2021 Esfandiary Dina 063365

This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/

Changing security dynamics in the Persian Gulf the case of the United Arab Emirates

Esfandiary, Dina

Awarding institution: King's College London

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement.

END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT

Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work Under the following conditions:  Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes.  No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work.

Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above.

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Download date: 07. Oct. 2021 Changing security dynamics in the Persian Gulf: The case of the United Arab Emirates

PhD in War Studies

Dina Esfandiary

1 Table of Contents Abstract ...... 4 Introduction ...... 6 1. Context ...... 7 2. Literature review: What gap is being filled? ...... 12 3. Questions and justification ...... 17 4. Methodology and research design ...... 29 Chapter 1: The Persian Gulf before 2011 ...... 36 1. The Persian Gulf region before 2003 ...... 37 2. The United Arab Emirates ...... 51 Chapter 2: Assertiveness and its indicators ...... 59 1. Defining assertiveness ...... 60 2. Indicators of assertiveness ...... 65 Chapter 3: The UAE’s growing assertiveness ...... 79 1. Growing capabilities ...... 79 2. Intent ...... 103 3. The perception of success ...... 114 Chapter 4: Why a growing assertiveness? ...... 128 1. Foreign policy studies ...... 130 2. Analysing foreign policy in non-democratic regimes ...... 139 3. The domestic scene in the UAE ...... 150 4. The disorder catalysts ...... 162 Chapter 5: Catalyst one - The 2011 Arab Spring ...... 167 1. Drivers of the Arab Spring ...... 170 2. An Arab Spring in the Persian Gulf? ...... 177 3. The impact of the Arab Spring on regional foreign policy ...... 184 4. Changes in the Persian Gulf following the Arab Spring ...... 197 Chapter 6: Catalyst two - The US Pivot to Asia ...... 204 1. The US in the Persian Gulf Region ...... 206 2. The Pivot ...... 214 3. The impact of the Pivot on the Gulf Arabs ...... 227 Chapter 7: Catalyst three - The 2015 Iran nuclear deal ...... 238 1. The 2015 nuclear deal ...... 241 2. The Gulf Arabs and the Iran nuclear crisis ...... 246 3. The impact of the 2015 nuclear deal on the UAE and its allies ...... 258 Conclusion ...... 275

1. Looking forward ...... 279 2. The broader impact of the change ...... 287 Bibliography ...... 298

3 Abstract

Gulf Arab states has the potential to profoundly affect regional security and the way the

Persian Gulf states interact amongst themselves and with the regional hegemons in the long term.

While interstate relations in the Persian Gulf have been the subject of a significant body of literature, there remain some gaps. This dissertation, written in two parts and using the

United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a case study, will aim to answer the following questions:

What is the evidence supporting the assertion that the UAE has become more assertive in its foreign policy? What are the key drivers of this change? On a larger scale, the dissertation also considers the extent to which changes in the UAE can be considered representative of a broader trend of increased assertiveness among smaller Gulf states. The choice of the UAE as a case study relates to the fact that this smaller Gulf Arab state represents the most visible and resilient manifestation of this change to regional dynamics.

In the first part, the dissertation will set out a number of ‘indicators’ of assertiveness - including growing capabilities; the intention to use those capabilities in the pursuit of

4 foreign policy objectives; and the perceived success of their use - and apply these to the

UAE with a view to evidencing the UAE’s growing assertiveness. In the second part, the dissertation will use a modified foreign policy analysis lens to structure an exploration of why the UAE has taken this particular path, with a particular focus on external drivers. Three key issues dominate the discussion in this context - the 2011 Arab Spring,1 President

Obama’s announced Pivot to Asia,2 and the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran.3 These external factors impacted significantly on the UAE’s foreign policymaking, by creating opportunities and entrenching old fears – both with regards to domestic security and the rise of regional threats, and, ultimately, driving the assertiveness that is increasingly visible in the country’s foreign policy decisions. It remains to be seen whether the smaller Gulf Arab states will also follow in the UAE’s footsteps and display greater assertiveness in a lasting manner, or periodically display it in specific arenas. Nonetheless, the new trend of assertiveness that has been evidenced and explained in this dissertation has important implications for security relations in the region.

1 See chapter five 2 See chapter six 3 See chapter seven

5 Introduction

For over a decade now, thinking on regional relations in the Persian Gulf has focused largely on the competition for regional hegemony between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the different layers of this rivalry.4 Today, this perspective is limiting. While Saudi Arabia and Iran remain major regional powers, a growing assertiveness appears to be taking shape within the UAE, and to a lesser extent within some of its smaller Gulf Arab neighbours, since 2011. This change is significant because it has the potential to profoundly affect regional security and the way the Persian Gulf states interact amongst themselves and with the regional hegemons in the long term. Some analysts have begun to explore the change here, but there has been no structured and systematic effort to 1) evidence the existence of this growing assertiveness; and 2) explain its causes.5 This dissertation, written in two parts and using the United Arab

Emirates (UAE) as a case study, will address this gap in current scholarly thinking.

In the first part, the dissertation will set out a number of ‘indicators’ of assertiveness and apply these to the UAE with a view to evidencing the UAE’s growing assertiveness. In the second part, the dissertation will use a modified foreign policy analysis lens to structure an

4 See for example, Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006); Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East (London and New York: IB Taurus, 2013); Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring that Wasn’t (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); Frederic M. Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Markus Kaim, Great Powers and Regional Orders (Aldershot: Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2008); Steven W. Hook and Tim Niblock ed, The United States and the Gulf: Shifting Pressures, Strategies and Alignments (Berlin and London: Gerlach Press, 2015); Steve A. Yetiv, America and the Persian Gulf: The Third Party Dimension in World Politics (Westport: Praeger, 1995) 5 See for example, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates – Power, Politics, and Policymaking (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017); Christopher M. Davidson, ‘The United Arab Emirates’, in Christopher Davidson Ed, Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf monarchies (London: Hurst & Company, 2011); Peter Salisbury, ‘Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy’, Chatham House Research Paper (July 2020), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-07-01-risk-in-uae- salisbury.pdf

6 exploration of why the UAE has taken this particular path, with a particular focus on external drivers. Three key issues dominate the discussion in this context - the 2011 Arab Spring,6

President Obama’s announced Pivot to Asia,7 and the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran8 - all external factors that have impacted significantly on the UAE’s foreign policymaking, creating opportunities and entrenching old fears, and, ultimately, driving the assertiveness that is increasingly visible in the country’s foreign policy decisions. The choice of the UAE as a case study relates to the fact that this smaller Gulf Arab state represents the most visible and resilient manifestation of this change to regional dynamics. The UAE’s behaviour is mirrored in other Gulf states, but with far less consistency, at least for the moment. In this sense, the

UAE is the vanguard of change and a microcosm of what may prove to be a far greater process of change.

1. Context

Analysis of foreign policy dynamics in the Persian Gulf has largely focused on the dynamics between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The focus is understandable; Iran and Saudi Arabia are the largest regional actors with the most extensive reach, while the once-prominent Iraq, a third potential rival, never recovered from the US invasion in 2003. Scholars Charles Tripp and

Shahram Chubin argue that several deep-seated structural factors limit ‘significant security cooperation’,9 including size, distribution of resources, oil, and location. The rivalry also encompassed ‘national, cultural, ethnic and sectarian divisions’, and was a ‘function of

6 See chapter five 7 See chapter six 8 See chapter seven 9 Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order (London: IISS Adelphi Paper 304, 1996), 3

7 domestic political developments in Iran and Saudi Arabia’.10 After the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini’s desire to export the revolution in the region and repeated challenges to the legitimacy of the Al Saud’s reign in Saudi Arabia added an ideological dimension to the rivalry. 11 Both countries also developed opposing perspectives on how to ensure domestic and regional security. Riyadh and its allies focused on internationalising regional security,12 while Iran for its part, believed in indigenising regional security.13 As a result, after the removal of Iraq as the third major player in the Persian Gulf region in 2003, the region was firmly split into two poles, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Yet Saudi Arabia’s longstanding rivalry with Iran was not the only relationship shaping the Persian Gulf region, even if it was the dominant one. Riyadh’s - at times turbulent - relations with its allies and smaller neighbours was also a major factor in the region.

In general terms, from their birth in the early seventies (except Oman, which became independent in 1951), the other Arab Gulf states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and the

UAE - fit into and indeed reinforced this regional duality, largely deferring to Riyadh on policy decisions affecting the region. This conformity was due to several factors. Firstly, independence from the UK occurred in a rapid timeframe, with London announcing its

10 Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order (London: IISS Adelphi Paper 304, 1996), 8 11 Ruhollah Khomeini, Governance of the Jurist: Islamic Government (Tehran: The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works – International Affairs Department, 1970), 23-24; Ruhollah Khomeini, ‘We shall confront the world with our ideology’, Speech, Radio Tehran (21 March 1980), in ‘Iran’s Revolution: The First Year’, Middle East Reports, Vol 10 (May/June 1980) 12 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 7 13 Khomeini, Governance of the Jurist; Khomeini, ‘We shall confront the world with our ideology’; Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami (Oxon: Routledge, 2003), 167; Author interviews with Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, Vienna, Geneva, Lausanne, New York, Berlin (2014- 17)

8 desire to completely disengage from the Persian Gulf region in January 196814 - going against the wishes of the Sheikhdoms, who wanted the UK to remain to protect them from overbearing neighbours like Iran15 - and independence between 1971 and 1972.16 Secondly, the smaller Gulf Arab countries feared Saudi hegemony and reprisals,17 especially in light of some of the small territorial disputes that existed among them. Thirdly, their newly independent status meant that the political elites were focused on managing their own internal dynamics and setting up state institutions. Internal threats to the leadership of the

Gulf Sheikhdoms were common during this early period. In Oman, Qaboos Bin Said Al Said overthrew his father and became Sultan in 1970, while an internal rebellion was underway in the Dhofar region.18 In Qatar, six months after independence in February 1972, Khalifa Bin

Hamad Al Thani deposed his cousin, Ahmad Bin Ali Al Thani, the then Emir of Qatar.19 In the meantime, the other Trucial states (what would become the UAE and Bahrain) were otherwise engaged in border disputes and negotiations over statehood and the formation of the UAE.20 As a result, defaulting to Riyadh for major regional policy decisions and leadership was a convenient path to follow. The need for the smaller Gulf Arab states to guard against foreign threats from bigger and more capable neighbouring countries reinforced this trend of deference to Saudi Arabia. The arrival of Iranian troops on the

14 F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 16-19 15 Eugene Rogan, The Arabs – A History (New York, Basic Books, 2009), 455 16 The Gulf Arabs even offered to pay to maintain the British presence in their region, but London refused, indicating that decolonisation in the Persian Gulf was driven by politics, and economics only hastened the move. See Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, 19; Simon C. Smith, ‘Britain's Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf: A Pattern Not a Puzzle’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Number 44, Vol. 2 (2016), 328 17 Author interview with Michael Hanna, Senior Fellow, The Century Foundation, New York (30 October 2019) 18 For more on the Dhofar rebellion, see Chapter 3 in Calvin H. Allen, W. Lynn Rigsbee II, Oman Under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution, 1970-1996 (London and New York: Routledge, 2013) 19 David Commins, The Gulf States: A Modern History (London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 2012), 189 20 Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, 25, 39

9 disputed island of Tunbs on 30 November 1971, just as British troops left, only served to highlight the Iranian threat, which worsened with the advent of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Despite this, relations between Saudi Arabia and its smaller neighbours were not without problems. For example, Riyadh refused to recognise the UAE, founded in 1971, until

1974, because of border issues.21 On the whole, however, the role of Saudi Arabia as a natural leader for the smaller Gulf states was one that became firmly established from their independence in the early 1970s, and this, despite concerns over possible Saudi domination.22

Clearly, awareness of the perceived Iranian threat and deference to Saudi Arabia on foreign policy decisions should not be reduced to ‘all or nothing’ terms. The relationship between the smaller Gulf Arab states and Saudi Arabia or Iran was, and continues to be, a nuanced and multidimensional one. The UAE provides a good example in this regard. After its initial neutrality during the Iran-Iraq War, the UAE’s leadership reconciled itself with the country’s position as a small power sandwiched between two larger powers: Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Abu Dhabi recognised that it was a country that was ‘still vulnerable to either an outright attack, or, more likely, collateral damage from a proximate conventional war’23 and that harboured a ‘concrete fear…that their bigger brethren would assume a hegemonic role’.24

Abu Dhabi’s outlook was fearful of the Iranian threat and firmly positioned on the need to

21 F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 25 22 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 77, 78, 81 23 Christopher M. Davidson, ‘The United Arab Emirates’, in Christopher Davidson Ed, Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf Monarchies (London: Hurst & Company, 2011), 25 24 Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf, 15

10 contain Iran’s hegemonic ambitions.25 But even the UAE as a whole, could not agree on policy towards Iran, as the elite in each emirate viewed the Iranian threat differently.26

Dubai for example, maintained extensive ties with Iran and served as a transhipment hub for Iran-bound goods during the height of sanctions, while Abu Dhabi continued to call for a tougher line on Tehran.27

Prior to 2003, the Gulf Arab states were focused on containing Iraq and Iran, the two main regional threats.28 After the removal of Iraq as a regional threat following the US invasion in

2003, Iran was the only other main regional rival left for the Gulf Arab states. Today, the intense, multi-layered regional rivalry that has characterised the region since 2003 is evolving.

While Iran remains a major regional hegemon, Saudi Arabia’s smaller neighbours appear to be slowly calling Riyadh’s leadership into question.29 Intensified by the Arab Spring in 2011, the US-announced Pivot to Asia and perceptions of waning US power in the Middle East, followed by the 2015 nuclear deal, a growing assertiveness is evident in the foreign policy of the UAE and to a lesser extent, the smaller Gulf Arab states.

25 Karim Sadjadpour, ‘The Battle of Dubai: The United Arab Emirates and the U.S.-Iran Cold War’, The Carnegie Papers (2011), 9 26 Abdullah Baabood, ‘Dynamics and Determinants of the GCC States’ Foreign Policy with Special Reference to the EU’, in Gerd Nonneman Ed, Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe (London and New York: Routledge: 2005), 146; Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 129-130 27 Sadjadpour, ‘The Battle of Dubai: The United Arab Emirates and the U.S.-Iran Cold War’, 9 28 F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 7 29 Author interview with GCC lawmakers and officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17)

2. Literature review: What gap is being filled?

The academic literature on modern relations in the Persian Gulf has predominantly focused on the multi-tiered rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The ups and downs in the relationship between Tehran and Riyadh have been analysed from many different angles, such as the structural features of each country that pit them against each other,30 religion and sectarianism,31 the Iranian perspective on the relationship,32 the view from the other side of the Gulf,33 and the role of the US presence on Saudi-Iran relations.34 More recently, some literature has begun to notice the UAE’s growing assertiveness,35 but these assessments stop short of linking the changing regional context since 2011 to the growing assertiveness displayed by the UAE and to a lesser extent, some of its smaller Gulf Arab allies.

Sectarianism and its use as a tool to galvanise populations is undeniably one of the most complicated issues facing the region. It has been at the heart of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. In

30 Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order (London: IISS Adelphi Paper, 1996), 304 31 See for example, Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006); Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring that Wasn’t (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); Frederic M. Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Danny Poste Ed, Sectarianization: Mapping the new politics of the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 32 See Kayhan Barzegar, ‘Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf: An Iranian View’, Middle East Policy, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (Fall 2010); Farhad Darvishi and Ameneh Jalilvand, ‘Impacts of US Military Presence in the Arabic Countries in the Persian Gulf’, Geopolitics Quarterly. Vol. 6, No. 4 (Winter 2010); Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami (Oxon: Routledge, 2003) 33 See for example Adel Ali Abdullah, The Drivers of Iranian Policy in the Arabian Gulf (in Arabic), (Al Tanweer centre for the studies of humanities; 2008) 34 See for example, Markus Kaim, Great Powers and Regional Orders (Aldershot: Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2008); Steven W. Hook and Tim Niblock Ed, The United States and the Gulf: Shifting Pressures, Strategies and Alignments (Berlin and London: Gerlach Press, 2015); Steve A. Yetiv, America and the Persian Gulf: The Third Party Dimension in World Politics (Westport: Praeger, 1995) 35 See for example, David B. Roberts, ‘Bucking the Trend: The UAE and the Development of Military Capabilities in the Arab World’, Security Studies, Vol. 29, Issue 2 (2020); Peter Salisbury, ‘Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy’, Chatham House Research Paper (July 2020), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-07-01-risk-in-uae-salisbury.pdf

12 his 2006 book, Vali Nasr focuses on the roots of the split between the Sunnis and the Shias.36

Nasr outlines that sectarianism fuelled the rivalry between the Gulf Arabs states under Saudi leadership and Iran, and that tackling its use as a tool of foreign policy is essential. The ideological dimension to the rivalry has also been an area of focus in the literature.37 Gregory

Gause describes ideology as a tool of mobilisation, and an additional threat.38 After 1979, the ideology of the Islamic Republic was opposed to that of the Gulf Arab states. Supreme Leader

Ayatollah Khomeini aimed to ‘export’ the Iranian revolution to the neighbourhood and attacked the legitimacy of the leadership in Riyadh as the custodian of Mecca and Medina,

Islam’s holiest sites.39 According to Christin Marschall, it was only when the Islamic Republic lessened the focus on exporting the revolution after the Iran-Iraq War, that it was possible for Iran to pursue better relations with its Gulf Arab countries.40

The impact of foreign presence in the region on the Saudi-Iranian rivalry has also been assessed.41 For some, regional tensions are a result of the US policy of choosing Saudi Arabia as an ‘Arab balancer’ against Iran, arguing that both countries are not necessarily predisposed towards animosity42 – taking the opposing view to Chubin and Tripp, who outline the

36 , Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 82 37 See for example, Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East (London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 2013); Frederic Wehrey, Theodore W. Karasik, Alireza Nader, Jeremy Ghez, Lydia Hansell, Robert A. Guffey, Saudi-Iranian Relations since the fall of Saddam (Santa Monica: RAND, 2009); Jamal S. Al Suwaidi, Iran and the Gulf: A Search for Stability (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996); Fahad M. Alsultan and Pedram Saeid, The Development of Saudi-Iranian Relations since the 1990s: Between conflict and accommodation (London and New York: Routledge, 2017); Banafsheh Kaynoush, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Friends or Foes? (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 38 F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1, 9-11, 241 39 Ruhollah Khomeini, ‘We shall confront the world with our ideology’, Speech, Radio Tehran (21 March 1980), in ‘Iran’s Revolution: The First Year’, Middle East Reports, Vol. 10 (May/June 1980) 40 Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami (Oxon: Routledge, 2003), 45 41 See for example, Wehrey et al., Saudi-Iranian Relations since the fall of Saddam; Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf) 42 Wehrey et al., Saudi-Iranian Relations since the fall of Saddam

13 structural factors that pit the two states against each other.43 The timeline stops short of discussing the perceived US disengagement from the region, which this dissertation considers to be a catalyst for the current trend. Matteo Legrenzi also emphasised the importance of the

US in the strategic calculations of the Gulf Arab leadership, highlighting their ‘diplomatic strategy of involving as many influential countries as possible in support of their defense’, describing it as an ‘insurance policy’ against regional threats.44 Gause, for his part, conceded that, ‘the United States is directly involved in the region’ but offers a less accepted viewpoint that downplays the significance of US presence in the minds of decision-makers in the Gulf region.45

Scholars have examined the impact of individuals and their relationships on decision-making in inter-state relations.46 It is undeniable that personalities have played a major role in the ups-and-downs of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, as well as in intra-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) relations. For example, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini’s perception of and disdain for the Gulf Arab monarchies only worsened the rivalry,47 whereas President Rafsandjani’s pragmatic desire to secure Iran in the region and boost its economy following eight years of devastating war made his administration more willing to conduct outreach towards the Gulf

43 Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order (London: IISS Adelphi Paper, 1996) 44 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 7 45 F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 46 See for example, Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, Presidential Personality and Performance (London: Routledge, 1998); Jerrold M. Post, The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 2005); Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla Clapp and Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006); Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1993) 47 Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami (Oxon: Routledge, 2003), 55

Arab governments.48 More recently, Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman in Saudi Arabia harbours a deep seated mistrust of Iranians,49 one that is shared by Mohammed Bin Zayed Al

Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi,50 making it difficult to manage their differences.

Within the Gulf, the relationship between Mohammed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Mohammad

Bin Salman is a significant driver of their efforts to maintain a unified front despite their differences.51

While all these areas of focus are useful, there remain some key gaps in the literature. Most importantly, analysis of differences within the GCC have either not covered most recent years where these differences have become more vocal and significant, or not dissected the growing trend of the smaller GCC states’ growing assertiveness. Legrenzi analyses the differences between the GCC states since the organisation’s inception referring to the Iran-

Iraq War, the longstanding territorial disputes between them and policies towards neighbouring Iran as key battlegrounds for these difference.52 Both Gause and Legrenzi also focus on the issues between Saudi Arabia and its smaller Gulf Arab allies, including these smaller states’ fear of Saudi Arabia and its potential regional hegemony.53 Gause traced the

48 Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami (Oxon: Routledge, 2003), 97 49 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers and officials, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17), see also Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Arab Spring, at last’, The New York Times, November 23, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/23/opinion/saudi-prince-mbs-arab-spring.html 50 US Embassy in the UAE, ‘Strong Words in Private from MBZ at IDEX – Bashes Iran, Qatar, Russia,’ Wikileaks Cable, February 25, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUDHABI193_a.html; US Embassy in the UAE, ‘Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Warns DOE DepSec Poneman About Iran,’ Wikileaks Cable, December 17, 2009, https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL0912/S00001/cablegate-abu-dhabi-crown-prince- warns-doe-depsec-poneman-about-iran.htm; US Embassy in the UAE, ‘US-UAE Cooperation Against Taliban Finance Continues,’ Wikileaks Cable, January 24, 2010, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10ABUDHABI27_a.html 51 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Punching above its weight’, interview by Michael Young, Diwan, Carnegie Middle East Center, June 29, 2020, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/82200; ‘UAE Foreign Policy: Beyond the Gulf’, Gulf 2000 Webinar, July 2, 2020 52 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 105-106 53 Ibid, 78, 81

15 tensions to the late seventies, when most of these countries were still comparatively new, and outlined that Saudi Arabia ‘more openly asserted their leadership of the smaller Gulf monarchies’ from then on.54 But the differences analysed in both books remained either relatively minor or were kept behind closed doors and quickly and effectively managed by the leadership in the region. It is only more recently that differences between the GCC states have become more vocal and difficult to manage. Authors such as Kristian Coates Ulrichsen and

Christopher Davidson analysed Emirati domestic and foreign policy, seeking to explain the small country’s growth in importance.55 Others have begun to examine the changing security dynamics in the Persian Gulf, including by looking at the impact of the Arab Spring on Gulf

Arab security.56 More recently, there has been some preliminary analysis conducted on the growing assertiveness of the UAE,57 but generally, this has focused largely on the domestic decision-makers that enabled this policy change. These assessments stop short of examining the regional and international context that made the UAE’s foreign policy change possible and of linking the Arab Spring, the perceived US disengagement from the region embodied in

President Obama’s Pivot to Asia and the Iran nuclear deal directly to the growing

54 F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 39 55 See Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates – Power, Politics, and Policymaking (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017); Christopher M. Davidson, ‘The United Arab Emirates’, in Christopher Davidson Ed, Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf monarchies (London: Hurst & Company, 2011) 56 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen Ed, The Changing Security Dynamics of the Persian Gulf (London: Hurst & Company, 2017); Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising – The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2012); March Lynch, The New Arab Wars – Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016); Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017); Emile Hokayem and David B. Roberts, ‘Friends With Benefits: The Gulf States and the Perpetual Quest for Alliances’, in Michael Wahid Hanna and Thanassis Cambinis Eds, Order from Ashes: New Foundations for Security in the Middle East (New York: The Century Foundation, 2018) 57 See for example, David B. Roberts, ‘Bucking the Trend: The UAE and the Development of Military Capabilities in the Arab World’, Security Studies, Vol. 29, Issue 2 (2020); Peter Salisbury, ‘Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy’, Chatham House Research Paper (July 2020), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-07-01-risk-in-uae-salisbury.pdf

16 assertiveness displayed by the UAE. This dissertation seeks to address this lacuna and expand upon the manifestations of this change and the impact it may have on the region.

3. Questions and justification

The changing power relations in the Persian Gulf region since 2011 require new analysis and understanding.58 Attempting to understand and chart emerging trends in a regional context that is characterised by volatility and fluidity is no easy task. While in some cases the dissertation will offer some important context on what other smaller Gulf Arab states think and the more assertive measures they have taken since 2011 to contribute to a better understanding of the impact of the catalysts and the emerging trend, this dissertation will be grounded in a detailed, empirical exploration of the UAE as a case study of this change. Key questions include: What is the evidence supporting the assertion that the UAE has become more assertive in its foreign policy? What are the key drivers of this change? To what extent can the changes in the UAE be considered representative of a broader trend of increased assertiveness among smaller Gulf states? In order to answer these questions, this dissertation will establish the existence of this trend by setting out three ‘indicators’ of assertiveness and applying these to the case of the UAE: Capabilities, the intention to deploy these capabilities and the state’s perception of the ‘success’ of their deployment. The dissertation, drawing on an amended two-level approach of foreign policy studies, will then focus on understanding and explaining the regional context that intensified the development of this change in UAE

58 The starting point for this analysis will be the wave of unrests that swept through the Middle East in 2011. It was then that the smaller Gulf Arab countries, and the UAE in particular, began to pursue their interests more firmly, both diplomatically and militarily

17 foreign policy by examining three major events, beginning with the 2011 Arab Spring, the announced Pivot to Asia, and the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran.

Of course, it is possible that the growing confidence and assertiveness of the UAE is not part of a broader pattern in the region. This would mean that what appears to be a current trend is instead a temporary change, and that eventually, the UAE and other smaller Gulf Arab states will default back to their longstanding acquiescence to Saudi leadership, or that it remains limited in scope to the UAE and does not take hold among the rest of the smaller Gulf

Arab states. While possible, this seems unlikely, because the forces unleashed today as a result of the combination of the above-mentioned catalysts and specific events such as the

Yemen war, can no longer be rolled back. Indeed, the UAE has invested too many resources in regional conflicts, and its involvement has been too visible for it to simply change course.

Rather, the countries experiencing the change, and the UAE in particular, will rapidly learn from instances where they have perhaps overstretched and re-assess their stance on specific issues and conflicts, all with a view to attaining their objectives and maintaining the resilience of their drive towards self-sufficiency, even when these conflict with those of its security guarantor or its close allies. To date, the lessons drawn from the UAE’s growing assertiveness demonstrate that its policy is fit for purpose,59 at least in the eyes of decision-makers in Abu

Dhabi, and as such, it is likely to be a resilient approach that may well take hold in other small

Gulf states. If the current trend continues, it has the potential to fundamentally alter security dynamics in the Persian Gulf region. At the very least, the current direction of travel suggests that the smaller Gulf Arab States will exert far greater influence on regional affairs going

59 Author interview with a former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019). This will be further examined later in the chapter under the third part of the analytical framework, and in chapter five

18 forward. Taken to the extreme, however, the Iran-Saudi duality that has framed regional activities to date could give way to a new Persian Gulf with multiple power centres. As a result, comprehensive analysis of the dynamics at play here is essential to a broader understanding of the Persian Gulf and its evolution.

1.1 Case Study: The UAE

The UAE clearly exhibits the increased assertiveness that this dissertation seeks to examine, particularly in the realm of foreign policy, and could well be the most visible manifestation of a broader process of change among smaller Gulf states. The desire to act more assertively is influenced by a range of factors, from domestic drivers - most notably the rise of Crown Prince

Mohammed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan60 - to international economic trends including changes to the price of oil.61 This dissertation, however, will draw on extensive fieldwork in the region to argue that the main drivers of change in this context have come from the foreign policy arena.

In other words, the foreign policy context is the primary arena in which the changes were enabled, developed, and enacted.

For Abu Dhabi, the Arab Spring and President Obama’s announced Pivot to Asia served as constraints on its foreign policy decision-making by highlighting the Iranian threat and the

UAE’s feeling of isolation because of the belief that the US was leaving the region, while

60 See David B. Roberts, ‘Bucking the Trend: The UAE and the Development of Military Capabilities in the Arab World’, Security Studies, Vol. 29, Issue 2 (2020); Peter Salisbury, ‘Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy’, Chatham House Research Paper (July 2020), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-07-01-risk-in-uae-salisbury.pdf; Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Punching above its weight’, interview by Michael Young, Diwan, Carnegie Middle East Center, June 29, 2020, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/82200; Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates – Power, Politics, and Policymaking (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017) 61 This will be examined in greater detail later in the chapter

19 providing an opportunity for it to fill an emerging void in the region. The 2015 nuclear deal with Iran worsened the feeling of abandonment, and gave Tehran the means to pursue what

Gulf states viewed as destructive regional policy.62 While prior to 2011, the UAE volunteered its forces to assist US-led missions worldwide, these were always done in coordination with the US or its regional allies. After the 2011 wave of unrests however, the UAE’s strategy shifted and it doubled-down on its efforts to become more assertive in the pursuit of its own interests, including through the projection of hard-power capabilities, even when this put it at odds with its regional allies.63 Importantly though, the UAE made it a point to maintain the image of its unity with Saudi Arabia even as these changes occurred.64

The UAE is an important case study in understanding the emerging changes in the region. It encompasses the dilemmas that the other smaller states face and the problems they must tackle in dealing with this growing assertiveness. For example, the UAE must manage internal differences of opinion on regional policymaking, most notably between the two most powerful emirates: Abu Dhabi, traditionally more hard-line on Iran, and Dubai, a regional hub for Iran trade. It must also carefully manage its relationship with Saudi Arabia because the two are close allies, with a multi-dimensional relationship that covers economic, political and kinship ties, and both rulers have a close personal relationship.65 Understanding the effect of the new regional trends on the UAE, will allow us to infer what these changes will mean for the Persian Gulf region as a whole.

62 Author interview with lawmakers and officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, (2014-17) 63 Emma Soubrier, ‘Evolving foreign and security policies: a comparative study of Qatar and the UAE’, in Khalid Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 133 64 Author interview with UK Foreign and Commonwealth official, London (25 June 2019) 65 Simon Henderson, ‘Meet the Two Princes Reshaping the Middle East’, Politico, June 13, 2017, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/13/saudi-arabia-middle-east-donald-trump-215254

In many ways, the UAE exemplifies what seems to be a broader process shaping the region.

Decision-making among the Gulf Arabs has become a more complex process, as the smaller

Gulf Arab states have become bolder in calling for their goals and interests to be considered.

For example, in Yemen, the UAE pursued its own interests rather than merely supporting

Saudi Arabia in its pushback of the Houthi rebels and containment of Tehran.66 For the UAE, the containment of radical Islam in the southern parts of the country was a major concern, which is why it focused its efforts on this, at times countering Saudi efforts.67 It seems the smaller GCC states are no longer content to merely follow Riyadh’s lead, especially if this does not benefit them or fulfil their interests.

Finally, the UAE has also been quite consistent in its foreign policy on Iran over the years, and this, despite its internal disputes on the subject.68 Kuwait and Qatar, for example, have been less consistent in their foreign policy. For example, after the January 2016 crisis with Iran,

Qatar followed Saudi Arabia’s lead and downgraded ties with Iran,69 only to re-establish them following the summer 2017 GCC crisis.70 While Qatar has also demonstrated assertiveness in its regional policies, including in Libya during the Arab Spring, Doha scaled back some of its activities, ‘gradually realising that perhaps it had overreached’.71 Today, Qatar displays

66 This will be examined in greater detail in chapter two 67 Eleonora Ardemadni, ‘UAE’s Military Priorities in Yemen: Counterterrorism and the South’, ISPI Commentary (28 July 2016), https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/commentary_ardemagni_28_07.2016.pdf 68 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 17, 89, 99, 129 69 ‘Qatar recalls envoy to Iran after attacks in Saudi missions: State News’, Reuters, January 6, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-iran-qatar/qatar-recalls-envoy-to-iran-after-attacks-on-saudi- missions-state-news-idUSKBN0UK23Z20160106 70 Simeon Kerr, ‘Qatar restores diplomatic ties with Iran’, The Financial Times, August 24, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/bd8f21c8-889d-11e7-bf50-e1c239b45787 71 Mehran Kamrava, Qatar – Small State, Big Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013), xvii

21 elements of growing assertiveness in its foreign policy, but it remains cautious following setbacks after the Arab Spring.72 In addition, following the 2017 Saudi-led blockade of Qatar,

Doha was forced to focus its attention to domestic matters. However, the blockade firmly established the need for Doha to become self-sufficient in domestic matters in particular, thereby re-establishing the seeds of a similar trend in its foreign policy.73 Qatar remains the state that is best equipped to follow the UAE on this trend, but it will tread cautiously, as it still seeks to ensure the effects of the 2017 blockade are lessened. Kuwait must tread carefully in its foreign policy because of its significant Shia population, and as such, faces similar dilemmas to the one faced by the emirate of Dubai in the UAE, which has a significant Iranian population, which this dissertation covers. Bahrain’s foreign policies have consistently aligned with Saudi Arabia, and it shows no signs of breaking away from its neighbour and patron. As a result, it has not shown significant signs of this regional trend and is likely to remain behind its other smaller Gulf Arab allies. Importantly, neither state has felt particularly emboldened in recent years. Bahrain, facing significant domestic turmoil is predominantly focused on ensuring the survival of the ruling family with the help of its Saudi neighbour and ensuring that the Pearl roundabout demonstrations will not be repeated.74 Kuwait for its part, is loath to rock the boat within the GCC, and sees itself as predominantly an ally of the other GCC states.75 Finally, while Oman provides yet another interesting case study in terms of its relations with Iran, Muscat has traditionally been more independent in its foreign policy than the other Gulf Arab states. While treading carefully in order to remain within the GCC, Muscat

72 Author interview with senior official, Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Doha (15 December 2019) 73 Ibid 74 Jeremy Bowen, ‘Bahrain tensions a trigger for Gulf turmoil’, BBC News, December 13, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20606069 75 Author interview with Sami Al-Faraj, President, Kuwait Centre for Strategic Studies (24 May 2016); Author interview with Majdi Al-Dhafiri, Kuwaiti ambassador to Iran (24 May 2016); Author interview with Abdul Aziz Al-Sharekh, Director General, Kuwait Diplomatic Institute (25 May 2016)

22 has always been clear that Iran is not the enemy. In recent years, Muscat’s opposition to some

GCC policy has also been more vocal; the Omani leadership surprised its allies by publicly rejecting the idea of a GCC Customs Union in 2013 because the Union would not have served its interests.76 Nevertheless, it is a trend that has long-term roots in Omani history,77 and while recent events have highlighted Omani foreign policy independence, they have not been the cause of it, like they have for the other smaller Gulf Arab states. As a result, while this dissertation will provide as context some of the measures taken by the other smaller Gulf

Arab states in the pursuit of greater assertiveness, it will focus on the UAE as the manifestation of this trend.

For now, the changes have been slight, yet they hint at things to come. As this trend gains momentum, the process has the potential to profoundly change the regional order in the

Middle East. In this regard, the UAE is a litmus test of sorts; the most visible indicator of the impact of the far-reaching developments mentioned above on the long-standing regional order.

1.2 The analytical approach

As mentioned in the introduction, the dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part will establish the existence of a growing assertiveness in UAE foreign policy and, to a lesser extent, among the smaller Gulf Arab states more broadly. To do this, the analysis sets out three

76 ‘Oman will withdraw from GCC if Union is formed: foreign minister’, The National, December 7, 2013, https://www.thenational.ae/world/oman-will-withdraw-from-gcc-if-a-union-is-formed-foreign-minister- 1.314873 77 This was reiterated during several interviews with Omanis, including author interview with Ibrahim Al Saadi, Minister Plenipotentiary, Omani Embassy to the UK, London (9 November 2020)

23 indicators of assertiveness: 1) greater capabilities – military, diplomatic, economic and political; 2) the state’s willingness to use those capabilities in pursuit of objectives that it deems important to the national interest but that may diverge from the interests of allies; and 3) the perceived ‘success’ of their use as part of a coherent strategic approach. 78 These indicators are then applied to the case of the UAE.

On building its capabilities, following 2011, Abu Dhabi increased its demand for military equipment, diversified its sources significantly, and increased its efforts to develop an indigenous military-industrial complex, thus demonstrating a desire to diversify its sources of security, with a view to becoming increasingly self-sufficient as it builds its own military- industrial complex. In the economic realm, the thinking underpinning the UAE’s use of economic diplomacy and influence changed. While the UAE had drawn on economic diplomacy prior to the Arab Spring, after 2011, the UAE used it proactively to achieve the outcomes it wanted. Abu Dhabi also deployed it more visibly and aggressively. Diplomatically, the UAE focused on building its capabilities and improving its image internationally. Secondly, the UAE demonstrated an intention to deploy these capabilities in various regional fora, including in Yemen and Libya, even when its objectives did not align with the UAE’s allies.

While prior to 2011, the UAE also involved itself in peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo and

Afghanistan,79 after 2011, it did not hesitate to act on its own in the pursuit of its objectives.

78 Chapter two will define this in greater detail, and chapter three will examine the change through the three core components after 2011 79‘UAE to keep troops in Kosovo’, Reuters, March 14, 2000. These contributions were controversial, see for example, Will Bartlet, James Ker-Lindsey, Kristian Alexander, Tena Prelec, ‘The UAE as an Emerging Actor in the Western Balkans: The Case of Strategic Investment in Serbia’, Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea, Vol. 7, Issue 1: Special Section: New Perspectives on UAE Foreign Policy (2017), 94-112; Tena Prelec, ‘The UAE’s presence in the Balkans: Commercial interest, geopolitical calculations, or a meeting point between ‘sultanism’ and authoritarianism?’, LSE Blogs, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/07/11/the- uaes-presence-in-the-balkans/

Finally, the ‘success’ of deployments – in other words, how Abu Dhabi perceived the deployments to fulfil their objectives irrespective of the impact they had on the ground, provided the policy of assertiveness with assured momentum.

The second part of the dissertation will examine the UAE’s regional context from 2011 to the summer of 2017 in order to understand what events have contributed to entrenching and speeding-up this trend. It will help explain the ‘why’ behind the trend of growing assertiveness by focusing on the international level and the constraints events in the region posed on UAE foreign policymaking. To do so, it will adopt a modified foreign policy analysis lens. Foreign policy studies examine the dynamics that determine a state’s foreign policy.80 The literature debates the importance accorded to the domestic and foreign spheres in shaping a state’s foreign policy, examining issues such as the personalities of decision-makers,81 their political and cultural contexts,82 and a state’s system of alliances.83 The literature broadly agrees on the need to study both the domestic and foreign context in order to understand a country’s foreign policy.84 But importantly, it recognises that the domestic political constraints in particular are more closely tied to democratic countries.85 This is important to us because of

80 See for example, Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003); Valerie M. Hudson and Christopher S. Vore, ‘Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow’, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 (October 1995); James N. Rosenau Ed, Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1967); Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988); John Ikenberry, ‘Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order’, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998-1999); William B. Quandt, ‘The Electoral Cycle and the Conduct of Foreign Policy’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 101, No. 5, Reflections on Providing for "The Common Defense" (1986); Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, Burton Sapin, Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University, 1954); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976) 81 Hudson and Vore, ‘Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow’, 210 82 See Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, 434 83 Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, 234 84 Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’ 85 See Ibid, 436

25 the nature of the states under study. The Gulf Arab states, including the UAE, are absolute monarchies,86 not democratic societies. All states, including absolute monarchies like the Gulf

Arab states, however, must contend with an international context, which is generally, outside their control. The focus on the international level is heavily informed by empirical research in the region. In a sample of over eighty interviews, participants repeatedly and without prompt identified international factors as those having the most significant influence on foreign policy. In addition, the foreign policy context is the primary arena in which the changes examined in this dissertation were enabled, developed, and enacted in response to regional events, especially after 2011. The dissertation, while recognising the contribution of domestic factors to the development of the growing assertiveness trend, will argue that in the case of the UAE, it is a series of international level factors that have had the greatest influence on behavioural change and helped entrench this trend.

1.3 Other factors that contributed to this trend

This dissertation will not discuss the impact of changes in the energy market or domestic affairs on changes in the region at length, though it recognises the importance of both in contributing to the trend.87

86 Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East (London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 2013), 83 87 For more on the significance of oil, including in the foreign policy decisions of the Gulf Arab states, see Eugene Rogan, The Arabs – A History (New York, Basic Books, 2009); F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Andrew Scott Cooper, The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran and Saudi Arabia changed the balance of power in the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011); Christopher M. Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (Hurst & Company: London, 2012) 42-46; Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (New York: Free Press, 1991); Jim Krane, Energy Kingdoms: Oil and Political Survival in the Persian Gulf (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019); Thomas L. McNaugher, Arms and Oil: US Military Strategy and the Persian Gulf (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985); Charles L. Glaser and Rosemary A. Kelanic Eds, Crude Strategy: Rethinking the US Military Commitment to Defend Persian Gulf Oil (Washington DC:

It is undeniable that both the rise in the price of oil, as well as the US ‘shale revolution’ and

US energy independence contributed to the emergence of the trend discussed in this dissertation by providing oil-producing states with the means to pursue a more assertive foreign policy. The rise in the price of oil – the region’s primary raw material– after 1979 and the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, enabled the Gulf Arab countries to begin developing their capabilities. Shortly after, while the US had been working to decrease its dependence on oil since the 1970s, the Shale Revolution firmly established it, making the

Persian Gulf region less of an ‘energy concern’ to Washington – that was how it was perceived by the Gulf Arab states.88 This was key to shaping regional security perceptions for the leadership in the Gulf Arab states.

The origins of Emirati assertiveness coincides with the rise in power of Mohammed Bin Zayed

Al Nahyan,89 the current crown prince of Abu Dhabi and the Deputy Supreme Commander of the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces.90 Under its first ruler, Sheikh Zayed (Bin Sultan Al

Nahyan), the founder of the UAE and its first president, the country’s foreign policy was

Georgetown University Press, 2016); Hossein Askari, Collaborative Colonialism: The Political Economy of Oil in the Persian Gulf (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 88 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers and officials, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17); Kirsten Westphal, Marco Oberhaus, Guido Steinberg, ‘The US Shale Revolution and the Arab Gulf States: The Economic and Political Impact of Changing Energy Markets’, SWP Research Paper (November 2014) 89 This will be examined in greater detail in chapter four 90 Peter Salisbury, ‘Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy’, Chatham House Research Paper (July 2020), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-07-01-risk-in-uae- salisbury.pdf, 9

27 largely ‘idealistic’ and ‘Arab world-centered’.91 But Mohammed Bin Zayed had more ambitious goals for the country, including greater self-sufficiency and influence abroad.92

The domestic political dynamics in the UAE and some of its neighbouring countries and the politics of oil have been factors in the ability of the Gulf Arab states to build their capabilities, as well as their perceptions of security issues, including most importantly, the commitment of their primary security guarantor. Indeed, for the UAE, Mohammed Bin Zayed’s ambitions for the country translated into a more assertive foreign policy, and so, was key to the establishment of this trend. But the trend’s persistence and its increased momentum after

2011 was determined by the regional context and events that either entrenched or created new fears and provided new opportunities for the UAE’s greater assertiveness. As a result, this dissertation is primarily a study of non-economic, foreign policy decisions and changes.

As such, a study of the domestic dynamics in these countries as well as changes in world energy markets are beyond the scope of this study.

91 Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, ‘New assertiveness in UAE foreign policy’, Gulf News, October 9, 2012, https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-Ed/new-assertiveness-in-uae-foreign-policy-1.1086667 92 Hussein Lbish, ‘The UAE’s Evolving National Security Strategy’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington Report (6 April 2017), https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/UAE-Security_ONLINE.pdf, 4-6; see also, Author interview with former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019); US Embassy in the UAE, ‘Strong Words in Private from MBZ at IDEX – Bashes Iran, Qatar, Russia,’ Wikileaks Cable, February 25, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUDHABI193_a.html; US Embassy in the UAE, ‘Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Warns DOE DepSec Poneman About Iran,’ Wikileaks Cable, December 17, 2009, https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL0912/S00001/cablegate-abu-dhabi-crown-prince-warns-doe-depsec- poneman-about-iran.htm; US Embassy in the UAE, ‘US-UAE Cooperation Against Taliban Finance Continues,’ Wikileaks Cable, January 24, 2010, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10ABUDHABI27_a.html; Author interview with former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019); David Goldfischer, ‘The United States and its Key Gulf Allies: A new Foundation for a troubled partnership?’ in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 79

4. Methodology and research design

This dissertation is an empirically grounded, contemporary history of the Persian Gulf region.

The methodology and organisation of the dissertation explores indicators of the trends discussed above and facilitates their analysis, while the second half of the dissertation seeks to explain how the regional and international arena enabled and sped up the implementation of assertiveness. To this end, desk-based research covered not only the primary period under study, that is to say, from 2011 until the outbreak of the GCC crisis in the summer of 2017, but also key developments that shaped relations between these states since the independence of the Arab Gulf States in the second half of the twentieth century. In some instances, in particular in the application of the indicators of assertiveness to the UAE, the dissertation refers to events that occurred after 2017. This is intended to help highlight elements of the argument and demonstrate the continuation of the trend. The analysis of the growing assertiveness of the UAE and some of its smaller Gulf Arab neighbours begins with the 2011 Arab Spring, identified as a key turning point in the acceleration of the assertiveness trend.93 The thesis also pays particular attention to the effect of the US announcement of a

Pivot to Asia and the aftermath of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.

The methodological approach to the research comprises two principle strands. First, the dissertation relies heavily on desk-based research. A comprehensive review of scholarly literature, policy analysis, national statements and media coverage, local and international, relevant to power relations in the Gulf provides a solid basis for understanding contemporary

93 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers and officials, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17)

29 challenges to and shifts in the regional balance of power. The author used as much literature from the region as possible and worked in multiple languages. While generally useful as a reflection of official government positions and policy, primary literature such as official statements in this region aim to portray government policy in an overly positive light or contain hostile government rhetoric against foreign powers, which does not necessarily reflect government policy. These sources must be carefully evaluated and placed in context.

Secondary literature from the region will often be religiously or politically biased. As a result, regional work was supplemented with the extensive body of broader literature available on the Gulf Arab States, Iran, and their domestic politics and foreign relations.

The Persian Gulf constitutes a complex and fluid web of shared history, religion, politics, and conflict. This posed considerable methodological challenges, including the difficulty of compiling first-hand information about the reasons behind foreign and security policy decisions in the Persian Gulf. The lack of archival sources is the most glaring issue: Countries in the region do not have extensive, organised archives, and those available are not always easily accessible to foreign researchers. However, London’s involvement in the independence of the Gulf Arab countries, made it possible to get an insight into the tone of the dialogue between the new countries in the Persian Gulf, especially the UAE, through the FCO’s documents on the region, released in 1998. The only drawback is that British officials were not always present at meetings. In addition, the contemporary nature of the research project means that more recent documents of interest will not be available to the researcher.

A second methodological strand therefore complemented the research: qualitative research in the form of semi-structured interviews. Empirical fieldwork incorporating first-hand

30 testimony from former and current officials and experts in the region provided original and empirically-grounded insights into thinking in the region. It would be impossible to get a full understanding of these countries without spending time in the region, given that most interactions in that region occur outside the scrutiny of the public. Because of the regional deficit of trust, more candid, productive conversations with regional policymakers and experts often occur on a small-scale or one-to-one level. A wide network of existing contacts in the Persian Gulf region helped to identify appropriate candidates for interviews, which were conducted over the course of this research project to chart the changes in the relationship over the full duration of the research work. The author endeavoured to conduct regular field trips to the countries covered in this dissertation to conduct interviews and maintain regular contact with a range of experts, academics, officials, and economic actors in the region and beyond. Such conversations also occurred on the side-lines of major events and conferences both in the region, and in Europe and America. But even semi-structured interviews posed several challenges. The research focuses; a new assertiveness of the UAE, and to a lesser extent, other smaller Gulf Arab states and how this was likely to shape the region in the future, are sensitive foreign policy issues that government officials were at times, reluctant to discuss in a frank and open manner. Many interviewees proved very cautious. While in some cases conducting multiple interviews with the same interviewees led to an increase in trust and therefore more open conversations, in others, it was difficult to obtain nuanced information beyond the government-approved line when speaking to current officials, in particular. This caution was overcome through anonymous interviews that afforded currently serving officials the opportunity to speak frankly, while remaining

31 cognisant of the inevitable security and informational concerns associated with speaking to those outside government.94

1.4 Plan

The dissertation will progress in two parts: The first will evidence the existence of the change in the UAE’s foreign policy, and the second part will examine why the change has taken place.

The first chapter begins with an overview of the recent history and current state of affairs in the Persian Gulf with insight into regional relations prior to 2011. It will also include an overview of the formation of the UAE – our main case study – and some of the challenges this young country faced. The historical overview forms the context for this dissertation’s analysis.

Chapter two will define assertiveness and set out three indicators of assertiveness: growing political, diplomatic, military, cultural and economic capabilities, the intention to use them and finally, the perception of their use – the deployment of the capabilities enumerated above may not be judged as ‘successful’ from an external perspective, but as long as the leadership perceives it as such, then this will empower them to continue on their assertive track.

94 See the definition of the Chatham House Rule, https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/chatham-house-rule

Chapter three will apply these indicators with a view to evidencing the UAE’s assertiveness.

It will examine the increase in the UAE’s capabilities, the development of Abu Dhabi’s intention to use those capabilities and the perception of the ‘success’ of their use.

The second part of the dissertation begins with chapter four, which seeks to examine why the

UAE has become more assertive. Drawing on foreign policy studies literature, the chapter will set out a modified foreign policy analysis lens, which will structure analysis of the causal factors driving the more assertive behaviour displayed by the UAE and, to a lesser extent, other small Gulf states. The lens recognises the importance of both domestic and international factors, but gives prominence to international factors. Finally, the chapter will introduce the ‘catalysts of change’: The Arab Spring, President Obama’s Pivot to Asia and the

2015 nuclear deal with Iran – and justify their selection.

Chapter five will begin the study of the first catalyst: The Arab Spring. The wave of discontent that swept through the Arab world created a void in the region: the collapse of Arab powerhouses provided the Gulf Arab States with an opportunity to step in and fill the power vacuum. In addition, Tehran’s response to the Arab Spring, calling for an ‘Islamic

Awakening’,95 refocused Iran as a major source of concern for Gulf Arab states.96 The Arab

Spring also highlighted their vulnerability to domestic turbulence and change. This chapter will examine the effects of the Arab Spring on the UAE and explore how it provided Abu Dhabi with an opportunity to shape regional events and pursue its interests individually.

95 Ali Khamenei, ‘Speech to Iran’s Assembly of Experts’, Speech, Tehran, September 15, 2010. http://english.khamenei.ir/news/1416/Leader-s-View-of-Islamic-Awakening, accessed 8 January 2018 96 This was a point that interviewees made several times during interviews. Author interviews with GCC lawmakers and officials, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17)

Chapter six will discuss the impact of the announced US Pivot to Asia, the second catalyst of change. The announcement by the Obama administration reminded the Gulf Arab states of their reliance on the US for their security needs, and how changes to Washington’s foreign policy priorities would have a detrimental effect on their security. While the US pivot did not have much of an impact on the ground,97 the psychological impact on the Gulf Arab states was significant, with trust of the US at an all-time low during President Obama’s final years in office.98 The chapter will examine the intensity of the sense of abandonment for the UAE, and its subsequent drive for self-sufficiency.

Chapter seven will focus on the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 – the final catalyst. In the context of the perceived US disengagement from the region, the nuclear deal was the manifestation of the Gulf Arab states’ worst fear: US abandonment of its Gulf Arab allies in favour of their rival, Iran. The Gulf Arab capitals believed the deal would legitimise the Islamic Republic in the eyes of the international community and provide it with the means to pursue a destructive regional foreign policy.99 The chapter will examine how the UAE perceived the nuclear negotiations and the deal, and the effect this had on Abu Dhabi’s thinking.

97 See chapter five 98 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers and officials, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 99 Loveday Morris and Hugh Naylor, ‘Arab states fear nuclear deal will give Iran a bigger regional role’, The Washington Post, July 14, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/arab-states-fear- dangerous-iranian-nuclear-deal-will-shake-up-region/2015/07/14/96d68ff3-7fce-4bf5-9170- 6bcc9dfe46aa_story.html?utm_term=.703afe67ab01

Finally, the conclusion will draw together the various strands of analysis, reflect on what our empirical inquiry has revealed and identify avenues for further research.

Conclusion

By examining the case of the UAE, this dissertation will explore the nature of what seems to be a trend of growing assertiveness in that country. A trend that may take hold in other small Gulf states and could lead to important structural changes in the regional order in the

Persian Gulf. Given the potential significance of these changes for the region, it is vital to understand what caused these changes, what the changes themselves are, and how likely they are to be resilient and spread among other Gulf Arab states. Drawing on extensive empirical research gleaned from more than fifty semi-structured interviews with officials in the region, the dissertation will argue that recent developments have contributed to the erosion of the established dichotomy between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This thesis will thus hold historical value in charting the changes occurring in the Persian Gulf region and policy value in identifying new dynamics that must be considered when anticipating and managing regional crises.

Part One

Chapter 1: The Persian Gulf before 2011

Antipathy between the two regional hegemons: Iran and Saudi Arabia, supported by its smaller Gulf Arab allies, has long been a feature of international relations in the Persian Gulf region, but the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 saw this rivalry become a dominant force. The smaller Gulf Arab states largely deferred to Saudi Arabia when it came to major foreign policy decisions, and Riyadh was intent on opposing both Iran and Iraq to begin with, and

Iran alone, once Iraq was no longer a threat.100 While at times, the leadership in the smaller

Gulf Arab countries was uncomfortable with the way Riyadh dictated policies or made decisions and voiced their concerns,101 disagreements were not major and were generally kept behind closed doors. But since 2011, differences in opinions and goals have become more present and visible on the part of the smaller Gulf Arab states, and the UAE is the most visible example of how these changes are being expressed through increasingly assertive foreign policies. As such, the regional duality that characterised the Persian Gulf region since 2003 appears to be challenged by a growing assertiveness on the part of the smaller Gulf Arab states, with the UAE providing the clearest example of this development.

The revolts that broke out in the Middle East in 2011, followed by the perception of a withdrawing America enshrined in President Obama’s Pivot to Asia, and the nuclear deal with Iran, are three major international developments that helped entrench and give

100 F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 6, 33, 45, 50, 129 101 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 81; see also Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf States, 39

36 momentum to these changes. The UAE has become increasingly assertive politically, diplomatically, economically, and militarily, not hesitating to pursue its interests in the region, even if they are at odds with its allies and partners.

This chapter will provide an overview of the region and its dominant rivalries both before and after 2003, providing a historical context for the examination of the current change in the region, which is focused mainly on the 2011-2017 period. It will offer a brief historical account of the formation of the Gulf Arab states and examine the dynamics among the Gulf

Arab countries. This historical context is an important starting point for understanding the change in dynamics between the Gulf Arab states since 2011. Building on this, the chapter will narrow the focus to the dissertation’s case study, the United Arab Emirates, offering a brief summary of the country’s history and standing in the region. This focused country context will set the scene for a more detailed discussion on how broader regional changes have found form in the actions of UAE decision-makers.

1. The Persian Gulf region before 2003

1.1. The formation of new Gulf Arab states

The Persian Gulf was traditionally of interest to international powers because of its strategic location on the route to India,102 but also as a market and a source of Persian silk, especially for the British.103 Piracy, primarily by the Qawasim tribe – the ancestors to the Al Qasimi

102 Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 4 103 ‘Neo-Piracy in Oman and the Gulf: The Origins of British Imperialism in the Gulf,’ MERIP Reports, no. 36 (1975), 3

37 ruling family of Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah in the UAE - in the early nineteenth century encouraged further British involvement in the region. London established control over the foreign policies of the Trucial States and influence over their internal affairs following the

Maritime Truce in 1835 and 1853.104 But it was the discovery of oil in the 1930s in the region, and the subsequent growing international need for it, which dramatically increased the strategic significance of the Persian Gulf region to foreign powers. On 16 January 1968, the British government announced its decision to withdraw all its forces from the Persian

Gulf region by the end of 1971: a rapid timeframe.105 When the rulers of the Sheikhdoms heard the reason for British withdrawal was economic, 106 they offered to cover the cost of keeping British troops in their region.107 But London declined, indicating that its decision was ‘primarily driven by domestic political motivations’, including conducting defence budget cuts to garner support for further cuts in civil spending.108 The disparate Sheikhdoms did not want the British to leave, fearing their departure would leave them vulnerable to potential outside aggressors, in particular neighbouring Iran under the Shah.109 But the process was irreversible and in the early 1970s, the Gulf Arab states were forced to declare

104 ‘Neo-Piracy in Oman and the Gulf: The Origins of British Imperialism in the Gulf,’ MERIP Reports, no. 36 (1975), 4 105 There is debate about the causes of the British withdrawal. While some attribute it to economic imperatives and the devaluation of the British pound, see for example: G.C. Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Michael Dockrill, British Defence since 1945 (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1989); David Greenwood, ‘Constraints and choices in the transformation of Britain’s defence effort since 1945’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (April 1976), 5-26, others focus on the political and domestic considerations behind the decision, stating that drawing down forces in the region was inevitable, see for example: Simon C. Smith, ‘Britain’s decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf: A Pattern Not a Puzzle’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 44, Issue 2 (2016), 328-351; Shohei Sato, ‘Britain’s Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf 1964-68: A Pattern and a Puzzle’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol 37, Issue 1 (2009), 99-117; Edward Longinotti, ‘Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez: From Economic Determinism to Political Choice’, Contemporary British History, Vol. 29, Issue 3 (2015), 318-340 106 Sato, ‘Britain's Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf, 1964–68: A Pattern and a Puzzle’, 107 107 F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 19 108 Sato, ‘Britain's Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf, 1964–68: A Pattern and a Puzzle’, 109 109 Eugene Rogan, The Arabs – A History (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 455; Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, 19

38 their independence. The rapid pace of independence and the challenges of negotiating the formation of their states, including establishing new institutions and tackling differences between the main ruling families and tribes,110 meant that the leadership in these new countries faced numerous difficulties, including managing internal dynamics and establishing state institutions in a region where leadership ‘is still very much a personal affair’,111 all while securing themselves from foreign threats – a key factor in their independence.112

Internal threats to the leadership of the Gulf sheikhdoms were not uncommon at the time.

The sheikhdoms that would eventually come together to form the UAE, for example, could not agree on the form their country would take,113 and after the federation’s formation in

1971, internal political wrangling continued for the country’s first two decades of existence.114 In Oman, independent from the UK since 1951, Qaboos Bin Said Al Said overthrew his father and became Sultan in 1970.115 This change was partly spearheaded by the rebellion underway in the Dhofar province, on the border with Yemen,116 where discontent led to a full-scale civil war with foreign intervention in the context of the Cold

110 For an extensive history of the process of state formation for the Arab Sheikhdoms, see Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman (London and New York: Routledge, 2016) 111 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 13 112 F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 25, 39 113 The formation of the UAE will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter 114 For more on the formation of the UAE, see Christopher M Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (Hurst & Company: London, 2012), 11-37; Christopher M Davidson, ‘The United Arab Emirates’, in Christopher Davidson Eds, Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf monarchies (London: Hurst & Company, 2011); Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates – Power, Politics, and Policymaking (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017), 17-60 115 For more on the history of Oman, see Jeremy Jones and Nicholas Ridout, A History of Modern Oman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 116 For more on the Dhofar rebellion, see Chapter 3 in Calvin H. Allen, W. Lynn Rigsbee II, Oman Under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution, 1970-1996 (London and New York: Routledge, 2013)

War.117 Qatar too was facing its own internal struggles. Six months after it declared its independence on 1 September 1971, in February 1972, Khalifa Bin Hamad Al Thani deposed

Ahmad Bin Ali Al Thani, his nephew, in a bloodless coup.118 Bahrain, for its part, rapidly felt the effects of London’s retreat, as the Shah of Iran used the British withdrawal as an opportunity to lay claim to it.119 It was only in 1970, after the UN passed a resolution enshrining the results of a referendum confirming that Bahrainis desired sovereignty,120 that the Iranian government renounced its claim to Bahrain. Amidst all this turmoil and infighting, it is perhaps not surprising that the smaller Gulf Arab states turned to their larger and more powerful neighbour, Saudi Arabia, for leadership on many regional issues.

1.2. Saudi Arabian Leadership

As a result of domestic political dilemmas and poor regional security, from the time of

Britain’s withdrawal from the region, the smaller Gulf Arab states largely deferred to Riyadh on policy decisions affecting the region.121 Saudi Arabia emerged as the natural leader of the

Gulf Arab states. With more than two million square kilometres of land and a population of approximately 30 million people, as well as an abundant supply of oil, Saudi Arabia was the biggest Gulf Arab state, with the greatest resources available to it. It is also the birthplace of

Islam and the custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites: Mecca and Medina. But Saudi

117 Calvin H. Allen, W. Lynn Rigsbee II, Oman Under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution, 1970-1996 (London and New York: Routledge, 2013) 118 David Commins, The Gulf States: A Modern History (London and New York: I. B. Taurus, 2012), 189 119 F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 19 120 The Question of Bahrain, UN Security Council Resolution 278 (11 May 1970), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/278 121 Khalid Almezaini, ‘The transformation of UAE foreign policy since 2011’ in Kristian Coates Ulrichsen Ed, The Changing Security Dynamics of the Persian Gulf (London: Hurst & Company, 2017), 194

40 leadership was not straightforward. Firstly, Saudi Arabia also faced its own internal difficulties. It was managing tensions with its significant Shia minority in the Eastern

Province,122 and the overbearing and hard-line clergy on which the Al Saud family depends,123 as well as ensuring the successful continued implementation of the social contract between the ruling family and the Saudi population.124 Secondly, the smaller Gulf

Arab states feared that Saudi Arabia would impose its vision for the region, including its perception of regional threats, and its policies on the rest of the Gulf Arab states;125 a fear that was borne out from the late seventies onwards.126 In fact, by 2009, the US assessed that, ‘while publicly expressing close ties with Riyadh, the UAE privately regards the

Kingdom as its second greatest security threat after Iran (Israel is not on the list)’.127 As a result, despite the drive to pool resources under Saudi leadership with the formation of the

GCC in May 1981 in response to regional shifts like the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia,128 the smaller Gulf Arab states simultaneously tried to guard against an overbearing Saudi leader by ensuring they would

122 For more on the turbulent relationship between the Saudi government and the Shias in the Eastern province, see Toby Matthiesen, The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 123 Paul Aarts and Carolien Roelants, Saudi Arabia – A Kingdom in Peril (London: Hurst&Company, 2015), 16 124 For more on the difficulties faced by the Saudi government since its independence see the following selection of publications, Aarts and Roelants, Saudi Arabia – A Kingdom in Peril; John R Bradley, Saudi Arabia Exposed – Inside a Kingdom in Crisis (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005); Robert Lacey, Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia (London: Penguin, 2009); Steffan Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia (Ithica and London: Cornell University Press, 2010); Toby Craig Jones, Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2010) 125 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 77, 78, 81; US Embassy in the UAE, ‘A Long Hot Summer for UAE-Saudi Relations,’ Wikileaks Cable, October 29, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUDHABI981_a.html 126 F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 39 127 US Embassy in the UAE, ‘A Long Hot Summer for UAE-Saudi Relations’ 128 For more on the formation of the GCC see, Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf

41 retain decision-making and self-sufficiency in defence matters at least.129 They avoided full military integration, instead creating a small force of 5000 men with ‘no real fighting capability’,130 and countries like the ‘UAE insist[ed] that when the [Peninsula Shield] force enters a member’s territory the command structure reverts from Saudi Arabia to that of the host country’.131 Indeed, according to Legrenzi, the ‘enthusiasm for ‘cooperation’ and

‘regionalisation’ at the societal level is matched by a healthy distrust of possible Saudi hegemony’.132

This distrust drove some of the smaller Gulf Arab countries to pursue their own foreign policy goals even as they remained under the leadership of Saudi Arabia. Bahrain, whose ruling Khalifa family is Saudi Arabia’s closest ally, signed its own Free Trade Agreement with the US, in an effort to set its own agenda and depart from relying solely on Riyadh.133 Qatar too, tried to develop a more independent foreign policy, 134 which at times resulted in a split from its GCC allies.135 But until recently, the Gulf Arab states were able to keep their disagreements mainly behind closed doors, and they rarely pursued interests in open

129 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 78 130 Ibid, 78 131 Ibid, 78 132 Ibid, 81 133 Elizabeth Becker, ‘US and Bahrain reach a Free Trade Agreement’, The New York Times, May 28, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/28/business/us-and-bahrain-reach-a-free-trade-agreement.html 134 For more on Qatar’s foreign policy, see Mehran Kamrava, Qatar – Small State, Big Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013) 135 See the crisis in 2014 and again in 2017, David D. Kirkpatrick, ‘3 Gulf Countries Pull Ambassadors from Qatar Over its Support of Islamists’, The New York Times, March 5, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/world/middleeast/3-persian-gulf-states-pull-ambassadors-from- qatar.html; Kareem Faheem and Karen Young, ‘Four Arab nations sever diplomatic ties with Qatar, exposing rifts’, The Washington Post, June 5, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/four-arab-nations-sever- diplomatic-ties-with-qatar-exposing-rift-in-region/2017/06/05/15ad2284-49b4-11e7-9669- 250d0b15f83b_story.html?utm_term=.30140b5ff3ad

42 defiance of their close GCC allies.136 The smaller Gulf Arab states were aware of their vulnerability to both internal and external security threats, which trumped concerns over

Saudi hegemony. This drove them to tighten their ranks and continue to work together to address common external threats, primarily Iran and Iraq. In order to better understand their security environment today, the next section will examine the threat posed by these two other regional powers to the smaller Gulf Arab states.

1.3 Other regional hegemons: Iran and Iraq

It was inevitable that Iran would pose a threat to its Gulf Arab neighbours. When he came to power in September 1941 following his father’s abdication, 137 Mohammad Reza Shah wanted to ensure his country could become self-reliant, a modern country and a regional, if not international, powerhouse.138 The Shah exploited every opportunity he could to achieve his regional ambitions, which directly affected the security of the Gulf Arab states.139 After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, it was the nature of the new theocratic government in

Tehran that was threatening to the Gulf Arab countries. The Islamic Republic’s desire to spread the Islamic revolution in the region,140 and Ayatollah Khomeini’s repeated challenges

136 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, and experts, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 137 The Pahlavis came to power in December 1925 under Reza Shah. In 1979, the Iranian Revolution deposed his son, Mohammed Reza Shah 138 For more on the Shah’s vision for Iran see, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York; Stein & Day Publishing, 1980); Abbas Milani, The Shah (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2012) 139 For example, the Shah’s claims to Bahrain prevented the sheikhdom from joining the federation that was being negotiated following the British withdrawal from the region. See Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 17. While he finally relinquished his claim, allowing Bahrain to declare independence on 16 December 1971, he maintained his claims to three islands off the coast of the UAE: Abu Musa, which it disputed with the emirate of Sharjah, and Greater and Lesser Tunbs, which it disputed with Ras Al Khaimah. 140 Ruhollah Khomeini, Governance of the Jurist: Islamic Government (Tehran: The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works – International Affairs Department, 1970), 23-24; Ruhollah Khomeini,

43 to the legitimacy of the Al Saud’s reign in Saudi Arabia,141 did little to help the growing distrust and antagonism the Gulf Arab states felt towards Tehran. Over time, as Iran’s system matured, the revolutionary zeal faded,142 and the Islamic Republic became increasingly pragmatic. As a result, Iran’s involvement in the region mainly became a way for it to secure itself and create a buffer zone between its borders and hostile foreign powers,143 though desires of Iranian regional hegemony and influence remained.144 It is for these reasons that the Islamic Republic and its regional goals have always been one of the most pressing foreign policy concern for most of Iran’s Gulf Arab neighbours.145 But the Gulf

Arab states could not agree on their Iran policy.146 Oman, for example, repeatedly called for

‘We shall confront the world with our ideology’, Speech, Radio Tehran, March 21, 1980, in ‘Iran’s Revolution: The First Year’, Middle East Reports, Vol 10 (May/June 1980) 141 Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East (London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 2013), 5 142 Alidad Mafinezam, Aria Mehrabi, Iran and its Place among Nations (Greenwood: Praeger, 2008), 37; Ali Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 221; Shireen T. Hunter, Iran after Khomeini (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 1992), 93. 143 Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran, 226, Hunter, Iran after Khomeini, 93; Ali Ansari, Modern Iran: Reform and Revolution (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2003), 283; Daniel Byman, Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Jerrold D. Green, Iran’s Security Policy in a Post-Revolutionary Era (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001), 9, Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami (Oxon: Routledge, 2003), 11. For more on the means Iran uses to involve itself in the region, see Gregory F. Rose, ‘The post-Revolutionary Purge of Iran’s Armed Forces: A Revisionist Assessment’, Iranian Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2/3 (Spring – Summer 1984), 153-194; Nikola B. Schahgaldian, ‘The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic’, RAND Report (March 1987); Frederic Wehrey, Jerrold D. Green, Brian Nichiporuk, Alireza Nader, Lydia Hansell, Rasool Nafisi, S. R. Bohandy, The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009); Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 53–78, Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 258–267; Kenneth Katzman, ‘Iran’s Foreign and Defence Policies’, Congressional Research Service Report (7 November 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44017.pdf 144 Author interviews with Iranian officials, Berlin, New York, Lausanne, Doha (2015-2019) 145 This was the single most important point highlighted during interviews in the Gulf Arab states throughout the field research conducted for this thesis. Author interviews with GCC lawmakers and officials, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 146 Author roundtable with experts and analysts, B’huth, Dubai (29 February 2017)

44 closer relations with Tehran,147 attracting the ire of some of its more anti-Iran neighbours.148

At the other end of the spectrum, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were firm on pushing Iran back,149 while countries like Kuwait and Qatar sat somewhere in the middle: Concerned about Iran’s regional policies, but forced to work with Tehran either because of the sizeable

Iranian contingency within their borders (Kuwait) or because of shared gas fields (Qatar).150

In addition, there have been periods where dialogue between the Gulf Arabs and Iran was impossible, and others, where relations were warmer, under Iranian President Rafsandjani or President Khatami for example.151 As a result, the Gulf Arab states have struggled to present a unified front on Iran policy, further limiting their ability to deal with the Iranian threat.

But Iran was not the only threat to the Gulf Arab states. Prior to 2003, and especially following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in June 1990, Iraq was also a major concern.152 In fact, it was in large part because of the Iraqi threat and Saddam Hussein’s

147 Author interview with former Omani ambassador to Vienna, Muscat (19 May 2016); Author interview with Saif Bin Hashil Al Maskery, former Assistant Secretary of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), former ambassador to Switzerland and former member of the Majles Ashura, Muscat (5 March 2017). For more on Oman’s relations with Iran, see Gertjan Hoetjes, ‘Iran-GCC Relations: The Case of Oman’, in Maiike Warnaar, Luciano Zaccara, Paul Aarts, Iran’s Relations with the Arab States of the Gulf (London and Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016) 148 Author interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, Abu Dhabi (28 February 2017); author interview with Central Bank Board Member, Muscat (5 March 2017); author interview with Omani Majles Ashura member, Muscat (5 March 2017) 149 Author roundtable with the Policy Planning Unit, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abu Dhabi (28 February 2017); author interview with Youssef Al Otaiba, UAE ambassador to the USA, Washington DC (2 March 2016); author interview with Lana Nusseibeh, UAE ambassador to the United Nations, New York (11 March 2016), Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, ‘Iran is threatening the stability in the Middle East’, Financial Times, January 30, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/5254f36a-05a2-11e8-9e12-af73e8db3c71; Adel Bin Ahmed Al-Jubeir, ‘Can Iran Change?’ The New York Times, January 19, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/19/opinion/saudi- arabia-can-iran-change.html 150 Author interviews with Kuwaiti officials, officials in the navy, and academics, Kuwait City (25-26 May 2016); Author interviews with Qatari officials, experts, and academics, Doha (14-17 May 2016) 151 F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 131; Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami (Oxon: Routledge, 2003), 97, 102 152 Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, 7

45 invasion of Kuwait that the Gulf Arab states opened the door to a US military presence on their territories from January 1991 onwards.153 Saddam Hussein had been the centre of gravity in the Middle East and ‘when he was removed it changed everything else’.154 The US invasion not only removed the buffer between Iran and the Gulf Arab states, but it also changed the regional balance of power: ‘The day before the American led invasion, Iraq was in the Sunni sphere of influence. By the time the Americans left it was on the Shia side’.155

The perception was that Iraq was ‘lost’ to Iran because of the growing strength of the Shias in Iraq,156 and as a result, despite their differences on how to deal with their troublesome neighbour, the Gulf Arab threat assessment shifted to an almost sole focus on rolling back the ever-growing Iranian threat.157 This resulted in the polarisation of the region under the two regional hegemons: Iran and Saudi Arabia. In order to better understand the changes the region is experiencing today, the next section will examine the regional rivalry between

Iran and Saudi Arabia in greater detail, looking at the origins of the rivalry and the areas it played out in following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. This provides important context that frames many of the developments that will be examined further in this dissertation.

1.4 From 2003-2011: The Saudi-Iran rivalry

153 F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 88, 127-129 154 Paul Danahar, The New Middle East: The World After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 283 155 Ibid 156 Frederic Wehrey, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Jessica Watkins, Jeffrey Martini, Robert A Guffey, The Iraq Effect: The Middle East after the Iraq War (Washington DC: RAND Corporation, 2010), 26-27 157 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers and officials, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17)

Since their independence, the Gulf Arab states have viewed Iran with suspicion. Iran and the

Gulf Arabs compete on several fronts, including but not limited to, the political, sectarian, and religious fronts, and their respective visions of regional security. This section will provide a brief overview of the Iran-Saudi rivalry in order to better understand the state of regional relations prior to the change that this thesis identifies.

According to Charles Tripp and Shahram Chubin, structural differences between Iran, and

Saudi Arabia and its allies naturally limit security cooperation and entrench the rivalry.158

Iran possesses several favourable characteristics that strengthen its standing vis-a-vis its

Gulf Arab neighbours, including its size, large population and resources. 159 It sits in a strategically significant area, giving Tehran control over the waterways through which much of the world’s oil travels. Iran’s continued independence from direct colonial control and the impact of the Iran-Iraq War160 has led Iranians to firmly believe in the principle of self- sufficiency and independence from foreign influence, in opposition to Iran’s Gulf Arab neighbours who depend on foreign assistance for their security. Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies however, face the opposite situation. While Saudi Arabia’s native population is more significant than that of the other countries in the Persian Gulf region, it is still smaller than

Iran’s.161 The other GCC states have small native populations, which in some cases, have been surpassed by the number of foreign workers present in recent years.162 Saudi Arabia’s

158 See Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, ‘Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order’, IISS Adelphi Paper 304 (1996) 159 The World Bank population data, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=IR, last accessed December 18, 2017 160 Ariane Tabatabai and Tracy Samuels, ‘What the Iran-Iraq War Tells Us about the Future of the Iran Nuclear Deal’, International Security, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Summer 2017), 152-182 161 According to the World Bank, Saudi Arabia’s population in 2016 was 32,276,000 people, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=SA, last accessed December 18, 2017 162 For more on population sizes and composition in the GCC countries see, ‘GCC: Total population and percentage of nationals and non-nationals in GCC countries (national statistics, 2010-2017) (with numbers)’,

47 access to the Persian Gulf is limited to the northern part of the waters, with no access to the straits. Its capital is located inland, albeit not too far from its coastal borders, while the remaining capitals of the GCC countries are all coastal and facing Iran, making them vulnerable to a potential attack. But the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is not limited to structural differences; sectarianism, internal security dilemmas and opposing views on regional security are all major differences between the two sides of the Persian Gulf.

Sectarianism plays a major role in the rivalry. While the majority of the Gulf Arab populations are Sunni, 163 Iran is majority Shia, a minority that represents approximately 10-

13 percent of global Muslim worshippers.164 As the home to Mecca and Medina, Riyadh aspires to lead all Sunni Muslims.165 But the Islamic revolution put in place an alternative

Shia-led government in Iran that aimed to present itself as a different model for the region.166 Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini - the father of the Iranian revolution - regularly attacked the very foundations of Saudi Arabia and its claim to leadership of

Gulf Labour Markets, Migration, and Population (GLMM) Programme, http://gulfmigration.eu/gcc-total- population-percentage-nationals-non-nationals-gcc-countries-national-statistics-2010-2017-numbers/, last accessed December 5, 2017 163 The Shias believe that the Prophet appointed Ali Ibn Abi Talib, Muhammad’s first cousin married to his daughter and closest living male relative, as his successor, while the Sunnis believe the Prophet did not appoint a successor. See Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 31-63 164 ‘Mapping the Global Muslim Population’, The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (October 2009), 1, 8 165 Paul Aarts and Carolien Roelants, Saudi Arabia – A Kingdom in Peril (London: Hurst&Company, 2015), 10 166 Ruhollah Khomeini, Governance of the Jurist: Islamic Government (Tehran: The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works – International Affairs Department, 1970); Ruhollah Khomeini, ‘We shall confront the world with our ideology’, Speech, Radio Tehran, March 21, 1980, in ‘Iran’s Revolution: The First Year’, Middle East Reports, Vol. 10 (May/June 1980)

Islam,167 thus emboldening the Shia in the region.168 To the Sunnis, this proved that the

Shias, under Iranian leadership, had ‘designs on Mecca and Medina’.169 Today, the Gulf Arab states (and many in the West) continue to view Iranian actions in the region through a sectarian prism.170 They, in turn, respond with their own anti-Shia narrative, 171 thereby further entrenching the divide.

The internal security dilemmas faced by Saudi Arabia and its smaller GCC allies,172 and the opposing governmental systems in place in Iran and the Gulf Arab states exacerbated the divide.173 For Saudi Arabia and some of its GCC allies, it is essential to have an external enemy to distract from looming internal societal and economic problems: ‘to the Gulf rulers, the essence of the Iranian threat was not territorial expansion, but the fear of their own regimes getting toppled.’174 In Iran, there is a tendency to paint its influence as greater than

167 Ruhollah Khomeini, Governance of the Jurist: Islamic Government (Tehran: The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works – International Affairs Department, 1970), 55; Ruhollah Khomeini, ‘We shall confront the world with our ideology’; ‘Excerpts From Khomeini’s speeches’, Special to the New York Times, August 4, 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/04/world/excerpts-from-khomeini-speeches.html. The November 1979 occupation of the Grand Mosque by Juhayman Al Utaibi, the grandson of Ikhwan activists, further increased the questions surrounding the legitimacy of the Al Saud family. For a detailed account of the occupation of the Grand Mosque, see Paul Aarts and Carolien Roelants, Saudi Arabia – A Kingdom in Peril (London: Hurst&Company, 2015) 168 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 138 169 Ibid, 151 170 Author interview with official, Saudi embassy in Qatar, Doha (18 May 2016); Author interview with Majdi Al- Dhafiri, Kuwaiti ambassasor to Iran, Kuwait City (24 May 2016); Author interview with Sami Al-Faraj, President, Kuwait Centre for Strategic Studies, Kuwait City (24 May 2016); Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, ‘Iran is threatening the stability in the Middle East’, Financial Times, January 30, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/5254f36a-05a2-11e8-9e12-af73e8db3c71; Adel Bin Ahmed Al-Jubeir, ‘Can Iran Change?’ The New York Times, January 19, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/19/opinion/saudi-arabia- can-iran-change.html 171 Al-Jubeir, ‘Can Iran Change?’; Ben Hubbard, ‘Dialogue with Iran is impossible, Saudi Arabia’s Defence Minister Says’, The New York Times, May 2, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-iran-defense-minister.html 172 Chapter four outlines an analytical lens that highlights the importance of the domestic and the international in driving foreign policy decision-making in countries 173 Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East (London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 2013), 25-27 174 Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami (Oxon: Routledge, 2003), 202

49 it actually is: ‘For domestic audiences, radical language is more significant than what is actually carried out in practice.’175 For example, in 2014, Ali-Reza Zakani, an Iranian member of parliament boasted that Tehran controlled four Arabs capitals176 – a statement that was far from the truth but was repeated by all Gulf Arab outlets. Domestic politics in the Persian

Gulf region further exacerbated tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Another factor in the Gulf Arab-Iran rivalry is the opposing perspectives on how to guarantee regional security: Under the leadership of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Arab states have long believed in internationalising regional security, whereas the Islamic Republic wants to rid the region of foreign powers.177 After the 1979 revolution, the Islamic Republic’s driving principle became to safeguard the country from foreign interference, while ridding the region of it too. Today, this policy objective remains, with Iranian officials often blaming US presence in the region for much of the instability.178 Riyadh and its neighbours, however, believe in the opposite: maximising the number of foreign powers that have a stake in the security of the Persian Gulf region.179 Today, the Gulf Arabs are eager to diversify their security providers and build their self-sufficiency,180 but they know this will take time, and as a result continue to believe that a collective security system that excludes the United States

175 Professor Mahmood Sariolghalam quoted in Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami (Oxon: Routledge, 2003), 21 176 ‘Expanding Influence’, Gulf News, March 3, 2015, http://www.pressreader.com/uae/gulfnews/20150303/283729837737074/TextView 177 Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy; Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East (London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 2013), 59. For more on Iran’s foreign policy objectives, see Mohammad Javad Zarif, ‘What Iran Really Wants: Iranian Foreign Policy in the Rouhani Era’, Foreign Affairs (May/June 2014) 178 Author interviews with Iranian officials, Vienna, Geneva, Lausanne, New York, Berlin (2014-17), Ali Khamenei, ‘speech on Student’s Day’, Speech, Tehran, November 4, 2002, http://english.khamenei.ir/news/152/Leader-s-Speech-on-Students-Day, last accessed: December 17, 2017 179 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers and officials, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 180 Statement made at author roundtable with officials and academics, Qatar University, Doha (14 May 2016); Author interview with Sami Al-Faraj, President, Kuwait Centre for Strategic Studies, Kuwait City (24 May 2016)

50 is ‘out of the question’.181 Opposing visions of how to guarantee regional security inevitably further pit Iran and Saudi Arabia against each other.

As we have seen, following 2003 and the removal of Iraq as a threat, the multi-tiered rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia defined the region. The dichotomy persisted for over a decade, with Iran and Saudi Arabia playing out their rivalry in various arenas in the region, but never directly engaging in all-out war,182 and the smaller Gulf Arab states generally standing behind Saudi Arabia. But today, the landscape is changing. Differences within the

GCC states over foreign policy decisions, once only held behind closed doors, are becoming apparent as the smaller GCC states are becoming increasingly assertive in their foreign policy. The UAE has been at the forefront of this change. The next section will briefly examine the history of the UAE to provide context for the UAE’s growing assertiveness today.

2. The United Arab Emirates

The UAE exemplifies the broader shift that appears to be shaping the region. It is a case study in both its self-perception of growing strength and clout, and in the effect this change has had on its foreign policy in the region. The UAE displayed a desire for self-sufficiency early on, evident in its deployment in Kosovo for example.183 But in the years following the

181 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 75 182 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton Paperback, 2003), 340, 343 183 At the end of the nineties, the UAE sought to take on a more active international role to test its forces and kit. It contributed 1,200 troops, along with battle-tanks and armoured vehicles, to the NATO peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. It complimented this effort with aid and assistance, followed by commercial investments.

Arab Spring, the nature and pace of its assertiveness changed. Abu Dhabi significantly increased its political and diplomatic activities in the region and beyond, and pursued the defence of its interests unilaterally – something it was not accustomed to doing - or with regional allies in a more active manner. The purpose of this section is not to offer a comprehensive overview of the history of the UAE and the challenges the country faces today, but rather, to briefly outline the formation of the UAE and the impact this had on Abu

Dhabi’s thinking, as well as some of the country’s key concerns in the period preceding our period of study, providing the backdrop for this dissertation’s core analysis.

After the British announced their departure from the Persian Gulf, the emirates that would form the UAE had a particularly difficult time as their leaders were embroiled in lengthy and complicated negotiations over the formation of the country and its institutions.184

Throughout the seventies, difficulties emerged because of opposing interests, disputes over borders and islands, perceptions of how the country should be run and the desire to prevent the central government from encroaching on the prerogatives of the ruling families and paving the way for the bigger emirates to have greater rights than the smaller ones.185 As a result, some of the ruling families did not buy into the idea of creating a federation.186 It was only once the external security threats became significant and coincided with the looming deadline of the British withdrawal that the ‘vulnerability of the single emirates became clear

In May 2000, the General Commander of NATO troops in Europe hailed the UAE’s involvement and declared the intervention a success. 184 For more on the formation of the UAE, see Christopher M. Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (Hurst & Company: London, 2012), 11-37; Christopher M. Davidson, ‘The United Arab Emirates’, in Christopher Davidson Ed, Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf monarchies (London: Hurst & Company, 2011); Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates – Power, Politics, and Policymaking (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017), 17-60 185 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 13-15 186 Ibid, 17

52 even to their rulers and a somewhat uneasy union could be forced on seven of the nine protected states’.187 But internal threats to the legitimacy of the Union and its leadership emerged with an attempted coup in Sharjah a year later in 1972. The internal political wrangling continued in the first two decades of the UAE’s existence,188 affecting the way the country’s leadership viewed its hold on power for years to come.

The UAE’s international context was key to its formation and the first few years of its existence. Abu Dhabi found itself at odds with some of its Arab neighbours, including Saudi

Arabia and Qatar, over claims to land.189 In fact, Riyadh refused to recognise the UAE until

1974, after Abu Dhabi forfeited the disputed territories of Khor Al Udaid, Khor Duwayham and Huwayat to Saudi Arabia.190 This contributed to Abu Dhabi’s wariness of Saudi hegemony, laying the foundations for the desire to become self-sufficient, and contributed to the lack of real integration among the GCC.191 In the midst of all this, the UAE also felt vulnerable to Iran’s hegemonic ambitions.192 On 30 November 1971, as soon as the British left the region, the Shah of Iran sent Iranian troops to the lesser and greater Tunbs, and the

Abu Musa islands, firmly establishing the perception that Iran was a real and long-standing threat to the country.193 But this did not prevent both countries from working together when needed, according to Christin Marschall,

187 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 17 188 ‘Emirates Act To End Coup Crisis’, Chicago Tribune, June 19, 1987, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1987- 06-19/news/8702150353_1_ras-al-khaimah-al-qassimi-uae 189 F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 25 190 Christopher M. Davidson, Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success (London: Hurst & Company, 2008), 276 191 Ibid, 275; Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf, 77, 81 192 See Abbas Milani, The Shah (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2012), 327 193 See for example, US Embassy in the UAE, ‘MBZ Hosts Gulf Security Dinner with Isa Asd Vershbow And PM A/S Shapiro’, Wikileaks Cable, July 23, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUDHABI746_a.html

In general, both Iran and the Gulf states kept the islands issue apart from their

political and economic relations. Whenever problems occurred in these fields, Abu

Musa and the Tunbs were played up rhetorically. Likewise, there seems to have been

more willingness to solve the dispute whenever the relationship was smooth. The

dispute, however, did not have any direct bearing on general relations.194

Throughout the eighties and nineties, Iran and the tensions with Saudi Arabia were the

UAE’s main foreign policy concerns. According to Davidson, the regional context also determined the process of state formation because the Al Nahyan family – the ruling family of Abu Dhabi and the dominant clan of the Bani Yas tribal grouping - were the only ones who were able to stand up to the new federation’s regional foes, strengthening their position internally.195

While the UAE faced a number of foreign threats, it was also grappling with domestic issues related to state formation and the building of institutions.196 The looseness of the federation has been an enduring problem for the UAE, which, along with the different rates of economic growth in each emirate, led to inequalities within the country.197 The UAE is also a rentier state based on the distribution of wealth, which means that as a wealthier country with smaller indigenous population, it has a stronger bargain.198 Challenges to this ruling

194 Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami (Oxon: Routledge, 2003), 134 195 Christopher M. Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (Hurst & Company: London, 2012), 21 196 This will also be examined in chapter four 197 Christopher M. Davidson, ‘Government in the United Arab Emirates: Progress and Pathologies’, in Abbas Kadhim, Governance in the Middle East: A Handbook (London/New York: Routledge, 2013), 281-283 198 Ibid, 276

54 bargain have been numerous over the years, ranging from the problem of an increase in numbers of expats in the country, fostering a sense of being strangers in their own countries for Gulf nationals,199 the increasing difficulty for nationals of reaching their ruling Sheikhs - a cornerstone of the Bedouin political culture,200 and the dramatic decline in the price of oil, giving the Gulf monarchies less disposable income.201 As a result, a quest for economic diversification emerged.202 This initially meant relying on energy-reliant, export oriented industries like petrochemicals, metals, fertilisers and plastics.203 But the emirates that were not resource rich - Dubai being a notable example - focused instead on infrastructure and attracting foreign investment.204 Davidson described the UAE as ‘presided over by a hybrid polity made up of seemingly modern governmental structures, which have been grafted onto traditional political structures that have undergone little or no evolution since the

UAE’s creation in 1971’.205 As a result, the UAE has emerged as a hybrid country: politically stagnant domestically, but economically vibrant. The process of state formation was slow and painful, and many were unsure the country would endure. In 2009, Sheikh Zayed’s long- time translator, Zaki Nusseibah said:

199 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates – Power, Politics, and Policymaking (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017), 175 200 Christopher M. Davidson, ‘The United Arab Emirates’, in Christopher Davidson Ed, Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf monarchies (London: Hurst & Company, 2011); 27, 28; Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates, 117 201 See Luay Al-Khatteeb, ‘Gulf oil economies must wake up or face decades of decline’, Middle East Economic Survey (14 August 2015); Yoel Guzansky and Nizan Feldman, ‘Plunging Oil Prices: The Challenge for the Gulf Oil Economies’, INSS Insight, No. 675 (22 March 2015), http://www.inss.org.il/publication/plunging-oil-prices-the- challenge-for-the-gulf-oil-economies/; F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 33 202 Christopher M. Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (Hurst & Company: London, 2012), 44 203 Ibid, 44 204 Christopher M. Davidson, Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success (London: Hurst & Company, 2008), 102, 106 205 Christopher M. Davidson, ‘Government in the United Arab Emirates: Progress and Pathologies’, in Abbas Kadhim, Governance in the Middle East: A Handbook (London/New York: Routledge, 2013), 275

There was a lot of skepticism about whether this place would survive. All the

journalists I took around then, the editors, the visiting dignitaries – they all looked at

the Emirates and said it would not survive…They thought that the individual

emirates would be absorbed by their bigger neighbors. You must remember, we had

revolutions all around us – there was Communism and Marxism, and simply bigger

neighbors like Iran and Saudi Arabia.206

The domestic difficulties meant that it was not surprising that at first, the UAE was conservative in its policymaking. According to Peter Salisbury, ‘For much of its first few decades as a nation state, the UAE operated a conservative foreign and national security policy that was largely predicated on ensuring survival in the face of internal and external threats to the fragile unity and territorial integrity of the federation’.207 During these years, and in the aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the UAE’s leadership reconciled itself with its vulnerability as a small power sandwiched between Iran and Saudi Arabia.208 It is in this context, and with the added challenge of not being an overly tightly knit federation, that Abu Dhabi devised a few guiding principles for its foreign policy. Under its first ruler,

Sheikh Zayed (Bin Sultan Al Nahyan), the founder of the UAE and its first president, the country’s foreign policy was largely ‘idealistic’ and ‘Arab world-centered’,209 with limited

206 Jonathan Shainin, ‘Zaki Nusseibeh: Before and After’, Bidoun Interviews, Issue 18, 2009, https://www.bidoun.org/articles/zayed-zaki-nusseibeh 207 Peter Salisbury, ‘Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy’, Chatham House Research Paper (July 2020), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-07-01-risk-in-uae- salisbury.pdf, 3 208 Christopher M. Davidson, ‘The United Arab Emirates’, in Christopher Davidson Ed, Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf monarchies (London: Hurst & Company, 2011), 25; Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 15 209 Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, ‘New assertiveness in UAE foreign policy’, Gulf News, October 9, 2012, https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/new-assertiveness-in-uae-foreign-policy-1.1086667

56 objectives. But Sheikh Zayed’s son, Mohammed Bin Zayed, also became increasingly prominent throughout the nineties and he had more ambitious goals for his country.210 He aimed to make the UAE as self-sufficient as possible while ensuring that foreign powers had a stake in its security; boost its international and regional influence in the defence of its political and economic interests; and develop lasting relations with friendly powers, especially Saudi Arabia, 211 while containing threats, predominantly Iran212 and Islamism.213

These goals continue today, as does the emphasis on self-sufficiency, both of which contributed to the development of the UAE’s growing assertiveness following 2011.

Conclusion

Clearly, differences within the GCC states on foreign policy are nothing new, but the increasingly public nature of these internal conflicts are.214 They indicate a more overt willingness on the part of some of the smaller Gulf Arab states to pursue their interests and goals even when these do not coincide with those of their allies or their de facto ‘leader’,

Saudi Arabia. We appear to be witnessing a growth in assertiveness in the foreign policy of the UAE in particular. This dissertation focuses on the growing assertiveness in the UAE’s

210 This will be examined in chapter four 211 Hussein Lbish, ‘The UAE’s Evolving National Security Strategy’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington Report (6 April 2017), https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/UAE-Security_ONLINE.pdf, 6 212 Ibid, 4-6; see also several Wikileaks Cables describing the UAE’s fears of Iran, including US Embassy in the UAE, ‘Strong Words in Private from MBZ at IDEX – Bashes Iran, Qatar, Russia,’ Wikileaks Cable, February 25, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUDHABI193_a.html; US Embassy in the UAE, ‘Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Warns DOE DepSec Poneman About Iran,’ Wikileaks Cable, December 17, 2009, https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL0912/S00001/cablegate-abu-dhabi-crown-prince-warns-doe-depsec- poneman-about-iran.htm; US Embassy in the UAE, ‘US-UAE Cooperation Against Taliban Finance Continues,’ Wikileaks Cable, January 24, 2010, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10ABUDHABI27_a.html 213 David B. Roberts, ‘Bucking the Trend: The UAE and the Development of Military Capabilities in the Arab World’, Security Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2020), 323 214 The catalysts establishing and intensifying these changes – the 2011 Arab Spring, the US Pivot to Asia and the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran – are introduced in chapter four. The effect they have on the UAE and the smaller Gulf Arab states are developed further in chapters five, six, and seven

57 foreign policy and how the regional and international context in particular made this assertiveness possible and sped the trend up. The next chapter will articulate this idea of assertiveness more clearly, providing a definition and several indicators that can be used to establish its existence. Through the examination of each indicator for the case of the UAE, we will evidence the growing assertiveness in its foreign policy. The dissertation will then delve deeper into the regional context that made it possible for the UAE to develop and speed up this assertiveness.

Chapter 2: Assertiveness and its indicators

This dissertation contends that since the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, differences in opinions and goals among the Gulf Arab countries have grown significantly and become more visible in the domain of foreign policy. Such differences are nothing new, but the increasingly public nature of these internal conflicts represent a significant break with past practice. They indicate a more overt willingness on the part of some of the smaller Gulf Arab states to pursue their interests and goals, even when these do not coincide with those of their allies or their de facto ‘leader’, Saudi Arabia. These traditionally compliant states have become bolder in their exchanges within the GCC and with Riyadh. As such, the regional duality that has held sway in the Persian Gulf region since 2003 appears to be challenged by a growing assertiveness on the part of the smaller Gulf Arab states, with the UAE providing the clearest example of this development. The UAE has become increasingly assertive politically, diplomatically, economically, and militarily, not hesitating to pursue its interests in the region, even if they are at odds with its allies and partners. It has developed its capabilities, deployed these increasing capabilities in the pursuit of its goals, and judged that its deployments - both military and non-military - have been successful, a perception that reinforces its more assertive stance.

Clearly, this regional shift has far-reaching implications and needs to be comprehensively understood. Before assessing the drivers of this regional change, however, it is first necessary to understand what assertiveness means in this context and how it can be identified and evidenced in a state’s foreign policy. With this in mind, this chapter will begin by examining and providing a definition for the concept of assertiveness. Building on this,

59 the chapter will then set out and discuss three indicators of assertiveness: 1) greater capabilities – military, diplomatic, economic and political; 2) the state’s willingness to use those capabilities in pursuit of its objectives, even if they diverge from the interests of allies; and 3) the perceived ‘success’ of their use as part of a coherent strategic approach. Taken together, these provide a structured and rigorous means to identify and evidence a generally more assertive foreign policy.

1. Defining assertiveness

For the purposes of this dissertation, assertiveness refers to the increasingly bold foreign policy decisions made by a country, and a demonstrable willingness to involve itself more forcefully in various international arenas in the pursuit of its own interests, even when this does not align with the interests of its friends and allies. At first sight, this definition might seem straightforward. Yet the concept of assertiveness has been the subject of considerable debate in the literature on international relations with little consensus on the definition and no prominent theory that ‘employs a typology of state behaviour that includes “assertive” as a category’.215 In his work, Kevin Narizny, defines assertiveness as a ‘level of activity in a state’s foreign policy’, adding that

It represents the state’s willingness to pay the costs, whatever they may be, of

following a particular strategy. States rarely devote all of their available resources to

the pursuit of their international objectives; instead, they make an expected utility

215 Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?’ International Security, Vol.37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), 10

calculation about what level of investment will produce the most profitable

returns.216

This definition implies the decision is always part of a calculated, longer term strategy, but for the purposes of this dissertation, we will also include the decision to pursue a more forceful policy that is the result of a sudden opportunity. This is because while the decision to become more assertive might form part of a larger strategy, the opportunity to act as such, is often sporadic and unplanned. The perceived change in Chinese behaviour following

2010, when Beijing was seen as acting more assertively in its foreign policy, and especially in the South China Sea, also led to a series of definitions and explanations of what assertiveness meant.217 In his essay on debunking the myth of China’s ‘new’ assertiveness,

Alastair Iain Johnston states that ‘Some scholars use assertive to refer to a constructive activism in international life. Others use it to describe imperialistic, nationalistic, or anti- normative behavior’, and defines it himself as ‘a form of assertive diplomacy that explicitly threatens to impose costs on another actor that are clearly higher than before’.218 He states that China’s perceived assertiveness, especially since 2009, can in fact be viewed as regular

Chinese diplomatic behaviour.219 Johnston highlights a key analytical problem with assessing

216 Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2007), 11 217 See for example, John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, Issue 4 (Winter 2010), 381-396; Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Explaining Beijing’s Assertiveness’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 37, Issue 4 (2014), 133-150; Sarah Raine, ‘Beijing’s South China Sea Debate’, Survival, Vol. 53, Issue 5 (2011), 69-88; Michael Yahuda, ‘China’s New Assertiveness in the South China Sea’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 22, Issue 81 (2013), 446-459; Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?’ International Security, Vol.37, No. 4 (Spring 2013); Dinding Chen and Xiaoyu Pu, ‘Correspondence: Debating China’s Assertiveness’, International Security, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Winter 2013/14); Mingjiang Li, ‘Reconciling Assertiveness and Cooperation? China’s Changing Approach to the South China Sea Dispute’, Security Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Winter 2010), 49-68; Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘The United States and Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea’, Security Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Winter 2010), 69-84 218 Johnston, ‘How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?’, 9-10 219 Ibid, 11-12

61 assertiveness: ‘A common problem in the new assertiveness analyses is that they consider only confirming evidence while ignoring disconfirming examples. The risk here is exaggerating change and discounting continuity’.220 In the case of China, for example, he highlighted that analysts and the media, ‘tended to miss a great deal of ongoing cooperative interaction between the United States and China throughout 2010’.221 While it is key to be aware of this potential pitfall of examining assertiveness in a state, including in the Persian

Gulf, this is a narrow definition of assertiveness. Dinding Chen and Xiaoyu Pu make this point in their response to Johnston’s essay, stating that ‘this definition omits the possibility that assertiveness also has a positive connotation’ and should ‘be viewed in a broader sense’ that is not just tied to aggression.222 Rather, these authors expand the definition into three ‘types’ of assertiveness, although these are only discussed in the context of great powers: offensive, defensive and constructive. Offensive assertiveness is ‘a great power’s use of coercion to expand its interest and influence without provocation from other countries’. Defensive assertiveness is when ‘a great power’s capability and willingness to defend its current interests are growing, yet it seeks only to defend—not expand—those interests’, while constructive assertiveness refers to a state that ‘assumes a leadership role to solve regional and global problems’.223 While the three types of assertiveness outlined by

Chen and Pu are discussed in relation to great powers, it is possible to apply them to smaller powers too, but generally, on a regional rather than global stage, as they seek to change the regional balance of power in their favour. Assertiveness also encompasses a desire to

220 Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?’ International Security, Vol.37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), 32 221 Ibid, 32 222 Dinding Chen and Xiaoyu Pu, ‘Correspondence: Debating China’s Assertiveness’, International Security, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Winter 2013/14), 176-177 223 Ibid, 177

62 become increasingly self-sufficient, enabling the state to wean itself off its international partners. It is not required to adopt a more assertive foreign policy posture, but greater self- sufficiency can translate to greater freedom to pursue a state’s own interests. This will be examined further below.

1.1 Self-sufficiency

Self-sufficiency provides the state with the means to pursue greater assertiveness in its foreign policy. Self-sufficiency has been discussed in various contexts in the literature on international relations.224 Across all, a common theme arises; self-sufficiency is equated with having the means – economic, intellectual, military, policy – and the freedom to use these autonomously to secure national interests and pursue desired policy objectives. An important variable here is the extent to which these means can be generated indigenously, or at the least, not heavily dependent on external support. In his work, Richard Dien

Winfield outlines the constraints that international relations poses on states and individuals, and argues that these constraints can only be ignored when a state is self-sufficient enough that it is ‘impervious to external threat and without need of any foreign ties’.225 Indeed, self- sufficiency is often explicitly associated with security and defence. Writing in the 1930s, for example, Walter Lippman argued that ‘the fear of military encirclement and naval blockade’ was a key factor shaping state-level desire for self-sufficiency.226 Similarly, Leo Grebler,

224 See for example, Richard Dien Winfield, Freedom and Modernity (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991); Louiza Odysseous, The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations (Minnesota, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2007); Leo Grebler, ‘Self-Sufficiency and Imperialism’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 198, Present International Tensions (July 1938) 225 Winfield, Freedom and Modernity, 283 226 Walter Lippmann, ‘Self-Sufficiency’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 2 (January 1934), 207

63 writing in the lead-up to World War II, associated self-sufficiency with the concept of freedom and the ability to defend oneself.227 Writing more recently, Louiza Odysseous argues that self-sufficiency is ‘usually bound up in the notion of autonomy’, which largely

‘has to do with freedom’.228 To achieve self-sufficiency, however, requires action on several levels. Grebler said it requires ‘mobilization not only of military forces, but of all human and economic resources of a country’. 229 He went on to state that the experience of WWI made it clear that ‘economic self-sufficiency as a prerequisite to military security cannot be improvised: it needs foresight and long-term preparation’.230

Self-sufficiency is thus regarded as a holistic and carefully planned effort to equip a state with the necessary means to determine its own fate in so far as is possible, which is what a state’s pursuit of assertiveness also aims to achieve. Winfield notes that ‘History amply confirms…how rare a luxury is indifference to territorial rights and foreign affairs’.231 It is perhaps not surprising, then, that self-sufficiency is an objective for many states: It allows increased freedom in decision-making and reduces reliance on others, thereby allowing a state to also pursue a more assertive foreign policy. Importantly, while technically, a state can be assertive without being self-sufficient, this would come with an unacceptably high level of risk because the state in question would ultimately be bound by its reliance on other states, which would limit the duration, the means and commitment it has to its assertive policy-making. As a result, a commitment to, and some success in attaining self-sufficiency is

227 Leo Grebler, ‘Self-Sufficiency and Imperialism’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 198, Present International Tensions (July 1938) 228 Louiza Odysseous, The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations (Minnesota, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 31 229 Grebler, ‘Self-Sufficiency and Imperialism’, 3 230 Ibid, 3 231 Richard Dien Winfield, Freedom and Modernity (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991), 283

64 necessary in a state’s assertiveness, because self-sufficiency frees the state of constraints imposed by its reliance on other partners.

2. Indicators of assertiveness

Having set out a definition of assertiveness, it is now necessary to consider how assertiveness can be identified in terms of a state’s behaviour and foreign policy actions.

This will allow us to evidence assertiveness and begin to explore why this change is taking place in the Persian Gulf. Drawing on a diverse body of literature, the following pages set out and discuss three indicators of assertiveness: 1) A focused and sustained effort to grow and develop military, political/diplomatic, cultural and economic capabilities; 2)

Demonstrable intentions to deploy these growing capabilities in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives that reflect national interests, even at the expense of allies and neighbours; and

3) The success of any deployments, as perceived by the state, since change can only gain real momentum and become entrenched if the countries enacting it become confident that the more assertive pursuit of their interests and goals is working. This dissertation argues that the combination of these three factors provides evidence of a state’s assertiveness.

2.1 Growing capabilities

In order to understand whether a small power displays greater assertiveness, it is imperative to consider the country’s capabilities – traditionally viewed as an indicator of strength for a state. For no country can be assertive if it does not have the means to do so.

In Ikenberry, Mastanduno and Wohlforth’s study on unipolarity - different to the subject of

65 this dissertation, which deals with smaller countries that are becoming increasingly assertive in their foreign policy-making, but relevant nonetheless – the authors refer to the importance of capabilities in defining a strong or ‘unipolar’ state, which is a state that,

(a) commands an especially large share of the resources or capabilities states can use

to achieve their ends, and (b) excels in all the component elements of state

capability, conventionally defined as size of population and territory, resource

endowment, economic capacity, military might, and organizational-institutional

“competence”.232

In his study on great powers, John Mearsheimer states that ‘power is based on the particular material capabilities that a state possesses’.233 Kenneth Waltz also put capabilities at the heart of his work, stating that power is dependent on capabilities such as the ‘size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence’.234 Simply put, a state’s capabilities determine its strength and influence because they provide it with the means to pursue national objectives. Jervis notes that, ‘increasing capabilities make it possible to pursue a whole host of objectives that were out of reach when the state’s security was in doubt and all efforts had to be directed at achieving primary objectives’.235 While this statement is in reference to a hegemon, the point remains valid for smaller states. In other words, amassing greater

232 G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, ‘Introduction’ in G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth Eds, International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 5 233 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 55 234 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1979), 113 235 Robert Jervis, ‘Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective’, in Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth Eds, International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity

66 capabilities offers the state the ability to pursue a more active and assertive policy in the pursuit of its own objectives. As such, capabilities form the first indicator of a move towards greater assertiveness.

For Ikenberry, Mastanduno and Wohlforth, the main measures of a state’s capabilities are its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and its military capabilities236 - both of which are included in this dissertation’s first indicators. But this is a limited definition because it does not include other, more subtle forms of capability. Jervis expands on the definition of capabilities presented by the previous authors, and includes ‘other forms of capability, often summarized under the heading of “soft power”’.237 Indeed, soft power has the effect of a force multiplier of sorts: ‘Soft power matters but by itself cannot establish or alter the international hierarchy…Intellectual and cultural strength can feed economic growth and perhaps bolster the confidence required for a state to play a leading role on the world stage…’. This dissertation will consider all the types of capabilities outlined above in the analytical framework because combined, these provide a better picture of what the country under scrutiny achieved. Indeed, examining just the UAE’s growing economic and military might would miss a significant portion of its international influence, which is tied to its image and the money it spends abroad to lobby for its causes and objectives. Ignoring this would thus place important constraints on our understanding. The next section will enumerate the different types of capabilities this dissertation will consider as part of the effort to establish the existence of assertiveness in a state’s foreign policy.

236 G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, ‘Introduction’ in G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth Eds, International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 7 237 Robert Jervis, ‘Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective’, in Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth Eds, International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity 256

2.1.1 Military capabilities

The first type of capability that the framework will assess is military capabilities. The academic literature on power is dominated by realist thinking that focuses on military capabilities as the means to a state’s power and influence. Mearsheimer believes that power is based on ‘tangible assets’, which in turn determine a country’s ‘military strength’.238 Peter Paret states that ‘military power expresses and implements the power of the state in a variety of ways within and beyond the state borders, and is also one of the instruments with which political power is originally created and made permanent’.239 Robert

Art explains that military force is ‘central to statecraft’, even if it is not in use.240 In their study on military capabilities, and also drawing on Paret’s definition, Tellis, Bially, Layne, and

McPherson go further and outline that the output of military capability is a state’s ability ‘to successfully prosecute a variety of operations against a country’s adversaries’.241

This dissertation defines increasing military capability as the qualitative and quantitative increase of military supplies and equipment, including weapons platforms, and supplies such as transport equipment. A qualitative increase in military capabilities refers to the modernisation of equipment, as well as increasing self-sufficiency in developing more advanced military equipment.242 Looking at military capabilities allows us to gauge a country’s foreign policy ambitions. For example, in the 2000s, despite significant

238 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton Paperback, 2003), 55 239 Peter Paret, ‘Military Power,’ The Journal of Military History, Vol. 53, No. 3 (July 1989), 24 240 Robert J. Art, ‘American foreign policy and the fungibility of force’, Security Studies, Vol. 5, Issue 4 (1996), 10 241 Ashley J. Tellis, Janice Bially, Christopher Layne, Melissa McPherson, Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2000), 133 242 Some believe effectiveness is part of military capability, but we will not look at it here. Rather, this element feeds into the third indicator: The perception of success

68 constraints,243 Japan sought to increase its political and security role in the region through the build-up of its military capability, 244 including through the transformation of the Japan

Coast Guard, which is now ‘“indistinguishable” from neighbouring navies’ according to US ambassador John Bolton.245 Indeed, the legal, political and normative constraints on the expansion of the self-defence forces meant that Japan was willing to risk punishment to grow its capabilities. As a result, the successful growth of Japan’s military capabilities under such conditions revealed a great deal about the change that was underway within Japanese politics and society. But military capabilities are only one facet of the increase in capabilities that can speak to a state’s assertiveness – other capabilities will be examined in the next section.

2.1.2 Other capabilities

In the academic literature, capabilities beyond those associated with military power are usually examined through the prism of ‘soft power’. As established above, Jervis included

‘soft power’ as ‘other forms of capability’,246 and outlines that at times, image and reputation are far more powerful than just military capability.247 In 1990, Joseph Nye used the term ‘soft power’ when discussing the decline of American power,248 and added,

243 This refers to article 9 of the US-imposed constitution, which limits Japan’s ability to build up an army. See The Constitution of Japan, (3 November 1946), https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html 244 Richard J. Samuels, ‘"New Fighting Power!" Japan's Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security’, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/2008), 84-112 245 Ibid, 111 246 Robert Jervis, ‘Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective’, in G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth Eds, International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 256 247 Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 6 248 For more on defining soft power, see for example, Matthew Kroenig, Melissa McAdam and Steven Weber, ‘Taking Soft Power Seriously’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 29, Issue 5 (2010), 412-431; Steven B. Rothman,

The definition of power is losing its emphases on military force and conquest that

marked earlier years. The factors of technology, education, and economic growth are

becoming more significant in international power, while geography, population, and

raw materials are becoming somewhat less important.249

He attributes the change in the nature of power to five ‘trends’: ‘Economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, and changing political issues’, which include the information war.250 As a result, convincing other states to want what the leading state has, depends on ‘intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions’.251 Almost fifteen years later, Nye further expanded on his definition of soft power, defining it as ‘the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and policies’, but also values.252 In his study on soft power, Giulio M. Gallarotti outlines that that the realist definition of power no longer captures the concept adequately, and that it can only remain relevant by combining it with the concept of soft power, which cultivates compliance ‘through a variety of policies, qualities, and actions that endear nations to other nations – more indirect and non‐coercive

‘Revising the soft power concept: what are the means and mechanisms of soft power?’, Journal of Political Power, Vol. 4, Issue 1 (2011), 49-64; David W. Kearn, ‘The hard truths about soft power’, Journal of Political Power, Vol. 4, Issue 1, (2011), 65-85; Ien Ang, Yudhishthir Raj Isar and Phillip Mar, ‘Cultural diplomacy: beyond the national interest?’, International Journal of Cultural Policy, Vol. 21, Issue 4, (2015), 365-381; Joseph S. Nye, ‘Power and foreign policy’, Journal of Political Power, Vol. 4, Issue 1 (2011), 9-24 249 Joseph S Nye, ‘Soft Power’, Foreign Policy, No. 80, Twentieth Anniversary (Autumn 1990), 154 250 Ibid, 160, 165 251 Ibid, 167 252 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), x, 15

70 methods’.253 It is therefore no longer possible to examine military capabilities alone to determine a state’s influence.

The understanding of capabilities presented here includes an assessment of the change in other capabilities, as well as traditional military capabilities. Examining these other capabilities is important because smaller states that are assertive are loath to resort to military power, but still want to be able to shape other international actors’ preferences and actions.254 The build-up of capabilities is only one side of the coin: A country’s intention and willingness to use these growing capabilities is an indicator of its growing assertiveness. The next section will examine the importance of intent in gauging assertiveness for a state.

2.2. Intent

While capabilities alone provide material strength and are useful to bolster a state’s confidence, they are inadequate if the country in question is not willing to use them. But determining a state’s political intentions is no easy task because it is by definition a murky element to assess.255 It could also be argued that in many situations, it is in a state’s interest to hide its intentions. There are, however, signposts that can provide some insight into the intentions of states. The main one of relevance here is the state’s apparent willingness to draw on its capabilities in the pursuit of its interests.

253 Giulio M. Gallarotti, ‘Soft Power: What it is, Why it’s Important, and the Conditions for its Effective Use’, Journal of Political Power, Vol. 4, Issue 1 (2011), 27 254 See Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004) 255 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton Paperback, 2003), 31

There is no commonly accepted definition of intentions. David Edelstein focuses on state ambition as the definition of intention, stating, ‘how it is likely to achieve those ambitions and the costs it will bear to realize those goals’.256 He adds that it is key for a government to gauge an adversary’s intentions because this will enable it to make better policy to address the threat posed by the adversary. As such, a ‘confident’ assessment of another state’s intentions is desirable, because a state

can distinguish states with malign intentions from states with benign intentions can

focus its military resources on those countries that have the capability and the desire

to harm it and can engage in mutually beneficial cooperation with those states with

benign intentions even if they have significant capabilities.257

In his article on great power intentions, Sebastian Rosato summarises another definition of intention put forth by the literature, which chooses to focus on a state’s ‘interests, motives, and preferences’.258 But he believes this to be too broad, defining it instead as ‘the actions that a state plans to take under certain circumstances’, with three distinct characteristics: intentions are ‘attitudes about an action’, they are state-level and they can change.259

Keren Yarhi-Milo defines intent as ‘beliefs about the foreign policy plans of the adversary with regard to the status quo’. He divides assessment of intentions into ‘expansionist, opportunistic or status quo’, stating that

256 David M. Edelstein, ‘Managing uncertainty: Beliefs about intentions and the rise of great powers’, Security Studies, Vol. 12, Issue 1 (2002), 3 257 Ibid, 4 258 Sebastian Rosato, ‘The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers’, International Security, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Winter 2014/15), 52 259 Ibid, 52-53

Expansionist adversaries exhibit strong determination to expand their power and

influence beyond their territorial boundaries. Opportunistic states desire a favorable

change in the distribution of power with either a limited or an unlimited

geographical scope, but do not actively seek change. (…) Status quo powers want

only to maintain their relative power position. 260

Despite the inherent uncertainty of intentions, it is important to try to uncover the intentions of a state though indicators that can provide for some insight into the direction of travel of a state. Yarhi-Milo outlines three types of indicators of intentions. First, he examines ‘noncapability-based actions’, such as ‘an adversary’s decision to withdraw from a foreign military intervention or join binding international organizations’.261 This prism is based on how costly it is for a state to implement a decision and what can be inferred from this cost: if an action is not costly, then it can be taken by anyone at any time, and therefore, ‘provides no credible information about the actor’s likely plans’.262 The second approach involves examining a state’s military capabilities as an indicator of its intentions.

This approach, ‘drawing on insights from realism as well as costly signalling’, would ‘reveal credible information about an adversary’s ability to engage in warfare and thus its intention to do so’.263 The third approach involves examining a state’s ‘strategic military doctrine, military training patterns, and strategic thought’ to determine its intentions.264 In this

260 Keren Yarhi-Milo, ‘In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries’, International Security, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Summer 2013), 7 261 Ibid, 8 262 Ibid, 78 263 Ibid, 8 264 Keren Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 5

73 dissertation, an increase in capabilities is its own indicator of assertiveness. A small state’s willingness to employ its growing capabilities in the pursuit of its interests is another clear indicator of its intention to be more assertive in its foreign policy. For a small power, an independent pursuit of its own foreign policy goals, even when these conflict with the objectives of its friends and allies, is a high-cost policy. As such, it can be regarded as a credible indicator of its intentions and will speak to the country’s view of and dedication to the policy change.

2.3 The Perception of Success

The chapter to this point has examined how an increase in capabilities, as well as increasing willingness to use these capabilities in the defence of a state’s interests are key to establishing the assertiveness of a state. But capability and intent, while significant because they enable small states to ‘contribute’ rather than just ‘endure’,265 are only part of the picture. The final indicator of assertiveness relates to how a state perceives the change in direction of its policy and whether it deems it to be a successful change or not.

Effectively determining the success of a policy is challenging. According to David Baldwin,

‘The literature on foreign policy evaluation is also characterized by analytical and conceptual anarchy. Analytical approaches and conceptual definitions abound’.266 But it is key because

‘knowledge about the likely utility of a technique of statecraft…is policy-relevant only

265 Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli, ‘Small States in the Gulf’, in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 2 266 David A. Baldwin, ‘Success and Failure in Foreign Policy’, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 3 (June 2000), 169

74 insofar as it is helpful in deciding whether or not to use one technique rather than another’

– a decision that the leadership of states must make daily.267 In his study on public services,

George Boyne defines policy success as a dynamic process with multiple inputs, that must consider the objectives of the service or organisation in question and also depends on how the service is viewed by stakeholders.268 Baldwin agrees, qualifying success as

‘multidimensional’, and lays out some of those dimensions.269 First, he says that ‘since

(most) foreign policy is goal-oriented, evaluating effectiveness in accomplishing goals’ is key, but it is also difficult, especially when a policy has multiple goals that are of varying degrees of importance.270 Baldwin’s other dimensions include the cost of the policy to the state implementing it, the cost of non-compliance imposed on the target, the stakes for the user – the importance of the policy goal, and the stakes for the target: ‘The more the target has at stake, the more difficult the undertaking is likely to be’.271 Scholars David Marsh and Allan

McConnell draw on the dynamism that Boyne prioritises to establish a similar framework to

Baldwin for evaluating policy success.272 They believe that three elements should be examined: ‘Process’, which refers to the stages of policy-making in which issues emerge and are framed, options are explored, interests are consulted and decisions made’;

‘programmatic’ success – ‘if a policy is implemented according to objectives laid down when it was approved’; and ‘political’ success – ‘from the perspective of government and the governing party, a policy may be successful if it assists their electoral prospects, reputation

267 David A. Baldwin, ‘Success and Failure in Foreign Policy’, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 3 (June 2000), 170 268 George A. Boyne, ‘What is Public Service Improvement?’, Public Administration, Vol. 81, Issue 2 (June 2003), 211-227 269 Baldwin, ‘Success and Failure in Foreign Policy’, 172 270 Ibid, 173 271 Ibid, 176 272 David Marsh and Allan McConnell, ‘Towards a Framework for Establishing Policy Success’, Public Administration, Vol. 88, No. 2 (2010), 564-583

75 or overall governance project’.273 Ultimately, however, it is the leadership of the country’s assessment regarding the success of its policy that will determine whether the country will continue on its chosen assertive path. This is why the third indicator considers the state’s perspective of the success of the policy it is deploying, rather than seeking to form or draw upon a more objective, external assessment of success.

Indeed, the implementing state’s assessment of the success of its policy is likely to be different from a third-party assessment of that policy. The field of psychology has studied the effect of perception on human behaviour at length. In his study on self-efficacy, Albert

Bandura explains that,

Self-efficacy judgments, whether accurate or faulty, influence choice of activities and

environmental settings… Judgments of self-efficacy also determine how much effort

people will expend and how long they will persist in the face of obstacles or aversive

experiences.274

In other words, an individual’s perception of the outcome of a behaviour, and the confidence in their ability to perform determines the continuation of that behaviour. This assessment can reasonably be transferred to state level behaviour because the state is governed by individuals who conduct this type of self-assessment. As a result, if a state deems that the policy it is pursuing is not ‘successful’ because it does not attain its

273 David Marsh and Allan McConnell, ‘Towards a Framework for Establishing Policy Success’, Public Administration, Vol. 88, No. 2 (2010), 570-575 274 Albert Bandura, ‘Self-Efficacy Mechanism in Human Agency’, American Psychologist, Vol. 37, No. 2 (February 1982), 123

76 objectives, or has too high a cost for the implementing state according to Baldwin’s dimensions of success, then it is unlikely to continue implementing it. For the state to continue on its policy of greater assertiveness, it must regard the use of its capabilities as acceptable, and even successful in achieving their objectives. Naturally, if every deployment of political or military capability were unsuccessful in securing a state’s interests in the eyes of that state, it would not contribute to a growing confidence in its influence and might. It might even lead to a sense of restraint, with the state in question taking time to reassess and address obstacles to the effective deployment of its capabilities in the pursuit of its interests. According to Mehran Kamrava, this was felt by Qatar:

During the course of the Arab Spring, Qatar moved away from being a mediator to

becoming a more active supporter of change in the Middle East region, deeply

involving itself in what it assumed would be a new era first in Libya, then in Syria.

Gradually realizing that perhaps it had overreached, it slowly adapted and adopted a

more pragmatic foreign policy.275

In other words, Doha believed that its interventionist stance had begun to take its toll on its ability to achieve its foreign policy objectives and its reputation.276 Qatar changed tack when it realised that it could not sustain the assertiveness it had displayed in the region after the

Arab Spring. This demonstrates that if a state does not perceive its policy as successful and without costs, then it is likely to change track.

275 Mehran Kamrava, Qatar – Small State, Big Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013), xvii 276 Ibid, xvii

Conclusion

The indicators of assertiveness introduced in this chapter comprise three main parts: capabilities – both military and other, the intention to deploy those capabilities, and the perception of the success of their deployment by the state that implemented the policy.

Together, these three elements will help establish the trend of growing assertiveness that has taken shape within the UAE, and some of its small neighbours. Indeed, the UAE has put its increasing capabilities to use in various fora with particular voracity following 2011. Abu

Dhabi also perceived its policy as successful, which is why the trend continues today.

Drawing on these indicators, the next chapter will outline the establishment of this policy change, and why it is likely to last.

Chapter 3: The UAE’s growing assertiveness

The previous chapter set out three key indicators that can be help identify assertiveness in a state’s foreign policy: a concerted effort to increase capabilities – military and other, the state’s intention to use them and finally, the state’s perception of the success of their use.

Indeed, if the state in question judges that its approach is achieving its objectives and bodes well for the longer term, then it is arguably more likely to continue on the adopted track.

Having set out these indicators, this chapter will apply them to the UAE to evidence the change in behaviour. It will assess the UAE’s capabilities, examine its willingness to deploy those capabilities, and determine the UAE’s perception of the success of its greater assertiveness. The chapter will finish by examining the UAE’s contribution to the war in

Yemen and in Libya. While it will be difficult to offer a complete assessment of the UAE’s mission in both countries because the conflicts are ongoing - despite Abu Dhabi’s claims that it would withdraw most of its forces from Yemen in July 2019277 - it is vital to examine practical examples of Emirati assertiveness playing out in the region.

1. Growing capabilities

The first indicator of assertiveness is growing capabilities. The UAE devoted time and money to developing its capabilities prior to 2011, for example, developing a relationship with the

US after the First Gulf War that included US provision of hardware, training, dialogue, basing

277 Declan Walsh, David D. Kirkpatrick, ‘U.A.E Pulls Most Forces from Yemen in Blow to Saudi War Effort’, The New York Times, July 11, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/world/middleeast/yemen-emirates- saudi-war.html

79 and joint exercises.278 On the political/diplomatic and economic front, several economic setbacks related to the UAE’s image following the 9/11 attacks,279 helped Abu Dhabi realise how much refining its image could increase its influence, particularly among Western countries. Diplomatic efforts in the West were complemented by Emirati investment in areas ranging from real estate and sports teams, to aid to neighbouring countries;280 all of which was intended to generate influence through multiple channels. Crucially, however, these efforts were all quite limited when compared to the UAE’s endeavours following

2011. After the Arab Spring, the UAE’s strategy changed considerably: Abu Dhabi used economic diplomacy far more proactively to achieve the outcomes it wanted,281 and intensified public relations efforts to improve its image. Militarily, Abu Dhabi increased its demand for military equipment, diversified its suppliers significantly, and doubled-down on its efforts to develop an indigenous military-industrial complex.

1.1 Military capabilities

As previously established, military capabilities have long been considered to be among the principal means allowing a state to acquire power and influence.282 Prior to 2011, the UAE

278 Kenneth Katzman, ‘The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for US Policy’, Congressional Research Service Reports (2014), 12-13 279 See the DP World fiasco in 2006, ‘Bush says he will veto any bill to stop UAE port deal’, Fox News, February 22, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/2006/02/22/bush-says-will-veto-any-bill-to-stop-uae-port- deal.html; Stephen E. Flynn, ‘The DP World Controversy and the Ongoing Vulnerability of U.S. Seaports’, Testimony – Prepared Remarks, March 2, 2006, https://www.cfr.org/report/dp-world-controversy-and- ongoing-vulnerability-us-seaports-prepared-remarks; David E. Sanger, ‘Under Pressure, Dubai Company Drops Port Deal’, The New York Times, March 10, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/10/politics/under- pressure-dubai-company-drops-port-deal.html 280 Christopher M. Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (Hurst & Company: London, 2012), 81, 83 281 Emma Soubrier, ‘Evolving foreign and security policies: a comparative study of Qatar and the UAE’ in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 134 282 See chapter two

80 had already undertaken some efforts to develop its military capabilities. It participated in

US-led military operations internationally, including in Bosnia during and after the Bosnian war (1992-1995) and in 1992 in Somalia for example.283 These allowed Abu Dhabi to gain valuable experience on the ground while demonstrating that it could be a dependable and necessary ally to the US. But none of these deployments were conducted alone or in the pursuit of Abu Dhabi’s own objectives. The UAE had decided on the need for a national power projection capability in the mid-nineties. In its procurement, Abu Dhabi focused on air power,284 followed by anti-missile systems, and ground launched strike capabilities; suggesting that Iran was the main target. But Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al Rodhan judged that ‘in practice, the GCC has invested in what is little more than an expensive façade, and internal rivalries preclude the development of well-trained and integrated forces. This makes the UAE Air Force heavily dependent on the United States for any large- scale operation against Iran’.285 In addition, Washington’s continued insistence on interoperability and compatibility of systems, aiming to ensure the continued dependency of the UAE and its allies on the US and its military industrial complex,286 made it difficult for countries like the UAE to develop independent doctrine on the deployment of their military capabilities in the pursuit or defence of their own interests.

283 Kenneth Katzman, ‘The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for US Policy’, Congressional Research Service Reports (2017), 19 284 See for example, ‘UAE gets cruise missiles’, BBC news, November 26, 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/222553.stm; Julian Moxon, ‘UAE orders Mirage 2000-9s and goes ahead with upgrade work’, Flight Global (24 December 1997), https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/uae-orders-mirage-2000-9s-and-goes-ahead-with-upgrade- 30950/. It also purchased 80 F-16 Block 60 aircrafts (with a contract eventually signed in 2000) from the US for $6.4 billion. See ‘United Arab Emirates Signs Agreement for the Purchase of 80 Lockheed Martin F-16s’, Defense-aerospace.com, March 5, 2000, http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles- view/release/3/1775/uae-sign-contract-for-80-lockheed-f_16s-(mar.-6).html 285 Anthony H. Cordesman, Khalid R. Al Rodhan, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 299 286 Bilal Saab, ‘The Gulf Rising: Defense Industrialization in Saudi Arabia and the UAE’, The Atlantic Council – Brent Snowcroft Center on International Security Report (May 2014), 4

The situation changed significantly after the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011. The Gulf

Arab States significantly increased their imports of military capabilities. While the UAE had high levels of military imports since 2001, these increased by 63 percent in 2012-2016.287

According to a UAE-based analyst, in the aftermath of 2011, Abu Dhabi was intent on building a military capability that was qualitatively and technologically superior to others in the region, which would, along with the growth of its soft power, help the UAE project power in the region.288 The UAE’s military build-up seemed primarily geared towards showcasing strength,289 replicating key US military capabilities on a smaller scale, addressing the perceived Iranian threat, and contributing to the establishment of an indigenous military-industrial complex. But as the UAE increased its involvement in regional fora, the requirements of active combat operations also drove some of their purchases, as did

‘defence diplomacy’: investing large sums of money into the US military-industrial complex as a means to buy loyalty and support.290 Three clear trends emerged from the UAE’s greater assertiveness in the military capabilities sphere: the first was the general urgency with which UAE weapons procurements increased in the years following 2011, the second is

Abu Dhabi’s effort to diversify its sources of security and its military procurements following the growing perception of US disengagement from the region, and third, is the newfound desire to build its own military industrial complex.

287 Aude Fleurant, Pieter D. Wezeman, Siemon T. Wezeman, Nan Tian, ‘Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2016’, SIPRI Fact Sheet (February 2017), 11 288 Author interview with Riad Kahwaji, CEO, INEGMA, Dubai (13 November 2016) 289 Author interview with Andreas Krieg, Lecturer, School of Security Studies, King’s College London, London (8 October 2019); Andreas Krieg, ‘The Weaponization of Narratives Amid the Gulf Crisis’, in Andreas Krieg Ed, Divided Gulf: The Anatomy of a Crisis (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 96-97; Karen Young, The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates (London: Palgrave, 2014), 102–130 290 Author interview with Andreas Krieg, Lecturer, School of Security Studies, King’s College London, London (8 October 2019)

1.1.1 Increase in weapons purchases

Despite the UAE’s greater willingness to break with its allies and partners, the US continued to be a key security partner. According to SIPRI, the UAE was the US’ second largest client for weapons sales, at 7.4% of total US exports between 2013-2017.291 The perceived growth in the Iranian threat after 2011 led Abu Dhabi to focus its efforts on missile defence systems, space and air-based intelligence and reconnaissance platforms, which are essential to an effective targeting programme against Iranian missiles, and to project power in the region.292 In 2011, the UAE purchased two THAAD missile defence batteries from Lockheed

Martin to counter Iranian ballistic missiles,293 followed by an order of 12 more M142

HIMARS launchers and ATACMS from Lockheed Martin in 2015 – doubling their fleet,294 and an upgrade contract for the UAE’s existing F-16E/F combat aircraft – though details of the upgrade were not made public.295 Requirements of deployment to regional conflict areas have also led the UAE to purchase additional Patriot missiles as it waits for the US to agree

291 Peter D. Wezeman, Aude Fleurant, Alexndra Kuimova, Nan Tian and Siemon T. Wezeman, ‘Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2017’, SIPRI Fact Sheet (March 2018), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/fssipri_at2017_0.pdf, 2 292 Author interview with Riad Kahwaji, CEO, INEGMA, Dubai (13 November 2016) 293 Scott R. Gourley, ‘U.A.E. Becomes First International Customer for THAAD’, Defense Media Network, January 4, 2012, https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/u-a-e-becomes-first-international-customer- for-thaad/ 294 ‘Rockets and Reach: UAE Doubles Down on HIMARS, ATACMS’, Defense Industry Daily, October 2, 2014, https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/uae-orders-752m-worth-of-himars-launchers-rockets-02659/ 295 ‘UAE agrees $1.6 billion deal with Lockheed Martin to upgrade F-16 fighters’, Reuters, November 12, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-lockheed-airshow/uae-agrees-1-6-billion-deal-with-lockheed- martin-to-upgrade-f-16-fighters-idUSKBN1DC0JH

83 to the upgrade of the Patriot PAC-3 systems,296 as well as the Air Tractor and Archangel counter-insurgency aircraft.297

Along with greater procurement, the UAE also aimed to ensure that it could continue to benefit from the US’ security umbrella and superior technical, training and deployment expertise.298 While Abu Dhabi was fearful of a US withdrawal from the region, it also wanted to ensure that in so far as the US was interested in remaining a significant security partner, it could. This would enable it to continue to benefit from US provided security, assistance, training, and weapons, while it used the time to develop its capabilities through other means – either with other partners or indigenously. The UAE and the US established a Joint

Strategic Military Dialogue allowing military officials to meet regularly to improve integration between their armed forces and General Martin Dempsey chaired the first session in May 2014.299 The US continued to train Emirati armed forces through the US

Foreign Military Sales programme, through which the UAE buys its US-made weapons and military kit.300 Finally, the UAE continued to participate in international US-led military operations, though ‘some experts say the UAE has joined U.S.-led operations to further invest the United States in UAE security, to prepare its forces for potential combat, and to

296 Jen Judson, ‘Thanks to missile sales to UAE, US Army can buy 100 more advanced Patriot missiles’, Defense News, August 6, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/07/27/thanks-to-missile-sales-to-uae-us- army-can-buy-100-more-advanced-patriot-missiles/ 297 Tony Osborne, ‘UAE Taking Delivery of Archangel COIN Aircraft’, Aviation Week Network, November 8, 2015, https://aviationweek.com/dubai-air-show-2015/uae-taking-delivery-archangel-coin-aircraft 298 Author interview with GCC lawmakers and officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 299 Kenneth Katzman, The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E): Issues for U.S. Policy’, Congressional Research Service reports (2014), 12; ‘U.S and UAE Hold 4th Joint Military Dialogue’, News Release US Department of Defense (10 April 2019), https://dod.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1811503/us-and-uae- hold-4th-joint-military-dialogue/ 300 Ibid, 12-13

84 increase UAE influence over U.S. regional policy’.301 Through its increased weapons purchases, the UAE aimed to counter the perceived growing Iranian threat, continue to build ties with its primary security guarantor, and continue to demonstrate its value as a political and military partner in the region.302

1.1.2 Greater diversification

Relying solely on the US seemed unreasonable given its perceived disengagement from the region: it ‘isn’t doing enough’ said an Emirati official in April 2016.303 As a result, while the

UAE increased its efforts to become increasingly self-sufficient in this field, it knew it would still need to rely on external providers in the meantime, and as such, sought to broaden its defence relations.304

France was already a prominent security partner for the UAE following the 2008 agreement establishing a French military base in the UAE and giving the French navy and air force access to Emirati ports and air bases;305 key to France’s ability to project power in the Asia

301 Kenneth Katzman, The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E): Issues for U.S. Policy’, Congressional Research Service reports (2016), 18 302 Author interview with Emirati experts, officials, academics, Abu Dhabi and Dubai (2014-2017) 303 Author interview with Emirati Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016) 304 Interviews in the region highlighted the link between the effects of the catalysts identified in this dissertation (including perceived growth of the Iranian threat as well as US perceived disengagement from the region) and a new urgency for weapons procurements. Author interview with GCC lawmakers and officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17); Kenneth Katzman, ‘The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E): Issues for U.S. Policy’, Congressional Research Service reports (2012), 15 305 Emmanuel Jarry, ‘France, UAE sign military and nuclear agreements’, Reuters, January 15, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-sarkozy-gulf/france-uae-sign-military-and-nuclear-agreements- idUSL1517472620080115

Pacific.306 But cooperation between the two increased significantly in the years following

2012, with France becoming the UAE’s most important security relationship after the US.307

Regular visits by France’s then Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian,308 and closer cooperation to tackle the threat of terrorism – perceived as a key threat by the UAE – are examples.309 Both countries also conducted joint military exercises, including in May 2012310 and November 2016.311 According to Theodore Karasik, a UAE-based analyst, ‘From the

UAE’s point of view, France is eclipsing other western countries in terms of the counterterrorism agenda…’. Importantly, he points to the provision of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance by France on efforts to fight ISIS in particular, ‘that other allies, such as the

United States, do not. Paris and Abu Dhabi see eye to eye on requirements for countries such as Libya and Egypt, as well as to Jordan, in the fight against ISIL’.312 This view was shared by several other interviewees.313 The UAE also boosted military cooperation with the

United Kingdom, with whom it has a 1996 Defence Cooperation Agreement. In November

2012, the UAE and the UK announced a joint defence partnership, which would serve as a basis for greater weapons sales to the region from the UK, including the Typhoon fighters.314

306 French Ministry of Defence, France and Security in the Asia-Pacific, Defence White Paper, Paris (April 2013), https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/261113/3194598/file/PlaquetteAsiePacifique2014ENBD.pdf, 2, 10 307 Author interview with Andreas Krieg, Lecturer, School of Security Studies, King’s College London, London (8 October 2019) 308 ‘France sees more joint defence ventures with UAE’, Emirates 247, February 17, 2013, https://www.emirates247.com/business/france-sees-more-joint-defence-ventures-with-uae-2013-02-17- 1.495279 309 Theodore Karasik, ‘UAE People and Politics: UAE and France’s robust cooperation in fighting extremists’, The National, May 7, 2015, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/uae-people-politics-uae-and-france- s-robust-cooperation-in-fighting-extremists-1.116523 310 ‘Mohammed lauds military exercise’, Khaleej Times, May 3, 2012, https://www.khaleejtimes.com/article/20120502/ARTICLE/305029810/1002 311 ‘UAE and French armed forces conclude ‘Gulf 2016’ joint military exercise’, The National, November 24, 2016, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-and-french-armed-forces-conclude-gulf-2016-joint-military- exercise-1.192384 312 Karasik, ‘UAE People and Politics: UAE and France’s robust cooperation in fighting extremists’ 313 Author interview with Emirati experts, officials, academics, Abu Dhabi and Dubai (2014-2017) 314 ‘Joint defence partnership between UK and the UAE announced’, BBC News, November 6, 2012, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20216028

But relations between the two countries were not without complications, as the UAE believed London to be too supportive of the wave of uprisings that swept through the

Middle East region in 2011. As a result, Abu Dhabi ultimately refused to purchase Typhoon fighters and ceased using British officers to train the Emirati military.315 The UAE also looked to other suppliers, buying two GlobalEye airborne early warning radar aircrafts (based on a

Bombardier Global 6000 frame) from Saab in 2015316 and two more Bombardier Global

6000 aircrafts modified by Marshall Aerospace for electronic and signals intelligence gathering.317

Importantly, in its quest for greater diversity, Abu Dhabi did not want to limit itself to

Western security guarantors, especially when these partners refused to sell them certain weapons systems. It increasingly turned its attention to other major players, including China and Russia. The UAE’s desire to purchase armed drones became more urgent following the deployment of its capabilities in Yemen and Libya. After the United States refused to sell it armed drones,318 Abu Dhabi turned to China. In 2016, it acquired the Chinese-made Wing

Loong drone,319 which it upgraded with the purchase of the Wing Loong II in 2018.320 It is noteworthy that the Chinese approval process for weapons exports is faster and does not

315 Simeon Kerr, ‘UAE stops using former British officers as military trainers’, The Financial Times, May 22, 2014, https://www.ft.com/content/53cc2584-e1ab-11e3-9999-00144feabdc0 316 Craig Hoyle, ‘Picture: Saab unveils first GlobalEye for UAE’, Flight Global, February 23, 2018, https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/picture-saab-unveils-first-globaleye-for-uae-446155/ 317 ‘First UAE spyplane breaks its cover’, Arabian Aerospace, December 27, 2017, https://www.arabianaerospace.aero/first-uae-spyplane-breaks-its-cover.html 318 ‘Chinese military drone sales hover over Middle East’, Associated Press, February 26, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2134680/chinese-military-drone-display- united-arab-emirates; Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi and Justin Bronk, ‘Armed Drones in the Middle East: Proliferation and Norms in the Region’, RUSI Occasional Paper (December 2018), 27 319 Natasha Turak, ‘Pentagon is scrambling as China ‘sells the hell out of’ armed drones to US allies’, CNBC, February 21, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/21/pentagon-is-scrambling-as-china-sells-the-hell-out-of- armed-drones-to-americas-allies.html 320 Ibid

87 come with many of the constraints that Washington builds into its deals, making it easier for buyers, including the UAE, to use them in any way they see fit.321 But they also pose a problem because the US – the main provider of military platforms for the UAE and its allies – considers Chinese technology a security risk, and does not allow data gathered from Chinese drones to be integrated into US command chains.322 There is some speculation that turning to China for drones is in an effort to convince the US to sell the UAE the more sophisticated

MQ-9 Reaper and MQ-1B Predator UAVs,323 which are more advanced and could be better integrated into the UAE’s military planning. This would ‘be in line with the overall Emirati desire ‘to maintain the strongest link with the US military sphere’,324 especially for the time being as it sees no other viable alternative to obtain the best quality equipment - China’s drones do not have the reputation of being high quality325 - and while it continues to develop its indigenous capabilities. Notably though, the weapons procurements from China represent just an acquisition of capability.326 China cannot and does not want to provide the

321 Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi and Justin Bronk, ‘Armed Drones in the Middle East: Proliferation and Norms in the Region’, RUSI Occasional Paper (December 2018), 22, 30 322 Peter Apps, ‘Chinese, local drones reflecting changing Middle East’, Reuters, March 7, 2019, https://in.reuters.com/article/apps-drones/column-chinese-local-drones-reflect-changing-middle-east- idINKCN1QO0FT 323 Tabrizi and Bronk, ‘Armed Drones in the Middle East: Proliferation and Norms in the Region’, 30; Agnes Al Helou and Chirine Mouchantaf, ‘Source: UAE wants to buy 24 F-35s’, DefenseNews, November 12, 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/dubai-air-show/2017/11/12/uae-undertakes-air-force- restructuring-plan/ 324 Quoted in Tabrizi and Bronk, ‘Armed Drones in the Middle East: Proliferation and Norms in the Region’, 30 325 David Axe, ‘One Nation Is Selling Off Its Chinese Combat Drones’, The National Interest, June 5, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/one-nation-selling-its-chinese-combat-drones-61092 326 Camille Lons, Jonathan Fulton, Degang Sun, Naser Al-Tamimi, ‘China’s Great Game in the Middle East’, ECFR Policy Brief (October 2019), https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/china_great_game_middle_east.pdf; Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai, Triple Axis: Iran’s Relations with Russia and China (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018). There is a debate emerging about China’s role in the Middle East and whether it should go beyond its current transactional approach to the region, see Wang Huiyao, ‘From the Syrian civil war to Yemen to energy, China has a larger role to play in the Middle East’, South China Morning Post, November 13, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3037353/syrian-civil-war-yemen-energy-china-has-larger- role-play-middle

88 same level of security the US provides the UAE for now, ‘making the relationship an operational, not strategic, one’.327

Russia has also been an important source of weapons and equipment for the UAE. Some of this activity occurred prior to the period under study - in 1998 for example, the UAE was

‘the fourth biggest Russian arms customer after China, India and Iran’.328 But after 2011, the

UAE continued its efforts to diversify its procurements by further building ties with Russia and doing so with greater urgency, viewing Moscow as an ‘alternative supplier or as a second option whose presence might increase regional buyers’ leverage with U.S. officials and exporters’.329 UAE interest in the purchase of other military equipment, such as anti- tank missiles and surface-to-air missiles, led to further sales in the years that followed.330

1.1.3 Greater self-sufficiency: developing its own military-industrial complex

For the UAE, working with non-Western security providers such as Russia was an attractive option because Moscow did not object to moving the assembly of its military equipment to the UAE, or to assisting the UAE build its own equipment.331 Indeed, Abu Dhabi’s long-term goal of becoming self-sufficient became all the more urgent following the perceived US

327 Author interview with Andreas Krieg, Lecturer, School of Security Studies, King’s College London, London (8 October 2019) 328 Oksana Antonenko, ‘Russia’s Military Involvement with the Middle East’, in Thomas Keaney, Barry Rubin Eds, Armed Forces in the Middle East: Politics and Strategy (London and New York: Frank Cass, 2002) 329 Clayton Thomas, ‘Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy’, Congressional Research Service Reports (11 October 2017), 7 330 ‘UAE buys Russia’s Kornet, Pantsir missile systems – general’, TASS, February 17, 2019, http://tass.com/world/1045135 331 Kirikk Semenov, ‘Russia seeks closer military-technical cooperation with the UAE’, Al Monitor, November 2017, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fa/originals/2017/11/russia-eyes-closer-military-cooperation- uae.html

89 abandonment of the region, the growing security threat posed by Iran, and the UAE’s involvement in regional conflicts.332 This resulted in an Emirati push for joint production or assembly,333 or even requiring that sellers invest in the UAE and share technology through offset agreements, which ‘compel foreign suppliers to invest in local industrial projects so that the recipient country can offset the typically significant cost of defense procurement.

Such programs have allowed the [UAE] to connect their domestic defense sectors with global defense producers and acquire advanced defense industrial knowledge and technology’.334 While its indigenous defence industry remains modest, the UAE was characterised as ‘the most promising of the Arab candidates seeking to gain emerging arms producer status’,335 and aimed to become a net exporter ‘over the next five to ten years’336.

Florance Gaub and Zoe Stanley-Lockman attribute this to the UAE’s more advanced knowledge-based economy, and its advanced investments into R&D, as well as the motivation to both diversify the economy and become self-sufficient.337 In 2014, the UAE established the Emirates Defense Industries Company (EDIC) through the merger of a number of state-controlled defence companies and focused on expanding its production of components for the platforms imported from foreign suppliers. 338 This raises a question for foreign suppliers about whether these components will ‘eventually replace – rather than

332 This policy was also the result of internal efforts towards economic diversification and Emiratisation 333 Sandra I. Erwin, ‘Defense Industry Eyes growth in the Middle East’, National Defense, May 2, 2014, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2014/5/2/defense-industry-eyes-growth-in-the-middleeast 334 Bilal Y. Saab, ‘Arms and Influence in the Gulf – Riyadh and Abu Dhabi Get to Work’, Foreign Affairs, May 5, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-05-05/arms-and-influence-gulf 335 Florence Gaub and Zoe Stanley-Lockman, ‘Defence industries in Arab states: players and strategies’, European Union Institute for Security Studies Chaillot Paper, No. 141, (March 2017), 47 336 Erwin, ‘Defense Industry Eyes growth in the Middle East’ 337 Gaub and Stanley-Lockman, ‘Defence industries in Arab states’, 47-52 338 ‘UAE merger creates defense services, manufacturing company’, Reuters, December 2, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-defence-m-a/uae-merger-creates-defense-services- manufacturing-company-idUSKCN0JG1IE20141202

90 duplicate – capabilities mastered by more advanced defence industries’.339 In 2019, the UAE went a step further announcing the formation of ‘EDGE’, a government-owned company that consolidated a number of other entities in the sector and absorbed EDIC, with the

‘mandate to disrupt an antiquated military industry’.340

Nevertheless, Abu Dhabi knew it would still have to rely on foreign suppliers to continue to build military capabilities, while it boosted its indigenous capabilities. In 2017, Russia announced the signature of ‘an agreement on industrial cooperation in the field of military engineering’ with Abu Dhabi, which outlined a joint effort to develop a light fifth-generation jet for the UAE.341 The UAE also pursued a number of ad hoc deals with international firms to help build new indigenous systems. For example, in 2013, it worked with Yogoimport, a

Serbian firm, to jointly develop an Advanced Light Attack System (ALAS) cruise missile, which evaded international export control restrictions and was simple to manufacture.342

Gaub and Stanley-Lockman enumerated other Emirati foreign partners, ranging from well- known first-tier weapons and military equipment suppliers, such as France and Germany, to smaller producers such as Estonia, Malaysia and South Africa, and to partners in the region.343

339 Florence Gaub and Zoe Stanley-Lockman, ‘Defence industries in Arab states: players and strategies’, European Union Institute for Security Studies Chaillot Paper, No. 141, (March 2017), 53 340 Agnes Helou, ‘UAE launches ‘Edge’ conglomerate to address ‘antiquated military industry’, DefenseNews, November 6, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/dubai-air-show/2019/11/06/uae- launches-edge-conglomerate-to-address-its-antiquated-military-industry/ 341 Russia and UAE to work on fifth generation fighter jet’, TASS, February 20, 2017, http://tass.com/defense/931828 342 Gaub and Stanley-Lockman, ‘Defence industries in Arab states’, 53 343 See table in Ibid, 54, 61

Following 2011, the UAE’s desire to increase its military capabilities became more urgent.

The outbreak of the Arab Spring, the announced US Pivot to Asia and the Iran nuclear deal - the three catalysts that will be explored in part two of the dissertation - led to fears of US unreliability as a security guarantor and the perception that regional threats were growing.

It became imperative for the UAE to become increasingly assertive in the pursuit of its security. The UAE’s increasingly diversified military procurements, pursuit of an indigenous capability and the weapons systems it sought to amass, reflected this. But military capabilities were not the only area the UAE focused on, it also expanded other capabilities in the years following 2011.

1.2 Other capabilities

1.2.1 Political and diplomatic clout

In chapter two, we examined the changing perceptions of what constitutes power and influence,344 and included non-military capabilities in the dissertation’s analytical framework. This section will outline measures Abu Dhabi put in place to increase its political and diplomatic clout and improve its image internationally.

The failure of a deal to take over the operation of several US ports by Dubai Ports World (DP

World), a state-owned terminal management company, in 2006 first brought the importance of image to light for the UAE. In March 2006, the British High Court gave DP

World approval to acquire Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O), a

344 See chapter two

British owned company that also operated 21 ports in the US. But in the US, the idea that a state-owned Middle Eastern company could control US infrastructure drew ire from politicians across the political spectrum.345 Fear of terrorism led Congress to threaten to block the sale and the-then Democratic governor of New Jersey Jon Corzine went so far as to say ' This transaction fails the basic test of common sense with regard to our nation's homeland security. (…) Dangerous men, tainted blood money and nuclear technology have moved across UAE borders’.346 As a result, DP World announced they would drop out of the deal shortly after.347 Emirati officials were surprised at the level of vitriol directed at them, one stated: ‘What we learned is that Congress does not know very much about us’.348 This first major setback was a wake-up call for the UAE, and a reminder that their image needed work.349 But it was only after the Arab Spring that the UAE’s efforts to build its international influence and image as a forward-looking, modern state, took on a sense of urgency.

In the aftermath of 2011, the UAE increased its efforts to build its political and diplomatic capabilities, including embarking on a spending spree in the countries where it aimed to improve its image, or when it wanted to obtain a particular policy outcome. In 2013, the

UAE reportedly spent $14.1 million in lobbying and influencing in the US, citing ‘illicit finance

345 ‘Bush says he will veto any bill to stop UAE port deal’, Fox News, February 22, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/2006/02/22/bush-says-will-veto-any-bill-to-stop-uae-port-deal.html; Stephen E. Flynn, ‘The DP World Controversy and the Ongoing Vulnerability of U.S. Seaports’, Testimony – Prepared Remarks, March 2, 2006, https://www.cfr.org/report/dp-world-controversy-and-ongoing-vulnerability-us- seaports-prepared-remarks 346 Edward Simpkins and Sylvia Pfeiger, ‘Dubai ‘will not drop’ £3.9 billion bid for P&O’, The Telegraph, February 26, 2006, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2933078/Dubai-will-not-drop-3.9bn-bid-for-PandO.html 347 David E. Sanger, ‘Under Pressure, Dubai Company Drops Port Deal’, The New York Times, March 10, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/10/politics/under-pressure-dubai-company-drops-port-deal.html 348 Larry Luxner, ‘Oil-Rich UAE, reaching for the Stars, Gets Pulled Back Down to Earth’, The Washington Diplomat, November 18, 2010, http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6048:oil-rich-uae-reaching- for-stars-gets-pulled-back-down-to-earth-&catid=204:march-2010&Itemid=240 349 Author interview with Youssef al Otaiba, UAE ambassador to the USA, Washington DC (2 March 2016)

93 issues’ – likely referring to terror financing and sanctions on Iran - as the goal,350 that was an increase of 40% compared to its spending in 2009.351 This period also saw the UAE target countries other than the US, including in Europe, where the Emiratis were accused of similar efforts.352 The UAE seemed to firmly believe in the value of drawing on Western PR firms to sway opinions in target countries, so much so, that it funded a campaign by Glover Park

Group - an American communications consulting firm - to counter negative press on

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi.353 This was intended to secure the UAE’s candidate of choice in Egypt after Mubarak’s fall. The spending was coupled with continued outreach on the part of an effective diplomatic corps in key countries to improve the UAE’s image and more importantly, help steer policymakers in target countries towards decisions that were favourable to the UAE. This was most notable in Washington DC, where the UAE ambassador maintained his posting despite a damning series of emails leaked by The

Intercept outlining his ‘sordid life’, 354 expanding on the extensive contacts between UAE officials and the Trump campaign leading up to the 2016 US elections,355 and detailing his links to international businessmen, including Jho Low, reportedly involved in a global

350 Lindsay Young, ‘What countries spent the most to influence in the USA in 2013’, The Sunlight Foundation, May 8, 2014, https://sunlightfoundation.com/2014/05/08/what-countries-spent-the-most-to-influence-the- usa-in-2013/; Colby Itkowitz, ‘Which foreign countries spent the most to influence U.S. politics?’, The Washington Post, May 14, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/wp/2014/05/14/which- foreign-countries-spent-the-most-to-influence-u-s-politics/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d164a2624fd9 351 Jennifer LaFleur, ‘Adding it up: the Top Players in Foreign Agent Lobbying’, ProRepublica, August 18, 2009, https://www.propublica.org/article/adding-it-up-the-top-players-in-foreign-agent-lobbying-718 352 Author roundtable with officials in Europe’s External Action Service, Brussels (24 June 2019); David Rose, ‘Cameron and the Arab Sheiks’ web of influence that infiltrated Britain: The shadowy nexus of PM’s cronies that secretively lobbied for Middle East paymasters’, The Mail on Sunday, October 18, 2015, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3277345/Cameron-Arab-Sheiks-web-influence-infiltrated-Britain- shadowy-nexus-PM-s-cronies-secretively-lobbied-Middle-East-paymasters.html 353 Zaid Jilani, ‘The UAE Secretly Picked Up the Tab for the Egyptian Dictatorship’s D.C. Lobbying’, The Intercept, October 4, 2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/10/04/egypt-lobbying-uae-otaiba-trump-sisi/ 354 Ryan Grim, ‘Diplomatic Underground – The Sordid Double Life of Washington’s Most Powerful Ambassador’, The Intercept, August 30, 2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/08/30/uae-ambassador-yousef- al-otaiba-double-life-prostitutes-sex-work/ 355 David Hearst, ‘Revealed: How Trump confidant was ready to share inside information with UAE’, Middle East Eye, June 28, 2018, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/revealed-how-trump-confidant-was-ready- share-inside-information-uae

94 corruption scandal.356 By the time the Qatar crisis broke out in the summer of 2017, the

UAE’s PR effort had taken on gargantuan proportions, and had become increasingly bold, including a battle between the UAE and Qatar to discredit and tarnish each other’s reputations,357 and an Emirati effort to involve itself directly in US domestic politics, by encouraging the dismissal of US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson for being ‘weak’.358 The

UAE’s involvement in US domestic affairs was a direct result of the growing sense of abandonment it felt.359 Interestingly, despite the realisation that a change in US engagement in the region was inevitable,360 the UAE still devoted considerable resources into fostering good relations with Donald Trump, who would become President of the US in

2016, to delay or better yet, reverse, the perceived disengagement.361

In the years following 2011, Abu Dhabi also developed an active PR campaign to promote its image as a forward-looking, modern, progressive Muslim society, in the hopes that this would increase its influence abroad and demonstrate what a ‘reasonable’ partner it could be.362 Ambassador Al Otaiba penned several opinion pieces in foreign media on a range on topics, including on tolerance,363 shoring up support for the battle against ISIS,364 and the

356 Bradley Hope, Tom Wright, ‘Stolen Emails Show Ties between UAE Envoy and 1MDB Fund’s Central Figure’, The Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/stolen-emails-show-ties-between-u-a- e-envoy-and-1mdb-funds-central-figure-1501579801 357 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, ‘New UAE Documentary Claims Qatar Complicit in 9/11 Attacks’, Foreign Policy – The Cable, July 24, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/24/new-uae-documentary-claims-qatar-complicit- in-911-attacks-gulf-crisis-saudi-arabia-doha/ 358 Suzanne Kianpour, ‘Emails show UAE-linked effort against Tillerson’, BBC News, March 5, 2018, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-43281519 359 Author interview with Emirati experts, officials, academics, Abu Dhabi and Dubai (2014-2017) 360 Author interview with former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019) 361 Author interview with Emirati official, Washington DC (2 March 2016) 362 Author interview with Emirati experts, officials, academics, Abu Dhabi and Dubai (2014-2017) 363 Yousef Al Otaiba, ‘A Vision for a Moderate, Modern Muslim World’, Foreign Policy, December 2, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/02/a-vision-for-a-moderate-modern-muslim-world-uae-abu-dhabi-isis/ 364 Yousef Al Otaiba, ‘ISIL Can’t be Beat on the Battlefield Alone’, Politico, February 16, 2015, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/isil-cant-be-beat-on-the-battlefield-alone-115233

95 rights of women.365 One component of this campaign was to promote the idea that women in the UAE, despite living in a Muslim nation, enjoyed expansive rights and improved working conditions. In 2014, the UAE conducted a media blitz to promote pictures of female army pilot Major Mariam Al Mansouri, who led the UAE’s airstrikes campaign against the

Islamic State in Syria.366 The country also regularly holds major events to commemorate

International Women’s Day and touts its efforts to promote the employment of Emirati women in senior positions both in government and in the private sector.367 These efforts complemented the development of the UAE’s cheque-book diplomacy and leveraging economic and financial assistance in the pursuit of its interests, which the next section will examine.

1.2.2 Economic and cultural influence

Another area identified in chapter two as a significant non-military capability was economic and cultural capabilities and influence. In the years following 2011, the UAE displayed its greater assertiveness economically, by both investing abroad and willing to make that investment conditional upon following the UAE’s conditions. It also sought to portray itself as a cultural hub in the region. The UAE diversified its economy by investing in various sectors abroad, from real estate to sports teams.368 According to Mathiessen,

365 ‘On Woman’s Day, the UAE Ambassador to the US Writes an Open Letter to his Daughter’, Harpers Bazaar Arabia, March 8, 2017, https://www.harpersbazaararabia.com/for-womens-day-the-uae-ambassador-to-the- us-writes-an-open-letter-to-his-daughter 366 Karen Zraick, ‘Arab Woman Led Airstrikes over Syria’, The New York Times, September 25, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/26/world/middleeast/emirates-first-female-fighter-pilot-isis- airstrikes.html; ‘Woman who reached for the skies’, The National, June 10, 2014, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/woman-who-reached-for-the-skies-1.586232 367 See for example, HH Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid, ruler of Dubai’s tweets on March 7, 2017 368 Christopher M. Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (Hurst & Company: London, 2012), 8, 44

The new interventionism of the GCC states has an economic rationale to it… (But)

while none of the GCC’s regional investment strategies are profitable from a purely

economic perspective, they make more sense when political, military, diplomatic,

symbolic, and economic influences are combined and seen as complementing each

other.369

Ulrichsen believed this was part of a ‘far broader strategy to project the soft power appeal of UAE’,370 and become increasingly proactive as the UAE focused on ‘innovation and [its] model of economic development to swiftly mobilise nationwide resources behind an agreed policy objective’.371 This section will examine the UAE’s efforts to develop its economic and cultural capabilities since 2011.

After 2011, the UAE further developed its economic tools and cultural influence.372 Abu

Dhabi’s reliance on cheque-book diplomacy became more visible as it showcased its efforts in the region and beyond. It also focused on developing a cultural infrastructure in the country, which would showcase the UAE as a forward-thinking, educational, and cultural centre in the region. Efforts included attracting prestigious foreign universities and museums, including France’s Louvre,373 to set up satellites in the UAE. For Abu Dhabi,

369 Toby Matthiesen, ‘Renting the Casbah’ in Kristian Coates Ulrichsen Ed, The Changing Security Dynamics of the Persian Gulf (London: Hurst & Company, 2017), 51 370 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates – Power, Politics, and Policymaking (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017), 163 371 Ibid 127 372 Matthiesen, ‘Renting the Casbah’ 373 Stanley Carvalho, ‘East meets West as Louvre Abu Dhabi opens in the Gulf’, Reuters, November 7, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-louvre/east-meets-west-as-louvre-abu-dhabi-opens-in-the-gulf- idUSKBN1D719F

97 international aid and disaster relief has also been key to expanding its international influence. From funds sent to the US in response to hurricanes Katrina and Irma, to financial assistance to Syrian refugee re-settlement programmes,374 and building hospitals in the

US,375 these efforts helped boost the country’s image.

In addition, the UAE developed a more elaborate strategy for financial assistance, one which included more active involvement in the recipient state’s political and economic management, so as to secure influence and greater say in decision-making in target countries. Financial assistance from the UAE included ‘demands for domestic spending, including welfare benefits and infrastructure investment’, often ‘at moments of incremental public concern for fiscal deficits and sustained lower energy prices’, all in support of the UAE and its allies’ ‘own set of norms and priorities’.376 In other words, the ‘return on investment’

- not always calculated in pure monetary terms - became key.377 Advancing its foreign policy objectives, including limiting ‘competition, especially political space that is tolerant to activist religious political organization, or political Islam’, and not hesitating to challenge

‘Western advice and hegemony’,378 was crucial for the UAE and its cheque-book diplomacy.

The ‘proactive use of economic diplomacy’ by the UAE, 379 while not new, shifted in nature

374 Amna Ehtesham Khaishgi, ‘UAE has become the leading donor to charitable causes around the world’, The National, August 21, 2014, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/uae-has-become-the-leading-donor- to-charitable-causes-around-the-world-1.263786 375 Stephanie Strom, ‘Abu Dhabi Gives US Hospital 4150 Million’, The New York Times, September 15, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/16/us/16donation.html?mtrref=www.google.co.uk 376 Karen E. Young, ‘A New Politics of GCC Economic Statecraft: The Case of UAE Aid and Financial Intervention in Egypt’, Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf and the Red Sea, Vol. 7, Issue 1: Special Section: New Perspectives on UAE Foreign Policy (2017), 124 377 Ibid, 125 378 Ibid, 116 379 Emma Soubrier, ‘Evolving foreign and security policies: a comparative study of Qatar and the UAE’ in Khalid S Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 134

98 and became a tool to increase influence and affect change in areas where the UAE has ideological and political goals.380 In other words, while its assistance does not have

the ‘strings’ of traditional conditionality of IMF and World Bank lending programs

which tie fund dispersion to fiscal and monetary policy reforms in order to receive

the promised funds, the UAE and some of its Gulf Arab allies exemplify a more tactile

and easily reversible aid conduit. They may not ask much in return for aid, but they

can also fail to deliver or quickly reverse course if their broader political and

investment goals in the recipient state are not quickly realized. UAE aid to Egypt

exemplifies this trend.381

In Egypt, during Morsi’s tenure, the UAE allegedly plotted the Islamist government’s demise in coordination with the Defence Ministry in Egypt, sending financial assistance to mount protests against the Muslim Brotherhood government.382 It was only after the collapse of the Morsi’s government that Abu Dhabi pledged $3 billion in aid to the new government.383

The UAE allocated approximately $1.56 billion to developing infrastructure, healthcare and education in the country.384 In total, a UAE brochure on aid to Egypt outlined that Abu Dhabi

380 Karen E. Young, ‘A New Politics of GCC Economic Statecraft: The Case of UAE Aid and Financial Intervention in Egypt’, Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf and the Red Sea, Vol. 7, Issue 1: Special Section: New Perspectives on UAE Foreign Policy (2017), 113-136 381 Ibid, 116 382 David D. Kirkpatrick, ‘Recordings Suggest Emirates and Egyptian Military Pushed Ousting of Morsi’, The New York Times, March 1, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/02/world/middleeast/recordings-suggest- emirates-and-egyptian-military-pushed-ousting-of-morsi.html 383 Along with $5 billion from Saudi Arabia and $4 billion from Kuwait – a significant increase on the contributions from the US and Europe of $1.5 billion and $1.3 billion respectively. See Rod Nordland, ‘Saudi Arabia Promises to Aid Egypt’s Regime’, The New York Times, August 19, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-vows-to-back-egypts-rulers.html 384 Lisa Watanabe, ‘Gulf States’ engagement in North Africa’, in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 175

99 had allocated $10 billion for the country.385 The UAE also developed a ‘wide-ranging developmental strategy’ for Egypt, demonstrating its commitment to the country ‘in the quantity and diversity of its aid and investments, as well as its interest in localizing aid through direct investment in construction and industry’.386 Its financial support was complemented by the establishment of a UAE-Egypt Task Force to ‘speed up legislation, reforms, and other measures meant to attract more investments’,387 and an Emirati branding strategy at the Egypt Economic Development Conference that aimed to portray the meeting as an effort to help the Egyptian people, and showcase the UAE’s assistance as collaborative rather than as a patron.388 This demonstrated the UAE’s heightened sense of the importance of framing and image in ensuring its success in increasing its influence and sway in Egyptian decision-making.

In their assessment of Emirati assistance to Egypt, Sons and Wiese state that financial support would ‘increasingly come with conditions attached. The UAE will expect the

Egyptian government to implement administrative and economic reforms’, demonstrating

Abu Dhabi’s commitment to the political system that replaced the Islamist government.389

They added that ‘The UAE will discourage political steps such as a reconciliation with the

Muslim Brotherhood’, and that ‘more than in the past, the UAE can be expected to use its

385 For more on how much the UAE allocated to assisting Egypt, see Sebastian Sons, Inken Wiese, ‘The Engagement of Arab Gulf States in Egypt and Tunisia since 2011 – Rationale and Impact’, DGAP Analysis, Vol. 9 (October 2015), 31-38. This reportedly did not include another $4 billion that Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum announced during the Egypt Economic Development Conference in March 2015, see Ibid, 34 386 Karen E. Young, ‘A New Politics of GCC Economic Statecraft: The Case of UAE Aid and Financial Intervention in Egypt’, Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf and the Red Sea, Vol. 7, Issue 1: Special Section: New Perspectives on UAE Foreign Policy (2017), 116 387 Sons, Wiese, ‘The Engagement of Arab Gulf States in Egypt and Tunisia since 2011 – Rationale and Impact’, 34 388 Ibid, 35 389 Ibid, 37

100 economic power for such political leverage’.390 In Egypt, the UAE decided to take matters into its own hands by using financial assistance and trade as a way of securing influence and achieving its policy objective of curtailing Islamism, which was on the rise in the country.

This was demonstrably more assertive than the way the UAE used cheque-book diplomacy and aid in the past.

Curtailing Islamism was only one Emirati foreign policy objective, the rise of Iran was another.391 The UAE used its economic sway to contain Iran as best it could, including by disrupting Iran’s relations with China. The UAE was alarmed at the ties between China and

Iran,392 and as a result, ‘enacted a plan…in the 2000s to reach out to China in a robust manner to bring a balance to Beijing’s Iran policy through economic engagement’.393 This coincided with China’s desire to become a more active player in the Middle East.394 For the emirate of Dubai the shift eastward came out of necessity following the 2009 crisis,395 but for the UAE in general, it was in part in response to its fears of a growing Iran and the perception that the US was no longer a reliable partner. The real effort to court Beijing and create lasting links =began in earnest with the announcement of a ‘strategic partnership’ in

January 2012,396 which was expanded to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ following

390 Sebastian Sons, Inken Wiese, ‘The Engagement of Arab Gulf States in Egypt and Tunisia since 2011 – Rationale and Impact’, DGAP Analysis, Vol. 9 (October 2015) 391 See chapters one and four 392 For more on China’s relations with Iran see, Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai, Triple Axis: Iran’s Relations with Russia and China (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018) 393 Theodore Karasik, ‘The GCC’s New Affair with China’, Middle East Institute (24 February 2016), https://www.mei.edu/publications/gccs-new-affair-china 394 Esfandiary and Tabatabai, Triple Axis 395 Dania Thafer, ‘After the Financial Crisis: Dubai-China Economic Relations’, Middle East Institute (15 September 2013), https://www.mei.edu/publications/after-financial-crisis-dubai-china-economic-relations 396 ‘China, UAE to build strategic partnership: Wen’, The China Daily, January 16, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-01/16/content_14456913.htm. For more on China’s economic and political ties with the UAE see, Jonathan Fulton, ‘China’s Changing Role in the Middle East’, Atlantic Council Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East Report (June 2019), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Chinas_Changing_Role_in_the_Middle_East.pdf

101

President Xi’s visit to the UAE in July 2018.397 In 2015, the UAE was the regional host for the

Asian Infrastructure Bank, and this despite ‘an appeal from the United States to its allies not to do so’,398 demonstrating once again that it was not afraid to pursue its own interests, even when these did not coincide with those of its partners and allies. Further, the UAE was critical to the ‘internationalisation of the Chinese renminbi’ when Emirate NBD became the first bank in the region to issue a yuan ‘dim sum’ bond in 2012.399 These efforts built on a

$10 billion UAE-China joint strategic investment fund that was created in 2015 to help support and deepen economic relations between the two.400 The entire process has been accompanied by a growing institutionalisation of their relations in all spheres.401

Mohammed Baharoon explained these efforts in the context of the UAE’s economic diversification and its desire to ‘build a corridor of trade from China to Europe’.402 These efforts were not limited to China, the UAE also built a ‘robust economic relationship’, ranging from trade in commodities to tourism, with Russia,403 and looked to other countries such as India, Japan, the Philippines and South Korea, just to name a few.404

397 Nick Webster, ‘UAE and China declare deep strategic partnership as state visit ends’, The National, July 21, 2018, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-and-china-declare-deep-strategic-partnership-as-state-visit-ends- 1.752515 398 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates – Power, Politics, and Policymaking (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017), 156 399 Kanika Saigal, ‘Middle East: Emirates NBD prints Gulf’s first dim sum bond’, Euromoney, April 2, 2012, https://www.euromoney.com/article/b12kjmj0qjjwj8/middle-east-emirates-nbd-prints-gulfs-first-dim-sum- bond; Dania Saadi, ‘UAE financial ties with China were years in the making’, The National, January 11, 2015, https://www.thenational.ae/business/uae-financial-ties-with-china-were-years-in-the-making-1.115095 400 ‘UAE, China launch $10b joint strategic fund’, Gulf News, December 17, 2015, https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/uae-china-launch-10b-joint-strategic-fund-1.1636147 401 Muhammad Zufika Rakhmat, ‘Institutionalising China’s relations with the Gulf’, International Policy Digest , April 15, 2019, https://intpolicydigest.org/2019/04/15/institutionalising-china-s-relations-with-the-gulf/ 402 Statement by Mohammed Baharoon, Director General, B'huth Center for Strategic Studies, at Middle East Institute Webinar on ‘Covid-19, Oil Prices, and Prospects for Iran-GCC Relations’ (6 May 2020) 403 Theodore Karasik, Giorgio Cafiero, ‘Geopolitics Drive Russia and the UAE closer’, Middle East Institute (4 April 2017), https://www.mei.edu/publications/geopolitics-drive-russia-and-uae-closer 404 ‘UAE’s ‘Look East’ policy is developing’, The National, February 16, 2017, https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/uae-s-look-east-policy-is-developing-1.49919

102

The Arab Spring followed by the announced US Pivot to Asia and the nuclear deal, firmly entrenched the idea that the US was no longer as committed to the region as it once was, and this, at a time where the main regional rival Iran, was ascending. As a result, after 2011, the UAE significantly increased its efforts to develop its military, political, diplomatic, and economic capabilities. But capabilities were only one side of the coin; Abu Dhabi’s willingness to use these growing capabilities is also an indicator of assertiveness.

2. Intent

Chapter two established the intention to deploy amassed capabilities as an indicator of assertiveness. The inherent uncertainty of intentions is what makes them so important to gauge – because this will speak volumes about a state’s likely trajectory. Following 2011, the

UAE became ‘serious about using its defence industry to enhance its operational capabilities’, 405 increasing its strategic depth and in the pursuit of its own interests. This section will outline examples of Emirati willingness to draw on its growing capabilities to affect its regional policy, influence, and strategic depth with greater virulence and, crucially, even when this opposed the interests of its partners. As the Arab Spring protests spread,

Abu Dhabi involved itself in various regional arenas, including Egypt, Libya and Syria, to either change the outcome of certain events, increase its influence in various countries or build new relationships with stakeholders.406 It did so by drawing on its military capabilities,

405 Florence Gaub and Zoe Stanley-Lockman, ‘Defence industries in Arab states: players and strategies’, European Union Institute for Security Studies Chaillot Paper, No. 141, (March 2017), 62 406 Marc Lynch, ‘The New Arab Order: Power and Violence in Today’s middle East’, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2018 Issue), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-08-13/new- arab-order; Victor Gervais, ‘The Changing Security Dynamic in the Middle East and its Impact on Smaller Gulf Cooperation Council States’ Alliance Choices and Policies’ in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The

103 political, diplomatic and economic levers, and its existing networks of contacts and international businesses which gave it additional sway.407 According to Sherwood, ‘This type of political, military, diplomatic and economic engagement – from beginning to end – is unconventional for a small state’.408 While the UAE involved itself in several regional arenas, it is not possible to assess all of them in this dissertation. This section will examine the UAE’s involvement in Yemen and Libya in particular, which represent recent examples of its willingness to draw on all its capabilities to pursue its foreign policy objectives.

2.1 Yemen

Of the countries engaged in the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, the UAE made the most significant contribution.409 It initially joined the coalition alongside Saudi Arabia, and in support of Riyadh’s goals to push back the Houthis in Yemen and contain Iran.410 For the

UAE, given the regional context after the Arab Spring and the US Pivot to Asia, it was important to show support and contribute to the Saudi-led endeavour to contain a rising

Iran in the region in 2014 when the Houthis took over the Yemeni capital, because it was

Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 32 407 Marc Lynch, ‘The New Arab Order: Power and Violence in Today’s middle East’, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2018 Issue), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-08-13/new- arab-order 408 Leah Sherwood, ‘Risk diversification and the United Arab Emirates’ Foreign Policy’, in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 150 409 Sam Wilkin, ‘UAE troops dig in for a long war in Yemen’, Reuters, December 2, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-emirates/uae-troops-dig-in-for-a-long-war-in-yemen- idUSKBN0TL14T20151202 410 Saudi Arabia aimed to curb the perceived Iranian presence on its border. Author interview with official, Saudi embassy in Qatar, Doha (18 May 2016); Author interviews with former and current Gulf Arab officials and academics, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Muscat and Kuwait City (April and May 2016); Mubarak Ali AlSabah, Flotilla Commander, Kuwait Coast Guard, Kuwait City (24 May 2016); Marc Lynch, The New Arab Wars: Uprising and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 64; Author interview with Majdi Al-Dhafiri, Kuwaiti Ambassador to Iran, Kuwait City (24 May 2016)

104 clear that the US would not do it.411 But gradually, Emirati objectives in the conflict differed from those of its ally, and Abu Dhabi pursued them despite the fact they were at times in opposition to Saudi Arabia’s aims. While examining this conflict is complicated because it is on-going, the UAE’s contribution to the conflict in Yemen is an example of Abu Dhabi’s willingness to use its growing capabilities in the pursuit of its own objectives.

After the initial public show of support from Saudi Arabia’s allies for Riyadh’s efforts to lead a coalition to contain Iran, the Yemen conflict began to expose and deepen existing underlying tensions. When the Houthis took over Sana’a, Abu Dhabi was first to pledge its commitment to the Saudi-led coalition, committing troops – ‘the largest and most experienced contingent of ground troops’,412 intelligence and firepower to conduct counter- insurgency, provide ground and air support, and clear landmines.413 These efforts were supplemented with significant economic assistance and investment, including $4 billion of aid over the course of three years according to the UAE’s Minister of State for International

Cooperation.414 In public, these efforts were intended to display a unified front with Saudi

Arabia and the other members of the coalition in the battle against the Houthis and Iran.

Foreign Minister Gargash stated, ‘The Emirati political and military stand in supporting Saudi

411 Author roundtable with the Policy Planning Unit, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016) 412 Sam Wilkin, ‘UAE troops dig in for a long war in Yemen’, Reuters, December 2, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-emirates/uae-troops-dig-in-for-a-long-war-in-yemen- idUSKBN0TL14T20151202 413 Leah Sherwood, ‘Risk diversification and the United Arab Emirates’ Foreign Policy’ in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 151 414 Mina Aldroubi, ‘UAE humanitarian aid to Yemen almost $4bn’, The National, June 26, 2018, https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/uae-humanitarian-aid-to-yemen-almost-4bn-1.744471

105 and Gulf security is progressive…Our goal is to succeed in returning security to Yemen and to protect the security of the Gulf through Yemen’.415

But the alignment with Saudi Arabia was short-lived. According to an official in the UAE,

Yemen was complicated because Abu Dhabi and Riyadh had ‘different visions for the way ahead, but wanted to stay together’.416 While the UAE and Saudi Arabia shared the goal of pushing back the perceived Iranian influence in Yemen, the UAE also had a number of interests it aimed to secure. ‘Reconstruction, commercial interests and maritime security concerns’, particularly in the south and east, drove the UAE’s involvement in Yemen, as did anti-terrorism efforts.417 The UAE also wanted to ensure access to the Red Sea, the Indian

Ocean, and extend control over the Bab Al Mandab straits to strengthen its position as a global trading hub.418 As a result, the UAE drove the coalition’s efforts in the south and east, and built partnerships with, paying, arming and training local ground forces, including

‘Southern Resistance’ forces, some of which are loyal to the UAE rather than Yemeni officials.419 The UAE then looked east, and with the help of American troops, Emirati soldiers captured the ports of Mukalla and Shihr, and islands in the Bab Al Mandab straits, through which most of the world’s oil passes,420 helping its anti-piracy efforts.

415 Ola Salem, ‘UAE military intervention in Yemen was ‘inevitable’’, The National, March 26, 2015, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-military-intervention-in-yemen-was-inevitable-1.82859 416 Author interviews with Emirati officials, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016) 417 Eleonora Ardemadni, ‘UAE’s Military Priorities in Yemen: Counterterrorism and the South’, ISPI Commentary (28 July 2016), https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/commentary_ardemagni_28_07.2016.pdf, 1 418 Author interview with Andreas Krieg, Lecturer, School of Security Studies, King’s College London, London (8 October 2019) 419 Noah Browning, Alexander Cornwell, ‘UAE extends military reach in Yemen and Somalia’, Reuters, May 11, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uae-security-yemen-somalia/uae-extends-military-reach-in-yemen- and-somalia-idUSKBN1IC12A; Abdulwahab Al Qassab, ‘Strategic Considerations of the UAE’s Role in Yemen’, Arab Center Washington DC Policy Analysis (9 March 2018), http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/strategic- considerations-of-the-uaes-role-in-yemen/ 420 ‘The ambitious United Arab Emirates – the Gulf’s ‘little Sparta’’, The Economist, April 6, 2017, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/04/06/the-ambitious-united-arab-emirates

106

Abu Dhabi also focused on pushing back the growth of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

(AQAP) in Yemen. The Yemeni civil war and the coalition’s efforts against the Houthis helped foster fertile grounds for the expansion of AQAP.421 In fact, as the conflict wore on, the

UAE’s priority shifted to focusing on fighting Islamic extremism and terrorism in the south, including in Mukalla; an AQAP base.422 Indeed, after the Houthis were largely driven away from the south423 – the UAE’s area of focus – Abu Dhabi’s objectives became two-fold: to draw down its efforts in the fight against the Houthis and hand over to its allies,424 and focus on the fight against extremism. But the UAE’s anti-terror efforts have put it at odds with its

Saudi ally. Indeed, Riyadh turned to Islamic leaders to help its fight against the Houthis, including backing Al Islah, the Yemeni variant of the Muslim Brotherhood – perceived as a long-running threat in the UAE. Abu Dhabi encouraged Riyadh to abandon its Islamist allies and advocated working with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh (before he was killed in

2017), arguing he would have been more reliable than Saudi-backed Abdrabbuh Mansur

Hadi, whose Presidency was rejected by the Houthis.425 Tensions emerged as Riyadh worried that Abu Dhabi was creating pockets of influence for itself,426 and even resulted in conflict among their local allies when in February 2017, UAE-backed allies fought forces

421 For more on the growth of AQAP in Yemen, see ‘Yemen’s Al Qaeda: Expanding the Base’, International Crisis Group Report, Number 174 (2 February 2017), https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and- arabian-peninsula/yemen/174-yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base 422 Ibid 423 Elana DeLozier, ‘UAE Drawdown May Isolate Saudi Arabia in Yemen’, The Washington Institute, Policywatch 3148 (2 July 2019), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/uae-drawdown-in-yemen-may- isolate-saudi-arabia 424 Author phone interview with Elizabeth Dickinson, Senior Analyst, Arabian Peninsula, International Crisis Group (28 August 2019) 425 Neil Partrick, ‘The UAE’s War Aims in Yemen’, Sada Blog – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (24 October 2017), http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/73524 426Ibid

107 loyal to Saudi Arabia.427 The situation worsened as the UAE increased its assistance to separatist groups in the south, which seized control of the port city of Aden, previously the temporary base for President Hadi's government, in August 2019.428 This marked a break in the uneasy alliance between the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the pro-government forces backed by the Saudi-led coalition. While the UAE initially pledged its support to Saudi Arabia in pushing back the Houthis in Yemen, it rapidly developed its own objectives, which it pursued even when these did not align with Riyadh’s objectives, demonstrating that Abu Dhabi did not hesitate to deploy its growing capabilities in the pursuit of its own interests.

2.2 Libya

In Libya, the UAE also displayed a willingness to draw on its growing capabilities in the pursuit of its own interests. The UAE involved itself in Libya following the outbreak of the protests and Muammar Ghaddafi’s excessive use of force to quell them.429 In a bid to secure its legitimacy within Libya,430 the UAE took on a leadership role within the GCC in coordinating intervention, taking on much of the lobbying efforts within the Arab League

427 ‘3 killed in inter-militia fighting at Yemen’s Aden airport’, Associated Press, February 12, 2017, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/02/12/3-killed-in-inter-militia-fighting-at-yemen-aden-airport.html 428 ‘Yemen conflict: Southern separatists seize control of Aden’, BBC News, August 11, 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-49308199 429 Jo Adetunji, Peter Beaumont and Martin Chulov, ‘Libya protests: More than 100 killed as army fires on unarmed demonstrators’, The Guardian, February 20, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/20/libya-protests-benghazi-muammar-gaddafi; Laila Fadel and Liz Sly, ‘Gaddafi forces fire on protestors in Tripoli; defiant leader urges thousands of supporters to take up arms’, The Washington Post, February 26, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2011/02/25/AR2011022502731.html?noredirect=on; ‘World Report 2012: Libya – Events of 2011’, Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012/country-chapters/libya 430 Emma Soubrier, ‘Evolving foreign and security policies: a comparative study of Qatar and the UAE’ in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 135

108 and conducting a diplomatic push to provide intervention with a UN mandate.431 The UAE declared its intention to take part in the NATO-led mission on March 24, deployed to implement UN Security Council resolution 1973, and deployed six Mirage and F-16 fighter jets.432 Jean-Marc Rickli added that the ‘UAE forces also provided NATO a high level of area knowledge in addition to their air ﬁghting capabilities. At the political level, they provided the operation with much-needed legitimacy within the Arab world’.433 The operation was conducted in collaboration with other Arab countries, including Qatar,434 and included financial assistance to the rebels and a flurry of diplomatic activity to add pressure to the

Qaddafi government.435 Interestingly, some read these deployments as part of a UAE effort to increase ties with the US, and increase US interest and stake in Emirati security.436

However, when observed with further deployments in Libya in the following years, ones that were not always in alignment with US objectives, it became clear that Abu Dhabi joined the NATO-led strikes in an effort to increase its visibility and military practice in this arena, and to pursue its own objectives down the line. In a 2016 interview, Riad Kahwaji, Director of a prominent military think-tank, emphasised that it was key for the UAE to join

431 Leah Sherwood, ‘Risk diversification and the United Arab Emirates’ Foreign Policy’ in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 150 432 Kareem Shaheen, ‘UAE warplanes will patrol Libyan no-fly zone’, The National, March 25, 2011, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-warplanes-will-patrol-libyan-no-fly-zone-1.417396; Haneed Dajani, ‘UAE warplanes in Sardinia ahead of dispatch to Libya’, The National, March 29, 2011, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-warplanes-in-sardinia-ahead-of-dispatch-to-libya-1.409823; For more on other Emirati efforts in Libya, see Jean-Marc Rickli, ‘The Political Rational and Implications of the United Arab Emirates’ Military Involvement in Libya’ in Dag Henriksen and Ann Karin Larssen Eds, Political Rational and International Consequences of the War in Libya (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 144 -146 433 Ibid, 148 434 For more on the contribution of the GCC states to the NATO-led intervention in Libya, see Bruce R. Nardulli, ‘The Arab States Experience’, in Karl P. Mueller Ed, Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015), 339-372 435 Ibid, 359 436 Hussein Lbish, ‘The UAE’s Evolving National Security Strategy’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington Report (6 April 2017), https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/UAE-Security_ONLINE.pdf, 23; Jean- Marc Rickli, ‘The Political Rational and Implications of the United Arab Emirates’ Military Involvement in Libya’ in Henriksen and Larssen Eds, Political Rational and International Consequences of the War in Libya

109

‘international coalition efforts like those led by the US or NATO’ so that the US and its allies would view Abu Dhabi as a ‘competent military power in a coalition’.437

As the conflict dragged on, Libya became an arena for GCC competition. The Qataris significantly ramped up their involvement both with the coalition, working closely with the

French, and with the rebels and the National Transitional Council (NTC), providing funding and assistance in light of the freezing of Libyan assets.438 Qatar also led the effort to arm the rebels, despite the sensitivity of the issue and the arms embargo that was in place, and sent humanitarian assistance.439 But Qatar’s involvement with Muslim Brotherhood affiliates posed a problem for the UAE, who differed on the opposition figures to support in Libya.

The UAE established links with a ‘conglomeration of predominantly anti-Islamist actors like the Zintan Brigades militia and the Libyan National Army under the command of General

[and since, Field Marshal] Khalifa Haftar’, placing it in direct opposition to Qatar.440

According to Marc Lynch, the 2012 Benghazi attacks against US personnel, made the Libya issue enormously problematic in Washington, leaving ‘the field wide open to competition’ among the Gulf Arab states.441

The NATO-led mission was no longer enough to meet the UAE’s goals, since the Muslim

Brotherhood were still active in Libya and Islamist ideology was thriving, despite the initial

437 Author interview with Riad Kahwaji, CEO, INEGMA, Dubai (13 November 2016) 438 For more on Qatar’s involvement in Libya see David Roberts, ‘Behind Qatar’s Intervention in Libya’, Foreign Affairs, September 28, 2011, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2011-09-28/behind-qatars- intervention-libya 439 Bruce R. Nardulli, ‘The Arab States Experience’, in Karl P. Mueller Ed, Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015), 362 440 David B. Roberts, ‘Qatar and the UAE: Exploring Divergent Responses to the Arab Spring’, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Autumn 2017), 547 441 Marc Lynch, The New Arab Wars – Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 179

110 results of the first elections in 2012.442 As a result, the UAE and Egypt launched airstrikes on

Islamist targets in Tripoli in August 2014.443 Indeed, after losing the July 2014 election, a coalition of Islamist militias from Misrata referred to as ‘Libya Dawn’ established itself in

Tripoli,444 establishing the New General National Congress – an alternative administration, and pushing out the UN-recognised government to the city of Tobruk.445 This new rival power centre presented a challenge for the international community who sought to support state institutions. Importantly, UAE and Egyptian airstrikes were conducted without notifying the Obama administration, demonstrating their resolve in taking matters into their own hands, once again.446 The lack of notification to the US here was key: it highlighted an

Emirati desire to pursue their own interests without support or acquiescence from

Washington, illustrating that ‘the UAE did not appear to be either persuaded by

Washington’s arguments or deferential to its views’.447 Fahmy Howeidi, a moderate Islamic intellectual, highlighted the significance of the UAE airstrikes: ‘The UAE strike in Libya must be read as something else entirely because it represents a shift from indirect intervention to direct military intervention, and it is not to help a friendly state but to support one faction against another factions’.448 The UAE also increased military transfers and deployments to

442 According to Gomati, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party (J&C) lost the political party votes, only winning 15% of their allocated 80 party seats. The UAE backed secular party—the National Forces Alliance (NFA) led by Mahmoud Jibril—won around 40% of the political party votes. However, the 120 independent seats, of which 25 had affiliation to the NFA was not enough for the NFA and Jibril to control the parliament’, see Anas El Gomati, ‘The Libyan Revolution Undone – the Conversation Will Not Be Televised’, in Andreas Krieg Ed, Divided Gulf: The Anatomy of a Crisis (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019), 188 443 Anne Gearan, ‘Egypt and the UAE strike Islamist Militias in Libya’, The Washington Post, August 25, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/egypt-and-uae-strike-islamist-militias-in- libya/2014/08/25/8685ef04-2c98-11e4-be9e-60cc44c01e7f_story.html?utm_term=.f09f7c6f3c04 444 Qatar reportedly assisted the Libya Dawn coalition, see Ibid, 24 445 David D. Kirkpatrick, ‘Libyan Militias Seize Control of Capital as Chaos Rises’, The New York Times, September 1, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/02/world/africa/militias-seize-control-of-libyan- capital.html 446 Ibid 447 Hussein Lbish, ‘The UAE’s Evolving National Security Strategy’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington Report (6 April 2017), https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/UAE-Security_ONLINE.pdf, 28 448 Fahmy Howeidi, ‘The Emirati airstrikes on Libya’, Al-Shorouk, August 27, 2014

111

Libya, and this despite the arms embargo.449 The SIPRI Arms Transfer Database estimated that Libya received 750 Spartan APC/APVs between 2012-2013, 50 Typhoon APCs in 2012,

38 Typhoon GSS-300s, 103 Panthera T6 APVs between 2015-2016 and 10 N35 APCs in

2017.450 This was confirmed by a 2017 UN Panel of Experts report on Libya,451 and a 2018 report which indicated that this type of support was on-going.452

After 2014, the UAE only further committed itself to ensuring the roll-back of Islamism in

Libya. It unapologetically increased its support to General Haftar, even after reports of his brutality,453 his unwillingness to back the Government of National Accord and work with other groups in the country,454 and his alleged provision of free passage to ISIS fighters from

Derna to Sirte.455 In 2016, the UAE provided him with air support from the Al Khadim air based, and reportedly, Chinese-made drones used to conduct airstrikes on Tripoli in 2019.456

Reports also emerged that the UAE-run military base in Eastern Libya had undergone

449 UN Security Council Resolution 2292 (14 June 2016), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2292 450 SPIRI Arms Transfer Database, https://sipri.org/databases/armstransfers (accessed June 17, 2019) 451 Final report of the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011), UN Security Council (1 June 2017), 24, 33-34, 43-44, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1711623.pdf 452 ‘Libya embargo violations : UN panel to report findings to UNSC’, Al Jazeera, March 1, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/libya-embargo-violations-panel-report-findings-unsc- 180301080019627.html. Reporting in 2019 stated that missile strikes attributed to General Haftar were conducted using Wing Loong variants. See ‘Libya missile strikes point to possible UAE role: UN report’, France 24, May 6, 2019, https://www.france24.com/en/20190506-libya-missile-strikes-point-possible-uae-role-un- report 453 Zachary Cohen and Joshua Berlinger, ‘Libyan general praise by Trump accused of possible war crimes’, CNN, May 15, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/15/politics/libya-war-crimes-allegations-intl/index.html 454 Hussein Lbish, ‘The UAE’s Evolving National Security Strategy’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington Report (6 April 2017), https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/UAE-Security_ONLINE.pdf, 28 455 ‘Libya’s Shifting Sands: Derna and Sirte’, Al Jazeera reports, June 22, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeraworld/2017/06/libya-shifting-sands-derna- 170613115119424.html; Sasha Toperich, ‘Khafa Haftar is no longer part of Libya’s solution’, The Hill, May 1, 2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/441552-khalifa-haftar-is-no-longer-part-of-libyas-solution 456 Tom Kington, ‘UAE allegedly using Chinese drones for deadly airstrikes in Libya’, Defense News, May 2, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2019/05/02/uae-allegedly-using-chinese-drones-for-deadly- airstrikes-in-libya/

112 significant development between March and November 2017,457 and in summer 2018, the

UAE lent its support to General Haftar to begin exporting Libyan oil under his control outside the channels approved by the UN.458 All these indicated a growing commitment to supporting the anti-Islamist forces in Libya and increasing its presence in the country.

Importantly, it showed the UAE’s intention and willingness to draw on the range of capabilities that it had developed to attain its objectives. It also showed growing disregard for international processes, fora, and the interests of other, including friendly, states in its policymaking – what mattered to it above all was securing its interests and objectives.

The UAE followed a similar pattern in regional fora over the years that followed 2011 because of the impact the Arab Spring, the announced US Pivot to Asia and the nuclear deal had on its perception of its security context. At first, the UAE’s involvement in the region was cautious; only deploying its military assets in support of the US-led international coalitions in Libya and the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. But gradually, its propensity to break from these coalitions and pursue its own interests individually, and at times, in opposition to the interests of its allies and partners, increased. In addition, Abu Dhabi did not hesitate to draw on non-military capabilities in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives, including making aid and development assistance conditional upon the implementation of political processes in receiving countries, or to affect the outcome of such processes. It also drew on a range of public relations tools at its disposal in order to improve its image and help convince stakeholders of what it was doing. The UAE displayed a

457 Ami Rojkes Dombe, ‘Report: The UAE is Expanding the al-Khadim Air Base in Libya’, Israel Defense, December 17, 2017, https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/32228 458 Benoit Faucon, Jared Malsin, Summer Said, ‘U.A.E. Backed Militia Leader’s Bid to Take Control of Libyan Oil Exports’, The Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-a-e-backed-militia-leaders- bid-to-take-control-of-libyan-oil-exports-1531474200

113 clear intent to draw on its growing capabilities to attain its objectives internationally in a way that it had not prior to 2011.

3. The perception of success

The third indicator of assertiveness in foreign policy relates to a state’s perception of the success (or otherwise) of the deployment of capabilities.459 As established in chapter two, in order to determine the existence and longevity of the UAE’s growing assertiveness, it is imperative to examine how Abu Dhabi views the outcomes of its foreign policy decisions because the focus on capability and intent only presents a partial picture. For the UAE to be aware of its growing clout and to continue the drive towards greater assertiveness, it must regard the use of its capabilities as acceptable, and even successful in achieving its objectives. Moreover, for the changes in Emirati foreign policymaking to endure, they must be conducted in a manner that does not lead to Emirati over-reach, which could involve getting bogged down in multiple conflicts and arenas, and spreading itself too thin, thereby affecting its ability to achieve its objectives. In other words, the successful employment of these growing capabilities should continue to provide Abu Dhabi with confidence in its abilities and decisions, and instil a desire to continue the current path to developing its international clout.

3.1 The perceived success of the UAE’s non-military assertiveness

459 See chapter two

114

The UAE has put its increasing capabilities to use in various fora, some of which are outlined above. The result has been mixed, but on the whole, the UAE has made gains: its image has improved internationally, as has its ability to influence foreign powers and secure its interests. Despite the poor perception of the UAE in the West following the involvement of some of its nationals in the 9/11 attacks in 2001, it was no longer seen as a harbinger of extremism only a few years later. A former Emirati military official explained that the UAE had developed a great deal of soft power it could use in its favour, the UAE ‘looks more measured, has more clout. We have a good image’, he said,460 - a sentiment that was shared by many officials and experts in the UAE.461 He contrasted this with the UAE’s neighbour and ally Saudi Arabia, and said he believed that the UAE looks measured and has greater influence in the US.462 Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a noted UAE-based academic stated that ‘It has dawned on [the UAE] that they have lots of [levers] and they can cash them in’.463 A few years later, he highlighted the UAE’s confidence in its regional endeavours, when he said that ‘the UAE was the heart of decision-making in the Arab world’.464 In 2014, the US ambassador designate to the UAE claimed that the country, ‘is a strong military partner and a reliable contributor to coalition operations, participating in five major such efforts with the US since Operation Desert Storm’.465 This, despite the capacity problems faced by the

460 Author interview with AlBadr Al Shateri, Professor, UAE National Defense College, Abu Dhabi (28 February 2017) 461 Author interviews with Emirati experts, officials, academics, Abu Dhabi and Dubai (2014-2017) 462 Author interview AlBadr Al Shateri, Professor, UAE National Defense College, Abu Dhabi (28 February 2017) 463 Andrew England and Simeon Kerr, ‘UAE: the Middle East’s power broker flexes its muscles’, The Financial Times, October 24, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/1b2b7f54-b411-11e7-a398-73d59db9e399 464 Quoted by Abdullah Baabood who was on the same panel as Abdulkhaleq Abdulla when he made that statement. Author interview with Abdullah Baabood, former Professor, Qatar University, (28 February 2020) 465 Statement by Barbara A. Leaf, Ambassador-designate to the UAE, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 10, 2014, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Leaf_Testimony.pdf

115

UAE.466 Another UAE-based analyst with deep knowledge and experience of regional issues explained that despite the country’s success in amassing hard and soft power, Abu Dhabi was aware of its limitations and recognised that it was not a regional power yet.467 Rather, he believed, Abu Dhabi was intent on building up a military capability that was qualitatively and technologically superior to others in the region, which would, along with its growth of soft power, help the UAE project power in the region.468 Importantly though, it would also help the UAE be perceived as a serious international power. He went on to state his belief that the US perception of the UAE as a serious military power, and as such, a valuable partner, in the context of military coalitions was not limited to the US, extending to Europe and the NATO alliance.469

The UAE has also succeeded in diversifying its security partners.470 In an effort to hedge its position, the UAE sought closer partnerships with smaller regional states, including building ties with Egypt, which became increasingly dependent on the UAE. It also increased exchanges with larger players. ‘The UAE’s strategy became to talk to Russia and China directly,’ explained an official at a Qatar University roundtable in 2016, referring to new bilateral engagement rather than through the GCC.471 The UAE ‘aimed to diversify its risks by going to Russia and China and others for deals and weapons. And it succeeded’, said a former Emirati military intelligence official in 2016.472 Prior to a summer 2018 visit to Abu

466 For more on this and the UAE’s reliance on surrogates, see Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli, Surrogate Warfare: The Transformation of War in the Twenty-First Century (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019) 467 Author interview with Riad Kahwaji, CEO, INEGMA, Dubai Dubai (13 November 2016) 468 Ibid 469 Ibid 470 Khalid Almezaini, ‘The transformation of UAE foreign policy since 2011’, in Kristian Coates Ulrichsen Ed, The Changing Security Dynamics of the Persian Gulf (London: Hurst & Company, 2017), 201 471 Author roundtable with officials and academics, Qatar University, Doha (14 May 2016) 472 Author roundtable with regional experts, officials and academics, Dubai (19 April 2016)

116

Dhabi, President Xi Jinping called for ‘a blueprint for China-UAE cooperation so as to unlock its full potentials and advance China-UAE relations at a higher level and speed, and build a

China-UAE community of shared future in Belt and Road cooperation’.473 In July 2019, during a visit to China by Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed, the two upgraded their ‘strategic partnership’ to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ that involved new deals in various sectors.474 The UAE also sought to improve relations with Russia, despite the differences between the two in Syria. The two signed a ‘Declaration of Strategic Partnership’ in June

2018, which served as a basis for the expansion of their political, security and economic ties.475 Russia and the UAE had built extensive trade ties with trade volume growing from

$200 million to $1.6 billion between 2000 and 2017, with the UAE becoming Russia’s biggest trading partner in the region.476 The declaration also outlined regular meetings and consultations between both sides, cooperation on oil market stability and combatting terrorism, and increasing foreign direct investment.477 These new diversified partnerships demonstrate the success the UAE has had in being more assertive in its foreign policy, and building greater self-sufficiency by diversifying its security, political, military and economic partners – a success that Emiratis are aware of and would not shy aware from highlighting during interviews.478 The UAE’s efforts to increase its political influence both within the

473 Xi Jinping, ‘UAE, Chinese people never give up their dreams: President Xi’, Gulf News, July 17, 2018, https://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/uae-chinese-people-never-give-up-their-dreams-president-xi- 1.2253147 474 ‘UAE and China sign strategic agreements as Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed visits Beijing’, The National, July 22, 2019, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/uae-and-china-sign-strategic-agreements-as-sheikh- mohamed-bin-zayed-visits-beijing-1.889051 475 ‘UAE, Russia forge strategic partnership’, Gulf News, June 1, 2018, https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/uae-russia-forge-strategic-partnership-1.2230246; ‘Declaration on the strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and the United Arab Emirates’ (1 June 2018), http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5309 476 Li-Chen Sim, ‘Russia and the UAE are now Strategic Partners: What’s Next?’, LobeLog, June 7, 2018, https://lobelog.com/russia-and-the-uae-are-now-strategic-partners-whats-next/ 477 Ibid 478 Author interview with Emirati experts, officials, academics, Abu Dhabi and Dubai (2014-2017)

117 region and beyond has also paid off, further boosting its ability to diversify its economic, political and security partners.

In the economic sphere, the UAE found it easier to conduct business deals in Europe and the

US with minimal or no opposition, in part, due to its improved image. The Emirati ambassador to Washington DC, Ambassador Al Otaiba drew parallels between the Emirati and American outlook on business interests in 2016, ‘The US and the UAE have a lot in common when it comes to how we view business…The UAE has one of the most open and innovative economies in the world, and over the years, we’ve demonstrated that the UAE is a dependable and significant economic partner of the US’.479 One example of the relative ease with which the UAE was able to secure economic deals abroad was the successful purchase of aerospace companies working on US airports by government-owned Dubai

Aerospace Enterprises without any protest from Congress, even though earlier, Congress had questioned allowing Dubai Port World a series of acquisitions in the maritime and port sector.480 In 2017, Aerospace Enterprises bought Dublin-based AWAS, a major aircraft lessor in a deal that attracted little negative attention.481 In fact, the UAE as a whole, with Dubai in the lead, became a key business and trade partner for many companies within and outside the region. This followed extensive efforts to diversify the country’s economy – a successful endeavour as ‘the proportion of UAE GDP accounted for by hydrocarbons has fallen from as

479 Frank Kane, ‘Interview: UAE Ambassador to Washington on building economic relations with US’, The National, August 2, 2016, https://www.thenational.ae/business/interview-uae-ambassador-to-washington-on- building-economic-relations-with-us-1.145104 480 ‘Dubai Aerospace to Buy Carlyle Aircraft Service Units for $1.8 Billion’, Associated Press, April 2, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/id/17902964 481 Anshuman Daga, ‘Dubai Aerospace to buy aircraft lessor AWAS, catapults to top tier’, Reuters, April 24, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-awas-m-a-dubaiaerospace-idUSKBN17Q0QI

118 high as 90 percent in the 1979s to about 28.2 percent in 2013’,482 build the UAE as a regional financial hub,483 and draw on each emirate’s strength in expanding its economic activities – focussing for example on heavy manufacturing in Ras Al Khaimah and infrastructure and financial services in Dubai.484 This success in establishing itself as a regional – seen by some locals as an established global - business hub was touted by Emirati officials and experts alike,485 and was often the subject of op-eds in the media. ‘The UAE is already a global trade and communication hub…This means that from the economic point of view, the UAE should no longer think of itself as a Gulf state with a global role, but needs a rethink of itself as a global state that is positioned in the Gulf’, read a Gulf News article in

2015.486

The UAE’s economic efforts abroad were not focused just on the West, they went ‘hand in hand with a major expansion of investments by Khaleeji (Gulf Arab) companies, private investors, and GCC sovereign wealth funds in North Africa and the wider Arab world’.487 The

UAE’s new economic ‘interventionism’ was key to linking together the country’s multiple foreign policy objectives. Toby Matthiesen stated that ‘none of the GCC’s regional investment strategies are profitable from a purely economic perspective’, but they made

‘sense when political, military, diplomatic, symbolic, and economic influences are combined and seen as complementing each other’.488 In other words, greater economic assertiveness

482 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates – Power, Politics, and Policymaking (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017), 87 483 Ibid, 99-103 484 Ibid, 90, 91 485 Author interview with Emirati experts, officials, academics, Abu Dhabi and Dubai (2014-2017) 486 ‘Defining UAE as world’s leading business hub’, The Gulf News, February 2, 2015, https://gulfnews.com/opinion/editorials/defining-uae-as-worlds-leading-business-hub-1.1450459 487 Toby Matthiesen, ‘Renting the Casbah’ in Kristian Coates Ulrichsen Ed, The Changing Security Dynamics of the Persian Gulf (London: Hurst & Company, 2017), 51-52 488 Ibid, 51

119 occurred in the context of greater military and diplomatic assertiveness, and each served and reinforced the other, further entrenching the trend. Indeed, as we saw earlier, in Egypt, its economic strategy aimed to buy Abu Dhabi leverage, which it used to obtain political gains.489 The UAE pledged to assist the interim government in Egypt after the ouster of

Mubarak, but suspended the pay-outs while the Muslim Brotherhood were in power, only resuming a wide-ranging assistance programme after the Egyptian military took over. This demonstrated that Abu Dhabi was not afraid to pursue the outcome it wanted for the country – even when this was in direct opposition to what its partners were pushing for: The

US for example, while reticent to deal with a Muslim Brotherhood government, did not condone this type of intervention to change the government. Nevertheless, in this instance, without the benefit of much hindsight, it is possible to say that the UAE was successful in helping bring about the changes it sought for Egypt, naturally bolstering it in its new approach. And importantly, the leadership in the UAE saw it as such, further bolstering their interventions in the region. In a New York Times profile of Mohammed Bin Zayed, Robert

Worth, the journalist that interviewed the Emirati leader stated ‘the overthrow of Morsi was the first great success of Mohammed Bin Zayed’s counterrevolutionary campaign, and it seems to have supercharged his confidence about what could be done without American constraints’.490 The UAE’s newfound assertiveness was most visible in its military deployments in the region following the Arab Spring. From Libya to Yemen, Abu Dhabi did not hesitate to involve itself in conflicts – at times exacerbating them – in order to pursue its own objectives, even when these did not coincide with those of its allies and friends. While

489 Sebastian Sons, Inken Wiese, ‘The Engagement of Arab Gulf States in Egypt and Tunisia since 2011 – Rationale and Impact’, DGAP Analysis, Vol. 9 (October 2015), 37 490 Robert F. Worth, ‘Mohammed Bin Zayed’s Dark Vision of the Middle East’s Future’, The New York Times Magazine, January 9, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/magazine/united-arab-emirates- mohammed-bin-zayed.html

120 this dissertation has already examined some of the UAE’s regional deployments,491 the next section will briefly outline how the UAE viewed these deployments.

3.2 The perceived success of the UAE’s military assertiveness

In the years that followed 2011, the UAE assertively pursued the development of its military, diplomatic, political and economic capabilities, and importantly, deployed military capabilities on its own for the first time.492 This section will briefly examine how Abu Dhabi viewed its deployment in Yemen and Libya.

3.2.1 Yemen

It is difficult to fully assess the UAE’s efforts in Yemen as the conflict continues to evolve and the impact of the deployment will continue to be felt for the foreseeable future, but several points are worth noting.

Objectively, the UAE has seen success in Yemen on several fronts: expanding its influence, increasing its land and naval presence in and around the country in strategically significant areas and waterways, and regaining some of the territory lost to the Houthis and to Islamic extremists. Importantly, the gains achieved demonstrated to Emirati allies and partners that

‘a capable and compact regional military such as the UAE armed forces, can launch – and

491 See section 1.2 Intent in this chapter 492 See the sections above on deployments of capabilities in Yemen and Libya

121 win – complex operations on their own’.493 UAE special forces rolled back Houthi advances into Aden in 2015 ‘almost entirely alone’.494 The UAE also ‘planned dozens of major combat operations in Yemen, including urban warfare, amphibious landings, armoured pursuit operations, precision strike operations with NATO-standard consideration of humanitarian law and noncombatant immunity, stabilization and reconstruction operations, and unconventional warfare in support of local proxies’.495 In addition, the UAE’s ability to identify local partners and build auxiliary forces, which they trained and sent equipment to, made it a key partner in counter-terrorism efforts in Yemen. The UAE’s operations in Yemen became an additional pretext for it to expand its activities, basing and influence in the Horn of Africa.496 The UAE also succeeded in building influence in and around Yemen, projecting power across the Bab Al Mandab and into eastern Africa. Its cooperation with and successful training of local forces provided it with potential proxy forces that it could draw on in the future. In addition, according to Knights and Mello, the expansion of UAE naval bases contested Iranian regional naval expansion, and ‘could contribute to the United Arab

Emirates’ strategic depth in an eventual clash with Iran…[providing] depth that might allow a reserve force of Emirati surface combatants, aircraft, and even submarines to remain active and able to interdict Iran’s coastline and shipping during an extended war’.497 But as the conflict in Yemen dragged on, Emirati deaths increased and the coalition’s reputation was affected by their indiscriminate bombing campaigns and the humanitarian crisis

493 Michael Knights, ‘Lessons from the UAE War in Yemen’, Lawfare, August 18, 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/lessons-uae-war-yemen 494 Ibid 495 Ibid 496 For more on the UAE’s involvement in the Horn of Africa, see ‘The United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa’, International Crisis Group Middle East Briefing, No. 65 (6 November 2018); Alex Mello and Michael Knights, ‘West of Suez for the United Arab Emirates’, War on the Rocks, September 2, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/west-of-suez-for-the-united-arab-emirates/ 497 Mello and Knights, ‘West of Suez for the United Arab Emirates’

122 unfolding in Yemen,498 the UAE’s successes were diminished, and its reputation tarnished.

The deployment also created new rifts and disagreements between the UAE and its allies.

None of these, however, prevented the Emiratis from believing their intervention in Yemen was a success.

Officials in the UAE believed that the country had achieved its objectives in Yemen: It contained regional Iranian influence and pushed back the Houthis, it increased its influence and military presence inside and outside the country, and it built its ability to project force in the region499 – and, as a result, they are ‘proud of [their] military campaign in Yemen’.500

This despite what they perceived to be less-than-promised US-involvement, according to a former Emirati national security advisor, the UAE ‘was expecting a lot from America in

Yemen, surveillance, target selection, but none of that came’.501 Importantly, the UAE did all of this, while demonstrating to its Western security partners that it was an invaluable and competent ally, one that provided ‘an Arabic-speaking, culturally attuned ground presence to undertake hands-on management of Yemeni counterterrorism forces and to exchange information and support with unique U.S. intelligence and strike capabilities’.502 It was also able to do this alone, and had developed relationships which would help it in the future:

498 See Iona Craig, ‘Bombed into famine: how the Saudi air campaign targets Yemen’s food supplies’, The Guardian, December 12, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/12/bombed-into-famine-how- saudi-air-campaign-targets-yemens-food-supplies; ‘Indiscriminate bombings and unreliable reassurances from Saudi-led coralition force MSF to evacuate staff from six hospitals in the north’, Medecins sans Frontieres Press Release (16 August 2016), https://www.msf.org/yemen-indiscriminate-bombings-and-unreliable-reassurances- saudi-led-coalition-force-msf-evacuate; ‘Yemen: Coalition Airstrikes Deadly for Children’, Human Rights Watch (12 September 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/12/yemen-coalition-airstrikes-deadly-children; Nour Youssef, ‘Airstrikes in Yemen Kill 68 Civilians in a Single Day’, New York Times, December 28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/world/middleeast/un-yemen-war.html 499 Author interview with Emirati experts, officials, academics, Abu Dhabi and Dubai (2014-2017) 500 Michael Knights, ‘Lessons from the UAE War in Yemen’, Lawfare, August 18, 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/lessons-uae-war-yemen 501 Author interview with former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019) 502 Knights, ‘Lessons from the UAE War in Yemen’

123

Abdulla explained that the UAE was confident it could rely on ‘local forces to continue confronting the Houthis on their own. The UAE has already trained a total of 90,000 Yemeni forces who are capable of filling the vacuum and supporting the legitimate Yemeni government. They can do the job and are well-trained, well-equipped, and battle tested’. 503

The UAE’s success on the ground demonstrated that it was able to project force and use its extensive foreign-bought arsenal in the pursuit of its goals. In an interview in 2016 – only two years into the conflict – the head of an Emirati think-tank explained that the UAE had been ‘smart about building itself a military capability with large airpower and qualitative support that helps it effectively project power in an arena like Yemen’.504

Abu Dhabi judged its intervention in Yemen a success in terms of achieving its objectives of containing Iran, and by extension the Houthis, in the areas it was concerned with, rolling back extremism in southern Yemen and increasing its influence in the country, all the while demonstrating its ability to conduct such operations on its own. This allowed it to drawdown its presence in the country once most of its objectives had been achieved. To Abu

Dhabi, the intervention in Yemen was a success, indicating that assertiveness was likely to last.

3.2.2 Libya

503 Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, ‘The UAE drawdown in Yemen is a welcome step, but it needs to be reciprocated’, Middle East Institute (11 July 2019), https://www.mei.edu/publications/uae-drawdown-yemen-welcome-step- it-needs-be-reciprocated 504 Author interview with head of an Emirati think tank, Dubai (13 November 2016)

124

In Libya too, it is difficult to assess the success of the UAE’s intervention as the conflict is ongoing, but again, Abu Dhabi believes it has been successful in several areas. It established a foothold, including by building links to, and a dependence of, local actors, most notably with

General Haftar and his troops.505Abu Dhabi succeeded in demonstrating its worth as a partner and ally to Western countries, both diplomatically, in coordinating Arab support for the coalition, and militarily, with its contribution to the campaign in Libya.506 It has also increased its influence within the NATO-led coalition, according to Rickli, ‘the UAE’s contribution to NATO’s Operation Unified Protector and its wider role in Libya should be seen as an attempt to maintain the regional stability of the Gulf while at the same time shaping perceptions as a reliable partner with NATO’.507 The UAE was instrumental in gathering and coordinating Arab support for intervention in Libya508 – a testament to its growing regional influence. In addition, according to Ulrichsen, ‘participation in the NATO- led coalition also gave the UAE increased leverage over the (re)shaping of Western policy toward the Arab Spring once the initial shock of the Arab Spring wore off’.509 Emirati officials reportedly leveraged their involvement in the coalition efforts in Libya to ‘influence the US position towards the uprising in Bahrain’, and ensure that the US pursued a policy that was in line with what Abu Dhabi – and in this case, Saudi Arabia - wanted for this small country.510 Importantly, the UAE is now a significant player in Libya; no resolution of the

505 Tom Allinson, ‘Libya: Khalifa Haftar’s repressive proto-state and the ‘myth’ of stability’, DeutscheWelle, February 26, 2020 506 Jean-Marc Rickli, ‘The Political Rational and Implications of the United Arab Emirates’ Military Involvement in Libya’ in Dag Henriksen and Ann Karin Larssen Eds, Political Rational and International Consequences of the War in Libya (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 148 507 Ibid, 146-147 508 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates – Power, Politics, and Policymaking (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017), 195 509 Ibid, 196 510 Ibid, 196; Helene Cooper and Robert Worth, ‘In Arab Spring, Obama Finds a Sharp Test’, The New York Times, September 24, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/us/politics/arab-spring-proves-a-harsh- test-for-obamas-diplomatic-skill.html

125 conflict can be envisaged without some coordination with it, which is why it was invited to participate in the Berlin Conference on Libya in January 2020.511 An Arab Gulf analyst noted in 2016 that the UAE was a small country with limited resources, but that its efforts in Libya was an example of ‘successful Emirati power projection’.512 But notably, the UAE has so far failed in reducing instability in the country or ridding it of Islamism, Haftar’s efforts have not borne fruit, as he has not been able to capture Tripoli, and their involvement has garnered greater scrutiny for its blatant disregard for international norms and the UN arms embargo.513 A former Emirati government advisor referred to it as a ‘morass’, but highlighted that this was not a view that was shared by others in government.514

While the UAE’s deployment in countries like Libya and Yemen, and in a number of other regional fora continues today, making it difficult to assess just how ‘successful’ these interventions have been without the benefit of hindsight, Abu Dhabi saw these interventions as achieving outcomes that were successful, or at the very least, acceptable.515

This provided it with the confidence to continue its assertiveness in the region and beyond, rather than re-assess the usefulness of this policy. The fact that the UAE could involve itself in these arenas, sometimes openly against the objectives of its allies and partners, and still not suffer any significant adverse consequences, meant that it stood to gain from the continuation of its assertiveness.

511 The Berlin Conference on Libya, Conference Conclusions, Press Release, Berlin (19 January 2010), https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/the-berlin-conference-on-libya-1713882 512 Author interview with Riad Kahwaji, CEO, INEGMA, Dubai (13 November 2016) 513 See for example, Jared Malsin and Amira El Fekki, ‘Libya’s Tripoli Government Blames U.A.E for Deadly Airstrike’, The Wall Street Journal, July 4, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/libyas-tripoli-government- blames-u-a-e-for-deadly-airstrike-11562255129; ‘Libya missile strikes point to possible UAE role: UN report’ 514 Author interview with former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019) 515 Author interview with Emirati experts, officials, academics, Abu Dhabi and Dubai (2014-2017)

126

Conclusion

While the UAE displayed a desire for self-sufficiency prior to 2011, it was only after this date that Abu Dhabi significantly increased its political, diplomatic, military, and economic activities in the region and beyond, and pursued its interests unilaterally. This chapter applied three indicators that taken together, demonstrate the UAE’s greater assertiveness in the region: Increasing capabilities, willingness to use these capabilities and the UAE’s perception of the deployments, which points to the resilience of the policy.516 The UAE’s assertiveness and newfound confidence in its abilities shows no signs of abating. Unlike its neighbours, who have all dabbled in some way or another with a more assertive stance in the region since 2011, the UAE has displayed a consistent forward momentum with this trend, and continues to expand its involvement and influence both in the region and beyond.

The second part of this dissertation will seek to explore the ‘why’ behind the growing assertiveness in Emirati foreign policy making. It will do so by adopting a revised foreign policy analysis outlook, which will examine the changing regional context that enabled the

Emirati assertiveness. It will examine three ‘catalysts’ of this change: the 2011 Arab Spring, the announced US Pivot to Asia, and the 2015 nuclear deal.

516 Outlined in chapter one

127

Part Two

Chapter 4: Why a growing assertiveness?

This dissertation argues that a growing assertiveness is now visible in the foreign policy of the UAE - a trend that may take hold in other small Gulf states and could lead to important structural changes in the regional order in the Persian Gulf. The first part of the dissertation aimed to demonstrate this in a rigorous manner by devising three indicators of assertiveness - an increase in capabilities, the intention to deploy these capabilities and the state in question’s perception of the ‘success’ of their use - and applying these to the case of the UAE. The UAE is a particularly relevant example as it appears to be at the forefront of the changes under study and, in many ways, represents a microcosm of a broader trend beginning to take effect in the Persian Gulf. These changes have, and will likely continue to, complicate the drive for consensus among the Gulf Arab states, and their decision-making as a group, as the UAE and some of its smaller Gulf Arab neighbours pursue their interests irrespective of those of their allies.

Having established the existence of this trend, it is now necessary to consider its causes.

What explains the more assertive foreign policy of the UAE? Why has this shift gained momentum in the period since 2011? What are its drivers? The second part of the dissertation, which begins with this chapter, will seek to answer these questions, and in doing so, shed new light on the evolution of international relations in the Persian Gulf region more broadly. With these objectives in mind, the first part of this chapter sets out an amended foreign policy analysis lens that will help to structure analysis of the key factors

128 that have shaped the foreign policy direction of the UAE, particularly in the past decade. In line with conventional thinking on foreign policy analysis, the framework recognises that both internal and external factors exert influence on a state’s foreign policy. As we will see, this two-level approach is deeply rooted in foreign policy studies literature. Crucially, however, the approach presented here will argue that in the case of more autocratic regimes, such as those in the Persian Gulf region, the balance of analysis should be weighted significantly towards external factors rather than internal ones. The case for this approach will be presented and linked clearly to a subset of scholarly work within foreign policy studies that focuses on the nature and foreign policy expression of non-democratic regime types. The emphasis on external factors will also be bolstered by evidence gleaned from empirical research in the Gulf region.

Having discussed the conceptual approach, the second part of the chapter will begin to apply it to the case of the UAE. The analysis here will focus on the domestic context, which will pave the way for a discussion of the international context in subsequent chapters. The priority attached to the international level - and the developments that this dissertation identifies as catalysts of change in the analytical approach - is reflected in the more expansive treatment of this dimension across three chapters. Ultimately, application of this analytical approach suggests that it was these three catalysts – the 2011 Arab Spring, the announced US Pivot to Asia and the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran – that were the principal factors entrenching the UAE’s shift, replicated to a lesser extent elsewhere in the region, towards a more assertive foreign policy.

129

1. Foreign policy studies

The field of foreign policy studies has evolved considerably over the past few decades. A subset of international relations, it deals with the dynamics that determine a state’s foreign policy, both internally and externally, as well as foreign policy itself. This section will conduct a brief overview of the literature on foreign policy studies and identify some key issues to consider when seeking to determine the drivers behind a state’s foreign policy.

In his book, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, Christopher Hill explains that foreign policy ‘exists in the space created by the separateness of states and by their very lack of omnipotence. Its purpose is to mediate the impact of the external on the domestic and to find ways of projecting a particular set of concerns in an intractable world’, adding that it is inherently political and ‘requires a strategic view of the balance between internally generated goals, values and interests, and external constraints’.517 This aligns with David

Campbell’s understanding of foreign policy as, ‘not a bridge between two distinct realms, but something that both divided and joined the inside and the outside, the state and the interstate system’.518 In his analysis, Hill adds that the possession of sovereignty is a condition for the conduct of foreign policy, and that sovereignty is determined by the

‘effective actorness of the state at home and abroad’.519 In other words, modern statehood

‘involves both internal and external aspects and neither side can be privileged over the

517 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 32, 37 518 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Identity, 2nd edition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 60 519 Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, 37

130 other’.520 He goes on to say that, ‘foreign policy can never be abstracted from the domestic context out of which it springs. Without domestic society and the state there would be no foreign policy’.521 Snyder, Bruck and Sapin agree that foreign policy is not just a function of the state-to-state relations:

We have defined international politics as processes of state interaction at the

governmental level. However, there are non-government factors and relationships

which must be taken into account by any system of analysis, and there are obviously

non-governmental effects of state action. Domestic politics, the non-human

environment, cross-cultural and social relationships are important in this

connection.522

Given the importance of foreign policy, it is no surprise that considerable scholarly effort has been devoted to understanding its nature and dynamics. Hudson and Vore believe that

Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) ‘has involved the examination of how foreign policy decisions are made and has assumed that the source of much behaviour and most change in international politics is human beings, acting individually or in collectivities’.523 Their definition departs from the slightly more state/sovereignty-centric focus of Hill’s analysis, because they explain that ‘the decision-making approach of FPA breaks apart the monolithic view of nation-states as unitary actors. It focuses on the people and units that comprise the

520 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 41 521 Ibid, 43 522 Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University, 1954), 203 523 Valerie M. Hudson and Christopher S. Vore, ‘Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow’, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 (October 1995), 210

131 state’.524 They focus on the ‘context’ foreign policy decision-makers find themselves in and point to five elements of the context as its definition: individual characteristics of the decision-makers, their perceptions, the state of society and culture in the country in question, the country’s polity and finally, the international system.525 Alexander Wendt agrees, stating that,

the primary actors in international politics, states, are much more autonomous from

the social system in which they are embedded. Their foreign policy behavior is often

determined primarily by domestic politics, the analogue to individual personality,

rather than by the international system (society).526

He adds however, that ‘individuals and domestic politics may be important causes of foreign policy, but ignoring systemic structures assumes that states are autistic, which usually is not the case’.527 What all these authors have in common is the consideration of both the domestic and the foreign arenas as dynamics that are at play in foreign policy-making. In

1967, James Rosenau also referred to both the domestic and international arenas as key to devising foreign policy, saying ‘Domestic sources of foreign policy are no less crucial to its content and conduct than are the international situations towards which [foreign policy] is created’, but admitted that the interplay between the two is not always clear.528

524 Valerie M. Hudson and Christopher S. Vore, ‘Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow’, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 (October 1995), 210 525 Ibid, 226 526 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 2 527 Ibid, 18-19 528 James N. Rosenau Ed, Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1967), 4

132

Robert Putnam elaborated on the relationship between the domestic and the external by defining foreign policy as a ‘two-level game’.529 ‘It is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations, or the reverse. The answer to that question is clearly "Both, sometimes."’530 Putnam described what he meant by a ‘two-level game’:

At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the

government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing

coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek

to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the

adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be

ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain

interdependent, yet sovereign’.531

In other words, for Putnam, it is not possible for either the foreign or the domestic arena to be the only driver of foreign policy; both are. Putnam elaborates on the aforementioned levels by offering an example – that of reaching an international agreement: the first stage is the one where negotiators bargain the clauses in the agreement – in this case, in the external area.532 This is by definition outside the control of the government in question since much of it depends on factors that the government of a state cannot control, including the objectives and red-lines of other governments party to the negotiations. The government in question can only control what their own objectives are and what they are willing to

529 Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988) 530 Ibid, 427 531 Ibid, 434 532 Ibid, 436

133 compromise on. The second stage of reaching international agreements occurs in the domestic arena and involves ‘separate discussions within each group of constituents about whether to ratify the agreement’.533 In other words, negotiations occur among the different stakeholders internally to ensure that everyone agrees to the ratification and subsequent implementation of the agreement. The implementation of the agreement; the final foreign policy outcome, cannot be done without both levels agreeing to it. Hill describes this process as a ‘causal loop’,534 with one feeding into the other and both feeding into the development and implementation of the foreign policy in question.

1.1 The domestic constraints

Importantly, both the domestic and external arenas are a source of constraint on a state’s foreign policy, but the ‘internal pressures’ are particularly significant, according to Hill.535

Foreign policy studies literature highlights that several factors in the domestic sphere impose limits on a state’s ability to devise, negotiate, or implement a particular foreign policy. For example, Ikenberry points to how a state’s constitution and its institutions will affect who makes the foreign policy decisions in the government and the means at a state’s disposal for its foreign policy.536 Others point to the importance of the electoral cycle and changes in government in devising foreign policy537 - with sudden changes in government

533 Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), 436 534 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 257 535 Ibid, 229-231; Alexander Wendt, A Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 536 John Ikenberry, ‘Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order’, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998-1999), 45-46 537 William B. Quandt, ‘The Electoral Cycle and the Conduct of Foreign Policy’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 101, No. 5, Reflections on Providing for "The Common Defense" (1986), 825-837; Kenneth Waltz, ‘Electoral

134 spelling a significant change in a state’s foreign policy agenda. Individuals and their perceptions also form part of the domestic constraints. The personalities and perceptions of the leadership in a country affect the foreign policy a state will devise,538 as does public opinion and groups that want to influence foreign policy in order to attain a particular objective.539 In addition, other factors such as domestic cultures and ‘social attitudes and political forces’,540 ‘domestic society’ and different sectors of society such as the military, public opinion, the banking and private sector,541 all act as constraints. Finally, the state and its subjects’ visions of itself is another constraint. Hill refers to this as a ‘sense of distinctiveness’, stating the stronger the sense the more likely the foreign policy will be unpredictable.542 In their 1954 analysis, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin focus on the process and the structure of groups involved in foreign policy decision-making.543 They refer to the domestic space as the ‘internal setting’, and believe it is important because ‘clues to the way any state behaves towards the world must be sought in the way its society is organized and functions, in the character and behaviour of its people and in its physical habitat’.544

They add that ‘societies interact with each other in a wide range of ways through an intricate network of communications – trade, family ties, professional associations, shared values, cultural exchanges, travel, mass media and migration’.545 Their body of work argues

punishment and foreign policy crisis’ in James N. Rosenau Ed, Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1967), 263-265 538 Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, Burton Sapin, Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University, 1954); A.J.R. Groom and Margot Light Eds, Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), 97; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976) 539 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 232 540 Ibid, 235 541 Ibid, 231 542 Ibid, 230 543 Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics 544 Ibid, 203 545 Ibid, 204

135 that the multiplicity of actors, groups and institutions involved in foreign policy decision- making make the process inherently opaque and unpredictable. Hill divides the groups at the heart of the domestic constraints into ‘concentric circles’ of different actors with varying levels of influence; parliaments, public opinion, pressure groups and the press,546 and accounts for individuals that ‘can emerge from anywhere, with an impact of unpredictable nature and duration’ on foreign policy.547 Aside from individuals in the domestic arena, another key constraining factor on foreign policy is the allocation of resources, which is determined domestically, and can be quite costly. 548 The resources available to a state will determine the state’s capacity to pursue a certain foreign policy: if a state has limited resources then it will be forced to limit its foreign policy.

Domestic foreign policy constraints are significant, but they are not the only constraints on a state’s foreign policy. States also face constraints from outside their borders. This is what the next section will examine.

1.2 International Constraints

Governments must operate within the confines of the international system and the other states in it, when devising their foreign policies. This means they must contend with constraints on their ability to devise their foreign policy that emanate from outside their borders. These include for example, other states, alliance groups and treaties, international

546 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 232 547 Ibid, 232 548 Ibid, 233

136 institutions, groups within other countries, and events. While international pressures may seem less significant on the surface because decision-making and planning for foreign policies are conducted on a domestic level, all states must contend with an international context, which is, in many ways, outside their control. Hill explains the significance of international constraints on foreign policymaking, saying, domestic pressures,

can be insistent, practical, but also the product of relatively ephemeral

political rows…International pressures, by contrast, may well be ignored in

favour of domestic concerns, yet ultimately may have greater long-term

significance. This is when they are thought to be central to the state’s very

survival, through the need for defence and alliances on the one hand and the

creation of a favourable international milieu on the other.549

Hill believes that international constraints have greater long-term implications and are less malleable by a state. In their work on decision-making in foreign policy, Snyder, Bruck and

Sapin define international constraints as ‘external settings’, which refer to ‘such factors and conditions beyond the territorial boundaries of the state – the actions and reactions of other states (their decision-makers) and the societies for which they act and the physical world’.550 They point to four main external constraints on states and their governments: non-human environment, other cultures, other societies, and societies organised and functioning as states’.551 Indeed, domestic elements and influence groups within other

549 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 234 550 Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, Burton Sapin, Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University, 1954), 203 551 Ibid, 201

137 countries can influence a government’s decision-making in foreign policy. An obvious example of this would be the influence exerted by Israel on US foreign policy in the Middle

East. These dimensions, which are not exhaustive, since they do not cover other external factors such as non-state actors, are all outside a state’s borders and all influence a government’s foreign policy decision-making. In addition, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin also explain that external factors can be more or less important to a state’s foreign policy decision-making depending on the perceptions and goals of the decision-makers in the state, and not all external constraints will be viewed in the same manner by states:

The relevance of particular factors and conditions in general and in particular situations

will depend on the attitudes, perceptions, judgments and purposes of…[a state’s]

decision-makers…The external setting in constantly changing and will be composed of

what the decision-maker decides is important.552

It is clear that both the domestic and the external affect a state’s ability to make decisions in foreign policy. But both arenas cannot always be of equal importance to a state. Their relative importance will be affected by the decision-makers perceptions and goals, as per the Snyder, Bruck and Sapin study, but also by the condition of governance in a state. The next section will examine how the type of government in place in a country will affect the relative importance of the domestic versus the external constraints on a state.

552 Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, Burton Sapin, Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University, 1954), 203

138

2. Analysing foreign policy in non-democratic regimes

The scholarly works discussed to this point seem to suggest that an analytical approach intended to help make sense of the foreign policy direction or decisions of a particular state should consist of two equally weighted levels: the domestic and the international. Yet some authors have identified a major challenge with this approach: the difference between democratic and non-democratic states. In democratic states, a range of actors in the domestic sphere are constantly bargaining, challenging and attempting to sway the outcome of foreign policy decisions. This process may often be a very fractious and combative affair, but it occurs within established procedures or institutions and may be enshrined in a form of constitution. The literature recognises that this multiplicity of actors and institutions present in the domestic scene and, more importantly, their freedom to debate, bargain, challenge and oppose the ruling authorities, are more closely tied to democratic countries.553 In his seminal work, Putnam makes explicit reference to this in acknowledging that that some of the domestic constraints on foreign policy decision- making, ‘might be peculiar to democracies’.554

A detailed discussion of the nature of ‘democracy’ is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but in the literature, democratic states are generally viewed as housing a multiplicity of actors and groups who have a significant say in decision-making through formal and informal processes of negotiation and bargaining. These regimes are also associated with numerous institutions who all play a role in organising, regulating and limiting the power of

553 See for example, Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), 436 554 Ibid, 436

139 government.555 In his study on the characteristics of democracy, Felix Oppenheim also refers to two levels of characteristics for such states, particularly with regards to its manifestation:

‘The difficulty with the concept of democracy is rather that its defining expression must refer, not only to overt human behavior (eg: political participation), but also to legal institutions (eg: voting, representation).’556 Aside from expressions of democracy, both of these levels also present constraints for the democratic government in place. While

Oppenheim refers to expressions of democracy, these also exist as constraints for a democratic government. Indeed, the constraints are also present on two levels: from the various individuals and groups involved directly in decision-making, or in swaying decision- making, and from the processes and institutions established, which are intended to regulate and supervise decision and policy-making. Alan Wolfe refers to ‘political parties, the press, business organizations and trade associations, labour unions, churches, lobbyists, reform organizations, fraternal and social groups’ as the institutions that make up a democracy, and calls them ‘a requirement of democracy’.557 These all present a democratic government with an added layer of restriction or complication in the implementation of policy, including foreign policy, because the process must include bargaining, negotiation and justification for some or each of these actors, depending on the country.

These dynamics mean that the domestic arena can generally be considered of greater importance in determining the foreign policy of a democratic state, rather than a state with

555 This is not a comprehensive definition of a democracy, but rather some elements of such states that are key to the study of foreign policy. For more on democracies and their formation, see for example, Charles Tilly, Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), for more on the characteristics of democracies, see Felix E. Oppenheim, ‘Democracy – Characteristics Included and Excluded’, The Monist, Vol. 55, Issue 1 (1 January 1971), 29–50 556 Oppenheim, ‘Democracy – Characteristics Included and Excluded’, 30 557 Alan Wolfe, Does American Democracy Still Work? (Yale: Yale University Press, 2006), 75

140 a more autocratic form of government. Putnam recognises this in his work on the ‘two-level game’,558 as do others. Wendt, for example, says,

Sovereignty is not about de facto freedom of action relative to society, or “state

autonomy,” but about being recognized by society as having certain powers, as

having authority. These powers may be limited, as in the night-watchman state, or

extensive, as in the totalitarian, but as rights they are legal rather than political facts,

de jure rather than de facto. Democratic states are no less sovereign than fascist

states, despite the greater domestic constraints they face.559

Wendt recognises that democratic states face greater constraints domestically than states governed by other types of government. Hill agrees, believing that ‘in a democratic and self- sufficient country like the US, it may well seem that the balances of influences on foreign policy comes down on the domestic side’, pointing to the complexity of the checks and balances system in the US, and the division of power between the executive, the legislative and the judicial branches.560

This also means that conversely, autocratic states do not face the same constraints in devising foreign policy. Indeed, autocratic governments do not deal with the same institutions, influence groups, political parties, and others. Leaders in these countries

558 Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), 436 559 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 206-207 560 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 230

141 contend less with public opinion on foreign policy, face fewer constitutional constraints in decision-making, and fewer domestic groups and stakeholders who can effectively sway decision-making by the elites. They are also not subject to changes in government following electoral cycles (though they continue to fear threats to their hold on power, such as coups).

In such countries, foreign policy decision-making is usually the purview of a small elite or of a single individual, making their opinions and personalities a greater factor.561 Decisions are often made without consultation with others and without convincing the public opinion of the need for a particular foreign policy. In addition, decisions are implemented as soon as the decision-makers want them to be, without having to go through arduous processes to receive institutional approval and the approval for the use of national resources in the pursuit of a particular foreign policy. In other words, while the domestic scene remains a source of foreign policy, for example, because of the importance of decision-makers and their personalities, the impact of some of the dimensions outlined above are lessened for countries that are not democratic.

However, while it may be more straightforward for a non-democratic country to conduct foreign policy because it is relatively free of some of the domestic constraints faced by democratic governments, such states are not completely free from vested interests and internal bargaining. We have often witnessed interest groups – diplomats, the military or lobby groups for example – influencing foreign policymaking. Steinberg and Shih discuss this in reference to the setting of exchange rates, arguing that in China, the ‘major decisions to

561 This will be examined in greater detail for the UAE in the next section

142 maintain an undervalued exchange rate…were taken in response to demands for undervaluation from tradable industries.’562 They add,

Interest groups have multiple points of access in nondemocratic regimes, and

autocrats have strong incentives to keep the exchange rate at a level that is

supported by powerful domestic interest groups to ensure their political survival.

Interest groups that have many connections with high-level officials will have a

strong influence on exchange rate policy in autocracies.563

Another point worth highlighting regarding the influence of the domestic sphere on non- democratic governments is that the general lack of influence groups inevitably means that the main decision-maker will have a greater say in the foreign policy decision-making. This makes the decision-maker’s perceptions, personality, and goals of importance, and these generally remain within the purview of the domestic. The section below will explain the analytical approach adopted by the second part of the dissertation to frame the analysis.

2.1 An amended, two-level analytical approach

Taking the above discussion into account, as well as the more autocratic forms of governance that characterise the smaller Gulf Arab states, the analytical approach adopted here will constitute an amended, two-level foreign policy analysis. The approach will recognise the significance of the domestic level, particularly in terms of the influence

562 David A. Steinberg, Victor C. Shih, ‘Interest Group Influence in Authoritarian States: The Political Determinants of Chinese Exchange Rate Policy’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 45, Issue 11 (2012), 1405 563 Ibid, 1407

143 exerted by powerful individuals or clusters of elites, but give priority to the international level and the factors here that have shaped foreign policy. In addition to the reasons outlined in the literature review above, this focus on the international level is heavily informed by empirical research. In a sample of over eighty interviews, participants repeatedly and without prompt identified international factors as those having the most significant influence on foreign policy. In this sense, the analytical approach is informed by theory but very much grounded in practice.

At the international level, the analysis will focus on two principal factors: 1) The international threat context and the impact on regime security; and 2) the role of alliances.

Clearly, there are other factors at the international level - often produced by particular contextual circumstances - that can have a bearing on foreign policy making, and these will be noted and considered as they arise. Here again, however, the approach is informed by empirical research. Interviewees consistently pointed to regime security and how it was affected by regional events, and the importance of alliances as key international factors shaping foreign policy in the Persian Gulf region. As demonstrated below, the choice of these factors is easily justified in the relevant literature, but it is important to recognise the empirical evidence that supports this dissertation and the themes that emerge from it.

2.1.1 The international threat context and the impact on regime security

A state’s perception of the level of threat it faces in its immediate surroundings is a significant external constraint on its foreign policy. While this may appear to be a domestic constraint because it is determined in part by the leadership’s threat perceptions, the

144 perceived threat occurs outside of its borders and is therefore considered an external constraint.

How a state perceives the severity of the threats it faces will determine what action it takes in foreign policy.564 In his study on threat perception during an international crisis, Cohen states, ‘Threat perception is the decisive intervening variable between action and reaction in international crisis’.565 He defines a threat as ‘passive’; ‘an anticipation of impending danger’ in the context of his study.566 He explains that states must anticipate ‘how others will behave’ because they are forced to reckon with and coordinate their actions and behaviours ‘with that of others in the absence of means of communication’.567 In other words, states are not alone in the international system, and their foreign policy will inevitably be determined by how other states behave and whether this poses a threat to them, and importantly, to the political system they head. He also explains that when there are multiple equal actors, the actions of one will have a limited impact on the others, but when actors are few, or there is a stronger and bigger actor, then the actions of one will have a greater impact on the others.568 Jervis also defines threat perception in relation to the reaction it will spark: ‘A state that is predisposed to see either a specific other state as an adversary, or others in general as a menace, will react more strongly and more quickly

564 See for example, Richard K. Herrmann and Jonathan W. Keller, ‘Beliefs, Values, and Strategic Choice: U.S. Leaders’ Decisions to Engage, Contain, and Use Force in an Era of Globalization’, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 66, No. 2 (May 2004), 557-580; Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), 167-214; Jack S. Levy, ‘The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace’, The Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1 (June 1998), 139-165 565 Raymond Cohen, ‘Threat Perception in International Crisis’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 93, No. 1 (Spring 1978), 93 566 Ibid, 94 567 Ibid, 104 568 Ibid, 104

145 than a state that sees its environment as benign’.569 Similarly, if the external threat to the security of the government is deemed to be acute, then this will lead the state to adjust course appropriately, and also react more strongly. In their collection of essays on balance of power, Paul, Wirtz and Fortmann demonstrate that the perception and existence of a threat is what determines the steps a state will take to ensure the threat is lessened.570

Here, the authors focus on the different types of balancing states will pursue to contain or lessen the perceived threat.

Clearly, a state’s perception of the threats that exist outside of its borders plays a crucial role in determining the foreign policy it implements, especially if it views an acute threat to the security of its government or system. The perception of threats will play a significant role in determining the alliances a state pursues, the conflicts it engages with, and its foreign policy posture; whether it is assertive or whether it follows the rules set by a more powerful neighbour. As a result, it will necessarily be a significant external constraint on a state’s ability to develop foreign policy. According to Cohen, states must necessarily co-exist and factor each other in their foreign policy decisions because they do not exist independently of one another, and in order to do that they ‘must necessarily develop certain rules of the game to prevent, or at least limit, unwelcome contact’.571 This leads to the formation of alliances, security architectures and commitments, which is the next external constraint on a state’s ability to develop foreign policy that we will examine.

569 Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), 175 570 T.V Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004) 571 Raymond Cohen, ‘Threat Perception in International Crisis’, Political Science Quarterly Vol. 93, No. 1 (Spring 1978), 104

146

2.1.2 Alliances

Alliances allow states to build their security by joining forces with other, generally like- minded, states.572 They are the product of a state’s foreign policy. But they are also an additional external constraint on a government’s ability to construct foreign policy.

States pursue alliances with other states to increase their security, particularly for smaller or weaker states – in the words of Wright, ‘alliances and regional coalitions among the weak to defend themselves from the strong have been the typical method for preserving…balance’.573 Also examining it from a balance of power perspective, Morgenthau states that alliances are ‘a necessary function of the balance of power operating in a multiple state system’.574 Levy explains that states will ‘balance against those states that constitute the primary threats to their interests and particularly against any state that threatens to secure a hegemonic position’.575 Benson defines alliances as ‘a promise by one country to provide military support to another country subject to some condition’, 576 but he also believes that examining military alliances alone offers an incomplete picture because it ignores the ‘broader menu of contracts’ that make up interstate alliances.577 Benson argues

572 The scholarship on alliances is significant. See for example (this is not an exhaustive list), Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson Eds, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Random House, 1959); Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Cornell, Cornell University Press, 1987); Thomas Schelling, Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2007); Brett V. Benson, Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), 167-214; Jack S. Levy, ‘The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace’, The Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1 (June 1998), 139-165; T.V Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004) 573 Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 773 574 Morgenthau and Thompson Eds, Politics Among Nations, 175 575 Levy, ‘The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace’, 147 576 Benson, Constructing International Security, 17 577 Ibid, 4

147 that ‘International security commitments are often incomplete because it is simply not possible to anticipate every potential incident covered by the scope of the promise.

However, many are deliberately designed to be ambiguous’.578 Walt argues that this is exactly why it is vital to understand the origins of alliances for a state, otherwise it will lead to miscalculations and poor planning. Understanding the origins of alliances allows states to determine their viability; whether a state can rely on the alliance to deter an aggressor or to balance against a stronger state.579 Walt views it from a purely security standpoint, arguing that neither ideology, like-mindedness, foreign aid, nor ‘political penetration is by itself a powerful cause of alignment’, but rather, that states come together either to appease another state or to balance against it.580 He focuses on threats, rather than balance of power as a cause of alliances.

Irrespective of the reasons for it, an alliance acts as an external constraint on a state and its ability to conduct foreign policy. This is because the state will be constrained in its ability to do what it wants by the commitments it has made to other states as part of the alliance, whether that is to refrain from belligerent behaviour or to follow through on a promise of a security guarantee in the face of aggression by a third party. Much of the literature argues that the stronger and clearer the commitment, the greater the constraint on both the

‘committing’ state and on ‘receiving’ state. Indeed, both parties to the alliance (or all parties if it is a multi-state alliance) are committed to acting a certain way and refraining from

578 Brett V. Benson, Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); 2 579 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Cornell, Cornell University Press, 1987) 580 Ibid, 5

148 certain other acts in the international fora.581 Jervis for example, attributes Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991 to the unclear signals he received from the US on what was permissible.582 But a government’s misunderstanding of alliances and commitments by other states also acts as a constraint on its foreign policy because the uncertainty might force it to be more careful. Benson specifically argues that in some cases, ambiguity of commitment reinforces deterrence and prevents third party states from acting aggressively because they are unsure of what security commitments have been made to the state/region they are targeting and will therefore be more cautious in their foreign policy.583 It is clear the system of alliances and commitments a state has developed for itself acts as a significant external constraint on its ability to conduct foreign policy freely, and one which is outside of its control, once it chooses to opt into the commitment.

The above discussion provides some justification for the choice of regime security and threat perceptions and alliances as the main factors at stake at the international level of the analytical approach. Again, the intention here is not to exclude all other factors, but to focus the analytical lens on those that are a) identified as significant in the literature, and b) have been identified as key factors by a large and diverse sample of officials and experts in the region in question. The next section will shift the focus to the dissertation’s case study. The following section will briefly summarise the domestic political scene in the UAE and how domestic constraints have impacted the UAE’s ability to conduct foreign policy. This will

581 See for example, James D. Fearon, ‘Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, Issue 1 (1997), 68-90; Paul K. Huth, ‘Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,’ Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (1999), 25-48 582 Robert Jervis, ‘What Do We Want to Deter and How Do We Deter It?’, in L. Benjamin Edington and Michael J. Mazarr, Turning Point: The Gulf War and US Military Strategy (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 122 – 124 583 See Brett V. Benson, Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)

149 form the backdrop for the following three chapters, which will examine the external constraints on the UAE’s foreign policy, and its newfound increasing assertiveness, in greater detail.

3. The domestic scene in the UAE

Drawing on the analytical lens above, this section will examine one of the two contexts that affect the UAE’s ability to conduct foreign policy: It will set out some of the domestic challenges the UAE’s leadership faced, and provide a short overview of the importance of the rise of Mohammed Bin Zayed in determining the beginning of the UAE’s assertiveness, and the country’s visions and goals for its foreign policy. It will become clear that the nature of the governance system in the UAE, combined with the enormous influence wielded by

Mohammed Bin Zayed within the country, greatly reduced the constraints on foreign policy development in the domestic context.

3.1 The domestic scene

As established in chapter one, in the years that followed the British departure from the

Persian Gulf, the emirates that would form the UAE had a particularly difficult time as their leaders were embroiled in lengthy and complicated negotiations over the formation of the country and its institutions.584 The federation, according to Ulrichsen, ‘faced a challenging

584 See chapter one. For more on the formation of the UAE, see Christopher M. Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (Hurst & Company: London, 2012), 11-37; Christopher M. Davidson, ‘The United Arab Emirates’, in Christopher M. Davidson Ed, Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf monarchies (London: Hurst & Company, 2011); Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates – Power, Politics, and Policymaking (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017), 17-60

150 domestic and regional environment as a well as a protracted struggle over the balance of power between the federal and emirate levels’.585 The internal political wrangling continued in the first two decades of the UAE’s existence,586 affecting the way the country’s leadership viewed its hold on power for years to come.

Some of the leadership in the emirates that would eventually make up the UAE did not buy into the idea of creating a federation.587 The ruling families disagreed on how the country should be run, fearing they would lose control and decision-making powers, and importantly, that the bigger emirates would have a greater say in decisions that affected them.588 As a result, the federation that was established was a ‘loose confederation’ whereby certain decision-making capabilities were not transferred to Abu Dhabi, including policy on oil and defence, which remained the purview of each emirate until 1996,589 while each emirate maintained a private government and its own legislature.590 The federal nature of the country also means that ‘policymaking is filtered through multiple layers of authority’, which is ‘not replicated elsewhere in the Gulf’.591 In addition, individual emirates refused to hand over these key sectors because their security was tied to their defence decisions, and their well-being and income was intimately tied to oil sales. Indeed, the leadership in the UAE – along with the other Gulf Arab states - used oil revenues to establish

585 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Punching above its weight’, interview by Michael Young, Diwan, Carnegie Middle East Center, June 29, 2020, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/82200, 53 586 ‘Emirates Act To End Coup Crisis’, Chicago Tribune, June 19, 1987, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1987- 06-19/news/8702150353_1_ras-al-khaimah-al-qassimi-uae 587 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 17 588 Ibid, 13-15 589 Christopher M. Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (Hurst & Company: London, 2012), 35 590 Ibid, 37 591 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates – Power, Politics, and Policymaking (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017), 10

151 a ruling bargain between themselves and the governed. The bargain was a top-down driven pact that involved lavish lifestyles bestowed upon Emirati nationals by the government, in exchange for citizens ‘surrender[ing] their political and social rights to participatory government’ and not questioning the legitimacy of their rulers.592 Nevertheless, Abu Dhabi carried the mantel of the main decision-maker in the UAE, ‘not least of all because of Abu

Dhabi’s single-handed financing of most federal development projects’.593 This further increased the divisions and economic inequalities between the different emirates,594 a key challenge for the UAE even today.595 As a result, the UAE under its founder and first president, Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan was focused on building the state and its institutions, which according to Almezaini, explains why UAE foreign policy was ‘consistent at first’.596 During these years, and in the aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the

UAE’s leadership reconciled itself with the country’s position as a small power sandwiched between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and felt vulnerable to attack and subjugation to regional hegemons.597 In this context, the country’s foreign policy was limited, largely ‘idealistic’ and

‘Arab world-centered’.598 The perception of being caught between two big neighbours and its limited resources as a small state explains why the UAE relied on other states to increase

592 Mehran Kamrava, ‘Introduction’, in Mehran Kamrava Ed, Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 2 593 Christopher M. Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (Hurst & Company: London, 2012), 35 594 Christopher M. Davidson, ‘Government in the United Arab Emirates: Progress and Pathologies’, in Abbas Kadhim, Governance in the Middle East: A Handbook (London/New York: Routledge, 2013), 283 595 Christopher M. Davidson, ‘The United Arab Emirates’, in Christopher Davidson Ed, Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf monarchies (London: Hurst & Company, 2011), 29 596 Khalid Almezaini, ‘The transformation of UAE foreign policy since 2011’ in Kristian Coates Ulrichsen Ed, The Changing Security Dynamics of the Persian Gulf (London: Hurst & Company, 2017), 194 597, ‘The United Arab Emirates’, 25; Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B Taurus, 2015), 15 598 Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, ‘New assertiveness in UAE foreign policy’, Gulf News, October 9, 2012, https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/new-assertiveness-in-uae-foreign-policy-1.1086667

152 its security, including the US and Saudi Arabia, and why it acted in conjunction with others.599

3.2 The rise of Mohammed Bin Zayed and the UAE’s new foreign policy objectives

The importance of the influence of individuals and their sway over foreign policy is recognised in this section. The rise of Mohammed Bin Zayed – the ‘core policy entrepreneur’ according to David Roberts600 - changed the UAE’s initially conservative domestic and foreign policy, as he sought to adjust the UAE’s foreign policy objectives, including making the country more influential and self-sufficient.601 The section below will briefly examine

MBZ’s rise and the effect this had on the country’s foreign policy objectives.

Mohammed Bin Zayed is the third son of Sheikh Zayed. Following his education abroad,

MBZ returned to the UAE where he became chief of staff of the UAE armed forces in 1993.

During this time, ‘he led the modernization of the armed forces…[and] promoted the professionalization of the military…and the development of a domestic arms manufacturing programme’.602 As well as being appointed as chief of staff of the armed forces,

Mohammed Bin Zayed also advised his father on security issues.603 This meant that by the

599 Khalid Almezaini, ‘The transformation of UAE foreign policy since 2011’ in Kristian Coates Ulrichsen Ed, The Changing Security Dynamics of the Persian Gulf (London: Hurst & Company, 2017), 193 600 David B. Roberts, ‘Bucking the Trend: The UAE and the Development of Military Capabilities in the Arab World’, Security Studies, Vol. 29, Issue 2 (2020), 321 601 Michael Young, ‘Punching above its weight – an interview with Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Diwan, Carnegie Middle East Center (29 June 2020), https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/82200; ‘UAE Foreign Policy: Beyond the Gulf’, Gulf 2000 Webinar, July 2, 2020 602 Peter Salisbury, ‘Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy’, Chatham House Research Paper (July 2020), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-07-01-risk-in-uae- salisbury.pdf, 10 603 Ibid, 10

153 time his father died in 2004, he was ‘already the de facto decisionmaker in the military’.604

He also became Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi in November 2004, was appointed Deputy

Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces in January 2005 and serves as a special adviser to the President of the UAE, Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, his older brother.

According to the US ambassador to the UAE, Mohammed Bin Zayed was ‘the man who runs the United Arab Emirates’ and ‘the key decision maker on national security issues’ by

2009.605 The ambassador added, ‘we assess that he has authority in all matters except for final decisions on oil policy and major state expenditures’. In 2010, Sheikh Saqr Bin

Mohammed Al Qassimi of Ras Al Khaimah, the only remaining founding father of the UAE, died, just as Sheikh Khalifa withdrew himself from public life for health reasons. As a result,

‘Mohammed Bin Zayed became the de facto decisionmaker in Abu Dhabi…’ and despite not having a federal-level position, he ‘was gradually able to centralize decision-making authority at a UAE-wide level in Abu Dhabi’, explained Ulrichsen.606

The UAE’s approach to foreign policy gradually changed as Mohammed Bin Zayed became more prominent, demonstrating the sway a single individual could have on a country’s foreign policy in a non-democratic state.607 Mohammed Bin Zayed sought to ensure the UAE would never find itself vulnerable in the same way that Kuwait had during the Iraqi invasion.608 As a result, his new foreign policy objectives included becoming as self-sufficient

604 David B. Roberts, ‘Bucking the Trend: The UAE and the Development of Military Capabilities in the Arab World’, Security Studies, Vol. 29, Issue 2 (2020), 320 605 US Embassy in the UAE, ‘Scene-setter for the President’s Meeting with Shaykh Mohammed Bin Zayed,’ Wikileaks Cable, August 31, 2009, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUDHABI862_a.html 606 Michael Young, ‘Punching above its weight – an interview with Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Diwan, Carnegie Middle East Center (29 June 2020), https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/82200 607 Leah Sherwood, ‘Risk diversification and the United Arab Emirates’ Foreign Policy’ in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 152 608 Roberts, ‘Bucking the Trend: The UAE and the Development of Military Capabilities in the Arab World’, 308

154 as possible while ensuring that foreign powers had a stake in its security; boosting its international and regional influence in the defence of its political and economic interests; and developing lasting relations with friendly powers, especially Saudi Arabia, 609 while containing threats, predominantly Iran610 and Islamism.611 The former US ambassador to the

UAE, Richard Olson said in 2009, ‘MBZ stated the UAE has two enemies, Iran and terrorism’.612 The cable goes on to outline Mohammed Bin Zayed’s firm belief that Iran is working with the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar to destabilise the UAE and the region.613

According to Davidson, the UAE had tried to position itself as a ‘wealthy active neutral’ state in the region until 2011, allowing it to continue working with its ally Saudi Arabia as it sought to involve itself in international fora as a mediator.614 Emma Soubrier says the UAE had a policy of ‘armed neutrality’, which ‘implied no projection of forces except for the occasional peacekeeping operations’ in order to build experience of foreign deployments and demonstrate its reliability as a partner.615 This was in large part a legacy of Sheikh Zayed Bin

609 Hussein Lbish, ‘The UAE’s Evolving National Security Strategy’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington Report (6 April 2017), https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/UAE-Security_ONLINE.pdf, 6 610 Ibid, 4-6; see also several Wikileaks Cables describing the UAE’s fears of Iran, including US Embassy in the UAE, ‘Strong Words in Private from MBZ at IDEX – Bashes Iran, Qatar, Russia,’ Wikileaks Cable, February 25, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUDHABI193_a.html; US Embassy in the UAE, ‘Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Warns DOE DepSec Poneman About Iran,’ Wikileaks Cable, December 17, 2009, https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL0912/S00001/cablegate-abu-dhabi-crown-prince-warns-doe-depsec- poneman-about-iran.htm; US Embassy in the UAE, ‘US-UAE Cooperation Against Taliban Finance Continues,’ Wikileaks Cable, January 24, 2010, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10ABUDHABI27_a.html 611 David B. Roberts, ‘Bucking the Trend: The UAE and the Development of Military Capabilities in the Arab World’, Security Studies, Vol. 29, Issue 2 (2020), 323 612 US Embassy in the UAE, ‘Strong Words in Private from MBZ at IDEX – Bashes Iran, Qatar, Russia,’ Wikileaks Cable, February 25, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUDHABI193_a.html 613 Ibid 614 Christopher M. Davidson, ‘The United Arab Emirates’, in Christopher Davidson Ed, Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf monarchies (London: Hurst & Company, 2011), 24 615 Emma Soubrier, ‘Evolving foreign and security policies: a comparative study of Qatar and the UAE’ in in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 133

155

Sultan Al Nahyan’s rule.616 Nevertheless, Mohammed Bin Zayed made the UAE ‘more willing to go beyond its immediate neighbourhood’ through the deployment of forces in Kosovo [in

1999], believing that would be an ‘invaluable opportunity for the UAE to get operational experience and to learn from the very best’617 – an experience it repeated in Afghanistan in

2001.618 Of the new objectives of Emirati foreign policy, two became increasingly important:

The fight against Islamism and the goal of containing Iran.

3.2.1 The fight against Islamism

Over the years, Abu Dhabi came to believe that Islamism posed the single biggest threat to its power; an ‘existential threat’,619 and the ‘gravest threat to the UAE’s domestic security and to long-term regional order’.620 The threat posed by Islamism became more acute for the UAE following the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Islamists became ‘increasingly politicised’ following the invasion and the arrival of US troops, invoking the Islamic right to criticise their governments for allowing the arrival of foreign, and especially the US military in their countries.621 In addition, Mohammed Bin Zayed harboured a personal fear and hatred of Islamists, and believed they aimed to exploit any opportunity

616 Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, ‘New assertiveness in UAE foreign policy’, Gulf News, October 9, 2012, https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/new-assertiveness-in-uae-foreign-policy-1.1086667 617 Remarks by Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘UAE Foreign Policy: Beyond the Gulf’, Gulf 2000 Webinar, July 2, 2020 618 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates: Power, Politics and Policymaking (London and New York: Routledge, 2017) 619 Author interview with former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019); David Goldfischer, ‘The United States and its Key Gulf Allies: A new Foundation for a troubled partnership?’ in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring, 79 620 Peter Salisbury, ‘Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy’, Chatham House Research Paper (July 2020), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-07-01-risk-in-uae- salisbury.pdf, 15 621 Frederic M. Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 14

156 to take over the region and could not be trusted or moderated through dialogue and integration.622 According to Salisbury,

A principal driving force in the UAE leadership’s approach to the region is as much

what it stands against as what it stands for. MBZ and his inner circle perceive that

transnational, political Islamist ideologies promoted by Iran and the Sunni Islamist

Muslim Brotherhood and its boosters, including but not limited to Qatar and Turkey,

pose an existential threat to the stability of so-called ‘status quo’ powers in the

region, and act as a driver of regional radicalism.623

According to a New York Times profile of Mohammed Bin Zayed, he makes ‘little distinction among Islamist groups, insisting that they all share the same goal: some version of a caliphate with the Quran in place of a constitution’.624 He regards ‘political Islamism as a tool used by regional rivals including Iran, Qatar and Turkey to project their own power and weaken Gulf monarchies and secular republics alike’.625 As such, for Abu Dhabi the Muslim

Brotherhood was a ‘security challenge’ equivalent to the Iranian threat,626 which it aimed to

622 US Embassy in the UAE, ‘UAE Officials Query Deputy Secretary Armitage on Arab Media Iraq, and Israel,’ Wikileaks Cable, April 28, 2004, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04ABUDHABI1344_a.html; US Embassy in the UAE, ‘U/S Burns’ January 22 Meeting with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and UAE Foreign Minister,’ Wikileaks Cable, January 24, 2007, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07ABUDHABI97_a.html; Robert F. Worth, ‘Mohammed bin Zayed’s Dark Vision of the Middle East’s Future’, The New York Times Magazine, January 9, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/magazine/united-arab-emirates-mohammed-bin-zayed.html 623 Peter Salisbury, ‘Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy’, Chatham House Research Paper (July 2020), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-07-01-risk-in-uae- salisbury.pdf, 9 624 Worth, ‘Mohammed bin Zayed’s Dark Vision of the Middle East’s Future’ 625 Salisbury, ‘Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy’, 15 626 Emma Soubrier, ‘Evolving foreign and security policies: a comparative study of Qatar and the UAE’ in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring, 137

157 contain through a policy of ‘quiet marginalisation’ for a number of years.627 The UAE ambassador to the US summarised the leadership’s sentiment vis-à-vis Islamism in 2009,

‘senior Abu Dhabi ruling family members have made clear their concern about extremism and have taken concrete actions to minimize both the presence and influence of extremist

Islam in the Emirates’.628 The perceived existential threat posed by Islamism forms a large part of the backdrop to the UAE’s increased assertiveness from 2011 point onwards because events such as the Arab Spring exacerbated this threat, especially as it coincided with a perceived US withdrawal from the region.629

3.2.2 Containing Iran

Iran has long been considered a major regional hegemon and problem for the UAE. A former

Emirati advisor to the government explained that Abu Dhabi considered the Iranian threat

‘existential’.630 First, while the fear of Iran existed before 1979 because of the Shah’s hegemonic ambitions in the region, the Islamic Republic’s desire to spread the Islamic revolution in the region exacerbated the threat.631 Second, the very nature of the Islamic

Republic posed a threat to the UAE, which pioneered and preached a form of ‘secular

627 Ingo Forstenlechner, Emilie J. Rutledge and Rashed Alnuaimi, ‘The UAE, the ‘Arab Spring’ and different types of dissent’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 19, Issue 4 (December 2012) 628 US Embassy in the UAE, ‘A Long Hot Summer for UAE-Saudi Relations,’ Wikileaks Cable, October 29, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUDHABI981_a.html 629 Author interview with Andreas Krieg, Lecturer, School of Security Studies, King’s College London, London (8 October 2019); Author interview with former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019) 630 Author interview with former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019) 631 Ruhollah Khomeini, Governance of the Jurist: Islamic Government (Tehran: The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works – International Affairs Department, 1970), 23-24; Ruhollah Khomeini, ‘We shall confront the world with our ideology’, Speech, Radio Tehran (21 March 1980), in ‘Iran’s Revolution: The First Year’, Middle East Reports, Vol 10 (May/June 1980)

158

Islamism’: A country with a Muslim population but where Islamism had no role in politics.632

Article 7 of the Emirati constitution enshrines Islam as the official religion of the country,633 but the UAE’s leadership has historically separated church and state as much as possible.634

The Islamic Republic therefore stood in stark contrast to the UAE’s vision of statehood.635 In

2008, the US Charge d’Affaires in the UAE summarised Abu Dhabi’s position on Iran:

The UAE military has long viewed Iran as its top security threat in spite of the

extensive economic relationship the two countries share…UAE military planners will

continue to focus on it as the primary driver of defense procurements. Mohammed

Bin Zayed will stress the continual concern that Iran poses to the UAE; he will speak

632 James Langton and Haneen Dajani, ‘UAE ambassador explains what secularism means for Middle East governance’, The National, August 8, 2017, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-ambassador-explains-what- secularism-means-for-middle-east-governance-1.618023 633 Article 7, Constitution of the United Arab Emirates (1996), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ae/ae030en.pdf 634 David B. Roberts, ‘Mosque and State: The United Arab Emirates’ Secular Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-arab-emirates/2016-03-18/mosque-and-state 635 For more on the Iranian revolution see, Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); Brendan January, The Iranian Revolution (Minneapolis: Twenty-First Century Books, 2008); Charles Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2005); Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (Yale: Yale University Press, 2006), 170-322. For more on the idea of Velayat-e-Faqih and the structure of the new Iranian government, see Ruhollah Khomeini, Governance of the Jurist: Islamic Government (Tehran: The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works – International Affairs Department, 1970); Rouzbeh Parsi Ed, ‘Iran: A Revolutionary Republic in Transition’, European Union Institute for Security Studies Chaillot Paper, No. 128 (February 2012), https://www.issueeuropa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/cp128- Iran_A_revolutionary_republic_in_transition_0.pdf; Daniel Brumberg and Farideh Farhi Eds, Change in Iran: Politics of Contention and Conciliation (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2016); Mehran Tamadonfar, Islamic Law and Governance in Contemporary Iran: Transcending Islam for Social, Economic and Political Order (London: Lexington Books, 2015); Fakhreddin Azimi, The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A Cenutry of Struggle against Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2008); Arshin Adib-Moghaddam Ed, A Critical Introduction to Khomeini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 69-115; David Menashiri, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society and Power (London and New York: Routledge, 2001); Abbas Milani, ‘Decision Making in Iran's Foreign Policy: A Heuristic Approach’, Journal of Social Affairs, Vol. 73 (Spring 2002)

159

out in private with USG interlocutors against the "superpower" ambitions of his

Persian neighbors’.636

Indeed, Salisbury says ‘Mohammed Bin Zayed, like his father, has long feared an attack on the UAE by Iran. A former senior Western diplomat described Mohammed Bin Zayed as

‘obsessed’ with the idea of an Iranian attack on the UAE’.637 The fear of Iran extended to a mistrust of all Shia Muslims, and was a sentiment felt throughout the Emirati elite, including

Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the leader of Dubai, which had the closest ties to Iran. In 2006, US CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid met with Mohammed Bin Zayed and Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, and summarised their views in a cable:

[Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum] MBR said that while he views Shia as Muslims,

he worries where their allegiance lies. Both [Mohammed Bin Zayed] MBZ and MBR

believed that with the Shia tradition of veneration of religious figures, Iraqi Shia

loyalties were more to their religion and, by extension, to Iran, than to their own

country.638

As a result, containing Iran and its hegemonic ambitions became a foreign policy objective.

But despite the widespread fear and mistrust of Iran, the different emirates could not agree

636 US Embassy in the UAE, ‘March 11 Gulf Security Dialogue and March 12 Joint Military Committee with UAE,’ Wikileaks Cable, March 6, 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08ABUDHABI296_a.html 637 Peter Salisbury, ‘Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy’, Chatham House Research Paper (July 2020), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-07-01-risk-in-uae- salisbury.pdf, 13 638 US Embassy in the UAE, ‘General Abizaid Meeting with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Dubai Crown Prince,’ Wikileaks Cable, January 2, 2006, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06DUBAI10_a.html

160 on a unified policy towards Iran.639 Dubai for example, maintained extensive ties with Iran and served as a transhipment hub for Iran-bound goods during the height of sanctions, while Abu Dhabi continued to call for a tougher line on Tehran.640

The literature on foreign policy analysis demonstrates the importance of the domestic arena in explaining a country’s foreign policy. But it also demonstrates some of the limits, including that it is mainly focused on the domestic and foreign constraints that democratic states face. The UAE – the main subject of this dissertation, along with some of its small Gulf

Arab neighbours, are monarchies and not subject to some of the domestic constraints faced by democracies. As a result, public opinion on foreign policy is a lesser concern, as are domestic groups and stakeholders who can effectively sway decision-making by the elites. In the UAE, Mohammed Bin Zayed sought to centralise foreign policy decision-making, which is the purview of a small elite. In other words, while the domestic scene remains a source of foreign policy, the impact of domestic constraints is somewhat lessened for countries that are not democratic, like the UAE. All states, however, must contend with an international context, which is generally, outside their control. In addition, for the UAE, which had already displayed elements of assertiveness prior to 2011, it was the opportunities created and the fears sparked by a series of events in the region after this date, that helped engrain its assertiveness and gave it added momentum.641 In other words, while the foreign policy

639 Abdullah Baabood, ‘Dynamics and Determinants of the GCC States’ Foreign Policy with Special Reference to the EU’, in Gerd Nonneman Ed, Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe (London and New York: Routledge: 2005), 146; Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 129-130 640 Karim Sadjadpour, ‘The Battle of Dubai: The United Arab Emirates and the U.S.-Iran Cold War’, The Carnegie Papers (July 2011), 9 641 Interviews with regional decision-makers and experts overwhelmingly point to a series of events in the region that provided the UAE with the opportunity to develop and enact its greater assertiveness

161 decision-making was made domestically, as was the allocation of resources for its foreign policy, the policy of growing assertiveness was in large part, in response to regional events after 2011. As a result, in order to help explain the UAE’s growing assertiveness, this dissertation focuses on the regional and international context – the primary arena in which the changes were enabled, developed, and enacted. The next section will introduce the events in the region, referred to as ‘disorder catalysts’, which engrained the trend of assertiveness for the UAE.

4. The disorder catalysts

This dissertation noted that prior to the 2011 Arab Spring, the region was predominantly marked by the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Today, while that rivalry remains, the region is marked by the greater assertiveness of the UAE. Abu Dhabi developed a desire to increase its hard power through the purchase of military hardware beginning at the end of the nineties, and even put some of it to use in its contribution to peacekeeping efforts in

Kosovo and Afghanistan.642 But while those deployments were valuable to showcase some of the its capabilities, and for Abu Dhabi to gain valuable insight and experience in this type of deployment, they remained limited in scale and only in collaboration with other countries. After the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, the UAE, and to a lesser extent, some of the smaller Gulf Arab states, aware of their growing strengths, became increasingly

642‘UAE to keep troops in Kosovo’, Reuters, 14 March 14, 2000. These contributions were controversial, see for example, Will Bartlet, James Ker-Lindsey, Kristian Alexander, Tena Prelec, ‘The UAE as an Emerging Actor in the Western Balkans: The Case of Strategic Investment in Serbia’, Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea, Vol. 7, Issue 1: Special Section: New Perspectives on UAE Foreign Policy (2017), 94-112; Tena Prelec, ‘The UAE’s presence in the Balkans: Commercial interest, geopolitical calculations, or a meeting point between ‘sultanism’ and authoritarianism?’, LSE Blogs, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/07/11/the- uaes-presence-in-the-balkans/

162 assertive in the pursuit of their interests. This dissertation highlights three catalysts that helped establish and intensify the growing trend of assertiveness: The Arab Spring, the

Obama administration’s announcement of the Pivot to Asia and what this meant regarding perceptions of US commitment to the region, and finally, the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran.

This section will introduce these catalysts before they are analysed further in the next three chapters.

The 2011 Arab Spring spearheaded the regional change that is the focus of this dissertation.

The wave of unrests that swept through the Arab world caught the elites in the UAE and other smaller Gulf Arab countries off-guard,643 and posed several domestic and regional problems for them. Domestically, it highlighted their vulnerability to turbulence and change, effectively putting the ruling families at risk of being toppled. Outside their borders, the

Arab Spring left a significant void in the region following the collapse of countries like Egypt

– once a regional leader – into disarray, providing the Gulf Arab States with an opportunity to step in and fill the power vacuum. This coincided with the beginning of the impression that their US ally would no longer blindly defend its partners in the region;644 the Gulf Arabs saw the Obama administration’s support for change in Egypt, as abandoning its ally.645

Finally, Tehran’s response to the Arab Spring; calling for an ‘Islamic Awakening’,646 was received as a direct threat to the leadership in the Gulf Arab states.647 The combination of threats and opportunities the Arab Spring unleashed gave greater urgency to the UAE’s

643 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 644 Ibid 645 Author interview with Abdullah Baabood, former Professor, Qatar University, Doha (15 May 2016) 646 Ali Khamenei, ‘Speech to Iran’s Assembly of Experts’, Speech, Tehran, September 15, 2010, http://english.khamenei.ir/news/1416/Leader-s-View-of-Islamic-Awakening, accessed 8 January 2018 647 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17)

163 need to become self-sufficient and no longer rely on regional and international allies to guarantee its security, and provided it with the opportunity to act more assertively on the regional stage in order to achieve its objectives.

But while the first catalyst spearheaded the regional change, it was both the lead up to, and the aftermath of, the Obama administration’s announcement of the Pivot to Asia as a US policy goal – identified here as the second catalyst – that provided the backdrop for the decision by the UAE and its smaller Gulf Arab neighbours to diminish their reliance on the

United States as their security provider. The announcement made by President Obama in a speech to the Australian parliament in November 2011,648 followed Secretary of State

Hillary Clinton’s op-ed in Foreign Policy the month before,649 called into question the commitment of the US to the Middle East – or at least, that was how it was perceived by the

Gulf Arab elites.650 It highlighted the Gulf Arab states’ reliance on the US for their security needs, and how changes to Washington’s foreign policy priorities would have a detrimental effect on their security. In the UAE, the general impression among policy-makers was that the US was ‘not doing enough’ in the region, and that it was too ‘legacy driven’.651 While the

US Pivot did not have much of an impact on the ground,652 the psychological impact was significant, with trust of the US at an all-time low during President Obama’s final years in

648 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,’ Speech, Australian Parliament, Canberra, November 17, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks- president-obama-australian-parliament 649 Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/ 650 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 651 Author roundtable with the Policy Planning Unit, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016) 652 See chapter six

164 office.653 As a result, the leadership in the UAE concluded that it was imperative for them to diversify their sources of security, while they built up their self-sufficiency.

The final catalyst that firmly intensified and entrenched this trend for the UAE, was the final round of negotiations leading up to the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1, and the deal itself. In the context of the perceived US disengagement from the Middle East,

President Obama’s engagement of Tehran further worsened the Gulf Arab fear of being abandoned by the US, and established a new fear: that the US would turn to their regional rival, Iran, instead.654 It also led to concerns over what a legitimised and bolstered Tehran would do in the region.655 In fact, a few months after the nuclear deal, the UAE ambassador to the US, Ambassador Al Otaiba, stated that the ‘nuclear deal was only good if it also meant that Iran would deal differently with the region’, but there had been ‘no change on ground in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon since the nuclear deal. It didn’t help the region’.656 The UAE and its allies believed the deal had legitimised the Islamic Republic in the eyes of the international community, helped it out of isolation, and provided it with the means to continue its regional foreign policy, all as the US was disengaging itself from the region.657 The 2015 nuclear deal with Iran reiterated the Iranian threat and firmly established the UAE’s need to wean itself off the US as much as possible, and rely solely on itself for the defence of its interests.

653 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers and officials, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 654 Ibid 655 Ibid 656 Author interview with Youssef Al Otaiba, UAE ambassador to the USA, Washington DC (2 March 2016) 657 Loveday Morris and Hugh Naylor, ‘Arab states fear nuclear deal will give Iran a bigger regional role’, The Washington Post, July 14, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/arab-states-fear- dangerous-iranian-nuclear-deal-will-shake-up-region/2015/07/14/96d68ff3-7fce-4bf5-9170- 6bcc9dfe46aa_story.html?utm_term=.703afe67ab01

165

The three catalysts – the Arab Spring, the Pivot to Asia and the nuclear deal with Iran - served to emphasise the power vacuum left in the region by the collapse of the traditional

Arab leaders and states, highlight Iran as a problem for GCC states for the foreseeable future and finally, reinforce the perception that they were alone to deal with security problems. In the following three chapters, each catalyst will be examined separately by discussing the context in which they emerged and the events themselves. This is the international level of the analytical approach. In each chapter, the analysis will seek to understand how the events in question relate to the factors identified as significant in the conceptual discussion above. For each catalyst, the dissertation will assess the reactions of some of the smaller Gulf Arab states, but it will focus on the UAE as the leader of this trend.

166

Chapter 5: Catalyst one - The 2011 Arab Spring

On 17 December 2010, when Mohammed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, set himself on fire in protest at the way he was treated after he could not bribe police officials to allow him to continue his street vending, he could not have foreseen the changes this would lead to in his region. The so-called ‘Arab Spring’ began in Tunisia and subsequently spread throughout the Middle East, fundamentally altering the security dynamics of the region. While the protests did topple some of the region’s autocrats, it did not change much of the day-to-day issues that fed the discontent in the region or lead to much change in the way in which they were ruled. But it altered the way states behaved in the region. The revolts left a gaping hole in the region’s security dynamics as major regional leaders fell, alternative non- governmental power centres emerged, and the US, considered the traditional security guarantor,658 did not step in to ensure the survival of US-friendly governments, providing an opportunity for other states to fill the void. And fill the void they did; most notably the UAE and to a lesser extent, some of the other smaller Gulf Arab states, such as Qatar. They saw the uprisings as ‘a rare opportunity to revise the regional order in their favour and establish their control in new ways’.659 This led to a shift in ‘the centre of the gravity in the Middle

East’: power shifted from the traditional Arab leaders – such as Egypt and Syria - to the wealthy Gulf Arab states.660 But the Arab Spring was also perceived as a threat to the Gulf

658 Karl P. Mueller, Becca Wasser, Jeffrey Martini, Stephen Watts, ‘U.S Strategic Interests in the Middle East and the Implications for the Army’, RAND Corporation – Perspective (2017), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE265/RAND_PE265.pdf; Shahram Akbarzadeh, America’s Challenges in the Greater Middle East – the Obama Administration’s Policies (New York; Palgrave MacMillan, 2011); Michael A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding role in the Persian Gulf 1833 – 1922 (New York: Macmillan Inc, 1999) 659 March Lynch, The New Arab Wars – Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 27 660 Author interview with Michael Hanna, Senior Fellow, The Century Foundation, New York (30 October 2019)

167 monarchies’ domestic political systems and society, as it ‘starkly exposed’ the ‘false stability enjoyed by the autocratic regimes’.661 The protests were a threat to the political systems in the Gulf Arab states and to their ruling families, which was highlighted by several interviewees.662 Protestors demanded a greater say in decision-making, as well as greater social, political and speech freedoms. But none of these demands fit in with the existing social contract in the Gulf Arab states, which involved lavish government spending on citizens in exchange for an acceptance of the legitimacy of the ruling families.663 The leadership in the Gulf Arab countries found themselves having to protect their existing political systems through token reforms and economic handouts, but also by cracking down on the protests. The UAE for its part, moved rapidly to crack down on any expression of discontent and desire for change, and combined it with limited elections and further financial assistance, which enabled Abu Dhabi to manage the discontent. Nevertheless, the

Arab Spring clearly affected the UAE and its Gulf Arab neighbours’ international threat context, which in turn, had a perceived impact on their regime security – one of the two key international constraints on foreign policy identified in the previous chapter. This, in turn, impacted the way they conducted foreign policy as they became more willing to involve themselves in the region to both increase their power and influence.

661 March Lynch, The New Arab Wars – Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 13 662 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 663 Gregory F. Grause III, ‘Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian Stability’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 4 (July/August 2011), 85

168

The leadership in the region also saw a weakened Arab world following the outbreak of the protests;664 a regional central bank official stated that the Arab Spring had weakened regional economies,665 while a policy planning team from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the region highlighted that the Arab Spring had also created ‘major divisions’ between countries in the region,666 allowing countries like Iran to expand their influence. The fear of

Iran was heightened by the perception that the US - the region’s traditional security guarantor - was losing interest in the region and in the security and stability of its Gulf Arab partners.667 The perceived US abandonment of President Mubarak of Egypt, a long-time partner of the US, was seen as proof of Washington’s new stance on the region.668 This affected the Gulf Arab states’ perception of their security alliances and their relationships with extra-regional powers – the second element of international constraints on foreign policy. This in turn, acted as a constraint on their foreign policymaking. The Arab Spring marked the beginning of the entrenchment of a regional trend: that of the growing assertiveness of the UAE, elements of which other small Gulf Arab countries also pursued.

The previous chapter set out the analytical approach that will be used to explore the causal factors underpinning the trend of increased assertiveness in the UAE, and to some extent in the region more broadly. It then identified three catalysts that helped cement and speed up the trend of growing assertiveness in the region: the 2011 Arab Spring, the announced US

664 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers and officials, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17); March Lynch, The New Arab Wars – Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 54 665 Author interview with a Central Bank official, Manama (9 December 2012) 666 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 667 Ibid 668 Ibid; Author interview with a former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019); Author interview with Michael Hanna, Senior Fellow, The Century Foundation, New York (30 October 2019); Lynch, The New Arab Wars, 22-23, 54, 55, 146

169

Pivot to Asia and the perception of US disengagement from the region, followed by the 2015

Iran nuclear deal. This chapter will begin the in-depth assessment of the three catalysts, beginning with the 2011 Arab Spring. It will examine the outbreak of the Arab Spring and how it impacted the UAE and its neighbours and the effect it had on their foreign policies.

While focusing on the UAE, it will also discuss the impact of these events on other Gulf Arab states because they shared some of the UAE’s assessments of the protests and their impact.

The Arab Spring created a significant power vacuum as regional powerhouses collapsed, leaving the Gulf Arab states eager to expand their influence and involvement in the region both as an opportunity and a way to secure themselves. It also highlighted the Iranian threat, as Iran too, sought to capitalise on the wave of unrest that swept through the region and expanded its power projection. Finally, it established the realisation that the US - the

Gulf Arab states’ primary security guarantor - was prepared to sit back and observe events, and that its support was no longer guaranteed. The chapter will then summarise some of the changes the Arab Spring led to, including an immediate regrouping of the GCC before internal rifts re-appeared, noting that the presence of the UAE’s greater assertiveness as a result of the Arab Spring and the other catalysts, was already discussed in chapter three.

1. Drivers of the Arab Spring

Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire on 17 December 2010 to protest the way he had been treated by the authorities. The police in Sidi Bouzid, a small provincial town in Tunisia, had confiscated the vegetable vendor’s card when he refused to pay a bribe, and when he

170 went to the local governmental building to complain, he was not allowed inside.669 His self- immolation sparked protests in Sidi Bouzid, which rapidly spread to the rest of the country through the use of social media, to the surprise of many.670 It also spread beyond Tunisia, into Egypt, Libya, and the rest of the Middle East. The scale and complexity of the Arab

Spring – a fluid and rapidly evolving social movement that spread across several cultural and national contexts – is one of the reasons that much has been written on it.671 While the impact of the revolts was different throughout the region, the demonstrators all shared certain grievances, including dissatisfaction with quality of life, poor socio-economic conditions and political discontent with what were perceived by the citizenry as corrupt and overbearing regimes.672 The demonstrations also,

Shared common themes, slogans, modes of action, expectations and

hopes…Beholden to no government or singular movement and empowered by

669 Marc Fisher, ‘In Tunisia, act of one fruit vendor sparks wave of revolution through Arab world’, The Washington Post, 26 March 26, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-tunisia-act-of-one-fruit- vendor-sparks-wave-of-revolution-through-arab- world/2011/03/16/AFjfsueB_story.html?utm_term=.ca7af8075dbd 670 Ibid; Bilal Randeree, ‘Protests continue in Tunisia’, Al Jazeera, December 26, 2010, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/2010122682433751904.html 671 For more on the history and causes of the Arab Spring, see March Lynch, The New Arab Wars – Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016); Fisher, ‘In Tunisia, act of one fruit vendor sparks wave of revolution through Arab world’; Larbi Sadiki Ed, Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization (London and New York: Routledge, 2015); Kenneth M. Pollack, The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011); Steven A. Cook, False Dawn: Protest, Democracy and Violence in the New Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2013); Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Digital Media and the Arab Spring (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Robin Wright, Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion Across the Islamic World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012); Marc Lynch Ed, The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East (New York: Columbia Studies in Middle East Politics, 2014) 672 Steven A. Cook, Lorenzo Moretti and David Rudin, ‘Corruption and the Arab Spring’, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 2012), 21-28; Matthew Partridge, ‘How the economic policies of a corrupt elite caused the Arab Spring’, The New Stateman, June 7, 2011

171

ubiquitous communications technology, these movements violated the long-

standing experiences of Arab politics.673

Cognisant that briefly summarising such a momentous event will not do justice to its complexity, it is important to have a basic understanding of the drivers if we are to understand why this event had such a significant impact on the way the leadership in the smaller Gulf Arab states and the UAE in particular viewed the region and their ability to influence the course of events. This section identifies some of the key drivers of the Arab

Spring by grouping them into two main sections: grievances, and shared identity and the role of technology.

1.1. Political, social, and economic grievances

Protesters in Sidi Bouzid, a governorate within the capital Tunis, initially wanted to show solidarity with Mr Bouzizi, but underlying anger at the generally poor socio-economic conditions and quality of life, the lack of political freedoms and the corruption of the ruling classes in Tunisia soon emerged as dominant themes.674 Political representation and the sense of not having a voice was a core driver of discontent, especially as the regime had

673 March Lynch, The New Arab Wars – Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 7 674 For more on the origins of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, see Christopher Alexander, Tunisia: From Stability to Revolution in the Maghreb (New York: Routledge, 2016)

172 silenced previous protests.675 Crucially, these themes were not limited to the Tunisian context, they were felt throughout the region.676

In nearby Egypt, labour unrest overlapped with a growing youth movement that was tired of widespread inequality677 and false promises of reform, and this despite the growth rates achieved in both countries.678 In Libya and Yemen, the context for the uprisings was not dissimilar: Popular discontent over regime corruption, brutality and nepotism,679 and the lack of economic opportunities, both for the youth,680 and for women.681 In Yemen, however, the political context was also key to the outbreak of demonstrations: There were serious divisions between the north and the south of the country, but the presence of the

Houthis - an opposition Islamic political and armed movement that emerged in the 1990s - in the crowds made Yemen’s neighbours nervous, and as such, led to the internationalisation of its internal troubles.682 In Bahrain, the protests were also the result of

675 See for example, the repression of protestors at Redeyef in 2008, Jean-Marie Lemaire, Rim Mathlouti, ‘Redeyef, the precursor of the Tunisian revolution’, France 24, February 15, 2011, https://www.france24.com/en/20110215-reporters-tunisia-redeyef-gafsa-mining-phosphate-accusations- competition-rigged-ben-ali-supporters-protests-journalists 676 Gregory F. Grause III, ‘Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian Stability’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 4 (July/August 2011), 88 677 See Elena Ianchovichina, Lili Mottaghi, Shantayanan Devarajan, ‘Inequality, uprisings, and conflict in the Arab World’, The World Bank, October 21, 2015, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/303441467992017147/Inequality-uprisings-and-conflict-in-the- Arab-World; see also ‘Socio-Economic Context and Impact of the 2011 Events in the Middle East and North Africa Region’, MENA-OECD Investment Programme Reports (December 2011), http://www.oecd.org/mena/competitiveness/49171115.pdf 678 Grause, ‘Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian Stability’, 86 679 Lina Khatib and Ellen Lust Eds, Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2014), viii 680 International Monetary Fund, ‘Libya: 2013 Article IV Consultation’, IMF Country Report No. 12/150 (May 2013), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13150.pdf, 12 681 Lili Mottaghi, ‘The Problem of Unemployment in the Middle East and North Africa explained in Three Charts’, The World Bank – Voices and Views: Middle East and North Africa, August 25, 2014, http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/problem-unemployment-middle-east-and-north-africa-explained- three-charts 682 March Lynch, The New Arab Wars – Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 2, 65, 66

173 dissatisfaction with the ruling family and socio-economic conditions. But this time, they were closely related to sectarian divisions within the country: with the majority Shia population calling for a greater say in the country’s political and economic spheres.683 The sectarian dimension was significant in the Persian Gulf, as differences in socio-economic conditions between the Sunnis and Shias in the Gulf Arab countries and the deliberate marginalisation of the Shia684 exacerbated feelings of disenfranchisement. In Saudi Arabia, the country’s minority Shia community, concentrated in the oil rich Eastern province, had been deliberately marginalised politically and economically for years, and subject to discrimination.685 Sectarianism meant that the elite’s response was calibrated to ensure that perceived Iranian influence over the Shia in their countries was addressed and contained.

1.2 Shared Identity and the role of technology

The social, economic, and political grievances were felt throughout the Middle East, even though the expression of discontent began in Tunisia. Its spread was boosted by Pan-

Arabism - shared grievances with others of similar backgrounds,686 as well as the prevalence of technology, television and social media.687 In some cases, like in the Persian Gulf, the discontent was heightened because of identity and sectarian politics; given the inequalities that existed between the Shias and Sunnis.

683 Frederic M. Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 70-83 684 Ibid, xiv; Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 108 685 Toby Matthiesen, The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 8, 10, 16, 217-218; Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf, 16, 105, 121 686 Gregory F. Grause III, ‘Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian Stability’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 4 (July/August 2011), 88 687 Author interview with Michael Hanna, Senior Fellow, The Century Foundation, New York (30 October 2019)

174

The existence of shared grievances throughout the region provided organisers of the protests in each country with an opportunity: to tap into those grievances and the momentum that had been initiated. The shared grievances contributed to reducing the geographical distance among each theatre of discontent and provided protestors with a sense of belonging to an immediate community that shared those grievances. Reinoud

Leenders expands on this by referring to the protests in Syria.688 According to him, despite the lack of change in the features of the Syrian regime – it was still as oppressive as before and no cracks or differences had emerged within it – the protests gained momentum at this particular time because ‘many Syrians’ perception of their ability to challenge’ the regime had changed once they witnessed the success of the revolutions in other countries.689 As a result, the revolts that began in a small town in Tunisia, rapidly spread throughout the region, progressively affecting all Arab countries in one way or another.

The prevalence of technology, television and social media facilitated the spread of discontent, allowing people on the ground to plug into a larger community that shared their grievances, and facilitated the coordination of protests and protesters.690 Protestors became

688 Reinoud Leenders, ‘Social Movement Theory and the Onset of the Popular Uprising in Syria’, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol 35, Issue 3 (July 2013), 273-289 689 Ibid, 275 690 For more on the role of technology and social media in the Arab Spring, see Philip N. Howard, The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy- Information, Technology and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Mahmood Monshipouri, Democratic Uprisings in the New Middle East: Youth, Technology, Human Rights and US Foreign Policy (London and New York: Routledge, 2014); Zeynep Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2017); Wael Ghonim, Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People is Greater than the People in Power – A Memoir (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcour, 2012); Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Digital Media and the Arab Spring (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Victoria Carty, ‘Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt: The Impact of New Media on Contemporary Social Movements and Challenges for Social Movement Theory’, International Journal of Contemporary Sociology, Vol 51, Issue 1 (2014), 51-80; Gadi Wolfsfeld, Elad Segev and Tamir Sheafer, ‘Social Media and the Arab Spring: Politics Comes First’, The International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol 18, No 2 (2013), 115-137

175 connected to those in neighbouring countries through technology, and as such, while ‘the uprisings were overwhelmingly domestic’, angry protestors were ‘inspired by events abroad to act at home’.691 According to Anas Gomati, Qatar’s Al Jazeera network was key to the revolts: ‘It was Al Jazeera’s positive and emotional coverage of these revolutionary youth and their ideas, as well as the interactive nature of its platform, that was both unique to the

Arab world and captivated viewers across the world’.692 Social media, for its part, served as a means of transmitting and amplifying common or shared grievances, and unifying protestors across borders.693

The general dissatisfaction with the poor quality of life, which included ‘low standards of living, wide-spread corruption, and lack of fairness’,694 which resulted from the fragmentation of the social contract that characterised Arab governments, was key in explaining the outbreak of protests. Shared grievances throughout the region and new technologies helped ensure that protesters in each country were not alone and could build on each other’s successes. This dissertation will now examine how the Arab Spring affected the Gulf Arab states to varying degrees.

691 March Lynch, The New Arab Wars – Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 49 692 Anas El Gomati, ‘The Libyan Revolution Undone – The Conversation will not be Televised’, in Andreas Krieg Ed, Divided Gulf: The Anatomy of a Crisis (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019), 182-183 693 For more on the impact of social media on discontent and protests, see Stephanie Alice Baker, ‘The Mediated Crown: New Social Media and New Forms of Rioting’, Sociological Research Online, Vol. 16, No. 4 (30 November 2011), 195-204; Victoria Carty, ‘Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt: The Impact of New Media on Contemporary Social Movements and Challenges for Social Movement Theory’, International Journal of Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 51, Issue 1 (2014), 51-80 694 Elena Ianchovichina, Lili Mottaghi, Shantayanan Devarajan, ‘Inequality, uprisings, and conflict in the Arab World’, The World Bank, October 21, 2015, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/303441467992017147/Inequality-uprisings-and-conflict-in-the- Arab-World, 29

176

2. An Arab Spring in the Persian Gulf?

The root causes of the wave of protests that broke out in 2011 were relatively consistent throughout the region, but the impact and consequences of the Arab Spring on those in power were less so. While the ‘societies and governments of the Gulf have been immune to neither the message nor the impact of the Arab Spring’,695 in most cases, they weathered the storm more effectively – though it is important to note that these states are by no means a homogenous group.696 This section will examine how the Arab Spring affected the

Gulf Arab states generally and what they did to protect themselves from it. It will then discuss the impact of the Arab Spring on the UAE and its Gulf Arab neighbours.

2.2 The UAE

While most of the GCC countries grappled with domestic protests inspired by the Arab

Spring in some form or another, the UAE was largely exempt from the uprisings.697 This exception was explained by the country’s religious and sectarian homogeneity – the Shias in the UAE make up only about five percent of the population,698 and the UAE’s great wealth - surpassing the other Gulf Arab states on a per capita basis - enabling it to offset the discontent somewhat.699

695 May Seikaly and Khawla Mattar, ‘Introduction - The Arab Spring: How Immune are the Gulf Arab States?’ in May Seikaly and Khawla Mattar Eds, The Silent Revolution: The Arab Spring and the Gulf Arab States (Berlin and London: Gerlach Press, 2014), 4 696 Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, ‘The Impact of the Arab Spring on the Gulf Arab States’, in Seikaly and Mattar Eds, The Silent Revolution, 41 697 This also applies to Qatar 698 Christopher M. Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (Hurst & Company: London, 2012), 144 699 Russel E. Lucas, ‘The Persian Gulf Monarchies and the Arab Spring’, in Mehran Kamrava Ed, Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East (London: Hurst & Company, 2014), 315-316, 327;

177

According to Christopher Davidson, the ruling bargain in the UAE was significantly stronger than in other Gulf Arab states because of its smaller indigenous population.700 The government had successfully connected all Emirati families to state institutions and the ruling family, effectively reducing political pressure,701 but the discrepancies in wealth and importance between the seven emirates remained a problem.702 The financial benefits packages to the poorer emirates enabled Abu Dhabi to consolidate its rule over the other emirates, but further entrenched the rentier state they had tried to reform. The 2008 financial crisis in the UAE had already shifted power to Abu Dhabi and away from other emirates like Dubai,703 effectively engraining ‘Abu Dhabi’s supremacy’.704 As a result of these discrepancies, the UAE saw small scale protests over living and labour conditions,705 and activism, especially through social media, which began before the regional uprisings.706 The

UAE had been grappling with calls for democratisation for several years,707 the Arab Spring however, emboldened the activists to step up their campaign and lead a peaceful call for

Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, ‘Repurcussions of the Arab Spring on GCC States’, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies Research Paper (May 2012), https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS- PDFDocumentLibrary/Repercussions_of_the_Arab_Spring.pdf, 18; Angela Shah, ‘Why the Arab Spring Never Came to the UAE’, Time Magazine, July 18, 2011, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2083768,00.html 700 Christopher M. Davidson, ‘Government in the United Arab Emirates: Progress and Pathologies’, in Abbas Kadhim, Governance in the Middle East: A Handbook (London/New York: Routledge, 2013), 276, 278 701 Ibid, 276 702 Christopher M. Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (Hurst & Company: London, 2012), 34-37 703 Thomas Atkins, ‘Boom turns to gloom as crisis hits Dubai’, Reuters, November 21, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dubai-crisis/boom-turns-to-gloom-as-crisis-hits-dubai- idUSTRE4AJ65C20081121 704 Author interview with Michael Hanna, Senior Fellow, The Century Foundation, New York (20 October 2019) 705 See for example, ‘Workers gather in protest against unpaid salaries’, The National, 19 June 19, 2011, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/workers-gather-in-protest-against-unpaid-salaries-1.377290 706 Christopher M. Davidson, ‘Fear and Loathing in the Emirates’, Sada Blog – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (18 September 2012), http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/49409 707 US Embassy in the UAE, ‘Local Views on Prospects for UAE’, Wikileaks Cable, September 16, 2004, http://wikileaks.wikimee.org/cable/2004/09/04ABUDHABI3210.html

178 reform rather than a change in government or system.708 In March 2011, among a series of petitions that were circulated online, 133 national figures made of Liberals and Muslim

Brother Islamists in the UAE called Al Islah, sent a letter to the President of the UAE asking for the Federal National Council (FNC) to be given more legislative powers.709 According to

Emirati professor Abdukhaleq Abdulla, their demands were reasonable. 710 But Abu Dhabi was too focused on the cooperation between the Liberals and the Islamists to pay attention to the demands in the letter. As established in chapter four, Abu Dhabi believed that

Islamism posed the single biggest threat to its power.711 Fearing this was Al Islah’s attempt to capitalise on the discontent in the region to bring the Arab Spring to the UAE – a likely overreaction and overestimation of Al Islah’s actual goals and capabilities - the government moved rapidly to crack down on any expression of discontent and desire for change, taking many Emiratis by surprise.712 The crackdown combined with limited elections, carefully calibrated rhetoric discrediting those asking for change, and further financial assistance enabled Abu Dhabi to skilfully avoid any major outbreak of discontent, and arguably saw its government strengthened as it consolidated its rule over the periphery as a result of the financial assistance packages.

708 Russel E. Lucas, ‘The Persian Gulf Monarchies and the Arab Spring’, in Mehran Kamrava Ed, Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East (London: Hurst & Company, 2014), 316 709 Ingo Forstenlechner, Emilie Rutledge and Rashed Salem Alnuaimi, ‘The UAE, the ‘Arab Spring’ and different types of dissent’, Middle East Policy Council, Vol. XIX, No. 4 (Winter 2012), https://www.mepc.org/uae-arab- spring-and-different-types-dissent; Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, ‘Repercussions of the Arab Spring on GCC States’, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies Research Paper (May 2012), https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/Repercussions_of_the_Arab_Spring.pdf, 18 710 Abdulla, ‘Repercussions of the Arab Spring on GCC States’, 18 711 See chapter four. Author interview with former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019); David Goldfischer, ‘The United States and its Key Gulf Allies: A new Foundation for a troubled partnership?’ in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 79 712 Christopher M. Davidson, ‘Fear and Loathing in the Emirates’, Sada Blog – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (18 September 2012), http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/49409

179

2.3 The other Gulf Arab states

The Arab Spring affected the Gulf Arab monarchies to varying degrees. While the Qataris largely escaped, in Bahrain, the uprisings began following decades of marginalisation of different sectors of Bahraini society.713 While the focus was on the Shia-Sunni dynamics of the uprising – Bahrain is a majority Shia country ruled by a minority Sunni government - the dynamics that led to the uprisings were not initially sect-based. Because of its dwindling oil resources, Bahrain had to establish a different ruling bargain: rather than lavishing the population as a whole with financial assistance, it chose to focus on ensuring the loyalty of its core Sunni tribal support base, establishing divisions among its citizens.714 Despite reforms in the 1990s,715 inequalities persisted as socio-economic conditions worsened.716

Disenfranchised Sunnis and Shias took to the streets on 14 February 2011 in a ‘Day of

Protest’ to demand political reform and greater accountability. Importantly, protestors called for change within the current system, and demonstrators specifically dismissed sectarian-rhetoric by chanting slogans like ‘No Shiites, no Sunnis, only Bahrainis’.717

Nevertheless, the government ‘skilfully played up sectarian tensions and the bogeyman of

Iran’ in an effort to discredit demonstrators,718 regardless of the accuracy of the claim.719

713 Steven Sotloff, ‘Bahrain’s Shia crackdown’, Foreign Policy, September 10, 2010 714 Justin Gengler, ‘How Bahrain’s crushed uprising spawned the Middle East’s sectarianism’, The Washington Post, January 13, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/13/how-bahrains- crushed-uprising-spawned-the-middle-easts-sectarianism/?utm_term=.2ef6b9371137 715 For more on the political changes that occurred in Bahrain in the 1990s and early 2000s see, Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Steven Wright, ‘Political Change in the Arab Oil Monarchies: From Liberalization to Enfranchisement’, International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 5 (September 2007), 918-921 716 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Bahrain’s Uprising: Regional Dimensions and International Consequences’, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2013) 717 Ibid 718 Frederic M. Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 73 719 The report commissioned by the government on the causes of the uprising in Bahrain stated that there was no evidence of Iranian involvement in sparking the uprising in Bahrain. See ‘Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry’, November 23, 2011, http://www.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf

180

When the government could not get the demonstrations under control and dialogue with the opposition failed, the GCC stepped in by sending the Peninsula Shield Force troops to quell the unrest.720 The failure of the protests in Bahrain and the ferocity with which they were crushed foreshadowed the failure of the Arab Spring in the Gulf Arab states.

Bahrain was not the only state affected by the outbreak of the Arab Spring. In Kuwait, the

‘oldest and most vibrant democracy in the Gulf’,721 protests were slow to start. But when the Arab Spring spread across the region, Kuwaitis used it as an opportunity to call for change: demanding a reorganisation of constitutional powers and the resignation of the

Prime Minister.722 But because the protests took longer to develop and were more muted than in other countries, the Kuwaiti government had more time to respond, providing an economic stimulus package to every Kuwaiti citizen of 1,000 dinars – conveniently leaving out the stateless Bedouins – and changing the prime minister, enabling the country to weather the storm with only minor concessions.723

For Saudi Arabia though, the situation was more delicate. Protests erupted in the majority

Shia Eastern Province of the country after the protests in Bahrain, giving them a sectarian undertone. The Shias in Saudi Arabia made up about 10 to 15% of the Saudi population, were subject to discrimination and given fewer opportunities than the majority Sunni

720 Ethan Bronner and Michael Slackman, ‘Saudi Troops Enter Bahrain to Help Put Down Unrest’, The New York Times, March 14, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/world/middleeast/15bahrain.html 721 Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, ‘The Impact of the Arab Spring on the Gulf Arab States’, in May Seikaly and Khawla Mattar Eds, The Silent Revolution: The Arab Spring and the Gulf Arab States (Berlin and London: Gerlach Press, 2014), 47 722 Isabel Coles, Eman Goma, ‘Analysis: Challenge to PM brings Kuwait a breath of Arab Spring’, Reuters, November 21, 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kuwait-parliament/analysis-challenge-to-pm-brings- kuwait-a-breath-of-arab-spring-idUSTRE7AK0YW20111121 723 Russel E. Lucas, ‘The Persian Gulf Monarchies and the Arab Spring’, in Mehran Kamrava Ed, Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East (London: Hurst & Company, 2014), 321

181 population. While they had access to better economic opportunities than the Shia in

Bahrain, their plight was the subject of long-standing discord between the Shia community and the government, leading to regular protests and a long-running, but ultimately failing, process of national dialogue with the leadership.724 As a result, on 17 February 2011, Shia activists gathered in Awwamiyya to demand the release of political prisoners, which the government acquiesced to, further emboldening Shia activists to call for further protests to address a range of grievances.725 But ‘the Saudi state was largely able to prevent protests through a mix of co-optation, repression and a network of patronage that works through state institutions and religious and tribal networks’,726 buying themselves time, but not allaying the concerns of the Shia minority.

Oman was the final country in the GCC to be affected by protests during the Arab Spring.

Though Oman did not have a heavily repressive state system and had a high per capita wealth, it too was affected by the same socio-economic problems as elsewhere in the region,727 particularly high youth unemployment, estimated above 30 percent in 2011.728 As such, protests demanded higher wages,729 and expressed discontent over the lack of

724 For more on the Shia community in Saudi Arabia, see Frederic M. Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Toby Matthiesen, ‘The Local and the Transnational in the Arab Uprisings: The Protests in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province’, in May Seikaly and Khawla Matar Eds, The Silent Revolution: The Arab Spring and the Gulf States (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2014), 105-143 725 See Matthiesen, ‘The Local and the Transnational in the Arab Uprisings: The Protests in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province’, 105-143 726 Ibid, 125 727 See Crystal A. Ennis and Raid Z. al-Jamali, ‘Elusive Employment: Development Planning and Labour Market Trends in Oman’, Chatham House Research Paper (September 2014), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/20140916ElusiveEmploymentOman EnnisJamali.pdf 728 Ibid, 3 729 Jennifer S. Hunt, ‘That Late Unpleasantness: The Arab Spring in Oman’, in Seikaly and Matar Eds, The Silent Revolution, 146-147

182 political reform and corruption in government.730 Notably, as in Bahrain, protestors did not want to overthrow the Sultan, merely to reform the system. The government did not respond to the protests as forcefully as others - though protests in Sohar did at times become violent - choosing instead to appease protestors through economic stop-gap measures, such as cash handouts.731 While Sultan Qaboos appeared to manage the crisis so as to avoid major changes to his government, the country’s economic well-being remained a problem.732

The wave of unrests that swept through the Middle East in 2011 caught the region off guard. The threat to the stability of the Gulf Arab states’ political systems was felt acutely in capitals,733 including in Abu Dhabi, which was less affected by the protests. The protests led to major changes in the region, changing the UAE’s international threat context and impacting regime security, thereby affecting its foreign policymaking. The next section will examine how the Arab Spring impacted the UAE and its neighbours’ vision and understanding of the region, and how this led to the emergence of trend examined in this dissertation.

730 Christopher M. Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (Hurst & Company: London, 2012), 209 731 Nada Bakri, ‘Protests in Oman Spread from Port City to Capital’, The New York Times, February 28, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/world/middleeast/01oman.html?mtrref=www.google.com 732 Daniel J. Graeber, ‘Moody’s: Oman exposed to economic risk’, UPI, July 15, 2016, https://www.upi.com/Moodys-Oman-exposed-to-economic-risk/2881468575177/; Ennis and al-Jamali, ‘Elusive Employment: Development Planning and Labour Market Trends in Oman’ 733 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers and officials, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City, 2014-17

183

3. The impact of the Arab Spring on regional foreign policy

The Arab Spring led to several significant changes in the region, which impacted the way the

UAE, and to a lesser extent its neighbours, behaved. It acted as an external constraint on the

UAE and some of its Gulf Arab allies’ foreign policymaking by heightening the threat perception in the region, which inevitably impacted their sense of regime security, and changing their alliances and security relations with states such as the US, their primary security guarantor.734 According to Lynch, the Arab Spring reshaped the region in four ways:

It ‘challenged America’s position in novel ways, exposing all the contradictions in its policies and the limits of its power’; accelerated sectarianism; ‘dramatically expanded the intra-

Sunni power struggles into a great variety of fractured states, potential allies, and adversaries’; and ‘sharply exacerbated the threat perception of the Arab regimes by revealing that popular challengers could actually overthrow them’.735 For the UAE, and to a lesser extent some of its neighbours, the Arab Spring was especially significant in three foreign policy areas, all of which relate directly to the priorities set out in the analytical framework described in the previous chapter: First, the collapse of some noted Arab leaders left a power vacuum in the region, second, fear caused by the opportunity for the rise of

Iran, and finally, the muted US response to these changes spearheaded the perception of a

US withdrawal from the region. In the UAE, the Arab Spring sparked intense internal debate and a reassessment of the its position in the region, with the appearance of some divisions on the topic.736 While all the smaller Gulf Arab states shared the perceptions described

734 See chapter four 735 March Lynch, The New Arab Wars – Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 18 736 Author roundtable with the Policy Planning Unit, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016)

184 above, the UAE acted on it in the most noticeable way: it demonstrated greater assertiveness and a newfound urgency in the drive towards self-sufficiency.737

3.1 The collapse of Arab powerhouses

A significant change brought on by the Arab Spring was the collapse of authoritarian Arab leaders such as Mubarak, Ghaddafi and Ben Ali, and chaos in major Arab countries such as

Egypt and Syria, which impacted the way the Gulf Arab states viewed regional and domestic security – the first element of international constraints on foreign policymaking identified in the previous chapter. Egyptian leadership of Arab countries emerged during Gamal Abdul

Nasser’s presidency.738 With strong autocratic leaders, countries like Syria and Libya also became major regional players.739 As a result, the collapse of both the Egyptian and Libyan leadership and the outbreak of civil war in Syria and Libya, meant that several major regional powerbrokers were embroiled in their own domestic turbulence and no longer had the bandwidth to lead in the region. This had a dual effect: It alarmed the UAE and its allies, who were fearful that the same could happen to them, and created a power vacuum in the region. This affected their international threat context, which impacted regime security – the first external constraint on foreign policymaking identified in the previous chapter.

Interviews in the region confirmed the fears regarding regime security that these

737 See chapter three 738 For more on the rise of Arab nationalism in the region, see for example Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon Eds, The Origins of Arab Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century – From Triumph to Despair (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003); Fawaz A. Gerges, Making the Arab World: Nasser, Qutb, and the Clash that Shaped the Middle East (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018) 739 For more on the rise of Syria and Libya see for example, Allison Pargeter, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi (New Havena and London: Yale University Press, 2012); Bente Scheller, The Wisdom of Syria’s Waiting Game (London: Hurst & Company, 2013); Leon T. Goldsmith, Cycle of Fear: Syria’s Alawites in War and Peace (London: Hurst & Company, 2015)

185 developments ignited. In 2016, Riad Kahwaji said ‘The Arab Spring spooked everyone in the region. Most importantly, the royal families of the Gulf realised they are under threat’.740

An Omani analyst said, ‘if something were to happen to a smaller GCC state then all regional order would be gone. There is a real sense of vulnerability among the Gulf Arab states’.741

Indeed, the leadership in the UAE, while somewhat protected from the full brunt of the

Arab Spring protests, worried that the discontent would spill over into its borders.742 This potentially existential threat to regime security, in turn, affected the UAE’s foreign policy decision-making, by infusing it with assertiveness and a sense of urgency in pursuing its own objectives and self-sufficiency.

At the same time, the situation provided an unparalleled opportunity for states in the region who were unaffected or only marginally affected by the regional wave of discontent, including the UAE: Those willing to capitalise on developments now had a chance to shape the region more to their liking and ‘compete for influence in the power vacuum created by the dislocation of the regional order’.743 The UAE for its part, while recognising the dangers, saw this as an opportunity to cash in on some of its long-term investments in developing its diplomatic, political and military capabilities and fulfil its own goals, involving itself overtly in conflicts like Libya and Yemen and pursuing its own agenda, including the containment and roll-back of Islamism.744 Qatar too, saw a similar opportunity in the outbreak and spread of

740 Author interview with Riad Kahwaji, CEO, INEGMA, Dubai (13 November 2016) 741 Author interview with Omani analyst, Doha (15 May 2016) 742 Author interview with Riad Kahwaji, CEO, INEGMA, Dubai (13 November 2016); Author interviews with GCC lawmakers and officials, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City, 2014-17 743 Victor Gervais, ‘The Changing Security Dynamic in the Middle East and its Impact on Smaller Gulf Cooperation Council States’ Alliance Choices and Policies’ in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017) 744 This is examined in greater detail in chapter three. March Lynch, The New Arab Wars – Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 246; Author interview with former Gulf

186 the Arab Spring. According to Mehran Kamrava, ‘during the course of the Arab Spring, Qatar moved away from being a mediator to becoming a more active supporter of change in the

Middle East region, deeply involving itself in what it assumed would be new eras first in

Libya, then in Syria’.745 Both countries foreign policies were impacted by their view of the changes in the region. Qatar however, unlike the UAE, re-assessed its involvement after a series of setbacks. It realised ‘that perhaps it had overreached, it slowly adapted and adopted a more pragmatic foreign policy’.746 The UAE for its part, has consistently increased its involvement in the region since the Arab Spring, including in cases where its goals oppose those of its allies like Saudi Arabia, such as in Yemen.

3.2 The perceived rise of Iran

The collapse of Arab stronghold countries was both an opportunity and a problem. It was an opportunity because it allowed the UAE to expand its involvement in regional security. But if it provided an opportunity for the UAE, then it would also provide its regional foes with an opportunity, including Iran. As discussed in previous chapters, Iran’s relations with its Gulf

Arab neighbours have been complicated, to say the least. And Iran has been the cause of contention within the GCC states.

Cooperation Council (GCC) official and former member of the Omani Majles Ashura, Muscat (5 March 2017); Author interview with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Muscat, (5 March 2017) 745 Mehran Kamrava, Qatar – Small State, Big Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013), xvii 746 Ibid, xvii; Author roundtable with Qatari delegation of academics and experts, New York (26 September 2018).

187

Threat perceptions and their over-inflation or undervaluation have often caused or entrenched conflicts and rivalries in the Persian Gulf region.747 According to Emma Soubrier,

‘The most important factor shaping…the UAE’s responses to [its] external environment is their leaders’ perception’.748 This was particularly true of the aftermath of the Arab Spring, as the changes in the region fed into the Gulf Arab leaders’ evolving perceptions of the threats they faced, the context they were operating in, the likely future state of affairs and the impact it would have on their regime security, which in turn, acted as an external constraint on their foreign policy decision-making. To the leadership in the UAE and its Gulf

Arab allies, the Arab Spring lead to the weakening of the Arab world, which was now embroiled in internal instability. This, along with the regional void left by the crumbling of the old Arab leaders, inevitably in their minds, resulted in a rise in Iran’s regional power and influence, heightening it as a security concern both in the region and in its ability to impact domestic security in their countries.749 A senior Emirati government official captured this sentiment in November 2016, when he said, ‘the 2011 upheavals created an open space for

Iranian intervention and influence’ in the region. 750 ‘The Arab Spring was the big turning point regarding views of Iran. The region saw Iran in a different light’, explained an academic at a roundtable in Doha, referring to the increasing fear of the Iranian threat.751 Abdulla explained that the Arab Spring ‘revealed that the fears of the GCC countries regarding Iran

747 See F. Gregory Gause III, ‘Threats and Threat Perceptions in the Persian Gulf Region’, MESA Roundtable: Mutual Threat Perceptions in the Gulf, Middle East Policy, Vol XIV, No 2 (Summer 2007), 119-124 748 Emma Soubrier, ‘Evolving foreign and security policies: a comparative study of Qatar and the UAE’, in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 127 749 Author roundtable with experts and analysts, Al Jazeera Research Center, Doha (16 May 2016); Author interview with former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019) 750 Statement by high-level UAE government official, Sir Bani Yas Forum, Abu Dhabi, 18-20 November 2016 751 Author roundtable with officials and academics, Qatar University (14 May 2016)

188 are the only constant in Gulf strategic and security thinking’.752 He underlined that the Arab

Spring exacerbated previously held perceptions and views on Iran, adding that ‘Iran occasionally attempt[ed] to play on the weak points of the internal Gulf situation, position itself into domestic Gulf affairs, and achieve regional expansion whenever the opportunity presents itself’.753 The impact of Iran’s actions following the Arab Spring clearly fit with the idea of international constraints on foreign policymaking identified in the dissertation’s analytical approach. It worsened regional security threats for the Gulf Arabs while the internal turmoil felt in these countries further exacerbated the fear of Iran’s reach into their domestic politics, thereby impacting their foreign policy.

While Abdulla’s assessment was perhaps a too radical in overestimating Iran’s desire to sow conflict and differences within the GCC, it is undeniable that Iran for its part, did not help this perception. When the Arab Spring broke out, the leadership in Tehran was quick to capitalise on the protests, hailing them as an ‘Islamic liberation movement’ and ‘awakening’, encouraging their spread in the region, and pointing to the wave of unrest as the beginning of the end of US presence in the region.754 By painting them as ‘Islamic’ protests, and implicitly drawing a link to its own successful revolution in 1979, Iran sought to position itself as a leading voice for change and resistance, in hope that this would increase its popularity on the Arab street,755 and to ‘glorify the Iranian Revolution and construct it as an

752 Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, ‘Repurcussions of the Arab Spring on GCC States’, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies Research Paper (May 2012), https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS- PDFDocumentLibrary/Repercussions_of_the_Arab_Spring.pdf, 23 753 Ibid, 23 754 ‘Khamenei hails ‘Islamic’ uprisings’, Al Jazeera (4 February 2011), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/201124101233510493.html 755 Shahram Chubin, ‘Iran and the Arab Spring: Ascendancy Frustrated’, GRC Gulf Papers (September 2012), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Iran_and_Arab_Spring_2873.pdf, 8

189 exemplary system’.756 This struck a chord with Iran’s Gulf Arab neighbours, who understood that Iran ‘as a Persian power cuts its access to Arab countries. So it has to focus on religion’.757 Iran’s stated support for the revolts in the region also served to boost the

Islamic Republic’s rhetoric of support of the ‘oppressed’ against the ‘oppressors’; a longstanding pillar of the system.758 According to Jaspal, framing the protests as ‘Islamic’ allowed the Islamic Republic to shield itself from their spill-over into Iran, which itself, had seen a period of discontent following the election of Mahmood Ahmadinejad in 2009.759 To

Iran’s neighbours, its framing of the revolts was proof of its hegemonic intentions for the region.

But Iran’s rhetoric was not the only problem: The threat of its growing influence in the context of the fall of Arab strongholds was significant in the minds of its Gulf Arab neighbours.760 To the Gulf Arabs, this threat became reality as the Arab Spring wore on and

Iran increased its involvement in the region. Hanna explains that prior to the Arab Spring much of Iran’s involvement in the region was limited to soft power projection and leading the resistance against Israel.761 As a result of the post-2011 recalibration of its power projection in the region, Tehran lost some of its ability to project soft power among the region’s Sunnis, though its hard power projection grew.762 But the Gulf Arabs did not see the

756 Rusi Jaspal, ‘Representing the Arab Spring in the Iranian press: Islamic awakening or foreign-sponsored terror?’ Politics, Groups and Identities, Vol. 2, Issue 3 (2014), 424; Payam Mohseni, ‘The Islamic Awakening: Iran’s Grand Narrative of the Arab Uprisings’, Middle East Brief, Crown Center for Middle East Studies Brandeis University, No. 71 (April 2013), https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB71.pdf 757 Author roundtable with experts and analysts, B’huth, Dubai (29 February 2017) 758 Ali Khamenei, Speech to Officials and Ambassadors of Islamic Countries on Mab’ath, May 16, 2015, http://english.khamenei.ir/news/2069/Leader-s-Speech-to-Officials-and-Ambassadors-of-Islamic-Countries 759 Jaspal, ‘Representing the Arab Spring in the Iranian press: Islamic awakening or foreign-sponsored terror?’ 423 760 Author roundtable with experts and analysts, Al Jazeera Research Center, Doha (16 May 2016) 761 Author interview with Michael Hanna, Senior Fellow, The Century Foundation, New York (30 October 2019) 762 Ibid

190 limits on Iran’s powers. Rather, Iran’s neighbours saw all of Tehran’s regional forays through the prism of a hegemonic strategy to gain influence in the region.763

Iran’s involvement in the Syrian civil war only served to highlight Gulf Arab fears of Iranian hegemony and was the first public display of the shift from Iranian soft to hard power deployment in the region. ‘The real challenge and turning point for how the region viewed

Iran was Syria,’ explained an official at a Qatar University roundtable in 2016.764 Since the outbreak of hostilities in Syria, Iran provided money, weapons, training, and advice to the government of Bashar Al Assad.765 The UAE and its Gulf Arab allies viewed Iran’s involvement in the Syrian conflict as a way for it achieve its hegemonic ambitions.766

According to Lbish, the leadership in the Gulf Arab countries ‘believe that if Iran and its allies prevail and the current Syrian regime survives unreconstructed it will open the door for further inroads by Tehran into the Arab world and the eventual creation of a Persian mini- empire in the region’.767 Iran’s involvement in Syria heightened the UAE and its allies’ sense of vulnerability, because they believed that Syria’s collapse would put them next on Iran’s target list.768 As a result, it was seen as imperative to contain Iran in Syria in order to contain it in the whole region.769

763 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 764 Author roundtable with officials and academics, Qatar University, Doha (14 May 2016) 765 For more on Iranian involvement in Syria, see Ben Hubbard, Isabel Kershner and Anne Barnard, ‘Iran, Deeply Embedded in Syria, Expands ‘Axis of Resistance’’, New York Times, February 19, 2018; ‘Bitter Rivals: Iran and Saudi Arabia, Part II: Syrian War’, PBS Frontline Series, February 27, 2018, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/watch-why-iran-backed-assad-in-syria/; Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai, ‘Iran’s ISIS policy’, International Affairs, Vol. 91, Issue 1 (2015), 1-15; Farnaz Fassihi, Jay Solomon, Sam Dagher, ‘Iranians Dial Up Presence in Syria’, Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2013 766 Author roundtable with professors and analysts at Qatar University, Doha (14 May 2016) 767 Hussein Lbish, ‘What’s at stake for the Gulf Arabs in Syria?’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington Report (30 June 2016), https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Ibish_GCCSyria_Web.pdf, 1 768 Author interview with Abdullah Baabood, Professor, Qatar University, Doha (15 March 2016) 769 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17)

191

Iran did not have to be physically present in a country for the Gulf Arab countries to perceive Iranian involvement. When protests broke out in Bahrain, the Gulf Arab states were seriously alarmed at the prospects of both a collapse of one of their own,770 and the growth of Iranian interventionism in the internal affairs of the Gulf Arab states.771 The government painted the Bahraini protests as the work of Tehran reaching out to the potential Shia constituency it had in the small country.772 This reflected a real fear that Iran would use this as an opportunity to discredit the Sunni leadership and foster instability in

Bahrain in order to increase its influence in the country. Both the government in Bahrain, as well as its neighbours, believed that Iran had real ties with the majority Shia population in the country,773 but in reality, Bahraini Shias were cautious and wary of Tehran.774

Nevertheless, for the Gulf Arab states, it was critical that Iran did not have access and influence in neighbouring Bahrain, perceived as Riyadh’s backyard, prompting the Saudi-led intervention in Bahrain, quelling the protests and returning to an uneasy status quo.775

The Iranian threat to the UAE and its Gulf Arab neighbours was nothing new, but the Arab spring heightened it. In the eyes of the leadership in the UAE and some of the smaller Gulf

Arab countries, the collapse of Arab stronghold states provided Tehran with an opportunity

770 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 771 Ibid 772 ‘Bahrain hints at evidence of Iran protest links’, The Telegraph, November 24, 2011, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/bahrain/8912240/Bahrain-hints-at-evidence-of- Iran-protest-links.html 773 Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East (London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 2013), 70 774 Simon Henderson, ‘Saudi Arabia’s fears for Bahrain’, The Washington Institute, Policy Watch 1759 (17 February 2011), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/saudi-arabias-fears-for-bahrain 775 Ethan Bronner and Michael Slackman, ‘Saudi Troops Enter Bahrain to Put Down Unrest’, The New York Times, March 14, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/world/middleeast/15bahrain.html

192 to swoop in and fill the void. And fill the void it did - or tried to at least - with the deployment of a new hard power in the region. The increasing Iranian threat impacted the

UAE’s regional threat context and posed a potential threat to the domestic stability of its government. The changing regional threat context acted as an external constraint on the

UAE’s foreign policymaking. It became imperative to increase efforts to contain and push the Islamic Republic back, especially in light of the perceived lack of US intervention in the region to safeguard its allies.776

3.3 The perception of US influence and power in the region

The opportunity created by the collapse of leading Arab states following the Arab Spring, and the fear that Iran would capitalise on this, was only compounded by growing fears stemming from the Obama administration’s perceived desire to disengage from the region,777 which would have a significant impact on the UAE and its allies’ security relations and alliances. In his 2009 speech in Cairo, President Obama said ‘No system of government can or should be imposed by one nation...’.778 This was a break from the perception that the

US was a supporter of the autocratic order in the Middle East,779 though President Obama was careful to assert that this view would not dampen his commitments to governments

‘that reflect the will of the people’.780 This, along with the belief that Obama aimed to turn

776 This will be examined further in chapter six 777 This dissertation will dive further into the role of the US in the Middle East in the next chapter 778 Barack Obama, ‘A New Beginning,’ Speech, Cairo University, Cairo, June 4, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09 779 Fawaz Gerges quoted in David Lepeska, ‘Obama and the Middle East: Why the US is disengaging’, The National, January 27, 2012, https://www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/books/obama-and-the-middle-east-why- the-us-is-disengaging-1.404554 780 Barack Obama, ‘A New Beginning,’ Speech, Cairo University, Cairo, June 4, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09

193 his attention inwards, established a sense of unease at what the future would hold with regards to their main security guarantor’s commitment to them.781 According to Lynch, the

Arab Spring was fundamental to the Gulf Arab perception of US presence in the region: ‘The greatest impact of the Arab uprising may be to ultimately prove to be the dismantlement of the American Middle East regional order – an outcome which terrifies the regime protected by that order…’.782 President Obama’s perceived abandonment of regional friends or disengagement from crises in the region following the outbreak of the Arab Spring had significant repercussions on the UAE’s psyche in particular.783 The perceived change in the

UAE’s relations with the US, which falls under the second of the international constraints on foreign policymaking prioritised in our analytical approach, convinced Abu Dhabi that it would have to take greater responsibility in ensuring its own security, through greater assertiveness and self-sufficiency. Key to their perception of US disengagement from the region was President Obama’s reaction – or lack thereof - to the outbreak of the protests in

Egypt.784

The 25 January 2011 ‘Day of Rage’ inspired by events in Tunisia, marked the start of large- scale protests in Egypt.785 While protestors in Egypt had similar economic and political

781 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers and officials, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City, 2014-17 782 March Lynch, The New Arab Wars – Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 18-19 783 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers and officials, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City, 2014-17 784 Author interview with former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019) 785 For more analysis on the Egyptian revolution in 2011, including its causes, the revolution itself and the aftermath, see Ashraf Khalil, Liberation Square: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2011); David D. Kirkpatrick, Into the Hands of the Soldiers (London: Bloomsbury, 2018); Wael Ghonim, Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People is Greater than the People in Power – A Memoir (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcour, 2012); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Chronicles of the Egyptian Revolution and its Aftermath: 2012-2016 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Thanassis Cambanis, Once Upon a Revolution: an Egyptian Story (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015); Steven A. Cook, The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012)

194 concerns to those in Tunisia, Egyptians had been protesting against their political leadership for more than a decade and, as such, the difficulty was to convince the public that the protest movement could be successful and was worth investing in.786 The success of the

Tunisian protests, however, had a galvanising effect, and Egyptians rallied to the call. Four gruelling days later, on 29 January, the Muslim Brotherhood joined the protests bringing to it much-needed manpower, organisation and experience.787 Importantly, in Egypt’s case, the army refused to shoot at Egyptian protestors after the government ordered it to. According to Lynch, the Obama administration was key to this decision, engaging ‘in near constant dialogues at all levels up and down the ranks of the Egyptian military, pushing it not to fire’.788 The Obama administration decided that Mubarak, a long-time US ally, could no longer remain in place, and only a few days after the outbreak of the protests, on 1

February, President Obama stated that ‘an orderly transition must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must begin now’.789 Egyptian protestors held the symbolic Tahrir square until the Mubarak government fell on 11 February 2011, leading to a period of bargaining and transition. The impact of the Obama administration’s active call for a transition so rapidly after the beginning of the protests cannot be overstated. According to Lynch,

‘American allies around the region were aghast that Obama seemed to be abandoning

America’s long-time Egyptian partner’. 790 The Emiratis along with the Saudis ‘furious at what they saw as Obama’s betrayal’ worked hard to keep Mubarak in place, urging him to

786 Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising – The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), 85 787 Ibid, 91 788 Ibid, 92 789 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on the Situation in Egypt’, Speech, The White House – Office of the Press Secretary, February 1, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press- office/2011/02/01/remarks-president-situation-egypt 790 Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising – The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), 94

195 cling onto power for the foreseeable future, and thus, actively working against American interests.791 The Obama administration’s ‘rhetorical embrace of the Arab uprising as the right side of history, his willingness to accept the removal of Mubarak, and his support for

Egyptian democracy, even if the Muslim Brotherhood won elections, cut to the very heart of the survival guarantee which Arab regimes wanted from the US’.792 The Emiratis were

‘frustrated with this administration’ as a result of this.793 There was genuine worry that ‘if the US would give up on Mubarak so easily, would it stand by them if they faced popular uprisings?’794 In addition, the US abandonment of Mubarak ‘seemed to call into question what remained of US Cold War realpolitik: the implicit US commitment to defend the Gulf monarchies against Iran’.795 The Emiratis saw unfolding before them the beginning of their worst nightmare:796 That the US would no longer be a reliable security partner. The sentiment only worsened as the Arab Spring wore on and new conflicts emerged throughout the region, including in Syria and Libya. In Syria, Washington stayed clear of the conflict despite the images of unparalleled violence committed by President Assad against his own citizens.797 Kahwaji explained President Obama’s reticence to strike Syria after the red-line set on the use of chemical weapons in the context of the administration’s desire to

791 Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising – The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), 94; Marc Lynch, The New Arab Wars – Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 54; Author interviews with GCC lawmakers and officials, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City, 2014-17 792 Lynch, The New Arab Wars, 22-23 793 Author roundtable with Emirati officials, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016) 794 Lynch, The Arab Uprising, 94 795 David Goldfischer, ‘The United States and its Key Gulf Allies: A new Foundation for a troubled partnership?’ in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 74 796 Author interview with former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019) 797 For more on President Obama’s red-line see, Jeffrey Lewis and Bruno Tertrais, ‘The Thick Red Line: Implications of the 2013 Chemical-Weapons Crisis for Deterrence and Transatlantic Relations’, Survival, Vol. 59, Issue 6 (2017), 77-108; ‘Obama’s failure to enforce his ‘red-line’ emboldened and strengthened Al Assad’, The National, August 20, 2017; Derek Chollet, ‘Obama’s Red Line, Revisited’, Politico, July 19, 2016, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/obama-syria-foreign-policy-red-line-revisited-214059

196 resolve the nuclear crisis with Iran: ‘Obama avoided striking Syria because of Iran – he didn’t want to rock the boat and confront Iran’.798 This fed into the Emirati belief that Washington was selling them out in favour of Iran.799

To the leadership in the UAE and some of the other small Gulf Arab states, events in Egypt indicated that President Obama was embarking on a new foreign policy: one of disengagement from the Middle East. This fed their worst fear of being abandoned by their sole security guarantor. But while this sentiment was beginning to get traction among the

Emirati policy community, some hoped that it would be an exception rather than the new rule. In discussions in April 2016, Emirati officials highlighted the UAE’s ‘good relations’ with the US ‘despite the Arab Spring’, but also bemoaned that the US was too ‘legacy driven’ and was not ‘doing enough’ for its friends in the region.800 Nevertheless, perceived changes in

US policy, the new regional void left by the collapse of major Arab states, and the perceived rise of Iran, contributed to changes in the way the UAE predominantly, but some of its allies as well, conducted foreign policy. While at first, the Arab Spring led to a regrouping of the smaller Gulf Arab countries under the leadership of Saudi Arabia, rivalries rapidly emerged, leading the UAE and other small Gulf Arab states to pursue their own agendas in the region.

4. Changes in the Persian Gulf following the Arab Spring

The 2011 protests altered the way in which states behaved in the region. This section will examine how the UAE and some of the smaller Gulf Arab states reacted to the Arab Spring.

798 Author interview with Riad Kahwahji, CEO, INEGMA, Dubai (13 November 2016) 799 This will be examined further in chapter seven 800 Author roundtable with Emirati officials, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016)

197

4.1 A regrouping of the GCC?

The immediate effect of the protests in the Middle East was to foster a regrouping of the smaller Gulf Arab states under Saudi Arabia’s leadership,801 thereby increasing the importance of their principle security alliance. According to Matteo Legrenzi, ‘GCC members are brought together by common threats in either the internal or external realms...’, which is what the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring led to. 802 But ‘if there is no perception of a common threat, GCC states revert to competing among themselves, and GCC institutionalism is certainly not enough to keep them from doing so’.803 In fact, this dynamic took place among the GCC following the Iran-Iraq War.804 The outbreak of the protests in

2011 had a similar effect: ‘Whatever their disagreements, these regimes first and foremost wanted to survive’.805

As established, the 2011 protests posed a challenge to the Gulf Arabs. They made the leadership in the UAE and some of the Gulf Arab countries realise that ‘if one was

801 Shadi Hamid, ‘From the Arab Spring Comes a More Unified Gulf Cooperation Council’, Brookings Institution Opinions, April 15, 2011, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/from-the-arab-spring-comes-a-more-unified- gulf-cooperation-council/; Emma Soubrier, ‘Evolving foreign and security policies: a comparative study of Qatar and the UAE’, in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 133; Mehran Kamrava, Qatar – Small State, Big Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013), xviii; Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising – The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), 103-104 802 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 111 803 Ibid, 111 804 During the war, the Gulf Arabs disagreed on who to assist in the conflict. The heightened security threat from Iran prompted the smaller Gulf Arab states to put aside their differences and unify under Saudi leadership, leading to the formation of the GCC. See Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015) 805 March Lynch, The New Arab Wars – Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 58

198 overthrown then all become a target’, it also ‘made royal families in the region realise that they needed each other’.806 When first faced with these threats, the Gulf Arabs put aside their differences and regrouped under the umbrella of Saudi leadership in order to tackle the perceived threat. ‘The collapse of regional order and the sense of vulnerability this created within the Gulf Arab elites, coupled with the fact that their security guarantor was abandoning them, translated into greater unity under the wings of Saudi Arabia.’807 Events in the region ‘prompted Saudi Arabia to take the initiative and lead. While smaller Gulf Arab states judged it better to align themselves with leaders they know and trust’.808 ‘Even Qatar came back together with Saudi Arabia and the others’, explained Kahwaji.809 There was a

‘unity of views within the GCC, especially on Iran’ confirmed several Emirati officials in reference to the post-Arab Spring period.810 As a unified group, the leadership in the Gulf

Arab states put together a $20 billion aid package for Bahrain and Oman, who were experiencing protests of their own.811 They deployed the Peninsula Shield Force in Bahrain and despite their differences on Iran, in April 2011, the GCC foreign ministers issued a statement condemning Iranian involvement in their affairs and calling for Tehran to respect their sovereignty.812

806 Author interview with Riad Kahwaji, CEO, INEGMA, Dubai (13 November 2016) 807 Author interview with Abdullah Baabood, Professor, Qatar University, Doha (15 May 2016). This was a statement echoed during author roundtables with analysts and experts, Al Jazeera Research Center, Doha (16 May 2016); University of Qatar academics and experts, Doha (14 May 2016); and interview with Abdul-Aziz Al- Sharekh, Director-General, Kuwait Diplomatic Institute, Kuwait City (25 May 2016) 808 Author roundtable with experts and analysts, Al Jazeera Research Center, Doha (16 May 2016) 809 Ibid 810 Author roundtable with Emirati officials, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016) 811 GCC to set up $20bn bailout fund for Bahrain and Oman’, The National, March 11, 2011, https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/gcc-to-set-up-20bn-bailout-fund-for-bahrain-and-oman-1.413176 812 Thomas Erdbrink and Toby Warrick, ‘Bahrain crackdown fueling tension between Iran, Saudi Arabia’, The Washington Post, April 22, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/bahrain-crackdown-fueling- tensions-between-iran-saudi-arabia/2011/04/21/AFVe6WPE_story.html

199

But this unity was short-lived. Kamrava states that the ‘marriage of convenience that had drawn Qatar and Saudi Arabia temporarily together at the start of the uprisings gave way to bitter acrimony’, and while he focused on Saudi Arabia and Qatar, his analysis can be extended to the GCC as a whole.813 Cracks developed internally, though these were kept behind closed doors as much as possible. But the divisions between the UAE and Saudi

Arabia slowly became more significant. A bureaucrat within the Emirati Ministry of Foreign

Affairs confirmed this: ‘Divisions have emerged among the states in the GCC, including most surprisingly between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. This was evident in Yemen,814 where there are different visions for the way ahead. But the unity of purpose remains, for now’.815

Familiar rivalries and disagreements on issues like Iran re-emerged: ‘A regional order defined by moderate Sunni autocrats united against a radical Shia threat masked considerable internal competition, however. Saudi Arabia aspired to lead a unified Arab world against Iran, but faced multiple challengers’.816 In addition, the opportunity to drive their own agenda made the UAE more willing to draw on the growing capabilities they amassed over the previous years to defend their individual interests in the region. The cracks in the GCC alliance acted as an external constraint – or in this case a new freedom - on their foreign policy decision-making: it provided the states within the alliance an opportunity to pursue their own agenda as their links to one another were frayed.

According to Lynch, the Gulf Arab states ‘began to aggressively try to mould the direction of the popular uprisings’, but rather than work together, their interventions were more

813 Mehran Kamrava, Qatar – Small State, Big Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013), xviii 814 This was examined in chapter three 815 Author interview with Senior official, Policy Planning Unit, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016) 816 March Lynch, The New Arab Wars – Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 15

200

’competitive than cooperative’.817 In fact, in some instances, the competition further fed into their desire to pursue their own agendas. For example, Emirati interventions in the region following the Arab Spring were at times driven as much by opposing Qatari clients than clear interest or other strategic priorities.818 This was further worsened by competing priorities in the region: For example, the UAE focused its efforts on curbing Islamism, whereas Qatar had spent years cultivating a relationship with regional Islamic networks and groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood.819 Importantly, this put the UAE at odds with Riyadh as well: The UAE, ‘far more regionally active than ever before in its history, generally closely aligned itself with Saudi Arabia but had different priorities and a sharply different perspective on Islamist movements’, presaging an increasingly problematic point in their relations.820 While as established, differences among the GCC states were nothing new, after the Arab Spring, they were no longer pushed aside or quietly dealt with to demonstrate unity. Changes that occurred in the region acted as an external constraint on foreign policymaking: The UAE became increasingly fearful of the international threat context and simultaneously, aware of its growing capabilities, the opportunities and challenges the Arab Spring had created for it, and its own policy objectives, and began to display greater interventionism in the region.

817 March Lynch, The New Arab Wars – Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 63 818 Author email exchange with Marc Lynch (7 October 2019) 819 Marc Lynch, ‘The New Arab Order: Power and Violence in Today’s middle East’, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2018 Issue), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-08-13/new- arab-order; Eric Trager, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood Is the Root of the Qatar Crisis’, The Atlantic, July 2, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/muslim-brotherhood-qatar/532380/; David B. Roberts, ‘Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?’, The Middle East Policy Council, Vol. XXI, No. 3 (Fall), https://www.mepc.org/qatar-and-muslim-brotherhood-pragmatism-or-preference; Hassan Hassan, ‘Qatar’s troubles are rooted in its support for Islamists’, The National, May 30, 2017, https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/qatar-s-troubles-are-rooted-in-its-support-for-islamists-1.45881 820 Lynch, The New Arab Wars, 26

201

Conclusion

The 2011 Arab Spring posed several problems for the elites in the UAE and to some of the other small Gulf Arab states. First, the regional uprisings highlighted their vulnerability to change and their precarious hold on power. Events in the region changed the UAE and some of its smaller Gulf Arab neighbours’ international threat perception – the first external constraint on foreign policymaking identified in the previous chapter, which in turn, directly impacted regime security. The Arab Spring also left a void in the region following the collapse of countries like Egypt, providing the UAE with an opportunity to step in and fill the power vacuum. But where there is an opportunity for the UAE and its allies, there is also an opportunity for Iran, which sought to capitalise on the vacuum by calling for a region-wide

‘Islamic Awakening’ and deploying its hard power throughout the region.821 This coincided with the impression that their US ally would no longer blindly defend its partners in the region,822 affecting their perception of their security relations with the US. Both fall under our two factors of external constraints on foreign policy identified in the previous chapter.

The combination of threats and fears the Arab Spring unleashed impacted how the UAE and some of its allies conducted foreign policy, leading to greater assertiveness. The UAE most noticeably embodied this trend, as it increased its involvement in the regional arena, and increasingly did so with little consideration for the interests of its allies and friends.

821 Ali Khamenei, Speech to Iran’s Assembly of Experts, September 15, 2010, http://english.khamenei.ir/news/1416/Leader-s-View-of-Islamic-Awakening, accessed January 8, 2018 822 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17)

202

While the Arab Spring was the first catalyst that sped up the regional change, the Obama administration’s announcement of the Pivot to Asia as a US policy goal823 – identified here as the second catalyst – provided further fuel for the decision by the UAE and some of its smaller Gulf Arab neighbours to become increasingly assertive. For the leadership in the

Gulf Arab states, the Pivot publicly called into question the commitment of the US to the

Middle East.824 It highlighted the vulnerability of the Gulf Arab states to the changes in US foreign policy goals. This belief was acute in the UAE – a long-time friend and beneficiary of the US security umbrella. Despite believing it was a close and reliable friend of Washington, it was also fearful of US abandonment. As a result, the leadership in the UAE concluded that it was imperative for them to diversify their sources of security. The next chapter will examine the US Pivot to Asia, and how it was perceived by the smaller Gulf Arab states and the UAE in particular.

823 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament’, Speech, The White House, November 17, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president- obama-australian-parliament; Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/ 823 Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’; Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President Obama to U.S. and Australian Service Members’, Speech, Royal Army Air Force Base, Darwin, November 17, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-us-and- australian-service-members 824 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17)

203

Chapter 6: Catalyst two - The US Pivot to Asia

President Obama announced he would be America’s ‘first Pacific President’ during a trip to

Japan in the first year of his presidency in November 2009.825 He believed that his predecessor, President George W. Bush, ‘had paid too little attention to Asian regional issues and that the United States should restore and then enhance its traditional level of engagement there.’826 The slow recovery of the US economy, and the American perception that it need not maintain such a heavy presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, enabled ‘America to become more engaged in Asia.’827 But the beginning of the Obama presidency seemed to indicate a different path: One where the US reaffirmed its commitment to the Middle East.

Only months after coming to the White House, President Obama delivered a speech entitled

‘a new beginning’ during a visit to Cairo in June 2009 to ‘Muslims around the world’.828 In it, he called for a reset in relations between Muslims and the West, based on ‘mutual interest and mutual respect’.829 Arabs believed this signalled a greater US commitment to the region, one that did not involve imposing Western values on the Arab world, but rather, built on a more equal partnership.830 While President Obama did indeed have the intention of rebuilding ties with Muslim countries following eight years of destructive US foreign policy in

825 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall’, Speech, The White House – Office of the Press Secretary, 14 November 14, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks- president-barack-obama-suntory-hall 826 Kenneth G. Lieberthal, ‘The American ‘Pivot to Asia’’, Foreign Policy, December 21, 2011, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/ 827 Susan Rice, ‘Explaining President Obama’s Rebalance Strategy’, Medium, September 5, 2016, https://medium.com/@ObamaWhiteHouse/explaining-president-obamas-rebalance-strategy-eb5f0e81f870 828 Barack Obama, ‘A New Beginning’, Speech, Cairo University, Cairo, June 4, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09 829 Ibid 830 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17); Fawaz Gerges, Obama and the Middle East: The End of America’s Moment? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 102

204 the region, his intention was to do so to allow the US to focus a greater part of its attention on Asia and the growing concern posed by a rising China.831 Secretary Clinton elaborated on what the Pivot to Asia would entail presenting it as a re-allocation of resources, which had been freed up following the winding down of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Asia-

Pacific.832 This policy and how it was perceived by the UAE and its neighbours acted as an external foreign policy constraint on Abu Dhabi and some of the other Gulf Arab capitals, framing and changing their foreign policy decision-making.

Ultimately, the Pivot had little real impact on the ground for US partners in the Middle East.833

Its psychological effect on the region, however, was considerable, especially following the

Arab Spring and President Obama’s perceived abandonment of Mubarak in Egypt. The UAE and its allies perceived the Pivot as proof that the US was embarking on a long-term strategy of disengagement in the Middle East – at their expense. It highlighted America’s unreliability as a security guarantor and partner. The UAE viewed this as a potential change in its international threat context, with likely impacts on regime security – the first element of our external constraints on foreign policy identified in chapter four – and an impending change in its security alliance – the second element. As a result, this framed their subsequent foreign policy decision-making: The Pivot gave new momentum to the idea that to guarantee their security, the UAE and other smaller Gulf Arab states would have to stand on their own two feet. For the UAE, this translated into an intensification of its assertiveness,834 which was

831 Fawaz Gerges, Obama and the Middle East: The End of America’s Moment? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 10; Ben Rhodes, quoted in Ryan Lizza, ‘The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring remade Obama’s foreign policy’, The New Yorker, May 2, 2011, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/02/the- consequentialist 832 Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/ 833 This will be examined further in this chapter 834 See chapter three

205 evident in the further development of its capabilities, Abu Dhabi’s willingness to deploy these capabilities and the lessons it drew from their deployment – the three core indicators of assertiveness as set out in chapter one. The previous chapter established that the Arab Spring was key to intensifying the growing assertiveness of the UAE because it affected both its international threat context and as a result, regime security, and their security alliances and relations with third powers – the two international constraints on foreign policy identified in chapter four. This chapter will examine how the second catalyst - the statement of a US Pivot to Asia - worsened the Gulf Arab perception of the US commitment to the region and, as a result, gave added momentum to the new assertiveness in the region. It will briefly summarise the history of US involvement in the Persian Gulf region. It will then examine the Obama administration’s intentions vis-à-vis the region, the goals of the Pivot to Asia, and how very little was achieved. Finally, the chapter will examine the Pivot’s impact on the UAE and its neighbours: How it was considered proof of long-term US disengagement from the region, and as a result, further entrenched the idea that the US could no longer be relied upon as a security guarantor, forming the backdrop to the change in the UAE’s foreign policy.

1. The US in the Persian Gulf Region

In order to understand the impact of the Obama administration’s desire to pivot to Asia on the psyche of the leadership in the UAE and its neighbouring countries, it is important to examine the history of the US presence in the Persian Gulf. After the Second World War, US presence in the Middle East was dictated by the Cold War and the need to pull Arab countries

206 away from Soviet influence.835 In the Persian Gulf however, it was only after the Iraq invasion of Kuwait that US presence became permanent, marking the beginning of a close security relationship, but one which was not without its complications. The US presence in the Gulf

Arab countries was controversial for domestic audiences, particularly among the religious elites who did not want it.836 But this did not prevent America from becoming a major player on the ground.

The Middle East became a key arena in the struggle against Communism as the US backed

Israel against Soviet-backed Arab governments. As such, any intervention in the region was viewed within the context of containing the Soviet Union.837 When in 1971, the UK withdrew from the region, the Gulf Arabs looked for new partners. The US did not want to take over the role of the British,838 instead, it developed a ‘Twin Pillar’ policy: Relying on both Iran and Saudi

Arabia to safeguard the US’ local interests and stability in the region. The policy was developed as part of the Nixon Doctrine, which established that while the US would assist its friends and allies in defending against aggressors, it could not defend all countries in the

835 For more on US foreign policy in the Middle East during the Cold War, see for example, Ray Takeyh, Steven Simon, The Pragmatic Superpower: Winning the Cold War in the Middle East (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2016); Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945 (London: I.B. Taurus, 2003); Rashid Khalidi, Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East (Boston; Beacon Press, 2009); Bryan R. Gibson, Sold out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds and the Cold War (New York: Palgrave MacMillan US, 2015); Geoffrey Wawro, Quicksand: America’s Pursuit of Power in the Middle East (New York: The Penguin Press, 2010); Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2014) 836 Eugene Rogan, The Arabs – A History (New York, Basic Books, 2009), 583; F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 88, 127, 128 837 Fawaz Gerges, Obama and the Middle East: The End of America’s Moment? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 35. See also, George Kennan, ‘The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State’, Telegram, Washington DC, February 22, 1946, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116178.pdf; Harry S. Truman, ‘Address before a Joint Session of Congress’, Speech, Congress, Washington DC, March 12, 1947, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp 838 Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, 22

207 world.839 It outlined that the Shah’s Iran would receive political support and weapons so ‘it could act as an American proxy in the region’, while Saudi Arabia would be encouraged to expand militarily, but still be viewed as the ‘distinctly junior partner in security matters’.840

This increased existing tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia as they vied for US support and assistance in the region. The 1979 Islamic Revolution led Washington to abandon its Twin

Pillars policy and side with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab states against an Islamic government that had openly threatened the US and US persons with the takeover of the embassy in Tehran, which began on 4 November 1979.841

The 1979 revolution elevated the Iranian threat in the eyes of the Gulf Arab states.842 The relatively young Gulf Arab states felt vulnerable even though the US had abandoned Iran as an ally. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait further shook the balance of power in the region,843 Gause calls it the ‘biggest strategic change’ in the region.844 Prior to the invasion, US support to the

Gulf Arab states had been largely political because Gulf Arab populations were reluctant to host US troops on their territory.845 But Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait highlighted the weakness and vulnerability of the Gulf Arab states.846 The US needed access to Saudi bases to help the Gulf countries defend themselves against the Iraqi aggressor.847 It also became clear

839 Richard Nixon, ‘Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam’, Speech, November 3, 1969, https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2017/09/address-nation-war-vietnam-november-3-1969/ 840 F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 21-22 841 For more on the hostage crisis see, Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah: The Iran Hostage Crisis – The First Battle in America’s War with Militant Islam (New York: Grove Press, 2006); David Farber, Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s First Encounter with Radical Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Fateful Encounter with Iran (London: I.B. Taurus, 1985) 842 See chapter one 843 Toby Matthiesen, The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 143 844 Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, 88 845 Ibid, 127 846 Ibid, 105 847 Ibid, 104

208 that the only way to safeguard the Gulf Arab countries was to invite foreign troops to the region, abandon the ‘myth of self-reliance’,848 and unify to form the GCC.849 Riyadh invited US troops on its territory, but did so without signing any formal agreement – a testament to the sensitivity of the decision.850 The Clinton administration formalised this step, and added a military dimension to it with the development of the ‘dual containment’ policy, which identified both Iran and Iraq as threats, which it sought to isolate.851 The move to internationalise regional security contributed to domestic political turbulence in these countries, and increased tensions with Iran, which believed in the indigenisation of regional security.852 But ultimately, hosting US troops in the region helped establish an era of relative peace in the nineties.853 While the US only provided a security umbrella to the Gulf Arab states and not an alliance, the relationship was still critical to the Gulf Arab states.

A decade later, the attack on the twin towers in New York and targets in Washington DC led to a change in US Middle East policy.854 President George W. Bush led a new ideological

848 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 75 849 Ibid, 75; Christopher M. Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (Hurst & Company: London, 2012), 179 850 F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 128 851 Ibid, 127; F. Gregory Gause III, ‘The Illogic of Dual Containment’, Foreign Affairs (March/April 1994) 852 This is discussed in chapter one 853 Christopher M. Davidson, ‘The United Arab Emirates’, in Christopher M. Davidson Ed, Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf monarchies (London: Hurst & Company, 2011), 10; Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami (Oxon: Routledge, 2003), 94, 116; Frederic M. Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), xvi 854 For more on President Bush’s strategy towards the Middle East, see for example, Timothy Andres Sayle, Jeffrey A. Engel, Hal Brands, William Inboden Eds, The Last Card: Inside George W Bush’s Decision to Surge in Iraq (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2019); Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud: The Secret Relationship Between the World’s Two Most Powerful Dynasties (New York: Scribner, 2004); William J. Burns, The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for its Renewal (New York: Random House, 2019); Bob Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006); Stanley A. Renson and Peter Suedfeld Eds, Understanding the Bush Doctrine: Psychology and Strategy in an Age of Terrorism (New York and London: Routledge, 2007); Kenneth Stein, ‘The Bush Doctrine is selective engagement: Continuity in American foreign policy toward the Middle East’, Politique Etrangere, Vol. 67, No. 1 (January 2002), 149-171; Dennis Ross, ‘The Middle East Predicament’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1 (Jan-Feb

209

American policy that involved engineering ‘social and political change in the Middle East by using force’, combatting terror by ‘toppling the tyrants who supported them’, and ‘relying on unilateral force to reaffirm US dominance’,855 elements of which was outlined in the 2002

National Security Strategy.856 According to Gerges,

Instead of using September 11 as a catalyst to endear America to the people of the

region and to renew American leadership, Bush and the neoconservatives

monstrously miscalculated: they tried their hands at imperialism, and they did so with

the intention of transplanting America’s version of democracy and free-market

capitalism to the region.857

President Bush’s case for the spread of democracy was not limited to Iraq and Afghanistan – the countries that felt the brunt of the post 9/11 need to take action – it targeted countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Bahrain as well.858 And that was the crux of the problem, to

America’s Gulf Arab friends, 2003 was considered a ‘double betrayal’: Firstly, ‘the US commitment to regional democratization axiomatically threatened the one-family rule’ system in place in the Gulf Arab states, and secondly, it led to the ‘vast expansion of Iranian influence’ in the region because it removed Saddam Hussein as a barrier to the spread of

2005), 61; Pierre Noel, ‘The Bush Doctrine and Oil Security’, Politique Etrangere, No. 2 (July 2006), 246-253; Robert Jervis, ‘Understanding the Bush doctrine’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 118, No. 3 (Fall 2003), 365- 390 855 Fawaz Gerges, Obama and the Middle East: The End of America’s Moment? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 70 856 Office of the White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington DC, September 2002, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html 857 Gerges, Obama and the Middle East, 5 858 David Goldfischer, ‘The United States and its Key Gulf Allies: A new Foundation for a troubled partnership?’ in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 71

210

Iranian influence.859 According to Lynch, it was ‘guaranteed to stoke resentment’.860

America’s reputation in the Middle East took a severe beating.861 This set the scene for the perceived change in policy that would come with the election of President Barack Obama.

The election of President Obama was a welcome change, both at home and abroad.862 Obama openly rejected the Bush doctrine, calling it ‘outdated’ because it responded to an

‘unconventional threat’ with ‘conventional thinking’.863 He dismissed the idea of retrenchment and outlined that America would continue to lead in partnership with its allies:

‘America cannot meet the threats of this century alone, and the world cannot meet them without America. We can neither retreat from the world nor try to bully it into submission.

We must lead the world, by deed and by example’.864 According to Ben Rhodes, the administration would first have to deal with a number of issues they had inherited from the

Bush presidency:

The project of the first two years has been to effectively deal with the legacy issues

that we inherited, particularly the Iraq war, the Afghan war, and the war against Al

Qaeda, while rebalancing our resources and our posture in the world…If you were to

boil it all down to a bumper sticker, it’s ‘wind down these two wars, re-establish

859 David Goldfischer, ‘The United States and its Key Gulf Allies: A new Foundation for a troubled partnership?’ in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 71 860 Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising – The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), 224 861 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17); See also ‘Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years (2001-2008)’, Pew Research Center (18 December 2008), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2008/12/18/global-public-opinion-in-the- bush-years-2001-2008/ 862 Barack Obama, ‘Renewing American Leadership’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 4 (July -Aug 2007), 2-16 863 Ibid, 4 864 Ibid, 4

211

American standing and leadership in the world, and focus on a broader set of

priorities, from Asia and the global economy to a nuclear-nonproliferation regime. 865

The Middle East was intrigued by what this change would mean for them.866 President Obama conducted extensive outreach to the region, beginning just days after his inauguration with an interview to Al-Arabiya, a Dubai-based Arabic news outlet.867 He called for immediate engagement with the region, and addressed pressing concerns, including the Israeli-

Palestinian issue.868 Only months after his inauguration, Obama, on his first trip as president, travelled to Muslim-majority Turkey to re-iterate the administration’s policy of ‘broader engagement’ of the Muslim world based on ‘mutual interest and mutual respect’.869 Shortly after, he repeated this policy aim in a speech entitled ‘a new beginning’ during a visit to Cairo in June 2009 to ‘Muslims around the world’.870 The speech was directed at Arab public opinion and aimed to reset relations between Muslims and the West, based on ‘mutual interest and mutual respect’.871 America’s friends in the region thought this might signal a new era of greater US commitment, based on a more equal partnership,872 it sparked expectations that

865 Ben Rhodes, quoted in Ryan Lizza, ‘The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring remade Obama’s foreign policy’, The New Yorker, May 2, 2011, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/02/the- consequentialist 866 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 867 ‘Full transcript of Obama’s Al-Arabiya interview’, Transcript, NBC News, January 27, 2009, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/28870724/ns/politics-white_house/t/full-transcript-obamas-al-arabiya- interview/ 868 Ibid 869 Barack Obama, ‘President Obama’s Remarks in Turkey’, Transcript, The New York Times, April 6, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/06/us/politics/06obama-text.html 870 Barack Obama, ‘A New Beginning’, Speech, Cairo University, Cairo, June 4, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09 871 Ibid 872 Fawaz Gerges, Obama and the Middle East: The End of America’s Moment? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 66-67

212 relations with the US would be different from now on.873 But Obama aimed to draw down US presence in the region and widen the focus of America’s foreign policy. Gerges explains that

‘…Obama’s outreach strategy reflected less of a sustained commitment and engagement in the region and more of an effort to cut further losses and perform damage control’.874

American officials, including Thomas E. Donilon, national security advisor to President Obama, made their desire to focus on more pressing concerns clear. According to Ryan Lizza of the

New Yorker,

One of Donilon’s overriding beliefs, which Obama adopted as his own, was that

America needed to rebuild its reputation, extricate itself from the Middle East and

Afghanistan, and turn its attention toward Asia and China’s unchecked influence in the

region. America was ‘overweighted’ in the former and ‘underweighted’ in the latter,

Donilon told me. ‘We’ve been on a little bit of a Middle East detour over the course of

the last ten years,’ Kurt Campbell, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and

Pacific Affairs, said. ‘And our future will be dominated utterly and fundamentally by

developments in Asia and the Pacific region.’875

As a result, the Obama administration crafted the Pivot to Asia policy. The next section will examine the policy itself; the impetus for it, the crafting of it and its announcement, before examining its actual impact on the ground.

873 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17); Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising – The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), 222 874 Fawaz Gerges, Obama and the Middle East: The End of America’s Moment? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 66-67 875 Ryan Lizza, ‘The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring remade Obama’s foreign policy’, The New Yorker, May 2, 2011, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist

213

2. The Pivot

President Obama believed that Washington should both pursue engagement on equal footing and draw down its presence in the Middle East, in order to tackle new challenges elsewhere.

In 2016, Jeffrey Goldberg wrote that Obama was ‘fixated on turning America’s attention to

Asia. For Obama, Asia represents the future’.876 Aside from a nod towards rebuilding ‘ties to

[US] allies in Europe and Asia’ in his piece in Foreign Affairs in 2007,877 it was only after his inauguration that president Obama highlighted his desire to enact a US pivot to Asia.878 During a trip to Japan in his first year in office, President Obama referred to himself as ‘America’s first Pacific president’, stating that ‘as an Asia Pacific nation, the United States expects to be involved in the discussions that shape the future of this region’.879 The Pivot was an ambitious policy, that was refined on a number of occasions. But ultimately,

The Asia that President Obama expected when he took office was not the Asia that he

got. Confronted with a global financial crisis, ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,

and policy priorities of climate change and healthcare reform, America’s first

president with roots in the Pacific did not exactly have the luxury of looking east.880

876 Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic (April 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ 877 Barack Obama, ‘Renewing American Leadership’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 4 (July -Aug 2007), 12 878 Nicholas D. Anderson, Victor D. Cha, ‘The Case of the ‘Pivot to Asia’: System Effects and the Origins of Strategy’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 132, Issue 4 (2017), 602 879 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall’, Speech, The White House – Office of the Press Secretary, November 14, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/realitycheck/the-press- office/remarks-president-barack-obama-suntory-hall 880 Anderson, Cha, ‘The Case of the ‘Pivot to Asia’: System Effects and the Origins of Strategy’, 602

214

As a result, the president was forced to scale back his ambitions.881 This section will examine what drove Obama’s Pivot to Asia and what it entailed, before returning to the region to examine the impact it had on the UAE and its neighbours.

2.1 Drivers of the Pivot

Two important international factors enabled and encouraged the roll-out of the policy:

China’s growing assertiveness in the region beginning in 2010, and the draw-down of US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2011.882

2.1.1 China’s growing assertiveness

Initially, the Obama administration did not aim to contain China, rather, to engage Beijing.883

According to Anderson and Cha, at the start of his presidency, Obama had a relatively conciliatory approach to China, which consisted of ‘engaging a rising China, strengthening the

U.S.-Japan alliance, reaching out to North Korea, and re-evaluating regional trade deals’.884

One priority was to tackle the effects of the 2008 financial crisis, and in this, the administration ‘believed China would be an indispensable partner’.885 During their first meeting in London in April 2009, President Obama and President Hu Jintao announced the

‘US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue’, which was intended to make meetings between

881 Scott W. Harold, ‘Is the Pivot Doomed? The Resilience of America’s Strategic ‘Rebalance’’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2015), 85-99 882 Kenneth G. Lieberthal, ‘The American ‘Pivot to Asia’’, Brookings, December 21, 2011, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/ 883 Chi Wang, Obama’s Challenge to China: The Pivot to Asia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 6 884 Nicholas D. Anderson, Victor D. Cha, ‘The Case of the ‘Pivot to Asia’: System Effects and the Origins of Strategy’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 132, Issue 4 (2017), 605 885 Wang, Obama’s Challenge to China, 59

215 senior officials in economics and foreign policy of both countries a regular and structured occurrence.886 Obama’s first visit to China in November 2009 was intended to showcase the beginning of a better relationship with Beijing, but China held firm on a number of issues, leading to media coverage of a ‘rising China, more willing to say no to the United States’.887

Obama’s policy of engaging China was not popular with his cabinet, including Secretary

Clinton who said, ‘I don’t want my grandchildren to live in a world dominated by the

Chinese’,888 and pushed him to take a tougher stance against Beijing.

President Obama’s tenure and push for better relations with Beijing coincided with China’s

‘entrance as a major world power’.889 As a result, while China helped the US out in certain respects, it held firm on others, including helping curb North Korea’s bellicose behaviour.890

In addition, Beijing stepped up its claims to islands in the South China Sea in 2010,891 while tensions also rose between China and the US on the economic front.892 China recovered relatively swiftly from the world economic crisis,893 giving it the means to pursue its more active foreign policy. Beijing’s assertiveness highlighted that President Obama’s policy of engagement was not working. So the US strengthened ties with its allies and partners in Asia

886 Dennis Wilder, ‘The US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue: Continuity and Change in Obama’s China Policy’, The Brooking Institution (15 May 2009), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-u-s-china-strategic- and-economic-dialogue-continuity-and-change-in-obamas-china-policy/ 887 Helene Cooper, ‘China Holds Firm on Major Issues in Obama’s Visit’, The New York Times, November 17, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/world/asia/18prexy.html 888 Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic (April 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ 889 Chi Wang, Obama’s Challenge to China: The Pivot to Asia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 9 890 Mark Landler, ‘Obama Urges China to Check North Korea’, The New York Times, December 6, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/world/asia/07diplo.html 891 Wang, Obama’s Challenge to China, 73-74 892 Ibid, 83-87 893 David Barboza, ‘China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy’, The New York Times (15 August 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/global/16yuan.html; Will Martin, ‘The US could lose its crown as the world’s most powerful economy as soon as next year, and it’s unlikely to ever get it back’, Business Insider, January 10, 2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-economy-to-fall-behind-china-within- a-year-standard-chartered-says-2019-1

216 and spearheaded the adoption of a ‘tougher line’, which included filing cases against China at the World Trade Organisation and announcing the deployment of a new missile defence system in Japan.894 According to Wang, it was in 2011, ‘after two years in office, (that) the

Obama administration began to solidify its Asia strategy (including China policy) into a unified diplomatic, military and economic refocusing called the “pivot” or “rebalancing” to Asia’, including a tougher stance on China.895

2.1.2 The US drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan

Along with China’s growing willingness to assert itself internationally, the drawdown of US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan were important enablers for this policy shift. US troops had been present in Afghanistan since the first thousand special forces were sent to the country to support US airstrikes against Taliban forces following the 9/11 attacks in 2001.896 In 2005,

President Bush re-affirmed US commitment to working with Afghanistan, and secured continued access to Afghan military facilities to continue the War on Terror.897 Following the

2006 resurgence in violence, President Obama enacted a surge in US troops in Afghanistan to tackle the violence, 898 which allowed the start of the drawdown in July 2011. A similar pattern followed in Iraq following the US invasion in March 2003.899 The US-led coalition ended

894 Mark Landler, ‘Obama’s Journey to Tougher Tack on a Rising China’, The New York Times, September 20, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/us/politics/obamas-evolution-to-a-tougher-line-on-china.html 895 Chi Wang, Obama’s Challenge to China: The Pivot to Asia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 81 896 For a timeline of America’s war in Afghanistan see ‘The U.S. War in Afghanistan - timeline’, The Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan 897 Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership, Washington DC, May 23, 2005, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/2005/46628.htm 898 Barack Obama, ‘Speech on Afghanistan’, CNN, December 2, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/12/01/obama.afghanistan.speech.transcript/index.html 899 For a timeline of America’s war in Iraq, see ‘The Iraq War – timeline’, The Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war

217

Saddam Hussein’s regime, which led to a long era of sectarian violence, lawlessness, and political instability. During the campaign, Obama announced he would withdraw US combat brigades from Iraq by the summer of 2010, and the remainder of US troops would leave by the end of 2011. As a result, by 2011, it appeared that the US would no longer be impeded by its military commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan, enabling it to turn its attention elsewhere.

Ultimately though, Obama struggled to fulfil his plans of drawing down US commitments to the Middle East. Despite his July 2011 target date, American troops remained in Afghanistan, and it was only in May 2014 that the President announced a timetable for withdrawing US forces from the country by the end of the 2016.900 Nevertheless, the drawing down of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan - the ‘legacy issues’ that the Obama administration ‘inherited’, according to Ben Rhodes901 - was a factor that enabled the Obama administration to turn its attention to Asia. The next section will examine what the administration’s pivot policy entailed.

2.2 What did the Pivot entail?

President Obama outlined his vision for the Pivot to Asia in a speech during his trip to the region in November 2011. According to noted China expert, Kenneth Lieberthal,

It articulated an integrated diplomatic, military, and economic strategy that stretches

from the Indian subcontinent through Northeast Asia — and one that can profoundly

900 Mark Landler, ‘U.S. Troops to Leave Afghanistan by End of 2016’, The New York Times, May 27, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/world/asia/us-to-complete-afghan-pullout-by-end-of-2016-obama-to- say.html 901 Ryan Lizza, ‘The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring remade Obama’s foreign policy’, The New Yorker, May 2, 2011, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist

218

shape the U.S.-China relationship. The core message: America is going to play a

leadership role in Asia for decades to come.902

President Obama’s first stop was the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit (APEC), where he stated, ‘The United States is a Pacific power and we are here to stay’.903 In his speech to the Australian parliament on 17 November 2011, President Obama reaffirmed US commitment to its allies in the region, reiterating that: ‘Our new focus on this region reflects a fundamental truth -- the United States has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation’.904 The president outlined the three areas the rebalance would focus on:

The first revolved around security, which included upholding international laws and

norms, maintaining U.S. regional defense spending and military presence, building the

capabilities of allies and partners, strengthening alliances, engaging regional

organizations, and building a cooperative relationship with China. The second core

tenet of Obama’s articulation of the pivot was prosperity, which focused mainly on

free and fair trade and environmentally sustainable growth. The third tenet of the

pivot was human rights, indicating the United States’ intention to champion freedoms

of speech, of the press, of assembly, of religion, and of citizens to choose their own

902 Kenneth G. Lieberthal, ‘The American ‘Pivot to Asia’’, Foreign Policy, December 21, 2011, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/ 903 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President Obama at APEC CEO Business Summit Q&A’, Speech, The White House, Hawaii, November 12, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press- office/2011/11/12/remarks-president-obama-apec-ceo-business-summit-qa 904 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament’, Speech, Australian Parliament, Canberra, November 17, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks- president-obama-australian-parliament

219

leaders. In sum, in President Obama’s view, the pivot consisted of a tripartite U.S.

commitment to security, prosperity, and human rights in the Asia-Pacific.905

President Obama made security in Asia a top priority. During his trip to Australia in November

2011, Obama announced that the US would base 2,500 marines in Darwin – prompting China to respond that the US was escalating military tensions in its backyard.906 On alliance building and multilateral organisations, President Obama focused his efforts the East Asia Summit

(EAS), which he attended for the first time in November 2011, and on building the Trans-

Pacific Partnership (TPP). Following the 2008 economic crisis, the economic angle of the Pivot was also key to its effectiveness. Indeed, ‘in 2010, 61 percent of U.S. goods exports and 72 percent of U.S. agricultural exports worldwide went to the Asia-Paciﬁc’.907 Following the outbreak of the Arab Spring, President Obama also promoted democracy and human rights in Asia. Lieberthal assesses that many of the measures outlined by Obama already existed, especially those on pushing back Chinese ambitions, but his November 2011 policy statement

‘brought disparate elements together in a strategically integrated fashion that explicitly affirms and promises to sustain American leadership throughout Asia for the foreseeable future’.908 The strategy outlined was complex and multi-layered.

905 Nicholas D. Anderson, Victor D. Cha, ‘The Case of the ‘Pivot to Asia’: System Effects and the Origins of Strategy’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 132, Issue 4 (2017), 598; see also, Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament’, Speech, Australian Parliament, Canberra, November 17, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian- parliament 906 Jackie Calmes, ‘A U.S. Marine base for Australia Irritates China’ The New York Times, November 16, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/obama-and-gillard-expand-us-australia-military-ties.html 907 U.S. Trade Representative, ‘The United States in the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership’, (November 2011), cited in David W. Barno, Nora Bensahel, Travis Sharp, ‘Pivot but Hedge: A strategy for Pivoting to Asia While Hedging in the Middle East’, Orbis, No. 2, Issue 56 (December 2012), 158-176 908 Kenneth G. Lieberthal, ‘The American ‘Pivot to Asia’’, Brookings, December 21, 2011, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/

220

The Pivot was further clarified by several American officials in the months and years that followed. In October 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton outlined six major pillars of the policy, referring to it as ‘forward-deployed diplomacy’.909 Interestingly, and significant for the

Gulf Arab states, Clinton couched it in terms of a move from the Middle East region to Asia, with the headline sentence for her piece stating, ‘The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq’.910 Anderson and Cha summarised these pillars: strengthening bilateral alliances; deepening ‘working relationships with emerging regional powers, including

India and Indonesia but also, most importantly, China’; re-engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding US trade and investment in the region; boosting US military personnel in the region to ensure regional security and stability; advancing human rights and democracy in the region.911 Clinton’s piece re-iterated the Pivot’s priority and America’s commitment to it, ‘This kind of pivot is not easy, but we have paved the way for it over the past two-and-a- half years, and we are committed to seeing it through as among the most important diplomatic efforts of our time’.912 In 2012, Tom Donilon restated the important components of the policy: Alliance-building and strengthening, ‘forging deeper partnerships with emerging powers’, engaging with regional multilateral institutions, strengthening the relationship with

China, and ‘advancing the region’s economic architecture’.913 In 2015, Secretary of Defense

909 Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/ 910 Ibid 911 Nicholas D. Anderson, Victor D. Cha, ‘The Case of the ‘Pivot to Asia’: System Effects and the Origins of Strategy’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 132, Issue 4 (2017), 598 912 Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’ 913 Tom Donilon, ‘Remarks by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon – As prepared for delivery’, Speech, The White House, Washington DC, November 15, 2012, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press- office/2012/11/15/remarks-national-security-advisor-tom-donilon-prepared-delivery. See also, Tom Donilon, ‘The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013’, Speech at Asia Society, New York, March 11, 2013, https://asiasociety.org/new-york/complete-transcript-thomas-donilon-asia-society-new-york; ‘Foreign Affairs focus: Tom Donilon on U.S. Asia Policy’, Foreign Affairs, February 6, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/videos/2014-02-06/foreign-affairs-focus-tom-donilon-us-asia-policy; Tom Donilon, ‘Obama is on the right course with the ‘Pivot to Asia’’, The Washington Post, April 20, 2014,

221

Ash Carter outlined the ‘next phase’ of the Pivot: investment and development of capabilities, deployment of military capabilities, adapting America’s ‘overall defense posture in the region to be geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable’, and boosting regional alliances and partnerships.914 The next section will examine the impact of the Pivot on the ground in Asia, and how much of an actual change it was for the Middle East.

2.3 The impact of the Pivot on the ground

In 2016, Ambassador Susan Rice, National Security Advisor to President Obama, assessed that the Pivot was vital to ‘renew and redefine U.S. leadership on the world stage’ and to boost

America’s economic recovery.915 She outlined the policy’s success, emphasising ties to new partners and expanded ‘region-wide cooperation’ through multilateral institutions, citing US participation in the East Asia Summit and ASEAN, and the launch of the Young Southeast Asian

Leaders Initiative.916 But the result was not as clear cut as she suggested.

President Obama made the security aspect of his rebalance to Asia a priority. In 2011,

President Obama announced that he planned to deploy 2500 Marines in Australia as part of the military/security dimensions of the Pivot and to signal America’s military commitment to the region.917 This came during budget cuts, including in defence, following the financial crisis

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obama-is-on-the-right-course-with-the-pivot-to- asia/2014/04/20/ed719108-c73c-11e3-9f37-7ce307c56815_story.html 914 Ash Carter, ‘Remarks on the Next Phase of the U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific’, Speech, McCain Institute, Arizona State University, Tempe, April 6, 2015, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech- View/Article/606660/ 915 Susan Rice, ‘Explaining President Obama’s Rebalance Strategy’, Medium, September 5, 2016, https://medium.com/@ObamaWhiteHouse/explaining-president-obamas-rebalance-strategy-eb5f0e81f870 916 Ibid 917 Jackie Calmes, ‘A U.S. Marine Base for Australia Irritates China’, The New York Times, November 16, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/obama-and-gillard-expand-us-australia-military-ties.html

222 in 2008,918 and the draw-down of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.919 While the numbers seemed limited, they were not insignificant. Anderson and Cha write that under Obama, troops in the region increased from 117,000 by the end of 2008, to 163,000 in 2016.920 In

October 2014, the DOD announced the ‘Pacific Pathways’ programme, which involved conducting military exercises with partners in the region, increasing joint training and stationing 80,000 soldiers in Hawaii, Alaska and Japan.921 The Pivot also saw the US increasing its staffing on all issues related to the Asia-Pacific,922 and ramp up arms sales to the region.923

Finally, Anderson and Cha argue that,

Perhaps most important from the Asian perch, the Obama administration gave more “face

time” to Asia. During the Obama administration, the president or secretary of state visited

an average of seven Asia-Pacific countries annually for bilateral meetings, whereas under

both the Clinton and Bush administrations, this number was closer to five.924

918 Louis Jacobson, Amy Sherman, ‘PolitiFact Sheet: Military spending under Obama and Congress’, PolitiFact, December 14, 2015, https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2015/dec/14/politifact-sheet-our- guide-to-military-spending-/ 919 Mark Landler, ‘U.S. Troops to Leave Iraq by Year’s End, Obama Says’, The New York Times, October 21, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/world/middleeast/president-obama-announces-end-of-war-in- iraq.html; ‘Obama announces Afghanistan troop withdrawal plan’, CNN, June 23, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/06/22/afghanistan.troops.drawdown/index.html 920 Nicholas D. Anderson, Victor D. Cha, ‘The Case of the ‘Pivot to Asia’: System Effects and the Origins of Strategy’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 132, Issue 4 (2017), 610 921 Tyrone C. Marshall Jr., ‘Pacific Pathways Increases Readiness Through Partnership’, DOD News, October 15, 2014, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/603461/; Janina Davidson, Lauren Dickey, ‘Fact: America’s Rebalance to Asia Has Some Serious Military Muscle’, The National Interest, April 16, 2015, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/fact-americas-rebalance-asia-has-some-serious-military-12652 922 For more on staff changes in the Obama administration, see Chi Wang, Obama’s Challenge to China: The Pivot to Asia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 29-57 923 Anderson, Cha, ‘The Case of the ‘Pivot to Asia’: System Effects and the Origins of Strategy’, 610 924 Ibid, 612

223

Jeffrey Bader argues that while the administration had ‘tangible achievements to show’ on the security and diplomatic front, the same cannot be said of the economic sector,925 where the US ‘had few specific accomplishments’.926 The administration successfully concluded the

TPP – the largest regional trade agreement in history927 - in October 2015, but it was not ratified by Congress, and President Trump unilaterally pulled out of the agreement in 2017.

The deal faced the economic dominance of China, who ‘engaged in a number of economic counter-initiatives intended to set up free-trade arrangements in Asia that would in turn exclude the United States’.928 In 2013, China also announced the One Belt One Road initiative

(OBOR):929 A remake of the Silk Road, which aimed to build ‘a transcontinental economic development zone and integrated logistics and infrastructure network, connecting China via land and maritime routes to Central and South Asia, Africa, and Europe’.930 OBOR became a symbol of China’s growing assertiveness and push-back against President Obama’s Pivot policy.931

The administration’s Pivot was also constrained by limited resources, budget cuts and sequestration, and other international crises. According to Admiral Harry B. Harris, nominated in 2013 to be the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, ‘Continued reductions to meet

925 Jeffrey A Bader, ‘The lynch pin of Obama’s Asia pivot is about to succeed or fail’, Business Insider, July 29, 2015, https://www.businessinsider.com/the-lynchpin-of-obamas-asia-pivot-is-about-to-succeed-or-fail-2015-7 926 Ibid 927 Kevin Granville, ‘What Is TPP? Behind the Trade Deal that Died’, The New York Times, January 23, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/tpp-explained-what-is-trans-pacific-partnership.html 928 Georg Lofflmann, ‘The Pivot between Containment, Engagement, and Restraint: President Obama’s Conflicted Grand Strategy in Asia’, Asian Security, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2016), 98 929 For more on OBOR, see Scott Kennedy, ‘Building China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’’, CSIS (3 April 2015), https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-china%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cone-belt-one-road%E2%80%9D 930 Lofflmann, ‘The Pivot between Containment, Engagement, and Restraint: President Obama’s Conflicted Grand Strategy in Asia’, 98 931 Andrew Chatzky, James McBride, ‘China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative’, Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder (21 February 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative

224 sequestration-mandated resource levels will diminish our military's size, reach, and margin of technological superiority. All of these factors will impact the U.S. rebalance to the Pacific’.932

An independent study conducted by CSIS confirmed that budget cuts had already affected the

US’ ability to fully implement the policy, and that future fiscal uncertainty meant that it was unclear whether the Pentagon would be able to fulfil its goals in Asia.933 In addition, Scott W.

Harold points to the Obama administration’s ‘failure of strategic messaging’ as another problem with the implementation of the Pivot:934 President Obama may have had the intention to pivot to Asia, but there remained confusion over what exactly this entailed.935

Other international crises such as Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, also limited the

Pivot. But it was the unforeseen events in the Middle East that required enduring attention:

‘The principal challenges likely will emanate from the greater Middle East, a region that is plagued by volatility but inseparable from core U.S. interests’.936 Amitai Etzioni said challenges in the Middle East are ‘current’ versus future ones in Asia,937 stating that the ‘U.S. has not developed a strategy for dealing with Pakistan, a way to stabilize Afghanistan or, arguably,

Iraq, is flailing in its dealings with Iran, and is confused about how to deal with a Middle East that is trending toward Islamic majorities. Pivoting to the Far East will prove a major

932US Senate Hearing, Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Harry B. Harries Jr., U.S. Navy, Nominee to be Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Washington DC, 2014, https://www.armed- services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Harris_12-02-14.pdf; see also Mark E. Manyin, Stephen Daggett, Ben Dolven, Susan V Lawrence, Michael F Martin, Ronald O’Rourke, Bruce Vaughn, ‘Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ toward Asia’, Congressional Research Service Reports (28 March 2012), 15 933 ‘Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships’, CSIS report (January 2016), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs- public/legacy_files/files/publication/160119_Green_AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web_0.pdf 934 Scott W. Harold, ‘Is the Pivot Doomed? The Resilience of America’s Strategic ‘Rebalance’’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2015), 89 935 ‘Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships’, VIII 936 David W. Barno, Nora Bensahel, Travis Sharp, ‘Pivot but Hedge: A Strategy for Pivoting to Asia while Hedging in the Middle East’, Foreign Policy Research Institute (Spring 2012), 159 937 Amitai Etzioni, ‘The United States’ Premature Pivot to “Asia”’, Society, Vol. 49, Issue 5 (September 2012), 395–399

225 distraction at this point in time’.938 Throughout the remainder of his presidency, no matter how much President Obama tried to focus his attention on Asia, consecutive crises in the

Middle East made it impossible for him to achieve all that he set out to.

Ultimately, the success of Obama administration’s policy of rebalancing towards Asia was mixed. It succeeded in establishing ‘an enduring framework for engagement with Southeast

Asia’,939 and had several political, military and economic successes. But the US faced several constraining factors and a range of foreign policy quagmires. Despite this, Harold said,

The strategy of rebalancing to the Asia–Pacific will endure. This is because the

rebalance is a low-cost, durable, fundamentally sound, and strategic policy based on

the national interests of the United States. It enjoys widespread support both within

the bureaucracy and across much of the mainstream political spectrum.940

The Pivot had little concrete effect on the US’ commitment to the Middle East. Obama continued to be heavily involved in the unfolding crises in the region. But it was too late. In the UAE, the belief that the US was disengaging from the region was so predominant that it ignored the numbers pointing towards increasing economic ties,941 and ever-closer cultural and military relations between Abu Dhabi and Washington.942 These things no longer

938 Amitai Etzioni, ‘The United States’ Premature Pivot to “Asia”’, Society, Vol. 49, Issue 5 (September 2012), 395–399 939 Michael J. Green, ‘The Legacy of Obama’s “‘Pivot to Asia’”, Foreign Policy, September 3, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/03/the-legacy-of-obamas-pivot-to-asia/ 940 Scott W. Harold, ‘Is the Pivot Doomed? The Resilience of America’s Strategic ‘Rebalance’’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2015), 86 941 See factsheet on ‘UAE-US Economic Relationship’, Embassy of the UAE in Washington DC, https://www.uae- embassy.org/uae-us-relations/key-areas-bilateral-cooperation/uae-us-economic-relationship 942 Statement by former Emirati official at author roundtable with regional experts, officials and academics, Dubai (19 April 2016)

226 mattered, the president had made clear his intention to draw down forces in the Middle East and focus his attention on Asia, and that is what America’s friends in the region heard. The next section will examine the impact of the policy on the Gulf Arab states.

3. The impact of the Pivot on the Gulf Arabs

Irrespective of how far the administration got in the implementation of its Pivot policy, it was the message of wanting to draw down America’s involvement in conflicts in the Middle East that was heard by leaders in the region.943 It did not matter that ultimately, Obama was not able to disengage from the Middle East as much as he wanted to, the damage had been done by just stating his intention to. The Pivot impacted the region by firmly establishing the perception that US disengagement from the region was not temporary, but rather, part of a long-term trend. This changed the UAE and its Gulf Arab allies’ regional threat context: It made America’s partners in the Persian Gulf increasingly nervous about their security, and further added to the unease that had already appeared following the Arab Spring: that the US could not be trusted to deliver on its security guarantees to the UAE and its neighbours if needed, thereby affecting the Gulf Arabs’ regional alliances and security relations with third powers. The perception of US disengagement from the Middle East falls under both elements of the external constraints on foreign policymaking identified in chapter four. The Pivot served as an external constraint on the UAE, forcing it to react to the change in context by adapting its foreign policy. Indeed, it affected Abu Dhabi’s international threat context, which it believed would then impact domestic regime security. As a result of the American reaction to

943 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17)

227 the Arab Spring, and more importantly, President Obama’s statement of wanting to turn to

Asia, Abu Dhabi perceived its US security guarantor as increasingly pre-occupied with other arenas and unreliable.944 This, they believed, would leave them vulnerable to external threats, which would in turn, impact the security of the government itself. In addition, to the UAE, the

US is almost an ally: ‘Yes, the defence relationships aren’t formalised, but it’s a distinction without a difference because you’ll have the tripwire effect,’ explained a Gulf analyst during a roundtable in Dubai in 2016.945 ‘Defence agreements don’t have to be worded as an alliance to effectively act as one,’ he added. As a result, Abu Dhabi perceived US disengagement from the region as a change in its alliances and security relations. The UAE not only believed that it would be left to fend for itself in case of a crisis, but that it would also face the growing regional threats, including those posed by Iran and Islamism, without US support. This further fed into Abu Dhabi’s desire to become increasingly self-sufficient and assertive. This section will examine the impact of the Obama administration’s Pivot statement on the psyche of leaders in the UAE and neighbouring Arab Gulf countries.

As outlined in the previous chapter, the 2011 Arab Spring already planted the perception of

US disengagement from the Middle East in the minds of the leadership in the Gulf Arab states.946 Importantly though, while the Arab Spring highlighted Gulf Arab fears of abandonment by the US, some hoped that Obama’s change in foreign policy direction with

944 See section 3.1 below. Author interviews with lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi (2014-17) 945 Statement by a regional analyst during author roundtable with regional experts, officials and academics, Dubai (19 April 2016) 946 See chapter five

228 regard to the region would be an exception rather than the new rule.947 The statement of the

Pivot to Asia, however, destroyed that hope.

3.1 Long-term US disengagement from the region

President Obama’s stated desire to turn to Asia erased doubts that his management of the crises during the Arab Spring was a fluke. To the Gulf Arabs, the public statement of a desire to move away from the Middle East towards Asia was the clear announcement of a long-term goal of the US to lessen its involvement in the Middle East. President Obama further fed into this belief with his less-than-complimentary statements on the region’s rulers, the lack of democracy in the region, and the necessity for regional powers to work together to resolve their differences.948 In an interview with Goldberg in 2016, he compared the Middle East and

Asia, outlining his stark vision of the former and how it compares to Asia’s growth potential and prosperity:

Right now, I don’t think that anybody can be feeling good about the situation in the

Middle East…You have countries that are failing to provide prosperity and opportunity

for their people. You’ve got a violent, extremist ideology, or ideologies, that are

turbocharged through social media. You’ve got countries that have very few civic

traditions, so that as autocratic regimes start fraying, the only organizing principles

are sectarian…Contrast that with Southeast Asia, which still has huge problems—

947 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 948 Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic (April 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/

229

enormous poverty, corruption—but is filled with striving, ambitious, energetic people

who are every single day scratching and clawing to build businesses and get education

and find jobs and build infrastructure. The contrast is pretty stark…They are not

thinking about how to kill Americans…What they’re thinking about is How do I get a

better education? How do I create something of value?949

Elites in Gulf Arab states were outraged at the interview. According to a former Emirati military intelligence official, the Pivot, coupled with Obama’s language when describing US partners in the Persian Gulf, led to a loss of ‘all trust in the US’.950 In the summer of 2013, the

Obama administration conducted a review of the Pivot, which he announced in a statement to the UN in September 2013. He was careful to state that the US would not disengage from the region, but that it would be ‘far more likely to invest our energy in those countries that want to work with us, that invest in their people instead of a corrupt few; that embrace a vision of society where everyone can contribute -- men and women, Shia or Sunni, Muslim,

Christian or Jew’ – a contrast to his more positive tone when discussing the Pacific region.951

A month later, National Security Advisor Susan Rice went one step further and stated, ‘We can’t just be consumed 24/7 by one region, important as it is…[President Obama] thought it was a good time to step back and reassess, in a very critical and kind of no-holds-barred way, how we conceive the region’.952 This was jarring to the Gulf Arab states, and further indication

949 Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic (April 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ 950 Author interview with former Emirati military intelligence official, Dubai (10 April 2016) 951 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly’, United Nations, New York, September 24, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press- office/2013/09/24/remarks-president-obama-address-united-nations-general-assembly 952 Mark Landler, ‘Rice Offers a More Modest Strategy for the Mideast’, The New York Times, October 26, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/world/middleeast/rice-offers-a-more-modest-strategy-for- mideast.html

230 of America’s diminishing commitment to the region.953 ‘You can’t count on the US, it has no vision for the region’, said a prominent Middle East analyst.954 Over time, as the policy became clearer and repeated by different parts of the administration, it became clear that pivoting to

Asia was something the US as a whole, wanted to focus on.

While some in regional policy circles were reassured that Obama’s tenure was nearing an end,955 others believed that even a Republican president would follow this trend, though the hope was that it would be to a lesser extent.956 The head of a prominent think-tank in the UAE referred to this period as a ‘new era’ characterised by the ‘retreat of great powers’, clearly seeing a long-term decline of US involvement and power in the region.957 Researchers from the Al Jazeera Research Center in Doha stated, ‘Resentment against the US is growing in the region. There won’t be a change with the next administration. The Arab public has lost faith in the US. The elites have lost faith. No change of leadership in the US will change this’.958 In

2016, Qatari officials and academics highlighted that the UAE and Saudi Arabia blamed many of the region’s woes on Obama’s disengagement from the region, and that they ‘don’t believe

Obama when he says he won’t abandon them’.959 A former Omani member of the Shura council said ‘the US is interested in leaving the region, that much is clear’.960 A member of the board of Oman’s central bank said ‘the region’s been taken for a ride by the US. Now it’s time

953 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 954 Statement by a Middle East analyst, Bani Yas conference, Abu Dhabi (18-19 November 2016) 955 Author interview with Youssef Al Otaiba, UAE ambassador to the USA, Washington (2 March 2016) 956 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 957 Author interview with UAE think-tank director, Dubai (1 March 2017) 958 Author roundtable with experts and analysts, Al Jazeera Research Center, Doha (16 May 2016) 959 Author roundtable with professors and researchers, Qatar University, Doha (15 May 2016) 960 Author interview with former Omani member of the Majles Shura, Muscat (21 May 2016)

231 for us to be realistic about what we can expect’.961 During the 2016 presidential race in the

US, the Republican candidate Donald Trump repeated that if he were president, he would be

‘making allies pay’ for US support,962 which further unnerved leaders in the Persian Gulf region.963 While ultimately President Trump was more vocal in his support of America’s Gulf

Arab partners during his presidency, in fact, Saudi Arabia was his first state visit as President in May 2017,964 he did not always deliver in practice, as Gulf Arab states were often left to fend for themselves, particularly during the ‘maximum pressure’ campaign on Iran and the regional tensions this led to throughout 2019-2020.965 The UAE developed a different strategy in its effort not to find itself isolated from future US administrations, especially a Republican one: It chose to cultivate close ties and build influence within the Trump administration, hoping this would help it maintain US interest in its security and engaged in the region.966 ‘We will wait out Obama’, said an Emirati official before the US elections in 2016, displaying confidence in their ability to work with and manage whatever US party came to power after

Obama.967 In fact, while the Emiratis preferred a Republican win, they also believed that a

961 Author interview with Omani central bank board member, Muscat (5 March 2017) 962 See for example, Louis Jacobson, ‘Donald Trump says Kuwait never paid U.S. back for ousting Saddam Hussein’, Politifact, April 27, 2011, https://www.politifact.com/truth-o- meter/statements/2011/apr/27/donald-trump/donal-trump-says-kuwait-never-paid-us-back-ousting/ 963 Author interview with Abdullah Baabood, former Professor, Qatar University, Doha (15 May 2016) 964 Philip Rucker and Karen DeYoung, ‘Trump signs ‘tremendous’ deals with Saudi Arabia on his first day overseas’, Washington Post, May 20, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-gets-elaborate- welcome-in-saudi-arabia-embarking-on-first-foreign-trip/2017/05/20/679f2766-3d1d-11e7-a058- ddbb23c75d82_story.html 965 See for example the immediate aftermath of the strikes on Saudi oil installations in September 2019 and the lack of US response to the attacks, Rory Jones and Sune Engel Rasmussen, ‘What We Know About the Saudi Oil Attacks’, Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-we-know- about-the-saudi-oil-attacks-11568991017 966 See chapter three. See Rajiv Chandrasekran, ‘In the UAE, the United States has a quiet, potent ally nicknamed ‘Little Sparta’’, The Washington Post, November 9, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-the-uae-the-united-states-has-a-quiet-potent- ally-nicknamed-little-sparta/2014/11/08/3fc6a50c-643a-11e4-836c- 83bc4f26eb67_story.html?utm_term=.a92d2e0ed1d6; David Hearst, ‘Revealed: How Trump confidant was ready to share inside information with UAE’, Middle East Eye, June 28, 2018, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/revealed-how-trump-confidant-was-ready-share-inside-information- uae 967 Author interview with UAE official, Washington DC (2 March 2016)

232

Hillary Clinton presidency, while not ideal, would still be better than the Obama administration.968 Indeed, as Secretary of State, Clinton demonstrated that she would be tough on Iran and eager to deepen ties with American’s Gulf Arab partners. But the UAE’s strategy was only partially successful and ultimately, Abu Dhabi decided to prepare for US disengagement from the region.969

3.2 The US is not a reliable partner

Irrespective of the impact of the Pivot on the ground, the UAE and its allies in the region became convinced that the US could no longer be relied upon to help them should they need it.970 A regional analyst said ‘the US is not willing to do what is necessary to maintain relations with the Gulf Arabs. It is not in a position to restore confidence’.971 Obama’s dismissive tone towards the Gulf Arab leaders gave momentum to the idea that because he disliked them and their way of governing, he would not necessarily come to their aid unless it was directly in US interests to do so. ‘Obama believes the Gulf Arab states are acting like spoiled kids,’ said an

Omani analyst.972 He added ‘The Gulf Arab states have no security guarantor anymore.’973 As a result, whether it was because of President Obama’s isolationism, his perceived dislike of the Gulf Arab leadership or the perception that the US was a waning global power, the result for the UAE and its Gulf Arab neighbours was the same: the United States could no longer be trusted to come to the defence of the Gulf Arab monarchies without hesitation, should it be

968 Author interview with UAE official, Washington DC (2 March 2016) 969 Author interview with a former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019) 970 Ibid 971 Author roundtable with experts and analysts, Al Jazeera Research Center (16 May 2016) 972 Author interview with Omani analyst, Doha (15 May 2016) 973 Ibid

233 required to. It also fostered a sense that the UAE’s goals and interests would likely be either ignored or de-prioritised by the US, which meant that Abu Dhabi would have to pursue them itself.

Against this background, it is important to note however, that during this period US officials were at pains to highlight growing ties between the US and the UAE and the significant US presence in the region. According to a CRS report released in 2014, the UAE and the US expanded on the 1994 Defense Cooperation Agreement and set up a ‘Defense Cooperation

Framework’,974 which was intended to improve the integration of US and Emirati capabilities, and completed the basing of 5000 US forces at various facilities throughout the UAE, including

Jebel Ali port and Al Dhafra air base. 975 In addition, the UAE also requested to be considered a ‘Major Non-NATO Ally’, similar to Kuwait and Bahrain, or a ‘key U.S. defense partner’ in order to expedite the approval of weapon sales to it.976 Despite the generally negative views of the US,977 the UAE for its part continued to do what it could to ensure greater US involvement and stake in regional security matters and in the UAE’s security and military.

Indeed, a 2016 poll showed that disapproval of the US and its involvement in the Middle East had reached 69 percent in the UAE, only slightly behind Saudi Arabia’s 72 percent.978 In addition, 77 percent of respondents polled disagreed that the US contributed to peace and stability in the Arab world.979 But this did not prevent a sizable 75 percent of Emiratis polled

974 See chapter three 975 Kenneth Katzman, ‘The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E): Issues for U.S. Policy’, Congressional Research Service reports (28 November 2016), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/58453f2a4.pdf, 19 976 Ibid, 20 977 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 978 ‘Middle East 2016: Current Conditions and the Road Ahead’, Zogby Research Services, Prepared for the Sir Bani Yas Forum (November 2016), 5 979 Ibid, 7

234 to state that it was important for them to maintain good ties with the US.980 The continued defence cooperation with the US and Abu Dhabi’s efforts to court the US in the security sphere did not, however, change the perspective in Abu Dhabi that ultimately, the US would no longer be a reliable partner.

It became clear that the smaller Gulf Arab states viewed the Pivot as a statement of fact and a long-term change in US foreign policy. Their perception of the regional security situation impacted their perception of regime security. Indeed, perceived American abandonment was particularly problematic as the UAE and its allies viewed the region as increasingly unstable.

In other words, as their threat perception of the region worsened, they also felt less able to address it given US perceived disengagement from and disinterest in the region.981 As per the external constraints on foreign policymaking laid out in chapter four, this constrained and changed Emirati foreign policy decision-making. In addition, the change in their security relations with the US - our second indicator - conferred them with the belief that they would have to take their security into their own hands. These elements firmly established a sense of urgency to achieve self-sufficiency in a range of issues and made the UAE, and to a lesser extent some of the other smaller Gulf Arab states, more assertive in the pursuit of their own foreign policy objectives.

Conclusion

980 ‘Middle East 2016: Current Conditions and the Road Ahead’, Zogby Research Services, Prepared for the Sir Bani Yas Forum (November 2016), 8 981 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17)

235

When President Obama announced he would be America’s ‘first Pacific President’ in

November 2009,982 the Gulf Arabs took relatively little notice because it followed on the heels of the president’s speech in Cairo only six months prior, where he reaffirmed America’s commitment to the Middle East and its people. The Cairo speech was welcomed as a new era in US relations with the Middle East.983 But President Obama had another goal in mind: With the gradual recovery of the US economy, and the perception that the US need not maintain such a heavy presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, America could turn to Asia, a region where

‘growth and dynamism’ was key because it was linked to US economic growth, and peace and stability would be ‘crucial to global progress’.984 The Pivot involved extensive outreach to Asia through ‘forward-deployed diplomacy’, building a network of regional partnerships, re- affirming alliance commitments and US commitment to multilateral institutions and building economic ties.985 According to Gerges, ‘Obama’s actions, together with statements by his advisers, clearly show that the real goal was and is to realign America’s international relations to shift the focus to Asia and Pacific ocean, where the stakes are high’.986 While ultimately, the Pivot had little real impact on the ground for US allies and friends in the Middle East, its psychological effect on the region however, was considerable. The UAE and its allies saw the

Pivot – which followed on the footsteps of America’s ‘abandonment’ of Mubarak in Egypt - as further proof of a waning US commitment to the region. As a result, the Gulf Arabs perceived the establishment of a long-term US policy of disengagement from the Middle East, making it

982 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall’, Speech, The White House – Office of the Press Secretary, 14 November 14, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks- president-barack-obama-suntory-hall 983 Barack Obama, ‘A New Beginning’, Speech, Cairo University, Cairo, June 4, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09 984 Secretary Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/ 985 Ibid 986 Fawaz Gerges, Obama and the Middle East: The End of America’s Moment? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 66

236 an unreliable security partner. This changed the UAE’s regional threat context, making it increasingly nervous about domestic regime security and regional security. That the US could not be trusted to deliver on its security guarantees to the UAE if needed, affected Abu Dhabi’s regional alliances and security relations. These acted as external constraints on the UAE’s foreign policymaking, making it increasingly assertive, including in diversifying its security relations and suppliers, and focusing on building indigenous capabilities. It also further fostered a sense that the UAE’s goals and interests would likely be either ignored or de- prioritised by the US, which meant that Abu Dhabi would have to pursue them itself.

The Pivot to Asia was the second catalyst that further entrenched Abu Dhabi’s growing desire to become increasingly assertive in its foreign policy. There remained one more major international event that would affect the way the UAE, and to a lesser extent some of the other smaller Gulf Arab states, conducted foreign policy: The 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, the final catalyst. The next chapter will outline the problem Iran’s nuclear programme posed to the international community and Iran’s neighbours, and the role played by the Gulf Arab states during the negotiations. It will then assess the nuclear agreement and its impact on the

Gulf Arab states.

237

Chapter 7: Catalyst three - The 2015 Iran nuclear deal

On 14 July 2015, after decades of negotiations and a final round of talks that lasted nearly 3 years, the US, UK, France, China, Russia and Germany (the P5+1 - the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) and Iran finally reached an agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme. The negotiations were gruelling and overcame multiple challenges and misunderstandings. The final agreement contained or rolled-back parts of

Iran’s nuclear programme, and extended Iran’s ‘breakout time’ from three months to one year, giving the international community time to react should Iran attempt to dash for the bomb.987 It was a multilateral victory that put in place several unprecedented mechanisms, including intrusive verification procedures.988 But Iran’s Gulf Arab neighbours saw the matter differently.

It was no secret that the Gulf Arabs were sceptical of the nuclear negotiations.989 They resented not being included,990 and while the nuclear deal was useful in curbing Iran’s nuclear programme, which carried a number of security and environmental risks,991 it was in fact, a secondary security problem.992 The real concern was Iran’s expansionist regional

987 The time it would take for Iran to amass the raw materials needed for one nuclear device. See Ernest Moniz, ‘A nuclear deal that offers a safer world’, The Washington Post, April 12, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-safer-iran/2015/04/12/ae3a7f78-dfae-11e4-a1b8- 2ed88bc190d2_story.html?utm_term=.9eae4bab7b12 988 Ibid 989 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 990 Author interview with Sami Al Faraj, President, Kuwait Centre for Strategic Studies, Kuwait (24 May 2016); Author interview with Abdullah Baabood, former Professor, Qatar University, Doha (15 May 2016) 991 See Dina Esfandiary, ‘Two tremors in two weeks, and many questions for Iran’, The National, April 22, 2013, https://www.thenational.ae/two-tremors-in-two-weeks-and-many-questions-for-iran-1.324812 992 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17)

238 policy,993 especially in light of a difficult regional context, which they viewed as ‘aligning against them, threatening both their regional stature and their domestic security’.994 They feared the deal would provide Iran with further means to fund its proxies and destabilise the region at their expense and would ‘give Iran the green light’ to do what it wanted.995 A final agreement had the potential to further alter the Gulf Arab states’ international threat context, which, in turn, had the potential to impact domestic regime security – the first element of external constraints on foreign policymaking, identified in chapter four. A final deal also had the potential to alter their alliances and security relations – the second element of external constraints on foreign policymaking, as the Gulf Arabs believed the US – their security guarantor - was abandoning them in favour of Iran. When the P5+1 finally reached an agreement with Iran, the Gulf Arabs reacted publicly with caution,996 but privately prepared themselves to contain Iran.997 The UAE privately lobbied its allies and

993 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17); Author interview with Emirati official, New York (11 March 2016); Yousef Al Otaiba, ‘One Year After the Iran Nuclear Deal’, The Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/one-year-after-the-iran-nuclear-deal-1459721502; Suleiman Al-Khalidi, ‘Saudi FM says Riyadh determined to confront Iranian expansion in region’, Reuters, July 9, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-saudi-iran/saudi-fm-says-riyadh-determined-to-confront-iranian- expansion-in-region-idUKKCN0PJ2GJ20150709; Gregory F. Gause III, ‘Why the Iranian deal scares Saudi Arabia’, The New Yorker, November 26, 2013, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-the-iran-deal- scares-saudi-arabia; Angus McDowall, ‘Region will lose sleep over Iran deal: Saudi advisor’, Reuters, November 24, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-saudi-fears/region-will-lose-sleep-over-iran-deal- saudi-adviser-idUSBRE9AN07C20131124 994 Gause, ‘Why the Iranian deal scares Saudi Arabia’ 995 Author roundtable with the Policy Planning Unit, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016) 996 Ian Black, ‘Iran nuclear deal: Saudi Arabia and Gulf react with caution’, The Guardian, November 24, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/iran-nuclear-deal-middle-east-reaction-saudi-arabia; Adam B. Lerner, ‘Saudi Arabia cautiously endorses Iran deal’, Politico, April 6, 2015, https://www.politico.com/story/2015/04/saudi-arabia-iran-nuclear-deal-116694; ‘The Nuclear agreement: a strategic earthquake in the Middle East’, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, April 3, 2015, https://www.alquds.co.uk/%EF%BB%BF%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82- %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%B2%D9%84%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%84- %D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7/ (in Arabic); ‘Iran’s nuclear deal: Four questions that need answers’, Al Riyadh, April 6, 2015, http://www.alriyadh.com/1036684 (in Arabic) 997 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17)

239 friends to ensure that the deal would not diminish the international community’s desire to contain Iran and its activities in the region.998 As a result, while the government publicly supported the deal, it also highlighted the Iran threat at a time where it felt its allies and friends were ignoring its interests and concerns.999 The deal changed the UAE’s international threat context, acting as an external constraint on its foreign policy, and forcing them to adjust course by becoming more assertive.

The previous two catalysts compounded the UAE’s fears. The nuclear deal – the third catalyst – further entrenched Gulf Arab fears of Iranian hegemony and aggression, while firmly establishing their belief that the US was abandoning them, thus highlighting the need for self-sufficiency. This chapter will begin by briefly discussing the road to the deal and assessing the nuclear agreement and its impact. It will examine the role played by the UAE and its Gulf Arab neighbours during the negotiations and their fears leading up to the final agreement. It will discuss this with regards to all Gulf Arab states because many shared the

UAE’s beliefs on the negotiations and the nuclear deal itself. The chapter will then hone in on the three-fold impact of the 2015 nuclear deal on the UAE: further highlighting Iran as its main security threat, just as the US seemed to be less interested in the region,1000 thereby legitimising – in Gulf Arab eyes – the perceived destabilising Iranian influence in the region, and raising the prospect, once again, of Saudi hegemony and assertiveness in the Persian

Gulf region.

998 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 999 Author interview with Emirati official, Washington (2 March 2016); Author interview with Emirati official, New York (11 March 2016) 1000Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic (April 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/

240

1. The 2015 nuclear deal

1.1 A Brief History of Iran’s nuclear programme

The history of Iran’s nuclear programme is essential to understanding the significance of the nuclear deal and how it was perceived in the region. Iran’s nuclear programme began under the Shah, in coordination with other countries and suppliers.1001 When the Islamic Republic came to power, the US and its allies, previously content to work with Iran, broke off relations and ceased to supply its nuclear programme, and pressured others, including China and Argentina, to stop as well.1002 For Iran, pursuing the nuclear path was important because it had devoted too much time, money and effort to walk away from it, and had tied the issue to one of national pride, prestige and innovation.1003 Meanwhile, the US began to impose multi-layered sanctions intended to punish Iran for the hostage crisis, its poor human rights record, and its nuclear programme.1004 In 2002, an Iranian opposition group revealed the existence of two nuclear facilities; an enrichment facility in Natanz and a heavy water reactor at Arak, sparking an international crisis that would last more than a

1001 For more on the origins of Iran’s nuclear programme, see Steven Hurst, The United States and the Iranian Nuclear Programme: A Critical History (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018); Jeremy Bernstein, Nuclear Iran (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2014); David Patrikarakos, Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State (London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 2012); Seyed Hossein Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012) 1002 See Greg Bruno, ‘Iran’s Nuclear Program’, Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder (10 March 2010), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-nuclear-program; Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, ‘Iran’s Nuclear Procurement Program: How Close to the Bomb?’, The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1997), https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/koch51.pdf, 131; Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Mohammad Mehdi Mousavian, ‘Building on the Iran Nuclear Deal for International Peace and Security’, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2018), 171 1003 See Wyn Bowen, Matthew Moran, Dina Esfandiary, Living on the Edge: Iran and the Practice of Nuclear Hedging (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016) 1004 See Ali Vaez, ‘Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions’, International Crisis Group Report, No. 138 (25 February 2013), https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian- peninsula/iran/138-spider-web-making-and-unmaking-iran-sanctions

241 decade.1005 In June 2003, the foreign ministers from three EU states, France’s Dominique de

Villepin, Germany’s Joschka Fischer, and the UK’s Jack Straw engaged Iranian authorities on their nuclear programme, initiating more than a decade of negotiations with the Europeans, which was later expanded to include the other permanent members of the UN Security

Council, the US, China and Russia (the P5+1).1006 It was not until the secret talks between the US and Iran – which had not met bilaterally since the 1979 revolution – in Oman,1007 and the election of President Hassan Rouhani, who brought in a new team of technocrats and made the resolution of this crisis a priority for his administration, that the negotiations were given new impetus. Two months after a phone call between Presidents Obama and

Rouhani,1008 negotiators adopted the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), a roadmap to the final comprehensive agreement, which temporarily froze and even rolled-back some parts of the

Iranian programme in exchange for a suspension of some sanctions, for the duration of the negotiations.1009 The JPOA was renewed multiple times, leading to the April 2015

‘framework’ agreement, which outlined the ‘key parameters’ of a Joint Comprehensive Plan

1005 Remarks by Alireza Jafarzadeh on New Information on Top Secret Projects of the Iranian Regime’s Nuclear Program, IranWatch, August 14, 2002, https://www.iranwatch.org/library/ncri-new-information-top-secret- nuclear-projects-8-14-02 1006 See Wyn Bowen, Matthew Moran, Dina Esfandiary, Living on the Edge: Iran and the Practice of Nuclear Hedging (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016) 1007 ‘Secret US-Iran talks cleared the way for historic nuclear deal’, Associated Press, November 24, 2013, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/10471030/Secret-US-Iran-talks-cleared-way- for-historic-nuclear-deal.html 1008 Jeff Mason, Louis Charbonneau, ‘Obama, Iran’s Rouhani hold historic phone call’, Reuters, September 27, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-iran/obama-irans-rouhani-hold-historic-phone-call- idUSBRE98Q16S20130928 1009 Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), Geneva (24 November 2011), http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/Joint_plan_24Nov2013.pdf

242 of Action (JCPOA).1010 After a final painstaking push, the negotiators announced the JCPOA on 14 July 2015.1011

1.2 The nuclear deal – a good deal?

The JCPOA outlined restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme and detailed verification and implementation measures, in exchange for comprehensive sanctions relief and peaceful nuclear cooperation.

The deal addressed both available routes to a nuclear weapon: Enriched uranium and plutonium. Iran’s centrifuges were cut to roughly half the centrifuges Iran had before the agreement, for ten years.1012 The deal limited Iranian research and development work, prevented Tehran from enriching above five percent, capped its stockpile of low enriched uranium to 300kg for 15 years, and extended Iran’s breakout time from 2-3 months to one year.1013 On the plutonium track, Iran committed to halting construction at the Arak Heavy

Water facility,1014 and working with the P5+1 to redesign the reactor. The deal addresses

Iran’s potential accumulation of fuel at the heavy water plant by requiring Tehran to ship it

1010 Julian Borger and Paul Lewis, ‘Iran nuclear deal: negotiators announce ‘framework’ agreement’, The Guardian, April 2, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/iran-nuclear-deal-negotiators- announce-framework-agreement 1011 The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Vienna (14 July 2015), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf 1012 Iran’s old IR-1 centrifuges were cut from 19,500 to 6,104, of those, 5,060 would enrich uranium to less than 5 per cent (only at the Natanz enrichment plant). The remainder would be dismantled and stored under IAEA seal. See The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Vienna (14 July 2015), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf section A 1013 Ibid 1014 Ali Ahmad, Frank von Hippel, Alexander Glaser and Zia Mian, ‘A Win-win Solution for Iran’s Arak Reactor’, Arms Control Today, April 1, 2014, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_04/A-Win-Win-Solution-for-Irans- Arak-Reactor

243 all out to a third country, where it would be disposed of or treated.1015 Implementation of the deal and potential Iranian cheating would be monitored by the most intrusive and multi- layered verification mechanism to date, giving the IAEA access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities for twenty years.1016

In exchange for these limits, Iran would receive comprehensive sanctions relief. The EU lifted its unilateral sanctions, but the US could not do the same because of the multi-layered and intertwined nature of the US sanctions regime.1017 It did, however, cease to apply all major sanctions on Iran’s financial and energy sectors, and gave Iran access to oil revenue held abroad through renewable Presidential Orders. Sanctions related to human rights abuses and terrorism remained in place. The EU and the UN agreed to lift their arms embargo and the restrictions on the transfers of ballistic missile technology after several years. Finally, the JCPOA promotes the establishment of civil nuclear cooperation between

Iran, the P5+1 and other foreign nuclear providers.

The nuclear deal was intended to address Iran’s nuclear programme, but it was hoped that the deal would be the beginning of the end of the Islamic Republic’s isolation and lead to the moderation of its other problematic behaviour. Critics focused on the fact that the deal allowed Iran to retain an enrichment programme and that restrictions would be limited in time.1018 Tehran believed that relying on external supplies made it vulnerable, and insisted

1015 The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Vienna (14 July 2015), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf, section B 1016 Ibid, section C 1017 Ali Vaez, ‘Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions’, International Crisis Group Report, No. 138 (25 February 2013), https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian- peninsula/iran/138-spider-web-making-and-unmaking-iran-sanctions 1018 See for example, James Phillips, ‘The Most Glaring Flaws in Obama’s Iran Deal’, The Heritage Foundation (14 July 2015), https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/the-most-glaring-flaws-obamas-iran-

244 that it needed to be self-sufficient.1019 In fact, US acceptance of some form of enrichment programme on Iranian soil was instrumental in ensuring the negotiations led to a deal.1020

Critics also criticised the lack of ‘anytime, anywhere’ inspections of all suspicious facilities,1021 but this would never have been accepted by Iran. In sum, while the JCPOA did not completely remove Iran’s enrichment capability or close all its nuclear facilities - that kind of agreement was simply not achievable - it effectively constrained and rolled-back

Iran’s nuclear programme. The Gulf Arabs, for their part, feared that the negotiations and the deal would legitimise the Islamic Republic in the eyes of the international community and provide it with additional means to expand its nefarious regional activities. The next section will examine the Gulf Arab position on Iran’s nuclear programme and their opposition to the negotiations and the deal.

deal; Alan J. Kuperman, ‘The Iran Deal’s Fatal Flaw’, The New York Times, June 23, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/23/opinion/the-iran-deals-fatal-flaw.html; Charles Krauthammer, ‘The Fatal Flaw in the Iran Deal’, The Washington Post, February 26, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-fatal-flaw-in-the-iran-deal/2015/02/26/9186c70e-bde1-11e4- 8668-4e7ba8439ca6_story.html. Strictly speaking, the permitted enrichment programme is beyond what Iran needs for a peaceful nuclear programme, see Michael Singh, ‘The Case for Zero Enrichment in Iran’, Arms Control Today (March 2014), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014-03/case-zero-enrichment-iran 1019 Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai, ‘Meeting Iran’s Nuclear Fuel Supply Needs’, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, June 5, 2014, https://thebulletin.org/2014/06/meeting-irans-nuclear-fuel-supply-needs/ 1020 Author interviews with the Iranian negotiating team, Geneva, Lausanne, Vienna (2013-2015); author interview with US official, Vienna (13 May 2015) 1021 Senator Bob Menendez, speech on Iran Nuclear Deal, Seton Hall University, August 18, 2015, https://www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/menendez-delivers-remarks-on-iran-nuclear-deal- at-seton-hall-universitys-school-of-diplomacy-and-international-relations; Ambassador Eric Edelman, ‘The Iran Nuclear Deal after One Year: Assessment and Options for the Next President’, Report, JINSA’s Gemunder Center Iran Task Force (July 2016), http://www.jinsa.org/files/The%20Iran%20Nuclear%20Deal%20After%20One%20Year%20- %20Assessment%20and%20Options.pdf

245

2. The Gulf Arabs and the Iran nuclear crisis

When the P5+1 and Iran began their negotiations in earnest, the Gulf Arabs were dismayed and fearful.1022 First, they felt isolated as the world powers negotiated a regional security crisis without them.1023 More importantly, they felt betrayed as their security guarantor and friend – the US – chose to talk to their greatest rival: Iran.1024 Finally, to them, the nuclear negotiations and subsequent deal elevated the Islamic Republic by giving it legitimacy from its interaction with the world powers and gave it the financial means to pursue its expansionist foreign policy agenda. This section will examine the Gulf Arab reaction and views of the nuclear negotiations and the deal itself.

2.1 Early Gulf Arab perspectives of the Iranian nuclear programme

Beginning in 2005, the Gulf Arab states loudly expressed their fears of the Iranian nuclear programme,1025 calling on the international community to step in to prevent it and launching an initiative for a Gulf Free of Nuclear Weapons.1026 In 2006, the then Secretary

General of the GCC, Ahmed Bishara, stated that Iran’s nuclear programme ‘totally turns over the balance of power, and makes Iran the master of the region and the influential

1022 Oman was an exception 1023 Author interview with Sami Al Faraj, President, Kuwait Centre for Strategic Studies, Kuwait (24 May 2016); Author interview with Abdullah Baabood, former Professor, Qatar University, Doha (15 May 2016) 1024 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 1025 ‘GCC presses NATO for nuclear-free Middle East’, AFP, December 3, 2005, https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2005/Dec-03/68556-gcc-presses-nato-for-nuclear-free- middle-east.ashx 1026 Dina Esfandiary, Elham Fakhro and Becca Wasser, ‘Obstacles for the Gulf States’, Arms Control Association, September 16, 2011, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/5014

246 instrument in its decisions’.1027 The Arab public was broadly in favour of an Iranian nuclear programme, which they viewed as way to balance against Israeli hegemony and US presence in the region.1028 Their leaders however, felt differently. Their worry about Iran was not related to the programme on its own, but rather, what Iran would do with it. A civilian nuclear programme would provide Iran with a path towards becoming nuclear- capable, and while Gulf Arab fears ‘do not necessarily stem from the threat of a direct nuclear attack from Iran’, they do fear the ‘ripple effects’ a nuclear-capable Iran would cause throughout the region’.1029 According to Kaye and Wehrey, such effects could include a ‘preventive strike by the United States or Israel, the escalating spiral of a regional arms race…a nuclear accident at one of Iran’s reactors, and the prospect that a nuclear Iran will become more emboldened in its support for terrorism and Shia activism or more unyielding in its diplomacy’.1030 Gulf Arab fears of retaliatory strikes by Israel or the US were compounded by the possibility they would be caught in the crossfires: facing retaliation by

Tehran or by Iranian proxies.1031 They feared that Iranian leaders would ‘calculate that a nuclear weapon afforded them a degree of insulation against a retaliatory attack, should their clandestine sponsorship of a terrorist attack become exposed’, paving the way for

Tehran to ‘more aggressively intervene and influence the broader region’.1032 This involved

1027 Emile Hokayem and Matteo Legrenzi, ‘The Arab Gulf States in the Shadow of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge’, The Stimson Center Working Paper (26 May 2006), 4; Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 117 1028 Sammy Salama and Heidi Weber, ‘The Emerging Arab Response to Iran’s Unabated Nuclear Program’, NTI report (22 December 2006), https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/arab-response-irans-nuclear-program/; Frederic Wehrey, David E. Thaler, Nora Bensahel, Kim Cragin, Jerrold D. Green, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Nadia Oweidat, and Jennifer Li, Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 134 1029Ibid, 134 1030 Dalia Dassa Kaye and Frederic M. Wehrey, ‘A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbours’, Survival, Vol. 49, Issue 2 (2007), 111 1031 Ibid, 115 1032 Ibid, 117-118

247 boosting support to Hezbollah, and other Shia groups in the region, most notably in neighbouring Iraq.1033

While a lesser concern than Iran’s regional endeavours, the leadership in the Gulf Arab states also feared the civilian nuclear programme itself. Several Gulf Arab capitals and major cities sit just across from Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant.1034 If there was an accident, winds in the Persian Gulf, which blow from east to west, would make the Gulf states vulnerable to radiation leaks, while water supplies would be disrupted because coastal currents circle counter-clockwise.1035 Abu Dhabi was particularly concerned as it believed the UAE would be the first to feel the effects of a nuclear accident in Iran.1036 These worries were compounded by the fact that Iran was the only country with a fully functioning nuclear power plant that was not party to the Nuclear Safety Convention – the international treaty that established fundamental safety principles for states that operate nuclear plants.1037

Despite their concerns, the Gulf Arab states remained largely quiet when the nuclear crisis first broke out in 2002 and for a few years after that. According to Hokayem and Legrenzi, this was because they were preoccupied with Iran’s involvement in Iraq: ‘Gulf regimes see with great anxiety the internal shift in Iraqi politics that is bringing to power an emboldened

1033 Emile Hokayem and Matteo Legrenzi, ‘The Arab Gulf States in the Shadow of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge’, The Stimson Center Working Paper (26 May 2006), 2 1034 Dalia Dassa Kaye and Frederic M. Wehrey, ‘A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbours’, Survival, Vol. 49, Issue 2 (2007), 117 1035 Dina Esfandiary, ‘Two tremors in two weeks, and many questions for Iran’, The National, April 22, 2013, https://www.thenational.ae/two-tremors-in-two-weeks-and-many-questions-for-iran-1.324812; Tariq Khaitous, ‘Why Arab leaders worry about Iran’s nuclear program’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May 23, 2008, https://thebulletin.org/2008/05/why-arab-leaders-worry-about-irans-nuclear-program/ 1036 Author interview with two officials from the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), Abu Dhabi (November 2017) 1037 Esfandiary, ‘Two tremors in two weeks, and many questions for Iran’

248

Shia majority whose rise generates internal and regional concerns’,1038 and they ‘worried about Tehran’s efforts to spread its influence throughout the Arab world and Washington’s unwitting assistance to Iranian ambitions’.1039 In addition, they were ‘constrained by two powerful and convergent forces: their own public opinions and resilient pan-Arab norms’.1040 As a result, responses to the nuclear programme were not unified; much like their foreign policies towards Iran in general. Their response to the crisis and the subsequent negotiations followed a three-pronged strategy, one which typified Gulf Arab foreign policy more generally: ‘Keep the discussion away from the public arena, placate Iran to avoid antagonizing a powerful neighbour and rely on EU diplomacy and American military forces to constrain and deter Iran’.1041 As a result, the Gulf Arabs remained on the side-lines as the Europeans negotiated with Iran on its nuclear programme. At the time, they judged that ‘antagonizing Iran by siding fully and overtly with the United States now will bring no substantial benefits and will instead likely yield more tensions in the future’.1042 The authors outlined a number of drawbacks identified by the leadership in the Gulf Arab states in taking part in the negotiations, including the sense that their contribution in economic benefits and security guarantees would be minimal compared to that of Europe and the US, and that

Iran does not consider them a major security threat.1043 But this did not prevent them from criticising the negotiations, complaining that they were left out publicly, and succeeding in their strategy of staying out of the talks but remaining in the know on how they were progressing, as they were ‘actively courted by both high-level Iranian and American officials’

1038 Emile Hokayem and Matteo Legrenzi, ‘The Arab Gulf States in the Shadow of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge’, The Stimson Center Working Paper (26 May 2006), 3-6 1039 F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 147 1040 Hokayem and Legrenzi, ‘The Arab Gulf States in the Shadow of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge’, 3-6 1041 Ibid, 4 1042 Ibid, 9 1043 Ibid, 11-12

249 throughout the negotiations.1044 When in June 2006, the P5+1 offered Iran an incentive package to suspend enrichment and other sensitive activities,1045 the Gulf Arabs and their allies saw this as rewarding Iran for its stubbornness and continued progress on its programme.1046

Nevertheless, Gulf Arab fears of Iran and its nuclear programme did not prevent dialogue with Tehran. Exchanges between both sides of the Gulf continued, as did Iran’s attempts at charm offensives, including visits from President Ahmadinejad to Kuwait in March 2006,1047 the UAE in May 2007 to discuss regional security issues,1048 and Doha in December 2007 as the first Iranian President to visit a GCC summit.1049 Other officials also travelled to the Gulf

Arab states, including Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs

Mohammad-Reza Baqeri to Mecca to meet with Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal in ‘a bid to persuade the Saudis to coordinate stands on regional issues’,1050 and then Supreme

National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani to Saudi Arabia in early 2007.1051 Supreme

Leader Khamanei deliberately dispatched key advisors and diplomats, including former

Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati and Expediency Council Chair Akbar Hashemi

1044 Emile Hokayem and Matteo Legrenzi, ‘The Arab Gulf States in the Shadow of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge’, The Stimson Center Working Paper (26 May 2006), 12 1045 Glenn Kessler, ‘Six Power Reach Accord on Iran Plan’, The Washington Post, June 2, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/01/AR2006060100363.html 1046 Sammy Salama and Heidi Weber, ‘The Emerging Arab Response to Iran’s Unabated Nuclear Program’, NTI, December 22, 2006, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/arab-response-irans-nuclear-program/ 1047 Daniel Williams, ‘Tehran Courts Support of Arabs’, The Washington Post, March 20, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/19/AR2006031900926.html 1048 ‘Iran’s Ahmadinejad in UAE talks’, BBC News, May 13, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6650745.stm 1049 ‘Iran: Ahmadinejad to attend Gulf Arab summit’, Associated Press, December 2, 2007, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/22063268/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/iran-ahmadinejad-attend-gulf- arab-summit/ 1050 Daniel Williams, ‘Tehran Courts Support of Arabs’, The Washington Post, March 20, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/19/AR2006031900926.html 1051 Glenn Kessler, ‘Arab Groups Signals Iran to Avoid Meddling in Iraq’, The Washington Post, January 17, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/16/AR2007011600406.html

250

Rafsandjani, to the Gulf Arab counties to help mend ties.1052 Gulf Arab leaders also visited

Iran, including Qatar’s Emir Hamad Bin Khalifa in November 2009 to discuss regional and bilateral security issues.1053 Iran also reassured the Gulf Arab states about the peacefulness of its nuclear programme, but this was not enough: ‘We appreciate Iran’s efforts to reassure the region over its program…But for the sake of stability and to avoid any environmental disaster, there needs to be more Iranian guarantees…’ said UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh

Abdullah Ibn Zayed in May 2006.1054 The Gulf Arab states remained spectators to the last round of negotiations that led to the 2015 nuclear deal.

2.2 The Gulf Arabs and the final round of negotiations

After his inauguration in January 2009, President Obama recorded a message directly to the

Iranian people in March 2009 on the occasion of Nowruz – the Persian New Year, calling for a US engagement of Iran that is ‘honest and grounded in mutual respect’.1055 But it was not until the Sultanate of Oman offered to broker talks between Iran and the US directly that the negotiations began in earnest. According to the former US ambassador to Oman, the

Omanis aimed to bridge some of the gaps in US and Iranian perspectives of what would be

1052 Emile Hokayem and Matteo Legrenzi, ‘The Arab Gulf States in the Shadow of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge’, The Stimson Center Working Paper (26 May 2006), 12 1053 Christopher M. Blanchard, ‘Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations’, Congressional Research Service Reports (18 November 2009), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20091118_RL31718_f090d7756f138ca45c5b163084f4e52bc6450975.p df, 3 1054 Tariq Khaitous, ‘Why Arab leaders worry about Iran’s nuclear program’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May 23, 2008, https://thebulletin.org/2008/05/why-arab-leaders-worry-about-irans-nuclear-program/ 1055 Barack Obama, ‘In Celebration of Nowruz.’ Videotaped remarks, The White House, Washington DC, March 20, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/videotaped-remarks-president-celebration- nowruz

251 acceptable in nuclear negotiations, including a right to enrichment.1056 Oman’s involvement in brokering the talks was kept quiet, for fear that it would put the Sultanate in further difficulty with its Gulf Arab allies.

Once these negotiations seemed serious, the Gulf Arab states claimed to want to participate.1057 But the Gulf Arab states could not agree what form their participation would take, who they would send as their representative, whether the GCC or an individual state, and if the latter, then which country - something interviews with officials across the region confirmed.1058 According to Hokayem and Legrenzi, ‘Arab states undoubtedly prefer a non- nuclear Iran but they are unwilling to assume the costs of negotiations with Iran’, a factor complicated by the ‘existing asymmetry of power between the Gulf Arab states and Iran, combined with the Gulf Arabs' lack of political options’, 1059 and the complexity of relations between them.1060 They judged that not only would their contribution to the negotiations be marginal: There was not much they could offer Iran to entice it to give up its programme or enrichment because ‘Iran could be seriously interested only in the economic benefits and security guarantees that the European Union and the United States can offer’,1061 but that given their place in Iran’s security calculus,1062 Iran would not want to negotiate with them.

1056 Richard J. Schmierer, ‘The Sultanate of Oman and the Iran Nuclear Deal’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Winter 2015), 115-116 1057 Author interview with Sami Al Faraj, President, Kuwait Centre for Strategic Studies, Kuwait (24 May 2016); Author interview with Abdullah Baabood, former Professor, Qatar University, Doha (15 May 2016) 1058 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 1059 Emile Hokayem and Matteo Legrenzi, ‘The Arab Gulf States in the Shadow of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge’, The Stimson Center Working Paper (26 May 2006), 9. A statement which was also reiterated during author interview with Abdullah Baabood, former Professor, Qatar University, Doha (15 May 2016) 1060 Tariq Khaitous, ‘Arab Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Iran’, Policy Focus #94, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (June 2009), 20 1061 Ibid, 20; Hokayem and Legrenzi, ‘The Arab Gulf States in the Shadow of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge’, 10 1062 Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai, ‘Saudi Arabia Cares More About Iran Than Iran Does About Saudi Arabia’, The National Interest, October 18, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/saudi-arabia-cares-more- about-iran-iran-does-about-saudi-18091

252

In addition, many in the region believed the negotiations were pointless to begin with: No amount of security guarantees or economic ‘carrots’ could ever entice Iran to give up its nuclear programme, so it would a waste of time for them to engage in the exercise.1063

It was also difficult for the Gulf Arabs to elaborate a unique policy on Iran. Oman and Qatar, for example, have a long history of economic and diplomatic exchanges with Iran, while

Saudi Arabia competes for regional hegemony with Iran.1064 Differences even exist within countries: The emirates in the UAE had different views and policies on Iran.1065 For example,

Abu Dhabi and Ras Al Khaimah harboured real antagonism towards Iran, while the emirates of Dubai and Sharjah did not want confrontation with it.1066 According to Davidson, Dubai in particular was reluctant to break off ties with Iran after the 1979 revolution because of decades of trade between the two, leading to ‘divided loyalties within the UAE’.1067

Hokayem and Legrenzi argued that some Arab governments believed ambiguity on Iran

‘served their interests well’, but that in fact, it left them at the mercy of the US and its allies, and reduced their ability to ‘shape the future of their own region’.1068 Finally, the Gulf Arab states believed they could not be seen as ‘leading the charge against Iran’, because of the backlash they would face from Tehran.1069 Rather, they opted to use whatever diplomatic

1063 Emile Hokayem and Matteo Legrenzi, ‘The Arab Gulf States in the Shadow of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge’, The Stimson Center Working Paper (26 May 2006), 10, 11 1064 See chapter one 1065 See chapter one. Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 89; Christopher M. Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (Hurst & Company: London, 2012), 35; Christopher M. Davidson, Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success (London: Hurst & Company, 2008), 227 1066 Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami (Oxon: Routledge, 2003), 135 1067 Christopher M. Davidson, ‘The United Arab Emirates’, in Christopher M. Davidson Ed, Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf Monarchies (London: Hurst & Company, 2011), 10 1068Hokayem and Legrenzi, ‘The Arab Gulf States in the Shadow of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge’, 21 1069 Ibid, 14

253 leverage they had on the US and its allies to push Iran harder in the negotiations, which interviewees confirmed.1070 This would allow them to continue to deal with Iran on the issue that mattered to them most: Regional security, and continue to lobby the negotiating states who kept them informed of the status of the talks.

The UAE and its neighbours continued to fear the outcome of the negotiations, but nevertheless publicly supported them because they had the potential to resolve a longstanding international concern. Behind the scenes however, they made it no secret that the negotiations and a potential final nuclear deal with Iran would not resolve their main concern: Iran’s regional meddling.1071 In 2016, Ambassador Otaiba stated that the nuclear deal ‘would only be good if it addressed the way Iran behaved in the region’.1072 To them, the international focus on Iran’s nuclear programme was too narrow, ignoring the main reason why Iran was a problem. The UAE and its allies pointed to Iran’s ‘multi-decade investment into its proxies’1073 and feared the deal would provide Iran with further means to increase this funding, increase its meddling in the internal affairs of Arab states, and destabilise the region at their expense: Iran will ‘pocket the benefits of the deal and use it to

1070 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 1071 Ibid; Yousef Al Otaiba, ‘One Year After the Iran Nuclear Deal’, The Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/one-year-after-the-iran-nuclear-deal-1459721502; Suleiman Al-Khalidi, ‘Saudi FM says Riyadh determined to confront Iranian expansion in region’, Reuters, July 9, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-saudi-iran/saudi-fm-says-riyadh-determined-to-confront-iranian- expansion-in-region-idUKKCN0PJ2GJ20150709; Gregory F. Gause III, ‘Why the Iranian deal scares Saudi Arabia’, The New Yorker, November 26, 2013, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-the-iran-deal- scares-saudi-arabia; Angus McDowall, ‘Region will lose sleep over Iran deal: Saudi advisor’, Reuters, November 24, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-saudi-fears/region-will-lose-sleep-over-iran-deal- saudi-adviser-idUSBRE9AN07C20131124 1072 Author interview with Youssef Al Otaiba, UAE ambassador to the USA, Washington DC (2 March 2016) 1073 Statement by UAE official, author roundtable with regional experts, officials and academics, Dubai (19 April 2016)

254 support its foreign policy’.1074 Officials in Abu Dhabi said they believed the deal would ‘give

Iran the green light’ to do what they wanted in the region,1075 and ‘free its hand to provide additional funding to Hezbollah, the Houthis and the Shias in Iraq’.1076 As a result, they called for a ‘grand bargain’ type of agreement that would help contain Iran’s regional endeavours. But negotiators on both sides agreed that such an agreement was beyond reach. In fact, in private, a US negotiator stated that the US would ‘not make the discussion about regional issues because the Arabs were not in the room, and the US could not decide for the region’.1077 In addition, the UAE and its neighbours believed the negotiations were legitimising the Islamic Republic as a major international player because it was negotiating with the world powers.1078 A Qatari academic referred to this as a ‘renewal of legitimacy’ for the Islamic Republic.1079 The interim deal announced in November 2014 confirmed Gulf

Arab fears: To them, it officially ‘normalised’ Iran, and demonstrated the lengths to which

Western negotiators would go to ensure that Iran would agree to a deal.1080 In 2016, Prince

Turki Al Faisal, former Saudi head of intelligence and ambassador to the US, said

Washington was now ‘actively supporting Iran’.1081 Gary Sick, former US National Security

Council staff, summarised the sentiment in the region: After two years of negotiations and an interim deal, Iran had ‘covered itself in glory’.1082 The change in the regional threat

1074 Author roundtable with experts and analysts, Al Jazeera Research Center (16 May 2016); see also, Kenneth Katzman, ‘The Gulf Cooperation Council Camp David Summit: Any Results?’, Hearing, Senate, Washington DC, July 9, 2015, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20150709/103726/HHRG-114-FA13-Wstate- KatzmanK-20150709.pdf, 4 1075 Author roundtable with the Policy Planning Unit, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016) 1076 Author roundtable with experts and analysts, Al Jazeera Research Center (16 May 2016) 1077 Statement by a US negotiator of the Iran deal, Sir Bani Yas Conference, Abu Dhabi (18-19 November 2016) 1078 Statement by Qatari academic, author roundtable with regional experts, officials and academics, Dubai Dubai (19 April 2016) 1079 Ibid 1080 Author roundtable with former officials and academics, Qatar University, Doha (14 May 2016) 1081 Statement by Prince Turki Al Faisal, RAND meeting, Washington (3 March 2016) 1082 Author interview with Gary Sick, senior research scholar, Middle East Institute and adjunct professor, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, New York City (10 March 2016)

255 context and the effect this might have on internal regime security, as well as the perceived change in relations with their main security guarantor, the US,1083 acted as a constraint on the UAE and its Gulf Arab allies’ foreign policy decision-making. As a result, opposition to the last stretch of negotiations increased, as did efforts to lobby the US to ensure that the deal would not become an end in itself.1084

The Obama administration tried to assuage Gulf Arabs fears by keeping them informed of the outcome of the talks. In May 2015, President Obama invited the GCC leaders to Camp

David to show unity and reassure them. The Gulf Arabs wanted to draw attention to the challenges a post-deal Middle East would pose: ‘We are not wasting time confronting that agreement. We don’t want to be seen as going against a close ally…Instead, we are bracing ourselves for the post-agreement world’. 1085 They aimed to reach a clear agreement on the plan for containing Iran after a nuclear deal.1086 Secretary of State John Kerry seemed to indicate this was in reach when he said, ‘We are fleshing out a series of new commitments that will create between the United States and the GCC a new security understanding, a new set of security initiatives. That will take us beyond anything that we have had before’.1087 But the summit ended in disappointment; only two of the six GCC members sent their heads of state, and the US was unable to provide the types of security assurances that

1083 The two elements of external constraints on foreign policy outlined in chapter four 1084 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 1085 A senior Gulf official quoted in Julian Borger, ‘Gulf states to push for a US plan for containing Iran’, The Guardian Global Security Blog, May 1, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/julian-borger-global- security-blog/2015/may/01/gulf-states-to-push-for-a-us-plan-for-containing-iran 1086 Ibid 1087 ‘US, Gulf allies seek agreement on new security measures: Kerry’, Reuters, May 8, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-gulf-kerry/u-s-gulf-allies-seek-agreement-on-new-security-measures- kerry-idUSKBN0NT1CY20150508

256

Kerry had promised,1088 or the Gulf Arabs wanted.1089 Other P5+1 members also tried to reassure their Gulf Arab friends: In September 2015, Tobias Ellwood, Parliamentary Under

Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), wrote,

I should stress that there should be no doubt about our commitment to regional

security or stability following the reopening of our Embassy in Tehran. We have not

in any way weakened our resolve to stand with our allies and partners in the Gulf

and will continue to work with them to prevent interference in the internal affairs of

the countries in this region.1090

While their strategy of remaining in the background and lobbying their allies to get what they wanted worked for the Gulf Arabs during previous rounds of negotiations, it did not for the final round, where they felt their interests were ignored by the Obama administration.

When the final agreement was announced, the UAE and its allies expressed cautious support for it publicly but continued to focus their efforts on addressing the Iranian threat to the region.1091 Abu Dhabi found the agreement limiting because it narrowly tackled one

1088 Dan Roberts, ‘Obama summit with Arab allies begins despite Saudi king’s absence’, The Guardian, May 14, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/may/14/barack-obama-arab-gulf-leaders-camp-david- summit 1089 Author interview with former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019) 1090 Tobias Ellwood, ‘The United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates: Strategic partners for generations to come’, FCO Blog, September 2, 2015, https://blogs.fco.gov.uk/philipparham/2015/09/02/the-united-kingdom- and-the-united-arab-emirates-strategic-partners-for-generations-to-come/ 1091 The UAE’s Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan sent a congratulatory note to President Hassan Rouhani for reaching the nuclear deal on 14 July 2015, see ‘UAE congratulations Iran on atomic deal, first official Gulf comment’, Reuters, July 14, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-emirates/uae- congratulates-iran-on-atomic-deal-first-official-gulf-comment-idUSKCN0PO1QV20150714

257 issue and feared it would provide Iran the means to further destabilise the region.1092 The next section will examine the impact of the nuclear deal on the UAE and its neighbours.

3. The impact of the 2015 nuclear deal on the UAE and its allies

3.1 Views of the deal

When the negotiators reached the final deal in July 2015, the UAE and its neighbours cautiously expressed support for it, while drawing attention to Iran’s role in the region. The

Gulf Arabs recognised that the agreement was a significant achievement, but believed it would worsen their security.1093 Indeed, while rolling back Iran’s nuclear programme was considered a positive, the focus on this narrow topic generated fears that regional security would be pushed back in terms of priorities. As per the study of international constraints on foreign policy in chapter four, this affected the UAE and its Gulf Arab allies’ international threat perceptions and domestic regime security. In the minds of the regional elite, the nuclear deal provided Iran with a boost in standing and capability, making it stronger in the region, and more capable of threatening the Gulf Arabs directly.1094 This was made worse by the belief that the world powers were likely to look the other way if Iran increased its nefarious activities in the region so the deal’s implementation would not be jeopardised.

These external constraints on their foreign policy compelled the Gulf Arabs to support the

1092 Author roundtable with experts and analysts, B’huth, Dubai (29 February 2017) 1093 Ben Hubbard, ‘Arab World Split Over Iran Nuclear Deal’, The New York Times, July 14, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-provokes-sharp-reactions-across- the-arab-world.html; Payam Mohseni Ed, ‘Iran and the Arab World after the Nuclear Deal: Rivalry and Engagement in a New Era’, The Iran Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University (August 2015), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Impact%20on%20Arab%20World%20- %20Web.pdf 1094 Author interview with Emirati official, Washington DC (2 March 2016)

258 deal, but also, to oppose it. The nuclear deal further entrenched the prevailing belief that the UAE and its allies would have to become self-sufficient in the pursuit of their own security and well-being, and firmly highlighted the need to stand up to and contain Iran in any way and arena possible.

When the nuclear deal was announced on 14 July 2015, Iran’s neighbours reacted sceptically: Cautiously supporting the deal but highlighting that it would not be good for the region.1095 The ruler of the UAE, Sheikh Khalifa, was the first Gulf Arab ruler to send a congratulatory telegram to President Rouhani, expressing hope for regional security.1096 But the UAE was fearful of what the deal would do to Iran’s regional ambitions. An Emirati official said, ‘Iran feels vindicated by the deal to continue its role as a regional hegemon using its proxies. The deal worsened regional relations’.1097 In 2016, a high-level Bahraini official stated that they were in favour of ‘keeping the deal’, but that the international community now had to ‘address Iran’.1098 Other analysts and officials expressed similar sentiments: Jamal Khashoggi, the deceased Saudi opposition journalist stated at the time,

‘Iran is an aggressor…It has ambitions and plans that it is implementing in the region, and it is using force, not diplomacy…Iran under sanctions was a pain in the neck for the Saudis, and it will be more of a pain in the neck without sanctions…There is no sign that the Iranians

1095 Hussein Lbish, ‘For Gulf Countries, Iran’s Regional Behavior Overshadows Nuclear Deal’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (17 July 2015), https://agsiw.org/for-gulf-countries-irans-regional-behavior- overshadows-nuclear-deal/; ‘In Gulf Press, Fear and Criticism of Iran Nuclear Agreement: Obama is Leaving the Middle East a Legacy of Disaster’, The Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch No. 6107 (15 July 2015), https://www.memri.org/reports/gulf-press-fear-and-criticism-iran-nuclear-agreement-obama-leaving- middle-east-legacy 1096 ‘UAE leaders congratulate Rouhani on nuclear deal’, Khaleej Times, July 14, 2015, https://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/government/uae-leaders-congratulate-rohani-on-nuclear-agreement 1097 Author interview with Emirati official, New York (11 March 2016) 1098 Statement by senior Bahraini official, Sir Bani Yas Conference, Abu Dhabi (18-19 November 2016)

259 are going to change and bring peace’.1099 Abdullah Baabood drew attention to the fact that the deal did not address Iranian foreign policy, which has been destructive in the region:

‘…Iran has been able to meddle in Arab politics. Iran’s bid for regional hegemony, coinciding with Arab political fragmentation and a weak Arab regional order in the midst of political chaos and regional turmoil, has led to a proxy war with its Arab neighbours, led by Saudi

Arabia’.1100 A general in the Qatari government expressed support for the non-proliferation aspects of the deal, but cautioned that Iran had ‘been released to do what it wants’.1101 A

Saudi official lamented that the deal had ‘dealt with Western and Iranian security concerns at the expense of the security of the region’.1102 A high-level Bahraini official stated that it was best to ensure the implementation of the deal, but ‘address Iran’s other activities’.1103

Generally, the UAE and its allies did not welcome the deal for fear of what it would do to security in their region.

3.2 Emirati fears

3.2.1 A stronger Iran?

1099 Ben Hubbard, ‘Arab World Split Over Iran Nuclear Deal’, The New York Times, July 14, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-provokes-sharp-reactions-across- the-arab-world.html 1100 Abdullah Baabood in Payam Mohseni Ed, ‘Iran and the Arab World after the Nuclear Deal: Rivalry and Engagement in a New Era’, The Iran Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University (August 2015), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Impact%20on%20Arab%20World%20- %20Web.pdf, 41-42 1101 Author interview with Hassan Saleh Al-Nesf, Brigadier General, Qatar National Committee for the Prohibition of Weapons (NCPW), Doha (15 May 2016); Author roundtable with experts and analysts, Al Jazeera Research Center (16 May 2016) 1102 Author interview with official, Saudi embassy in Qatar, Doha (18 May 2016) 1103 Statement by high-level Bahraini official, Sir Bani Yas Conference, Abu Dhabi (18-19 November 2016)

260

For Abu Dhabi, the nuclear deal was problematic on several levels. First, the leadership in the UAE firmly believed that the nuclear deal would strengthen Iran in the region.1104 The

Emirati news wire that reported the congratulatory note sent by the ruler of the UAE to

Rouhani after the deal, also quoted an ‘official source’ calling on Iran to roll back its regional activities now that the nuclear deal was done: ‘Iran could play a [significant] role in the region if it revises its policy and stops interfering in the internal affairs of countries like Iraq,

Syria, Lebanon and Yemen...Accompanying [efforts] would be for Iran to demonstrate a genuine desire to help extinguish fires devouring the region’.1105 But the deal ‘didn’t lead to the moderation of Iranian behaviour’, explained several Emirati officials.1106 Instead, ‘Iran is less isolated and stronger’, said an Emirati official.1107 The UAE and its neighbours believed the agreement would result in a more confident Iran, boosted by its decades-long negotiations with world powers and the ‘acceptance’ of its controversial nuclear programme. ‘Iran is more confident to interfere, and blunter in its violations in the region.

The deal gave Iran the green light to do what it wanted’, explained an Emirati official.1108 A foreign ministry staff member added, ‘the deal made Iran more aggressive. It has displayed the worst behaviour in the region since’.1109

Second, much like its regional allies, Abu Dhabi believed the deal would give Iran the means to pursue its active foreign policy in the region through the release of Tehran’s blocked

1104 Author interview with Emirati officials, Dubai and Abu Dhabi (2014-2017); Author interview with Youssef Al Otaiba, UAE ambassador to the USA, Washington DC (2 March 2016); Author interview with a former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019) 1105 ‘Iran nuclear deal: an overview of global reactions’, Euronews, July 15, 2015, https://www.euronews.com/2015/07/15/iran-nuclear-deal-reactions-from-around-the-world-overview 1106 Author roundtable with the Policy Planning Unit, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abu Dhabi (28 February 2017) 1107Author interview with Emirati official, Washington DC (2 March 2016) 1108 Author roundtable with the Policy Planning Unit, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016) 1109 Ibid

261 funds abroad and through sanctions relief.1110 To them, this would result in a bolder and more active Iran in the region, one that would not hesitate to challenge the Gulf Arab states if it needed to. Iran would be ‘more free to give money to Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the

Shias in Iraq’ argued an Emirati expert at the Al Jazeera Center in Doha.1111 The deal released Iranian assets and oil revenues held in restricted accounts in the US. Combined with the release in sanctions pressure that the deal would provide, the Emiratis (as well as its neighbours and many in the West)1112 believed that Iran would use the approximate $100 billion it would receive towards boosting its regional forces and proxies to destabilise the region at their expense.1113 The perceived rise of Iran and the perceived development of its capabilities posed a direct threat to the UAE, acting as a constraint on its foreign policy decision-making.

Third, in the UAE’s eyes, the entire process of negotiations and the final agreement would also legitimise the leadership of the Islamic Republic.1114 Indeed, for the better part of two decades the leadership of the Islamic Republic was in negotiations with some of the most powerful states on the international stage. While this was difficult enough to accept for the

UAE and its allies, to them, it was the final deal that provided the Islamic Republic with real legitimacy, both for the government itself and for what they considered to be an illegitimate

1110 Statement by head of an Emirati think tank, author roundtable with regional experts, officials and academics, Dubai (19 April 2016) 1111 Author roundtable with experts and analysts, Al Jazeera Research Center, Doha (16 May 2016) 1112 See for example, David Rothkopf, ‘Iran’s $300 Billion Shakedown’, Foreign Policy, April 16, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/16/irans-300-billion-shakedown-sanctions-nuclear-deal/ 1113 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17). JCPOA supporters countered this argument, see for example, Richard Nephew, ‘Sanctions Relief Won’t Be a $100 Billion Windfall for Iran’s Terrorist Friends’ Foreign Policy, July 2, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/02/iran-rouhani-khamenei-syria-assad-nuclear-sanctions-hezbollah/ 1114 Statement by head of an Emirati think tank, author roundtable with regional experts, officials and academics, Dubai (19 April 2016)

262 nuclear programme.1115 The deal sent the ‘wrong message’ because ‘Iran gets an endorsement’ of its nuclear programme.1116 The UAE’s commitment to non-proliferation and its 123 agreement with the US – an approach it was ‘trying to promote’ in the region – was ‘undermined’ by the Iran deal ‘.1117 As a result, to them, the nuclear deal made Iran stronger, more capable, legitimate and bolder, and allowed it to pursue its regional ambitions unchecked.1118

Iran for its part, had already been involved actively in the region even when under sanctions,1119 but it did not help itself vis-à-vis its Gulf Arab neighbours, as it continued its nefarious activities in the region, and in some cases, intensified them.1120 In Syria, in

October 2015, after the death of a senior IRGC commander, Brigadier General Hossein

Salami, Deputy Commander of the IRGC, announced that Iran would increase its presence in

Syria, both in quality and quantity, and provide both tactical and general advisory help and weapons.1121 In Iraq, ISIS’ takeover presented a real problem for Iran because of Iraq’s importance in Iranian thinking, the porous border and the shared political, economic and

1115 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 1116 Author interview with two senior Emirati foreign ministry officials, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016) 1117 Ibid 1118 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17). 1119 Richard Nephew, ‘Sanctions Relief Won’t Be a $100 Billion Windfall for Iran’s Terrorist Friends’ Foreign Policy, July 2, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/02/iran-rouhani-khamenei-syria-assad-nuclear- sanctions-hezbollah/ 1120 Jonathan Saul, Parisa Hafezi, Michael Georgy, ‘Exclusive: Iran steps up support for Houthis in Yemen’s war – sources’, Reuters, March 21, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-iran-houthis/exclusive-iran- steps-up-support-for-houthis-in-yemens-war-sources-idUSKBN16S22R 1121 Hossein Bastani, ‘Iran quietly deepens involvement in Syria’s war’, BBC News, October 20, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34572756; Dugald McConnell, Brian Todd, ‘Iran steps up its forces in Syria’, CNN, October 28, 2015, https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/27/middleeast/iran-syria-troop- buildup/index.html; Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai, ‘Iran’s ISIS Policy’, International Affairs, Vol. 91, Issue 1 (2015), 8, 13

263 religious ties between the two countries.1122 As a result, Tehran increased its involvement in the country, in particular through the deployment of hard power.1123 This heightened Gulf

Arab fears, which included legitimising Iranian influence and presence in Iraq, normalising cooperation between Iran and the US on a common security threat, and clearing the way for a growth of Iranian influence in Iraq.1124 In Yemen too, Iran increased its involvement in the conflict and ties with the Houthis in the aftermath of the nuclear deal.1125 Importantly though, the correlation with the JCPOA was tenuous; facts on the ground, such as the rise of

ISIS, were a major factor in Iran’s behaviour. But the UAE could not help but predominantly view the changes in the region in the context of the nuclear deal and the confidence it gave

Iran. Privately, some Emirati officials hoped the deal would provide ‘wind in the sails of the moderates’ – though they were sceptical this would happen.1126

Nevertheless, the nuclear deal and the effect this had on Iran – both in legitimising it in the eyes of the Gulf Arabs, and in giving it greater capabilities for its regional endeavours – posed a threat to the UAE. It changed Abu Dhabi’s international threat context by heightening the Iranian threat, which could, they believed, impact their domestic regime security, both through the regional threat and the UAE’s potential inability to address it adequately, and through the potential for direct Iranian intervention in internal Emirati

1122 Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai, ‘Iran’s ISIS Policy’, International Affairs, Vol. 91, Issue 1 (2015), 2-5; Garrett Nada, ‘Part 1: Iran’s Role in Iraq’, The Wilson Center (26 April 2018), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/part-1-irans-role-iraq 1123 ‘Iran has over 1,000 troops in Iraq, less than 2,000 in Syria: US general’, Reuters, October 27, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-dunford-iranians/iran-has-over-1000-troops-in-iraq-less- than-2000-in-syria-u-s-general-idUSKCN0SL23E20151027 1124 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 1125 Jonathan Saul, Parisa Hafezi, Michael Georgy, ‘Exclusive: Iran steps up support for Houthis in Yemen’s war – sources’, Reuters, March 21, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-iran-houthis/exclusive-iran- steps-up-support-for-houthis-in-yemens-war-sources-idUSKBN16S22R 1126 Author interview with two senior Emirati foreign ministry officials, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016)

264 affairs.1127 The deal therefore acted as an external constraint on the UAE’s foreign policy decision-making, further entrenching the drive towards greater assertiveness.

3.2.2. The US factor

The fear of Iran’s expansionist agenda for the region was made worse by the timing of the nuclear deal: Occurring at the moment when the UAE’s trust in the US was at its lowest,1128 and the fear of US abandonment was at its highest, perceptions that the JCPOA only strengthened.1129 Indeed, the previous chapter demonstrated that confidence in the Obama administration and the US as a security guarantor was at an all-time low in the Gulf Arab countries.1130 The JCPOA exacerbated this in two ways: First, It further highlighted that the

US - the UAE’s primary security guarantor – was abandoning it, in favour of dealing with

Iran. Second, the UAE believed US would appease Tehran to ensure the success of the

JCPOA. Referring to the elements of external constraints on foreign policy identified in chapter four, this represented a change in the UAE’s security relations with the US, which consequently, affected its foreign policy decision-making.

1127 Author interviews with Emirati officials, lawmakers, experts, academics, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, New York, and Washington DC (2014-2017) 1128 Statement by Emirati military official, author roundtable with regional experts, officials and academics, Dubai (19 April 2016) 1129 Ben Hubbard, ‘Arab World Split Over Iran Nuclear Deal’, The New York Times, July 14, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-provokes-sharp-reactions-across- the-arab-world.html 1130 According to a Zogby Poll conducted in 2014, significant majorities in both Saudi Arabia (88%) and the UAE (89%) view the US as having a negative impact on the region, see ‘Today’s Middle East: Pressures and Challenges’, Zogby Research Services LLC, Report prepared for the Sir Bani Yas Forum (November 2014), Section VII, https://assets.nationbuilder.com/aai/pages/7880/attachments/original/1431629755/Sir%252520Bani%25252 0Yas%2525202014%25252011-01.pdf?1431629755, 29; the 2016 poll showed majorities in those countries were still unfavorable to the US, but by smaller margins, see ‘Middle East 2016: Current Conditions and the Road Ahead’, Zogby Research Services, prepared for the Sir Bani Yas Forum (November 2016), Section I, https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/aai/pages/12021/attachments/original/1481751962/SBY2016_FINAL. pdf?1481751962, 5, 7

265

3.2.2.1 Further proof of US abandonment

To the UAE and its neighbours, the JCPOA negotiations and the final nuclear deal was proof that not only was the US seemingly less engaged in the region, but what little interest it had in the Middle East was focused away from the Gulf Arabs and towards Iran. For the leadership in the UAE, this was a real blow to their efforts to tighten their relations with the

US and highlight that they were America’s indispensable partner in the region.1131 President

Obama further fed into this perception, as his administration adopted a more nuanced policy vis-à-vis US support of its Gulf allies and aimed to resolve America’s problems with

Iran. In an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg in the Atlantic in April 2016, President Obama called Saudi Arabia and Iran to ‘share’ the region:

The competition between the Saudis and the Iranians—which has helped to feed

proxy wars and chaos in Syria and Iraq and Yemen—requires us to say to our friends

as well as to the Iranians that they need to find an effective way to share the

neighborhood and institute some sort of cold peace. An approach that said to our

friends ‘You are right, Iran is the source of all problems, and we will support you in

dealing with Iran’ would essentially mean that as these sectarian conflicts continue

to rage and our Gulf partners, our traditional friends, do not have the ability to put

out the flames on their own or decisively win on their own, and would mean that we

1131 Author interview with Emirati officials, Dubai and Abu Dhabi (2014-2017); Author interview with Youssef Al Otaiba, UAE ambassador to the USA, Washington DC (2 March 2016)

266

have to start coming in and using our military power to settle scores. And that would

be in the interest neither of the United States nor of the Middle East.1132

This led to frustration and anger within the elites in the UAE who felt that the US had betrayed them.1133 This frustration was amplified because the UAE saw this not just as US abandonment, but a pivot towards their regional rival, Iran.1134 As a result, President

Obama’s reassurance fell on deaf ears. In fact, President Obama found himself acquiescing to Gulf Arab interventionism in the region in order to appease their fears of abandonment.

In Yemen, for example, the Obama administration did not want war and harboured real concerns about the way the Saudi-led alliance was conducting their intervention:

With respect to Yemen, we have very deep concerns. We are able, because it’s the

nature of our relationship, to again provide certain types of support to the efforts in

Yemen, but also, I think, to be frank, when we believe that more care needs to be

taken to avoid civilian casualties. And that will be an ongoing position that we take.

And look, we have to hold all of ourselves to the highest possible standard when it

relates to preventing civilian deaths, and that will continue to be a part of our

dialogue as it relates to Yemen.1135

1132 Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic (April 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ 1133 Author roundtable with the Policy Planning Unit, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016) 1134 Ibid 1135 Press Call by Ben Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, and Jeff Prescott, Senior Direction for the Middle East, NSC, on the Upcoming Visit of King Salman of Saudi Arabia, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, September 2, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2015/09/03/press-call-ben-rhodes-deputy-national-security-advisor-strategic

267

But nevertheless, the Obama administration felt it had to give the Gulf Arabs ‘a pass’ to demonstrate that it continued to consider Gulf Arab interests and security in the region.1136

His efforts, however, did little to assuage Gulf Arab fears of US disengagement from the region and pivot towards Iran.

3.2.2.2 US appeasement of Iran

The UAE feared the US would no longer help contain Iran because the Obama administration now had a stake in the success of the JCPOA.1137 Instead, Washington would appease Tehran to ensure the success of the nuclear deal. A foreign-based Emirati official summarised the perception, saying that there was a lack of desire to confront Iran in

Washington, because they did not want to ‘risk the deal. They’re held hostage by it’.1138

Senior Emirati foreign ministry officials lamented that now that the deal had been reached, the US was ‘not doing enough’ to ‘stand up to Iran’, blaming it on President Obama’s ‘legacy driven’ foreign policy.1139 Another Emirati official said the US had ‘no political motivation to criticise Iran, to make sure the deal could succeed’.1140 With the deal, the US had demonstrated that it was prepared ‘to live with a more reactive Iran in the region’ and it

‘recognised Iran’s growth’, and that US policy on Iran would no longer be limited to just containment, thus continuing the reversal of twenty years of American foreign policy in the

Middle East.1141 Finally, officials in the UAE believed that the US was acting weak on Iran in

1136 Author interview with Gary Sick, senior research scholar, Middle East Institute, and adjunct professor, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, New York City (10 March 2016) 1137 Author roundtable with the Policy Planning Unit, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016) 1138 Author interview with Emirati official, Washington DC (2 March 2016) 1139 Author interview with two senior Emirati foreign ministry officials, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016) 1140 Author roundtable with the Policy Planning Unit, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016) 1141 Author interview with Gary Sick, senior research scholar, Middle East Institute and adjunct professor, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, New York City (10 March 2016)

268

Syria, and that Obama’s unwillingness to defend the red-line on the use of chemical weapons in Syria by the government was the result of a desire not to jeopardise the negotiations with Iran.1142 An Emirati-based think-tank expert stated that President Obama refused to take action in Syria ‘because of Iran’, he ‘didn’t want to confront Iran’, especially during the negotiations and after the final deal.1143 The Emiratis clearly viewed US withdrawal from the region and the pivot to Iran as a fait-accompli.

The US’ willingness to pursue the nuclear deal acted as an external constraint on the UAE’s foreign policymaking. For the UAE, the perceived US abandonment, coupled with

Washington’s pivot towards Tehran, changed their security relations with the US – its security guarantor, and almost an ally. This is the second element of the external constraints on foreign policy explored in chapter four. Indeed, the US could no longer be counted as a security guarantor, thereby affecting Abu Dhabi’s security, alliances and consequently, foreign policy decision-making. It further entrenched the idea that the UAE would have to pursue self-sufficiency and its own foreign policy objectives independently of the US. The

UAE’s fears were not limited to Iran and the perception of US retrenchment, however, concerns over Saudi hegemony were also significant.

3.2.3 Fears of Saudi hegemony

As we have seen, the nuclear deal exacerbated Emirati fears of Iranian hegemony and US abandonment. While publicly, previous events in the region encouraged the Gulf Arab states

1142 Statement by Gulf-based analyst, author roundtable with regional experts, officials and academics, Dubai (19 April 2016) 1143 Author interview with Emirati think-tank expert, Dubai (13 November 2016)

269 to unify in the face of a growing external threat, including a closer public stance between

Saudi Arabia and the UAE, behind closed doors, the succession of events in the region that culminated with the nuclear deal re-invigorated fears of a potential Saudi reassertion of its leadership over the smaller Gulf Arab states.1144

The UAE and its smaller Gulf Arab allies were concerned that Saudi Arabia would seek to counter emerging threats by first asserting its leadership over the smaller Gulf Arab states, and dragging them into conflicts they were not prepared to engage in.1145 Fears of Saudi hegemony among the smaller Gulf Arab states, including the UAE, were not new. Such fears were behind the lack of full military integration within the GCC in the years after its formation.1146 And even when GCC military integration came five years later with the establishment of the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF) in 1986, the smaller Gulf Arab states wanted to guard against Saudi overreach and hegemony, and being dragged into a conflict that did not concern them, insisting that when the PSF ‘enters a member’s territory, the command structure reverts from Saudi Arabia to that of the host country’.1147 More recently, prior to the final round of nuclear negotiations, Kaye and Wehrey referred to similar fears in their explanation of a potential ‘restructuring of the region’s power relations’ because of an Iranian nuclear programme. They quoted an Emirati official’s fear of the

‘hegemonic overreaction’ of Saudi Arabia, in which Riyadh would exploit the threat from

Tehran to win Washington’s recognition of Saudi pre-eminence in the Sunni Arab world’.1148

1144 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 1145 Ibid 1146 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 77 1147 Ibid, 78 1148 Dalia Dassa Kaye and Frederic M. Wehrey, ‘A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbours’, Survival, Vol. 49, Issue 2 (2007), 112

270

The 2015 nuclear deal exacerbated this fear for the UAE. Abu Dhabi believed that the heightening of the Iran threat following the deal could open the door to Saudi reassertion of its leadership within the GCC in order to stand up to Iran more effectively.1149 This would place Abu Dhabi at the mercy of Saudi ambitions and interests. Saudi assertion of its hegemony was evident in the pre- and post-JCPOA period: According to a Saudi policy analyst, Riyadh did not hesitate to ‘shame’ Kuwaiti counterparts, including by cutting off ties between tribal families, over what was considered to be overly ‘positive’ views of Iran.1150 It was particularly difficult for those in Kuwait to remain accepting of Tehran’s regional position following the uncovering of a Hezbollah cell in the country,1151 and the debate over whether this should be exposed in the media or kept quiet.1152 For the UAE, Saudi hegemony was evident in Yemen: Riyadh expected its GCC allies to contribute to efforts to push Iran back in Yemen,1153 but Riyadh’s efforts, including relying on groups affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood,1154 directly conflicted with the UAE’s goals in the country.1155

These differences with Riyadh in Yemen highlighted the feeling in Abu Dhabi that its allies and partners were ignoring or minimising the UAE’s interests and policy objectives. In addition, Mohammed Bin Salman’s ruling ‘style’ concerned the Emiratis.1156 A UK official focused on the region stated that the Emiratis believed that the Saudis were not paying

1149 Author interviews with Emirati experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi (2014-17), Author interview with UK Foreign and Commonwealth official, London (13 March 2019) 1150 Author interview with think-tank Director, Dubai (16 November 2016) 1151 Ibid 1152 Ibid 1153 Author interview with Riad Kahwaji, CEO, INEGMA, Dubai (13 November 2016) 1154 Neil Partrick, ‘The UAE’s War Aims in Yemen’, Sada Blog – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 24, 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/73524; Michael Knights and Alexandre Mello, ‘The Saudi-UAE War Efforts in Yemen (Part 1): Operation Golden Arrow in Aden’, The Washington Institute PolicyWatch 2462 (10 August 2015), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-saudi-uae- war-effort-in-yemen-part-1-operation-golden-arrow-in-aden 1155 See chapter three 1156 Author interview with UK Foreign and Commonwealth official, London (13 March 2019); Author interview with former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019)

271 enough attention to their international image and making rash decisions, particularly after the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, and subsequent crisis such as the leaked hacking of Amazon

CEO Jeff Bezos in January 2020.1157 Saudi Arabia’s growing disregard for international norms and their indiscriminate campaign in Yemen had already begun to impact their influence in

Washington DC.1158 The UAE worried that Saudi actions would affect their image too, given the two were viewed by many as two sides of the same coin.1159 While it was imperative for the UAE to demonstrate its loyalty and close ties to its Saudi neighbour, privately, there was significant concern about the impact this would have on the UAE’s image.1160

The potential for increasing Saudi hegemony affected the UAE’s regional threat perception – the first element of external constraints on foreign policymaking outlined in chapter four.

Indeed, if Saudi Arabia were to continue to re-assert itself regionally, this could impact

Emirati security, for example, by dragging Abu Dhabi into a war that it had no interest in fighting. Growing Saudi recklessness, embodied by Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, also risked dragging the UAE into unwanted tensions or tarnishing its reputation internationally. This, in turn, had the potential to impact the security of the regime domestically. Growing Saudi hegemony acted as an external constraint on the UAE’s foreign policy decision-making by further feeding into the prevailing perception that self-sufficiency had to be achieved rapidly, so that the country could secure its own interests, especially when these did not coincide with those of its closest ally, Saudi Arabia.

1157 Author interview with UK Foreign and Commonwealth official, London (13 March 2019); Author interview with former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019) 1158 See chapter three 1159 Author interview with former and current Emirati officials, Dubai and Abu Dhabi (2014-2017); Author interview with former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019) 1160 Author interview with UK Foreign and Commonwealth official, London (13 March 2019); Author interview with former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019)

272

The nuclear deal had a three-fold impact on the UAE: It further highlighted the immediacy and importance of the Iran threat in the context of the post-Arab Spring era and the announcement of a US Pivot to Asia, it was seen as proof of Washington’s intention to abandon its Gulf Arab allies in favour of Iran, and it revived existing fears of Saudi hegemony. These external constraints impacted the UAE’s foreign policymaking in two ways: First, the UAE believed it would have to increase its individual efforts to counter and manage the Iranian threat. Second, given that in their eyes, the US could no longer be trusted as primary security guarantor, this intensified the UAE’s prevailing desire to become increasingly independent and self-sufficient. This was evident in the continued investment in the development of the UAE’s capabilities, its willingness to deploy those capabilities to pursue its interests in the region, and in the lessons it drew from its assertiveness.1161

Conclusion

When the world powers and Iran announced the nuclear deal on 14 July 2015, the Gulf

Arabs expressed support for the deal, but cautioned that it would worsen regional tensions.

The deal had a significant impact on the psyche of the leadership in Abu Dhabi. Firstly, it believed the deal was restrictive because it did not address their primary concern: Iran’s hegemonic ambitions in the region. Rather, the perception was that the deal would serve to both legitimise and strengthen the Islamic Republic, through its continued engagement with world powers and the sanctions relief it was promised following implementation. As a result, Abu Dhabi believed the deal would make Iran more active in the region, thereby

1161 See chapter three

273 making it a greater threat to the Gulf Arab states. Secondly, the deal heightened the belief that Washington had abandoned its friends in the region in favour of their rival: Iran.

Washington could no longer be counted upon to secure the UAE, especially since President

Obama wanted to preserve the nuclear deal and as such, was perceived to favour appeasing

Iran. Finally, it was believed that the elevation of the Iranian threat following the nuclear deal would give Riyadh reason to reassert its leadership over its smaller GCC allies, who would find themselves having to balance between their interests and supporting Riyadh.

The nuclear deal affected the UAE’s regional threat context, which had implications for the security of its government. It also affected its relations with the US, its primary security guarantor. Both of these elements – the change in international threat context and the implications this has for regime security, as well as changes in alliances and security relations with third powers - acted as external constraints on the UAE’s foreign policy decision-making. The nuclear deal was the final catalyst that further entrenched Abu Dhabi’s desire to be independent and more assertive in its foreign policy.

274

Conclusion

Prior to the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, security relations in the Persian Gulf were largely determined by the competition for regional hegemony between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the different layers of this rivalry.1162 Today, the region is changing. While Saudi Arabia and Iran remain major regional powers, a growing assertiveness has taken shape within the

UAE, and to a lesser extent, some of the smaller Gulf Arab countries. While the UAE displayed elements of this trend prior to then, it was a series of significant events after 2011 - the Arab

Spring, President Obama’s announcement of a planned Pivot to Asia and the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran – that unleashed new fears and opportunities, acting as additional external constraints on the foreign policy decision-making of the UAE and its neighbours, making increased assertiveness a more tangible and seemingly lasting trend.

The UAE embodies this trend most visibly today. A constellation of internal and external factors has enabled it to act more independently and assertively in its foreign policy since

2011 in particular, and this small Gulf state has become the most prominent and resilient manifestation of this trend. In the conflict in Yemen, for example, the UAE pursued its own interests rather than merely supporting Saudi Arabia in its pushback of the Houthi rebels and containment of Tehran. For the UAE, the containment of radical Islam in the southern parts

1162 See for example, Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006); Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East (London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 2013); Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring that Wasn’t (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); Frederic M. Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Markus Kaim, Great Powers and Regional Orders (Aldershot: Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2008); Steven W. Hook and Tim Niblock Eds, The United States and the Gulf: Shifting Pressures, Strategies and Alignments (Berlin and London: Gerlach Press, 2015); Steve A. Yetiv, America and the Persian Gulf: The Third Party Dimension in World Politics (Westport: Praeger, 1995)

275 of the country was a major concern, which is why it focused its efforts on this, at times even countering Saudi efforts.1163 The UAE is no longer content to merely follow Riyadh’s lead, especially if this does not bring benefits or align fully with its national interests and objectives.

Understanding these changes in UAE policy will allow us to better understand the viability of this trend and the potential it has to spread among other smaller Gulf Arab states in a lasting manner. It is essential to better understand what led to these changes, as well as how this trend manifests itself in the region. This is because it has the potential to profoundly affect regional security and the way the Persian Gulf states interact, both amongst themselves and with the regional hegemons in the longer term.

The first chapter conducted an overview of the recent history and current state of affairs in the Persian Gulf with insight into regional relations prior to 2011. It then introduced the change which is the subject of this dissertation, arguing that what appears to be a growing assertiveness of the UAE, and to a lesser extent some of the smaller Gulf Arab states, calls into question the traditional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Chapter two defined the concept of assertiveness, before setting out several indicators to identify the existence of this trend. The first component is growing military and non-military capabilities, because no country can be assertive if it does not have the means to do so. While military capabilities are the traditional measures of the means a state possesses, cultural, economic, political, and diplomatic capabilities are also considered here because together, they offer a more accurate snapshot of what the country under scrutiny here is achieving. The second indicator is the state’s intention to use the capabilities outlined above. While capabilities provide the means

1163 Eleonora Ardemadni, ‘UAE’s Military Priorities in Yemen: Counterterrorism and the South’, ISPI Commentary (28 July 2016), https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/commentary_ardemagni_28_07.2016.pdf

276 to project power and influence, and are useful to bolster a state’s confidence, they are inadequate if the country in question is not willing to use them. The final component is the state’s perception of the successful use of its capabilities. This determines the resilience of the trend, as in the absence of any mitigating factors, perceived success in deployment of capabilities in pursuit of particular objectives should empower the state in question to continue on its more assertive track. Chapter three then applied these indicators to the UAE in order to evidence the existence of a growing assertiveness in the UAE’s foreign policy.

The second part of the dissertation explored what led to this change in the region. Chapter four set out an amended foreign policy analysis lens to help structure the analysis of the key factors that have shaped the foreign policy direction of the UAE. While recognising the importance of the domestic arena in influencing foreign policy decision-making, the dissertation focuses on the international domain because of its preponderance during the interviews and its relative importance in non-democratic countries.1164 Chapter four identified two indicators of external constraints: The international threat context and its impact on regime security, and alliances and relations with third states, both of which limit foreign policy decision-making. Drawing on this amended foreign policy analysis lens, the chapter then briefly introduced the three catalysts of change that played an important role in driving change in the region since 2011 - the Arab Spring, President Obama’s Pivot to Asia, and the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran.

1164 See chapter four

277

Chapter five studied the first catalyst: The Arab Spring, arguing that the wave of protest that swept through parts of the Middle East in 2011 intensified the regional change that is the focus of this dissertation, by posing several domestic and regional problems for the smaller

Gulf Arab states, and by providing them with opportunities to fill the power vacuum in the region. This coincided with a nascent impression that the United States sought to limit its involvement in the region, and by extension, would not be as committed to its Gulf Arab partners as it once was,1165 and a perceived rise in the Iranian threat.1166 The combination of threats and opportunities unleashed by the Arab Spring established the UAE’s desire to pursue self-sufficiency, while providing it with the opportunity to act more assertively on the regional stage in the pursuit of its own objectives.

Chapter six discussed the impact of the second catalyst of change, the announced US Pivot to Asia. 1167 The announcement called into question the commitment of the US to its Middle

Eastern allies – or at least, that was how the situation was perceived by the Gulf Arab elites.

It served to highlight the Gulf Arab states’ reliance on the US, and as a result, vulnerability to the changes in Washington’s foreign policy priorities. While the US Pivot had little impact on the ground,1168 the psychological impact on the leadership of the Gulf Arab states was significant. The leadership in the UAE concluded that it was imperative to diversify its sources of security, while committing to increasing its self-sufficiency.

1165 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 1166 Ibid 1167 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament’, Speech, Australian parliament, Canberra, November 17, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks- president-obama-australian-parliament; Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/ 1168 See chapter six

278

The final catalyst was the negotiations leading up to the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1, and the deal itself – examined in chapter seven. For the UAE and its neighbours, the negotiations and the deal worsened the perception of US disengagement from the

Middle East, and established a new fear: That the US would turn to their regional rival, Iran, instead.1169 It also increased fears of what a legitimised and bolstered Tehran would do in the region, thereby infusing the Iranian threat with new significance and further entrenching the trend of assertiveness for the UAE.1170 While the UAE seems to view its policy of assertiveness as one that has brought it a number of benefits, it has also created some potential problems, which this next section will examine.

1. Looking forward

1.1 Over-reach?

The UAE campaigned to improve its image and portray itself as a beacon of stability in an unstable Middle East, an innovative and fast-growing economic powerhouse, and a reliable security partner. But in the words of Matthiesen: ‘with increasing exposure comes new risks’.1171 As the UAE became a more prominent political, military and economic actor on the regional and world stage, greater attention was paid to its efforts, leading to greater criticism, both within and outside the region, of its methods, objectives and results. This will feed into how Abu Dhabi and the rest of the world view the success of the new Emirati policy and whether it is likely to last or not. Noting that the international opinion of the UAE

1169 Author interviews with GCC lawmakers, officials, experts and academics, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait City (2014-17) 1170 Ibid 1171 Toby Matthiesen, ‘Renting the Casbah’ in Kristian Coates Ulrichsen Ed, The Changing Security Dynamics of the Persian Gulf (London: Hurst & Company, 2017), 46

279 and its foreign policy is dynamic and rapidly changing, and that this dissertation focuses mainly on the pre-GCC split era (the period between 2011 and summer 2017), this section will provide a brief overview of a few instances, including some outside that timeframe, where the UAE’s image and influence was negatively affected following Abu Dhabi’s increasing assertiveness.

The UAE’s multi-pronged PR campaign to improve its image and influence the outcome of political processes and decision-making in foreign countries, in particular the US, was examined in chapter three. During the special investigation of President Trump in 2018-

2019, reports of the UAE’s extensive ties to the US political elite increased, including through contact with so-called ‘fixers’ who were charged with protecting Emirati interests within the Trump administration and advancing their foreign policy goals in Washington.1172

In addition, in the context of its more overt campaigns in Yemen and Libya, the split with

Qatar, and the investigations into President Trump, the UAE’s efforts continued to garner greater scrutiny with a continuous slew of damning media coverage of the UAE’s involvement in US politics.1173 But it was not just involvement in US politics that was

1172 David D. Kirkpatrick, ‘Who is Behind Trump’s Links to Arab Princes? A Billionaire Friend’, The New York Times, June 13, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/world/middleeast/trump-tom-barrack- saudi.html; Kenneth P. Vogel, ‘How a Trump Ally Tested the Boundaries of Washington’s Influence Game’, The New York Times, August 13, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/13/us/politics/elliott-broidy- trump.html 1173 See for example, Alex Emmons, Mathew Cole, ‘UAE Enlisted Business to Spy on Trump White House’, The Intercept, June 10, 2019, https://theintercept.com/2019/06/10/trump-uae-businessman-spy/; Sharon LaFraniere, Maggie Haberman, Adam Goldman, ‘Trump Inaugural Fund and Super PAC Said to Be Scrutinized for Illegal Foreign Donations’, The New York Times, December 13, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/politics/trump-inauguration-investigation.html; Sharon LaFraniere, Maggie Habberman, William K. Rashburn, Ben Protess, David K. Kirkpatrick, ‘Trump Friend’s Ties to Mideast at Heart of Lobbying Enquiry’, The New York Times, July 28, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/28/us/politics/thomas-barrack-foreign-lobbying.html; ‘Trump & the UAE: Connecting the Dots’, Al Jazeera, April 6, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/mueller-web- trump-uae-connection-180405113651605.html; Mark Mazzetti, David K. Kirkpatrick, Maggie Haberman, ‘Mueller’s Focus on Advisor to Emirates Suggest Broader Investigation’, The New York Times, March 3, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/03/us/politics/george-nader-mueller-investigation-united-arab-

280 problematic, Emirati efforts to improve their reputation through funding campaigns to

Western academic and research institutions also came under greater scrutiny,1174 particularly following crises such as the detention of British academic Matthew Hedges for alleged espionage,1175 the refusal of work visas for two NYU academics,1176 and the poor labour conditions faced by migrants building the NYU campus in Abu Dhabi.1177 Following increasing reports of record spending by the UAE to academic and expert institutions,1178 greater attention was paid to their publications and work, leading some institutions to decline additional funding from the UAE to avoid the greater scrutiny.1179 This began to take a toll on the UAE’s image in Washington, with greater scrutiny of the country by the US

Congress, and efforts to constrain the Trump administration’s ability to advance Emirati foreign policy goals, including its involvement in the Yemen war,1180 and the sale of weapons

emirates.html?smid=tw-bna; Terry Gross, ‘UAE’s Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed’s Growing Influence on the U.S.’, NPR’s Fresh Air, June 6, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/06/06/730339596/uaes-prince-mohammed- bin-zayed-s-growing-influence-on-the-u-s?t=1565775891581 1174 Jonathan Fenton-Harvey, ‘Saudi Arabia and the UAE Fund Academia with Strings Attached’, LobeLog, August 28, 2019, https://lobelog.com/saudi-arabia-and-the-uae-fund-academia-with-strings-attached/ 1175 Matthew Hedges, ‘An Ally Held Me as a Spy – And the West Is Complicit’, The Atlantic, January 25, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/01/matthew-hedges-uae-held-me-spy-west- complicit/581200/ 1176 ‘NYU journalism department cuts ties to NYU Abu Dhabi’, Associated Press, November 5, 2017, https://www.apnews.com/03d65fe3ab40437dada3dd5e7acfd406 1177 David Kenner, ‘The Selective Westernization of NYU’s Abu Dhabi Campus’, The Atlantic, May 10, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/05/the-selective-westernization-of-nyus-abu-dhabi- campus/560096/ 1178 See for example, Ryan Grim, ‘Gulf Government Gave Secret $20 Million Gift to D.C. Think Tank’, The Intercept, August 10, 2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/08/09/gulf-government-gave-secret-20-million- gift-to-d-c-think-tank/; Eric Lipton, Brooke Williams and Nicholas Confessor, ‘Foreign Power Buy Influence at Think Tanks’, The New York Times, September 6, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/us/politics/foreign-powers-buy-influence-at-think-tanks.html; Andrew England and Simeon Kerr, ‘Universities challenged: scrutiny over Gulf money’, Financial Times, December 13, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/fa6d15a4-f6ed-11e8-af46-2022a0b02a6c 1179 Sabrina Siddiqui, ‘Leading liberal thinktank will no longer accept funds from UAE’, The Guardian, January 25, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jan/25/united-arab-emirates-funding-center-for- american-progress 1180 Robbie Gramer, Amy Mackinnon, ‘Congress is Finally Done with the War in Yemen’, Foreign Policy, April 4, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/04/congress-makes-history-war-yemen-powers-bill/

281 to the UAE1181 – a measure that the Trump administration defied in May 2019 by selling $8 billion worth of weapons to the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Jordan,1182 sparking a renewed effort by the US Senate and Congress to block the sale.1183 This was a significant change from the statements made by US officials in 2014 confirming that the US relationship with the UAE is

‘the strongest relationship that the United States has in the Arab world today’.1184 More recently, US lawmakers in particular have not hesitated to criticise the Emiratis for their contribution to the war effort in Yemen, with Lindsey Graham, a Trump ally and Republican

Congressman, referring to the UAE’s efforts in Yemen as ‘problematic’.1185 US officials were not the only ones that questioned the UAE’s tactics in regional conflicts. Greater Emirati assertiveness, as well as its close association with Saudi Arabia and its increasingly brazen

Crown Prince, Mohammed Bin Salman, became problematic for Europeans and others.

Following successive reports of indiscriminate coalition bombing campaigns in Yemen and the brutal Saudi murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018, European countries began to review their weapons sales to the Gulf Arab states. In fact, all weapons sales to the

UAE and the coalition came under international scrutiny as the war waged on.1186

1181 Joe Gould, ‘Key US Democrat holds back support for Gulf munitions sales over Yemen’, DefenseNews, July 3, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2018/07/03/key-us-democrat-holds-back-support-for-gulf- munitions-sales-over-yemen/ 1182 Patricia Zengerle, ‘Defying Congress, Trump sets $8 billion-plus in weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, UAE’, Reuters, May 24, 2019, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-saudi-arms/defying-congress-trump-sets-8- billion-plus-in-weapons-sales-to-saudi-arabia-uae-idUKKCN1SU25P 1183 Joe Gould, ‘US House votes to block Saudi, UAE arms sales, bucking Trump veto threat’, DefenseNews, July 17, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2019/07/17/us-house-votes-to-block-saudi-uae-arms- sales-bucking-trump-veto-threat/ 1184 Statements by Anthony Zinni, former commander of all U.S. forces in the Middle and General James Mattis, quoted in Rajiv Chandrasekaran, ‘In the UAE, the United States has a quiet, potent ally nicknamed ‘Little Sparta’’, The Washington Post, November 9, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national- security/in-the-uae-the-united-states-has-a-quiet-potent-ally-nicknamed-little-sparta/2014/11/08/3fc6a50c- 643a-11e4-836c-83bc4f26eb67_story.html 1185 Chris Mulls Rodrigo, ‘Graham: ‘I’ve got a real problem’ with arms sales to Saudi Arabia’, The Hill, May 26, 2019, https://thehill.com/homenews/sunday-talk-shows/445584-graham-i-got-a-real-problem-with-arms- sales-to-saudi-arabia 1186 See for example, Helen Davidson and Christopher Knaus, ‘Australian weapons shipped to Saudi and UAE as war rages in Yemen’, The Guardian, July 25, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/australia- news/2019/jul/25/australian-weapons-shipped-to-saudi-and-uae-as-war-rages-in-yemen; Anna Stavrianakis,

282

While the UAE remained a major regional partner to the US and Europe, its reputation and carefully built image began to suffer from its greater interventionism in the region and beyond. This included how its allies and friends in the region, including within the GCC viewed it. The UAE ‘is short-sighted, and it is shooting itself in the foot’, according to a senior Qatari official.1187 Abdullah Baabood, a respected Omani academic and expert on regional security, stated that the UAE was ‘overplaying its hand right now’.1188 In an interview conducted in 2017, a former official of the GCC, said of the UAE that ‘it was playing with fire’ with its increasing assertiveness.1189 Emirati assertiveness in the region was at times, perceived as outright aggressive. The same former GCC official commented on how he believed the Emiratis were involving themselves in Omani affairs: ‘Omanis believe the

UAE is trying to surround Oman and that Abu Dhabi is planning for the post-Qaboos era.

They want to weaken the country’.1190 He questioned Abi Dhabi’s goals: ‘What are they really trying to achieve here?’ he asked.1191 An Omani official believed the UAE was being too assertive: ‘The Emiratis are being zealous, you can see this in Yemen’.1192 The UAE’s greater assertiveness in the pursuit of its foreign policy objectives and its willingness to pursue them alone in the years following 2011, inevitably garnered greater international scrutiny of its methods and policies. This reversed some of the consequential gains it made in terms of improving its image, but importantly, it may make it harder for Abu Dhabi to maintain its assertive stance.

‘UK arms exports are still playing a central role in Yemen’s humanitarian crisis’, The Guardian, May 21, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/may/21/mps-thanking-jeremy-hunt-efforts-peace- in-yemen 1187 Roundtable with senior Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, London (20 February 2020) 1188 Author interview with Abdullah Baabood, former Professor, Qatar University, Doha, London (28 February 2020) 1189 Author interview with a former GCC official, Muscat (5 March 2017) 1190 Ibid 1191 Ibid 1192 Author interview with Omani official, Muscat (5 March 2017)

283

1.2 A lasting change?

There is a risk that the greater scrutiny the UAE faces as a result of its more overt interventionism and assertiveness, and the subsequent effect this has on its image and its ability to continue on its current track, would convince it to return to the status quo ante and abandon its more assertive and interventionist policies. This seems unlikely however, as

Abu Dhabi believes the benefits of this more assertive stance outweigh the costs, that it is achieving the objectives it has laid out for itself in the region and beyond, and that it has faced few or no negative consequences for its increased assertiveness to date.1193 For example, the greater scrutiny and questioning of weapons sales to the UAE did not stop some countries from approving further weapons sales to the it, including Germany in

2019,1194 further proving to Abu Dhabi that its efforts were justified. Simply put, ‘they believe they are successful’.1195 In 2019 – following several years on the current, assertive track, a former advisor to the Emirati government said that the UAE was ‘the smartest, most nimble Gulf country’,1196 wilfully ignoring some of the negative consequences of the current policy. But if some of these negative consequences endure, then it is possible that the UAE will review its policy of assertiveness. One area to watch is the fruits of the UAE’s involvement in Libya. According to Samir Madani, a UAE analyst, ‘there is a visible flexibility in the UAE’s approach to foreign policy’, but its ability to learn from instances of over-reach remains to be seen.1197 ‘The best gauge of whether the UAE will learn from its mistakes will

1193 See chapter three 1194 Timothy Jones, ‘Germany approves controversial military exports to the UAE’, DeutscheWell, October 4, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-approves-controversial-military-exports-to-uae/a-50697912 1195 Author interview with Abdullah Baabood, former Professor, Qatar University, Doha London (28 February 2020) 1196 Author interview with former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019) 1197 Statement by Samir Madani in ‘UAE Foreign Policy: Beyond the Gulf’, Gulf 2000 Webinar (2 July 2020)

284 be in Libya, where General Haftar is now on the backfoot and Russia has adopted a more flexible strategy’, said Madani, adding that ‘Libya could be a prototype for overextension’.1198 Other problems that may surface for the UAE in the long run are how to ensure it is not over-extended in one arena, while facing a need to intervene elsewhere. At one stage, the UAE had 7000 troops in Hodeida in Yemen; ‘what would have happened if something had gone wrong elsewhere?’ asked Ulrichsen, 1199 and how to secure the new assets it has developed internationally. According to Ulrichsen, the UAE will face the challenge of ‘achieving a sustainable balance on multiple issues’, including ensuring ‘the hawkish approach to domestic and regional security does not weaken the integrative bonds among the seven emirates, particularly as the conflict in Yemen continues and UAE casualties mount’.1200 And yet, the UAE has become increasingly bold and unafraid of the consequences of its actions as time goes on. For example, on 13 August 2020, the US, the

UAE and Israel announced a normalisation agreement, officially, the Abraham Accords

Peace Agreement: Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalization Between the United Arab Emirates and the State of Israel. The UAE and Israel had already been working together behind the scenes for several years, but their dealings were always behind closed doors because public opinion in the UAE, and in other Gulf Arab states, did not seem to be ready for public normalisation.1201 Official normalisation was risky, especially as domestic opposition to it remained significant and required a strong hand to quell it.1202

1198 Statement by Samir Madani in ‘UAE Foreign Policy: Beyond the Gulf’, Gulf 2000 Webinar (2 July 2020) 1199 Statement by Kristian Coates Ulrichsen in ‘UAE Foreign Policy: Beyond the Gulf’, Gulf 2000 Webinar (2 July 2020) 1200 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Punching above its weight’, interview by Michael Young, Diwan, Carnegie Middle East Center, June 29, 2020, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/82200, 229 1201 Author interview with head of a research institute, Kuwait City (24 May 2016); Author interview with officials, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016) 1202 ‘UAE arrests opponents of Israel peace deal’, Middle East Monitor, August 17, 2020, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200817-uae-arrests-opponents-of-israel-peace-deal/

285

Nevertheless, the UAE went through with it, both demonstrating its assertiveness and risk tolerance, as well as the more understandable desire for economic exchanges between the two. As seen in the chapter three, no set-back to-date has conferred the UAE with a sense of restraint as it continues to expand its interest and involvement in the region, which would indicate that it is unlikely to do so in the future.

It would appear that this trend of growing assertiveness may well endure for the UAE. For now, the changes discussed in this dissertation remain relatively minor; noticeable as a potentially lasting trend for the UAE, but not yet adopted in a lasting manner by other smaller Gulf Arab states. But it has already had a significant impact on regional security, including on the GCC’s ability to work as a unit, especially following the outbreak of the crisis with Qatar, and the region’s ability to manage tensions. It will have an even greater impact if the UAE’s influence continues to grow and it is able to increase its involvement in regional conflicts or in the domestic politics of countries of interest such as the US, unchecked. Many in the UAE now believe that the US desire to disengage from the region was not restricted to President Obama’s administration, but also felt by the Trump administration, and was therefore an indicator of a long-term trend. There remained instances where the US was willing to flex its muscles in defence of its partners interests – for example, following the deployment of an additional 3000 troops to the Persian Gulf1203 after the uptick in tensions in 2019 and following the US assassination of leader of the Qods

Force Qassem Soleimani and Iranian promises to avenge his death.1204 But the prevailing

1203 Clark Mindock, ‘US deploys thousands more troops to the Middle East after Trump-ordered airstrike kills Iran general’, The Independent, January 3, 2020, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us- politics/us-iran-war-trump-soleimani-troops-middle-east-pentagon-embassy-airstrike-a9269791.html 1204 ‘Qasem Soleimani: Iran vows ‘severe revenge’ for top general’s death’, BBC News, January 3, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50986185

286 belief was that the US ‘does not have a long-term strategy for the Middle East’, and that

‘America is just as inflicted with short-termism in pursuing its own interests as every other country in the world’.1205 This firm belief in continued US disengagement from the region will inevitably continue to act as an external constraint on foreign policy decision-making and feed into the Emirati desire to remain on its assertiveness track. But what impact will assertiveness have on regional relations? While no authoritative answer can be given to this question yet, the next section will lay out some potential changes and trends sparked by the

UAE’s growing assertiveness since 2011.

2. The broader impact of the change

Since 2011, the UAE has displayed a consistent forward momentum as it continues to expand its involvement and influence both in the region and beyond. Given this is still a relatively new trend, it is difficult to assert the longer-term impact it will have on security relations in the Persian Gulf. At the very least, however, the UAE will exert significantly more influence on regional affairs going forward, which will affect the normal order of business in the region. There are also indications that this trend may extend to other smaller Gulf Arab states as well. For example, while Oman has always led a relatively independent foreign policy, it has become increasingly assertive in the pursuit of this independence following

2011, though it remains to be seen if this will continue under the rule of Sultan Haitham Bin

Tariq, sworn in in January 2020. Qatar for its part, experimented with assertiveness in the past, but more fitfully than its Emirati neighbour. Certainly, the increasing number of decision-shapers and makers, as a result of the bolder stance taken by the smaller Gulf Arab

1205 Author interview with former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019)

287 states, and the weight of their decisions, carries the potential for greater friction in the region. Clearly, if the region is no longer dominated by the rivalry between Iran and Saudi

Arabia as the dominant forces in the Gulf, but a more complex one involving a series of multiple forceful actors – or indeed, if this traditional rivalry is overlaid with another layer of antagonism, this time among the traditionally compliant Gulf Arab states themselves - then the likelihood for greater tensions increase.

2.1 Tensions within the GCC

The greater willingness to pursue national interests, even when they conflict with those of allies and partners, has already had a significant impact on regional security, including on the interstate trust within the GCC and its ability to work as a unit. ‘There is no GCC today’, said a former member of the Shura council in Oman in 2016.1206 According to Vicky Gervais, the UAE’s greater assertiveness, ‘further contributed to the undermining of the smaller GCC states’ alliance model’, increasing tensions and rivalries within the group. 1207 While some of this has been longstanding – for example, Oman’s willingness to engage with Iran has always been a source of contention within the GCC – the differences among the GCC states have become increasingly visible since 2011. When Saudi Arabia proposed to upgrade the GCC to form a union in 2011,1208 Oman opposed it and in 2013, threatened to walk away from the

1206 Author interview with former member of the Omani Majles Shura, Muscat (21 May 2017) 1207 Victor Gervais, ‘The Changing Security Dynamic in the Middle East and its Impact on Smaller Gulf Cooperation Council States’ Alliance Choices and Policies’ in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli Eds, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 40 1208 ‘GCC leaders conclude 32nd Session of Supreme Council’, Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Washington DC (21 December 2011), https://www.saudiembassy.net/news/gcc-leaders-conclude-32nd- session-supreme-council

288

GCC if it became a union.1209 Other instances of this type of intra-GCC disagreements have been rife since 2011, but none as visible and drastic as the summer 2017 split with Qatar. In

June 2017, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Bahrain cut air, sea and land transport links with their neighbour Qatar. Led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, they accused Qatar of sponsoring Islamist groups in the region, including the Muslim Brotherhood, and maintaining close ties with Iran. A detailed assessment of the causes of the rift, as well as its impacts, are beyond the scope of this dissertation,1210 but it is a noteworthy example of the change and example of the impact of the change this dissertation focuses on.

In the first instance, the 2017 rift is an example of the UAE’s growing assertiveness and willingness to pursue its own interests, even when this opposes those of its partners, or may carry a significant cost to it. Abu Dhabi drove the idea of blockading Qatar as it pursued its efforts to contain the spread of Islamism – including the Muslim Brotherhood – in the region.1211 The ‘point of view of the Abu Dhabi leadership, therefore, is not just about differences over foreign policy with Qatar: its position is that Qatar was complicit in a serious and possibly existential threat to its rule’1212 – a position that is not necessarily shared at the same threat level by Riyadh – Saudi Arabia is known to work with Islamist

1209 ‘Oman will withdraw from GCC if a union is formed: foreign minister’, The National, December 7, 2013, https://www.thenational.ae/world/oman-will-withdraw-from-gcc-if-a-union-is-formed-foreign-minister- 1.314873 1210 For more on the 2017 rift with Qatar, see Andreas Krieg Ed, Divided Gulf – The Anatomy of a Crisis (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Khalid Al-Jaber, Sigurd Neubauer, The Gulf Crisis: Reshaping Alliances in the Middle East (Washington DC: Gulf International Forum, 2018); Zeina Azzam, Imad K. Harb Eds, The GCC Crisis at One Year: Stalemate Becomes New Reality (Washington DC: Arab Center Washington DC, 2018); ‘Qatar and its neighbours’, IISS Strategic Comment, Vol. 25, No. 7 (March 2019); Jane Kinninmont, ‘The Gulf Divided: The Impact of the Qatar Crisis’, Chatham House Reports (May 2019); Alexey Khlebnikov, ‘The New Ideological threat to the GCC: Implications for the Qatari-Saudi Rivalry’, INSS Strategic Assessment, Vol. 17, No. 4 (January 2015) https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-new-ideological-threat-to-the-gcc-implications-for-the-qatari- saudi-rivalry/ 1211 Jane Kinninmont, ‘The Gulf Divided: The Impact of the Qatar Crisis’, Chatham House Reports (May 2019); 14 1212 Ibid, 15

289 groups, including in Yemen.1213 The UAE’s policy was also a reason for the rift’s entrenchment.1214 When Saudi Arabia conducted outreach towards Qatar in December 2019 to begin mending the rift, Abu Dhabi reportedly actively sought to block progress.1215

According to Qatari officials, ‘every attempt to fix the talks with or without the UAE has been spoiled by the UAE’.1216

In addition to the rift being an example of greater Emirati assertiveness, it is also a case study in the effects of that Emirati assertiveness on countries in the region. While the catalysts identified in the previous chapters also applied to Qatar, which saw an opportunity in the Arab Spring to expand its influence and ‘chance to step up to the big league’,1217 felt the fear of US withdrawal from the region,1218 and despite its better relations with Iran, also looked at the nuclear deal with apprehension about the effect it would have on Iran’s regional relations,1219 Qatar’s resort to greater assertiveness was irregular. Without the confidence or the perceived success that the UAE had, Qatar witnessed several setbacks as a result of its greater assertiveness, which imbued it with a sense of restraint.1220 Mehran

Kamrava referred to the change in policy in Qatar by calling it a new form of ‘subtle power’:

1213 Neil Partrick, ‘The UAE’s War Aims in Yemen’, Sada Blog – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (24 October 2017), http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/73524 1214 Roundtable with senior Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, London (20 February 2020) 1215 Ibid; Author interview with Abdullah Baabood, former Professor, Qatar University, London (28 February 2020) 1216 Roundtable with senior Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, London (20 February 2020) 1217 Paul Danahar, The New Middle East: The World After the Arab Spring (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 237 1218 Author interview with Qatari experts, officials, academics, Doha (May 2016) 1219 Author interview with Abdullah Baabood, former Professor, Qatar University, Doha (15 May 2016) 1220 Mehran Kamrava, Qatar – Small State, Big Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013)

290

Derived from a carefully combined mixture of diplomacy, marketing, domestic

politics, regional diplomacy, and, through strategic use of its sovereign wealth fund,

increasing access to and ownership over prized commercial resources. This bespeaks

of a new form of power and influence, one that is more subtle in its manifestations

and is less blunt and blatant.1221

He differentiates the Qatari form of assertiveness, which became ‘more pragmatic’ after it believed it had overreached,1222 from that of the UAE’s, which is bolder. But the rift with its neighbours introduced a new dynamic in the equation for Qatar.

The split with its GCC partners left Qatar isolated from its closest partners, and eager to build bilateral relations with several countries both within and outside the region. Doha, who had already increased the build-up of its military capabilities with greater momentum following the Arab Spring, and had invested considerably into developing its political and diplomatic influence abroad, was forced to further build political and diplomatic capabilities, and boost economic and political relations with several countries. This provided it with a greater capability to pursue its foreign policy objectives,1223 which will naturally affect the conduct of its foreign policy in the future. ‘Even if the rift is fixed’, said a Qatari official,

‘Qatar will continue to pursue bilateral relations with other countries’.1224 The official further explained that not only had Qatar gone through the trouble of building these bilateral relationships now, so it made sense to maintain them, but also that it had learnt

1221 Mehran Kamrava, Qatar – Small State, Big Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013), 49 1222 Ibid, Xvii 1223 Roundtable with senior Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, London (20 February 2020); Author interview with Qatari official, London (3 March 2020) 1224 Roundtable with senior Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, London (20 February 2020)

291 the lesson that even its closest allies could not be counted on, so it would have to chart its own path in the future.1225 This indicates that the rift – in part, a result of growing Emirati assertiveness – has led to a growing Qatari willingness to pursue its interests and thereby, display greater assertiveness, irrespective of whether it conflicts with those of its partners or not.

Events such as these point to the potential for smaller Gulf Arab states to follow in Abu

Dhabi’s footsteps. Some of the smaller Gulf Arab states have dabbled with greater assertiveness since 2011, but as time goes by, and Abu Dhabi continues on its current path, this may well prompt them to pursue their own assertive foreign policy with greater conviction, either because of Abu Dhabi’s perceived success in its foreign policy, or because its greater assertiveness will have affected its neighbours in a negative manner, and contributed to the breakdown in GCC relations. Even if they do not go to the same lengths as Abu Dhabi, their efforts will still change the nature of regional security and policymaking

– as demonstrated by the UAE’s role in conflicts in the region, either in opposition to Saudi

Arabia, such as in Yemen, or on its own, without its allies, such as in Libya. If they do not follow suit, or only sporadically display assertiveness in the region and beyond in the way that Qatar has in the past, it still impacts regional relations because it erodes the ability of the Gulf Arab states to work together as a group under the umbrella of the GCC, something we have begun to witness in a lasting fashion following the summer 2017 GCC rift.

2.2 Tensions with Iran

1225 Roundtable with senior Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, London (20 February 2020)

292

Iran’s existence, especially after the 1979 revolution, posed a foreign policy difficulty for the

Gulf Arab states. But the Gulf Arab states could not agree on their Iran policy: ‘The GCC’s stance on Iran is not clear or organised. The GCC can’t act together,’ said a research fellow in an Emirati think-tank.1226 The GCC ‘doesn’t even have a minimum definition on Iran: Is it a threat? A challenge? There’s no consistency’, explained a Qatar based regional analyst.1227

This created tensions within the GCC and made Iran policy erratic. Despite the rivalry between both sides of the Persian Gulf, prior to 2011, Iran engaged the GCC countries both as a group, and on a bilateral level when it became too difficult to engage the group together. For example, after the tensions sparked by the 1979 revolution in Iran and Oman’s mediation efforts between Iran and the remaining GCC countries failed, Tehran wished to reassure all states of the GCC of its policies in the region, and dispatched officials to all countries.1228 Iran wanted to build relations with GCC states as part of a concerted effort to build regional security, but ‘it proved…easier to establish bilateral cooperation with the smaller countries than with Saudi Arabia which in general distrusted Iran more’.1229

The growing assertiveness displayed by the UAE, and to a lesser extent some of its Gulf Arab allies, is increasing the differences between the countries of the GCC. The rising and increasingly public tensions within the GCC, provided an opportunity for Tehran to both improve its standing in the region, weaken the GCC, and deal with each Gulf Arab country separately, thereby increasing its chances of improving relations with those who are willing

1226 Author roundtable with experts and analysts, B’huth, Dubai (29 February 2017) 1227 Statement by a regional analyst, roundtable with regional experts, officials and academics, Dubai (19 April 2016) 1228 Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami (Oxon: Routledge, 2003), 76, 97 1229 Ibid, 169

293 to deal with it. ‘Iran is benefitting from the differences within the GCC’, explained Mahjoob

Zweiri, an academic based in Qatar.1230 Indeed, Iran was watching the increasing differences between the GCC closely, and believed that ‘the splits within the GCC will get worse: not all are on board with Riyadh’s policies, and they are not all viewed as equally important’ according to an Iranian official interviewed in 2016.1231 In 2017, another Iranian official stated that ‘Saudi Arabia is not interested in de-escalation, but rather, want to escalate’ with Iran.1232 In 2019, an Iranian official separated Saudi Arabia and the UAE from the rest of the GCC countries, stating that neither wanted to resolve their differences with Iran, believing that ‘Iran’s nose should become bloody before either country talks to it’, and adding ‘there is no GCC anymore’.1233 As a result, even before the summer 2017 GCC crisis,

Iran’s policy was to actively engage the countries of the GCC individually.1234 It aimed to build ties with those who were more willing to engage with it to offset the heightening of tensions with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.1235 For Tehran, the 2017 GCC split with Qatar was a welcome opportunity to expand on this policy and demonstrate that it would happily assist a neighbour in need. Following the announcement of the split in June 2017, Tehran assisted the newly blockaded Qatar by sending food and supplies,1236 while delivering a message of solidarity with Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweeting, ‘Neighbours are permanent; geography can’t be changed. Coercion is never the solution. Dialogue is imperative, especially during

1230 Author interview with Mahjoob Zweiri, Professor, Qatar University, Dubai (19 April 2016) 1231 Author interview with Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, phone interview (19 May 2016) 1232 Author interview with senior Iranian official, Berlin (26 June 2017) 1233 Author roundtable with two Iranian officials and a former Iranian ambassador, Oslo (8 March 2019) 1234 Author interview with Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, phone interview (19 May 2016); Statement by Alex Vatanka, Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute, at Middle East Institute Webinar on ‘Covid-19, Oil Prices, and Prospects for Iran-GCC Relations’ (6 May 2020) 1235 Author interview with Iranian officials, Berlin, Oslo, New York, London (2016-2019) 1236 ‘Iran sends five planes of vegetables to help Qatar after five Arab nations cut ties over ‘extremism’ links’, The Telegraph, June 11, 2017, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/11/iran-sends-five-planes- vegetables-qatar/

294 blessed Ramadan’.1237 Individuals in the region also believed that Iran was actively trying to break the GCC apart: ‘Iran’s actions were to isolate Saudi Arabia from the GCC and to get rest of the GCC to turn to towards it’.1238 Nevertheless, Tehran responded positively to mediation efforts by countries like Kuwait on behalf of the GCC as a whole, including in

Spring 2017, but it did so knowing that they would not lead to anything concrete, given the tensions between Iran on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the other.1239 It also does not prevent Iran from dealing with what it considers to be ‘hawkish’ countries like the UAE when they are willing to do so. Following President Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign and the outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic in 2020, the UAE somewhat softened its stance on Iran, believing that the Trump administration might lead the region to war and that Dubai would be the first port of retaliation for Iran, after Iran’s Revolutionary

Guards threatened it.1240 As a result, Abu Dhabi believed it would have to secure itself on its own, and conducted limited outreach and de-escalation vis-à-vis Iran.1241 Nevertheless, for

Tehran, the growing assertiveness of the smaller Gulf Arab countries, and the UAE in particular, has been a welcome development as it creates more centres of power and spreads decision-making amongst the states in the region. This inevitably results in diverging views of Tehran, traditionally seen as the main regional aggressor, and provides Tehran with an opportunity to build relations with countries that are more willing to engage with it, to offset any escalation in tensions with the others.

1237 Tweet by Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif (5 June 2017) 1238 Author interview with the Director of an Emirati think-tank, Dubai (1 March 2017) 1239 Author interview with senior Iranian official, Berlin (26 June 2017) 1240 Artemis Moshtaghian, ‘Iran threatens to attach Dubai and Haifa if country is bombed’, CNN News Updates, January 7, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/us-iran-soleimani-tensions-intl-01-07- 20/h_ec2a577fe833946485ca681a584d980a 1241 Daniel Benaim, Thanassis Cambinis, Dina Esfandiary, Michael Wahid Hanna, Aron Lund, Dahlia Scheindlin, ‘Roundtable: Middle East Strained by COVID-19, But Not Transformed’, The Century Foundation Report (9 June 2020), https://tcf.org/content/report/roundtable-middle-east-strained-covid-19-not-transformed/

295

Conclusion

The change examined in this dissertation began to gain new momentum in 2011. The UAE exemplifies the broader shift that appears to be shaping the region. It remains to be seen whether the smaller Gulf Arab states will also follow the same path as the UAE and display greater assertiveness in a lasting manner, or periodically display assertiveness in specific arenas of importance to them. Regardless of this, the change in the UAE’s foreign policy, and the temporary forays into greater assertiveness displayed by the smaller Gulf Arab states has already begun to change security relations in the region: Smaller states, no longer content to follow Riyadh’s lead, have begun to pursue their own interests, even when these do not coincide with those of their allies and partners. For some states, the regional context is likely to favour this type of development: After reversing some of its assertiveness following over-stretch after the Arab Spring, Qatar found itself being forced into following a more assertive and individualistic foreign policy after the summer 2017 blockade led by

Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Qatar pursued its own bilateral relations both in the region and beyond, including with Iran and the US, with whom it sought to increase ties actively.1242

Doha believed this paid off, ‘we are more needed today than before 2017, sitting in the middle between different parties in the region and beyond’, said a Qatari official in February

2020. Following the assessments made in earlier chapters where the third indicator of assertiveness was the perception of the success of the policy by the leadership of the assertive state, this would indicate the beginnings of a lasting change for Qatar as well.

1242 Roundtable with senior Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, London (20 February 2020); Author interview with Qatari official, London (3 March 2020)

296

The growing assertiveness displayed by the smaller Gulf Arab states, and the UAE in particular, leads to a number of broader questions that require consideration: What will happen when disagreements are no longer manageable? Are we witnessing the end of the

GCC? Will the Gulf Arab states be better equipped to deal with threats and changing regional security relations as a result of this shift? How will this affect relations with Iran in the long run: Are we likely to see an escalation in tensions or a slow easing of tensions as

Iran begins to mend ties with the neighbours that are willing to engage it? These questions will form the basis of further research on this topic. What is certain, however, is that the new trend of assertiveness that has been evidenced and explained in this dissertation has important implications for security relations in the region.

297

Bibliography

Interviews (chronological order)

1. Saud Al Tamamy, Professor, King Saud University, Manama (8 December 2012) 2. Hassan al Hassan, former analyst, Crown Prince’s court, Manama (8 December 2012) 3. Official from a regional Central Bank, Manama (9 December 2012) 4. Senior official, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vienna (19 November 2014) 5. Senior official, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lausanne (18 March 2015) 6. Former Iranian JCPOA negotiator, Lausanne (18 March 2015) 7. US official, Vienna (13 May 2015) 8. Senior official, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, London (5 February 2016) 9. Ellen Laipson, Former Director of the Stimson Center, Washington DC (2 March 2016) 10. Youssef Al Otaiba, UAE ambassador to the USA, Washington DC (2 March 2016) 11. Turki al Faisal al Saud, Former head of Saudi Intelligence and chairman of King Faisal Foundation's Center for Research and Islamic Studies, Washington DC (3 March 2016) 12. Karen Elliot House, Chairman of the board, RAND, and advisor to the Saudi embassy in Washington DC, Washington DC (3 March 2016) 13. Kristin Smith Diwan, Senior Resident Scholar, Arab Gulf States Institute Washington DC (3 March 2016) 14. Jon Alterman, senior vice president, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington DC (4 March 2016) 15. Richard Nephew, former State Department official, Senior Research Scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University (8 March 2016) 16. Gary Sick, senior research scholar, Middle East Institute, and adjunct professor, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, New York City (10 March 2016) 17. Lana Nusseibeh, UAE ambassador to the UN, New York (11 March 2016) 18. Former Emirati military intelligence official, Dubai (10 April 2016) 19. David Haboubi, Head, Nuclear, Energy Team, Atkins, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016)

298

20. Hamad Al Kaabi, UAE Ambassador to the IAEA, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016) 21. Senior official, Policy Planning Unit, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016) 22. Mahjoob Zweiri, Professor, Qatar University, Dubai (19 April 2016) 23. Abdullah Baabood, former Professor, Qatar University, Doha (15 May 2016) 24. Hassan Saleh Al-Nesf, Brigadier General, Qatar National Committee for the Prohibition of Weapons (NCPW), Doha (15 May 2016) 25. Gerd Nonneman, Professor, Georgetown University Qatar, Doha (17 May 2016) 26. Mehran Kamrava, Professor, Georgetown University Qatar, Doha (17 May 2016) 27. Official, Saudi embassy in Qatar, Doha (18 May 2016) 28. Saeed Khatibzadeh, Spokesperson, Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Phone (19 May 2016) 29. Former Omani ambassador to Vienna, Muscat (19 May 2016) 30. Mr Al Mutaisim, Editor, Al Faq, Muscat (19 May 2016) 31. Former Omani official, Muscat (21 May 2016) 32. Omani official, Muscat (21 May 2016) 33. Saif Bin Hashil Al Maskery, former Assistant Secretary of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), former ambassador to Switzerland and former member of the Majles Ashura, Muscat (21 May 2016) 34. Mubarak Ali AlSabah, Flotilla Commander, Kuwait Coast Guard, Kuwait City (24 May 2016) 35. Sami Al-Faraj, President, Kuwait Centre for Strategic Studies, Kuwait City (24 May 2016) 36. Majdi Al-Dhafiri, Kuwaiti Ambassador to Iran, Kuwait City (24 May 2016) 37. Fahad al-Shelaimi, President, Gulf Security and Peace Forum, Kuwait City (24 May 2016) 38. Abdullah Al-Shayji, Chairman, Department of Political Science, Kuwait University, Kuwait City (24 May 2016) 39. Abdul-Aziz Al-Sharekh, Director-General, Kuwait Diplomatic Institute, Kuwait University, Kuwait City (24 May 2016) 40. Mansour al-Nogaidan, Director, Al Mesbar, Dubai (10 November 2016) 41. Riad Kahwaji, CEO, INEGMA, Dubai (13 November 2016)

299

42. Senior executive, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi (21 November 2016) 43. David Haboubi, Head, Nuclear, Energy Team, Atkins, Abu Dhabi (21 November 2016) 44. AlBadr Al Shateri, Professor, UAE National Defense College, Abu Dhabi (28 February 2017) 45. Mansour Al Nogaidan, Director, Al Mesbar, Dubai (1 March 2017) 46. Board member, Oman Central Bank, and Professor, Sultan Qaboos University, Muscat (5 March 2017) 47. Senior official, Omani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Muscat (5 March 2017) 48. Hassan al-Busaidi, former official, Muscat (5 March 2017) 49. Former Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) official and former member of the Omani Majles Ashura, Muscat (5 March 2017) 50. Senior official, Iranian Foreign Minister, Berlin (26 June 2017) 51. Saeed Khatibzadeh, Spokesperson, Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin (26 June 2017) 52. Two officials from the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), Abu Dhabi (November 2017) 53. Alireza Miryousefi, Spokesperson, Iranian Mission to the United Nations, New York (15 August 2018) 54. Richard Nephew, former State Department official, Senior Research Scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University, New York (19 September 2018) 55. Senior official, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, New York (22 September 2018) 56. Former Head of Policy Planning, Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo (8 March 2019) 57. Former Iranian ambassador to the UN, Oslo (8 March 2019) 58. Saeed Khatibzadeh, Spokesperson, Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo (8 March 2019) 59. UK Foreign and Commonwealth official, London (13 March 2019) 60. Official, National Intelligence Council, Washington DC (30 April 2019) 61. UK Foreign and Commonwealth official, London (25 June 2019) 62. Elizabeth Dickinson, Senior Analyst, Arabian Peninsula, International Crisis Group, Phone (28 August 2019)

300

63. Senior official, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, New York (25 September 2019) 64. Former Iranian JCPOA negotiator, New York (25 September 2019) 65. Joost Hiltermann, Director, Middle East Program, International Crisis Group, New York (25 September 2019) 66. Andreas Krieg, Lecturer, School of Security Studies, King’s College London, London (8 October 2019) 67. Official, Omani embassy to the US, Washington DC (18 October 2019) 68. Ibrahim Alriyami, Minister Counselor, Political Affairs, Omani Embassy to the US, Washington DC (18 October 2019) 69. Michael Hanna, Senior Fellow, The Century Foundation, New York (30 October 2019) 70. Former Emirati national security advisor, New York (31 October 2019) 71. Abdullah Baabood, former Professor, Qatar University, Doha (14 December 2019) 72. Dania Al Thafer, Director, Gulf International Forum, Doha (14 December 2019) 73. Senior official, Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Doha (15 December 2019) 74. Andreas Krieg, Lecturer, School of Security Studies, King’s College London, London (28 January 2020) 75. Riad Kahwaji, CEO, INEGMA, London (29 January 2020) 76. Senior official, Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, London (20 February 2020) 77. Abdullah Baabood, former Professor, Qatar University, London (28 February 2020) 78. Joseph Bahout, Director at Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, Associate Professor of Practice, American University of Beirut, Phone (13 May 2020) 79. Cinzia Bianco, Fellow, ECFR, Phone (22 May 2020) 80. Elizabeth Dickinson, Senior Analyst, Arabian Peninsula, International Crisis Group (27 August 2019) 81. Senior official, Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, London (17 September 2020) 82. Ibrahim Al Saadi, Minister Plenipotentiary, Omani Embassy to the UK, London (9 November 2020)

301

Roundtables

1. Roundtable with the Policy Planning Unit, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abu Dhabi (14 April 2016) 2. Roundtable with regional experts, officials and academics, Dubai (19 April 2016) 3. Roundtable with experts and analysts, Al Jazeera Research Center (16 May 2016) 4. Roundtable with former officials and academics, Qatar University (14 May 2016) 5. Roundtable with the Policy Planning Unit, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abu Dhabi (28 February 2017) 6. Roundtable with experts and analysts, B’huth, Dubai (29 February 2017) 7. Roundtable with experts and analysts, Delma Institute, Abu Dhabi (2 March 2017) 8. Roundtable with former officials, experts and analysts, Switzerland (12 December 2017) 9. Roundtable with intelligence officials, Washington DC (30 April 2019) 10. Roundtable with officials in Europe’s External Action Service, Brussels (24 June 2019) 11. Roundtable with Iranian officials, Doha (15 December 2019) 12. Roundtable with intelligence officials, Washington DC (12 February 2020) 13. Roundtable with the Middle East team, Political Office, United Nations, New York (13 February 2020)

Books Aarts, Paul and Roelants, Carolien. Saudi Arabia – A Kingdom in Peril. London: Hurst&Company, 2015. Abdullah, Adel Ali. The Drivers of Iranian Policy in the Arabian Gulf (in Arabic). Al Tanweer centre for the studies of humanities: 2008. Alvandi, Roham. Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Abrahamian, Ervand. Iran between Two Revolutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.

Abrahamian, Ervand. Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1993.

302

Akbarzadeh, Shahram. America’s Challenges in the Greater Middle East – the Obama Administration’s Policies. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011. Alexander, Christopher. Tunisia: From Stability to Revolution in the Maghreb. New York: Routledge, 2016.

Allison, Graham. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971. Almezaini, Khalid S. and Jean-Marc Rickli Ed. The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring. London and New York: Routledge, 2017. Alsultan, Fahad M. and Pedram Saeid. The Development of Saudi-Iranian Relations since the 1990s: Between conflict and accommodation. London and New York: Routledge, 2017. Allen, Calvin H., W. Lynn Rigsbee II, Oman Under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution, 1970- 1996. London and New York: Routledge, 2013. Ansari, Ali. Modern Iran: Reform and Revolution. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2003. Ansari, Ali. The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Arjomand, Said Amir. The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Askari, Hossein. Collaborative Colonialism: The Political Economy of Oil in the Persian Gulf. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Azimi, Fakhreddin. The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A Cenutry of Struggle against Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2008. Barzegar, Kayhan. ‘Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf: An Iranian View’, Middle East Policy (Vol. XVII, No. 3, Fall 2010): 74-87. Bassiouni, M. Cherif. Chronicles of the Egyptian Revolution and its Aftermath: 2012-2016. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Benson, Brett V. Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Bernstein, Jeremy. Nuclear Iran. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2014. Bowden, Mark. Guests of the Ayatollah: The Iran Hostage Crisis – The First Battle in America’s War with Militant Islam. New York: Grove Press, 2006. Bowen, Wyn, Matthew Moran, Dina Esfandiary. Living on the Edge: Iran and the Practice of Nuclear Hedging. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016. Bradley, John R. Saudi Arabia Exposed – Inside a Kingdom in Crisis. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005

303

Brumberg, Daniel and Farideh Farhi Eds. Change in Iran: Politics of Contention and Conciliation. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2016. Burns, William J. The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for its Renewal. New York: Random House, 2019. Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Cambanis, Thanassis. Once Upon a Revolution: an Egyptian Story. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015. Campbell, David. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Identity, 2nd ed. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998. Chubin, Shahram, and Charles Tripp. Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order. London: IISS Adelphi Paper 304, 1996. Commins, David. The Gulf States: A Modern History. London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 2012. Cooper, Andrew Scott. The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011. Cook, Steven A. The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Cook, Steven A. False Dawn: Protest, Democracy and Violence in the New Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Cordesman, Anthony H., Khalid R. Al Rodhan. Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007. Danahar, Paul. The New Middle East: The World After the Arab Spring. London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2013. Davidson, Christopher M. Ed., Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf Monarchies. London: Hurst & Company, 2011. Davidson, Christopher M. After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies. Hurst & Company: London, 2012. Dawisha, Adeed. Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century – From Triumph to Despair. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003. Dockrill, Michael. British Defence since 1945. London: John Wiley and Sons, 1989. Edington L. Benjamin, and Michael J. Mazarr Eds. Turning Point: The Gulf War and US Military Strategy. Boulder: Westview, 1994. Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research Ed. International Interests in the Gulf Region. London: I.B. Taurus, 2005.

304

Esfandiary, Dina, and Ariane Tabatabai. Triple Axis: Iran’s Relations with Russia and China. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018. Farber, David. Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s First Encounter with Radical Islam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. Fraihat, Ibrahim. Unfinished Revolutions: Yemen, Libya and Tunisia after the Arab Spring. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2016.

Gause III, F. Gregory. The International Relations of the Persian Gulf. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. George, Alexander L., and Juliette L. George. Presidential Personality and Performance. London: Routledge, 1998. Gerges, Fawaz A. Obama and the Middle East: The End of America’s Moment? New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012.

Gerges, Fawaz A. Making the Arab World: Nasser, Qutb, and the Clash that Shaped the Middle East. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018

Ghonim, Wael. Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People is Greater than the People in Power – A Memoir. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcour, 2012. Gibson, Bryan R. Sold out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds and the Cold War. New York: Palgrave MacMillan US, 2015. Glaser Charles L., and Rosemary A. Kelanic Eds. Crude Strategy: Rethinking the US Military Commitment to Defend Persian Gulf Oil. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016. Goldsmith, Leon T. Cycle of Fear: Syria’s Alawites in War and Peace. London: Hurst & Company, 2015.

Goodarzi, Jubin. Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East. London: I.B. Taurus, 2009.

Groom, A.J.R., and Margot Light Eds. Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory. London: Pinter Publishers, 1994.

Halperin, Morton H., Priscilla Clapp and Arnold Kanter. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006. Hamid, Shadi, and William McCants Eds. Rethinking Political Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Hanna, Michael Wahid, and Thanassis Cambinis Eds. Order from Ashes: New Foundations for Security in the Middle East. New York: The Century Foundation, 2018.

305

Hashemi, Nader, and Danny Poste Eds. Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Henriksen, Dag, and Ann Karin Larssen Eds. Political Rational and International Consequences of the War in Libya. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Hertog, Steffan. Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia. Ithica and London: Cornell University Press, 2010. Hill, Christopher. The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003. Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. Hook, Steven W., and Tim Niblock Eds. The United States and the Gulf: Shifting Pressures, Strategies and Alignments. Berlin and London: Gerlach Press, 2015. Howard, Philip N., and Muzammil M. Hussain. Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Digital Media and the Arab Spring. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Howard, Philip N. The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy- Information, Technology and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Hunter, Shireen T. Iran after Khomeini. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 1992. Hurst, Steven. The United States and the Iranian Nuclear Programme: A Critical History. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018. Ikenberry, G John, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth Eds. International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Jaber, Khalid Al, Sigurd Neubauer. The Gulf Crisis: Reshaping Alliances in the Middle East. Washington DC: Gulf International Forum, 2018. January, Brendan. The Iranian Revolution. Minneapolis: Twenty-First Century Books, 2008. Jervis, Robert. The Logic of Images in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Jones, Toby Craig. Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2010. Jones, Jeremy, and Nicholas Ridout. A History of Modern Oman. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Lacey, Robert. Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. London: Penguin, 2009.

306

Kadhim, Abbas. Governance in the Middle East: A Handbook. London/New York: Routledge, 2013. Kaim, Markus. Great Powers and Regional Orders. Aldershot: Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2008. Kamrava, Mehran. Qatar – Small State, Big Politics. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013. Kamrava, Mehran Ed. Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Kaynoush, Banafsheh. Saudi Arabia and Iran: Friends or Foes? London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Keaney, Thomas, and Barry Rubin Eds. Armed Forces in the Middle East: Politics and Strategy. London and New York: Frank Cass, 2002. Keddie, Nikki R. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. Yale: Yale University Press, 2006. Khalidi, Rashid, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon Eds. The Origins of Arab Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991. Khalidi, Rashid. Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East. Boston; Beacon Press, 2009. Khalil, Ashraf. Liberation Square: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation. New York: St Martin’s Press, 2011. Khatib, Lina, and Ellen Lust Eds. Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2014. Khomeini, Ruhollah. Governance of the Jurist: Islamic Government. Tehran: The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works – International Affairs Department, 1970. Kirkpatrick, David D. Into the Hands of the Soldiers. London: Bloomsbury, 2018. Krane, Jim. Energy Kingdoms: Oil and Political Survival in the Persian Gulf. New York: Columbia University Press, 2019. Krieg, Andreas Ed. Divided Gulf: The Anatomy of a Crisis. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019. Krieg, Andreas, and Jean-Marc Rickli. Surrogate Warfare: The Transformation of War in the Twenty-First Century. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019. Kurzman, Charles. The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2005. Legrenzi, Matteo. The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf – Diplomacy, Security, and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East. London, New York: I.B Taurus, 2015.

307

Little, Douglas. American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945. London: I.B. Taurus, 2003. Lynch, Marc. The Arab Uprising – The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East. New York: Public Affairs, 2012. Lynch, Marc Ed. The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East. New York: Columbia Studies in Middle East Politics, 2014. Lynch, Marc. The New Arab Wars – Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East. New York: PublicAffairs, 2016. Mabon, Simon. Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East. London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 2013. Mafinezam, Alidad, and Aria Mehrabi. Iran and its Place among Nations. Greenwood: Praeger, 2008. Masri, Safwan M. Tunisia: An Arab Anomaly. New York: Columbia University Press, 2017.

Matthiesen, Toby. Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring that Wasn’t. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013. Matthiesen, Toby. The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

McNaugher, Thomas L. Arms and Oil: US Military Strategy and the Persian Gulf. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985. Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton Paperback, 2003. Menashiri, David. Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society and Power. London and New York: Routledge, 2001. Milani, Abbas. The Shah. New York: St Martin’s Press, 2012. Moghaddam, Arshin Adib Ed. A Critical Introduction to Khomeini. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Monshipouri, Mahmood. Democratic Uprisings in the New Middle East: Youth, Technology, Human Rights and US Foreign Policy. London and New York: Routledge, 2014. Morgenthau, Hans J., and Kenneth W. Thompson Eds. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Random House, 1959. Mousavian, Seyed Hossein. The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012.

Narizny, Kevin. The Political Economy of Grand Strategy. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2007.

308

Nasr, Vali. The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006. Nonneman, Gerd Ed. Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe. London and New York: Routledge: 2005. Nye, Joseph S. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: PublicAffairs, 2004. Odysseous, Louiza. The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations. Minnesota, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2007. Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza. Answer to History. New York; Stein & Day Publishing, 1980. Palmer, Michael A. Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding role in the Persian Gulf 1833 – 1922. New York: Macmillan Inc, 1999.

Pargeter, Allison. Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012.

Patrikarakos, David. Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State. London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 2012.

Paul, T.V., James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann. Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004.

Peden, G.C. Arms, Economics and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pollack, Kenneth M. The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011. Post, Jerrold M. The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton. Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 2005. Renson, Stanley A., and Peter Suedfeld Eds. Understanding the Bush Doctrine: Psychology and Strategy in an Age of Terrorism. New York and London: Routledge, 2007. Rogan, Eugene. The Arabs – A History. New York, Basic Books, 2009. Rosenau, James N. Ed. Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy. New York: Free Press, 1967. Sadiki, Larbi Ed. Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization. London and New York: Routledge, 2015. Sayle, Timothy Andres, Jeffrey A. Engel, Hal Brands, William Inboden Eds. The Last Card: Inside George W. Bush’s Decision to Surge in Iraq. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2019. Scheller, Bente. The Wisdom of Syria’s Waiting Game. London: Hurst & Company, 2013. Schelling, Thomas. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.

309

Schelling, Thomas. Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2007. Seikaly, May, and Khawla Mattar Eds. The Silent Revolution: The Arab Spring and the Gulf Arab States. Berlin and London: Gerlach Press, 2014. Sick, Gary. All Fall Down: America’s Fateful Encounter with Iran. London: I.B. Taurus, 1985.

Snyder, Richard C., H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin. Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University, 1954.

Suwaidi, Jamal S. Al. Iran and the Gulf: A Search for Stability. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996. Takeyh, Ray and Steven Simon, The Pragmatic Superpower: Winning the Cold War in the Middle East. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2016. Tamadonfar, Mehran. Islamic Law and Governance in Contemporary Iran: Transcending Islam for Social, Economic and Political Order. London: Lexington Books, 2015. Tilly, Charles. Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Tufekci, Zeynep. Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2017. Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates Ed. The Changing Security Dynamics of the Persian Gulf. London: Hurst & Company, 2017. Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. The United Arab Emirates – Power, Politics, and Policymaking. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017. Unger, Craig. House of Bush, House of Saud: The Secret Relationship Between the World’s Two Most Powerful Dynasties. New York: Scribner, 2004. Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Cornell, Cornell University Press, 1987. Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics. Reading: Addison Wesley, 1979. Wang, Chi. Obama’s Challenge to China: The Pivot to Asia. Abingdon: Routledge, 2017. Warnaar, Maiike, Luciano Zaccara and Paul Aarts. Iran’s Relations with the Arab States of the Gulf. London and Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2016. Wawro, Geoffrey. Quicksand: America’s Pursuit of Power in the Middle East. New York: The Penguin Press, 2010. Wehrey, Frederic M. Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014. Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

310

Winfield, Richard Dien. Freedom and Modernity. New York: State University of New York Press, 1991. Wolf, Anne. Political Islam in Tunisia: The Story of Ennahda. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Wolfe, Alan. Does American Democracy Still Work? Yale: Yale University Press, 2006. Woodward, Bob. State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006. Wright, Quincy. A Study of War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965. Wright, Robin. Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion Across the Islamic World. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012. Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power. New York: Free Press, 1991. Yetiv, Steve A. America and the Persian Gulf: The Third-Party Dimension in World Politics. Westport: Praeger, 1995. Young, Karen. The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates. London: Palgrave, 2014. Zahlan, Rosemarie Said. The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. London and New York: Routledge, 2016.

E-books Azzam, Zeina and Imad K. Harb Eds., The GCC Crisis at One Year: Stalemate Becomes New Reality. Washington DC: Arab Center Washington DC, 2018. http://arabcenterdc.org/wp- content/uploads/2018/07/Stalemate-becomes-reality.pdf Byman, Daniel, Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Jerrold D. Green. Iran’s Security Policy in a Post-Revolutionary Era. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1320.html Mueller, Karl P. Ed. Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR676.html Schahgaldian, Nikola B., Gina Barkhordarian. The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic. Santa Monica: RAND, March 1987. https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3473.html Tellis, Ashley J., Janice Bially, Christopher Layne and Melissa McPherson, Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2000. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1110.html Wehrey, Frederic M., Jerrold D. Green, Brian Nichiporuk, Alireza Nader, Lydia Hansell, Rasool Nafisi, S. R. Bohandy. The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s

311

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG821.html Wehrey, Frederic M., Theodore W. Karasik, Alireza Nader, Jeremy Ghez, Lydia Hansell, Robert A. Guffey. Saudi-Iranian Relations since the fall of Saddam. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG840.html Wehrey, Frederic M., David E. Thaler, Nora Bensahel, Kim Cragin, Jerrold D. Green, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Nadia Oweidat, Jennifer Li. Dangerous but not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG781.html Wehrey, Frederic M., Dalia Dassa Kaye, Jessica Watkins, Jeffrey Martini, Robert A Guffey. The Iraq Effect: The Middle East after the Iraq War. Washington DC: RAND Corporation, 2010. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG892.html

Journal Articles Ajzen, Icek. ‘The Theory of Planned Behaviour’, Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 50 (1991): 179-211. Anderson, Nicholas D. and Victor D. Cha. ‘The Case of the ‘Pivot to Asia’: System Effects and the Origins of Strategy’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 132, Issue 4 (2017): 595-617. Ang, Ien, Yudhishthir Raj Isar and Phillip Mar. ‘Cultural diplomacy: beyond the national interest?’, International Journal of Cultural Policy, Vol. 21, Issue 4, (2015): 365-381. Art, Robert J. ‘American foreign policy and the fungibility of force’, Security Studies, Vol. 5, Issue 4 (1996): 7-42. Baker, Stephanie Alice. ‘The Mediated Crown: New Social Media and New Forms of Rioting’, Sociological Research Online, Vol. 16, No. 4 (30 November 2011): 195-204. Baldwin, David A. ‘Success and Failure in Foreign Policy’, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 3 (June 2000): 167-182. Bandura, Albert. ‘Self-Efficacy Mechanism in Human Agency’, American Psychologist, Vol. 37, No.2 (February 1982): 122-147. Barno, David W., Nora Bensahel and Travis Sharp, ‘Pivot but Hedge: A strategy for Pivoting to Asia While Hedging in the Middle East’, Orbis, Issue 56, No. 2 (December 2012): 158-176. Bartlet, Will, James Ker-Lindsey, Kristian Alexander and Tena Prelec. ‘The UAE as an Emerging Actor in the Western Balkans: The Case of Strategic Investment in Serbia’, Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea, Vol 7, Issue 1: Special Section: New Perspectives on UAE Foreign Policy (2017): 94-112. Boyne, George A. ‘What is Public Service Improvement?’, Public Administration, Vol. 81, No. 2 (2003): 211-227.

312

Brynielsson, Joel, Andreas Horndahl, Fredrik Johansson, Lisa Kaati, Christian Mårtenson and Pontus Svenson, ‘Harvesting and analysis of weak signals for detecting lone wolf terrorists’, Security Informatics, Vol. 2, Issue 11 (2013): 1-15.

Carty, Victoria. ‘Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt: The Impact of New Media on Contemporary Social Movements and Challenges for Social Movement Theory’, International Journal of Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 51, Issue 1 (2014): 51-80.

Chen, Dinding and Xiaoyu Pu. ‘Correspondence: Debating China’s Assertiveness’, International Security, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Winter 2013/14): 176-183. Cohen, Katie, Fredrik Johansson, Lisa Kaati and Jonas Clausen Mork. ‘Detecting Linguistic Markers for Radical Violence in Social Media’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 26, Issue 1, (2014): 246-256. Cohen, Raymond. ‘Threat Perception in International Crisis’, Political Science Quarterly Vol. 93, No. 1 (Spring 1978): 93-107. Cook, Steven A., Lorenzo Moretti and David Rudin. ‘Corruption and the Arab Spring’, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 2012): 21-28. Darvishi, Farhad and Ameneh Jalilvand. ‘Impacts of US Military Presence in the Arabic Countries in the Persian Gulf’, Geopolitics Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Winter 2010): 167-180. Drollette Jr., Dan. ‘View from the inside: Prince Turki al-Faisal on Saudi Arabia, nuclear energy and weapons, and Middle East politics’, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 72, Issue 1: Nuclear Power in the Middle East (2016): 16-24 Edelstein, David M. ‘Managing uncertainty: Beliefs about intentions and the rise of great powers’, Security Studies, Vol. 12, Issue 1 (2002): 1-40. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Steven Wright. ‘Political Change in the Arab Oil Monarchies: From Liberalization to Enfranchisement’, International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 5 (September 2007): 918-921. Esfandiary, Dina and Ariane Tabatabai. ‘Iran’s ISIS policy’, International Affairs, Vol. 91, Issue 1 (2015): 1-15. Esfandiary, Dina and Ariane Tabatabai. ‘Yemen: An Opportunity for Iran-Saudi Dialogue?’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 39, Issue 2 (2016): 155-174. Etzioni, Amitai. ‘The United States’ Premature Pivot to “Asia”’, Society, Vol. 49, Issue 5 (September 2012): 395–399. Fearon, James D. ‘Signalling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, Issue 1 (1997): 68-90. Forstenlechner, Ingo, Emilie Rutledge and Rashed Salem Alnuaimi. ‘The UAE, the ‘Arab Spring’ and different types of dissent’, Middle East Policy Council, Vol. XIX, No. 4 (Winter 2012): 54-67.

313

Friedberg, Aaron L. ‘The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Explaining Beijing’s Assertiveness’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 37, Issue 4 (2014): 133-150. Gallarotti, Giulio M. ‘Soft Power: What it is, Why it’s Important, and the Conditions for its Effective Use’, Journal of Political Power, Vol. 4, Issue 1 (2011): 25-47. Grause III, Gregory F. ‘Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian Stability’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 4 (July/August 2011): 81-90. Grebler, Leo. ‘Self-Sufficiency and Imperialism’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 198, Present International Tensions (July 1938). Greenwood, David. ‘Constraints and choices in the transformation of Britain’s defence effort since 1945’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (April 1976): 5-26. Harold, Scott W. ‘Is the Pivot Doomed? The Resilience of America’s Strategic ‘Rebalance’’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2015): 85-99. Herrmann, Richard K. and Jonathan W. Keller. ‘Beliefs, Values, and Strategic Choice: U.S. Leaders’ Decisions to Engage, Contain, and Use Force in an Era of Globalization’, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 66, No. 2 (May 2004): 557-580. Hudson, Valerie M. and Christopher S. Vore. ‘Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow’, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 (October 1995): 209-238. Huth, Paul K. ‘Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,’ Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (1999): 25-48. Ikenberry, John. ‘Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order’, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998-1999): 43-78. Jaspal, Rusi. ‘Representing the Arab Spring in the Iranian press: Islamic awakening or foreign-sponsored terror?’ Politics, Groups and Identities, 2:3 (2014): 422-442. Jervis, Robert. ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, World Politics, Vol. 30, No.2 (January 1978): 167-214. Jervis, Robert. ‘Understanding the Bush doctrine’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 118, No. 3 (Fall 2003): 365-390.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. ‘How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?’ International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013): 7-48. Juneau, Thomas. ‘Iran’s Costly Intervention in Syria: a pyrrhic victory’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 25, Issue 1 (2020). Kaye, Dalia Dassa and Frederic M. Wehrey. ‘A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbours’, Survival, Vol. 49, No. 2 (2007): 111-128. Kearn, David W. ‘The hard truths about soft power’, Journal of Political Power, Vol. 4, Issue 1, (2011): 65-85.

314

Khatib, Lina. ‘Syria, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar: the ‘sectarianization’ of the Syrian conflict and undermining of democratization in the region’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 46, Issue 3 (2019): 385-403. Koch, Andrew and Jeanette Wolf. ‘Iran’s Nuclear Procurement Program: How Close to the Bomb?’, The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1997). Kroenig, Matthew, Melissa McAdam and Steven Weber. ‘Taking Soft Power Seriously’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 29, Issue 5 (2010): 412-431. Levy, Jack S. ‘The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace’, The Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1 (June 1998): 139-165. Lewis, Jeffrey and Bruno Tertrais. ‘The Thick Red Line: Implications of the 2013 Chemical- Weapons Crisis for Deterrence and Transatlantic Relations’, Survival, Vol. 59, No. 6 (2017): 77-108. Li, Mingjiang. ‘Reconciling Assertiveness and Cooperation? China’s Changing Approach to the South China Sea Dispute’, Security Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Winter 2010): 49-68. Lofflmann, Georg. ‘The Pivot between Containment, Engagement, and Restraint: President Obama’s Conflicted Grand Strategy in Asia’, Asian Security, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2016): 92-110. Liao, Nien-Chung Chang. ‘The sources of China’s assertiveness: The system, domestic politics or leadership preferences’, International Affairs, Vol. 92, Issue 4 (2016): 817-833. Leenders, Reinoud. ‘Social Movement Theory and the Onset of the Popular Uprising in Syria’, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, Issue 3 (July 2013): 273-289. Lippmann, Walter. ‘Self-Sufficiency’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 2 (January 1934): 207-215. Longinotti, Edward. ‘Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez: From Economic Determinism to Political Choice’, Contemporary British History, Vol. 29, Issue 3 (2015): 318-340.

Lynch, Marc. ‘The New Arab Order: Power and Violence in Today’s middle East’, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2018)

Maleki, Abbas. ‘Decision Making in Iran's Foreign Policy: A Heuristic Approach’, Journal of Social Affairs, Vol. 73 (Spring 2002): 39-53.

Marsh, David and Allan McConnell. ‘Towards a Framework for Establishing Policy Success’, Public Administration, Vol. 88, No. 2 (2010): 564-583.

Mearsheimer, John J. ‘The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, Issue 4 (Winter 2010): 381-396.

Mousavian, Seyed Hossein and Mohammad Mehdi Mousavian. ‘Building on the Iran Nuclear Deal for International Peace and Security’, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2018): 169-192.

315

‘Neo-Piracy in Oman and the Gulf: The Origins of British Imperialism in the Gulf,’ MERIP Reports, no. 36 (1975): 3-27. Noel, Pierre. ‘The Bush Doctrine and Oil Security’, Politique Etrangere, Issue 2 (July 2006): 246-253.

Nye, Joseph S. ‘Power and foreign policy’, Journal of Political Power, Vol. 4, Issue 1 (2011): 9- 24.

Nye, Joseph S. ‘Soft Power’, Foreign Policy, No. 80, Twentieth Anniversary (Autumn 1990): 153-171.

Obama, Barack. ‘Renewing American Leadership’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 4 (July -Aug 2007): 2-16

Oppenheim, Felix E. ‘Democracy – characteristics included and excluded’, The Monist, Vol. 55, Issue 1 (1 January 1971): 29–50.

Paret, Peter. ‘Military Power’, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 53, No. 3 (July 1989): 239- 256.

Putnam, Robert D. ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988): 427-460.

Quandt, William B. ‘The Electoral Cycle and the Conduct of Foreign Policy’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 101, No. 5, Reflections on Providing for "The Common Defense" (1986): 825- 837.

Raine, Sarah. ‘Beijing’s South China Sea Debate’, Survival, Vol. 53, No. 5 (2011): 69-88.

Roberts, David B. ‘Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?’ Middle East Policy Council, Vol. XXI, No. 3 (Fall 2014): 84-94.

Roberts, David B. ‘Qatar and the UAE: Exploring Divergent Responses to the Arab Spring’, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Autumn 2017): 544-562.

Roberts, David B. ‘Bucking the Trend: The UAE and the Development of Military Capabilities in the Arab World’, Security Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2020): 301-334.

Rothman, Steven B. ‘Revising the soft power concept: what are the means and mechanisms of soft power?’, Journal of Political Power, Vol. 4, Issue 1 (2011): 49-64.

Rose, Gregory F. ‘The post-Revolutionary Purge of Iran’s Armed Forces: A Revisionist Assessment’, Iranian Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2/3 (Spring – Summer 1984): 153-194.

316

Rosato, Sebastian. ‘The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers’, International Security, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Winter 2014/15): 48-88.

Ross, Dennis. ‘The Middle East Predicament’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1 (Jan-Feb 2005): 61-74.

Samuels, Richard J. ‘"New Fighting Power!" Japan's Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security’, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/2008): 84-112.

Sato, Shohei. ‘Britain’s Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf 1964-68: A Pattern and a Puzzle’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 37, Issue 1 (2009): 99-117. Schmierer, Richard J. ‘The Sultanate of Oman and the Iran Nuclear Deal’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Winter 2015): 113-120. Schuurman, Bart and Quirine Eijkman. ‘Indicators of terrorist intent and capability: Tools for threat assessment’, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, Vol. 8, Issue 3, (2015): 215-231. Smith, Simon C. ‘Britain's Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf: A Pattern Not a Puzzle’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, No. 44, Vol. 2 (2016): 328-351. Stein, Kenneth. ‘The Bush Doctrine: selective engagement in the Middle East’, Politique Etrangere, Vol 67, No. 1 (January 2002): 149-171. Tabatabai, Ariane and Tracy Samuels. ‘What the Iran-Iraq War Tells Us about the Future of the Iran Nuclear Deal’, International Security, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Summer 2017): 152-185. Thayer, Carlyle A. ‘The United States and Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea’, Security Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Winter 2010): 69-84. Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. ‘Bahrain’s Uprising: Regional Dimensions and International Consequences’, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (May 2013): 1-12. Wastnidge, Edward. ‘Iran and Syria: An Enduring Axis’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Summer 2017): 148-159. Wolfsfeld, Gadi, Elad Segev and Tamir Sheafer. ‘Social Media and the Arab Spring: Politics Comes First’, The International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2013): 115-137.

Yahuda, Michael. ‘China’s New Assertiveness in the South China Sea’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 22, Issue 81 (2013): 446-459.

Yarhi-Milo, Keren. ‘In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries’, International Security, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Summer 2013): 7-51.

Yanarella, Ernest J. ‘Tensions and ambiguities in the decision‐making approach: From Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin to Allison’, International Interactions, Vol. 2, No. 2, (1976): 101- 106.

317

Young, Karen E. ‘A New Politics of GCC Economic Statecraft: The Case of UAE Aid and Financial Intervention in Egypt’, Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf and the Red Sea, Vol. 7, Issue 1: Special Section: New Perspectives on UAE Foreign Policy (2017): 113-136.

Mohammad Javad Zarif, ‘What Iran Really Wants: Iranian Foreign Policy in the Rouhani Era’, Foreign Affairs (May/June 2014): 49-59.

Papers/reports Abdulla, Abdulkhaleq. ‘Repercussions of the Arab Spring on GCC States’, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies Research Paper (May 2012). https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS- PDFDocumentLI.B.rary/Repercussions_of_the_Arab_Spring.pdf. Abdulla, Abdulkhaleq. ‘The UAE drawdown in Yemen is a welcome step, but it needs to be reciprocated’, Middle East Institute (11 July 2019). https://www.mei.edu/publications/uae- drawdown-yemen-welcome-step-it-neEd.-be-reciprocated. Ardemadni, Eleonora. ‘UAE’s Military Priorities in Yemen: Counterterrorism and the South’, ISPI Commentary (28 July 2016). https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/commentary_ardemagni_28_07. 2016.pdf. ‘Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships’, CSIS report (January 2016). https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs- public/legacy_files/files/publication/160119_Green_AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web_0.pdf.

Barnes-Dacey, Julian. ‘France’s deepening relations with the Gulf’, ECFR Commentary (30 June 2015). https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_frances_deepening_relations_with_the_gulf. Baron, Adam. ‘The Marib Paradox: How one province succeeds in the midst of Yemen’s war’, European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief (12 June 2018). https://ecfr.eu/publication/the_marib_paradox_how_one_province_succeeds_in_the_mids t_of_yemens_war/. Bassiri Tabrizi, Aniseh and Justin Bronk. ‘Armed Drones in the Middle East: Proliferation and Norms in the Region’, RUSI Occasional Paper (December 2018). https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/armed-drones-middle-east-proliferation- and-norms-region. Benaim, Daniel, Thanassis Cambinis, Dina Esfandiary, Michael Wahid Hanna, Aron Lund, Dahlia Scheindlin. ‘Roundtable: Middle East Strained by COVID-19, But Not Transformed’, The Century Foundation Report (9 June 2020). https://tcf.org/content/report/roundtable- middle-east-strained-covid-19-not-transformed/.

318

Bruno, Greg. ‘Iran’s Nuclear Program’, Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder (10 March 2010). https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-nuclear-program. Chatzky, Andrew and James McBride. ‘China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative’, Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder (21 February 2019). https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative. Chubin, Shahram. ‘Iran and the Arab Spring: Ascendancy Frustrated’, GRC Gulf Papers (September 2012). https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Iran_and_Arab_Spring_2873.pdf. DeLozier, Elana. ‘UAE Drawdown May Isolate Saudi Arabia in Yemen’, The Washington Institute, Policywatch 3148 (2 July 2019). https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy- analysis/view/uae-drawdown-in-yemen-may-isolate-saudi-arabia Des Roches, D.B. ‘IDEX 2019 Highlights Gulf States’ Move to Develop Domestic Defense Industries’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (11 March 2019). https://agsiw.org/idex-2019-highlights-gulf-states-move-to-develop-domestic-defense- industries/. Edelman, Eric. ‘The Iran Nuclear Deal after One Year: Assessment and Options for the Next President’, Report, JINSA’s Gemunder Center Iran Task Force (July 2016). http://www.jinsa.org/files/The%20Iran%20Nuclear%20Deal%20After%20One%20Year%20- %20Assessment%20and%20Options.pdf.

Esfandiary, Dina and Marc Finaud. ‘The Iran Nuclear Deal: Distrust and Verify’, Geneva Papers, Research Series 18, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (April 2016). https://www.gcsp.ch/News-Knowledge/Publications/The-Iran-Nuclear-Deal-Distrust-and- Verify Ennis, Crystal A. and Raid Z. al-Jamali. ‘Elusive Employment: Development Planning and Labour Market Trends in Oman’, Chatham House Research Paper (September 2014). https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/20140916Elusive EmploymentOmanEnnisJamali.pdf Fulton, Jonathan. ‘China’s Changing Role in the Middle East’, Atlantic Council Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East Report (June 2019). https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Chinas_Changing_Role_in_the_Middl e_East.pdf.

Gaub, Florence and Zoe Stanley-Lockman. ‘Defence industries in Arab states: players and strategies’, European Union Institute for Security Studies Chaillot Paper, No. 141 (March 2017). https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/CP_141_Arab_Defence.pdf. Guzansky, Yoel and Nizan Feldman, ‘Plunging Oil Prices: The Challenge for the Gulf Oil Economies’, INSS Insight, No. 675 (22 March 2015). https://www.inss.org.il/publication/plunging-oil-prices-the-challenge-for-the-gulf-oil- economies/.

319

Fleurant, Aude, Pieter D. Wezeman, Siemon T. Wezeman, Nan Tian, ‘Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2016’, SIPRI Fact Sheet (February 2017). https://www.sipri.org/publications/2017/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-armstransfers-2016. Habibi, Nader. ‘The Impact of Sanctions on Iran-GCC Economic Relations’, Middle East Brief, Crown Center for Middle East Studies Brandeis University, No. 45 (November 2010). https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB45.pdf. Haddad, Fanar. ‘Understanding Iraq’s Hasd al-Sha’bi – State and Power in Post-2014 Iraq’, Report: Arab Politics Beyond the Uprisings, The Century Foundation (5 March 2018). https://tcf.org/content/report/understanding-iraqs-hashd-al-shabi/. Henderson, Simon. ‘Saudi Arabia’s fears for Bahrain’, The Washington Institute, Policy Watch 1759 (17 February 2011). https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy- analysis/view/saudi-arabias-fears-for-bahrain. Hajjar, Sami G. ‘US Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects’, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (March 2002). http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub185.pdf. Hokayem, Emile and Matteo Legrenzi. ‘The Arab Gulf States in the Shadow of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge’, The Stimson Center Working Paper (26 May 2006). Human Rights Watch. ‘World Report 2012: Libya– Events of 2011’, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012/country-chapters/libya.

Human Rights Watch. ‘Iraq: Pro-Government Militias’ Trail of Death’ (31 July 2014). https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/31/iraq-pro-government-militias-trail-death.

Human Rights Watch. ‘Iraq: Possible War Crimes by Shia Militia’ (31 January 2016). https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/31/iraq-possI.B.le-war-crimes-shia-militia.

Human Rights Watch. ‘Yemen: Coalition Airstrikes Deadly for Children’ (12 September 2017). https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/12/yemen-coalition-airstrikes-deadly-children. Ianchovichina, Elena, Lili Mottaghi, Shantayanan Devarajan, ‘Inequality, uprisings, and conflict in the Arab World’, The World Bank (21 October 2015). http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/303441467992017147/Inequality-uprisings- and-conflict-in-the-Arab-World. ‘In Gulf Press, Fear and Criticism of Iran Nuclear Agreement: Obama is Leaving the Middle East a Legacy of Disaster’, The Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch No. 6107 (15 July 2015). https://www.memri.org/reports/gulf-press-fear-and-criticism-iran- nuclear-agreement-obama-leaving-middle-east-legacy. International Monetary Fund. ‘Libya: 2013 Article IV Consultation’, IMF Country Report No. 12/150 (May 2013): https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13150.pdf.

320

Karasik, Theodore. ‘The GCC’s New Affair with China’, Middle East Institute (24 February 2016). https://www.mei.edu/publications/gccs-new-affair-china. Karasik, Theodore and Giorgio Cafiero. ‘Geopolitics Drive Russia and the UAE closer’, Middle East Institute (4 April 2017). https://www.mei.edu/publications/geopolitics-drive-russia- and-uae-closer. Kennedy, Scott. ‘Building China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’’, CSIS (3 April 2015). https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-china%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cone-belt-one- road%E2%80%9D. Khaitous, Tariq. ‘Arab Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Iran’, Policy Focus #94, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (June 2009). https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus94.pdf. Khan, Mohsin and Karim Mezran. ‘The Libyan Economy after the Revolution: Still no Clear Vision’, The Atlantic Council, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East - Issue Brief (2013). https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/169054/lI.B.yan_economy_after_revolution_no_clear_vision. pdf. Khatteeb, Luay Al. ‘Gulf oil economies must wake up or face decades of decline’, Middle East Economic Survey (14 August 2015). Khlebnikov, Alexey. ‘The New Ideological threat to the GCC: Implications for the Qatari- Saudi Rivalry’, INSS Strategic Assessment, Vol. 17, No. 4 (January 2015). https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-new-ideological-threat-to-the-gcc-implications-for- the-qatari-saudi-rivalry/. Kinninmont, Jane. ‘The Gulf Divided: The Impact of the Qatar Crisis’, Chatham House Reports (May 2019). https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/05/gulf-divided-impact-qatar- crisis-0. Knights, Michael and Alexandre Mello. ‘The Saudi-UAE War Efforts in Yemen (Part 1): Operation Golden Arrow in Aden’, The Washington Institute, PolicyWatch 2462 (10 August 2015). https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-saudi-uae-war-effort- in-yemen-part-1-operation-golden-arrow-in-aden.

Lbish, Hussein. ‘For Gulf Countries, Iran’s Regional Behavior Overshadows Nuclear Deal’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (17 July 2015). https://agsiw.org/for-gulf-countries- irans-regional-behavior-overshadows-nuclear-deal/. Lbish, Hussein. ‘What’s at stake for the Gulf Arabs in Syria?’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington Report (30 June 2016). https://agsiw.org/wp- content/uploads/2016/06/Ibish_GCCSyria_Web.pdf. Lbish, Hussein. ‘The UAE’s Evolving National Security Strategy’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington Report (6 April 2017). https://agsiw.org/wp- content/uploads/2017/04/UAE-Security_ONLINE.pdf.

321

Lons, Camille, Jonathan Fulton, Degang Sun, Naser Al-Tamimi. ‘China’s Great Game in the Middle East’, ECFR Policy Brief (October 2019). https://www.ecfr.eu/page/- /china_great_game_middle_east.pdf. Medecins sans Frontieres. ‘Indiscriminate bombings and unreliable reassurances from Saudi-led coalition force MSF to evacuate staff from six hospitals in the north’ (16 August 2016): https://www.msf.org/yemen-indiscriminate-bombings-and-unreliable-reassurances- saudi-led-coalition-force-msf-evacuate. Miller, Aaron David. ‘For America, An Arab Winter’, Wilson Quarterly (Summer 2011). https://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/summer-2011-a-changing-middle-east/for-america- an-arab-winter/. Mohseni, Payam. ‘The Islamic Awakening: Iran’s Grand Narrative of the Arab Uprisings’, Middle East Brief, Crown Center for Middle East Studies Brandeis University, No. 71 (April 2013). https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB71.pdf.

Mohseni, Payam Ed. ‘Iran and the Arab World after the Nuclear Deal: Rivalry and Engagement in a New Era’, The Iran Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University (August 2015). https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Impact%20on%20Arab%20Wo rld%20-%20Web.pdf.

Mueller, Karl P., Becca Wasser, Jeffrey Martini, Stephen Watts. ‘U.S Strategic Interests in the Middle East and the Implications for the Army’, RAND Corporation – Perspective (2017). https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE265/RAND_PE265.p df. Muslimi, Farea Al. ‘Iran’s Role in Yemen Exaggerated, but Destructive’, The Century Foundation Report (19 May 2017). https://tcf.org/content/report/irans-role-yemen- exaggerated-destructive/. Nada, Garrett. ‘Part 1: Iran’s Role in Iraq’, The Wilson Center (26 April 2018). https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/part-1-irans-role-iraq. Nadimi, Farzin, Michael Knights. ‘Iran’s Support to Houthi Air Defenses in Yemen’, The Washington Institute, Policy Watch 2953 (4 April 2018). https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-support-to-houthi-air- defenses-in-yemen. Parsi, Rouzbeh Ed, ‘Iran: A Revolutionary Republic in Transition’, European Union Institute for Security Studies Chaillot Paper, No. 128 (February 2012). https://www.issueeuropa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/cp128- Iran_A_revolutionary_republic_in_transition_0.pdf. Phillips, James. ‘The Most Glaring Flaws in Obama’s Iran Deal’, The Heritage Foundation (14 July 2015). https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/the-most-glaring-flaws- obamas-iran-deal.

322

Pollock, David, Michelle Dunne and Ali Shihabi. ‘The Scoop on the Arab Street: New Polls, Taboo Topics’, The Washington Institute, Policy Watch 2883 (1 November 2017). https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-scoop-on-the-arab-street- new-polls-taboo-topics. Al-Qassab, Abdulwahab. ‘Strategic Considerations of the UAE’s Role in Yemen’, Arab Center Washington DC Policy Analysis (9 March 2018) http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/strategic-considerations-of-the-uaes-role-in- yemen/ ‘Qatar and its neighbours’, IISS Strategic Comment, Vol. 25, No. 7 (March 2019). Roberts, David B. ‘Qatar’s domestic stability and the Gulf crisis’, The Washington Institute Policy Watch 2847 (18 August 2017). https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy- analysis/view/qatars-domestic-stability-and-the-gulf-crisis. Roberts, David B. ‘Reflecting on Qatar’s ‘Islamist’ Soft Power’, Brookings Policy Brief (April 2019). https://www.brookings.edu/wp- content/uploads/2019/04/FP_20190408_qatar_roberts.pdf. Saab, Bilal. ‘The Gulf Rising: Defense Industrialization in Saudi Arabia and the UAE’, The Atlantic Council – Brent Snowcroft Center on International Security Report (May 2014). https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-gulf-rising-defense- industrialization-in-saudi-arabia-and-the-uae/. Sadjadpour, Karim. ‘The Battle of Dubai: The United Arab Emirates and the U.S.-Iran Cold War’, The Carnegie Papers (2011). https://carnegieendowment.org/files/dubai_iran.pdf. Salama, Sammy and Heidi Weber. ‘The Emerging Arab Response to Iran’s Unabated Nuclear Program’, NTI report (22 December 2006). https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/arab- response-irans-nuclear-program/. Salisbury, Peter. ‘Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy’, Chatham House Research Paper (July 2020). https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-07-01-risk-in-uae-salisbury.pdf. ‘Socio-Economic Context and Impact of the 2011 Events in the Middle East and North Africa Region’, MENA-OECD Investment Programme Reports (December 2011): http://www.oecd.org/mena/competitiveness/49171115.pdf Solmirano, Carina and Pieter D. Wezeman. ‘Military Spending and Arms Procurement in the Gulf States’, SIPRI Fact Sheet (October 2010). https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/FS/SIPRIFS1010.pdf.

Sons, Sebastian and Inken Wiese. ‘The Engagement of Arab Gulf States in Egypt and Tunisia since 2011 – Rationale and Impact’, DGAP Analysis, Vol. 9 (October 2015): 31-38. https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/engagement-arab-gulf-states-egypt-and-tunisia- 2011

323

Thafer, Dania. ‘After the Financial Crisis: Dubai-China Economic Relations’, Middle East Institute (15 September 2013). https://www.mei.edu/publications/after-financial-crisis- dubai-china-economic-relations. ‘The Iraq War – timeline’, The Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war ‘The United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa’, International Crisis Group Middle East Briefing, No 65 (6 November 2018). https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north- africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/united-arab-emirates/b65-united-arab-emirates-horn- africa. ‘The U.S. War in Afghanistan - timeline’, The Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan. ‘UAE offers ground troops in fight against Islamic State’, Economist Intelligence Unit country report update (9 February 2016). http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=83927592&Country=United%20Arab%20Emir ates&topic=Pol_4. Vaez, Ali. ‘Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions’, International Crisis Group Report, No. 138 (25 February 2013). https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north- africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/138-spider-web-making-and-unmaking-iran- sanctions. Wehrey, Frederic. ‘Ending Libya’s Civil War: Reconciling Politics, Rebuilding Security’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Report (September 2014). http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ending_lI.B.ya_civ_war.pdf. Westphal, Kirsten, Marco Oberhaus, Guido Steinberg. “The US Shale Revolution and the Arab Gulf States: The Economic and Political Impact of Changing Energy Markets”, SWP Research Paper (November 2014).

Wezeman, Peter D., Aude Fleurant, Alexndra Kuimova, Nan Tian and Siemon T Wezeman, ‘Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2017’, SIPRI Fact Sheet (March 2018). https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/fssipri_at2017_0.pdf.

Wilder, Dennis. ‘The US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue: Continuity and Change in Obama’s China Policy’, The Brooking Institution, May 15, 2009. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-u-s-china-strategic-and-economic-dialogue- continuity-and-change-in-obamas-china-policy/ Yemen’s Al Qaeda: Expanding the Base’, International Crisis Group Report, No. 174 (2 February 2017). https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian- peninsula/yemen/174-yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base.

324

Online magazines Ahmad, Ali, Frank von Hippel, Alexander Glaser and Zia Mian. ‘A Win-win Solution for Iran’s Arak Reactor’, Arms Control Today, April 1, 2014. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_04/A-Win-Win-Solution-for-Irans-Arak-Reactor. Argemagni, Eleonora. ‘The Gulf monarchies’ complex fight against Daesh’, NATO Review Magazine, 2016. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/also-in-2016/geopolitics-gulf- monarchies-fight-against-daesh/en/index.htm. Davenport, Kelsey and Daryl Kimball. ‘Iran’s Ballistic Missile Test: Troubling but not Cause for Provoking Confrontation’, Arms Control Association, 1 February 1, 2017. https://www.armscontrol.org/print/8402 Esfandiary, Dina, Elham Fakhro and Becca Wasser. ‘Obstacles for the Gulf States’, Arms Control Association, September 16, 2011). http://www.armscontrol.org/print/5014. Esfandiary, Dina, and Ariane Tabatabai. ‘Meeting Iran’s Nuclear Fuel Supply Needs’, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (5 June 2014). https://thebulletin.org/2014/06/meeting-irans- nuclear-fuel-supply-neEd./. Khaitous, Tariq. ‘Why Arab leaders worry about Iran’s nuclear program’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. May 23, 2008. https://thebulletin.org/2008/05/why-arab-leaders-worry-about- irans-nuclear-program/ Shainin, Jonathan. ‘Zaki Nusseibeh: Before and After’, Bidoun Interviews, Issue 18, 2009, https://www.bidoun.org/articles/zayed-zaki-nusseibeh Singh, Michael. ‘The Case for Zero Enrichment in Iran’, Arms Control Today (March 2014). https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014-03/case-zero-enrichment-iran.

News Articles and Opinion Pieces Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith. ‘Yemen on the brink: how the UAE is profiting from the chaos of civil war’, The Guardian, December 21, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/21/yemen-uae-united-arab-emirates- profiting-from-chaos-of-civil-war. Abdulla, Abdulkhaleq. ‘New assertiveness in UAE foreign policy’, Gulf News, October 9, 2012. https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-Ed./new-assertiveness-in-uae-foreign-policy- 1.1086667. Abdulla, Abdulkhaleq. ‘Why the UAE is fighting in Yemen’, Gulf News, October 12, 2015. https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-Ed./why-the-uae-is-fighting-in-yemen-1.1599513. Adetunji, Jo, Peter Beaumont and Martin Chulov. ‘Libyaprotests: More than 100 killed as army fires on unarmed demonstrators’, The Guardian, February 20, 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/20/lI.B.ya-protests-benghazi-muammar- gaddafi.

325

Aldroubi, Mina. ‘UAE humanitarian aid to Yemen almost $4bn’, The National, June 26, 2018. https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/uae-humanitarian-aid-to-yemen-almost-4bn- 1.744471. Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. ‘New UAE Documentary Claims Qatar Complicit in 9/11 Attacks’, Foreign Policy – The Cable, July 24, 2017. http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/24/new-uae- documentary-claims-qatar-complicit-in-911-attacks-gulf-crisis-saudi-arabia-doha/. Allinson, Tom. ‘Libya: Khalifa Haftar’s repressive proto-state and the ‘myth’ of stability, DeutscheWelle, February 26, 2020. https://www.dw.com/en/libya-khalifa-haftars- repressive-proto-state-and-the-myth-of-stability/a-52538387. Almezel, Mohammed. ‘On the martyrs’ path to victory’, Gulf News, September 5, 2015. https://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/on-the-martyrs-path-to-victory-1.1578747. Apps, Peter. ‘Chinese, local drones reflecting changing Middle East’, Reuters, March 7, 2019. https://in.reuters.com/article/apps-drones/column-chinese-local-drones-reflect-changing- middle-east-idINKCN1QO0FT. Atkins, Thomas. ‘Boom turns to gloom as crisis hits Dubai’, Reuters, November 21, 2008. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dubai-crisis/boom-turns-to-gloom-as-crisis-hits-dubai- idUSTRE4AJ65C20081121. Axe, David. ‘One Nation Is Selling Off Its Chinese Combat Drones’, The National Interest, June 5, 2019. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/one-nation-selling-its-chinese-combat- drones-61092.

Bader, Jeffrey A. ‘The lynch pin of Obama’s Asia pivot is about to succeed or fail’, Business Insider, July 29, 2015. https://www.businessinsider.com/the-lynchpin-of-obamas-asia-pivot- is-about-to-succeed-or-fail-2015-7. ‘Bahrain hints at evidence of Iran protest links’, The Telegraph, November 24, 2011. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/bahrain/8912240/Bahrain- hints-at-evidence-of-Iran-protest-links.html. Bakri, Nada. ‘Protests in Oman Spread from Port City to Capital’, The New York Times, February 28, 2011. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/world/middleeast/01oman.html?mtrref=www.goog le.com. Barboza, David. ‘China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy’, The New York Times, August 15, 2010. https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/global/16yuan.html. Bastani, Hossein. ‘Iran quietly deepens involvement in Syria’s war’, BBC News, October 20, 2015. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34572756. Beauchamp, Zack. ‘The US and Iran are tacitly cooperating in Iraq’, Vox, November 17, 2915. https://www.vox.com/2018/11/20/17996024/the-us-and-iran-are-tacitly-cooperating-in- iraq.

326

Becker, Elizabeth. ‘US and Bahrain reach a Free Trade Agreement’, The New York Times, May 28, 2004. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/28/business/us-and-bahrain-reach-a- free-trade-agreement.html. Binnie, Jeremy. ‘UAE confirms Yemen drawdown’, Jane’s 360, July 10, 2019. https://www.janes.com/article/89799/uae-confirms-yemen-drawdown. ‘Bitter Rivals: Iran and Saudi Arabia, Part II: Syrian War’, PBS Frontline Series, February 27, 2018. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/watch-why-iran-backed-assad-in-syria/. Black, Ian. ‘Iran nuclear deal: Saudi Arabia and Gulf react with caution’, The Guardian, November 24, 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/iran-nuclear-deal- middle-east-reaction-saudi-arabia. Boghani, Priyanka. ‘Iraq’s Shia Militias: The Double-Edged Sword Against ISIS’, Frontline PBS, March 21, 2017. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/iraqs-shia-militias-the-double- edged-sword-against-isis/. Borger, Julian and Paul Lewis. ‘Iran nuclear deal: negotiators announce ‘framework’ agreement’, The Guardian, April 2, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/iran-nuclear-deal-negotiators- announce-framework-agreement. Branigan, Tania. ‘Clinton seeks consensus with China on tackling global economic woes’, The Guardian, February 21, 2009. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/21/hillary- clinton-china-economy-human-rights. Bronner, Ethan and Michael Slackman. ‘Saudi Troops Enter Bahrain to Help Put Down Unrest’, The New York Times, March 14, 2011. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/world/middleeast/15bahrain.html. Browne, Gareth. ‘Arab Coalition lays bare Iranian support for Houthis in Yemen’, The National, June 19, 2018. https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/arab-coalition-lays-bare- iranian-support-for-houthis-in-yemen-1.742032. Browning, Noah, Alexander Cornwell, ‘UAE extends military reach in Yemen and Somalia’, Reuters, May 11, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uae-security-yemen- somalia/uae-extends-military-reach-in-yemen-and-somalia-idUSKBN1IC12A. ‘Bush says he will veto any bill to stop UAE port deal’, Fox News, February 22, 2006. http://www.foxnews.com/story/2006/02/22/bush-says-will-veto-any-bill-to-stop-uae-port- deal.html. Calmes, Jackie. ‘A U.S. Marine base for Australia Irritates China’ The New York Times, November 16, 2011. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/obama-and-gillard- expand-us-australia-military-ties.html. Carvalho, Stanley. ‘East meets West as Louvre Abu Dhabi opens in the Gulf’, Reuters, November 7, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-louvre/east-meets-west- as-louvre-abu-dhabi-opens-in-the-gulf-idUSKBN1D719F.

327

Chandrasekran, Rajiv. ‘In the UAE, the United States has a quiet, potent ally nicknamed ‘Little Sparta’’, The Washington Post, November 9, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-the-uae-the-united-states- has-a-quiet-potent-ally-nicknamed-little-sparta/2014/11/08/3fc6a50c-643a-11e4-836c- 83bc4f26eb67_story.html?utm_term=.a92d2e0ed1d6. Charbonneau, Louis, Michelle Nichols. ‘US conducting ‘serious review’ of alleged Iran missile test’, Reuters, December 8, 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-missiles-usa- idUSKBN0TR2G920151208. ‘China, UAE to build strategic partnership: Wen’, The China Daily, January 16, 2012. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-01/16/content_14456913.htm. ‘Chinese military drone sales hover over Middle East’, Associated Press, February 26, 2018. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2134680/chinese-military- drone-display-united-arab-emirates. Chollet, Derek. ‘Obama’s Red Line, Revisited’, Politico, July 19, 2016. https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/obama-syria-foreign-policy-red-line- revisited-214059. ‘CNBC Transcript: Saudi Foreign Minister, Adel Al Jubeir, CNBC, November 9, 2017. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/09/cnbc-transcript-saudi-foreign-minister-adel-al- jubeir.html. Cohen, Zachary and Joshua Berlinger. ‘Libyan general praise by Trump accused of possible war crimes’, CNN, May 15, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/15/politics/lI.B.ya-war- crimes-allegations-intl/index.html. Cole, David. ‘Obama’s Most Dangerous Legacy’, The New York Review, February 24, 2016. https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/02/24/obama-most-dangerous-legacy-secret- drones/. Coles, Isabel and Eman Goma. ‘Analysis: Challenge to PM brings Kuwait a breath of Arab Spring’, Reuters, November 21, 2011. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kuwait- parliament/analysis-challenge-to-pm-brings-kuwait-a-breath-of-arab-spring- idUSTRE7AK0YW20111121. Cooper, Helene. ‘China Holds Firm on Major Issues in Obama’s Visit’, The New York Times, November 17, 2009. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/world/asia/18prexy.html. Cooper, Helene and Anne Barnard. ‘Jordan and Emirates Carry Out Airstrikes in Syria against ISIS’, The New York Times, February 10, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/11/world/middleeast/united-arab-emirates-resume- airstrikes-against-isis.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r=0. Cooper, Helene and Robert Worth. ‘In Arab Spring, Obama Finds a Sharp Test’, The New York Times, September 24, 2012. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/us/politics/arab- spring-proves-a-harsh-test-for-obamas-diplomatic-skill.html.

328

Coughlin, Con. ‘Iran is the force behind the Houthis. The world should hold it to account’, The National, June 21, 2018. https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/iran-is-the- force-behind-the-houthis-the-world-should-hold-it-to-account-1.742825. Clinton, Hillary. ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011. https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/. Craig, Iona. ‘Bombed into famine: how the Saudi air campaign targets Yemen’s food supplies’, The Guardian, December 12, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/12/bombed-into-famine-how-saudi-air- campaign-targets-yemens-food-supplies. Daga, Anshuman. ‘Dubai Aerospace to buy aircraft lessor AWAS, catapults to top tier’, Reuters, April 24, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-awas-m-a-dubaiaerospace- idUSKBN17Q0QI. Dajani, Haneed. ‘UAE warplanes in Sardinia ahead of dispatch to Libya’, The National, March 29, 2011. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-warplanes-in-sardinia-ahead-of-dispatch-to- lI.B.ya-1.409823. Davidson, Janina and Lauren Dickey. ‘Fact: America’s Rebalance to Asia Has Some Serious Military Muscle’, The National Interest, April 16, 2015. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/fact-americas-rebalance-asia-has-some-serious- military-12652. Davidson, Helen and Christopher Knaus. ‘Australian weapons shipped to Saudi and UAE as war rages in Yemen’, The Guardian, July 25, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/australia- news/2019/jul/25/australian-weapons-shipped-to-saudi-and-uae-as-war-rages-in-yemen. ‘Defining UAE as world’s leading business hub’, The Gulf News, February 2, 2015. https://gulfnews.com/opinion/editorials/defining-uae-as-worlds-leading-business-hub- 1.1450459. Dehghan, Saeed Kamali. ‘Tehran supports the Arab Spring…but not in Syria’, The Guardian, April 18, 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/apr/18/iran-arab- spring-syria-uprisings. Dombe, Ami Rojkes. ‘Report: The UAE is Expanding the al-Khadim Air Base in Libya’, Israel Defense, December 17, 2017. https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/32228. Donilon, Tom. ‘Obama is on the right course with the ‘Pivot to Asia’’, The Washington Post, April 20, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obama-is-on-the-right-course- with-the-pivot-to-asia/2014/04/20/ed719108-c73c-11e3-9f37-7ce307c56815_story.html. ‘Dubai Aerospace to Buy Carlyle Aircraft Service Units for $1.8 Billion’, Associated Press, April 2, 2017. https://www.cnbc.com/id/17902964. ‘Emirates Act to End Coup Crisis’, Chicago Tribune, June 19, 1987. http://articles.chicagotrI.B.une.com/1987-06-19/news/8702150353_1_ras-al-khaimah-al- qassimi-uae.

329

Emmons, Alex and Mathew Cole. ‘UAE Enlisted Business to Spy on Trump White House’, The Intercept, June 10, 2019. https://theintercept.com/2019/06/10/trump-uae-businessman- spy/. England, Andrew and Simeon Kerr. ‘Universities challenged: scrutiny over Gulf money’, Financial Times, December 13, 2018. https://www.ft.com/content/fa6d15a4-f6ed-11e8- af46-2022a0b02a6c. England, Andrew and Simeon Kerr. ‘UAE: The Middle East’s power broker flexes its muscles’, The Financial Times, October 24, 2017. https://www.ft.com/content/1b2b7f54-b411-11e7- a398-73d59db9e399. Erdbrink, Thomas and Toby Warrick. ‘Bahrain crackdown fueling tension between Iran, Saudi Arabia’, The Washington Post, April 22, 2011. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/bahrain-crackdown-fueling-tensions-between- iran-saudi-arabia/2011/04/21/AFVe6WPE_story.html. Erwin, Sandra I. ‘Defense Industry Eyes growth in the Middle East’, National Defense, May 2, 2014. http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2014/5/2/defense-industry-eyes- growth-in-the-middle-east. Esfandiary, Dina. ‘Two tremors in two weeks, and many questions for Iran’, The National, April 22, 2013. https://www.thenational.ae/two-tremors-in-two-weeks-and-many- questions-for-iran-1.324812. Esfandiary, Dina and Ariane Tabatabai. ‘Saudi Arabia Cares More About Iran Than Iran Does About Saudi Arabia’, The National Interest, October 18, 2016. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/saudi-arabia-cares-more-about-iran-iran-does-about- saudi-18091. Fadel, Laila and Liz Sly. ‘Gaddafi forces fire on protestors in Tripoli; defiant leader urges thousands of supporters to take up arms’, The Washington Post, February 26, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2011/02/25/AR2011022502731.html?noredirect=on. Faheem, Kareem and Karen Young. ‘Four Arab nations sever diplomatic ties with Qatar, exposing rifts’, The Washington Post, June 5, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/four-arab-nations-sever-diplomatic-ties-with- qatar-exposing-rift-in-region/2017/06/05/15ad2284-49b4-11e7-9669- 250d0b15f83b_story.html?utm_term=.30140b5ff3ad. Fassihi, Farnaz, Jay Solomon, Sam Dagher. ‘Iranians Dial Up Presence in Syria’, Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2013. https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranians-dial-up-presence-in- syria-1379298675. Faucon, Benoit, Jared Malsin, Summer Said. ‘U.A.E. Backed Militia Leader’s Bid to Take Control of Libyan Oil Exports’, The Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2018. https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-a-e-backed-militia-leaders-bid-to-take-control-of-lI.B.yan- oil-exports-1531474200.

330

‘First UAE spy plane breaks its cover’, Arabian Aerospace, December 27, 2017. https://www.arabianaerospace.aero/first-uae-spyplane-breaks-its-cover.html. Fisher, Marc. ‘In Tunisia, act of one fruit vendor sparks wave of revolution through Arab world’, The Washington Post, March 26, 2011. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in- tunisia-act-of-one-fruit-vendor-sparks-wave-of-revolution-through-arab- world/2011/03/16/AFjfsueB_story.html?utm_term=.ca7af8075dbd. ‘Foreign Affairs focus: Tom Donilon on U.S. Asia Policy’, Foreign Affairs, February 6, 2014. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/videos/2014-02-06/foreign-affairs-focus-tom-donilon-us- asia-policy. ‘France sees more joint defence ventures with UAE’, Emirates 247, February 17, 2013. https://www.emirates247.com/business/france-sees-more-joint-defence-ventures-with- uae-2013-02-17-1.495279 ‘Full transcript of Obama’s Al-Arabiya interview’, Transcript, NBC News, January 27, 2009. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/28870724/ns/politics-white_house/t/full-transcript-obamas- al-arabiya-interview/. Gardner, Frank. ‘Gulf Arabs ‘stepping up’ arms supplies to Syrian rebels’, BBC News, October 8, 2015. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34479929. ‘GCC presses NATO for nuclear-free Middle East’, AFP, December 3, 2005. https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2005/Dec-03/68556-gcc-presses-nato-for- nuclear-free-middle-east.ashx. Gause III, Gregory F. ‘Why the Iranian deal scares Saudi Arabia’, The New Yorker, November 26, 2013. https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-the-iran-deal-scares-saudi- arabia. Gearan, Anne. ‘Egypt and the UAE strike Islamist Militias in Libya’, The Washington Post, August 25, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/egypt-and- uae-strike-islamist-militias-in-lI.B.ya/2014/08/25/8685ef04-2c98-11e4-be9e- 60cc44c01e7f_story.html?utm_term=.f09f7c6f3c04. Gengler, Justin. ‘How Bahrain’s crushed uprising spawned the Middle East’s sectarianism’, The Washington Post, January 13, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey- cage/wp/2016/02/13/how-bahrains-crushed-uprising-spawned-the-middle-easts- sectarianism/?utm_term=.2ef6b9371137. Goldberg, Jeffrey. ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic, April 2016. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/. Gould, Joe. ‘Key US Democrat holds back support for Gulf munitions sales over Yemen’, DefenseNews, July 3, 2018. https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2018/07/03/key-us- democrat-holds-back-support-for-gulf-munitions-sales-over-yemen/.

331

Gould, Joe. ‘US House votes to block Saudi, UAE arms sales, bucking Trump veto threat’, DefenseNews, July 17, 2019. https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2019/07/17/us- house-votes-to-block-saudi-uae-arms-sales-bucking-trump-veto-threat/. Gourley, Scott R. ‘U.A.E. Becomes First International Customer for THAAD’, Defense Media Network, January 4, 2012. https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/u-a-e-becomes- first-international-customer-for-thaad/. Graeber, Daniel J. ‘Moody’s: Oman exposed to economic risk’, UPI, July 15, 2016. https://www.upi.com/Moodys-Oman-exposed-to-economic-risk/2881468575177/. Gross, Terry. ‘UAE’s Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed’s Growing Influence on the U.S.’, NPR’s Fresh Air, June 6, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/06/06/730339596/uaes-prince- mohammed-bin-zayed-s-growing-influence-on-the-u-s?t=1565775891581.

Gramer, Robbie and Amy Mackinnon. ‘Congress is Finally Done with the War in Yemen’, Foreign Policy, April 4, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/04/congress-makes- history-war-yemen-powers-bill/. Granville, Kevin. ‘What Is TPP? Behind the Trade Deal that Died’, The New York Times, January 23, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/tpp-explained- what-is-trans-pacific-partnership.html. Green, Michael J. ‘The Legacy of Obama’s “‘Pivot to Asia’”, Foreign Policy, September 3, 2016. https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/03/the-legacy-of-obamas-pivot-to-asia/. Grim, Ryan. ‘Diplomatic Underground – The Sordid Double Life of Washington’s Most Powerful Ambassador’, The Intercept, August 30, 2017. https://theintercept.com/2017/08/30/uae-ambassador-yousef-al-otaI.B.a-double-life- prostitutes-sex-work/. Grim, Ryan. ‘Gulf Government Gave Secret $20 Million Gift to D.C. Think Tank’, The Intercept, August 10, 2017. https://theintercept.com/2017/08/09/gulf-government-gave- secret-20-million-gift-to-d-c-think-tank/. ‘Gulf States send forces to Bahrain following protests’, BBC News, March 14, 2011. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12729786. Harb, Imad K. ‘Why the United Arab Emirates is Abandoning Saudi Arabia in Yemen’, Foreign Policy, August 1, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/01/why-the-united-arab- emirates-is-abandoning-saudi-arabia-in-yemen/. Hassan, Hassan. ‘Qatar’s troubles are rooted in its support for Islamists’, The National, May 30, 2017, https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/qatar-s-troubles-are-rooted-in-its-support- for-islamists-1.45881. Hearst, David. ‘Revealed: How Trump confidant was ready to share inside information with UAE’, Middle East Eye, June 28, 2018. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/revealed-how- trump-confidant-was-ready-share-inside-information-uae.

332

Hedges, Matthew. ‘An Ally Held Me as a Spy – And the West Is Complicit’, The Atlantic, January 25, 2019. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/01/matthew- hedges-uae-held-me-spy-west-complicit/581200/. Helou, Agnes Al and Chirine Mouchantaf. ‘Source: UAE wants to buy 24 F-35s’, DefenseNews, November 12, 2017. https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show- dailies/dubai-air-show/2017/11/12/uae-undertakes-air-force-restructuring-plan/. Henderson, Simon. ‘How to End Saudi Arabia’s War of Paranoia’, Foreign Policy, October 20, 2016. https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/20/two-yemens-are-better-than-one-saudi- houthi-iran/. ‘Here are the members of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and what they’re contributing’, Associated Press, March 30, 2015. http://uk.businessinsider.com/members-of-saudi-led- coalition-in-yemen-their-contrI.B.utions-2015-3. Hiltermann, Joost and April Longley Alley. ‘The Houthis are Not Hezbollah’, Foreign Policy, February 27, 2017. https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/27/the-houthis-are-not-hezbollah/.

Hope, Bradley and Tom Wright. ‘Stolen Emails Show Ties between UAE Envoy and 1MDB Fund’s Central Figure’, The Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2017. https://www.wsj.com/articles/stolen-emails-show-ties-between-u-a-e-envoy-and-1mdb- funds-central-figure-1501579801.

Horton, Michael. ‘Why the UAE Cut their Losses and Pulled Out of Yemen’, The American Conservative, August 8, 2019. https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/why-the- uae-cut-their-losses-and-pulled-out-of-yemen/.

Howeidi, Fahmy. ‘The Emirati airstrikes on Libya’, Al-Shorouk, August 27, 2014.

Hoyle, Craig. ‘Picture: Saab unveils first GlobalEye for UAE’, Flight Global, February 23, 2018. https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/picture-saab-unveils-first-globaleye-for-uae- 446155/.

Hubbard, Ben. ‘Arab World Split Over Iran Nuclear Deal’, The New York Times, July 14, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-provokes- sharp-reactions-across-the-arab-world.html. Hubbard, Ben. ‘Dialogue with Iran is impossible, Saudi Arabia’s Defence Minister Says’, The New York Times, May 2, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-iran-defense- minister.html. Hubbard, Ben, Isabel Kershner and Anne Barnard, ‘Iran, Deeply Embedded in Syria, Expands ‘Axis of Resistance’’, New York Times, February 19, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/world/middleeast/iran-syria-israel.html.

333

Huiyao, Wang. ‘From the Syrian civil war to Yemen to energy, China has a larger role to play in the Middle East’, South China Morning Post, November 13, 2019. https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3037353/syrian-civil-war-yemen-energy- china-has-larger-role-play-middle. ‘Iraqi Shi’ite militias accused of rights abuses in Hawija operation’, Reuters, September 28, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-rights/iraqi-shiite-militias- accused-of-rights-abuses-in-hawija-operation-idUSKCN1C3268. ‘Iran’s Ahmadinejad in UAE talks’, BBC News, May 13, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6650745.stm. ‘Iran: Ahmadinejad to attend Gulf Arab summit’, Associated Press, December 2, 2007. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/22063268/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/iran- ahmadinejad-attend-gulf-arab-summit/. ‘Iran confirms exchange of letters with Obama’, Reuters, September 17, 2013. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-usa/iran-confirms-exchange-of-letters-with- obama-idUSBRE98G0MT20130917. ‘Iran has over 1,000 troops in Iraq, less than 2,000 in Syria: US general’, Reuters, October 27, 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-dunford-iranians/iran-has-over- 1000-troops-in-iraq-less-than-2000-in-syria-u-s-general-idUSKCN0SL23E20151027 ‘Iran’s nuclear deal: Four questions that need answers’, Al Riyadh, April 6, 2015. http://www.alriyadh.com/1036684 (in Arabic). ‘Iran nuclear deal: an overview of global reactions’, Euronews, July 15, 2015. https://www.euronews.com/2015/07/15/iran-nuclear-deal-reactions-from-around-the- world-overview. ‘Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Delivers a Warning to Saudi Arabia’, Reuters, January 5, 2016. https://www.newsweek.com/iran-revolutionary-guard-corps-saudi-arabia-quds-force- 412060. ‘Iran sends five planes of vegetables to help Qatar after five Arab nations cut ties over ‘extremism’ links’, The Telegraph, June 11, 2017. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/11/iran-sends-five-planes-vegetables-qatar/. ‘Iran unveils new missile, says seeks peace through strength’, Reuters, August 22, 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/iran-military-missile/iran-unveils-new-missile-says-seeks- peace-through-strength-idUSL5N10X03320150822. ‘Iran tests new precision-guided ballistic missile’, Reuters, October 11, 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/iran-military-missiles/iran-tests-new-precision-guided- ballistic-missile-idINKCN0S507E20151011. ‘Iran shows off underground base with long-range missiles’, The Times of Israel, October 14, 2015. https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-shows-off-underground-base-with-long-range- missiles/.

334

Itkowitz, Colby. ‘Which foreign countries spent the most to influence U.S. politics?’, The Washington Post, May 14, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the- loop/wp/2014/05/14/which-foreign-countries-spent-the-most-to-influence-u-s- politics/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d164a2624fd9. Jacobson, Louis. ‘Donald Trump says Kuwait never paid U.S. back for ousting Saddam Hussein’, Politifact, April 27, 2011. https://www.politifact.com/truth-o- meter/statements/2011/apr/27/donald-trump/donal-trump-says-kuwait-never-paid-us- back-ousting/. Jacobson, Louis and Amy Sherman, ‘PolitiFact Sheet: Military spending under Obama and Congress’, PolitiFact, December 14, 2015. https://www.politifact.com/truth-o- meter/article/2015/dec/14/politifact-sheet-our-guide-to-military-spending-/. Jarry, Emmanuel. ‘France, UAE sign military and nuclear agreements’, Reuters, January 15, 2008. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-sarkozy-gulf/france-uae-sign-military-and- nuclear-agreements-idUSL1517472620080115. Jilani, Zaid. ‘The UAE Secretly Picked Up the Tab for the Egyptian Dictatorship’s D.C. Lobbying’, The Intercept, October 4, 2017. https://theintercept.com/2017/10/04/egypt- lobbying-uae-otaI.B.a-trump-sisi/. Jinping, Xi. ‘UAE, Chinese people never give up their dreams: President Xi’, Gulf News, July 17, 2018. https://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/uae-chinese-people-never-give-up-their- dreams-president-xi-1.2253147. ‘Joint defence partnership between UK and the UAE announced’, BBC News, November 6, 2012. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20216028. Jones, Rory and Sune Engel Rasmussen. ‘What We Know About the Saudi Oil Attacks’, Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-we-know-about- the-saudi-oil-attacks-11568991017. Jones, Timothy. ‘Germany approves controversial military exports to the UAE’, DeutscheWell, October 4, 2019. https://www.dw.com/en/germany-approves-controversial- military-exports-to-uae/a-50697912. Al-Jubeir, Adel Bin Ahmed. ‘Can Iran Change?’ The New York Times, January 19, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/19/opinion/saudi-arabia-can-iran-change.html. Judson, Jen. ‘Thanks to missile sales to UAE, US Army can buy 100 more advanced Patriot missiles’, Defense News, August 6, 2018. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/07/27/thanks-to-missile-sales-to-uae-us-army- can-buy-100-more-advanced-patriot-missiles/. Kalin, Stephen. ‘Saudi foreign minister says message to Iran is: ‘enough is enough’’, Reuters, November 16, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-jubeir/saudi-foreign- minister-says-message-to-iran-is-enough-is-enough-idUSKBN1DG1XU.

335

Kane, Frank. ‘Interview: UAE Ambassador to Washington on building economic relations with US’, The National, August 2, 2016. https://www.thenational.ae/business/interview- uae-ambassador-to-washington-on-building-economic-relations-with-us-1.145104. Karasik, Theodore. ‘UAE People and Politics: UAE and France’s robust cooperation in fighting extremists’, The National, May 7, 2015. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/uae- people-politics-uae-and-france-s-robust-cooperation-in-fighting-extremists-1.116523. Kerr, Simon. ‘UAE stops using former British officers as military trainers’, The Financial Times, May 22, 2014. https://www.ft.com/content/53cc2584-e1ab-11e3-9999- 00144feabdc0. Kenner, David. ‘The Selective Westernization of NYU’s Abu Dhabi Campus’, The Atlantic, May 10, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/05/the-selective- westernization-of-nyus-abu-dhabi-campus/560096/. Kessler, Glenn. ‘Six Power Reach Accord on Iran Plan’, The Washington Post, June 2, 2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2006/06/01/AR2006060100363.html. Kessler, Glenn. ‘Arab Groups Signals Iran to Avoid Meddling in Iraq’, The Washington Post, January 17, 2007. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2007/01/16/AR2007011600406.html. Khaishgi, Amna Ehtesham. ‘UAE has become the leading donor to charitable causes around the world’, The National, August 21, 2014. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/uae-has-become-the-leading-donor-to- charitable-causes-around-the-world-1.263786. Al-Khalidi, Suleiman. ‘Saudi FM says Riyadh determined to confront Iranian expansion in region’, Reuters, July 9, 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-saudi-iran/saudi-fm-says- riyadh-determined-to-confront-iranian-expansion-in-region-idUKKCN0PJ2GJ20150709. ‘Khamenei hails ‘Islamic’ uprisings’, Al Jazeera, February 4, 2011. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/201124101233510493.html. Kianpour, Suzanne. ‘Emails show UAE-linked effort against Tillerson’, BBC News, March 5, 2018. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-43281519. Kington, Tom. ‘UAE allegedly using Chinese drones for deadly airstrikes in Libya’, Defense News, May 2, 2019. https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2019/05/02/uae-allegedly- using-chinese-drones-for-deadly-airstrikes-in-libya/. Kirkpatrick, David D. ‘3 Gulf Countries Pull Ambassadors from Qatar Over its Support of Islamists’, The New York Times, March 5, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/world/middleeast/3-persian-gulf-states-pull- ambassadors-from-qatar.html.

336

Kirkpatrick, David D. ‘Libyan Militias Seize Control of Capital as Chaos Rises’, The New York Times, September 1, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/02/world/africa/militias- seize-control-of-libyan-capital.html. Kirkpatrick, David D. ‘Qatar’s Support of Islamists Alienates Allies Near and Far’, The New York Times, September 7, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/08/world/middleeast/qatars-support-of-extremists- alienates-allies-near-and-far.html. Kirkpatrick, David D. ‘Recordings Suggest Emirates and Egyptian Military Pushed Ousting of Morsi’, The New York Times, March 1, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/02/world/middleeast/recordings-suggest-emirates- and-egyptian-military-pushed-ousting-of-morsi.html. Kirkpatrick, David D., ‘Who is Behind Trump’s Links to Arab Princes? A Billionaire Friend’, The New York Times, June 13, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/world/middleeast/trump-tom-barrack-saudi.html. Krauthammer, Charles. ‘The Fatal Flaw in the Iran Deal’, The Washington Post, February 26, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-fatal-flaw-in-the-iran- deal/2015/02/26/9186c70e-bde1-11e4-8668-4e7ba8439ca6_story.html. Kuperman, Alan J. ‘The Iran Deal’s Fatal Flaw’, The New York Times, June 23, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/23/opinion/the-iran-deals-fatal-flaw.html. LaFleur, Jennifer. ‘Adding it up: The Top Players in Foreign Agent Lobbying’, ProRepublica August 18, 2009. https://www.propublica.org/article/adding-it-up-the-top-players-in- foreign-agent-lobbying-718. LaFraniere, Sharon, Maggie Haberman, Adam Goldman. ‘Trump Inaugural Fund and Super PAC Said to Be Scrutinized for Illegal Foreign Donations’, The New York Times, December 13, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/politics/trump-inauguration- investigation.html. LaFraniere, Sharon, Maggie Habberman, William K. Rashburn, Ben Protess, David K. Kirkpatrick. ‘Trump Friend’s Ties to Mideast at Heart of Lobbying Enquiry’, The New York Times, July 28, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/28/us/politics/thomas-barrack- foreign-lobbying.html. LaGrone, Sam. ‘Work: Sixty Percent of U.S. Navy and Air Force Will Be Based in Pacific by 2020’, USNI News, September 30, 2014. https://news.usni.org/2014/09/30/work-sixty- percent-u-s-navy-air-force-will-based-pacific-2020. Lake, Eli. ‘Iran Spends Billions to Prop Up Assad’, Bloomberg News, June 9, 2015. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-06-09/iran-spends-billions-to-prop-up- assad. Landler, Mark. ‘Despite Pressure, China Still Resists Iran Sanctions’, The New York Times, February 25, 2010. https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/26/world/asia/26diplo.html.

337

Landler, Mark. ‘Obama’s Journey to Tougher Tack on a Rising China’, The New York Times, September 20, 2012. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/us/politics/obamas-evolution- to-a-tougher-line-on-china.html. Landler, Mark. ‘Rice Offers a More Modest Strategy for the Mideast’, The New York Times, October 26, 2013. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/world/middleeast/rice-offers-a- more-modest-strategy-for-mideast.html. Landler, Mark. ‘U.S. Troops to Leave Afghanistan by End of 2016’, The New York Times, May 27, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/world/asia/us-to-complete-afghan- pullout-by-end-of-2016-obama-to-say.html. Langton, James and Haneen Dajani. ‘UAE ambassador explains what secularism means for Middle East governance’, The National, August 8, 2017. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-ambassador-explains-what-secularism-means-for- middle-east-governance-1.618023. Lemaire, Jean-Marie and Rim Mathlouti. ‘Redeyef, the precursor of the Tunisian revolution’, France 24, February 15, 2011. https://www.france24.com/en/20110215-reporters-tunisia- redeyef-gafsa-mining-phosphate-accusations-competition-rigged-ben-ali-supporters- protests-journalists. ‘Libya embargo violations: UN panel to report findings to UNSC’, Al Jazeera, March 1, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/lI.B.ya-embargo-violations-panel-report- findings-unsc-180301080019627.html. ‘Libya missile strikes point to possible UAE role: UN report’, France 24, May 6, 2019. https://www.france24.com/en/20190506-lI.B.ya-missile-strikes-point-possI.B.le-uae-role- un-report. ‘Libya’s Shifting Sands: Derna and Sirte’, Al Jazeera reports, June 22, 2017. https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeraworld/2017/06/lI.B.ya-shifting-sands- derna-170613115119424.html. Lipton, Eric, Brooke Williams and Nicholas Confessor, ‘Foreign Power Buy Influence at Think Tanks’, The New York Times, September 6, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/us/politics/foreign-powers-buy-influence-at-think- tanks.html. Mazzetti, Mark, David K. Kirkpatrick, Maggie Haberman. ‘Mueller’s Focus on Advisor to Emirates Suggest Broader Investigation’, The New York Times, March 3, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/03/us/politics/george-nader-mueller-investigation- united-arab-emirates.html?smid=tw-bna. Lepeska, David. ‘Obama and the Middle East: Why the US is disengaging’, The National, January 27, 2012. https://www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/books/obama-and-the-middleeast-why-the-us-is-disengaging-1.404554

338

Lerner, Adam B. ‘Saudi Arabia cautiously endorses Iran deal’, Politico, April 6, 2015. https://www.politico.com/story/2015/04/saudi-arabia-iran-nuclear-deal-116694. Lewis, Aidan. ‘Covert Emirati support gave East Libyan air power key boost: U.N. report’, Reuters, June 9, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lI.B.ya-security/covert-emirati- support-gave-east-lI.B.yan-air-power-key-boost-u-n-report-idUSKBN1902K0. Lieberthal, Kenneth G. ‘The American ‘Pivot to Asia’’, Foreign Policy, December 21, 2011. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/. Lizza, Ryan. ‘The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring remade Obama’s foreign policy’, The New Yorker, May 2, 2011. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/02/the- consequentialist. Luxner, Larry. ‘Oil-Rich UAE, reaching for the Stars, Gets Pulled Back Down to Earth’, The Washington Diplomat, November 18, 2010. http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6048:oil- rich-uae-reaching-for-stars-gets-pulled-back-down-to-earth-&catid=204:march- 2010&Itemid=240. Makieh, Kinda. ‘UAE firms scout trade at Syria fair, defying US pressure’, Reuters, August 31, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-emirates/uae-firms-scout-trade-at-syria- fair-defying-u-s-pressure-idUSKCN1VL0HB.

Martin, Will. ‘The US could lose its crown as the world’s most powerful economy as soon as next year, and it’s unlikely to ever get it back’, Business Insider, January 10, 2019. https://www.businessinsider.com/us-economy-to-fall-behind-china-within-a-year-standard- chartered-says-2019-1. Malsin, Jared and Amira El-Fekki. ‘Libya’s Tripoli Government Blames U.A.E for Deadly Airstrike’, The Wall Street Journal, July 4, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/lI.B.yas- tripoli-government-blames-u-a-e-for-deadly-airstrike-11562255129. Mason, Jeff and Louis Charbonneau, ‘Obama, Iran’s Rouhani hold historic phone call’, Reuters, September 27, 2013. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly- iran/obama-irans-rouhani-hold-historic-phone-call-idUSBRE98Q16S20130928. Matthiesen, Toby. ‘Saudi Arabia’s Shiite Problem’, Foreign Policy, March 7, 2012. https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/07/saudi-arabias-shiite-problem/. McConnell, Dugald and Brian Todd. ‘Iran steps up its forces in Syria’, CNN, October 28, 2015. https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/27/middleeast/iran-syria-troop-buildup/index.html. McDowall, Angus. ‘Region will lose sleep over Iran deal: Saudi advisor’, Reuters, November 24, 2013. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-saudi-fears/region-will-lose- sleep-over-iran-deal-saudi-adviser-idUSBRE9AN07C20131124.

339

McGinely, Shane. ‘Abu Dhabi Crown Prince warns against foreign meddling in Egypt’, Arabian Business, February 7, 2011. https://www.arabianbusiness.com/abu-dhabi-crown- prince-warns-against-foreign-meddling-in-egypt-379140.html. Mindock, Clark. ‘US deploys thousands more troops to the Middle East after Trump-ordered airstrike kills Iran general’, The Independent, January 3, 2020. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/us-iran-war-trump- soleimani-troops-middle-east-pentagon-embassy-airstrike-a9269791.html. Mitchel, Ellen. ‘Saudi Arabia offers to contribute troops to ISIS fight’, The Hill, March 16, 2017. https://thehill.com/policy/defense/324391-saudi-arabia-offers-to-contrI.B.ute-troops- to-isis-fight. ‘Mohammed lauds military exercise’, Khaleej Times, May 3, 2012. https://www.khaleejtimes.com/article/20120502/ARTICLE/305029810/1002.

Moniz, Ernest. ‘A nuclear deal that offers a safer world’, The Washington Post, April 12, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-safer-iran/2015/04/12/ae3a7f78-dfae- 11e4-a1b8-2ed88bc190d2_story.html?utm_term=.9eae4bab7b12. Morris, Loveday and Hugh Naylor. ‘Arab states fear nuclear deal will give Iran a bigger regional role’, The Washington Post, July 14, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/arab-states-fear-dangerous-iranian- nuclear-deal-will-shake-up-region/2015/07/14/96d68ff3-7fce-4bf5-9170- 6bcc9dfe46aa_story.html?utm_term=.703afe67ab01. Moshtaghian, Artemis. ‘Iran threatens to attach Dubai and Haifa if country is bombed’, CNN News Updates, January 7, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/us-iran- soleimani-tensions-intl-01-07-20/h_ec2a577fe833946485ca681a584d980a. Moukhallati, Dana. ‘Saudi Arabia: Iran blocking peace in Yemen, smuggling weapons to Houthis’, The National, October 29, 2017. https://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/saudi- arabia-iran-blocking-peace-in-yemen-smuggling-weapons-to-houthis-1.671186. Moxon, Julian. ‘UAE orders Mirage 2000-9s and goes ahead with upgrade work’, Flight Global, December 24, 1997. https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/uae-orders- mirage-2000-9s-and-goes-ahead-with-upgrade-30950/. Nephew, Richard. ‘Sanctions Relief Won’t Be a $100 Billion Windfall for Iran’s Terrorist Friends’ Foreign Policy, July 2, 2015. https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/02/iran-rouhani- khamenei-syria-assad-nuclear-sanctions-hezbollah/. Nordland, Rod. ‘Saudi Arabia Promises to Aid Egypt’s Regime’, The New York Times, August 19, 2013. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-vows-to- back-egypts-rulers.html. ‘NYU journalism department cuts ties to NYU Abu Dhabi’, Associated Press, November 5, 2017. https://www.apnews.com/03d65fe3ab40437dada3dd5e7acfd406.

340

‘Obama’s failure to enforce his ‘red-line’ emboldened and strengthened Al Assad’, The National, August 20, 2017. https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/editorial/obama-s- failure-to-enforce-his-red-line-emboldened-and-strengthened-al-assad-1.621352. ‘Oman will withdraw from GCC if a union is formed: foreign minister’, The National, December 7, 2013. https://www.thenational.ae/world/oman-will-withdraw-from-gcc-if-a- union-is-formed-foreign-minister-1.314873. ‘On Woman’s Day, the UAE Ambassador to the US Writes an Open Letter to his Daughter’, Harper’s Bazaar Arabia, March 8, 2017. https://www.harpersbazaararabia.com/for- womens-day-the-uae-ambassador-to-the-us-writes-an-open-letter-to-his-daughter. Osborne, Tony. ‘UAE Taking Delivery of Archangel COIN Aircraft’, Aviation Week Network, November 8, 2015. https://aviationweek.com/dubai-air-show-2015/uae-taking-delivery- archangel-coin-aircraft. Otaiba, Yousef Al. ‘ISIL Can’t be Beat on the Battlefield Alone’, Politico, February 16, 2015. https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/isil-cant-be-beat-on-the-battlefield- alone-115233. Otaiba, Yousef Al. ‘A Vision for a Moderate, Modern Muslim World’, Foreign Policy, December 2, 2015. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/02/a-vision-for-a-moderate-modern- muslim-world-uae-abu-dhabi-isis/. Otaiba, Yousef Al. ‘One Year After the Iran Nuclear Deal’, The Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2016. https://www.wsj.com/articles/one-year-after-the-iran-nuclear-deal-1459721502. Partridge, Matthew. ‘How the economic policies of a corrupt elite caused the Arab Spring’, The New Statesman, June 7, 2011. Qassemi, Sultan Sooud Al. ‘What Intervention in Yemen Means for the UAE’s National Identity’, Time Magazine, September 22, 2015. http://time.com/4040220/uae-intervention- in-yemen/. ‘Qasem Soleimani: Iran vows ‘severe revenge’ for top general’s death’, BBC News, January 3, 2020. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50986185. Rakhmat, Muhammad Zufika. ‘Institutionalising China’s relations with the Gulf’, International Policy Digest, April 15, 2019. https://intpolicydigest.org/2019/04/15/institutionalising-china-s-relations-with-the-gulf/. Randeree, Bilal. ‘Protests continue in Tunisia’, Al Jazeera, December 26, 2010. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/2010122682433751904.html.

‘Report: Saudi-UAE coalition ‘cut deals’ with al-Qaeda in Yemen’, Al Jazeera, August 6, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/report-saudi-uae-coalition-cut-deals-al-qaeda- yemen-180806074659521.html.

341

Rice, Susan. ‘Explaining President Obama’s Rebalance Strategy’, Medium, September 5, 2016. https://medium.com/@ObamaWhiteHouse/explaining-president-obamas-rebalance- strategy-eb5f0e81f870. Roberts, Dan. ‘Obama summit with Arab allies begins despite Saudi king’s absence’, The Guardian, May 14, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/may/14/barack- obama-arab-gulf-leaders-camp-david-summit. Roberts, David B. ‘Behind Qatar’s Intervention in Libya’, Foreign Affairs, September 28, 2011. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2011-09-28/behind-qatars- intervention-libya.

Roberts, David B. ‘Mosque and State: The United Arab Emirates’ Secular Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-arab- emirates/2016-03-18/mosque-and-state. ‘Rockets and Reach: UAE Doubles Down on HIMARS, ATACMS’, Defense Industry Daily, October 2, 2014. https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/uae-orders-752m-worth-of- himars-launchers-rockets-02659/. Rodrigo, Chris Mulls. ‘Graham: ‘I’ve got a real problem’ with arms sales to Saudi Arabia’, The Hill, May 26, 2019. https://thehill.com/homenews/sunday-talk-shows/445584-graham-i- got-a-real-problem-with-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia. Rose, David. ‘Cameron and the Arab Sheiks’ web of influence that infiltrated Britain: The shadowy nexus of PM’s cronies that secretively lobbied for Middle East paymasters’, The Mail on Sunday, October 18, 2015. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article- 3277345/Cameron-Arab-Sheiks-web-influence-infiltrated-Britain-shadowy-nexus-PM-s- cronies-secretively-lobbied-Middle-East-paymasters.html.

Rothkopf, David. ‘Iran’s $300 Billion Shakedown’, Foreign Policy, April 16, 2015. https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/16/irans-300-billion-shakedown-sanctions-nuclear- deal/. Rucker, Philip and Karen DeYoung. ‘Trump signs ‘tremendous’ deals with Saudi Arabia on his first day overseas’, Washington Post, May 20, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-gets-elaborate-welcome-in-saudi-arabia- embarking-on-first-foreign-trip/2017/05/20/679f2766-3d1d-11e7-a058- ddbb23c75d82_story.html. Saab, Bilal Y. ‘Arms and Influence in the Gulf – Riyadh and Abu Dhabi Get to Work’, Foreign Affairs, May 5, 2014. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-05- 05/arms-and-influence-gulf. Saadi, Dania. ‘UAE financial ties with China were years in the making’, The National, January 11, 2015. https://www.thenational.ae/business/uae-financial-ties-with-china-were-years-in- the-making-1.115095.

342

Saigal, Kanika. ‘Middle East: Emirates NBD prints Gulf’s first dim sum bond’, Euromoney, April 2, 2012. https://www.euromoney.com/article/b12kjmj0qjjwj8/middle-east-emirates- nbd-prints-gulfs-first-dim-sum-bond. Salem, Ola. ‘UAE military intervention in Yemen was ‘inevitable’’, The National, March 26, 2015. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-military-intervention-in-yemen-was-inevitable- 1.82859. Sanchez, Raf. ‘Iran test fires missiles branded with words ‘Israel must be wiped out’, The Telegraph, March 9, 2016. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/12188431/Iran-test-fires- missiles-branded-with-words-Israel-must-be-wiped-out.html. Sanger, David E. ‘Under Pressure, Dubai Company Drops Port Deal’, The New York Times, March 10, 2006. https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/10/politics/under-pressure-dubai- company-drops-port-deal.html.

Sanger, David E. ‘Bush Adds Troops in Bid to Secure Iraq’, The New York Times, January 11, 2007. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/11/world/middleeast/11prexy.html. Saud, Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdulziz Al. ‘Déjà vu again’, The Daily Star, July 16, 2015. Saul, Jonathan, Parisa Hafezi, Michael Georgy. ‘Exclusive: Iran steps up support for Houthis in Yemen’s war – sources’, Reuters, March 21, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us- yemen-iran-houthis/exclusive-iran-steps-up-support-for-houthis-in-yemens-war-sources- idUSKBN16S22R. Schmitt, Eric. ‘Iran is Smuggling Increasingly Potent Weapons into Yemen, US Admiral Says’, The New York Times, September 18, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/18/world/middleeast/iran-houthis-fifth-fleet- admiral.html. ‘Secret US-Iran talks cleared the way for historic nuclear deal’, Associated Press, November 24, 2013). https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/10471030/Secret-US-Iran- talks-cleared-way-for-historic-nuclear-deal.html. Semenov, Kirikk. ‘Russia seeks closer military-technical cooperation with the UAE’, Al Monitor, November 28, 2017. https://www.al- monitor.com/pulse/fa/originals/2017/11/russia-eyes-closer-military-cooperation-uae.html. Shah, Angela. ‘Why the Arab Spring Never Came to the UAE’, Time Magazine, July 18, 2011. http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2083768,00.html. Shaheen, Kareem. ‘Sheikh Abdullah meets Mubarak in Cairo’, The National, February 9, 2011. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/sheikh-abdullah-meets-mubarak-in-cairo-1.417157.

343

Shaheen, Kareem. ‘UAE warplanes will patrol Libyan no-fly zone’, The National, March 25, 2011. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-warplanes-will-patrol-lI.B.yan-no-fly-zone- 1.417396. Shaibany, Saleh Al. ‘Oman protest: Hundred demand jobs’, The National, January 22, 2018. https://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/oman-protest-hundrEd.-demand-jobs-1.697750. Sharafedin, Bozorgmehr. ‘Death Toll Among Iran’s forces in Syrian war passes 1,000’, Reuters, November 22, 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-iran- idUSKBN13H16J. Siddiqui, Sabrina. ‘Leading liberal thinktank will no longer accept funds from UAE’, The Guardian, January 25, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jan/25/united- arab-emirates-funding-center-for-american-progress. Solomon, Erika and Simeon Kerr. ‘Syria’s rebels heartened by healing of Sunni Arab rift’, Financial Times, April 13, 2015. https://www.ft.com/content/16a10034-df6c-11e4-b6da- 00144feab7de. Steven Sotloff. ‘Bahrain’s Shia crackdown’, Foreign Policy, September 10, 2010. https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/09/10/bahrains-shia-crackdown/. Stavrianakis, Anna. ‘UK arms exports are still playing a central role in Yemen’s humanitarian crisis’, The Guardian, May 21, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/global- development/2019/may/21/mps-thanking-jeremy-hunt-efforts-peace-in-yemen.

Strom, Stephanie. ‘Abu Dhabi Gives US Hospital 4150 Million’, The New York Times, September 15, 2009. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/16/us/16donation.html?mtrref=www.google.co.uk. ‘The ambitious United Arab Emirates – the Gulf’s ‘little Sparta’’, The Economist, April 6, 2017. https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/04/06/the-ambitious- united-arab-emirates. ‘The Democrats’ First 2008 Presidential Debate’, Transcript, The New York Times, April 27, 2007. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/27/us/politics/27debate_transcript.html. ‘The Nuclear agreement: a strategic earthquake in the Middle East’, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, April 3, 2015. https://www.alquds.co.uk/%EF%BB%BF%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A 7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D9%88%D9%8A- %D8%B2%D9%84%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%84- %D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A- %D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7/. Toperich, Sasha. ‘Khalifa Haftar is no longer part of Libya’s solution’, The Hill, May 1, 2019. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/441552-khalifa-haftar-is-no-longer-part-of-libyas- solution.

344

Trager, Eric. ‘The Muslim Brotherhood Is the Root of the Qatar Crisis’, The Atlantic, July 2, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/muslim-brotherhood- qatar/532380/. ‘Trump & the UAE: Connecting the Dots’, Al Jazeera, April 6, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/mueller-web-trump-uae-connection- 180405113651605.html. Turak, Natasha. ‘Pentagon is scrambling as China ‘sells the hell out of’ armed drones to US allies’, CNBC, February 21, 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/21/pentagon-is- scrambling-as-china-sells-the-hell-out-of-armed-drones-to-americas-allies.html. Tyler, Patrick E. ‘Hillary Clinton, in China, Details Abuse of Women’, The New York Times, September 6, 1995. https://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/06/world/hillary-clinton-in-china- details-abuse-of-women.html. ‘UAE agrees $1.6 billion deal with Lockheed Martin to upgrade F-16 fighters’, Reuters, November 12, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-lockheed-airshow/uae- agrees-1-6-billion-deal-with-lockheed-martin-to-upgrade-f-16-fighters-idUSKBN1DC0JH. ‘UAE and China sign strategic agreements as Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed visits Beijing’, The National, July 22, 2019. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/uae-and-china-sign- strategic-agreements-as-sheikh-mohamed-bin-zayed-visits-beijing-1.889051. ‘UAE and French armed forces conclude ‘Gulf 2016’ joint military exercise’, The National, November 24, 2016. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-and-french-armed-forces- conclude-gulf-2016-joint-military-exercise-1.192384. ‘UAE buys Russia’s Kornet, Pantsir missile systems – general’, TASS, February 17, 2019. http://tass.com/world/1045135. ‘UAE, China launch $10b joint strategic fund’, Gulf News, December 17, 2015. https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/uae-china-launch-10b-joint-strategic-fund- 1.1636147. ‘UAE congratulations Iran on atomic deal, first official Gulf comment’, Reuters, July 14, 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-emirates/uae-congratulates-iran-on- atomic-deal-first-official-gulf-comment-idUSKCN0PO1QV20150714. ‘UAE gets cruise missiles’, BBC news, November 26, 1998. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/222553.stm. ‘UAE leaders congratulate Rouhani on nuclear deal’, Khaleej Times, July 14, 2015. https://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/government/uae-leaders-congratulate-rohani-on- nuclear-agreement. ‘UAE merger creates defense services, manufacturing company’, Reuters, December 2, 2014. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-defence-m-a/uae-merger-creates- defense-services-manufacturing-company-idUSKCN0JG1IE20141202.

345

‘UAE reopens Syria embassy in boost for Assad’, Reuters, December 27, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-emirates/uae-reopens-syria- embassy-a-boost-for-assad-idUSKCN1OQ0QV. ‘UAE, Russia forge strategic partnership’, Gulf News, June 1, 2018. https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/uae-russia-forge-strategic-partnership-1.2230246 ‘UAE’s ‘Look East’ policy is developing’, The National, February 16, 2017. https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/uae-s-look-east-policy-is-developing-1.49919. ‘UAE special forces to deploy in Syria, as Russia warns of world war’, Associated Press, February 12, 2017. https://www.timesofisrael.com/uae-special-forces-to-deploy-in-syria-as- russia-warns-of-world-war/. ‘UAE recognises Libya rebels, to open Benghazi office’, Reuters, June 12, 2011. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-libya/uae-recognises-libya-rebels-to-open- benghazi-office-idUSTRE75B21H20110612. ‘UAE wants to buy over a squadron of Su-35 advanced fighter jets from Russia’, TASS, October 3, 2017. http://tass.com/defense/968593.

‘United Arab Emirates loses 45 soldiers in Yemen fighting’, Associated Press, September 5, 2015. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/11845899/United-Arab- Emirates-loses-45-soldiers-in-Yemen-fighting.html. ‘United Arab Emirates Signs Agreement for the Purchase of 80 Lockheed Martin F-16s’, Defense-aerospace.com, March 5, 2000. http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles- view/release/3/1775/uae-sign-contract-for-80-lockheed-f_16s-(mar.-6).html. ‘US, Gulf allies seek agreement on new security measures: Kerry’, Reuters, May 8, 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-gulf-kerry/u-s-gulf-allies-seek-agreement-on-new- security-measures-kerry-idUSKBN0NT1CY20150508. Vogel, Kenneth P. ‘How a Trump Ally Tested the Boundaries of Washington’s Influence Game’, The New York Times, August 13, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/13/us/politics/elliott-broidy-trump.html. Vogel, Kenneth P. and David D Kirkpatrick. ‘Fund-Raiser Held Out Access to Trump as a Prize for Prospective Clients’, The New York Times, March 25, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/25/us/politics/elliott-broidy-trump-access-circinus- lobbying.html. Walsh, Declan and David D. Kirkpatrick. ‘U.A.E Pulls Most Forces from Yemen in Blow to Saudi War Effort’, The New York Times, July 11, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/world/middleeast/yemen-emirates-saudi-war.html.

346

Weaver, Matthew. ‘Barack Obama accused of bowing to Beijing with Dalai Lama ‘snub’’, The Guardian, October 6, 2009. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/06/dalai-lama- barack-obama-washington. Webster, Nick. ‘UAE and China declare deep strategic partnership as state visit ends’, The National, July 21, 2018. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-and-china-declare-deep- strategic-partnership-as-state-visit-ends-1.752515. Wilkin, Sam. ‘UAE troops dig in for a long war in Yemen’, Reuters, December 2, 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-emirates/uae-troops-dig-in-for-a-long- war-in-yemen-idUSKBN0TL14T20151202. Williams, Daniel. ‘Tehran Courts Support of Arabs’, The Washington Post, March 20, 2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2006/03/19/AR2006031900926.html. ‘Woman who reached for the skies’, The National, June 10, 2014. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/woman-who-reached-for-the-skies-1.586232.

‘Workers gather in protest against unpaid salaries’, The National, June 19, 2011. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/workers-gather-in-protest-against-unpaid-salaries- 1.377290. Worth, Robert F. ‘Mohammed bin Zayed’s Dark Vision of the Middle East’s Future’, The New York Times Magazine, January 9, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/magazine/united-arab-emirates-mohammed-bin- zayed.html. Wright, Oliver. ‘ISIS threat: Cameron wants an alliance with Iran’, The Independent, August 17, 2014. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/isis-extremists-a-threat-to-the-streets- of-britain-warns-david-cameron-9674015.html. ‘Yemen conflict: Southern separatists seize control of Aden’, BBC News, August 11, 2019. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-49308199. ‘Yemen crisis: UAE soldiers killed by blast at camp’, BBC News, September 4, 2015. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34152104. Young, Lindsay. ‘What countries spent the most to influence in the USA in 2013’, The Sunlight Foundation, May 8, 2014. https://sunlightfoundation.com/2014/05/08/what- countries-spent-the-most-to-influence-the-usa-in-2013/. Youssef, Nour. ‘Airstrikes in Yemen Kill 68 Civilians in a Single Day’, New York Times, December 28, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/world/middleeast/un-yemen- war.html. Zacharias, Anna. ‘Yemen conflicts casts a shadow, but UAE unity strengthened’, The National, March 25, 2018. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/yemen-conflict-casts-a-shadow- but-uae-unity-strengthened-1.716068.

347

Zengerle, Patricia. ‘Defying Congress, Trump sets $8 billion-plus in weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, UAE’, Reuters, May 24, 2019. https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-saudi- arms/defying-congress-trump-sets-8-billion-plus-in-weapons-sales-to-saudi-arabia-uae- idUKKCN1SU25P. Zraick, Karen. ‘Arab Woman Led Airstrikes over Syria’, The New York Times, September 25, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/26/world/middleeast/emirates-first-female- fighter-pilot-isis-airstrikes.html. ‘3 killed in inter-militia fighting at Yemen’s Aden airport’, Associated Press, February 12, 2017. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/02/12/3-killed-in-inter-militia-fighting-at- yemen-aden-airport.html.

Blogs Borger, Julian. ‘Gulf states to push for a US plan for containing Iran’, The Guardian Global Security Blog, May 1, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/julian-borger-global- security-blog/2015/may/01/gulf-states-to-push-for-a-us-plan-for-containing-iran. Davidson, Christopher. ‘Fear and Loathing in the Emirates’, Sada – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 18, 2012. http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/49409. Ellwood, Tobias. ‘The United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates: strategic partners for generations to come’, FCO Blog, September 2, 2015. https://blogs.fco.gov.uk/philipparham/2015/09/02/the-united-kingdom-and-the-united- arab-emirates-strategic-partners-for-generations-to-come/. Fasanotti, Frederica Saini. ‘Making Libya’s economy work again’, Brookings Institution – Order from Chaos, October 7, 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from- chaos/2016/10/07/making-libyas-economy-work-again/. Fenton-Harvey, Jonathan. ‘Saudi Arabia and the UAE Fund Academia with Strings Attached’, LobeLog, August 28, 2019. https://lobelog.com/saudi-arabia-and-the-uae-fund-academia- with-strings-attached/. Fitzpatrick, Mark. ‘Iran’s missile test: a provocation, not a violation’, The Survival Editors’ Blog, December 3, 2018. https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival-blog/2018/12/iran-missile- test. Hamid, Shadi. ‘From the Arab Spring Comes a More Unified Gulf Cooperation Council’, Brookings Institution Opinions, April 15, 2011. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/from- the-arab-spring-comes-a-more-unified-gulf-cooperation-council/. Knights, Michael. ‘Lessons from the UAE War in Yemen’, Lawfare, August 18, 2019. https://www.lawfareblog.com/lessons-uae-war-yemen.

348

Mello, Alex and Michael Knights, ‘West of Suez for the United Arab Emirates’, War on the Rocks, September 2, 2016. https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/west-of-suez-for-the- united-arab-emirates/. Mottaghi, Lili. ‘The Problem of Unemployment in the Middle East and North Africa explained in Three Charts’, The World Bank – Voices and Views: Middle East and North Africa, August 25, 2014. http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/problem-unemployment-middle-east-and- north-africa-explained-three-charts. Partrick, Neil. ‘The UAE’s War Aims in Yemen’, Sada Blog – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 24, 2017. http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/73524. Prelec, Tena. ‘The UAE’s presence in the Balkans: Commercial interest, geopolitical calculations, or a meeting point between ‘sultanism’ and authoritarianism?’, LSE Blogs, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/07/11/the-uaes-presence-in-the-balkans/ Sim, Li-Chen. ‘Russia and the UAE are now Strategic Partners: What’s Next?’, LobeLog, June 7, 2018. https://lobelog.com/russia-and-the-uae-are-now-strategic-partners-whats-next/. Young, Michael. ‘Punching above its weight’, interview of Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Diwan, Carnegie Middle East Center, June 29, 2020, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/82200. Zenko, Micah. ‘Obama’s War of Choice: Supporting the Saudi-led Air War in Yemen’, The Council on Foreign Relations Blog, September 25, 2015. https://www.cfr.org/blog/obamas- war-choice-supporting-saudi-led-air-war-yemen.

Speeches/Testimonies/Lectures Carter, Ash. ‘Remarks on the Next Phase of the U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific.’ Speech, McCain Institute, Arizona State University, Tempe, April 6, 2015. https://dod.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606660/. ‘Remarks by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon – As prepared for delivery.’ Speech, The White House, Washington DC, November 15, 2012. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/15/remarks-national- security-advisor-tom-donilon-prepared-delivery. Donilon, Tom. ‘The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013.’ Speech, Asia Society, New York, March 11, 2013. https://asiasociety.org/new-york/complete-transcript-thomas- donilon-asia-society-new-york. Flynn, Stephen E. ‘The DP World Controversy and the Ongoing Vulnerability of U.S. Seaports.’ Testimony – Prepared Remarks, Washington DC, March 2, 2006. https://www.cfr.org/report/dp-world-controversy-and-ongoing-vulnerability-us-seaports- prepared-remarks. Jafarzadeh, Alireza. ‘New Information on Top Secret Projects of the Iranian Regime’s Nuclear Program.’ Speech, Washington DC, August 14, 2002.

349 https://www.iranwatch.org/library/ncri-new-information-top-secret-nuclear-projects-8-14- 02. Katzman, Kenneth. ‘The Gulf Cooperation Council Camp David Summit: Any Results?’ Statement, Hearing, Washington DC, July 9, 2015. https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20150709/103726/HHRG-114-FA13-Wstate- KatzmanK-20150709.pdf. Khamenei, Ali. Speech on Student’s Day, November 4, 2002. http://english.khamenei.ir/news/152/Leader-s-Speech-on-Students-Day. Khamenei, Ali. Speech to Iran’s Assembly of Experts, Tehran, September 15, 2010. http://english.khamenei.ir/news/1416/Leader-s-View-of-Islamic-Awakening. Khamenei, Ali. Speech to Officials and Ambassadors of Islamic Countries on Mab’ath, May 16, 2015. http://english.khamenei.ir/news/2069/Leader-s-Speech-to-Officials-and- Ambassadors-of-Islamic-Countries. Khomeini, Ruhollah. ‘We shall confront the world with our ideology.’ Speech, Radio Tehran, Tehran, March 21, 1980. Leaf, Barbara A. Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, September 10, 2014. https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Leaf_Testimony.pdf. Menendez, Bob. Speech, Seton Hall University, New Jersey, August 18, 2015. https://www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/menendez-delivers-remarks- on-iran-nuclear-deal-at-seton-hall-universitys-school-of-diplomacy-and-international- relations. Obama, Barack. Inaugural address, Washington DC, January 20, 2009. https://www.npr.org/2010/12/02/99590481/transcript-barack-obama-s-inaugural-address. Obama, Barack. ‘In Celebration of Nowruz.’ Videotaped remarks, The White House, Washington DC, March 20, 2009. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press- office/videotaped-remarks-president-celebration-nowruz. Obama, Barack. Speech to Turkish Parliament, Ankara, April 6, 2009. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/06/us/politics/06obama-text.html. Obama, Barack. ‘A New Beginning.’ Speech, Cairo University, Cairo, June 4, 2009. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo- university-6-04-09. Obama, Barack. ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall.’ Speech, The White House, Washington DC, November 14, 2009. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-suntory-hall. Obama, Barack. Speech on Afghanistan, CNN, December 2, 2009. http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/12/01/obama.afghanistan.speech.transcript/index.ht ml.

350

Obama, Barack. ‘Remarks by the President on the Situation in Egypt.’ Speech, The White House – Office of the Press Secretary, February 1, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/01/remarks-president- situation-egypt Obama, Barack. ‘Remarks by President Obama at APEC CEO Business Sumit Q&A.’ Speech, The White House, Hawaii, November 12, 2011. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2011/11/12/remarks-president-obama-apec-ceo-business-summit-qa. Obama, Barack. ‘Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament.’ Speech, Australian Parliament, Canberra, November 17, 2011. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president- obama-australian-parliament. Obama, Barack. ‘Remarks by President Obama to U.S. and Australian Service Members.’ Speech, Royal Army Air Force Base, Darwin, November 17, 2011. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president- obama-us-and-australian-service-members. Obama, Barack. ‘Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly.’ Speech, United Nations, New York, September 24, 2013. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/24/remarks-president- obama-address-united-nations-general-assembly. Nixon, Richard. ‘Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam.’ Speech, November 3, 1969. https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2017/09/address-nation-war-vietnam-november-3- 1969/. Truman, Harry S. ‘Address before a Joint Session of Congress.’ Speech, Congress, Washington DC, March 12, 1947. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp.

Government publications Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry. Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry. Manama, November 23, 2011. http://www.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf.

Blanchard, Christopher M. ‘Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations’, Congressional Research Service Reports (18 November 2009). https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20091118_RL31718_f090d7756f138ca45c5b163084f 4e52bc6450975.pdf. Council of the League of Arab States, Resolution 7360, extraordinary session, Cairo, March 12, 2011. http://responsI.B.ilitytoprotect.org/Arab%20League%20Ministerial%20level%20statement% 2012%20march%202011%20-%20english(1).pdf.

351

Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Washington DC. GCC leaders conclude 32nd Session of Supreme Council. Press Statement, Washington DC, December 21, 2011. https://www.saudiembassy.net/news/gcc-leaders-conclude-32nd-session-supreme-council. French Ministry of Defence. France and Security in the Asia-Pacific. Defence White Paper, Paris (April 2013). https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/261113/3194598/file/PlaquetteAsiePacifi que2014ENBD.pdf. Garamone, Jim. ‘U.S. Asia-Pacific Presence ‘Healthy, Robust, Valuable’, Dunford Says’, DOD News, Defense Media Activity, June 4, 2017. https://www.jcs.mil/Media/News/News- Display/Article/1202842/us-asia-pacific-presence-healthy-robust-valuable-dunford-says/. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Statements by Iranian leaders on America and Israel. Tel Aviv, September 21, 2015. https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Iran/Pages/Statements-by- Iranian-leaders-on-America-and-Israel-Sept-2015.aspx.

Katzman, Kenneth. ‘The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E): Issues for U.S. Policy’, Congressional Research Service reports (2012). Katzman, Kenneth. ‘The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for US Policy’, Congressional Research Service Reports (25 September 2014). Katzman, Kenneth. ‘The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E): Issues for U.S. Policy’, Congressional Research Service reports (28 November 2016). Katzman, Kenneth. ‘The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for US Policy’, Congressional Research Service Reports (2 November 2017). Katzman, Kenneth. ‘Iran’s Foreign and Defence Policies’, Congressional Research Service Report (7 November 2017). Katzman, Kenneth. ‘Oman: Reform, Security and U.S. Policy’, Congressional Research Service Reports (30 August 2018). Kennan, George. The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State. Telegram, Washington DC, February 22, 1946. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116178.pdf. Kremlin. Declaration on the strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and the United Arab Emirates. Moscow, June 1, 2018. http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5309. Manyin, Mark E., Stephen Daggett, Ben Dolven, Susan V. Lawrence, Michael F. Martin, Ronald O’Rourke, Bruce Vaughn. ‘Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ toward Asia’, Congressional Research Service Reports (28 March 2012). Marshall Jr., Tyrone C. ‘Pacific Pathways Increases Readiness Through Partnership’, DOD News, October 15, 2014, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/603461/ Mills, Claire. ‘ISIS/Daesh: The Military Response in Iraq and Syria’, House of Commons Library Briefing Paper, No. 06995 (1 August 2016).

352

Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership, Washington DC, May 23, 2005. https://2001- 2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/2005/46628.htm. Office of the White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington DC, September 2002. https://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html. Panel of Experts on Libya. Final report of the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011), UN Security Council, New York, June 1, 2017. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1711623.pdf. Rhodes, Ben and Jeff Prescott. Press Call on the Upcoming Visit of King Salman of Saudi Arabia, Washington DC, September 2, 2015. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2015/09/03/press-call-ben-rhodes-deputy-national-security-advisor-strategic. The Berlin Conference on Libya, Conference Conclusions, Press Release, Berlin, January 19, 2010. https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/the-berlin-conference-on-lI.B.ya- 1713882. The Constitution of Japan, November 3, 1946. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html. The Constitution of the United Arab Emirates, 1996. http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ae/ae030en.pdf The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Vienna, July 14, 2015. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf. The Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). Geneva, November 24, 2011. http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/Joint_plan_24Nov2013.pdf. Thomas, Clayton. ‘Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy’, US Congressional Research Service Reports (11 October 2017). UN Security Council Press Office. ‘Security Council Imposes Additional Sanctions on Iran, Voting 12 in Favour to 2 Against, with 1 Abstention’, UNSC press release, SC/9948, June 9, 2010. https://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc9948.doc.htm.

UAE embassy to the US. ‘UAE and Allies Launch Operation Against ISIL’, Press Statement, Washington DC, 2014. https://www.uae-embassy.org/news-media/uae-and-allies-launch- operation-against-isil.

UAE embassy to the US. ‘UAE-US Economic Relationship’, Fact Sheet, Washington DC. https://www.uae-embassy.org/uae-us-relations/key-areas- bilateral-cooperation/uae-us-economic-relationship. UN Security Council Resolution 2292 (14 June 2016): http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2292

353

UN Security Council, The Question of Bahrain, UN Security Council Resolution 278, New York, May 11, 1970. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/278. US Department of Defense. ‘U.S and UAE Hold 4th Joint Military Dialogue’, Press Release, Washington DC, April 10, 2019. https://dod.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News- Release-View/Article/1811503/us-and-uae-hold-4th-joint-military-dialogue/. US Senate Hearing. Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Harry B. Harries Jr., U.S. Navy, Nominee to be Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. Washington DC, 2014. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Harris_12-02-14.pdf.

Wikileaks Cables US Embassy in the UAE. ‘UAE Officials Query Deputy Secretary Armitage on Arab Media Iraq, and Israel.’ Wikileaks Cable, April 28, 2004. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04ABUDHABI1344_a.html. US Embassy in the UAE. ‘Local Views on Prospects for UAE’, Wikileaks Cable, September 16, 2004. http://wikileaks.wikimee.org/cable/2004/09/04ABUDHABI3210.html. US Embassy in the UAE. ‘General Abizaid Meeting with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Dubai Crown Prince.’ Wikileaks Cable, January 2, 2006. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06DUBAI10_a.html. US Embassy in the UAE. ‘U/S Burns’ January 22 Meeting with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and UAE Foreign Minister.’ Wikileaks Cable, January 24, 2007. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07ABUDHABI97_a.html. US Embassy in the UAE. ‘March 11 Gulf Security Dialogue and March 12 Joint Military Committee with UAE.’ Wikileaks Cable, March 6, 2008. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08ABUDHABI296_a.html. US Embassy in the UAE. ‘Strong Words in Private from MBZ at IDEX – Bashes Iran, Qatar, Russia.’ Wikileaks Cable, February 25, 2009. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUDHABI193_a.html. US Embassy in the UAE. ‘MBZ Hosts Gulf Security Dinner with Isa Asd Vershbow And PM A/S Shapiro.’ Wikileaks Cable, July 23, 2009. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUDHABI746_a.html US Embassy in the UAE. ‘Scene-setter for the President’s Meeting with Shaykh Mohammed Bin Zayed.’ Wikileaks Cable, August 31, 2009. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUDHABI862_a.html. US Embassy in the UAE. ‘A Long Hot Summer for UAE-Saudi Relations.’ Wikileaks Cable, October 29, 2009. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUDHABI981_a.html.

354

US Embassy in the UAE. ‘Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Warns DOE DepSec Poneman About Iran.’ Wikileaks Cable, December 17, 2009. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL0912/S00001/cablegate-abu-dhabi-crown-prince- warns-doe-depsec-poneman-about-iran.htm. US Embassy in the UAE. ‘US-UAE Cooperation Against Taliban Finance Continues.’ Wikileaks Cable, January 24, 2010. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10ABUDHABI27_a.html.

Polls Pew Research Center. ‘Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years (2001-2008)’, Poll, December 18, 2008. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2008/12/18/global-public-opinion-in-the- bush-years-2001-2008/. Zogby Research Services. ‘Today’s Middle East: Pressures and Challenges’, Poll, Report prepared for the Sir Bani Yas Forum, November 2014. .https://assets.nationbuilder.com/aai/pages/7880/attachments/original/1431629755/Sir%2 52520Bani%252520Yas%2525202014%25252011-01.pdf?1431629755 Zogby Research Services. ‘Middle East 2016: Current Conditions and the Road Ahead’, , Poll, Report prepared for the Sir Bani Yas Forum, November 2016. https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/aai/pages/12021/attachments/original/148175196 2/SBY2016_FINAL.pdf?1481751962.

Databases SPIRI Arms Transfer Database, https://sipri.org/databases/armstransfers

355