Rising Nuclear Risk, Disarmament and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

HOUSE OF LORDS Select Committee on International Relations 7th Report of Session 2017–19 Rising nuclear risk, disarmament and the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty Ordered to be printed 3 April 2019 and published 24 April 2019 Published by the Authority of the House of Lords HL Paper 338 Select Committee on International Relations The select Committee on International Relations is appointed by the House of Lords in each session “to investigate the United Kingdom’s International Relations”. Membership The Members of the Select Committee on International Relations are: Baroness Anelay of St Johns Lord Howell of Guildford (Chairman) Baroness Coussins Lord Jopling Lord Grocott Lord Purvis of Tweed Lord Hannay of Chiswick Lord Reid of Cardowan Baroness Helic Baroness Smith of Newnham Baroness Hilton of Eggardon Lord Wood of Anfield Declaration of interests See Appendix 1. A full list of Members’ interests can be found in the Register of Lords’ Interests: http://www. parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/standards-and-interests/register-of-lords- interests Publications All publications of the Committee are available at: http://www.parliament.uk/intl-relations Parliament Live Live coverage of debates and public sessions of the Committee’s meetings are available at: http://www.parliamentlive.tv Further information Further information about the House of Lords and its Committees, including guidance to witnesses, details of current inquiries and forthcoming meetings is available at: http://www. parliament.uk/business/lords Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Eva George (Clerk), Joseph Dobbs (Policy Analyst) and Thomas Cullen (Committee Assistant). Contact details All correspondence should be addressed to the International Relations Committee Office, House of Lords, London SW1A 0PW. Telephone 020 7219 7412. Email hlinttlrelations@ parliament.uk. Twitter You can follow the Committee on Twitter: @LordsIRCom. CONTENTS Page Summary 4 Chapter 1: Introduction 7 Figure 1: Global nuclear weapons inventories, 2018 8 This report 9 Chapter 2: The causes of nuclear risk 11 Multipolarity and inter-state competition 12 Dialogue and communication 14 Non-state actors 15 Technological development 16 ‘Tactical’ nuclear weapons 16 Dual-capable systems and entanglement 17 Emerging technologies 17 Nuclear modernisation and risk 19 Managing technological change 20 Digital communication, rhetoric and risk 21 Nuclear doctrine and declaratory policy 21 Box 1: Nuclear possessor states’ declaratory policies 22 Figure 2: The UK’s nuclear deterrent 24 Ambiguity 24 Misinterpretation of doctrine and miscalculation 25 The Reagan–Gorbachev doctrine 26 Chapter 3: The NPT and the wider non-proliferation regime 28 The NPT and its bargain 28 Box 2: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 28 The pillars of the NPT 29 The wider regime 30 Box 3: The wider regime 31 Verification and safeguards 33 The P5 process 36 Box 4: The P5 process 36 Assessing the NPT regime 39 Non-proliferation 39 Peaceful uses 42 Disarmament 44 Figure 3: Estimated global nuclear warhead inventories, 1945–2018 44 Nuclear modernisation programmes 46 Russia 47 The US 47 China 48 The UK 48 France 49 Nuclear possessor states outside the NPT 49 A Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone 50 Figure 4: Nuclear-weapon-free zones 51 The history of a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone 51 The reasons for failure to agree a WMD-Free Zone 53 Towards a conference in 2019? 54 Dissatisfaction of Non-Nuclear Weapon States 55 The Humanitarian Impacts initiative 55 The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (the Ban Treaty) 56 Box 5: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (the Ban Treaty) 56 The negotiation of the Ban Treaty 58 Assessment of the Ban Treaty 58 Box 6: Safeguards in the Ban Treaty 61 The UK’s approach to the Ban Treaty 62 Chapter 4: Challenges to non-proliferation and arms control 66 The Iran nuclear deal 66 Box 7: The Iran nuclear deal 67 Europe’s support 68 China and Russia 69 Sanctions 69 Box 8: Sanctions on Iran and the Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges 71 The future of the Iran deal 72 North Korea 73 Box 9: History of North Korea’s nuclear programme 73 US–North Korea negotiations 74 Role of the UK 76 Other regional powers 76 North Korea, Iran and the wider non-proliferation regime 77 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 78 Figure 5: Most recent nuclear tests of the nuclear possessor states 78 Box 10: The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 79 The Conference on Disarmament 81 A fissile material cut-off treaty 81 Figure 6: Global stockpiles of fissile materials 82 Box 11: A fissile material cut-off treaty 83 Arms control agreements 84 The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 85 Box 12: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 85 The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 90 Box 13: New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 90 The future of arms control 91 Box 14: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 92 Chapter 5: The 2020 NPT Review Conference 95 Previous Review Conferences 95 The UK’s influence and approach 96 Challenges and opportunities for the 2020 Review Conference 96 Objectives for RevCon 97 Influence 97 UK approach 98 UK leadership as the chair of the P5 process 98 The ‘Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament’ initiative 102 Box 15: The US ‘Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament’ initiative 102 Summary of conclusions and recommendations 104 Appendix 1: List of Members and declarations of interest 110 Appendix 2: List of witnesses 112 Appendix 3: Call for evidence 118 Appendix 4: Glossary of terms 120 Evidence is published online at https://www.parliament.uk/npt-nuclear- disarmament and available for inspection at the Parliamentary Archives (020 7219 3074). Q in footnotes refers to a question in oral evidence. 4 RISING NUCLEAR RISK SUMMARY The risk of the use of nuclear weapons has increased, in the context of rising inter-state competition, a more multipolar world, and the development of new capabilities and technologies. There are serious tensions between some of the nine nuclear possessor states—the five states the legitimacy of whose possession of nuclear weapons was recognised by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom and the United States), the three states which never signed the NPT (India, Israel and Pakistan) and North Korea, which signed the NPT but nevertheless developed such weapons. Irresponsible rhetoric, combined with a lack of communication between nuclear possessor states, creates serious risks of nuclear use due to misinterpretation and miscalculation. The benign circumstances which subsisted for nearly 25 years after the end of the Cold War, during which the risk of the use of nuclear weapons ceased to be a priority challenge to the international community, have ended. We conclude that the nuclear possessor states should commit to the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and do all they can to reduce global tensions, support nuclear non-proliferation, and pursue nuclear disarmament. Dialogue between the nuclear possessor states is also essential. In particular, notwithstanding current tensions, the Government and NATO should be prepared to talk to Russia about nuclear strategic stability. The maintenance of the existing international nuclear regime is of critical importance to long-term efforts to reduce the risks inherent in the possession of nuclear weapons. At the core of the regime is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which has three pillars—non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and disarmament. Since its entry into force in 1970 only one of its non-nuclear signatories—North Korea—has developed a deliverable nuclear weapon. The next Review Conference of the NPT will be held in 2020, marking 50 years since the treaty entered into force, and will be an opportunity to take stock of progress towards its goals. The NPT has had important successes that should be lauded, including limiting the number of nuclear possessor states and enabling the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. However, while reductions in nuclear stockpiles since the 1980s should be welcomed, it is clear that—largely as a result of the worsening security environment—global progress towards disarmament has stalled. The programmes of some nuclear possessor states go well beyond what can properly be described as modernisation, introducing new capabilities, particularly in the field of so-called tactical nuclear weapons, which could potentially increase nuclear risk. The lack of progress in the disarmament pillar of the NPT has led to considerable dissatisfaction, and contributed to the decision of some Non- Nuclear Weapon States to negotiate a treaty banning nuclear weapons. In advance of the 2020 NPT Review Conference we urge the Government to seek to reduce tensions between Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States. While we accept that UK will remain opposed to the Ban Treaty, its proponents have legitimate concerns about the pace of disarmament and nuclear risk, and the Government should adopt a less aggressive tone towards the treaty and its supporters. We also call on the Government to continue to support work towards the forthcoming UN conference on a Weapons of Mass Destruction- Free Zone in the Middle East, and encourage Israel to participate.We are concerned that global nuclear non-proliferation efforts have been undermined RISING NUCLEAR RISK 5 by the US’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal. This is against the interests of the UK. We welcome the Government’s robust defence of the deal, and its co-operation with European partners to find ways to preserve it. North Korea’s nuclear programme is also a serious concern, and we welcome efforts to seek a diplomatic solution. The entry into force of treaties concerning nuclear testing and fissile material would contribute to the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda.

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