Evolving Role of the Courts: Constitutional Review of Legislation Under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
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EVOLVING ROLE OF THE COURTS: CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990 By Charlotte Connell A dissertation submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 2010 CONTENTS I INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................ 5 A NEW ZEALAND’S CONSTITUTION ................................................................................................... 7 1 Orthodox view of New Zealand’s constitution .......................................................................... 7 2 Constitutional realist view of New Zealand’s constitution ..................................................... 11 B AN INTRODUCTION TO HANSEN ................................................................................................... 12 C LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION ........................................................ 14 II LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW .................................................. 16 A MODELS OF LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW ................................................... 16 B LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR REVIEW OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE BILL OF RIGHTS ACT ................... 18 1 Section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act targeted at Legislature and Executive .............................. 20 2 Section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act precludes review of legislation ......................................... 21 3 Current approach to section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act .......................................................... 23 C REVIEW OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE BILL OF RIGHTS ACT AS CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW .......... 26 1 Bill of Rights Act not entrenched ............................................................................................ 28 2 Bill of Rights Act not supreme law ......................................................................................... 29 3 Preservation of legislative supremacy: section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act ............................. 30 D CONSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS ACT IN PRACTICE ................................... 31 III PERFORMANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW ............................................................. 35 A PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO INTERPRETATION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS ACT ................................ 37 1 The purposive approach to interpreting rights ....................................................................... 39 2 Purposive approach to interpreting the legislative provision on the right ............................. 44 3 Assessing the effect of the legislative provision on the right .................................................. 46 B CHALLENGES FOR THE PURPOSIVE APPROACH IN RELATION TO THE BILL OF RIGHTS ACT ........... 50 1 Evidence of purpose ............................................................................................................... 50 2 Judicial discussion of the nature of a right is essential .......................................................... 51 3 Altering the application of the Bill of Rights Act to a right .................................................... 52 4 Scope of the right .................................................................................................................... 54 5 Interpretation and section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act ............................................................. 55 6 Concluding observations ........................................................................................................ 58 C PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................... 59 1 Assessing the value and importance of an objective ............................................................... 64 2 Judicial analysis of the policy options .................................................................................... 66 3 Balancing of the public interests ............................................................................................ 72 D PRUDENT USE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND RESTRAINT .............................................................. 78 1 Principle of institutional capacity and judicial deference ...................................................... 80 2 Principle of legitimacy and judicial restraint ......................................................................... 83 3 Proportionality test, intensity of review, and deference ......................................................... 84 E CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND DECLARATIONS OF INCONSISTENCY ............................................ 86 IV NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PARADIGM ................................................................................... 96 1 Conceptual weakness with the orthodox view ........................................................................ 96 2 Alternative paradigms for the relationship between Parliament and the courts .................... 99 V CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 103 VI BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................ 105 A PRIMARY SOURCES .................................................................................................................... 105 1 New Zealand case law .......................................................................................................... 105 2 New Zealand legislation ....................................................................................................... 105 3 Case law from other jurisdictions ........................................................................................ 105 4 Legislation from other jurisdictions ..................................................................................... 106 B SECONDARY MATERIALS ........................................................................................................... 106 1 Texts and other official sources ............................................................................................ 106 2 Journal articles..................................................................................................................... 107 4 Abstract The constitutional landscape in New Zealand has undergone significant change over the last 20- 35 years to improve the transparency and accountability of decision-making in the three branches of government. While most of these changes are a direct result of legislation, the constitutional role of the court has also been evolving and has seen the development of judicial review of the substance of the law for consistency with the New Zealand constitution. The orthodox view of the constitution is heavily critical of judicial, or constitutional, review of legislation by the courts and considers it to be an illegitimate encroachment on the domain of Parliament. This paper explores the legitimacy of constitutional review of legislation by the courts, specifically constitutional review of legislation under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the Bill of Rights Act). To be legitimate, constitutional review by the courts must have both legal authority and be performed consistently with the constitution. This paper observes that s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act has been employed by the courts, without interference from Parliament, to review legislation for consistency with that Act and that the courts use the purposive approach to interpretation and the proportionality analysis to perform such review consistently with the constitution. Finally, the paper explores whether the developing jurisdiction of constitutional review necessitates a new paradigm to define the constitutional relationship between the courts and Parliament because the orthodox view of New Zealand’s constitution is no longer supportable as the definitive position. Word length The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, and bibliography) comprises approximately 35,650 words. Subjects and Topics Constitutional Review of Legislation New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 Declarations of inconsistency Judicial deference and restraint to Parliament Human Rights 5 I INTRODUCTION New Zealand’s constitution is a creature of “pragmatic evolution”,1 and it is no surprise that the New Zealand constitution has evolved to accommodate the courts to performing constitutional review of legislation under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the Bill of Rights Act).2 Constitutional review under the Bill of Rights Act is legitimate not only by virtue of the legal authority for it conferred by s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act but also because the courts perform it consistently with the New Zealand constitution. Constitutional review under the Bill of Rights Act is holding its ground despite the challenges it presents to the orthodox view of the constitution suggesting it is timely for a new paradigm to describe the constitutional relationship between the courts and Parliament is necessary. The orthodox view of the relationship between Parliament and the courts places Parliament as the ultimate lawmaker and restricts the courts’ role to that of interpreting and applying the law specifically excluding the ability of the courts to examine the substance