decision of March 2016, by applying Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, and re-direct the suspended aid towards direct financial support to civil society organisations, in particular those working to promote and protect civil, political, social and economic rights and press freedoms, including organisations and their members in exile;
• Suspend financial support used to fund salaries and allowances for the Bu- rundian contingent in AMISOM, a practice totally at odds with the suspen- sion of direct support under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, and put pressure on the African Union to find a replacement for Burundian troops, allowing that mission to continue to fulfil its vital role in Somalia;
• Publicly condemn the organisation of the constitutional referendum given the current political and security context which is not conducive to such major changes;
Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi 33 What role for the European Union? • Support the organisation of a high-level meeting with all historical guaran- tors of the Arusha Agreement and support the release of a joint statement condemning the undermining of this Agreement and of its indisputable achie- vements in the search for peace in Burundi, as well as the deliberate exploita- tion of ethnic issues that could lead to a serious destabilisation of Burundian society, as well as to renewed conflict;
• Cease EU support to the mediation process as currently conducted by the EAC, given its lack of adequate inclusiveness and credibility, and press for the setting up by the AU of a mediation and facilitation team that is impartial and agreed by all parties, allowing the representation of all stakeholders in the conflict, with particular attention to the participation of women.
On the issue of the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights
Member States – Council of the EU – EEAS
• Extend the EU targeted sanctions (prohibition on entering EU territory and assets freeze) adopted in October 2015 against four people, and target other individuals within President Nkurunziza’s inner circle who are responsible for human rights violations and/or who use hate speech, in particular with ethnic connotations;
• Use the EU’s diplomatic influence to put pressure on the members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), in particular on European states that are perma- nent or temporary members, and more particularly on the UNSC sanctions committees, to immediately apply UN sanctions against Burundian officials responsible for human rights violations and/or who use hate speech, in par- ticular with ethnic connotations;
• Use the EU’s diplomatic influence to put pressure on members of the Human Rights Council to renew the mandate of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Burundi and demand that the Burundian government allow the UN, the AU and other independent observers to carry out investigations into crimes com- mitted since the beginning of the crisis, including access to all sites of deten- tion without prior warning and total and unimpeded access to all detained persons;
34 • Communicate in a much stronger and more coherent manner the EU’s com- mitment and determination to defend the rights and freedoms of Burun- dian citizens, such as the freedom of expression, association and assembly; condemn policies of harassment, arrest and detention of political opponents, human rights defenders (in accordance with the European Guidelines on Hu- man Rights Defenders185), civil society members and their families, and jour- nalists, in particular threats to and violence against the population as part of the referendum campaign;
• Demand that de-registered or suspended organisations are able to resume their activities and that their security is guaranteed; demand that media or- ganisations are able to resume their activities and that their security is gua- ranteed;
• Demand the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of conscience, and that any charges against them are dropped;
• Call for the abrogation of the new laws on local Burundian non-profit as- sociations and foreign NGOs, which appear to impose undue restrictions on freedom of expression, association and assembly and grant radical new powers to the government to control these organisations and repress critical 185. Ensuring Protection – European voices; Union Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, EEAS, 2008 • Publicly condemn the adoption of a new law on the creation of a national volunteer force which appears to legalise the activities of the ruling party’s violent youth militia, the Imbonerakure, which has been widely accused by international human rights organisations and the UN of seriously violating fundamental rights while operating with total impunity;
DG DEVCO – Members States - EEAS
. Urge EU Member States to provide strengthened direct and flexible financial aid to civil society organisations and the media, in particular women’s organ- isations, working on the ground but also those in exile, and in particular those who are working to promote and protect civil, political, economic and social rights and press freedoms ; facilitate internal relocation or access to emergency visas for human rights defenders and organisations at risk in Burundi, in order to help guarantee their physical and psychological integrity in all circumstances ;
Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi 35 What role for the European Union? On the security level
EEAS – Council of the EU
. Use the EU’s diplomatic influence to bring about the effective implementation of the UNSC decision to deploy 228 UN police officers to Burundi in accor- dance with UNSC resolution 2303 adopted on 29 July 2016;
DG DEVCO
. Press for the implementation of specific programmes in Burundi but also within and around refugee camps in neighbouring countries with the aim of promoting peaceful coexistence and strengthening social cohesion, with special emphasis on the inclusion of women and young people;
On the humanitarian level
DG ECHO
. Ensure that humanitarian projects are implemented with a clearly-defined “conflict sensitive” element and put in place rigorous mechanisms to ensure respect for humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality by interna- tional and Burundian implementation partners on the ground;
. Disburse additional emergency funding to meet the current needs of Burundian refugees.
36 List of abbreviations
ACAT Action des Chrétiens pour l’Abolition de la Torture (Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture) ACOTA Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia APF African Peace Facility APRODH Association Burundaise pour la Protection des Droits Humains et des Personnes Détenues (Burundian Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained Persons) ASBL Associations sans but lucratif (non-profit associations) AU African Union CB-CPI Coalition burundaise pour la CPI (the Burundian Coalition for the International Criminal Court) CDP Conseil des patriotes (Council of Patriots) CECAD Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit pour l’Autodeveloppement (Self-development Savings and Credit Cooperative) CNARED Conseil National pour le Respect de l’Accord d’Arusha pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Burundi et la Restauration de l’Etat de Droit (National Council for the Respect of the Arusha Agreement and for Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi and the Re-establishment of the Rule of Law) CNDD-FDD Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces de défense de la démocratie (National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy) COSOME Coalition de la société civile pour le monitoring électoral (The Civil Society Coalition for Electoral Monitoring) CPI/ICC Cour Pénale Internationale/International Criminal Court DG DEVCO Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development DG ECHO Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations DRC Democratic Republic of Congo EAC East African Community EC European Commission EDF European Development Fund EEAS European External Action Service EU European Union FAB Forces Armées Burundaises (Burundian Armed Forces) FARDC Forces Armées de RDC (Armed Forces of the DRC) FNL Forces Nationales de Libération (National Forces of Liberation) FOCODE Forum pour la conscience et le développement (Forum for Conscience and Development) FOREBU Forces Républicaines pour le Burundi (Republic Forces of Burundi) FORSC Forum pour le renforcement de la société civile (Forum for the strengthening of civil society) FPB Forces Populaires Burundaises (Popular Forces of Burundi) HR/VP High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission MSD Mouvement pour la Solidarité et la Démocratie (Movement for Solidarity and Democracy) NGO Non-governmental organisation PARCEM Parole et Action pour le Réveil des Consciences et l’Évolution des Mentalités (Word and Action for the Awakening of Consciousness and the Evolution of Mentalities) PNB Police Nationale Burundaise (Burundian National Police) RANAC Rassemblement national pour le changement (National Rally for Change) RCP Réseau des citoyens probes (Network of Honest Citizens) RFI Radio France Internationale RPA Radio Publique Africaine (African Public Radio) SNR Service National du Renseignement (National Intelligence Service) UBJ Union burundaise des journalistes (Burundian Union of Journalists) UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNSC United Nations Security Council
37 Created in 2003, the European Network for EurAc’s mission is to carry out advocacy work Central Africa (EurAc) has member organisa- towards the European institutions and politi- tions from civil society in 11 European coun- cal decision-makers around 3 central themes tries. These organisations work on and in the for the Great Lakes region: (1) peace and secu- Great Lakes region. They support civil society rity, (2) human rights and inclusive political organisations in Burundi, the Democratic participation and (3) management of natural Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda in their resources. Transversely from these fields, the efforts to promote peace, the defence of improvement of governance and the stren- human rights and development. gthening of non-state actors as counter-power are priorities of our advocacy network.
European Network for Central Africa - EurAc
Rue Stevin, 115 B-1000 Brussels Belgium
+32 (0)2 725 47 70 [email protected] www.eurac-network.org/en @Eurac_Net
Authoritarian abuses and covert elimination of dissident voices in Burundi 42 What role for the European Union?