After the Pyongyang Talks No
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ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security Issue After the Pyongyang Talks No. 561 Yossef Bodansky July 2018 After the Pyongyang Talks Yossef Bodansky July 2018 Executive Summary * The profound gap between the US and the DPRK - a gap concealed by vague yet optimistic rhetoric in Singapore - burst to the surface in the aftermath of the visit to Pyongyang by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. * While both sides agreed to talk again - both Pyongyang and Washington are cognizant there is actually very little to talk about. Three core-issues are at the crux of the US-DPRK crisis and there is no compromise in sight. * Meanwhile, the US-PRC Trade War has just started. For Beijing, this war is more than an economic issue. The escalating trade war gives Beijing the greatest impetus to harness the region’s other two great economies - Japan and South Korea - away from US influence and into inflicting the maximum damage on the overall strategic-economic posture of the US. The future of the Korean Peninsula will be a key theater. About ISPSW The Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy (ISPSW) is a private institute for research and consultancy. The ISPSW is an objective, task-oriented and politically non-partisan institute. In the increasingly complex international environment of globalized economic processes and worldwide political, ecological, social and cultural change, which occasions both major opportunities and risks, decision- makers in the economic and political arena depend more than ever before on the advice of highly qualified experts. ISPSW offers a range of services, including strategic analyses, security consultancy, executive coaching and intercultural competency. ISPSW publications examine a wide range of topics connected with politics, the economy, international relations, and security/ defense. ISPSW network experts have held – in some cases for decades – executive positions and dispose over a wide range of experience in their respective fields of expertise. © Institut für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung ISPSW Giesebrechtstr. 9 Tel +49 (0)30 88 91 89 05 E-Mail: [email protected] 10629 Berlin Fax +49 (0)30 88 91 89 06 Website: http://www.ispsw.de Germany 1 ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security Issue After the Pyongyang Talks No. 561 Yossef Bodansky July 2018 Analysis The profound gap between the US and the DPRK 1 - a gap concealed by vague yet optimistic rhetoric in Singapore - burst to the surface in the aftermath of the visit to Pyongyang by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Arriving in Tokyo on 7 July, Pompeo struck an optimistic note. Pompeo told the pool reporters that he had “very productive” talks in Pyongyang, and that Kim Yong-Chol and he spent “a good deal of time” discussing “a time-line” for the denuclearization of North Korea. “These are complicated issues, but we made progress on almost all the central issues,” he explained. “Some places, a great deal of progress; other places, there’s still more work to be done.” Pompeo expects the high-level direct discussions and negotiations to continue. Official Pyongyang was aghast by the overall character of the talks. Indeed, Kim Jong-Un did not meet Pompeo as a clear demonstration of Pyongyang’s deep displeasure with Washington. The moment Pompeo left Pyongyang, the KCNA published a lengthy bitter statement attributed to “a spokesman of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs”. The spokesman accused the Trump Administration of pushing a “unilateral and gangster-like demand for denuclearization” that was a blatant deviation from “the spirit of Singapore” particularly in relation to the verification regime. Pyongyang warns that the outcome of the just-completed talks is “very concerning” because it ushers in a “dangerous phase that might rattle our willingness for denuclearization that had been firm.” The spokesman asserted that the DPRK “expected that the US side would bring itself with a constructive proposal which would help build up trust true to the spirit of the DPRK-US summit meeting and talks.” The DPRK was “also thinking of doing something which corresponds with it [reciprocal measures]. It was, however, so regretful to mention what the US side had shown in its attitude and stand at the first DPRK-US high-level talks,” the spokesman added. There was a stark contrast between the policies for conflict resolution articulated by both sides. “The DPRK side, during the talks, put forward the constructive proposals to seek a balanced implementation of all the provisions of the Joint Statement out of its firm willingness to remain faithful to the implementation of the spirit and agreed points of the DPRK-US summit meeting and talks. These include taking wide-ranging proactive steps of simultaneous actions in a respective manner such as realizing multilateral exchanges for improved relations between the DPRK and the US,” the spokesman explained. In contrast, “the US side came up only with its unilateral and gangster-like demand for denuclearization just calling for CVID, declaration and verification, all of which run counter to the spirit of the Singapore summit meeting and talks. The US side never mentioned the issue of establishing a peace regime on the Korean peninsula which is essential for defusing tension and preventing a war. ... The issues the US side insisted on at the talks are all roots of troubles, which the previous [US] administrations also had insisted on to disrupt the dialogue processes, stoke the distrust and increase the danger of war.” Pyongyang is extremely disappointed and worried by this turn of events. “The results of the talks can’t but be so apprehensive. We thought that the US side would come with a constructive proposal which accords with the spirit of the DPRK-US summit meeting and talks. But expectation and hope of ours were so naive as to be 1 For background, see: Yossef Bodansky, The Trump-Kim Summit: What's Next?, ISPSW Issue No. 560, July 2018; Yossef Bodansky, The Korean Crisis: Kim’s New Posture, and the US Position, ISPSW Issue No. 509, September 2017; and Yossef Bodansky, After the Era of the Kims?, ISPSW Issue No. 481, April 2017 © Institut für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung ISPSW Giesebrechtstr. 9 Tel +49 (0)30 88 91 89 05 E-Mail: [email protected] 10629 Berlin Fax +49 (0)30 88 91 89 06 Website: http://www.ispsw.de Germany 2 ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security Issue After the Pyongyang Talks No. 561 Yossef Bodansky July 2018 foolish.” Pyongyang suggests that the US delegation violated the agreements reached in Singapore. The spokesman emphasized that “President Trump himself said he would move towards resolving the DPRK-US relations and the issue of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a new way.” The spokesman warned of the potentially dire ramifications of such a development. “If both sides at the working level reneged on the new way agreed at the summit and returned to the old way, the epoch-making Singapore summit would be meaningless, which was held thanks to the determinations and wills of the two top leaders to open a new future for the interests of the two peoples and peace and security of the world. The first DPRK-US high-level talks this time brought us in a dangerous situation where we may be shaken in our unshakable will for denuclearization, rather than consolidating trust between the DPRK and the US.” The spokesman blamed Washington for the emerging crisis. In particular, the US sought to exploit the commitment of the DPRK. “In the last few months, we displayed maximum patience and watched the US while initiating good-will steps as many as we can. But, it seems that the US misunderstood our goodwill and patience. The US is fatally mistaken if it went to the extent of regarding that the DPRK would be compelled to accept, out of its patience, the demands reflecting its gangster-like mindset.” Washington would do better by paying attention to the comprehensive and phased approach of Pyongyang, the spokesman explained. “A shorter way to denuclearization on the Korean peninsula is to remove deep-rooted mistrust and build up trust between the DPRK and the US. For this, both sides should be bold enough to be free from old ways which had only recorded failures and resolve the problem in a fresh manner which is never bound by the existing ways. A shortcut to [conflict resolution] is also to take a step-by-step approach and follow the principle of simultaneous actions in resolving what is feasible one by one while giving priority to creating trust.” Pyongyang, the spokesman conceded, is close to losing faith in the US and negotiations process. He warned that “if the US, being captivated in a fidget, tries to force upon us the old ways claimed by the previous administrations, this will get us nowhere.” The spokesman warned of the dire ramifications of the US failing to adopt the North Korean approach and instead attempt to stall the current progress. “Should the headwind begin to blow, it would cause a great disappointment not only to the international society aspiring after global peace and security but also to both the DPRK and the US. If so, this will finally make each side seek for another choice and there is no guarantee that this will not result into yet another tragedy.” Not everything is doomed. Pyongyang still has hope in the personal chemistry created between Kim Jong-Un and Trump. “We still cherish our good faith in President Trump,” the spokesman asserted. Thus, while both sides agreed to talk again - both Pyongyang and Washington are cognizant there is actually very little to talk about.