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Enhancing the Role of Information and Communications Technology for Disaster Risk Management

The secretariat of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) is the regional development arm of the United Nations and serves as the main economic and social development centre for the United Nations in Asia and the Pacific. Its mandate is to foster cooperation among its 53 members and 9 associate members. It provides the strategic link between global and country-level programmes and issues. It supports Governments of countries in the region in consolidating regional positions and advocates regional approaches to meeting the region’s unique socioeconomic challenges in a globalizing world. The ESCAP secretariat is in Bangkok. Please visit the ESCAP website at http://www.unescap.org for further information.

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2 | Building e-Resilience in Sri Lanka

Building e-Resilience in Sri Lanka: Enhancing the Role of Information and Communications Technology for Disaster Risk Management

© United Nations, 2016

This study has been prepared by Rohan Samarajiva, Shazna Zuhyle and Ransimala Weerasooriya.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations. The information contained is based primarily on interviews, published and unpublished data, and presentations by members of the industry.

The designations employed and material presented do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. References and maps obtained from external sources might not conform to the United Nations editorial guidelines. Mention of firm names and commercial products does not imply the endorsement of the United Nations.

The authors are grateful to Mrs. Marina Mohamed, Secretary to the Ministry of Disaster Management, Sri Lanka, the Directors General of the agencies under the Ministry, Mr. Clarence Perera of the National Building Research Organisation, Mr. Nuwan Waidyanatha and the officials of telecom service providers without whom this study could not have been conducted.

For more information contact:

Information and Communications Technology and Disaster Risk Reduction Division United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

The United Nations Building Rajadamnern Nok Avenue Bangkok 10200 Thailand

Telephone: +66 2 288 1234 Fax: +66 2 288 1000 Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.unescap.org/idd

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Contents

List of Figures ...... 5 Abbreviations and Acronyms ...... 6 1 Introduction ...... 7 1.1 The Role of the United Nations in Disaster Risk Reduction ...... 8 2 ICT Readiness of Disaster Risk Management in Sri Lanka ...... 10 2.1 Sri Lanka Hazard Profile...... 10 2.2 Institutional Framework, Use of ICTs and the State of Resilience ...... 11 2.3 Resilience in ICT Infrastructures ...... 14 3 Trends in Applications ...... 17 3.1 Smart Grids and Microgrids ...... 17 3.2 Disaster Mitigation: Hazard Mapping ...... 19 3.3 Preparedness: Early Warning ...... 20 3.4 Response and Recovery ...... 22 4 Lessons Learned and Proposals for Strengthened Regional Responses ...... 23 4.1 Applications ...... 23 4.2 Interdependency ...... 24 4.3 Regional and Supranational Actions ...... 24 4.4 Resilience and Affordability ...... 26 4.5 Policy Recommendations ...... 26 4.5.1 For International/Regional Organizations ...... 26 4.5.2 For National Governments ...... 27 4.5.3 For Telecom Service Providers ...... 27

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List of Figures

Figure 1: Examples of ICT applications at key stages of the DRM cycle

Figure 2: Milestones leading up to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals

Figure 3: Organizations responsible for disaster risk management in Sri Lanka

Figure 4: Access and core elements of 3G and 4G mobile networks

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

CCTV Closed-circuit Television CPP Cyclone Preparedness Programme (Bangladesh) DEWN Disaster and Emergency Warning Network DMC Disaster Management Centre DRM Disaster Risk Management DRR Disaster Risk Reduction EOC Emergency Operations Centre ESCAP Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (United Nations) GIS Geographic Information System GPRS General Packet Radio Service HF High Frequency HFA Hyogo Framework for Action ICT Information and Communications Technology IP Internet Protocol MNO Mobile Network Operator MSC Mobile Switching Centre NBRO National Building Research Organisation NCDM National Council for Disaster Management SMS Short Message Service SPEEDI System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information TDM Time-division Multiplexing TETRA Terrestrial Trunked Radio (formerly known as Trans-European Trunked Radio) UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicles UHF Ultra High Frequency UNISDR United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction VHF Very High Frequency

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1 Introduction

Disasters affect multiple facets of human life. Therefore, disaster risk management (DRM) requires multiple mechanisms across different silos in order to prepare for and deal with all types of disasters. The multiple mechanisms will most definitely require collaboration at the international or regional level, and coordination with government at the national and local levels, with community organizations and with individuals. In all these instances, effective communication is critical. As a result, information and communication technologies (ICTs) are vital for dealing with calamities, and functioning ICT infrastructures are essential both pre- and post-disaster. Services provided over ICT infrastructures can play a decisive role in the early warning of natural disasters, and there is much research documenting the role of ICTs in early warning.1 The role that can be played by resilient ICT infrastructures in the immediate aftermath of a disaster has been documented in a previous ESCAP report. 2

Figure 1: Examples of ICT applications at key stages of the DRM cycle

The sophistication and the interoperability of ICTs available today provide for greater use in all aspects of DRM (see Figure 1). 3 Remote sensing and geographic information system (GIS) modelling can be used to create hazard maps of vulnerable areas. If policies are in place, these can be used to minimize the effects of hazards in high-risk areas. Security-oriented systems such as closed-circuit

1 Rohan Samarajiva and Nuwan Waidyanatha, “Two complementary mobile technologies for disaster warning”, Info , vol. 11, no. 2 (2009), pp. 58-65; Rohan Samarajiva, “Mobilizing information and communications technologies for effective disaster warning: Lessons from the 2004 tsunami”, New Media and Society , vol. 7, no. 6 (2005), pp. 731-47; Juan Carlos Villagran de León and others, “Early warning systems in the context of disaster risk management”, Entwicklung & Ländlicher Raum , vol. 2 (2006), pp. 23-25. 2 Rohan Samarajiva and Shazna Zuhyle, The resilience of ICT infrastructure and its role during disasters (Bangkok, ESCAP, 2014). Available from http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/The%20resilience%20of%20ICT%20Infrastructures.pdf. 3 Suvit Yodimani and David Hollister, “Disasters and Communication Technology: Perspectives from Asia”, paper presented at the Second Tampere Conference on Disaster Communications, 28-30 May 2001.

7 | Building e-Resilience in Sri Lanka television (CCTV) footage are also increasingly being used as a disaster mitigation technique by observing changes of localities over time. 4 The resilience of ICTs is perhaps most critical at the moment of disaster occurrence, when emergency operations centres (EOCs), first responders, early warning systems and other key stakeholders need to be reliably connected. Building in redundancy at this stage is a key consideration. It is often addressed by the use of multiple modes of communication (e.g. TETRA, satellite, UHF and VHF). There are many examples of ICT applications that have been deployed for DRM (see Section 3). However, the effectiveness of the systems depends largely on the policies and guidance from the national level, social responsibility and willingness to adapt.

Resilience is defined by ESCAP as the capacity to withstand, adapt to, and recover from natural disasters—so that people can continue to lead the kind of lives that they value. This is in line with other programmatic definitions. 5 Resilience has long been an important concept in psychology and has recently crossed over to the development field via ecology, perhaps in recognition of the increasing significance of shocks of various kinds, including disasters. It is also used in a sense that is aligned with the programmatic definitions in the computing field, which is perhaps the most similar to discussions of ICT infrastructure. 6

Resilient infrastructure is an essential precondition of a resilient society. As various shocks, natural and otherwise, batter societies, it is understandable that attention is focused on resilience, though there are some who argue that resilience, or the coming back to where things were prior to the shock, is too weak an objective; that the desirable objective is that of anti-fragility wherein the system that has been subjected to the shock comes back even stronger. 7

The objective of this report is to highlight the critical role of ICTs in DRM. It also assesses the e- resilience of the ICT infrastructure in Sri Lanka and emphasizes the importance of building in resilience. Although technological advances have provided many sophisticated systems, it is also important to recognize the social and economic context before applying and implementing different technological measures.

1.1 The Role of the United Nations in Disaster Risk Reduction

The work on the post-2015 Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (now the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030)8 was prompted by the General Assembly Resolution 66/199 that requested the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) to facilitate the development of a framework to succeed the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) that expired in 2015.

4 Thin Lei Win, “Thai city uses CCTV, web to warn of floods”, Thomson Reuters Foundation , 19 June 2014. Available from http://news.trust.org//item/20140619090845-r6vi7/?source=jtOtherNews1. 5 The Rockefeller Foundation, perhaps the leading proponent and funder of resilience-focused development activities, defines resilience as, “the capacity of individuals, communities and systems to survive, adapt, and grow in the face of stress and shocks, and even transform when conditions require it.” See http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/our-work/current- work/resilience . 6 See Reuven Cohen and others, “Resilience of the Internet to random breakdowns”, Phys. Rev. Lett. , vol. 85, no. 4626 (19 October 2000). Available from http://arxiv.org/pdf/cond-mat/0007048.pdf. 7 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Antifragile: How to live in a world we don’t understand (London, Allen, 2012). 8 See UNISDR, "Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction". Available from http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/sendai-framework.

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This was followed by a consultative process that occurred in two phases. The first phase involved consultations on the substantive issues of the post-2015 framework that concluded before the Fourth Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction held in May 2013. The second phase focused on the content and format of the post-2015 framework.9 During the consultations and negotiations that led to the finalization of the Sendai Framework, calls were made to establish stronger links between disaster risk reduction (DRR),10 climate change and sustainable development. DRR should not be considered as a ‘sector’ in itself, but a practice to be applied across all sectors. 11 The Sendai Framework was adopted by United Nations Member States on 18 March 2015 at the Third United Nations World Conference on DRR.

The Sendai Framework was developed to build on and ensure continuity with the work carried out by countries and other stakeholders under the aegis of the HFA and previous instruments such as the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction of 1999, the Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World of 1994, and the International Framework of Action for the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction of 1989.

Figure 2: Milestones leading up to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals

9 UNISDR, Asia Pacific synthesis report: Consultations on the post-2015 framework for disaster risk reduction (Geneva, 2013). Available from http://www.unisdr.org/files/33369_synthesisreportunisdrasiapacificcon.pdf. 10 Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) is defined by UNISDR as: “The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events.” See http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology. 11 UNISDR, "Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction". Available from http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/sendai- framework.

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With the end of the Millennium Development Goals in 2015, a new set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) was adopted as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development on 25 September 2015 at the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit. The 17 SDGs and 169 global targets set out areas to advance sustainable development. There are 25 targets related to DRR in 10 of the 17 SDGs, firmly establishing the role of DRR as a core development strategy. 12

Resilience is a central element in the SDGs. For example, Goal 9 focuses on building resilient infrastructures, promoting sustainable industrialization and fostering innovation. This goal calls for investments in infrastructure, including the ICT infrastructure, and the need to develop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructures. 13 A resilient ICT infrastructure that comprises of optical fibre, satellite, coaxial cable and wireless links is crucial for supporting disaster response and recovery efforts. Also relevant is Goal 11, which is to “make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.” 14 In Sri Lanka, government agencies responsible for DRM have taken active measures to reduce risks by assessing landslide prone areas before new buildings were approved (see Section 2.1).

2 ICT Readiness of Disaster Risk Management in Sri Lanka

2.1 Sri Lanka Hazard Profile

Sri Lanka is an island located south-east of India in the Indian Ocean. It experiences frequent climatological, meteorological and hydrological disasters. The predominant climatological disaster in Sri Lanka is drought, which affects crop yields and livelihoods, and leads to widespread food insecurity. According to the DesInventar Disaster Information Database, out of all the natural disasters occurring between 1974 and 2008, droughts were responsible for 43 per cent of affected persons. Despite low death tolls and very low damages to housing, droughts accounted for 52 per cent of the damage to crops. 15 Drought can lead to major losses in income in farming communities, pushing some below the poverty line. The inadequacy of water and a rise in food insecurity have become a strain on government resources, and further increase people’s vulnerability to disaster risks.16

Hydrological disasters are numerous and come in the form of storms, floods and landslides. Meteorological disasters such as storms and lightning strikes affect a significant proportion of the population as do extreme wind events. Erratic monsoons and Sri Lanka’s proximity to the Bay of Bengal where many low pressure areas brew, cause heavy rains. Geophysical disasters are less numerous, however its impact can be disastrous and economic effects crippling.

12 UNISDR, "Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", October 2015. 13 United Nations "Sustainable Development Goals". Available from http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/infrastructure-industrialization/. 14 United Nations "Sustainable Development Goals". Available from http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/cities/. 15 DesInventar and Disaster Management Centre, “Disaster Event and Impact Profile”, in Sri Lanka National Report on Disaster Risk, Poverty and Human Development Relationship. Available from http://www.desinventar.lk/des_html/disaster_profile/disaster_profile.pdf. 16 See World Food Programme, "Synopsis of Rapid Drought Impact Assessment Report: Sri Lanka", April 2014. Available from http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp265011.pdf.

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Between 1974 and 2008, most of the lives were lost to the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004. The 35,399 deaths made up 90 per cent of deaths due to natural disasters during the period. 17 In fact, it was not until after the 2004 Tsunami that DRR and DRM 18 found a place on the national agenda. Furthermore, due to the effects caused by climate change and urbanization, previously safe areas have now become more risk prone. As a result, risk assessments and DRM have become a priority.

For the past three years, Sri Lanka has been experiencing a series of extreme weather events. In some cases a prolonged period of drought is followed by heavy rains and a series of hydrological disasters. This was the case in 2012, when a 10-month long drought was followed by severe flooding in December 2012. By the end of October 2012, the drought affected 1.8 million people and their livelihoods, predominantly paddy cultivation in the districts of Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa, Puttlam, Kurunegala and Mannar. The heavy rains and flooding in December 2012 caused further losses and damages to the same areas. According to the Disaster Management Centre (DMC) the floods displaced 447,000 people, further exacerbating crop losses. 19

In May 2013, a Cyclonic storm Mahasen (renamed Viyaru) displaced 7,339 people and caused 7 deaths. Unusually high south-west monsoon rains in 2013 was followed by a period of prolonged drought from November 2013 to April 2014. In a country where 32 per cent of the country’s labour force is employed in agriculture and 50 per cent of the electricity requirement is met by hydropower, shortfalls in monsoonal rains can have crippling effects. 20 As the year 2014 came to a close, heavy rains gripped the island nation displacing close to a million people.21

2.2 Institutional Framework, Use of ICTs and the State of Resilience

The formulation of the Disaster Management Act in 2005 provided the initial legal and institutional framework for DRM in Sri Lanka. The Ministry of Disaster Management, the DMC and the National Council for Disaster Management (NCDM) were created to implement the Act (see Figure 3). 22 The NCDM is chaired by the President, and the Prime Minister serves as Vice Chair. 23

In Sri Lanka, DRR activities have been integrated in many ministries and government agencies that include disaster-related planning and management in their respective functions. The Road Development Authority, for instance, has its own in-house disaster risk assessment team, and the Director-General of the National Building Research Organisation (NBRO) serves on its Board. The NBRO is responsible for mapping all unstable slopes and addressing any potential instability of land

17 Ibid. 18 Disaster Risk Management (DRM) is defined by UNISDR as: “the systematic process of using administrative directives, organizations, and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster. Disaster risk management aims to avoid, lessen or transfer the adverse effects of hazards through activities and measures for prevention, mitigation and preparedness. See https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology. 19 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Emergency appeal final report – Sri Lanka: Drought, 27 June 2013. Available from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sri%20Lanka%20Drought%20- %20Final%20Report.pdf. 20 IRIN, “Drought begins to bite in Sri Lanka”, 4 April 2014. Available from http://www.irinnews.org/report/99884/drought- begins-to-bite-in-sri-lanka. 21 The Sunday Times, “Floods continue to displace thousands”, 28 December 2014. Available from http://www.sundaytimes.lk/141228/news/floods-continue-to-displace-thousands-128964.html. 22 Ministry of Disaster Management, Sri Lanka Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme 2014-2018 , March 2014. Available from http://www.disastermin.gov.lk/web/images/pdf/slcdmp%20english.pdf. 23 Disaster Management Centre, Ministry of Disaster Management, Toward a Safer Sri Lanka: A Roadmap for Disaster Risk Management (2005). Available from http://www.adrc.asia/documents/dm_information/srilanka_plan02.pdf.

11 | Building e-Resilience in Sri Lanka caused by new structures being built in medium- and high-risk areas. Generally, the NBRO must be consulted before any new developments occur; however, this is not a statutory requirement and therefore, its recommendations are not legally binding. The 2005 Disaster Management Act is being revised to enhance the enforcement of fundamental DRR measures.

Figure 3: Organizations responsible for disaster risk management in Sri Lanka

The “Roadmap towards a Safer Sri Lanka, 2005-2013” led to a shift in DRM policy from a reactive mode to a proactive one in which disaster risk issues are proactively considered before a disaster occurs and measures are put in place to minimize the disaster impact. The roadmap outlined activities categorized as short-, medium- and long-term implementations to improve current DRM practices on the island.

To facilitate the policy shift to a more proactive approach, efforts were made as part of the roadmap implementation to better understand the risks and consequences in order to improve decision-making to minimize adverse impacts. 24 This included identifying the occurrences and intensity of hazards, and the areas most susceptible to disaster (e.g. through hazard and risk mapping). Yet, even though most

24 Disaster Management Centre, Ministry of Disaster Management, Toward a Safer Sri Lanka: A Roadmap for Disaster Risk Management (2005). Available from http://www.adrc.asia/documents/dm_information/srilanka_plan02.pdf.

12 | Building e-Resilience in Sri Lanka goals set out in the 2005 Roadmap were implemented, there were shortcomings in implementation at the local government level. 25

The Sri Lanka Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme 2014-2018, builds on the 2005 Roadmap and proposes a DRM approach that is aligned with national priorities. 26 It includes mechanisms to create resilience at the local level, and recognizes that climate change impacts DRR. The programme has therefore included climate change adaptation practices in local disaster preparedness.

Efforts to raise awareness on the importance of reducing disaster risks and preparing for disasters before they strike are now given precedence. The DMC has conducted many capacity- and awareness- building sessions that have empowered local communities to respond effectively in the event of a disaster. Public address systems have been distributed to local community organizations as a means of ‘reaching the last mile’ to those not yet connected to the early warning system. In certain instances however, cooperation at the local government level has been a deterrent. Nonetheless, measures have been taken to improve the knowledge and competence of citizens. For example, water level gauges have been placed in individuals’ backyards. They have been trained on the alerting protocol at each level of risk as water levels rise. Communities have also been engaged in mapping evacuation routes. Some of the major barriers faced are related to the mindset of people and the conditions they face. In the recent Koslanda landslide, the victims were forewarned but they did not evacuate their homes. This could mean that people did not heed the warnings, or the necessary conditions for people to evacuate (e.g. availability of alternative housing) did not exist. 27

The DMC is the implementing agency in all stages of the DRM cycle. At the heart of the DMC is the EOC where data from multiple sources are fed in for analysis and early warning, if needed. The data are from technical agencies under the Ministry of Disaster Management, the NBRO, the meteorological department and various international centres (e.g. the tsunami warning centres). Obtaining data from the various government agencies is a significant challenge for DMC due to the lack of collaboration and the lack of open data. Data either has to be bought or has to go through multiple bureaucratic levels of approval. Either way this causes a considerable lag in time taken to obtain, analyse and predict potential disasters, and the timeliness of data is critical in DRM.

To broadcast warnings, DMC maintains 77 multi-hazard warning towers along the coastal belt. The EOC is connected to numerous communication systems such as HF, UHF and VHF radio communication services, mobile satellite communication (Thuraya), cell broadcasting and the early warning towers. The EOC also has a fully equipped mobile vehicle on standby in the event of a disaster at the physical location of the EOC. Service providers have been given four profiles whose communications will be prioritized in the event of network congestion. The profiles are based on numbering and belong to key personnel such as divisional secretariats, disaster management committee members, district coordinators etc. At present, this priority-based communication mechanism has been implemented by Dialog (the mobile network operator with the largest market share) and is being applied by Sri Lanka Telecom (the incumbent fixed-line provider).

25 Report: Sri Lanka National Consultation on the Post-2015 Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction (Post Hyogo Framework for Action), 1 March 2013. Available from http://www.preventionweb.net/files/31603_31603posthfaconsultationsrilanka.pdf. 26 Ministry of Disaster Management, Sri Lanka Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme 2014-2018 , March 2014. Available from http://www.disastermin.gov.lk/web/images/pdf/slcdmp%20english.pdf. 27 Rohan Samarajiva, “What can be done about landslide disasters?” Lanka Business Online , 3 November 2014. Available from http://www.lankabusinessonline.com/what-can-be-done-about-landslide-disasters/.

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Additionally, a system is being developed that will issue alerts as automated voice messages to fixed- line telephones in households along the coastal belt. The rationale is that if a warning needs to be issued at night time, there is a greater chance of waking up the household through the landline as opposed to a short message service (SMS) alert. 28 This system is yet to be implemented and will be an add-on to existing early warning mechanisms.

With the assistance of the Japan International Cooperation Agency, Korean International Cooperation Agency, World Bank and others, the agencies under the Ministry of Disaster Management have made technological advances in some areas. For example, with the assistance of the Norwegian Geotechnical Institute, the NBRO is currently engaged in a ground subsidence project in Matale to identify sink holes. The ground penetration radar has the ability to detect hollowness in distant targets and thereby cavities. Other examples of ICT use include automated rainfall gauges in high-risk areas that transmit data every 30 minutes via the mobile network. The data is then collected and analysed in real-time at the NBRO headquarters in Colombo. The NBRO has also developed a drought prediction app based on the Android platform that takes into account rainfall, temperature, soil-moisture ratio, etc.

ICTs have gained prominence as a necessary element for the implementation of the various stages of the DRM framework. However, mindset changes are perhaps one of the most critical obstacles to overcome. A case in point is the landslide mapping programme that followed the same methodology for 15 years until 2014. The old method relied on aerial maps from the survey department and took one month to complete a map. The same task takes 15 minutes using Google’s satellite imagery. Project management that requires physical site visits before budget approvals is another area that can benefit from ICTs. CCTV monitoring as used in the Republic of Korea can replace site visits.

A general observation is that even with reasonably high-tech systems in place, the agencies do not have remote data backups through one of the many cloud-based service providers. This is a vulnerability that could turn catastrophic if a disaster hits the agencies’ headquarters.

2.3 Resilience in ICT Infrastructures

Reliable communication channels are vital for DRM especially during disasters to allow communication with first responders and survivors. Telecommunication service providers take various measures to ensure business continuity and seamless connectivity during a disaster, even if saving lives is not their primary rationale. Yet, as profit-maximizing entities, they are always making trade-offs between resilience and cost. There is a role for regulation in ensuring that adequate weight is given to resilience. 29

28 However, it must be noted that fixed-line penetration (12.7 per hundred people in 2013) is much lower than mobile penetration (95.5 SIMs per 100 people) in Sri Lanka, including in coastal areas, and the number of fixed-line subscribers is rapidly declining, according to the International Telecommunication Union’s Measuring the Information Society Report 2014 . 4.2 persons make up an average household in Sri Lanka. 29 L. Srivastava and R. Samarajiva, “Regulatory design for disaster preparedness and recovery by infrastructure providers: South Asian experience”, in Critical infrastructures: State of the art in research and application , W. A. H. Thissen and others, eds. (Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), pp. 103-120.

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With mobile communications, it is important to identify the choke points and have in place business- led disaster recovery measures for both the access and core networks (see Figure 4). Disaster recovery plans are necessary for mobile network operators (MNOs) to keep the costs and complexities to a minimum in the event of a disaster. Generally, a 100 per cent recovery (across all technologies and all services) within 96 hours of shut down is expected.

Figure 4: Access and core elements of 3G and 4G mobile networks

IP

Critical to communication systems and technologies is electricity. The absence of electricity during a disaster is often dealt with using backup batteries and generators. At any given time the high revenue generating base transceiver stations are powered with backup batteries.30 Portable generators are made available on an as-needed basis in the event of a disaster. If a base transceiver station is physically damaged, the cell-on-wheels solution is deployed.

Currently, base transceiver stations are connected to a base station controller via time-division multiplexing (TDM) or Internet protocol (IP) links. When TDM fails, manual patching is required. However, TDM will soon become obsolete when all their remaining links are converted to IP. Automated protocols have been put in place for the dynamic reallocation of the affected IP-based base station controller to several others so as to share the load. Further, MNOs maintain spare base station controllers at all times as a business requirement for disaster recovery. In the event of a radio network controller failure, residual capacity from the neighbouring radio network controllers will be utilized in the interim.

The mobile switching centre (MSC) is a critical element of the mobile core and so, redundancy has been built-in by dynamic MSC pooling. All traffic in the core network is IP-based. This makes it possible for automated reconfiguration of traffic to other MSCs in the event of failure.

30 The above discussion draws from Rohan Samarajiva and Shazna Zuhyle, The resilience of ICT infrastructure and its role during disasters (Bangkok, ESCAP, 2014). Available from http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/The%20resilience%20of%20ICT%20Infrastructures.pdf.

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For international backhaul, Sri Lanka is connected to SEA-ME-WE 3, SEA-ME-WE 4, Bharat Lanka Cable System, WARF, Dhiraagu-SLT, Bay of Bengal Gateway (to be operational in 2016) and SEA- ME-WE 5 (to be operational in 2016). 31

When selecting a physical location for the cable landing station, many factors are considered such as the depth of the sea bed off the coastline, and the size and strength of ocean waves. Reliable high- capacity fibre connectivity from the cable landing station to the main hub sites is required. The completed cable landing stations in Sri Lanka are based in and around Colombo, which is not ideal for redundancy. However, the construction of a new cable landing station in Matara for the near-complete SEA-ME-WE 5 cable, and the new cable landing station for the near-complete Bay of Bengal Gateway cable will enhance the resilience of Sri Lanka’s ICT infrastructure.

Beyond the physical undersea cables, the Synchronous Transport Module Number 16 links from the cable landing stations are connected to multiple locations in the island. Damage to any one of these facilities will trigger the international backhaul service providers to re-route traffic to an alternative site, on the basis of authorized communication received from an operator. In addition, there are multiple switching locations in Sri Lanka connected via fibre mesh network that will take over for the routing of voice and data. This network topology has been selected because of its high performance during failure, in comparison with other network topologies. Purely for disaster recovery purposes, there are also Internet data centres in other countries that will be used to re-route traffic. Of course idle resources are a considerable cost to service providers; therefore, redundant and residual capacities are all utilized for daily traffic routing.

The architecture of the fibre core is also key to ensuring business continuity. The network has been implemented such that a maximum of five sites will be isolated in the event of a disaster, thereby containing the negative impact.

Mobile services such as SMS and multimedia messaging service operate off virtual machines, thereby facilitating dynamic reconfiguration to ensure service continuity. The serving GPRS support node and the gateway GPRS support node are IP-based and act in a similar fashion as MSC pooling during loss of service.

Sri Lanka began liberalizing its telecommunication market since 1996. In liberalized environments, multiple suppliers and technologies exist. Even long-held assumptions such as the technical and economic infeasibility of building multiple undersea cable stations have had to be abandoned in the new competitive environment. 32 The most important benefit of competitive markets is the inherent redundancy created by the existence of multiple, competing networks. So even if one fails, it is unlikely that all networks in a specific locality will fail at the same time. Solutions such as permitting the customers of one operator to roam on the networks of competitors for the duration of ‘a state of exception’ resulting from a disaster are available only in competitive markets. Local roaming has been tested and is ready for implementation in the event of a disaster by two MNOs in the Maldives. Additionally, crews travelling across post-disaster terrain to repair one network can coordinate their activities using mobile phones from another functioning network. Where multiple undersea cable and satellite paths controlled by different companies exist, various kinds of formal and informal swap and barter arrangements can be made to ensure redundancy and business continuity.

31 See http://www.submarinecablemap.com/#/country/sri-lanka. 32 Office of the Communications Authority, Hong Kong, “Landing of submarine cables in Hong Kong”. Available from http://www.ofca.gov.hk/en/industry_focus/telecommunications/facility_based/infrastructures/submarine_cables/index.html.

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Following liberalization, the question of who will compensate the owners of damaged infrastructure and to what extent has come to the fore. If government continues to act as an informal insurer of last resort, it has been argued that the wrong incentives will be created, whereby private owners will not take prudent measures to safeguard their assets from disaster risks. On the other hand, mandating compulsory insurance would mean passing on significant additional costs to end users of services, especially in regulated industries. Regulatory agencies will have to achieve a reasonable balance between these two outcomes. 33 One possible solution is to create risk pooling systems, with adequate diversification strategies, that rest on the fact that a hazard cannot affect all the infrastructures in a group of countries at the same time.

The Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative, a regional programme that seeks to provide disaster risk modelling and assessment tools to member countries is a possible model that can be used in South Asia and other regions to ease the burden by providing immediate liquidity to governments. 34 The risk pooling mechanisms enable the Pacific Island countries to insure and purchase catastrophe coverage at a significantly lower cost than what individual government reserves or independent insurance covers will cost. Insurance, properly deployed, can create the incentives for building resilience into critical infrastructure.

Telecommunication infrastructure sharing in various forms has been promoted at government and inter-government levels, 35 and has been adopted by industry. The pressures to reduce costs and address the increasing difficulties of obtaining access to tower sites and spectrum made operators amenable to infrastructure sharing. In some cases, companies spun off their towers to specialized tower operators. 36 Increased vulnerability of the ICT infrastructure has been an unintended consequence. Now, if a shared tower is destroyed, multiple networks are affected. However, a disaster can also prompt infrastructure sharing as was the case in Sri Lanka where recovery efforts included the relocation of cell sites and the sharing of towers with other operators. 37

3 Trends in Applications

This section looks at specific examples of ICT applications for DRM in Asia and the Pacific. They have been grouped according to their function at the different stages of the DRM cycle (see Figure 1).

Smart grids play a vital role in adding a layer of resilience. It is yet to be widely deployed and is a good area of focus for developing economies as there are multiple benefits.

3.1 Smart Grids and Microgrids

Electricity is the fundamental energy source that all other networks and technologies rely on. Resilience is generally inherently built into ICT applications, particularly telecommunication networks; however, without a resilient and reliable power source all is lost. Smart grids include

33 L. Srivastava and R. Samarajiva, “Regulatory design for disaster preparedness and recovery by infrastructure providers: South Asian experience”, in Critical infrastructures: State of the art in research and application , W. A. H. Thissen and others, eds. (Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), pp. 103-120. 34 J. David Cummins and Olivier Mahul, Catastrophe Risk Financing in Developing Countries: Principles for Public Intervention (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2009). Available from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/CATRISKbook.pdf. 35 See International Telecommunication Union, “Best practice guidelines on innovative infrastructure strategies to promote affordable access for all”, 2008. Available from http://www.itu.int/ITU- D/treg/Events/Seminars/GSR/GSR08/PDF/GSRguidelines08_E.pdf. 36 For example, http://industowers.com/. 37 Dialog Telekom Limited. ”Disaster Reconvery and Business Continuity - Post 26/12”, 2009 .

17 | Building e-Resilience in Sri Lanka communication systems that permit the supplier to know what is happening at the customer’s site and at the generating sites in real time. As such, it has the ability to keep track of all available power sources and the electricity demand.38 It uses ICTs to monitor and manage the distribution of electricity from transmission to end users. As a result of ICT use such as sensors, controls, computers and automation, the electrical grid is able to respond efficiently to the demands of the users.39

As networks converge, the domino effect caused by a blackout can be immense. It can affect transportation and all forms of electronic communications, which can completely isolate a locality. In comparison with current one-way systems, smart grids add a level of resilience and convert the current static grid to a more flexible and proactive infrastructure. Consequently, it allows for risk- prone areas to be shielded from potential cascading effects caused by disasters.

Box 1: Smart Grids in Japan

The 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan that devastated much of Japan’s Tohoku region, made it the world’s costliest natural disaster since 1965. 40 However, its impact was not limited to the Tohoku region since grid outages and rolling blackouts adversely affected daily life in the archipelago in the aftermath of the nuclear accidents caused by the tsunami. As a significant proportion of Japan’s energy requirement is met by nuclear power, the meltdown at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant forced electricity companies to start rationing. 41 This left many households unable to operate heating systems, medical equipment and water pumps in high-rise buildings.

Despite Japan’s emphasis on DRR measures, the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami was unprecedented in its scale and damage. The disaster left many experts rethinking their strategies. One example is a low carbon footprint real estate development project that just started when the tsunami hit. In the aftermath, the project developed a smart grid energy management system that can visualize consumption to encourage savings, and direct excess energy generation to storage cells that can power up an evacuation centre during a natural disaster. All houses in the project are equipped with a smart meter that allows the residents to adjust their electricity consumption patterns. The diverse energy sources and storage cells build in the element of resilience into the energy management system. 42

Japan is home to a few smart city projects. The Kashiwa Smart City is built around an energy management system synonymous with smart grid technology. A central facility called the Kashiwa no-ha Smart Centre administers energy distribution and is crucial during disasters. The smart centre ensures electricity sharing during emergencies, directing power from batteries to residential areas to operate lighting, emergency elevators and water pumps. 43 The Yokohama Smart City Project uses a community energy management system to visualize energy consumption and monitor electricity usage. 44

38 Amy Poh Ai Ling, Sugihara Kokichi and Mukaidono Masao, "The Japanese Smart Grid: Initiatives, Investments, and Collaborations", International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications , vol. 3, no. 7 (2012), pp. 1-11. Available from: http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1208/1208.5394.pdf. 39 ESCAP, “Low Carbon Green Growth Roadmap for Asia and the Pacific: Fact Sheet – Smart Grid”, undated. Available from http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/56.%20FS-Smart-Grid.pdf. 40 The Economist, “Natural disasters: Counting the cost”, 21 March 2011. Available from http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/03/natural_disasters. 41 Zoe Murphy, “Japan earthquake: Living with blackouts”, BBC News , 15 March 2011. Available from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12731696. 42 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Private Sector Strengths Applied: Good practices in disaster risk reduction from Japan (Hyogo, 2013), pp. 7-12. Available from http://www.preventionweb.net/files/33594_privatesectorstrengthsapplied2013di.pdf. 43 Kashiwa-no-ha Smart City, “Environmental Initiatives”. Available from http://www.kashiwanoha- smartcity.com/en/concept/environment.html. 44 Ibid.

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During disasters, grid outages can create social and even psychological disruption, and make disaster relief efforts much harder. These circumstances have led to a demand for modular, hybrid energy systems that can operate from locally available power sources. In fact, the areas that coped best after Hurricane Katrina were those that were powered by microgrids. 45

Microgrids are small, self-contained electric power systems with the capability to seamlessly connect to and disconnect from the traditional grid. It is typically used to accommodate smaller consumer base loads such as individual buildings, hospitals and campuses. Microgrids have gained popularity as a viable alternative to address the dependency of critical infrastructures upon the main power system, which may be susceptible to blackouts and prolonged power outages. These systems are independent of the main power grid in that they can be disconnected from the main grid in the event of a power outage. Another advantage is that these self-contained units can source energy from renewable sources such as solar or wind power. 46 Microgrids are becoming the focus of electrification in India, as a project launched by Tata Power in Purnia in Bihar gains ground. 47

Smart grids no doubt have many advantages apart from considerably being more resilient to disaster than conventional power grids. However, it requires considerable investment, policy and market certainty, among others. Therein lie the biggest challenges.

3.2 Disaster Mitigation: Hazard Mapping

GIS and other means of hazard mapping provide authorities at the local and national levels a better ability to identify risks and provide motivation to implement action. They can be used to map evacuation routes such as high-elevation sites in the case of a tsunami or a flood. Color coded maps that can help visualize the impact of the natural hazards can save many lives by enabling timely evacuation. 48 Other software tools that use GIS mapping can detail the fastest evacuation routes and assist with vertical evacuation decisions.

The technology that supports such hazard mapping has developed over time and there is an increased willingness to share data. Such technological advances have occurred in the space of GIS extension tools that map evacuation routes such as the ‘Pedestrian Evacuation Analyst’. Various software applications and advances in space technology can also be harnessed to map out risk-prone areas. Space technology has been getting more focus in recent years, with the launch of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency’s DAICHI-2 to provide observations of higher resolution and cover a larger focus area at one time. 49

Many examples have demonstrated that hazard mapping need not necessarily be initiated or sponsored by governments. A case in point is the example of Haiti, where in the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti

45 Alex Houlston, “Little Solar Communities: Australia’s looming micro-grid moment”, Business Spectator , 9 October 2014. Available from http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2014/10/9/policy-politics/little-solar-communities-australias- looming-micro-grid-moment. 46 Michale Fitzgerald, “When the Power Goes Out, Microgrids Keep Electricity Flowing”, The Wall Street Journal , 18 May 2014. Available from http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304831304579544200059257532. 47 Anindya Upadhyay, “Around 25,000 villages to get electrified through micro-grids”, The Economic Times , 4 October 2014. Available from http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-10-04/news/54626535_1_clean-energy-energy- problems-solutions. 48 Barbara Liston, “New hurricane forecast maps to show flood risk from storm surge”, Thomson Reuters Foundation , 15 April 2014. Available from http://news.trust.org//item/20140415222739-wou3o/. 49 Yuki Matsuoka, “Satellite boosts risk monitoring”, United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction , 26 May 2014. Available from http://www.unisdr.org/archive/37608.

19 | Building e-Resilience in Sri Lanka earthquake, a group of volunteers from around the globe used the online platform, OpenStreetMap, to create the most detailed map of Haiti’s capital.

The Malawi Spatial Data Platform is a comparable open source data sharing platform that allows information sharing related to flash floods that are recurrent and costly natural disasters affecting remote villages in Malawi. 50 Such open data mapping has been implemented in Indonesia using the open source InaSAFE platform,51 and similar World Bank-backed projects are currently operational in various cities in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

These platforms that enable information sharing among various stakeholders is instrumental in ensuring disaster preparedness in many aspects. First it facilitates pre-event planning, which enables better response. Secondly, visual maps can create greater awareness about disasters in the local community.

However, there have been cases where despite the availability of hazard maps that detailed evacuations routes and risk-prone areas, these maps were not utilized to good effect to save human lives. The most recent case is the landslide in Sri Lanka where despite government authorities (NBRO) claiming that such hazard maps detailing areas of high, medium and low risks were freely available online, the local officials claimed they were unaware of their existence. 52

These situations underscore the urgency with which government agencies should collaborate in implementing proper disaster risk identification mechanisms, and in educating and motivating officials.

3.3 Preparedness: Early Warning

Early warning system implementations are perhaps the most common examples of public-private partnerships in DRM. The content of the warnings are the responsibility of government entities such as the DMC in Sri Lanka. However, the warnings are delivered through both state and private-owned communication networks.

It is often the lack of timely and accurate information that causes chaos. It is also important to take into account the social context prior to employing technical solutions. Bangladesh’s Cyclone Preparedness Programme (CPP) is a good example that developed a communication mechanism to ensure timely and accurate information, and ensured that appropriate technologies are used.

Situated at the top of the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh experiences frequent cyclones that are often followed by other hydrological disasters such as floods. Following the 1970 super cyclone that hit Bangladesh at a rate of 62m/sec, various international and Bangladesh government efforts converged to form a CPP. Since then, CPP has gained the reputation of being the most successful disaster

50 World Bank, “In Malawi, citizens get involved as innovative technologies help them better understand and manage disaster risks”, 4 December 2014. Available from http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/12/04/in-malawi- citizens-get-involved-as-innovative-technologies-help-them-better-understand-and-manage-disaster-risks. 51 World Bank, “Indonesia: New disaster management software released worldwide”, 7 April 2014. Available from http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/04/07/indonesia-new-disaster-management-software-released- worldwide. 52 Amantha Perera, “Disaster hazard maps going unused in Sri Lanka, creator say”, Thomson Reuters Foundation , 1 December 2014. Available from http://news.trust.org//item/20141201112711-9e4bv/.

20 | Building e-Resilience in Sri Lanka preparedness programme. It was at one time the largest wireless network in Asia. 53 The CPP disseminates warning signals received by the Meteorological Department through an extensive telecommunication network of HF and VHF radio that links the CPP with the coastal area. These warnings are received by a unit team leader equipped with a radio.54

In the case of hydrological disasters, Bangladesh has worked with the Regional Integrated Early Warning System for Africa and Asia in implementing the ‘1-10 day long-lead flood forecasting products’ programme. The probabilistic system of early warning helps communities save their assets, furniture and stock food for about 15 days in the event relief efforts are delayed. Communities have secured livestock, moved to higher ground and even organized alternative livelihoods during the disaster periods. The flood warnings are disseminated through the use of SMS and emails in local languages. They are also uploaded to relevant websites. 55

India’s zero casualty focus on disaster response is paying off as state governments of Odisha and Andhra Pradesh garner praise for evacuations of up to 400,000 coastal communities before cyclones Hudhud and Phailin made landfall. Regular real-time updates from the Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services helped build the confidence of the evacuated communities.

Sri Lanka’s first early warning alert system, the Disaster and Emergency Warning Network (DEWN), was launched in 2009 by DMC, Dialog Axiata PLC (the country’s largest mobile operator) and other partners. DEWN has a dedicated terminal device with multiple alarm features that may be fixed in critical locations. Alerts to the mobile phones of first responders or designated DEWN terminals can be issued from the central interface in the DMC. When the decision has been made to issue a public warning, the system can transmit messages using SMS and cell broadcasting. DEWN is the result of research and development work undertaken by the Dialog Axiata, with funding support from the University of Moratuwa Mobile Communication Research Lab and Microimage in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami.

Messages can either be sent via SMS for direct alerts or via cell broadcast for mass alerts, which would still work even if the network is congested. Although the service uses the cell broadcast function of Dialog Axiata, warnings can be delivered through other local service providers as well. Warning messages are also sent to DEWN alarm devices that have been installed in public locations such as temples, churches, schools etc. The DEWN alarm device contains a loud siren, flashing light and an LCD screen where the warning message is displayed in three languages.

Early warning practices can be seen taking a community focus, in the form of community-based early warning systems, involving government officials and volunteers equipping themselves with technology to save lives. A case in point is the city of Hat Yai, a frequently inundated low-lying area in southern Thailand. Here, a flood working group that comprises of government officials and volunteers monitors the city’s water flows using CCTV cameras, publish rainfall data on a website, compile handbooks, and establish insurance funds to compensate for the economic and human losses

53 Asia Disaster Reduction Centre, “Total Disaster Risk Management: Good Practices”, 2005, pp. 32-33. Available from http://www.adrc.asia/publications/TDRM2005/TDRM_Good_Practices/PDF/PDF-2005e/Chapter3_3.1.2-1.pdf. 54 Cyclone Preparedness Programme, “Telecommunication network”, Available from http://win.bdrcs.org/cppis/App_Pages/Client/CPPRadioNetwork.aspx. 55 S. H. M. Fakhruddin, “Applications of Medium Range Probabilistic Flood Forecast for Societal Benefits – Lessons Learned from Bangladesh”, in Reducing Disaster: Early Warning Systems for Climate Change , Ashbindu Singh and Zinta Zommers, eds. (Springer Netherlands, 2014), pp. 167-183. Available from http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94- 017-8598-3_9.

21 | Building e-Resilience in Sri Lanka caused by flooding. 56 Another example is the District Disaster Relief Committee of Kailali in Nepal that comprises of local government officials and community members who are mobilized to communicate warnings and coordinate relief.

A technically resilient early warning system alone cannot guarantee that loss of lives will be curtailed and damage to properties will be reduced. The process of gathering accurate and timely information to formulate the warning messages, and the actions taken when the warning messages are received are both critical factors. In Japan during the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, the height of the tsunami waves were underestimated, which led to misinformation in the warning messages. The disaster also pointed to the need to inform the public about evacuation routes as people evacuating in cars got stuck in traffic and were affected by the tsunami waves. 57 Another tragic example is the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI), an expensive computer system developed to forecast radiation, which directed evacuees towards the radiation flumes. 58

Despite these few shortcomings, however, Japan’s use of sophisticated monitoring systems saved many lives. The warnings were issued extraordinarily quickly. 59 One notable example was the nine high-speed trains that stopped safely as warnings of seismic activity were relayed in time.

3.4 Response and Recovery

Disaster recovery can constitute many phases from the immediate aftermath of the disaster to rebuilding for long-term recovery. Communication in the immediate aftermath of the disaster is crucial to avoid disruption and anxiety among the displaced populations, as well as to expedite the return to normalcy.

For example, in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, information about evacuation, temporary shelters and the distribution of emergency aid reached the populations fairly well. However, information about the scope and gravity of the nuclear accidents did not reach the populations causing anxiety, according to a report by Japan’s Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency. Updates on the disaster relief effort were disseminated to the affected populace by the government. The government collected this information through data received from local government agencies and through the use of various crowdsourcing platforms. These crowdsourcing platforms that are available to all online, kept the displaced population informed, and helped the coordination of relief efforts among the first responders and various volunteer groups. 60

The destruction of the computer servers with data essential for the provision of municipal services made disaster response more difficult in the affected areas in Japan. Damage to the

56 See: http://www.hatyaicityclimate.org/. 57 Federica Ranghieri and Mikio Ishiwatari, Learning from Megadisasters: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2014), pp. 12-13. Available from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/18864. 58 Mika Shimuzu, “Unheard voices in the Tohoku disaster: Toward international policy community”, Analytic Services Inc. , 26 August 2014. Available from http://www.anser.org/babrief_unheard-voices-feature. 59 Rohan Samarajiva, “Lessons to learn from a tsunami early warning system that worked”, Jakarta Globe , 21 March 2011. Available from http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/archive/lessons-to-learn-from-a-tsunami-early-warning-system-that- worked/430402/. 60 Federica Ranghieri and Mikio Ishiwatari, Learning from Megadisasters: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2014), p 9. Available from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/18864.

22 | Building e-Resilience in Sri Lanka telecommunication networks also made the distribution of relief goods difficult. Community radio helped fill the information void by communicating the times that relief aid would arrive and keeping local communities updated. 61

A White House Innovation for Disaster Response and Recovery Initiative produced an app called ‘Lantern Live’, which allows the disaster-hit populations to find refueling stations in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. The smartphone app developed by the Department of Energy was motivated by the difficulties faced by those affected in Hurricane Sandy. 62

Another technology that is currently being developed to help first responders during the immediate aftermath of a disaster is the use of drones or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) that record the scene of the search area using infrared cameras. The Sri Lankan DMC is currently exploring the use of UAVs with the assistance of the Korean International Cooperation Agency.

Backup of critical information that aid in rebuilding and reconstruction has proved to be crucial to speed up reconstruction and return to normalcy. In the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, land ownership records were fairly easily restored due to official and private backups, although the relevant local government authorities lacked backup of their own. However, this highlighted the need for resilient backup mechanisms (e.g., cloud services). 63

4 Lessons Learned and Proposals for Strengthened Regional Responses

4.1 Applications

This report has highlighted the potential of ICTs for DRM, ranging from GIS to distributed databases. ICTs can communicate warning of impending hazards, and their application can greatly contribute to DRR by enabling timely evacuation, for example. ICTs can also improve hazard mapping, enabling intelligent land use and implementation of appropriate building standards.

The potential of hazard mapping is illustrated by the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. The authorities had prepared hazard maps, but the actual inundation proved greater than had been predicted. This did cost some lives but a relatively large percentage of people (57 per cent) left just after the earthquake tremors, illustrating the value of hazard mapping and education. The Japanese authorities are now working to improve its risk assessment processes by integrating historical evidence and topographic information for a more accurate production of hazard maps.

The identification of power supply as a critical weak point in the ICT infrastructure in recent disasters has led to the beginning of a radical rethinking of electricity supply, discussed above in terms of smart

61 Federica Ranghieri and Mikio Ishiwatari, Learning from Megadisasters: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2014), p. 18. Available from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/18864. 62 Brian Forde, Denice Ross and Derek Frempong, “‘Lantern Live’ Mobile App Lights Way for Citizens Impacted by Disasters”, White House Blog , 21 November 2014. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/11/21/lantern- live-mobile-app-lights-way-citizens-impacted-disasters. 63 Federica Ranghieri and Mikio Ishiwatari, Learning from Megadisasters: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2014), p. 9. Available from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/18864.

23 | Building e-Resilience in Sri Lanka grids and microgrids. 64 The introduction of ICTs into the power grids and distribution networks in developing economies has lagged because the benefits have been seen solely in terms of costs. Replacing the labour of meter readers with technology is less attractive when labour costs are low. However, the costing is likely to change when resilience and energy conservation, especially at peak hours, are factored in.

4.2 Interdependency

Increasingly, attention is focused on the interdependency of critical infrastructures. 65 Post-disaster analysis of Hurricane Sandy and the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami showed that power supply was one of the critical weak points of ICT infrastructure. 66 ICTs provide the control systems for today’s centralized electricity grids, which will fail if the control systems fail. Transport infrastructures, especially those that have been upgraded to various ‘smart’ forms, will fail when either one or both communication and electricity systems experience lengthy failures. Thus, to fully address the objectives of resilient infrastructure embedded in SDG 9, it is necessary to go beyond a siloed approach and embrace multi-sectoral partnerships to address the interdependencies among infrastructures.

4.3 Regional and Supranational Actions

In the past, infrastructures were fully within the control of nation states, with a few exceptions. In many cases, they were actually owned and operated directly by governments. This is increasingly not the case. The power grids of Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal are now interconnected with the Indian power grid, for example. Foreign investment is not only permitted, but eagerly sought out for many infrastructures. A significant portion of the Australian electricity generation, transmission and distribution assets are owned by the Chinese government’s State Grid Corporation. 67 Therefore, infrastructure issues are increasingly becoming supranational in nature.

The very nature of the Internet has increased the international dependence of national ICT service providers. Most Internet-based activities, ranging from email to web searches, involve the flow of data across national borders. The degradation of Internet quality of service experienced by users in many parts of Asia when undersea cables in faraway locations, such as the Mediterranean or the Taiwan Strait are cut, is evidence of internationalization.

Ensuring the resilience of national ICT infrastructures and, thereby of societies, requires international action to enhance the resilience of the shared international backhaul components of national ICT

64 New York State Department of Public Service, “Reforming the energy vision: Staff report and proposal – Case 14-M- 0101”, 24 April 2014, is perhaps one of the best thought out discussion documents. It is seen by observers to have been enabled by the devastation caused to New York City by Hurricane Sandy. 65 See http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2014/nsf14524/nsf14524.htm. 66 Documented in detail in Rohan Samarajiva and Shazna Zuhyle, The resilience of ICT infrastructure and its role during disasters (Bangkok, ESCAP, 2014). Available from http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/The%20resilience%20of%20ICT%20Infrastructures.pdf. 67 Jared Lynch, "Treasurer Joe Hockey approves China State Grid deal to buy large stakes in power companies", Sydney Morning Herald , 21 December 2013. Available from http://www.smh.com.au/business/treasurer-joe-hockey-approves- china-state-grid-deal-to-buy-large-stakes-in-power-companies-20131220-2zqw7.html.

24 | Building e-Resilience in Sri Lanka systems. Since it is unrealistic to expect there will be no cuts to the thousands of kilometres of cables, the solution is resilient network architecture that includes redundancy. In the past, this was sought to be provided by ring architectures, but that has proved inadequate, especially when both parts of the ring are undersea cables. 68

The solution is the widespread adoption of mesh architectures across the Asia-Pacific that includes both undersea and terrestrial components, and works around the major choke points of the Red Sea- Suez, the Strait of Hormuz, the Malacca Strait and the Taiwan Strait. Increasingly, private and consortium cables are improving the redundancy with regard to undersea cable systems, although several countries such as Bangladesh and Myanmar are still dependent on a single cable, and others such as Timor-Leste are connected only via satellite and terrestrial cable. 69 Private actors can improve the situation with regard to undersea and hybrid cables (for example, the Bay of Bengal Gateway cable that avoids the Malacca Strait by using a terrestrial route from Singapore to Penang). 70

However, regional inter-governmental coordination will be required for building up a terrestrial mesh to complement the undersea systems. Laying cable across multiple countries to reach either the Atlantic or Pacific coasts requires permissions from multiple governments, any one of which can hold the entire project hostage. Therefore, the only way the terrestrial mesh can be built is with the cooperation of governments, or more specifically, with the road and railway authorities who have control over rights of way that extend across borders. The subset of these transportation corridors that are formally recognized as being the most important and connect across borders come under the authority of ESCAP, which has responsibility for the Asian Highway 71 and the Tran-Asian Railway. 72 Promotion of the use of conduits along these transportation corridors for open-access international and national backhaul networks is the centrepiece of the ESCAP Asia-Pacific Information Superhighway initiative. 73

The critical need is to connect to Europe or North America, where most data centres are located. This cannot be achieved by regional hybrid cables or mesh networks alone. As an ESCAP discussion paper 74 demonstrates, most Asian countries connect to the Internet via Hong Kong or Singapore, which results in the input prices for Internet services in their countries being high. The best solutions are submarine, terrestrial or hybrid systems that go all the way to Europe or North America, but regional systems would still contribute to lowering prices, and most importantly increasing the resilience of national ICT infrastructures. For example, there is no doubt that the resilience of Bangladesh’s ICT infrastructure has been improved by the construction of terrestrial linkages into India to supplement the sole submarine cable, SEA-ME-WE 4. In the same way, the construction of the cable landing stations in multiple locations will enhance the resilience of Sri Lanka’s ICT infrastructure (see Section 2.3).

68 Ryan Singel, “Fiber Optic Cable Cuts Isolate Millions From Internet, Future Cuts Likely”, Wired , 31 January 2008. Available from http://www.wired.com/2008/01/fiber-optic-cab/. 69 Additional undersea cables will connect Bangladesh and Myanmar by 2015-16. Timor Leste has opted for a low-latency satellite to supplement the terrestrial cable. 70 Telecom Review, “‘Bay of Bengal Gateway” Submarine Cable (BBG) Consortium Completes C&MA Signing and Supply Contract”. Available from: http://www.telecomreviewna.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=470:bay- of-bengal-gateway-submarine-cable-bbg-consortium-completes-cama-signing-and-supply-contract&catid=48:july-august- 2013&Itemid=96. 71 See http://www.unescap.org/our-work/transport/asian-highway. 72 See http://www.unescap.org/our-work/transport/trans-asian-railway. 73 See http://www.unescap.org/our-work/ict-disaster-risk-reduction/asia-pacific-information-superhighway. 74 ESCAP, “Discussion Paper Series on Problems and Challenges in Transit Connectivity Routes and International Gateways in Asia”, 2014. Available from http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Discussion%20Paper-Transit-Connectivity_0.pdf.

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One of the best things that can be done to improve the resilience of the national ICT infrastructure is to create economic incentives for actions contributing to resilience, and to desist from actions that would go against resilience. For example, governments fully compensating ICT infrastructure providers for losses caused by disasters would not create incentives for the adoption of resilient design. On the other hand, if operators are mandated to carry disaster damage insurance, the insurance companies will create economic incentives for resilient design. Regional organizations can facilitate the pooling of risk to encourage insurance products that will cover disaster losses.

4.4 Resilience and Affordability

Building in resilience to ICT infrastructures has been seen to oppose the objective of providing affordable access. The rationale is that when more redundancy is built into a network, the supply becomes costlier, and therefore, the prices for end users are higher. This rationale, however, does not take into account the costs to the customer and the economy when the infrastructure services fail. These costs are enormous, but are difficult to factor into the calculations that companies make in their internal decision-making regarding network design and investment.

On the other hand, customers that are reliant on infrastructure services make private investments in backup facilities by purchasing alternative connectivity services for wireless broadband that are not used regularly, and backup power supply in the form of inverters or generator sets. Their actual capital and operational costs are therefore much higher than what appear at first glance.

In the same way, problems of reliability of international backhaul impose additional costs on enterprises for whom connectivity is mission-critical. They have to make their own investments in ad hoc backup facilities (e.g., purchasing connectivity services from multiple providers) or in higher-cost services that include service-level agreements. It has been shown that customers in developing markets in Asia pay more per Mbps when retail broadband prices per Mbps are calculated in terms of what is actually delivered rather than what is advertised, especially in the international domain. 75

So it is not that resilience and affordability are not mutually exclusive. If customers begin to trust in the reliability and quality of the connectivity services, they will, over time, reduce their investments in workaround solutions and begin to rely entirely on the service provider. A smart service provider can exploit this to enhance revenues and profits.

4.5 Policy Recommendations

4.5.1 For International/Regional Organizations • Support and enable policies conducive to the construction and operation of resilient mesh networks across the Asia-Pacific for international backhaul of ICT services that include both terrestrial and maritime components. • Encourage coordination among different parts of the United Nations system responsible for different kinds of infrastructures so that they understand the critical interdependencies, and cooperate to increase the resilience of all infrastructures, including ICT infrastructures.

75 Helani Galpaya and Shazna Zuhyle, "South Asian Broadband Service Quality: Diagnosing the Bottlenecks", 1 April 2011. Available from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1979244.

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• Engage with member governments to impress upon them the concepts of interdependent and critical infrastructures, and the need to move away from the siloed approach. • Commission studies on the feasibility of risk pooling to enable the introduction of insurance as a DRR instrument.

4.5.2 For National Governments • Actively participate in regional efforts on resilient infrastructures and on using insurance as a DRR instrument. • Integrate DRR into development planning. • Create the conditions for greater cooperation among different parts of government responsible for resilient infrastructures; this includes horizontal cooperation among government units as well as vertical cooperation among those at different levels of government, with special attention being paid to local government. • Utilize technological innovations for disaster mitigation and warning, including GIS and, in particular, introduce ICT-based elements into the electricity grids and distribution networks to enhance resilience of the power infrastructure. • Take steps, including the development of open data policies, to ensure that agencies with responsibility for resilience and disaster response have access to the data they require. • Ensure adequate redundancy and risk reduction in international elements of the ICT infrastructure, by constructing cable landing stations in diverse locations, and putting in place adequate safeguards in the links from the cable landing stations to main network nodes. • Define ‘conditions of exception’ that can trigger mandatory national roaming under specified terms.

4.5.3 For Telecom Service Providers • Pay increased attention to the need for reliable connectivity services by customers, overcoming the obsolete thinking that sees resilience and affordability as mutually exclusive. • Improve contingency planning and provisioning of power supplies to base transceiver stations, and ensure adequate cells-on-wheels. • Enable robust core networks using the capabilities of all-IP networks. Ensure that the residual capacity of radio network controllers are used to supplement weak elements.

27 | Building e-Resilience in Sri Lanka