RE-ENTERING ELECTORAL POLITICS: Reputation and Party System Change in Spain and Greece

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PARTY POLITICS VOL 5. No.1 pp. 55–77

RE-ENTERING ELECTORAL POLITICS Reputation and Party System Change in Spain and Greece

Kerstin Hamann and Barbara Sgouraki-Kinsey

ABSTRACT

This article examines change in the Greek and Spanish party systems between their pre- and post-authoritarian periods. While the Greek party system displayed substantial continuity, the Spanish system showed considerable change. We connect continuity in party structure with length of interruption of competitive electoral politics. Our argument relies on the idea of reputation to explain why Spanish party leaders were far less constrained in moving their parties along the policy space than their Greek counterparts. Political parties in Spain had less reputation for established policy positions than Greek parties. Our argument and its implications are formally derived from a model developed by Bowler. We evaluate some alternative explanations and conclude that reputation is a factor accounting for variation in party system change in these two cases. At the time of the transition party leaders were presented with different opportunities to redeﬁne their respective parties’ policy positions.

KEY WORDS Ⅲ democratization Ⅲ elections Ⅲ Greece Ⅲ political parties Ⅲ Spain

Studies of transitions1 from authoritarian to liberal democratic regimes often note the importance of the length of authoritarian rule as a factor likely to affect the redemocratization process, but few studies explore any aspect of this relationship systematically (Pasquino, 1975; Diamandouros, 1982).2 One of the most important actors in the transition process are political parties (Pridham, 1990) as they structure alternative policy choices for voters. This article examines how the length of authoritarian rule – i.e. the length of the interruption of competitive party politics – affects continuity in the party system once liberal democratic regimes are reinstated. We argue that there is a negative association between the length of the electoral

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interruption and party system continuity at the time of the transition: the longer the interruption of competitive party politics, the less the expected party system continuity. Party system continuity refers to the stability of defining features of the structure of a party system, including the number of parties, their electoral strength and their policy positions. The logic of the argument relies on the concept of reputation. In competitive party systems, parties develop reputations for emphasizing policy issues and advocating particular policy positions over time. Their reputations constrain the extent to which party leaders can move along the policy space, that is, compete with other parties, as the policy positions parties assume have to be consistent over time to be credible to voters (Klingemann et al., 1994: 24). Thus, reputation constrains party leaders’ competitive strategies. There is wide agreement on the role of party competition in shaping party systems. Competition between parties determines the scope of political mobilization and participation, structures electoral alternatives and shapes the different aggregations of varied social interests and demands and their translation into public policy (e.g. Downs, 1957; Dawson, 1967; Pasquino, 1990; Klingemann et al., 1994). From one election to the next, more or less freedom to move along the policy space (that is, freedom to compete) translates into more or less stability in the structural features of party systems. We argue that the longer competitive electoral politics are interrupted, the less fixed are the parties’ reputations and, therefore, the greater their freedom to compete, which translates into greater change (or less continuity) in the party system. Any attempt at exploring the mechanisms underlying party competition has to include an argument linking the behavior of voters and party elites, for the two are interrelated. As Powell (1982: 74) argues, ‘party systems are designed to link citizens and leaders’ or, as Lawson (1980: 3) puts it, ‘parties are seen, both by their members and by others, as agencies for forging links between citizens and policymakers’. The extent to which parties move across the policy space is, at least in part, a vote-getting strategy pursued by party leaders. On the other hand, from the perspective of the electorate, this movement determines which party voters choose and how easily they are swayed to other parties. The vote-getting calculations of party leaders influence to a great extent their competitive strategies, which in turn affect voters’ electoral choices. Theories of party competition tend to either under- play or overplay the electoral role of the voters (Downs, 1957; Kirchheimer, 1966; Sartori, 1975). Using Bowler’s (1990) approach linking reputation and party movement, we explore change in re-emerging party systems by considering both voters and party leaders in Spain and Greece. While the factors influencing the nature of party systems in re-installed democracies are many, we focus here on the effects of the link between reputation and length of interruption of electoral politics. In the first section we provide a rationale for the selection of our cases, 56 04 – Hamann 20/11/98 8:53 am Page 57

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Spain and Greece. We then use Bowler’s (1990) approach to explore the mechanism by which length of electoral interruption is linked to party system competition and thus continuity in reborn democratic regimes; we develop our argument and derive some implications. In the third section we test these implications for the cases of Spain and Greece, examining and comparing continuity in their respective party systems and introducing alternative explanations. We ﬁnally apply our argument to the case of Por- tugal, which serves as a control case. We conclude by evaluating our argument and discussing some implications for transitional politics.

Case Selection

We explore the effect of the length of authoritarian rule on party system competition and continuity for the cases of Spain and Greece. These countries provide useful cases for comparison in that they assure variation in the length of interruption of their electoral politics. Spain did not have democratic elections between 1936 and 1977;3 this 41-year interruption is con- trasted with a 7-year absence of democratic elections in Greece (1967–74). In addition, the two cases vary in the extent to which their party systems underwent change. The Greek party system displayed a remarkable degree of continuity despite the authoritarian interlude, while the Spanish party system changed considerably between 1936 and 1977. Moreover, selection of these cases allows one to control for other poten- tially relevant variables. Spain and Greece exhibit many common traits regarding their ‘historical evolution, predominant modes of political domi- nation, the form and tempo of their economic development and systems of class relations’ (Giner, 1986: 12). Although variation exists in the timing of the civil wars in the two countries (Spain: 1936–9; Greece: 1944–9), the consequences for the conﬂict between right and left, the rightist authoritarian tradition, and historical and political memories for participants in the electoral system are expected to be comparable (Dalton, 1977; Dimitras, 1992; Iatridies and Wrigley, 1995; Litras, 1996). To be sure, we do not intend to disregard the important differences between these two countries. We only attempt to make some generalizations without considering such intervening factors as the nature of the authoritarian rule (for instance, the extent of repression or liberalization), the timing and the circumstances of its breakdown, or the nature of the previous democratic regimes and the particulars of their breakdown. Such considerations may complicate the argument and lead the discussion beyond the scope intended here without fundamentally changing the basic argument that the length of electoral interruption affects the extent of change in the party system by means of the constraints on party competition by party reputation. Finally, some comparisons with Portugal allow us to evaluate competing explanations and to better assess our argument. 57 04 – Hamann 20/11/98 8:53 am Page 58

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The Logic of Party System Continuity and Party Competition

Political parties are central actors in transitions to democracy and as such are the subject of scholarly work on democratization. Only a few studies have explored the question of how party systems are established in cases of redemocratization (Gunther et al., 1988; Pridham, 1990; Pridham and Lewis, 1996) and even fewer refer to the nature of the pre-authoritarian party systems to explain the shape of the party system in the post-authoritarian period (Linz, 1980; Remmer, 1985). In most studies, links between the old and the new party systems are not investigated (McDonough and López Pina, 1984; Barnes et al., 1985). However, the re-emerging party system is related to the party system of the previous democratic period. As Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 2–3) argue, ‘parties do not simply present ... themselves de novo to citizens at each election ... they have a history and so have the constellations of alternatives they present to the electorate’. Looking at the pre-existing party system provides clues for understanding the current party system, including cases where competitive elections have not been continuous. The extent to which party systems change during authoritarian interludes varies from case to case, and factors accounting for the breakdown of the previous democratic regime (Bennett, 1996), the breakdown of the authoritarian regime, or social, economic and demo- graphic changes during the authoritarian period may all play a part in shaping the reborn party system. In this article we link the pre- and post- authoritarian party systems by focusing on the role of party reputation in shaping the new party system. The link between party reputation and competition is often explored in the literature. According to Klingemann et al. (1994: 24), ‘parties sustain an identity that is anchored in the cleavages and issues that give rise to their birth’. This means that they cannot ‘repudiate their past for short-term advantage’. They argue that leapfrogging does not take place because each party has an ‘enduring ideological stance’ (p. 24). Further, Przeworski and Sprague’s (1986) argument assumes a link between party reputation and party competitive strategies: electoral tradeoffs follow a discrepancy between present and past party policy positions. Parties’ reputations constrain the competitive strategies of party leaders, thus affecting party system competition as a whole. The structure of the party system and its defining characteristics are inextricably linked to party system competition. For instance, a party system where parties can move unrestricted along the policy space is likely to exhibit more volatile structural patterns over time than a system at the other end of the continuum where party positions on the policy space are fixed. All else being constant, one expects that as constraints on party system competition increase, so does stability in party structure. Reputation, therefore, constrains competition, which in turn defines to a great extent the structure of the party system. 58 04 – Hamann 20/11/98 8:53 am Page 59

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Party continuity is related to party competition and reputation is the mechanism that underlies their connection.

The Formal Argument We assume that voters and party leaders are strategic actors attempting to maximize their expected utilities. Voters choose political parties that they perceive as closest to their policy preferences.4 Voters’ choices are based on the parties’ present positions but also on their past policy positions (Fiorina, 1981). Party leaders assume policy positions that they expect will increase, or at least maintain, their vote share (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986).5 They include the anticipated behavior of voters in this calculation. For simplicity we assume a unidimensional policy space. Party leaders’ decisions are mani- fested by their respective parties’ movement along this policy space. We deﬁne this movement, the end of a long process of interacting decisions between voters and party leaders, as party competition. We deﬁne the degree of party system continuity as the degree of stability of structural characteristics of the party system over time. These characteristics are the number of parties in the party system, their electoral strength and their position on the policy space. Using Bowler’s (1990) model of reputation as a heuristic device we construct an argument linking party system continuity to party system competition in reborn liberal democratic regimes. Bowler considers four components to account for the reputations of parties:

(1) the actual position of the party, (2) some set of popular perceptions of (1), (3) a set of expectations concerning the likelihood of the policy position being fulﬁlled, and (4) a set of memories or experiences which underpin (3). (Bowler, 1990: 64)

The incorporation of the idea of party ‘reputation’ in the model allows Bowler (1990: 64) to explicitly model ‘voter assessments of and reactions to the position taking and change in position taking of parties’. Thus, ‘implicit in these conceptions of reputation is the idea of a time dimension’. In constructing his model, Bowler assumes that the utility of party A to voter i is a function of party A’s position and the variance in that position:

UAi = f(PA, VA) (1)

He further assumes this functional form to be linear:

UAi = –a(ΗPA – iΗ) – b(VA) (2)

Thus, voter utility is determined by a linear function of the distance between the voter’s ideal point and the position of the party [–a(PA – i)], 59 04 – Hamann 20/11/98 8:53 am Page 60

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and a declining function of the variance in the party position [–b(VA)]. Bowler incorporates ‘reputation’ in the variance term:

VA = g(ΗPAt – PAt–1Η) (3)

Variance, or distance, is then a function of ‘how far the party has moved since last time’ (Bowler, 1990: 66).6 What are the implications of Bowler’s model for cases of democratic transitions? Even though it was developed for existing competitive democracies, we can easily adopt its logic for cases of (re)democratization. We first consider cases of democratic transition without prior experience with competitive electoral politics. In such cases there is no ‘party reputation’ upon which voters may base their assessment of changes in party positions. This is par- ticularly evident with regard to voting decisions at the first election. After the first election, and as party politics become consolidated, however, reputations are formed and the element of position variance becomes important. But considering the case of the first elections, we can extrapolate from Bowler’s model and argue that the first elections are important in shaping voters’ perceptions of parties and consequently the future scope and nature of party competition. This is so because once reputations are formed, position changes are costly for parties. But evidently, party reputation is not entirely absent in all cases of transition. Is it possible to establish different degrees of party reputation for different cases of transition to democracy? In cases where party politics are introduced for the first time one would expect the value of g to be zero; that is, the second term of equation (2) would be zero. In other words, a voter’s utility would be based totally on the first part of equation (2), the distance between the present position of the party and the voter’s ideal point. In cases, however, where countries redemocratize and party politics are ‘reborn’, one would expect the value of g to depend on the length of the interruption. We expect the value to be greater in the case of Greek voters than in the case of Spanish voters. According to Bowler’s reasoning, the Greek voter’s set of memories and experiences with regard to party policy positions and policy fulfilment must have been more vivid than that of the Spanish voter at the time of the first election; that is, party reputation weighed more heavily in the Greek voter’s electoral decision. What do the different values of g signify for party competition? The higher the value of g – that is, the more heavily the voters weigh movement based on their memories of past party positions, or the greater the distance ΗPAt – PAt-1Η – then (1) the more difficult it is for parties to gain votes by adopting policies long associated with other parties, (2) the more difficult it becomes for parties to credibly disassociate themselves from unpopular policies, and (3) the higher the cost to be borne by parties adopting new positions (Bowler, 1990: 67–8). This suggests that the higher the

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value of g the more limited the ‘ground of competition upon which parties ﬁght’ and, thus, the costlier the party movement along the policy space (Bowler, 1990: 69). If the value of g in the case of Spain is, as expected, lower than in the case of Greece – that is, if Spanish voters could not evaluate party positions based on party reputations to the extent that Greek voters could – then Spanish party leaders would be expected to have had the opportunity to move more easily along the policy space than Greek party leaders. From this argument we derive a number of implications and apply them to the cases of Spain and Greece. Shorter electoral interruptions are expected to be associated with greater continuity in the party system since reputations are stronger. Greater party system continuity is expected to be associated with greater constraints on the choices of party elites regarding their strategic positioning on the policy space; that is, their competitive strategies. More specifically, for the cases of Spain and Greece we expect greater party system continuity in Greece, where the interruption of electoral politics was shorter, compared to Spain, where no elections took place for about 40 years. By implication, we would expect the range of choice Greek party leaders had regarding the positioning of their parties on the policy space to be more constrained than that of their Spanish counterparts.

Party System Continuity and Party Competition in Spain and Greece

We conduct diachronic, within-country comparisons to assess the degree of party system continuity in Spain and Greece. If available, survey data across time in both countries might have provided additional support to our argument. However, due to the lack of such comparative, longitudinal data we focus strictly on structural characteristics of the party system. We consider three structural indicators to assess the degree of party system continuity for the two cases. First, we identify the number of parties gaining access to the legislature before and after the authoritarian period7 and, second, we compare the party systems by assessing the positions of parties on the left–right spectrum. The third feature of the party system, electoral strength of parliamentary parties, is not a useful measure to employ here since many newly founded parties enter parliament in the ﬁrst post- authoritarian elections, while other parliamentary parties in the pre- authoritarian period have ceased to exist by the time the country redemocratizes. Thus, electoral strength of speciﬁc parties represented in the legislature over time is in many cases impossible to assess. Instead, we look at an alternative indicator, vote correlations for ideologically proxi- mate parties between the pre-authoritarian and post-authoritarian periods.

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Party System Structure and Vote Correlations in the Pre- and Post-authoritarian Periods To what extent has the structure of the party systems in Spain and Greece changed from the pre- to the post-authoritarian period? If compared to 1936, the Spanish party system in 1977 manifests profound changes; on the other hand, the Greek party system exhibits a higher degree of continuity between 1967 and 1974.

Spain. Analyzing data on the Spanish party system, ﬁrst it becomes evident that the number of parties changed signiﬁcantly between 1936 and 1977. In 1936, the Spanish party system incorporated a large number of parties and displayed extreme fragmentation. As Linz concludes:

The Spanish party system during the Second Republic has been charac- terized as an extremely polarized multiparty system. In terms of the number of parties, their centrifugal tendencies, ideological polarization not only between parties but within parties, and the politics of irre- sponsible outbidding, the system resembles those of pre-breakdown Italy and Germany. (Linz, 1978: 145)

At least 31 political parties were represented in the national legislature for 1936, covering the policy space from the Sindicalistas at the extreme left to the Falange at the extreme right (Linz, 1978: 146–7).8 After the 1977 election, on the other hand, a signiﬁcantly smaller number of parties entered parliament.9 Out of over a hundred parties competing in the elections, 12 entered the legislature (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 26 August 1977: 28517). Thus, the number of parties with parliamentary representation was reduced by about two-thirds between 1936 and 1977. Second, political parties also moved their policy positions between 1936 and 1977: in 1936, they covered a larger area on the policy space. In contrast to the extreme fragmentation and polarization of the Second Repub- lic, during the 1976 election the parties converged towards the center of the political spectrum. During the transition period, the extreme positions of parties on a left–right scale ranging from 0 to 10 were 2.7 on the left and 8.4 (or 7.7) on the right (Laver and Schoﬁeld, 1990: 264).10 In her multi- country study on party system change in redemocratizing countries, Bennett (1996) uses the format of the party system (an index calculating the number of parties and their relative strength) and concludes that the change in the Spanish party system was considerable. The shifts of parties of the left (the socialist PSOE and the communist PCE) and the right toward the ideological center is evident. According to Gunther et al. (1988: 75), ‘despite its radical ideology and strategy’, the PSOE projected a moderate image in the 1977 election campaign. By the 1979 election, the ‘moderate, center-seeking strategy of González and Guerra prevailed and was implemented everywhere by the party apparatus’ 62 04 – Hamann 20/11/98 8:53 am Page 63

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(p. 266). Similarly, the PCE played a moderate role in the transition process (p. 146). Since its legalization in 1977, the party leadership had proceeded to moderate the party’s image and programs (p. 152). Linz (1980: 114) concludes that the PCE’s attempts at ‘integration in the political system finds a parallel in the moderate stances of the party’ (see also Maravall and Santa- maría, 1986; Share, 1986; Gunther et al., 1988; Gunther, 1992; Heywood, 1995, 1996). The democratic right was represented by a new party, the conservative AP (Alianza Popular). The pre-authoritarian parties of the right had ceased to exist under the dictatorship; consequently, the electoral right had no continuous party representation from the pre- to the post-authoritarian period. The AP’s strategies were also directed toward a movement to the center. The objectives of the AP leadership during the transition were to ‘build a large party of the center-right that would serve as a bulwark against the left’ (Gunther et al., 1988: 170). To this end, the AP leadership tried to ‘moderate the ideology of the party and merge with other groups’ (p. 170). In sum, the major Spanish parties of the right and left followed the politics of moderation and moved to the center of the policy space.11 The changes the Spanish party system underwent from the pre- to the post-authoritarian period are thus significant, both with respect to the number of parties gaining representation in the legislature and the positioning of the parties on the policy space. Third, to allow a comparison of the continuity of voting patterns in Spain we turn to Linz’s (1980: 103) estimation of correlations of the Spanish 1936 vote on the 1977 vote at the provincial level.12 Table 1 displays continuity in the Spanish political tendencies. The correlation coefficients carry the expected signs. The rightist political orientations of 1936 are positively correlated with the centrist (.20) and rightist (.38) vote of 1977, the 1936 centrist vote is positively correlated with the 1977 centrist vote (.11), and the leftist vote of 1936 remains strongly and positively correlated with the 1977 leftist vote. Although the fluidity of the centrist/rightist vote is evident, it takes

Table 1. Correlation between the June 1977 and February 1936 vote at the provincial level in Spain 1977 vote ——————————————————————– Historical vote 1936 PCE PSOE UCD AP Left .68 .54 –.36 –.45 Center –.17 –.32 .11 –.00 Right –.40 –.18 .20 .38 PSOE .22 .60 .04 –.07

Note: Spain has 52 provinces. Source: Linz (1980:103). 63 04 – Hamann 20/11/98 8:53 am Page 64

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place within the center-right area of the political spectrum. In other words, the leftist political tendencies have remained clearly delineated from the centrist/rightist tendencies over time. Yet the correlation coefﬁcients are, with the exception of the leftist vote, weak when compared to the coefﬁcients for the Greek case (see below).

Greece. In contrast, the Greek system experienced considerably fewer changes. First, the number of parties remained relatively stable. In the 1964 election, four parties entered parliament; in 1974, six parties were represented in the legislature (Mackie and Rose, 1991). Second, Featherstone (1987) assesses the change and continuity in Greek voting behavior based on the regional distribution of voting support before and after the dictatorship. He finds that by the time of the 1981 election the Greek party system had ‘in some respects returned to the pattern of 1963’ and ‘to the extent that the centrist vote has been transferred to PASOK (Pan- hellenic Socialist Movement), there is continuity with the pre-1967 party system’ (Featherstone, 1987: 58). Similar yet stronger cases have also been made by Mavrogordatos (1983, 1984) and Seferiades (1986). Mavro- gordatos (1983: 161) points to a remarkable stability in the Greek party system and notes that ‘for all the spectacular changes, the underlying pre- 1967 structure of the Greek party system has remained essentially intact’. Seferiades (1986: 83) also argues that the predictatorial party system closely resembled that of the mid-1970s. The ‘tendencies’ of the left of pre-1967 were represented by two distinct parties: the Communist Party of the Ex- terior and the Eurocommunist Party of the Interior, with the former cap- turing the ‘left pole’ by 1981 (p. 82). The pre-1967 center (EK) was occupied by the Panhellenic Movement. According to Seferiades, the PASOK victory of 1981 was not much different from the EK victories of 1963 and 1967. And finally, on the right side of the spectrum, ‘the old right did not die’: the National Front Party split from the more moderate New Democracy Party and, in 1977, gained ‘a not insignificant parliamentary representation’ (Seferiades, 1986: 82). Seferiades concludes (p. 83) that ‘by 1981 the predictatorial tripolar structure with its centrifugal mechanic was fully reinstated ... Despite the influence of highly unproportional electoral systems over such a long period of time, the ideological space of competition was not reduced a single bit’. On Mavrogordatos’ (1984: Fig. 1) left–right scale ranging from 1 to 10, the Greek parties lie between 1.8 and 9.4, a distance compatible with the pre-1967 party positions. Third, Table 2 illustrates how vote correlations on the provincial level in Greece show a similar pattern. Clearly, electoral support for Greek political tendencies exhibits much greater continuity than in the Spanish case. We combine the 1974 vote for PASOK and UC into a ‘center’ category to cor- relate it with the 1964 centrist vote. This is possible due to the nature of the coalitions within the UC of 1964 since the center of 1964 contained both centrist and leftist elements13 that found expression in the UC and PASOK 64 04 – Hamann 20/11/98 8:53 am Page 65

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Table 2. Correlations between the February 1964 and November 1974 votes at the provincial level in Greecea 1974 vote —————————————————————————– 1964 vote UDL PASOK UC Center ND Left .77 –.23 .05 –.18 –.55 (22.13) (2.16) (.339) (–.90) (–2.21) Center –.20 .23 .31 .54 –.53 (–2.96) (4.45) (4.10) (6.975) (4.52) Right –.23 –.22 –.26 –.47 .83 (–3.57) (–4.09) (–3.28) (–5.60) (10.9)

a In 1964, the number of electoral districts (provinces) was 55, and 56 in 1974. In our correlation we excluded the additional district created in 1974. Abbreviations: UDL = United Left; PASOK = Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement; UC = Union of the Centre; Center = the PASOK and UC vote combined; ND = New Democracy (right). Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios: statistically signiﬁcant at .05 level. Source: Calculated by the authors, based on election results from Greek electoral records.

of 1974 respectively (Clogg, 1987: 39–40). Although very tentative,14 these results support our hypothesis of greater continuity in voting patterns in the Greek case than in the Spanish case.

Greece and Spain compared. Based on this evidence and assessments in the literature, we conclude that the structure of the party system in Spain displayed signiﬁcant change, while the Greek system exhibited a high degree of continuity. Thus, the movement of Spanish parties along the policy space was substantially more extensive than that of Greek parties. The freedom of Spanish party leaders to shift the policy position of their parties was higher than that of Greek party leaders. Greek parties and party leaders had a stronger reputation than their Spanish counterparts and were therefore more restricted in their freedom to shift policy positions without incurring high electoral costs. The Spanish party system was more competitive in the sense that parties had more freedom for movement along the policy space. This was possible since party leaders were less constrained by reputations developed from the pre-authoritarian period. When Spanish voters were asked for reasons for their party preferences, 50 percent of the PSOE voters mentioned ‘political strength/ability to react’, followed by 47 percent for ‘party programme’ and 20 percent for ‘party leadership’. For the PCE, the most frequently cited reason was ‘party programme’ (51.5 percent), closely followed by ‘political strength/ability to react’ (51.3 percent) and party tradition (23.3 percent). The UCD was primarily elected because of its ‘political strength/ability to react’ (45.5 percent), ‘party programme’ (32.7 65 04 – Hamann 20/11/98 8:53 am Page 66

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percent) and ‘party leadership’ (32.3 percent) (Maravall, 1982: 38).15 There is little evidence, then, that public opinion constrained party leaders in (re)defining the position of their parties due to reputation; the available survey data demonstrate that voters’ decisions were guided primarily by outcome and efficiency-orientated considerations rather than long-standing party reputations. Data on party positions on the left–right spectrum thus confirm our hypotheses.

Alternative Explanations for Party System Continuity What accounts for the different degrees of continuity in the Greek and Spanish party systems? The degree of continuity, or stability, in the party system is determined by the continuity in the political behaviors of the participants in the party system, voters and party leaders. These behaviors are expressed as party preferences on the part of the voters and the definition of the party’s policy position on the part of the leaders. We have argued that the past reputations of parties’ policy positions constrain party elites at the time of a democratic transition, which explains the greater party system continuity in the Greek case compared to the Spanish case. A long interruption of electoral politics, however, may also affect the party system in a number of other ways. Alternative explanations such as the degree of socio-economic and generational change the two countries underwent during their authoritarian periods could also be factors con- tributing to changes in the party system. During the 40-year interruption of competitive party politics, Spain experienced considerably more socio- economic and generational change than Greece during its 7-year interlude. Significant shifts in the social structure and generational change at the mass and elite level are likely to affect the political behavior of voters and party leaders. Changes in the social structure may shift existing social cleavages and ideological distributions. Generational changes can reflect larger changes in the composition of the population that is affected by migration patterns, for example. Consequently, we assume that there will be less party system continuity in cases where considerable socio-economic or generational changes have occurred. We use these two indicators to evaluate the degree of expected change in the party system in Spain and Greece during the period of their electoral interruptions. We first examine the degree of social and generational change in the two countries and then discuss these changes in the context of our framework by extending our argument to the Portuguese case.

Socioeconomic Change. Tables 3 and 4 show occupational changes in Spain and Greece over time. For the Spanish case we consider change in the occupational structure between 1950 and 1975 and for the case of Greece we evaluate change in the occupational structure between 1961 and 1971. The change in the share of the working population employed in agriculture 66 04 – Hamann 20/11/98 8:53 am Page 67

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Table 3. Occupational structure by economic sector, Spain, 1950–75 (%) Sector 1950 1960 1970 1975 Agriculture, ﬁshing 48.8 41.7 29.0 22.9 Industry, construction 26.1 30.0 34.8 36.8 Services 25.1 28.3 36.2 40.6

Sources: Banco di Bilbao/INE in Donaghy and Newton (1987: 4), Banco de Bilbao in Pedreño Muñoz (1993: 1005)

(–25.9 percent) and services (+15.5 percent) in Spain is roughly twice the change in Greece (–13.4 percent and +6.4 percent respectively). The proportion of those working in industry and construction increased by 6.1 percent in the case of Greece, which is less than two-thirds the change in Spain (+10.7 percent). The time periods examined here do not coincide exactly with the intervals under consideration and may thus understate the evidence. For the case of Greece, in particular, we would expect even smaller changes for the 1967–74 interval since the early 1960s was a period of ‘remarkable economic development’ (Clogg, 1987: 45), the effects of which are reﬂected in the 1964 election. Likewise, we would expect greater changes for the Spanish case as the interruption of electoral politics from 1936 until 1977 comprises a longer time period than the one indicated in Table 3. Since sociostructural determinants have been given heavy emphasis in interpret- ing voting in Europe (Campbell and Valen, 1961; Shively, 1972; Kaase, 1976; Thomassen, 1976), it follows that changes in the socio-economic structure – economic, occupational, or regional – may be related to changes in voting patterns and the party system.

Table 4. Occupational structure by economic sector, Greece, 1928–80 (%) Sector 1951 1961 1971 1980 Agriculture 48.2 53.9 40.5 37 Mining, quarrying 0.5 0.6 0.6 n.a. Manufacturing 15.9 13.4 16.4 28 Construction 2.6 4.6 7.7 n.a. Electricity, gas 0.4 0.6 0.8 n.a. Transport, communication, storage 4.9 4.2 6.5 35 Services (bank, insurance, public) 21.4 19.4 25.5 n.a. Not declared 6.1 3.3 2.0 n.a.

Sources: ESYE, 1951, 1961, and 1971 censuses in Katsanevas (1984: 29); World Development Report 1984: Population Data Supplement (International Bank/World Bank, OUP, 1984) in Featherstone and Katsoudas (1987: 11). 67 04 – Hamann 20/11/98 8:53 am Page 68

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Generational Change. The length of the authoritarian period in Spain suggests the extent of generational change both at the elite and mass levels. By the time of the 1977 elections, only Spaniards over 60 years of age had wit- nessed competitive parties and elections (Barnes et al., 1985: 697). In 1975, this group constituted 20 percent of the electorate. In contrast, in 1974 a substantially larger proportion of the Greek electorate had had some experience with competitive elections since only those under 27 years of age had not had any previous opportunity to participate in democratic elections. On the elite level, the continuity of Greek party elites is stark compared to the Spanish party elites. The new Spanish party elite had little experience with pre-authoritarian politics. The transition process was led by Adolfo Suárez, the leader of the center-right UCD, ‘who had grown up in the Franco period’ (Linz, 1980: 102). In contrast, the re-establishment of the Greek democratic regime was led by Konstantinos Karamanlis, who had first entered politics in 1935 as a deputy and served as the leader of ERE (National Radical Union), the major party of the right, and as prime min- ister between 1955 and 1963. Among the Spanish leaders of the new democracy, ‘only Santiago Carrillo of the Partido Comunista de España (PCE), Ajuriaguerra, President of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), and Tar- radellas, President of the Generalitat of Catalonia, had played an important role before 1936’ (Linz, 1980: 102). The Socialist Party (PSOE), despite its long historical and organizational continuity, entered the new democratic process with a new leadership under Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra (Linz, 1980: 102). On the other hand, in the case of Greece, the senior leaders of most parties had ‘at one time or another occupied a variety of key positions in the various governments that had held office since the end of the [Second World] war’ (Kohler, 1982: 113–34). The 40-year interval between elections in Spain, then, may have produced a greater disruption in the continuity of the party system and the preferences of the electorate than the shorter interruption in Greece. Explanations based on socio-economic or generational change may not be incompatible with our approach, though. First, regional comparative studies suggest that stable voting patterns persist in the face of socio- economic changes and, furthermore, party reputations are transmitted across generations and in the absence of personal voting experience (Con- verse, 1969; Shively, 1972; Przeworski, 1975; Przeworski and Sprague, 1986). In particular for the Spanish case, empirical studies have shown a degree of intergenerational ideological continuity and continuity in party preferences that is comparable to other western democracies, despite the long absence of competitive elections (Maravall, 1982: 24–7).16 Without repeatedly reconfirming voters’ links to parties in regularly scheduled elections, these links may weaken over time. In addition, it has been shown that voters’ links to parties remain stable across age cohorts over time (Converse, 1969). Empirical evidence drawn from survey data suggests that in 1978, overall partisan identification was lower in Spain compared to other West 68 04 – Hamann 20/11/98 8:53 am Page 69

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European countries with a continuous history of electoral politics in the post-war era, and yet there were no striking differences across age groups (Barnes et al., 1985: 709).17 Second, socio-economic and generational changes may have independent effects and can be further investigated by examining cases that provide variation in social, economic and political changes. Portugal presents an interesting case for additional comparison since it experienced a long period without competitive elections (1925–75) while undergoing relatively limited socio-economic change. In the last pre-authoritarian general election in 1925, the Portuguese party system was fragmented, yet clearly dominated by the Democrats.18 The Democrats (PRP) received 80 out of 156 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (51 percent); the strongest contenders were the Nationalists (PRN) with 36 seats (23 percent). Overall, eight parties won parliamentary seats (Wheeler, 1978: 228) and, overall, 22 parties and factions existed in 1926 (Opello, 1985: 89). In the first democratic elections in 1975, the Socialist Party was the largest single party, receiving 38 percent of the votes. Overall, 12 parties contended the election, five winning representation in the legislature, with one of those parties (the Maoist Popular Democratic Union) gaining only one parliamentary seat (Bruneau and Macleod, 1986: 28; Opello, 1991: 94). While exact estimates of the policy position of the parties do not exist, the distribution of the parties on the left–right continuum has been calculated as lying between 1.8 on the left and 8.5 on the right.19 Bruneau and Macleod (1986: 6) characterize the party system in Portugal after the revolution as exemplifying the model of polarized pluralism. With respect to socio-economic change, Portugal resembles Greece rather than Spain. In 1930, 46 percent of the population worked in agriculture, 17 percent in the industrial sector and 37 percent in the service sector (Wheeler, 1978: 161). By 1970, agricultural employment had declined by 21 percent, those employed in the manufacturing sector had increased by 19 percent, and the proportion working in the service sector had decreased by 2 percent (Opello, 1991: 131). Thus, while considerable change did take place, especially in the primary sector, the overall change was not as significant in magnitude as in Spain. This cursory overview demonstrates that in the absence of competitive elections for extended periods of time, extensive changes in the party system can take place when elections are reintroduced, despite relatively limited socio-economic change. Multiple other reasons for the moderation of Spanish party leaders have been cited, such as historical learning (Bermeo, 1992) and the memories of the civil war. Clearly, Spanish political elites and voters had not forgotten the civil war nor the lessons of the dictatorship, but exactly how and why these memories were translated into political moderation instead of, for example, increased polarization and desires for revenge, is not clear. Edles (1995) suggests that symbols and culture played a crucial role in shaping these collective learning experiences. However, while historical learning may undoubtedly 69 04 – Hamann 20/11/98 8:53 am Page 70

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have taken place, it is problematic to assess empirically the type and amount of historical learning in a systematic fashion across cases. Our point is to illus- trate that the dilution of political reputation that comes with extended periods of authoritarianism enabled Spanish party leaders and their parties to move the parties across the policy space, which in the case of Spain amounted to a movement towards the center. Hypothetically, however, the Spanish party system could have become even more polarized instead. It is not the direction of the movement, then, that we set out to explain, but its magnitude.

Conclusion

In this article we have derived indicators and propositions from existing theory and attempted, when possible, a systematic empirical testing of these propositions. Such an approach to the study of democratic transitions may lead in the long run to the construction of theories that can explain a number of aspects of democratic transitions not previously explored and that can be used as the base for further research. Moreover, our approach to the study of one aspect of the party system, inter-party competition, is based on an argument that includes an analysis of the behaviors of both elites and voters. This permits a better understanding of the workings of the system as a whole and the outcomes produced by the interaction of its two distinct groups of actors. This specific argument certainly raises some problems, such as the difficulty of untangling the interaction. Yet its use in a comparative perspective and in a special context has been both helpful and convenient. We have argued that in cases of reborn democratic regimes the length of the interruption of electoral politics is related to the nature of competitive politics at the time of redemocratization. The shorter the interruption, the more fixed the reputations of political parties for specific policy positions. Reputation constrains freedom of party movement along the policy space; that is, constrains the ability of party leaders to compete. Greater constraints on party system competition yield greater stability in structural features of the party system; that is, greater party system continuity. We thus expect that Spanish party elites had a greater opportunity to move along the policy continuum than their Greek counterparts. Our argument rests on the logic of the reputation of political parties and their leaders. However, we have also considered alternative explanations for the degree of change in the party systems. We do not argue, then, that reputation is the only factor that may influence party leaders’ competitive strategies. What we have shown, however, is that Spanish party leaders were in a position to move their parties along the policy space more freely since the reputation they carried over was significantly smaller than in the case of Greece, where party leaders were significantly more constrained. Thus, once Spanish party leaders had decided to (re)define the position of their parties 70 04 – Hamann 20/11/98 8:53 am Page 71

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for whatever reason, this strategy promised to incur minimal electoral costs as their positions were less constrained by their reputation. The opposite holds for the Greek case. What are the implications of this argument? Can it help us understand certain distinct features of Spanish and Greek party politics at the time of the transition? We may speculate on one such feature, the politics of moderation in Spain, on the one hand, and the politics of polarization in Greece, on the other. The moderation of the Spanish and the polarization of the Greek party leaders have been frequent themes in the existing literature. For the Spanish case, Gunther et al. (1988: 389) conclude that ‘the moderately fragmented four-party system that emerged at the national level in Spain ... was one in which expressions of conflict were restrained and the structure of partisan competition was centripetal’. Overall, negotiations, consul- tations and pact-making20 among party elites were characteristic of the politics of the transition. On the other hand, the image portrayed by the Greek party system is one of ‘deep-rooted’ polarization (Featherstone, 1990: 188). Unlike their Spanish counterparts, Greek party elites did not enter pact- making and have still been unable to come to a stable consensus on consti- tutional issues or the electoral system. We have already noted above that unlike Greek party leaders, Spanish party elites were largely unsocialized in the rules of party politics. Accord- ing to Converse (1969), it is upon elite socialization that the success of democratic consolidation depends. Thus, party elites relatively socialized in the game of democratic politics are expected to behave differently from elites with little or no experience with the institutional rules of operation and interaction with allies, opponents and followers. More specifically, the con- fidence level of the former with respect to the behavior of their opponents and the behavior of the electorate is expected to be higher. A political environment high in uncertainty with respect to the behaviors of elites and the electorate favors pact-making among elites, restriction of the scope of inter-party conflict and limited mass mobilization (Pasquino, 1986). Thus, as the Spanish elites operated in conditions of greater uncertainty21 about the prospects for the survival of the new democracy and were given the opportunity for greater policy movement, they may have opted for moderation and inter-party pact-making. The perceived lower uncertainty and greater policy movement constraints in the case of Greece allowed for polarized inter-party competition. What is interesting here is that the Spanish party leadership did have a greater opportunity for such movement than the Greek party leadership since they were less constrained by reputation. These conclusions are still tentative and in need of further testing. Differ- ent levels of party continuity are difficult to establish, and different combi- nations of various features of party system continuity may also be found to exist in different cases. Moreover, the question of the consequences of these differences on the degree and nature of party competition remains to be answered. For instance, how did the moderation of competitive party 71 04 – Hamann 20/11/98 8:53 am Page 72

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politics in Spain in the ﬁrst elections affect the future of party politics? Linz (1980) cautions against party movement toward the center that involves the alienation of important sectors of the electorate as this may threaten the via- bility of electoral politics and increase anti-system political activities. And how has the polarization of Greek party politics affected the future of democratic political life in Greece? Is there any way to pinpoint and assess the effects of the different nature of party politics in Spain and Greece on the process of democratization 2 decades later? Even though this article cannot provide answers to these questions, it helps explain the nature of the party systems at the beginning of a new democratic period.

Notes

The authors would like to thank Kay Lawson, Paul Manuel, Carol Mershon, the late Barbara Salert, Bruce Wilson and anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions on earlier drafts. Thanks to Lisa Walters for research assistance.

1 O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 6) define a political transition as ‘the interval between one political regime and another’ where ‘the rules of the political game’ are not defined. Not only are they in constant flux, but they are usually arduously contested; actors struggle not just to satisfy their immediate interests and/or the interests of those they purport to represent, but also to define rules and procedures whose configuration will determine likely winners and losers in the future’. We concentrate here on the transition period up to the first democratic elections. 2 Remmer’s (1985) study on the effects of the longevity of authoritarian systems on redemocratization in Latin American countries is an exception within this body of literature. 3 We consider only national-level elections. 4 Even though this assumption may be generally true, it does not include strategic voting as we assume sincere voting to simplify the argument. 5 This does not mean, however, that there is necessarily a net cost – moving across the political space may, in some circumstances, result in a net increase in votes. A cost is still involved, though. 6 Bowler (1990) constructs an equation similar to equation (3) to depict variance in incumbent promises: VB = g(PBt – KBt – 1), where P are the promises made in the campaign at time t and KBt – 1 the kind of policies delivered while in office. 7 We consider the number of parties in the legislature rather than the number of parties competing in the election or one of the numerous indexes to calculate the number of effective parties. For other studies relying on the number of parliamentary parties, see Mershon (1996) or Laver and Shepsle (1990). 8 Linz (1978: 147) notes that the data on the exact number of parties are incon- sistent across different sources. Thus, the exact number might be slightly different from the 31 parties Linz lists. 9 By parliament or legislative assembly we refer in all cases to the lower house of parliament. 10 It is not in all cases clear exactly which time during the transition these data refer to, whether before or after the 1977 election.

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11 This moderation corresponded to an overall moderation of the Spanish electorate. See, for example, Maravall (1982: 20–2) or Heywood (1996). However, if we assumed a multi-dimensional party system and included issues of regional autonomy and their representation by regional parties, the picture would become slightly more complicated. Especially some Basque regional parties did not conform with the moderation of the major statewide parties. 12 We chose the provincial level because, first, it provides a more rigorous test than national correlations which may hide changes at the provincial level, and second, this level is commonly used in the literature to analyze stability in electoral patterns. 13 Clogg (1987) describes the centrist and leftist tendencies of UC as well as the role of Andreas Papandreou, the leader of PASOK in 1974, in the UC in 1964. 14 These data should be interpreted carefully. The correlations, in the case of Spain in particular, do not necessarily involve the same voters. They can only inspect continuities on the map of voting patterns at the provincial level. A lower level of analysis, such as the precinct level, could have provided a stronger argument for the Greek case. Another problem may lie in the correlation of the last election before authoritarian rule with the first election after authoritarian rule. These elections may have been conducted under extraordinary circumstances and thus may not reflect genuine political orientations. Additional correlations may rectify this problem. Yet in the case of Greece, there is no particular reason to believe that the 1964 or 1974 elections were extraordinary – if compared with the results of the 1963 and 1977 elections, respectively. In the Spanish case, datasets for elections before 1936 are not available to us. Other problems may include issues such as the clientelistic and personalistic character of Spanish and Greek party politics and the degree to which this allows us to discuss, for example, centrist or rightist tendencies in the two electorates. Although these considerations can pose some limitations to our argument, we have chosen to downplay their importance in this article since many studies argue for the emergence of political issues with well-defined constituencies. If, in an attempt to overcome this problem, we were to compare only Spanish and Greek leftist tendencies, where the organizational level has been shown to be high and where clientelistic politics are non-existent, we would be hard pressed to establish a greater continuity in the case of Greece – especially since Linz’s table of correlations does not provide any additional information. Note that the stronger continuity of the leftist vote in both cases suggests in itself the importance of party organization in stable voting patterns. For similar results of vote correlations on the provincial level, see Maravall (1982: 25). 15 Multiple responses were possible. Unfortunately, these data cannot be used for a systematic test against the Greek case since no comparable survey data exist for Greece. 16 Maravall (1982: 29) concludes that ‘the most satisfactory interpretation is that rather than support for a specific party, it was loyalty towards the Left or the Right in general which survived for 40 years and was passed from one gener- ation to the next in families and communities’. Other studies (McDonough et al., 1981: 54–5) show that overall, during the transition the Spanish electorate placed itself slightly to the left of where they perceived their parents to be, even though over half of the respondents answered ‘don’t know’ when asked about their parents’ political views. 73 04 – Hamann 20/11/98 8:53 am Page 74

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17 The age group with the smallest percentage of partisan identification is the 60+ group (35%), followed by the 16–19-years-old group (44%). Respondents between 30 and 39 years of age show the largest percentage of partisan identification (53%). See Barnes et al. (1985: 708–9). 18 Wheeler (1978: 227) concludes that for a number of reasons, including patronage and intimidation, the ‘1925 elections were not a democratic exercise’. Yet the ‘elections were not openly rigged upon orders of the government’ (p. 227) and, given the same caveats as in the Spanish and Greek cases, these elections serve as the best approximation of voters’ party preferences in the absence of other, more valid, data. Electoral data for this case refer to seat distribution in the Chamber of Deputies, not vote shares. 19 Laver and Schofield (1990: 263) present these data but, as in the Spanish case, the authors do not specify exactly which year in the immediate post-authoritarian period they refer to. 20 O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 37) define a ‘pact’ as ‘an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors, which seeks to define ... rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the “vital interests” of those entering into it’. 21 Both perceived uncertainty and sources of this uncertainty are important factors determining the behavior of party leadership.

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KERSTIN HAMANN is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Central Florida. She received her PhD in Political Science from Washington University, St Louis, in 1994. Her current research deals with Spanish politics, especially political parties and interest groups, elections and issues of regional autonomy. She has published articles and book chapters on democratic transitions in Spain and Central America and on Spanish labor unions. Currently, she is preparing a book manuscript on the Socialist Party and labor unions. ADDRESS: University of Central Florida, Department of Political Science, PO Box 161356, Orlando, FL 32816-1356, USA. [email: [email protected]]

BARBARA SGOURAKI-KINSEY is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at Washington University in St Louis. Her research interests include comparative politics, political participation, political parties and labor unions. Her dissertation is on the effects of the interaction of social context and electoral laws on electoral mobilization by political parties. ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, Washington University, Box 1063, One Brookings Drive, St Louis, MO 63130, USA. [email: [email protected]]

Paper submitted 28 January 1997; accepted for publication 6 July 1997. 77 04 – Hamann 20/11/98 8:53 am Page 78