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• • ABOUT ME PUBLICATIONS MORE • NASA NIAC EXTERNAL COUNCIL • [email protected] • ZAPATATALKSNASA.COM 2 • ONLY PART OF THE TOTAL COST TO NASA, DOD, GOVERNMENT (CLOSER TO “PRICE”) • OTHER PUBLIC DATA FOR PERSONNEL/GOVERNMENT AND OTHER PROGRAM/PROJECT RELATED PROCUREMENT COSTS WITH PRIOR, GETS NEAR TO “TOTAL COST” • THE BENEFIT ACROSS TIME, THE CUMULATIVE BENEFIT PRODUCED FOR THAT PRICE/COST, LONG TERM 4 • • • • • • • 5 • • • • • • • • • • • 6 Zapata 4/6/2021 The NASA Budget Education & IG, then Cross Agency Support '07 fwd NASA budget increases = ~ 1.8 % per year average 1995-2020 $24,000 Aerospace incl. R&D to '02 / Aeronautics '03 fwd Science $22,000 Space Flight Support (incl. Payload/Util., LSP, Comm., & SMA) $20,000 Cx '05 Fwd, SLS + Orion + Grd.Sys. '11 Fwd $18,000 NASA BUDGET Expl. R&D: Gateway $16,000 Purchase Power Expl. R&D: Advanced Cis-lunar/Landers, HRT, & Commercial LEO 19% Drop 1995-2021 Purchase Power $14,000 R&D (Many) & LifeSci; now Expl. R&D: AES Science Drop 1995 to 2021 = Space Tech. & Aero-Tech. Space Technology '10 Fwd $12,000 19% ISS R&D $10,000 ISS (Construction to '11, then Ops & Maint.) $8,000 Shift to (Cx/Ares I Cross-cutting Research Constellation canceled) Orion, SLS US Commercial Crew for ISS & Program Budget Begins & Ground Sys. Development $6,000 Management + LifeSci ISS Crew (Soyuz) & Cargo (US Commercial) << ISS 1st ISS Element $4,000 Development Launched Space Shuttle Production, Operations & Upgrades Begins 1985 (Russian) 1998 & Construction >> <-- Shuttle Shuttle Production, Earmarks $2,000 $Millions NASA Budget (Nominal Dollars) (Nominal Budget NASA $Millions Development Begins Operations 1972 & Upgrades Rescissions (2012a) $- 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Rescissions (2012b) Return To Flight Last Shuttle Columbia Purchase Power (PP) in 1995 $ Decision: End Shuttle post-ISS Flight 2011 Dragon/Cargo Cygnus/Cargo Dragon/Crew & Falcon 9 & Antares to ISS May 8 May 2012 Sept. 2013 2020 COMPETITIVENESS Zapata 5/15/2021 Commercial Orbital Space Launches To-Date Data from US Department of Transportation (to 2017) & Others (2018-2021) • The DOT defines a 50 US (private) - SX/Starlink commercial launch as a “launch that is 45 US - Other Commercial internationally competed US (gov) - SX/ISS Cargo/Crew (i.e., available in principle to 40 international launch US (gov) - NG/ISS Cargo providers) or whose primary 35 US (gov) - ULA/NASA Sci. payload is commercial in nature”; also FAA licensed 30 US (gov) - SX/NASA Sci./DoD launches. So interpreting, Starlink is “commercial in New Zealand (R-Lab USA) 25 nature” and included here. Europe Cargo and crew to the ISS, and NASA science missions 20 Russia are competed and China awarded on commercial 15 terms as a service and Number of Launches India licensed by the FAA, even if 10 only competed nationally, Japan so also included here. 5 Sea Launch Ukraine • Pending distinguishing 0 which specific DOD missions 1997 1999 2020 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2021 after 2017 are “competed” 1990 vs. previous block-buys with only a single provider (ULA). Year See “DOD NSSL (was EELV)” ahead. 10 COMPETITIVENESS Zapata 5/15/2021 Commercial Orbital Space Launches To-Date Data from US Department of Transportation (to 2017) & Others (2018-2021) 50 MARKET US (private) - SX/Starlink ELASTICITY? 45 US - Other Commercial US (gov) - SX/ISS Cargo/Crew 40 US (gov) - NG/ISS Cargo 35 US (gov) - ULA/NASA Sci. 30 US (gov) - SX/NASA Sci./DoD New Zealand (R-Lab USA) 25 Europe 20 Russia 15 China Number of Launches India 10 Japan 5 Sea Launch Ukraine 0 1997 1999 2020 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2021 Year 11 Zapata 5/18/2021 US Launchers 180 1. The failures in the Delta II (& III) line for 8/27/98, 5/5/99 and 8/23/00 were the Delta III, which was then 160 retired. 2. For the (overlapping) Delta IV and then Atlas V partial failure points, the 1st is a Delta IV on 12/21/04, the 2nd 140 is the Atlas V on 6/15/07. = Partial Failure GROWTH 120 = Failure Falcon PRODUCTIVITY 100 Atlas 80 60 Number of Launches 40 20 0 1/1/1989 1/1/1993 1/1/1997 1/1/2001 1/1/2005 1/1/2009 1/1/2013 1/1/2017 1/1/2021 Delta II (& III) Atlas I+II+III Minotaur Atlas V Delta IV Falcon Antares Electron LauncherOne 12 SUSTAINABILITY Zapata 5/15/2021 Launch Systems Reusability - SpaceX Falcon 700 16 • The Falcon booster return success rate 14 vs. attempts is: 600 • 86% for drone ship 12 landings 500 • 96% for land 10 landings 400 • 88% overall 8 • Falcon Heavy 3- 300 boosters are each 6 counted here (points 200 umber of Reuses 4 may overlap, i.e., 2 N Days Between Reuse Between Days Crew Flt 3 boosters on flight 76 100 each had the same 2 turnaround days) 0 0 15 35 55 75 95 115 An actual attempt to recover a booster starts at flight 14. Previous flights are test flights regarding return. Sequential Launch Order The 1st successful return is on the 20th flight. Trendlines are 10-point moving averages 13 SUSTAINABILITY Zapata 5/15/2021 Launch Systems Reusability - SpaceX Falcon 700 16 CREW FLIGHT NUMBER OF 600 14 REUSES = 1 12 500 (PUSHES 10 TRENDLINE 400 DOWN) 8 300 6 200 umber of Reuses 4 N Days Between Reuse Between Days Crew Flt 3 100 2 Crew Flt 3 0 0 15 35 55 75 95 115 An actual attempt to recover a booster starts at flight 14. Previous flights are test flights regarding return. Sequential Launch Order The 1st successful return is on the 20th flight. Trendlines are 10-point moving averages 14 SUSTAINABILITY Zapata 5/15/2021 Launch Systems Reusability - SpaceX Falcon 700 16 GOODNESS TRENDING UP 600 14 12 LANDING 500 RELIABILITY 10 TRENDING UP 400 8 300 6 200 umber of Reuses 4 N Days Between Reuse Between Days Crew Flt 3 100 2 0 0 15 35 55 75 95 115 An actual attempt to recover a booster starts at flight 14. Previous flights are test flights regarding return. Sequential Launch Order The 1st successful return is on the 20th flight. Trendlines are 10-point moving averages 15 DOD NSSL Zapata 4/6/2021 National Security Space Launch (was EELV) Program Annual Funding vs. Quantity Procured • As of Dec. 2019 SAR • Note! The NRO also contributes Running Procurement $M per Unit (excludes RDT&E) QTY Cumulative QTY per Year funds to the NSSL program. These additional $ are NOT $350 200 included here. • NRO covers 25% of the fixed 180 yearly payment to ULA. $300 • This NRO amount is likely in 160 the range of an additional $" $250 $300M a year. 140 Procured Qty. • For comparison on unit costs, also see GAO-18-360-SP, Year - 120 pp.128, a unit cost of $342.54M $200 in 2018 dollars. 100 • Note! The apx. $1B a year to $150 ULA apart from services for a 80 launch continues, even $M "Then $M though at times thought to be $100 60 phased out by 2020. There is now Launch Vehicle 40 Production Services (LVPS) and $50 Launch Operations Services 17 16 20 11 15 (LOPS). 5 7 5 6 5 8 9 7 6 7 6 5 8 5 6 7 8 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 1 3 3 0 0 • Pending – further $0 0 documentation and 2024 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 traceability on the fixed 1994 Data from Dec. 2019 Year SpaceX 2017=2, '18=1, '19=1, '20=2 to date amount to ULA not included Dec. 2012 DoD ULA 2017=5, '18=4, '19=4, '20=3 to date when announcing launch Selected Acquisition Reports opens EELV program contract awards (but awards Qty Procured/year are not Qty launched. to competition to SpaceX appear to be total amounts.) 16 DOD NSSL Zapata National Security Space Launch (was EELV) 4/6/2021 Program Annual Funding RDT&E $M Yearly Procurement Cost (Budget) $5,000 $4,500 $4,000 $" $3,500 Year - $3,000 $2,500 $2,000 $M "Then $M $1,500 $1,000 $500 $0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 17 SpaceX 2017=2, '18=1, '19=1, '20=2 to date Data from Dec. 2019 Dec. 2012 DoD Year ULA 2017=5, '18=4, '19=4, '20=3 to date Selected Acquisition Reports opens EELV program to competition Restart RDT&E: ATK, AR, SpaceX, Vulcan “Appropriators in a report accompanying the bill Zapata National Security Space Launch (was EELV) point out what industry 4/6/2021 and government officials Program Annual Funding have been saying for RDT&E $M Yearly Procurement Cost (Budget) years: that the development of $5,000 commercial launch $4,500 systems has substantially reduced the cost of $4,000 $" launching satellites to $3,500 orbit.
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