Securitization of Energy in Poland Under the Pis Government

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Securitization of Energy in Poland under the PiS Government

Bachelor's Thesis

LORNA RADTKE

Supervisor: Mgr. et Mgr. Veronika Zapletalová, Ph.D.

Department of International Relations and European Studies International Relations and European Politics

Brno 2020

Bibliographic Record

Author: Lorna Radtke Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University Department of International Relations and Euro- pean Studies Title of Thesis: Securitization of Energy in Poland under the PiS Government Degree Programme: International Relations and European Politics

Supervisor: Mgr. et Mgr. Veronika Zapletalová, Ph.D. Academic Year: 2020 Number of Pages: 55 Keywords: Poland; Energy Security; Law and Justice; Central Europe; Securitization Theory; Discourse Analy- sis; Law and Justice

1 Abstract

The Law and Justice party, abbreviated as PiS, has been the leading party of the Polish national government since late 2015. The PiS party views the current state of energy security as being under threat. This research paper will examine speech acts by PiS politicians and identify who/what are perceived as threats towards Poland’s energy security. This paper will firstly identify the securitizing actors. Then, this research will employ discourse analysis through the lens of the securitization theory to identify what are the perceived threats towards energy security and establish common narratives of PiS actors.

Statutory Declaration

I hereby declare that I have written the submitted Bachelor's Thesis con- cerning the topic of Securitization of Energy in Poland under the PiS Government independently. All the sources used for the purpose of fi- nishing this thesis have been adequately referenced and are listed in the Bibliography.

In Brno 23 August 2020

...... Lorna Radtke

Acknowledgements

I would first like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Mgr. et Mgr. Veronika Zaple- talová, Ph.D., for mentoring me through the process of writing this thesis. In addition, I am immensely thankful for my parents and closest friends for giving me endless amounts of encouragement during my studies.

Table of Contents

List of Tables 7

List of Terms and Acronyms 8

1 Introduction 9

1.1 The Law and Justice Party 10

1.2 Research Questions and Objectives 11

1.3 Structure 12

2 Research Approach 13

2.1 Operationalization 13

2.2 Case Selection 14

2.3 Data Collection 15

2.4 Limitations of this research 16

3 Literature Review 19

4 Theoretical Framework 21

4.1 Security and Energy in IR studies 21

4.2 The Copenhagen School and The Securitization Theory 22

4.3 Relevant Concepts to this research 25

5 Securitizing Actors in the Law and Justice Party 28

5.1 Q1: Who are the securitizing actors? 28

5.2 Q2: What are the perceived threats? 31

6 Conclusion 38

Bibliography 40

Cited Articles 46

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1: The Securitization Process 24

Table 1: Instances of Speech Acts by PiS Politician s 30 Table 2: Perceived Threats from Articles 32

List of Terms and Acronyms

PiS – Law and Justice Party of Poland Sejm – Lower House of Parliament in Poland

1 Introduction

When speaking of the EU’s energy policy and initiatives, Poland usually stands out as one of the biggest opponents and criticizes of many of those initiatives. EU initiatives, such as the expansion of renewable energies and a coherent climate policy, have been perceived as a threat by recent governments in Poland (Szulecki, 2017: 25). Other EU gas expansion projects, notably the Nord Stream 2, has been heavily criticized by Poland and the project has been de- scribed as a threat towards Central European security (Deign, 2018)

While previous governments have treated the state of energy security as under threat, the Law and Justice Party of Poland, abbreviated as PiS (Polski: Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) have taken extraordinary measures to ensure their energy security. Extraordinary measures regarding energy security in the EU are not commonplace. (Szulecki, 2020: 6) However, one instance was meas- ured in 2016 by the PiS party. This measure in November 2016 resulted in top Polish energy companies needing to follow the instructions of the ministry “particularly related to new energy infrastructure investments, even if that meant making decisions that undermined their economic situation” (Szulecki, 2020: 6).

Their goal of achieving energy security is led by political aims that surround their energy sector. However, it is sometimes unclear the threats, goals and position that this government takes. Decarbonization has been spoken of posi- tively in some instances, meanwhile the PiS-led government continues sup- porting their struggling coal sector.

1.1 The Law and Justice Party

The Law and Justice Party (PiS) has been the leading party in the Polish government since 2015 and recently re-elected again in 2019 for another term1. The party was founded in 2001 by Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński. Jaroslaw Ka- czyński serves as the Chairman of the party. PiS is often labeled as a conservative right-wing populist party, one of the many which have increasingly gained popularity since the Great Recession. For the past two decades they have been one of the most popular political parties in Poland (Gandesha, 2018: 49). Within the European Parliament, they belong to the European Conservatives and Reformist Party which holds 62 seats. Within the Sejm, the lower house of the Polish parliament, they hold 198 seats and 44 seats within the Senate.

The shift from the Civic Platform, a liberal-conservative and pro-European party, that led a majority government from 2007 to 2011 to PiS could be explained as the consequence of the “exhaustion of a certain model of politics and not just from political errors”(Rychard, 2018: 39). The focus of PiS centers on family values and the protection of Catholicism in Poland. They are often criticized in media of their anti-LGBT agenda (BBC News, 2020). Within the EU, PiS is labeled Eurosceptic and appealed to the population after the 2015 migrant crisis in an effort for “fear-induced support” (Yermakova, 2019: 177). They have gained popularity especially in opposition to coalitions such as The Civic Coalition (Civic Platform, Modern, and The Greens) and The Left.

PiS has been criticized for making many changes to the legal system. One instance includes the passing of a law which was “designed to paralyse the con- stitutional tribunal – the country’s highest judicial body, which rules on the le- gality of government actions – by requiring the court to consider its backlog in chronological order, thereby obstructing any judgment of the present

1 However, unsuccessfully maintaining a majority in the senate. (DeutscheWelle, 2019)

government’s decisions” (Davies, 2016). These actions have called into question which extraordinary measures this political party is willing to take in order to fulfill their political agendas, even when it comes down to the disman- tling of Poland’s checks and balances judicial system.

1.2 Research Questions and Objectives

This research will investigate two central research questions. First, which PiS actors are using securitizing speech? This question will reveal which actors are present within media making securitizing speech acts. Second, what are the perceived threats towards Poland’s energy security? The second question will analyze discourse and reveal patterns among utterances of threats towards the referent object (energy security). From identifying the perceptions of threats, narratives that are being employed by PiS actors within discourse regarding energy security can be uncovered.

The topic of how speech acts are used to securitize energy security in Poland is worth researching for a few reasons. Firstly, the case of the PiS party in Po- land is one that is not researched enough. While research regarding Poland’s perception of their energy security has been conducted, there is a gap regarding how certain political parties view and securitize energy security. Secondly, there is lack of academic literature surrounding the PiS party within the Eng- lish language. Much of the scholarly literature regarding the PiS party is in the Polish language and is unavailable outside of the national Polish discussion. Thirdly, given the PiS party has such a large role within Polish national and regional politics, this research is a relevant and justifiable theme within the field of International Relations and European Politics. Studying this topic further in depth would bring more academic discussion into a topic which is mostly dominated by media coverage.

1.3 Structure

The structure of this paper will follow six sections. The first section will introduce the topic, research questions and objectives to be acheived within this paper. This paper will then move on to the second section, the research approach. This section will explain the plan and steps of data collection, definition of variables, case selection and the limitations of the research. The third section will review relevant literature on the topic of the securitization of the energy security in Poland. Within this section the reasons why more research on this topic is needed will be shown. The fourth section will introduce the evolution of energy in security studies in international relations studies. Then the securitization theory, the main perscpetive used in this research, will be explained, as well as the other academic disputes of this theory. Relevant concepts used in this research will be explained at the end of this section. The analysis and results of the research questions will be the focus of the fifth section. The two questions will be split into different sections and dicussed separately. This research will end with the conclusion, which will reflect and summarize the information discovered within this research.

2 Research Approach

2.1 Operationalization

The first methodological question to answer is what exactly discourse is. Schiffrin (2003) notes that there are three main groups of discourse definitions. Firstly, anything beyond the sentence. Secondly, the language in use, such as a conversation. Thirdly, a broader range of social practice that includes nonlinguistic and nonspecific instances of language. The third group of definitions is the most widely used definition, especially within social sci- ences.

There are different approaches to discourse analyses. Firstly, a descriptive and linguistic approach. Grammar, languages and the system which words make meanings. Second, a critical approach focused on power and ideological bend to language, and how this is used within society (Hodges, 2008). Critical discourse analysis is used to “encompass an even wider sphere that includes all of the social practices, individuals, and institutions that make it possible or legitimate to understand phenomena in a particular way, and to make certain statements about what is ‘true’” (Hodges, 2008).

Following the steps of conducting discourse analysis, analyzing the speech and making patterns is needed for showing which political narratives are being presented by members of the PiS party when making public statements. Threats become legitimized by actors through narratives (Ciovacco, 2019:48). Qualitative methods will be used when presenting data due to the subjectivity of discourse analysis. However, showing frequency of threats used and utterances by PiS actors will also employ quantitative methods.

Securitizing speech happens when a threat, urgency or need to defend and survive are explained within text by PiS politicians. When examining discourse through the view of the securitization process, narratives are framed through the socially constructed perception of the threat towards the referent object, and then legitimized by a speech act. In order to obtain the necessary information towards identifying narratives, this research will look at statements of threats. From this, it will be possible to detail how the actors present the issues surrounding the energy sector.

Threats will be identified and used to show common narratives. Narratives within discourse analyses are used as devices for understanding what exactly the theme, goals and motivations of the speech is. “People often encode into narratives the problems that concern them and their attempts to make sense or resolve these problems” (Gee, 1999: 134).

2.2 Case Selection

The government led PiS party in Poland was chosen in this research to show how securitizing speech is used to create narratives. Firstly, this case is particularly interesting in securitization studies, as Poland for the past few decades has put an extraordinarily high priority on energy security. Polish officials have been vocal about their perceptions towards national, regional, and international energy security policies. However, there has been little to no research focusing on how a Polish political party in a government perceives threats to energy security.

2.3 Data collection

The data collection part of this research is crucial in order to be able to create a robust and defendable answer to the research questions.

This paper will identify the securitizing actors and identify the existential threats and then present narratives. From this, it is possible to gain substan- tial information about the actors and their objectives and find narratives. The collected data will reflect data that supports the identification of existential threats and the responses to them.

The data collection consists of online articles. Besides personal research and known prior information, possible securitizing actors were identified using search engine result keywords. Keywords such as: ‚energy security’; ‚Poland'; ‚energy policy’ were used as they relate to the topic of the research questions and prioritized relevant information. When reviewing quotes within articles, the actors making these quotes were checked within google search engine to confirm if they were a politician belonging to the PiS party. The actors needed to have made at least three securitizing statements to be included in this research. 23 direct quotes found from 22 articles were gathered. Search engines used were ‘google’ for information on actor speech and policies.

The biggest group of news outlets which published articles used in this research focus on content world and regional news (Reuters, Deutschewelle, Eu- ronews, Euroactiv.) The second largest group publishes content on energy matters and policy (World pipelines, Powermag, World Nuclear News.) The third largest group is related to Poland's national affairs (Biznes Alert, Pol in.)

Articles within the period of 2015 to 2020 are used for this research. The time frame would be most beneficial to start in 2015 from their win in the parlia- mentary elections. Studying earlier is not as beneficial towards this study

because the PiS party did not have a majority within the government from 2005 to 2007 and were in opposition from 2007 to 2015.

First, articles were compiled with direct quotes from the period from Novem- ber 2015 to present day. 41 relevant articles were gathered at the start of the collection process. During review, articles where speech acts did not provide information about threats towards energy security were deleted. After this, 22 articles remained. From 22 articles, I was left with 23 instances of speech from PiS members which alluded to threats to energy security. A free website called ‘consider.ly’ was used to sort and label threats, themes and actors in order to recognize patterns and make groups of threats. From organizing the quotes, I was able to see which threats were widely spoken about by PiS members. From this, it was possible to establish narratives that are most prominently displayed by the PiS party.

2.4 Limitations of this research

A few of the identified actors within this research have switched positions or are not currently practicing politicians. Within late 2019, there was a restruc- turing within the minister cabinets that abolished the Ministry of Energy. There was also the creation of the Ministry of State Assets which is ran by minister Jacek Sasin. This ministry now oversees the duties of the Ministry of Energy. Krzysztof Tchórzewski was the Minister of Energy in this role until 2019. Deputy Minister of Energy Grzegorz Tobiszowski is also not currently working as an active PiS politician. Piotr Naimski, former Deputy Minister of the Economy from 2007-2008 and MP in the Sejm from 2015-2019, is also identified within this paper and is currently not an active member of the PiS party. While these actors currently are not working as elected officials, they, nonetheless, are securitizing actors and were pushing common narratives about Polish energy policies.

It is safe to say that translators, especially those that are employed within newspapers and other media organizations, are careful about which terms they use and avoid. Translators who are working within certain political con- straints may contort information and speech in a way that will agree with their organization's message (Keshavarz, 2011: 2). Therefore, looking at information which may have been translated from the original language has the possibility of viewing the issue from a manipulated stance.

While employing media discourse within the original language is the most reliable, recent developments with automated translations programs (such as Google Translate) and the overwhelming access to information from online media outlets have made the task of analyzing translated media possible. Within the political sphere, translated information is impossible to ignore and an important factor within the foundations of discourse. “It is through translation that information is made available to addressees beyond national bor- ders; and it is very frequently the case that reactions in one country to statements that were made in another country are actually reactions to the information as it was provided in translation” (Schaffner, 2004: 118).

This issue may question the effectiveness of the data and methods used in this research. However, other academic works have also employed discourse analysis by using texts that had been either manually or translated by an online media outlet. While the method in this research does not employ manual translation, it nonetheless makes the case that translated information, either by humans or programs, can still reveal ideologies of politicians. For example, in the dissertation piece “Migration discourse in the European Parliament: Boundary work and determinants” author Jan Krotký (2020) translated MEP speeches from their original languages into English in order to determine speech acts which refer to human security. From this, Krotký was able to conclude that far-right MEPs were framing migration as a threat, while left lean- ing MEP’s focused on the human rights side of migration. In relation to this

research, translated text may still reveal narratives regarding the ideologies of the PiS members.

3 Literature Review

Currently, there is a considerable amount of academic research on the securitization of the energy sector in Poland. Most research of this research argues similar narratives and threat perceptions. The most prominent and researched assumption about Polish energy security is that the focus is set on economically-efficient, stable supplies, rather than other pressing issues such as decarbonization. Polish energy security policy is known to be focused heavily on short-term plans that are economically stable, rather than investments in renewables and decarbonization (Szulecki, 2016; Heinreich, 2016; Zorlu, 2013).

The controversial situation regarding the Polish coal industry has continued to reflect not only their stance of putting economically efficiency first over decarbonization, but also their view on saving costs in the short term (Brown, 2016). The secure and cost-efficient supply of energy is a national security concern within Poland. (Glen, 2012; Weiner, 2018; Wyciszkiewicz, 2009). Threats to the secure and cost-efficient supply of energy are where academics put different emphasis.

Differences in topics between academics is which threat is perceived as the most disastrous towards the energy sector. The literature on the subject lists different energy security areas, which are the most problematic and are seen as a threat to its survival and stability. For example, many works cite that the most problematic factor relies on Russian dependence (Ceccorulli, 2019; Ka- piszewski, 2004).

Other literature on the subject points to a specific event, the Russian-Ukrai- nian gas dispute of 2009, which caused policy efforts towards diversification and less reliance on Russian gas (Weiner, 2018). It can be said that the first decade of the 21st century contained extreme events that alarmed many

Polish citizens and politicians on the state and future of the country's energy supply.

The future of nuclear energy in Poland is another theme presented by the leading coaltion as a necessary step towards energy security, which for a few decades has been hard to secure but still introduced within national energy policy (Gawlikowska-Fyk 2014). One of the main goals of the Polish Nuclear Po- wer Program was to have at least one unit of the first Polish nuclear power plant constructed by 2020 with the functioning of the power plant by 2030, the entire period of the Polish Energy Policy (Ministry of Economy, 2011).

While these narratives and threat perceptions may still appear to be present within recent discourse, these past works don’t focus on how a political party within Poland presents an issue, rather as a grouping of the government regardless of political party.

4 Theoretical Framework

Firstly, this section will try to define what energy security means. Then the introduction of the securitization theory by the Copenhagen School will be introduced in relation to this research. Then in the following sections, this research will overview the relevant concepts in this research, such as definitions within the securitization process.

4.1 Security and Energy in IR studies

The end of 1945 brought the need for security studies to expand to include new sectors and challenges that the world began to face. During the cold war era, security studies were dominated by a realist perspective that dealt with the troubles of that period, such as nuclear deterrence. According to Mearshei- mer (1990) Security is necessary in the realist context towards understanding how the world is anarchic. Mearsheimer viewed the state as the pursuer of its own survivor as „All other states are potential threats, and no international institution is capable of enforcing order or punishing powerful aggressors.“ (1990: 12). Because of this perspective towards the state as the one which must be secured and maintain its sovereignty within an anarchic world, acad- mia on security studies became quite intertwined with the concept of national security.

Over time multidisciplinary views have challenged the classic realist views of security studies and they have opened up the field to other sectors of security, such as cyber-security, environmental security and energy security. From the 1970’s oil crisis, energy has been regarded as an essential factor in the stability of a nation (Treverton, 1980). Within the past few decades, energy security is included as an extension of national security policies. Therefore, a

liberal view of energy security began to emerge that focused on the economic aspects of security rather than realists. A liberal presumption regarding energy security is that it can be secured through interdepedence (Chifu, 2014: 258).

Energy security has been attempted within literature to be defined and remains to not have a precise universal definition and is ambiguous depending on the actor. Energy security definitions vary as „narrow issues of physical supply disruption to broader ones involving the economic, environmental, and political consequences of changes to energy markets.“ (Dreyer, 2013: 1). Energy security may be perceived as a critical policy issue for one while another may perceive the oil marker as a powerful force that „actuates the state of energy security.“ (Youngho, 2006: 17).

Outside of academic literature, definitions of energy security within certain contexts have been explored. The Chairman of the Organization of the Petro- leum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in a 2008 speech defined characterists of energy security as it should be recipricol between consumers and producers, universal, cover large populations, and allow for should allow for the deploy- ment of modernized technology in a „sustainable, economic and environmen- tally-sound manner“ (El-Badri, 2008). Another example, the U.S. Air Force Energy Strategic Plan defined the goal of energy security as „having assured access to reliable supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational needs“ (Wise, 2013: 85).

4.2 The Copenhagen School and The Securitization Theory

One of the most prominent works towards understanding security studies is by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. The securitization theory by au- thors Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (1998) provided a broader perspective to

the field. This theory tries to understand how a subject, often called a referent object, becomes securitized. The securitization theory also observes the influence on crisis management and the state directly caused by security (Buzan, Waever. 1998).

The securitization theory backs the process of securitization by further inves- tigating the means and objectives. The Copenhagen School also analyzed securitization through a securitization act, often referred to as a speech act. The securitization process describes the actions of an actor making a once non- securitized object become a security issue through a securitizing act (for example, a speech act) and the acceptance of an audience (Buzan & Waever, 1998).

Figure 1 (Source: Emmers, 2011: 138)

According to Emmers (2011: 140), within each securitization, there is a security act and a political act. Emmers pulls greater attention to the political motivations of actors. When studying securitization, academics shift the focus from the perceived threat or event towards the securitizing act, aka the construction of security (Daniel, 2015: 5). An essential factor within this

relationship relies on the audience's persuasion that an object needs to be securitized, even if no threats to the object are present (Balzacq, 2005).

The securitization process can be broken down into three steps. Firstly, the identification of existential threats through a speech act; Secondly, the existential threats must also be supported by the audience. Thirdly, an emergency action towards securing the object must take place and then be analyzed. Fourth, the effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of the rules.

Within the securitization process, a few factors need to be present for an object to become a securitized matter according to Buzan (1998). Firstly, there must be a referent object, or ideal, which needs to be protected, or 'securitized.' Secondly, there must be a 'securitizing actor' that is making the action towards making the object. The actions are most often completed through speech to the audience, which is the third factor needed present in the process. An audience that gives the actor the necessary power and support to securitize once further a non-security matter. Finally, there must be the pre- sence or idea of a threat that will affect the object's security. These factors are all necessary for there to be a securitization process to take place.

Within the securitization process, different levels of analysis, such as international, national, and individual, may be used. However, it has been criticized that the securitization theory gives privilege to the security of the nation. Ac- cording to the analysis of Lipschutz (1995), security must to be read through the lens of national security. In this research, the protection of the nation is the referent subject to be secured.

Within Security: A New Framework of Analysis (1998), Buzan and Waever introduce five sectors of security- military, societal, economic, political, and environmental. Levels of analysis within each sector include international sys- tems, international subsystems (may be territorially coherent or not) actors

composed of various subgroups, subunits like bureaucracies or lobbies, and individuals. However, multiple sectors could be securitized at once.

4.3 Relevant Concepts to this research

Securitizing actor(s)

Within the securitization process, the actor(s) is the subject who takes the action of securitizing a referent object. Securitizing a referent object is completed by stating that there is an external threat(s) that will affect the refer- rent object’s stability or survival (Buzan, 1998). Essentially, to securitize a referent object, an actor must first politicize the security issue to use irregular measures outside of the regular sphere of politics. According to Buzan and Waever (1998), the threat is socially constructed and by the perception of the securitizing actor(s).

For a non-politicized object to become a security issue, the issue must first become politicized (1998: 29). It must become a "part of public policy requiring government decision, and resource allocations or, more rarely, some form of communal governance' (Buzan, 1998). The referent object is considered to be securitized when actions that are not within the usual sphere of the standard political procedure. An actor can securitize an issue by portraying the issue as a question of security.

The difference between politicization and securitization according to Buzan (1998: 29) is that politicization "means to make an issue appear to be open, a matter of choice, something that is decided upon and that therefore entails re- sponsibility, in contrast to issues that earlier could not be different or should not be put under political control."

The securitization theory presents three main actors within the process of perception of threats: firstly, the securitizing actor, the audience, and

functional actors (Buzan. 1998). Although in the case of this research the actor is a government official, actors may also include organizations and non-state actors. Weaver states that in most cases, powerful elites have the best chance of politicizing an issue by identifying a fact. He says, "by definition something is a security problem when the elites declare it so" (Waever, 1995: 54). Despite this, the Copenhagen School has attempted to include actors outside of elites as securitizing actors.

Referent object

Within the securitization theory, the referent object is the object or value that needs to be protected from threats. Within the securitization process, the referent object is the object or ideal that ultimately becomes securitized. The referent object may vary depending on which area of security is concerned. For example, within human security, the referent object that which security policy and analysis must focus on to be effective needs to be on the security of the individual (Newman, 2010: 78). However, the nation as the referent object is still overwhelmingly regarded as the focus within security studies. In this research, the security of energy in its interpreteted definition is considered the referent object. However, the energy security of the state is also considered an important segment of the security of the nation.

Speech Act

When a regular routine within a state is stable and undisturbed, actors do not make security statements. In the case of a securitizing act, utterances of security made by actors initiate a measure that takes politics from classical measures and instead employs special rules which are needed for survival (Bar- toszewicz 2016, 36). Essentially, Buzan and Waever imply that threat perception is socially constructed within the process of securitization.

An existential threat

The identification and portrayed threats can be a part of "political agendas or increase their own structural power, such as using the securitization of migration as an electoral promise, or using the securitization of terrorism to expand surveillance technologies, border controls, and detention times" (Charret, 2009: 27). As mentioned earlier in this section, the perception of threats has widened and included a more multi-sector approach in contrast to traditional studies, which mainly focus on governmental and military sectors of security. Other areas of security, such as human security, environmental, and cyber- security, have been studied as many scholars studied how these sectors became more securitized within the past few decades.

5 Securitizing Actors in the Law and Justice Party

This section will explore the PiS party members' role in the securitization of energy within Poland. This part will use the view of the securitization theory to try to answer the following questions: Who are the securitizing actors in the PiS party? What are the perceived threats to energy security and what narratives are being made by the PiS politicians?

5.1 Q1: Who are the securitizing actors?

Actors, besides state actors, could be considered non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, as well as the media (Breslin, 2018). Within the PiS party, relevant actors are state actors, as they have the power and legi- timacy to securitize. When analyzing actors, one must seek out actors who have power and influence, not just within national politics, but are able to make the connection to the audience. „Securitizing actors must have certain amount of power, official or not, that enables them to influence the construction of public opinion“ (Ignjatijevic, 2015: 13). However, securitizing actors must have some connection to the audience in order for a securitizing act to happen.

Members of the PiS party could be executive officials, members of the Sejm, as well as retired members of the party who still have influence. PM Mateusz Mo- rawiecki, Piotr Naimski, as well as previous ministers Krzysztof Tchórzewski, Grzegorz Tobiszowski, and current Minister of State Assets Jacek Sasin are all officials who could be framed as 'securitizing actors.'

These actors use specific securitizing speech within the quotes from a sample of articles. Actors that were found to be using securitizing language when speaking of energy policies on more than three occasions within search results on

the same topic were included within this research. While identifying the securitizing actors, this data revealed the perceived threats of the actors and common narratives between these actors.

Table 1 (source: author)

Mateusz Morawiecki is the most well-known PiS party actor and had 5 instances of securitizing speech. He is very insistent on the promotion and investment into the coal sector, and that is the basis of Poland's energy security (Barteszko, 2017). He is also vocal about the threat posed by Russian gas and is opposed to the Nord Stream Pipeline. Morawiecki is also a proponent of nuclear energy towards a future source of energy (Barteszko, 2017).

Former Sejm member Piotr Naimski is currently not in office, but was partici- pating for four years until 2019 and had quite a significant influence and had made many statements regarding the energy sector. He had the highest

number of securitizing speech from articles at 6 instances. For example, like Morawiecki, he also claimed that the Nord Stream pipeline was a "question of security" (Deign, 2018). He is a proponent of creating a corridor from the Świnoujście LNG terminal in Poland towards Croatia for less Russian dependence.

Krzysztof Tchórzewski ended his career as The Minister of Energy in 2019, but still made many statements expressing his stances on Poland's energy future and its stability. From 23 instances, he had spoken of threats towards energy on 4 occasions. He made many comments regarding the necessity of low-cost transition and supply of energy. Specifically, the EU climate negotia- tions were bleak in his description of Poland's budget. "Poland wants to catch up with the EU, not perish. Each percentage [of renewable energy use] means huge costs" (The First News, 2019).

Grzegorz Tobiszowski was the Deputy Minister of Energy until 2019. On 5 instances he made securitizing statements. During the research on Tobiszowski, he was found in multiple sources being a proponent of the coal industry in Po- land. "Poland must maintain a coal-based economy" (Yeo, 2018). He stated that Poland's future mix of renewables depended on the use of coal (Jakóbik, 2020).

Since the creation of the Ministry of State Assets in late 2019, Minister Jacek Sasin has used this role to also comment on the state of energy in Poland. He is vocal about the threat of Russian gas and accused Gazprom of blackmailing Poland and reducing the amount of gas to be delivered (Barteszko, 2020b). He also promotes protecting the Polish coal sector. "Polish energy security depends on coal" (Poland In, 2019). He had the smallest amount of instances of securitizing speech at 3 instances.

5.2 Q2: What are the perceived threats? What narratives are revealed?

Table 2 (Source: author)

From the articles, threats to energy security were stated in 23 instances in articles ranging from 2015 to the present day.

5.2.1 Decarbonization and phasing out coal

The first perceived threat, which is the most apparent by PiS actors within the media, is that decarbonization and phasing out coal are the biggest threats to energy security. The economic importance and needed support from the coal industry is a talking point made often by PiS actors.

Coal has been often labeled as an integral sector of Poland's energy security. As of 2019, coal in energy production was 73.6 percent (Forum Energii,

2019). The sector also employs a considerable amount of the population within the coal-mining regions, with a little over 96,000 people being employed in the coal and lignite mining industry in 2015 (Statista, 2019).

The coal mining industry in Poland played an important role in its development, especially in the mid to late 20th century as it held a strong place as one of the world’s largest coal-producing countries (Szpor, 2018: 2). Coal continues to hold a special place among other industrial sectors as it remains under state control.

The coal and lignite sector has faced hardships in recent decades, such as a de- creasing sector which was set to bankrupt without government bailouts intervention. One example in 2019 of government intervention into the rescue of dying power plants happened at Belchatow power plant where the generating station received “received €114 million in subsidies, 10% of its total revenue” (Harper, 2020).

The PiS led government was set to restructure the industry and try to keep the sector alive. Numerous times, the use of coal as a source of energy was de- scribed as a foundation of the energy sector that cannot go away for the time being by PiS actors, notably PM Morawiecki and Jacek Sasin.

“Today coal is the basis of our energy industry and we cannot and do not want to give it up.” -Mateusz Morawiecki (Barteszko, 2017).

“Our country does not accept that coal has had its day as it will guarantee or energy security for many years.” -Jacek Sasin (Poland In, 2019).

Due to the initiatives towards EU-wide decarbonization, this was in turn seen as a threat to the coal sector in Poland. While promising the protection of the

coal sector and its employees, Poland in the end agreed to make non-binding efforts towards decarbonization. Poland is currently the only EU member country that has opted out of the zero-emissions by 2050 target (Rankin, 2019). Despite that, their speech regarding renewables has not been com- pletely negative, besides for the economic aspects. Decarbonization and phasing-out coal work hand-in-hand and cannot be accomplished without the other. Investing into renewable resources is viewed as crucial for meeting the EU’s 2050 decarbonization target. However, decarbonization and the investment into renewable energy was spoken of as a potentially costly move.

„Poland wants to catch up with Europe [increasing percentage of renewable energy in energy mix], not to perish. Each percent means huge costs“ -Tchorzewski (The First News, 2019).

„The cost of this idea [planned EU 2050 target] rises to hundreds of billions of dollars“ -Piotr Naimski (Proctor, 2019).

The goal of achieving carbon neutrality is said to also have the potential to also improve energy independence within Poland. However, factors such as an economic slowdown post-pandemic, climate change will not be prioritized by the public or government over the needs of economic recovery (Engel, 2020).

5.2.2 Energy dependence

The second-highest recorded threat towards energy security was that Poland needs to diversify its energy mix as well as become less dependent on Russian energy supplies. Anti-Russian rhetoric was found to be a common element of securitizing rhetoric regarding Poland’s energy security.

Unrelated to energy matters, the co-founder of the PiS party and ex-President of Poland Lech Kaczynski and other top Polish politicians died in a plane crash in Russia in 2010. The PiS party used anti-Russian rhetoric about the ‘unre- solved’ investigation into the crash, which was dismissed by the ruling Civic Platform party (Glocowski, 2020). The PiS party is extraordinarily critical of Russia due to this incident. Harbored resentment within this party towards Russia is an arguable defense for their distrust.

PiS politicians spoke of Russia as an unstable supplier, and to wean off, Poland must diversify its energy sources away from Russia. Past events where gas supplies were disrupted is said to be one of the catalysts of the anger of the PiS towards Russia (Weiner, 2018). The Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute of 2005, which caused policy efforts towards diversification and less reliance on Russian gas.

“We're not diversifying our supplies in order to continue with Russia.” -Piotr Naimski (Coelho, 2018).

To combat Russian energy domination in the region, Poland is firstly looking for other pipeline constructions. Notably, the Baltic Pipe was an interest to Polish energy security as it would link a natural gas pipeline between Norway and Poland. The pipeline was meant to help create a competitive market for gas within the EU (Woellwarth, 2020) and reduce its dependence on Russia for energy as well as on Ukraine as a transit-country. In addition, reliance from Russia could be weakened with a gas interconnector from Poland to Slovakia.

“Construction of the Poland-Slovakia gas interconnec- tion will foster Poland’s independence from the domi- nant eastern supplier of this raw material… this project

will ensure Poland’s energy security.” -Piotr Naimski (Woellwarth, 2019).

PiS officials have stated incidents of blackmail and mistreatment by Russia’s Gazprom. Gazprom currently dominates the Western European gas market, as Russia supplied 200.8 billion cubic meters, which accounted for 81 percent of the total gas exports (Gazprom Export, 2020).

“Poland was a subject to Gazprom's blackmail, which emerged in breaks in supplies or reducing the amount of gas to Poland” -Piotr Naimski (Barteszko, 2020b).

Apart from Russian dependence, the issue of dependence on an unstable and costly source of energy has been labeled as a possible threat towards national energy security. The need for development of future sources has also been ex- pressed by PiS members.

“For our future generations, I would also like alternative energy sources to develop freely in Poland… we look favorable at nuclear energy” -Mateusz Morawiecki (Barteszko, 2017).

Alternative energy sources are said to be needed not only for energy diversification but also to help remedy an insufficient supply of energy in Poland.

5.2.3 Insufficient supply of energy

While the current Polish government stresses the necessity to support the coal sector, some PiS politicians have also agreed that coal will not be able to support the energy sector in the future.

“With the shrinking of the (coal industry), we have to develop other activities, especially in our energy sector” Grze- gorz Tobiszowski (Jakóbik, 2020).

Sufficient electricity generation is one of the most targeted area of the national energy sector. Currently, most generated energy is powered by hard-coal and lignite power plants (Polish Geological Institute, 2018). Some solutions to mov- ing away from coal-powered electricity is nuclear energy. Another solution is renewable resources, although criticized as too expensive for investment into the energy mix. Some initiatives have been established recently such as Mój Prąd (My Current), a government program aimed at giving loans to homeown- ers to install solar panels to their owns in order to secure their electricity supply and diversify the energy mix.

As mentioned in the previous section, Poland is looking for new gas pipeline projects to diversify away from Russia. Due to the threat perceived by the PiS government of interruptions in gas imports, new pipelines could offer them more reliable sources of energy.

“The implementation of the Baltic pipe will enable the import or increased quantities of up to 10 billion m3 gas from deposits on the Norwegian shelf to Poland from October 2022” Piotr Naimski, (Woellwarth, 2020).

5.2.4 Unstable energy prices

Prices of power supply became a topic of discussion in Poland when the PiS government „promised that households would not be hit by increases despite rising carbon emission costs and surging wholesale power prices“ (Barteczko 2019). Household power tariffs were also previously capped in order to control

pricing. Poland has some of the highest electricity prices in Europe. As of 2019 their electricty prices were „19 percent higher than in Germany, 20 percent higher than in the Czech Republic, 16 percent higher in relation to Slovakia and 7 percent in comparison to Romania“ (Szymański, 2020).

“This competitiveness, which we have secured in 2019 ... has contributed to gains in many export sectors. So we will have to keep electricity prices under control from the social point of view” Krzysztof Tchorzewski, 2020 (Barteczko, 2019).

The price of coal in Poland has gotten higher in recent years, and coal mines are finding it hard to compete when Russian coal is 20 USD cheaper than Polish coal per ton (Kosc, 2020). Because of this, Poland began importing coal while Polish coal has been sitting at mines unsold. The PiS government sees the coal mines as a foundation of the energy sector, they will continue to help make sure these mines stay alive.

“We should manage coal companies better, so that we have cheaper and better quality coal that is sold in a more efficient way. This is what we’re trying to achieve” Jacek Sasin, (Sawicki, 2020).

To conclude this section, the argument to be made about the PiS members is that they have prioritized the low-cost flow of energy.

6 Conclusion

The challenges that the Polish government faces regarding its energy security has been a widely spoken of topic within European energy studies and the future of environmental and energy cooperation within the European Union. In recent works, the securitization theory and discourse analysis hasn‘t been tho- roughly employed to actors of a similar political party. Many studies focus on government officials, regardless of political affiliation and therefore didn’t reveal narratives of their political affiliation. The lack of examination into the PiS party and its threat perception towards energy security led to the creation of this thesis and the questions that it poses.

The answers to the first question „who are the securitizing actors in the PiS party“ revealed that Mateusz Morawiecki, Piotr Naimski, as well as previous ministers Krzysztof Tchórzewski, Grzegorz Tobiszowski, and current Minister of State Assets Jacek Sasin are all officials who could be framed as 'securitizing actors.' In my research, each of these actors met the threshold of making securitizing statements and identifying threats within the articles. Revealing these actors helped reveal major politicians within PiS that perceive and make statements of certain threats to energy security.

The second research question was „what are the perceived threats of these securitizing actors?“ The speech pushed by PiS actors reveal a large focus on four threats to energy: phasing out coal and decarbonization, energy dependence, insufficient supply of energy and energy prices. From this we were able to add context and further develop these narratives and explain why these threats may be perceived this way by PiS politicians.

The methodology in this thesis, while posed some limitations, still effectively showed patterns in how similar threats to energy security are uttered by the securitizing actors. A discourse analysis through the lens of the securitization

theory showed a pattern of speech acts and the identification of threats to the referent object.

The previous literature on the subject of Poland and the results from this analysis reveal similar patterns, such as focus on saving costs (Brown, 2016) efficient supply of energy (Glen, 2012; Weiner, 2018; Wyciszkiewicz, 2009) as well as not prioritizing the move to renewables over the coal industry (Szu- lecki, 2016; Heinreich, 2016; Zorlu, 2013).

To understand which concepts are relevant to this thesis, the theoretical framework explained the purpose of the securitization theory in understanding securitizing actors and securitizing speech, which was needed to answer the research questions. This section also highlighted the topic of energy in security studies to show that energy is considered an issue in modern security studies.

This research set out to add academic information on who are the securitizing actors of the PiS party towards energy security and what are common threats that are perceived. Limitations of this research such as the use of English language sources instead of Polish sources may weaken the overall argument. However, this research still found common narratives from PiS members even through English sources. This study could be built on in a few ways. For example, another research could look into different parts of the securitization theory process and PiS, such as examining the audience acceptance of such existence of threats.

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