FACTS ON THE GROUND: THE GROWING POWER OF ’S GAZA LEADERSHIP By Jonathan Spyer*

This article will observe the process whereby Hamas has consolidated and maintained its rule in Gaza. It will argue that the gradual strengthening of the Gaza leadership within Hamas preceded the upheavals of 2011. The fallout from the events in and Syria, however, served to accelerate and accentuate the process whereby the Gaza leadership made gains at the expense of the external leadership.

INTRODUCTION was heavily dependent on Iranian arms and money. The upheavals in a number of Arab The outbreak of an uprising against the countries that began in the spring of 2011 have Asad regime in Syria placed Hamas in an presented the Palestinian Islamist Hamas uncomfortable position. The uprising rapidly movement with both dilemmas and took on a sectarian aspect. It consisted of a opportunities. On the one hand, Hamas is the revolt largely by Sunni Arabs against a non- Palestinian branch of the Muslim Sunni dictatorship. The Asad regime, Brotherhood, and various branches of this meanwhile, responded to the uprising with trans-national movement have emerged as extreme brutality. Around 16,000 people have winners as a result of the upheavals. In Egypt, died so far as a result of its attempt to crush Tunisia, and in a more complex way also in the opposition. The in Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood has vastly Syria was of course a supporter of the increased its power and influence as a result of uprising, and rapidly moved toward a the decline and/or collapse of the secular, powerful position within the main opposition nationalist military regimes in those countries. alliance, the Syrian National Council. Iran, Most importantly, in Egypt, the Muslim meanwhile, provided vigorous support for the Brotherhood now dominates the parliament, Asad regime in its attempt to crush its and is contending for the presidency. opponents. Other elements of the “resistance For Hamas, the rise of the Muslim axis,” such as Hizballah, also played their part. Brotherhood in Egypt is of central This presented Hamas with a dilemma. On significance. Since July 2007, Hamas has the one hand, its strategic allies and hosts were maintained exclusive control over the Gaza engaged in a combined effort to crush a threat Strip area, which borders Egyptian-controlled to one of their allies. However, on the other Sinai. The prospect of Muslim Brotherhood hand, the threat consisted of an uprising by rule in Egypt is thus of strategic importance Sunni Muslim Arabs against a brutal, Alawi for the movement.1 Yet the Arab upheavals regime. This uprising, furthermore, was of at have also presented a challenge to Hamas. In least partially Sunni-Islamist character, and the mid-1990s, the movement began building Hamas’s fellow Muslim Brothers were playing a close alliance with Iran and its so-called a prominent role in it. 2 “resistance axis,” which includes the Shi’i Hamas dealt with this dilemma by quietly Hizballah organization and the Asad regime in withdrawing its leadership from Damascus, Syria. Hamas’s overall leadership was based while declining to hold public events in in Damascus. The Gaza enclave, meanwhile, solidarity with the Asad regime in the

44 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2012) Facts on the Ground: The Growing Power of Hamas’s Gaza Leadership movement’s Gaza enclave. At the same time, 1994--with the help of the international donor the movement hoped not to sever relations community. entirely with Iran and its allies. The main Once the question of power had been political fallout from this new situation facing settled at the highest level, the movement Hamas has been the relative strengthening of appears to have experienced little trouble in the movement’s Gaza leadership, at the administering this apparatus. According to one expense of the overall external leadership. report, Hamas “succeeded in monopolising This has manifested itself most clearly to date control of governance functions in Gaza, in the decision to transfer crucial areas of including security, economics, welfare, and authority, including over the movement’s the public infrastructure” 3 within six months budget, to the Gaza leadership, and away from of the June 2007 coup. How was the Khalid Mash’al, the movement’s nominal movement able to achieve this? leader. This article will observe the process Gaining Security Control whereby Hamas has consolidated and maintained its rule in Gaza. It will argue that The first issue facing Hamas was the the gradual strengthening of the Gaza consolidation of its security control of the leadership within Hamas preceded the . Observation of the establishment upheavals of 2011. The fallout from the events of Hamas’s power in this sector shows the in Egypt and Syria, however, served to way in which the movement has succeeded in accelerate and accentuate the process whereby absorbing the machinery of the PA, leaving the Gaza leadership made gains at the expense much of it in operation, while placing it firmly of the external leadership. under the supreme authority of Hamas. The longer-term process derived from the Following the 2007 coup, the Ramallah-based fact that the Gaza leadership has built up a Palestinian Authority leadership called on all strong and stable center of real power and PA security forces to cease operating in Gaza. actual rule over the Palestinian population in At this point, Hamas had two forces available Gaza. The external leadership could boast no for its use. These were the movement’s long- similar tangible asset. It did, however, handle standing armed wing, the Izz al-Din al- relations with the movement’s main patron in Qassam Brigades, and the Executive Force, Teheran. The relative lessening of the which Hamas had been building up around the importance of this relationship made the Interior Ministry held by Fathi Hamad in changing balance of power in the movement a Gaza. near inevitability, with the consequences that The Qassam Brigades benefited from the followed. capture of a large arsenal from the PA following the coup. The Brigades and the HAMAS IN GAZA: A QUASI- Executive Force succeeded in the period ahead SOVEREIGN ISLAMIST ENTITY to establish themselves as the dominant armed force in Gaza. While the Qassam Brigades The Hamas movement has exercised remained engaged with the primary movement exclusive control in the Gaza Strip since 2007. task of “resistance” against , the Following the collapse of the short-lived PA Executive Force was divided into three national unity government and Hamas’s armed separate branches in the period immediately ousting of Fatah from the Strip in June 2007, following the 2007 seizure of power. These the movement took over all functions of public included the Civil Police, the Internal Security administration in the Gaza Strip. Hamas Forces (an agency concerned with intelligence inherited the relatively sophisticated gathering and security within Gaza), and the administrative apparatus, which had been National Security Forces, which functioned as developed by the Palestinian Authority since an external border guard and defense “army.” Hamas sought to present these as “non-

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2012) 45 Jonathan Spyer political” forces quite separate from the Hamas monopoly of power. When they Qassam Brigades and Hamas’s own security overstepped this mark, as in Khan Yunis in structures. To this end, the Civil Police and 2009, they were dealt with swiftly and National Security Forces were nominally effectively. 6 headed by non-Hamas figures. The police, It is likely that Hamas preferred to allow notably, were headed by Tawfiq Jabir, a Islamic Jihad and other smaller groups to former Fatah man, until his death on the first maintain their military capabilities, as these day of Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in 2008. could provide a certain deniability for the He was replaced by Brigadier General Abu Hamas authorities when they nevertheless Ubaydah al-Jarah. 4 wished to put pressure on Israel. Ironically, Statements by senior Hamas figures this process resembles the use made of Hamas notwithstanding, it is highly doubtful that a by the PA leadership in the 1990s. Hamas’s coherent case can be made of any real long claim to represent an Islamic resistance separation between Hamas movement and option also meant that it was reluctant to “civil” security structures. This is because the challenge frontally organizations purporting to civil structures are in any case ultimately represent either of those principles in a more answerable to a political leadership consisting rigorous way than did Hamas itself. entirely of Hamas men. The Hamas Nevertheless, Hamas did act against these movement structures and the “civil” structures groups if and when it felt that its own position are both instruments available to the Gaza was threatened, ensuring its ultimate authority. leadership, and can work separately or in Hamas also worked to curb independent armed coordination with each other depending on the activity by clan-based groups. In so doing, it context. succeeded in creating a far calmer public Still, the attempt to bring into existence space than had existed under PA rule. different and parallel security structures, with Having established its ascendance, if not one more politically loyal to the leadership but quite monopoly, of the means of violence in all ultimately subordinated to it resembles Gaza, Hamas then set about achieving control practices familiar with other authoritarian over the tunnel system from Egypt that was Middle Eastern regimes of nationalist, the main means for the smuggling of Islamist, and monarchical types. Syria, the weaponry and other goods into Gaza. With West Bank Palestinian Authority, Iran, and this achieved, the movement was able to begin Saudi Arabia each in their own way have the process of turning its makeshift military maintained similar systems of parallel forces into a quasi-army, armed with authority, with more ideologically “pure” units sophisticated weapons systems brought in via with their own systems of command the tunnels. Once the physical assurance of coexisting alongside regular units. control over Gaza was achieved, Hamas then While never entirely disarming other began the work in earnest of acquiring control paramilitary groups, Hamas has been able to over other aspects of life in the Strip. force them to accept its ultimate authority when this proved necessary. On occasion, and Gaining Political and Judicial Control when it suited its purposes, Hamas was prepared to use violence against these other A decision by the West Bank Palestinian groups. This applied to organizations such as Authority to order 70,000 of its employees not Islamic Jihad, which sought to pursue an to report for work in the Gaza Strip independent campaign of rocket fire on Israel, (effectively, the PA paid them not to work) did which sometimes conflicted with Hamas’s not have the presumably desired effect of needs of the day. 5 It also applied to the Salafi rendering Gaza ungovernable. In the pre-June groupings, which flourished in Hamas- 2007 period, endless wrangling between controlled Gaza. These groups were tolerated Hamas officials and Fatah-affiliated civil as long as they did not interfere with the servants was a notable feature of the

46 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2012) Facts on the Ground: The Growing Power of Hamas’s Gaza Leadership governance of the Strip. Following the coup, and rhetorical. It plays no real role in Hamas was required to create an overseeing the actions of the executive or in administrative elite of its own, to work under legislation. its government. More important than the rump PLC are The movement was able to draw on a large Hamas’s regional and district Shura Councils pool of loyal university graduates in this task, in Gaza. The councils are elected by internal and it was achieved with considerable success. movement elections and seek to ensure that The partial and piecemeal implementation of government policies are in line with Hamas’s the Fayyad government’s order to employees broader agenda. The 77 members of the Gaza not to work aided Hamas in this task, since use regional Shura Council in turn elect the 15 could also be made of the previous elite. The member political bureau, which is the most need to rapidly create a new elite served to senior body of Hamas in Gaza.8 accelerate the process of Hamas’s transformation of Gaza, in that thousands of GAZA: A ONE-PARTY ISLAMIST teachers and other public employees were STATELET rapidly replaced by movement members. Where PA employees attempted to remain The structures of governance and control loyal to the West Bank PA, as in the judicial put in place by Hamas in the months following sector, Hamas simply created its own judicial the 2007 coup remain in place today. Gaza structures, based on Shari’a law, to bypass today thus constitutes an Islamist one-party them. statelet. The Hamas regime survived Hamas security officers dispensed Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009, and has summary justice, approved by clerics. More faced no serious internal challenge to its rule. lastingly, the movement expanded the role of As seen above, Hamas has imposed its control the already existing Islamic Conciliation over the judiciary. It has emptied the PA Committees, which began to play an official, legislative bodies of all power and content. rival role to the courts. 7 These quickly issued The movement maintains exclusive security judgments, operating according to Hamas’s control. A cabinet composed exclusively of interpretation of Islamic law. The system Hamas members enjoys executive authority. functioned under Hamas’s executive control, The nature of Hamas rule in Gaza has ending any pretence of judicial independence. received insufficient attention, because it was Hamas also established a Higher Justice widely assumed that the split between Gaza Council, which gave the ruling authorities the and the West Bank was a temporary power to fire judges. The head of this council, phenomenon, so no great importance was Abd al-Raouf al-Halabi, eventually took over attached to the way that Hamas ruled. Though the Gaza Supreme Court with an armed escort Palestinian reconciliation efforts remain, such of Hamas men. This led to a strike by judges, an assumption can no longer be made. which enabled Hamas to sack 44 judges, appointing others more to its liking. The Gaza Leadership Gains at the Expense Isma’il Haniya, who serves as prime of the Hamas Political Leadership minister of the Hamas authority in Gaza, assembled a cabinet consisting entirely of Hamas’s internal decisionmaking processes Hamas men in the days following the 2007 are kept deliberately opaque by the movement. coup. This body remains responsible for Yet even prior to the Arab upheavals of 2011, control of executive authority in the Gaza it was clear that the emergence of an Islamist Strip. Following the 2007 coup, The PA statelet in Gaza was creating rival centers of parliament, the Palestine Legislative Council, power in Hamas. The de facto government in was reconvened as an exclusively Hamas body Gaza was responsible for the lives of 1.3 other than a single independent legislator. It million people and for the daily administration continues to meet weekly, but its role is formal of an area over which it held sovereignty. It

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2012) 47 Jonathan Spyer thus represented real power for Hamas for the Khalid Mash’al, for example, became a first time. resident of Qatar; Imad Alami, a senior However, the exiled leadership in member of the Political Bureau in Damascus, Damascus and the head of the Political was the only member of the Damascus Bureau, Khalid Mash’al were able to maintain leadership to take up residence in Gaza (where overall control of the movement primarily he has aligned with hardline elements opposed because of the financial dependence of the to Mash’al, to whom he was opposed even Gaza enclave on support from the movement’s when still in Damascus). Moussa Abu international backers, most importantly Iran. Marzouk, who is himself originally from Observation of the Gaza enclave’s budget Gaza, left Damascus for Egypt. Other Hamas for 2012 reveals that of a total of $769 million, officials formerly resident in Damascus have only around a quarter is raised from local turned up in Istanbul and Khartoum. taxation and revenue. Jamal Nassar, a Hamas It is worth noting that the countries where official in Gaza, revealed that the rest would the external leadership might have been come from international “donors,” primarily expected to have reestablished itself--Qatar, Iran. 9 Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey, perhaps --all in The exiled leadership in Damascus, and different ways have normal relations with the above all Political Bureau head Khalid West, of a type which Syria and Iran do not. Mash’al were responsible for developing and As such, they would likely be reluctant to maintaining the links with Iran. This ensured challenge the West frontally by offering a new the continuous flow of funds, which alone home to the Hamas leadership, for little made the Gaza statelet viable. Most crucially, tangible gain. the control by the exiled leadership of the Thus, as a result of events in Syria, movement’s sources of income gave it, among Hamas’s external leadership ceased to operate other things, financial control of the as a united, coherent unit. According to a movement’s armed wing, the Qassam number of reports, Iran was angered by Brigades. These were based in Gaza, and as Hamas’s failure to express support for the the main armed element in the Strip, they Asad regime and swiftly imposed financial possessed the final say as to who could rule it. sanctions on Hamas in Gaza. A Gaza-based Thus, the control of their funding by the academic close to Hamas was quoted as external leadership afforded it leverage over saying that Teheran had terminated financial the Gaza leaders. support worth $23 million per month to After 2004, Hamas became increasingly Hamas-controlled Gaza as a result of the dependent on Iranian support, as funding from movement’s stance over Syria. 10 (Other Saudi Arabia and the Gulf began to decrease. sources placed Iranian support for Hamas at This led to the movement being widely seen as $400 million annually). a member of the Iranian-led regional axis. Yet In January 2012, Khalid Mash’al as a result of the uprising in Syria, the announced that he would withdraw his name movement was presented with a dilemma, of for consideration for reelection to the which the external leadership has ended up leadership of the movement. This move, being the main victim. however, signaled the beginning of a political The external leadership departed from contest between the external leadership and Damascus gradually in the latter part of 2011. the Gazans. Contrary to previous depictions, in Contrary to initial expectations, it has not which Mash’al had been seen as the more succeeded in reconstituting itself elsewhere. “ideological” leader, and the Gazans more Rather than making a smooth transition from pragmatic, in the first months of 2012, the patronage of Iran to the support and Mash’al appeared to take a more pragmatic domiciling of a Sunni-Arab state, the former stance. Haniya, on the other hand, visited Iran Damascus-based leadership has found itself and made a series of statements confirming spread across the region. Hamas’s ideological goals--most centrally, its

48 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2012) Facts on the Ground: The Growing Power of Hamas’s Gaza Leadership support for the destruction of Israel and Khalil al-Hayya, also owed their positions to opposition to any diplomatic process between the support of the Qassam Brigades. 11 Media Israelis and Palestinians. reports have also asserted that control of the An interesting dynamic emerged as a result organization’s budget and of the Qassam of this contest, in which Mash’al sought to Brigades have been removed from Mash’al. achieve the long-elusive reconciliation with Mash’al’s efforts toward reconciliation are the West Bank Palestinian Authority in order ongoing and are obviously connected to the to remove the alternative, autonomous power larger context of the contest between him and structure that had emerged in Gaza. This the Gaza-based leadership. If Mash’al attempt appears, for the moment at least, to manages to secure a reconciliation process, have failed. Mash’al signed an agreement in this will greatly weaken the Gaza leaders, who early February 2012, in Doha with Palestinian will be obliged to cede control of executive Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas. authority in the Strip, at least following the However, in a key indication of where the elections, to a renewed united PA leadership. power now lies in Hamas, the Gaza leadership This would pave the way for a Hamas bid for declined to accept it. The precise reason for control of the PLO, and thus of the Palestinian rejecting the agreement, according to a Hamas national movement as a whole. (An statement to the PLC, centered on the fact that alternative possibility that has been raised is it would have seen PA Chairman Abbas that in the event of the sides failing to agree to becoming both president and prime minister of the terms for the reuniting of the two the Palestinian Authority. Yet this detail is less authorities, a joint overall government could important than the fact that the movement’s be formed, with Fatah continuing to control “internal” representatives chose to reject an the West Bank and Hamas to control Gaza.) agreement already signed by the supposed overall head of Hamas. CONCLUSION: GAZA ASCENDANT? The failure of the Doha agreement was the first sign that a truly important shift was under While it is of course difficult to make way in Hamas. Since then, reports have predictions, it should be noted that emerged suggesting that Isma’il Haniya in reconciliation talks and various April 2012 won elections for the leadership of announcements of breakthroughs have taken the movement in Gaza--emerging as the first place periodically since 2011, yet person to hold this position since Abd al-Aziz reconciliation itself has remained elusive. Rantisi was assassinated by Israel in 2004. This does not necessarily mean that Mash’al The reports indicated a broad series of gains will fail to keep his position as the ostensible for the movement’s military leadership in the head of the movement (though Ya’ari predicts April 2012 elections. that Abu Marzouk’s strong links with the According to Israeli analyst Ehud Ya’ari, Gazans may well give him an advantage in a 12,000 voters in Gaza delivered a stinging leadership battle with Mash’al.) If, however, series of defeats to Mash’al loyalists in reconciliation does continue to prove elusive elections in Gaza. Ya’ari noted that very few despite Mash’al’s best efforts, this is probably individuals associated with Mash’al had an indication that the Gaza leadership does not succeeded in getting elected to the various want it. Their ability to achieve what they institutions, including the district Shura want and prevent a move that would lead to a councils, the Gaza Shura council, and the 15- significant loss in their power, in turn, shows member Gaza Political Bureau. Instead, their growing strength. individuals associated with the Qassam Thus, a process has emerged since 2007 in Brigades, such as Ahmad Jabari and Marwan which the Hamas Gaza leadership has first Issa, were elected to the Gaza Political consolidated its control in the Gaza Strip, and Bureau. A number of civilian politicians who has then parlayed this into an increasingly were elected to the Political Bureau, such as powerful and decisive role within the Hamas

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2012) 49 Jonathan Spyer movement as a whole. This process has been according to the practical needs of the rival exacerbated by the scattering of the external camps. leadership as a result of the uprising in Syria. It is impossible to predict the outcome of This process is in some ways analogous to the this contest, of course, but the achievement of growingly important role taken by the power in Gaza and its retention is for Hamas Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, at the the most significant development since its expense of external Fatah leaders following foundation in 1987. The rise to power and the establishment of the PA. prominence of its fellow Muslim Brothers It is important to note, however, that there elsewhere in the region and most notably in is no indication that the Gaza leadership’s Egypt creates great possibilities for the experience of power and administration in the movement. The Gaza leadership is likely to Gaza Strip is leading it toward moderation or seek to preserve its autonomous existence in pragmatism. On the contrary, the elements order to benefit from the changes now under that hold power in Gaza--in particular the way. forces around the Qassam Brigades and such figures as Foreign Minister Mahmoud Zahar-- * Dr. Jonathan Spyer is a senior research are strong believers in the path of military fellow at the Global Research in International struggle and the destruction of Israel. Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary This is in contrast to the once oft-made Center (IDC) Herzliya. His first book, The claim that the external leadership was more Transforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel- inclined to an ideological stance, while Haniya Islamist Conflict , was published in 2010. and the Gaza leaders tended more toward pragmatism. In the limited sense that the NOTES Gazans have seen it in their interest to preserve a relative quiet between Israel and 1 “Hamas Jubilant over Mursi’s Egyptian Gaza in the years that followed Israel’s Presidential Victory Claim,” al-Arabiya , June Operation Cast Lead, they are certainly 19, 2012, http://english.alarabiya.net . capable of a “tactical” pragmatism. However, 2 “Hamas Clinging to Gaza as Unity Remains as recent statements by Haniya and others in Elusive,” al-Arabiya , March 20, 2012, favor of the path of armed struggle show, this http://english.alarabiya.net . has not altered their fundamental definition of 3 Yezid Sayegh, “Hamas Rule in Gaza: Three the situation and of how they perceive their Years On,” Middle East Brief, Crown Center movement’s role. for Middle East Studies, 2010, Indeed, it has been Mash’al who has made http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/ remarks that have sounded more conciliatory, meb/MEB41.pdf . while Haniya visited Iran and confirmed the 4 See Yezid Sayegh, “‘We Serve the People’: movement’s commitments to its strategic Policing in Gaza,” Crown Paper v, Crown goals. In each case, the statements of both Center for Middle East Studies, April, 2011, men should be related to the power struggle http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/c between them and their interests, rather than a p/CP5.pdf . pure clash of ideas. To remain relevant, 5 “Islamic Jihad Says Hamas Stopping Their Mash’al needs reconciliation. Without it, Rocket Crews in Gaza,” Haaretz , October 10, having lost his control of the movement’s 2009, http://www.haaretz.com . purse strings, and as the steward of the 6 “Radical Islam in Gaza,” International Crisis decreasingly important relationship with Iran, Group, Middle East Report , No. 104, March he risks growing irrelevance. Haniya, by 2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en . contrast, aligned with the military leadership 7 "Ruling Palestine I: Gaza Under Hamas," in the Strip, wants to find a context to resist International Crisis Group, Middle East reunification in order to preserve “fortress Report , No. 73, 2008, Gaza.” The ideological arguments vary http://www.crisisgroup.org/en .

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8 Ehud Ya’ari, “Secret Hamas Elections Point to Internal Struggle,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policywatch , No. 1936, May 16, 2012, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org . 9 “Iran, Benefactors Boost Hamas’ 2012 Budget,” al-Arabiya , April 2, 2012, http://english.alarabiya.net . 10 “Hamas Will Not Come to Iran’s Aid in Case of War with Israel; Official,” al-Arabiya , March 7, 2012, http://english.alarabiya.net . 11 Ya’ari, “Secret Hamas Elections.”

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