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Campos V. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3D 1166 (1998) 1998-1 Trade Cases P 72,112

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Campos V. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3D 1166 (1998) 1998-1 Trade Cases P 72,112 Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166 (1998) 1998-1 Trade Cases P 72,112 Decided April 10, 1998. KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment Buyers of tickets to large-scale popular music concerts Declined to Extend by Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 4th Cir.(Md.), brought antitrust action under Clayton Act against October 28, 2002 alleged monopoly supplier of ticket distribution services. 140 F.3d 1166 The United States District Court for the Eastern District United States Court of Appeals, of Missouri, Stephen Limbaugh, J., dismissed action on Eighth Circuit. standing grounds, and buyers appealed. The Court of Appeals, Melloy, Chief District Judge, held that: (1) Alex CAMPOS; Dania Campos; Albert Alfonso, buyers were indirect purchasers and did not have standing Individually and on behalf of all others to sue supplier for money damages under Clayton Act; (2) similarly situated; Plaintiffs/Appellants, buyers had antitrust standing to seek injunctive relief; and v. (3) affidavit of supplier's officer was insufficient to show TICKETMASTER CORPORATION; that supplier did not transact business in states in which Defendant/Appellee. its subsidiaries were located, for purposes of Clayton Act's Stephen HINES; Dirk Schnable; Todd venue provision. Vicsik; Jamie Saltzman; Mike Ellis; Brad Cheskes; Suzanne Crawford, on behalf of Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. themselves and on behalf of a class of persons Morris Sheppard Arnold, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting similarly situated; Plaintiffs/Appellants, opinion. v. TICKETMASTER CORPORATION; Defendant/Appellee. Joseph CROWLEY, Individually and on behalf of West Headnotes (12) all others similarly situated; Plaintiff/Appellant, v. [1] Antitrust and Trade Regulation TICKETMASTER CORPORATION; Indirect purchasers Defendant/Appellee. Antitrust and Trade Regulation Tony STEPHENS, Individually and on behalf of Persons liable all others similarly situated; Plaintiff/Appellant, An “indirect purchaser” is one who bears v. some portion of a monopoly overcharge TICKETMASTER CORPORATION; only by virtue of an antecedent transaction Defendant/Appellee. between the monopolist and another, Ebon PETTY; Arlean Azzo; John Azzo; Scott independent purchaser. Clayton Act, § 4, 15 Henry Buettner; Scott J. Freedland; Brian Homer; U.S.C.A. § 15. Roger Hutton; Garrett Pfetzing; Christopher W. 7 Cases that cite this headnote Quinn; Thomas Rockov; James Stewart; Hilary Tompkins, on behalf of themselves and others, [2] Antitrust and Trade Regulation in a class to be certified; Plaintiffs/Appellants, Indirect purchasers v. Indirect purchasers who bear some portion TICKETMASTER CORPORATION; of a monopoly overcharge only by virtue Defendant/Appellee. of an antecedent transaction between No. 96–2883. the monopolist and another, independent | purchaser may not sue under Clayton Act Submitted Feb. 14, 1997. to recover damages for the portion of the | overcharge they bear; the right to sue for damages rests with the direct purchasers, who © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166 (1998) 1998-1 Trade Cases P 72,112 participate in the antecedent transaction with services had antitrust standing to seek the monopolist. Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C.A. injunctive relief under Clayton Act, although § 15. they were indirect purchasers of supplier's services; all buyers claimed to have purchased 10 Cases that cite this headnote tickets through supplier and to have paid monopolistic service fees. Clayton Act, § 5, 15 [3] Antitrust and Trade Regulation U.S.C.A. § 16. Indirect purchasers 20 Cases that cite this headnote In Eighth Circuit, an antitrust plaintiff cannot avoid the Illinois Brick direct purchaser rule by characterizing a direct purchaser as a party [7] Antitrust and Trade Regulation to the antitrust violation, unless the direct Venue purchaser is joined as a defendant. Clayton When venue is asserted over a parent Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15. corporation on the basis of a subsidiary's business activities, the question is whether 9 Cases that cite this headnote the parent exercises sufficient control over its subsidiary to cause the parent to transact [4] Federal Courts business in the judicial district within the Proceedings by transferee court; special venue provision of the Clayton Act. improper change Clayton Act, § 12, 15 U.S.C.A. § 22. Consolidated antitrust cases were controlled Cases that cite this headnote by the law of circuit into which they were transferred, rather than that of the various circuits in which they were first filed. [8] Antitrust and Trade Regulation Venue 11 Cases that cite this headnote Sufficient control over the operations of a subsidiary renders the subsidiary [5] Antitrust and Trade Regulation the instrument, rather than merely the Indirect purchasers investment, of the parent, and supports the conclusion that the parent is transacting Buyers of tickets to large-scale popular music business in a district for purposes of the concerts that were distributed by alleged Clayton Act's venue provision, despite the monopoly supplier of ticket distribution formal separation of corporate entities. services were indirect purchasers and did Clayton Act, § 12, 15 U.S.C.A. § 22. not have standing to sue supplier for money damages under Clayton Act; buyers Cases that cite this headnote purchased supplier's services only because concert venues were required to buy those services first as alleged result of supplier's [9] Antitrust and Trade Regulation long term exclusive contracts with concert Venue promoters. Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15. Sufficient control necessary for parent corporation to transact business in 6 Cases that cite this headnote subsidiary's district under Clayton Act's venue provision does not require that the subsidiary [6] Antitrust and Trade Regulation be controlled to an ultimate degree by its Consumers parent, although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required. Buyers of tickets to large-scale popular music Clayton Act, § 12, 15 U.S.C.A. § 22. concerts that were distributed by alleged monopoly supplier of ticket distribution © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166 (1998) 1998-1 Trade Cases P 72,112 Cases that cite this headnote Attorneys and Law Firms *1168 George W.Sampson, Seattle, WA, argued (Steve [10] Antitrust and Trade Regulation W. Berman, Seattle, WA, on the brief), for Plaintiffs/ Venue Appellants. Parent must have and exercise control and direction over the affairs of its subsidiary in Phil C. Neal, Chicago, IL, argued (James K. Gardner, order for venue in subsidiary's district to be Charles Evans Gerber, Chicago, IL, Francis P. Barron, proper under Clayton Act. Clayton Act, § 12, New York City, David W. Harlan, Michael A. Kahn, St. 15 U.S.C.A. § 22. Louis, MO, on the brief), for Defendant/Appellee. Cases that cite this headnote Before HANSEN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and MELLOY, 1 Chief District Judge. [11] Antitrust and Trade Regulation Venue Opinion Day-to-day control of the activities of the subsidiary is not required in order for a parent MELLOY, Chief District Judge. corporation to be carrying on business of The plaintiffs, individually and as a proposed class any substantial character within a judicial of popular music fans, sued Ticketmaster Corporation district, for purposes of Clayton Act's venue (“Ticketmaster”) for damages and injunctive relief. provision; it is enough if the parent exercises Sixteen cases, originally filed in various districts, were continuing supervision of and intervention consolidated for pretrial proceedings in the Eastern in the subsidiaries' affairs, especially if the District of Missouri. Eleven of the cases were dismissed. parent exercises its ability to influence major The plaintiffs in the remaining five cases then filed decisions of the subsidiary which lead or a consolidated complaint superseding the individual could lead to violations of the antitrust laws. complaints. The consolidated complaint alleged that Clayton Act, § 12, 15 U.S.C.A. § 22. Ticketmaster violated § 1 of the Sherman Act by engaging 2 Cases that cite this headnote in price fixing with various concert venues and promoters and by boycotting the band Pearl Jam; that Ticketmaster violated § 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing, [12] Antitrust and Trade Regulation or attempting to monopolize, the market for ticket Venue distribution services; and that Ticketmaster violated § 7 Affidavit of corporation's officer that of the Clayton Act by acquiring its competitors. See 15 corporation owned no property and had no U.S.C. § 1 et seq. The plaintiffs claimed standing to sue offices in states in which its subsidiaries were based on their payment of monopoly overcharges, in the located and that all day-to-day operations form of service and handling fees, for Ticketmaster's ticket of subsidiaries were under control of distribution services. subsidiaries' officers was insufficient to show that corporation did not transact business The district court dismissed the suit, holding that the in those states for purposes of Clayton plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because they were indirect Act's venue provision. Clayton Act, § 12, 15 purchasers within the meaning of Illinois Brick Co. v. U.S.C.A. § 22. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977) and its progeny. The district court also held Cases that cite this headnote that, even if the plaintiffs were not indirect purchasers, they were nevertheless inappropriate plaintiffs under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166 (1998) 1998-1 Trade Cases P 72,112 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983). Finally, the district court held that plaintiffs contend that they suffer injury to their property three of the consolidated cases had been improperly within the meaning of Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 venued, and dismissed the cases originally filed in Georgia, U.S.C.
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