THE MONETARY SIN of the WEST Jacques Rueff the MONETARY SIN of the WEST
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BY THE SAME AUTHOR The Age of Inflation, 1964 Balance of Payments, 1967 The Gods and the Kings, 1972 In French: Des sciences physiques aux sciences morales, 1922 Sur une théorie de l'inflation, 1925 Theories des phénomènes monétaires, 1927 La crise du capitalisme, 1925 Une erreur économique: L'organisation des transferts, 1929 L'ordre social, 3rd edition, 1967 Epître aux dirigistes, 1949 La regulation monétaire et le problème institutionnel de la monnaie, 1953 Discours sur le credit, 1961 L'âge de l'inflation, 4th edition, 1964 Discours de reception a l'Académie française et réponse de M. Andre Maurois, 1965 Le lancinant problème des balances de paiements, 1967 Les fondements philosophiques des systèmes économiques, 1967 Les dieux et les rois, 1967 Des sciences physiques aux sciences morales, "un essai de 1922 reconsidéré en 1969," 1969 THE MONETARY SIN OF THE WEST Jacques Rueff THE MONETARY SIN OF THE WEST Translated by Roger Glémet THE MACMILLAN COMPANY NEW YORK, NEW YORK Copyright © 1972 by Jacques Rueff © Librairie Plon, 1971 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photo- copying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, with- out permission in writing from the Publisher. The Macmillan Company 866 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022 Collier-Macmillan Canada Ltd., Toronto, Ontario The Monetary Sin of the West was originally published in French by Lib- rairie Plon under the title L·e Péché Monêtaìre de I'Occident and is reprinted by permission. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 79-182450 Second Printing 1972 Printed in the United States of America There is tragedy in the world because men contrive, out of nothings, tragedies that are totally unnecessary—which means that men are frivolous. —Henry de Montherlant, La Rose de Sable Contents Prologue PART ONE Introducing the Gold-Exchange Standard I The Diagnosis of June 1961 15 II Can the Monetary System of the West Endure? 36 PART TWO Attempts at Persuasion III Prudence and Discretion 61 IV General de Gaulle's Press Conference 70 V Interview with The Economist 75 VI Time for Action 99 VII Triffin and I 107 10 CONTENTS PART THREE Enter the Experts VIII The General Climate 117 IX Symptomatic Treatment 123 X The Critical Error in the Diagnosis: The International Liquidity Shortage 127 XI Irrigation Plans During the Flood 131 XII Implementing the Washington Directives 135 XIII Nathanaël or Paper-Gold 138 XIV An Economic Heresy: The Feedback Scheme for Exported Capital 145 PART FOUR "We Shall Have the Consequences" XV A Trend That Cannot Be Reversed 151 XVI What Is to Be, Will Be 158 XVII Precarious Dominance of the Dollar 179 Epilogue 199 Afterword to the American Edition 204 PROLOGUE The problem of Western currency is more topical than ever. For ten years now, the international monetary system has been patched up by many expedients that were intended to extend its assured life. It cannot endure very long in the present state. The following pages afford a description of its modifications over time. They provide a diagnosis and make a prognosis possible. Some qualification is necessary, however, as regards the rate of foreseeable evolution. The art of monetary expedients has been refined to such a point over the last ten years that no one can predict what artificial devices can be generated by the fertile minds of experts. One thing is certain, however: while additional innovations may stave off the gradual deterioration of the system for a while, they cannot change the outcome. As far as prognosti- cation is concerned, events can never be wrong. But unfortunately, events have already passed judgment. It is to be hoped that they will not continue to show that in the monetary field, as indeed in other fields, the same causes always bring about the same effects, and those who persist in ignoring the past are irrevocably doomed to live the same sequence of events again. PART ONE Introducing the Gold-Exchange o Standard I THE DIAGNOSIS OF JUNE 1961 Some will no doubt be surprised that in 1961, practically alone in the world, I had the audacity to call attention to the dangers inherent in the international monetary system as it existed then.1 My fears at the time were based essentially on the growing similarities between the international monetary developments of the years 1958-1961 and those of the latter part of the 1926-1929 period. There was the same accumulation of Anglo-Saxon cur- rencies in the monetary reserves of European countries, in par- ticular France, and the same inflation in creditor countries. In both periods the monetary system was characterized by the widespread application of a specific, adventitious procedure that Anglo-Saxon countries termed the gold-exchange standard. What marks this system is that, de jure or de facto, in the coun- 11 must, however, pay a tribute here to my friend Professor Robert Triffin of Yale University, who also diagnosed the threat of the gold-exchange standard to the stability of the Western world. But while we agreed on the diagnosis, we differed widely as to the remedy to be applied. On the other hand, the late Professor Michael Heilperin, of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, held a position in every respect close to mine. 16 THE MONETARY SIN OF THE WEST tries it affects, the counterpart in the balance sheet of the bank of issue for the amount of money in circulation is not only gold or claims denominated in the national currency, as is the case under the gold standard. It also includes a large proportion of foreign currencies that are freely convertible into gold—that is to say, in the 1925-1930 period, dollars and sterling, and since 1945, dollars only. The last section of this chapter (see pages 31-35) records in greater detail the main features of this system and provides some information relating to its origins and scope of application. Between 1930 and 1934 I was Financial Attache in the French Embassy in London. In that capacity, I had noted day after day the dramatic sequence of events that turned the 1929 cyclical down- turn into the Great Depression of 1931-1934. I knew that this tragedy was due to disruption of the international monetary system as a result of requests for reimbursement in gold of the dollar and sterling balances that had been so inconsiderately accumulated. On 1 October 1931 I wrote a note to the Finance Minister, in preparation for talks that were to take place between the French Prime Minister, whom I was to accompany to Washington, and the President of the United States. In it I called the Government's attention to the role played by the gold-exchange standard in the Great Depression, which was already causing havoc among Western nations, in the following terms: There is one innovation which has materially contrib- uted to the difficulties that are besetting the world. That is the introduction by a great many European states, under the auspices of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, of a monetary system called the gold- exchange standard. Under this system, central banks are authorized to include in their reserves not only gold and claims denominated in the national currency, but also foreign exchange. The latter, although entered as assets of the central bank which owns it, naturally remains de- posited in the country of origin. THE DIAGNOSIS OF JUNE 1961 17 The use of such a mechanism has the considerable drawback of damping the effects of international capital movements in the financial markets that they affect. For example, funds flowing out of the United States into a country that applies the gold-exchange standard increase by a corresponding amount the money supply in the re- ceiving market, without reducing in any way the money supply in their market of origin. The bank of issue to which they accrue, and which enters them in its reserves, leaves them on deposit in the New York market. There they can, as previously, provide backing for the granting of credit. Thus the gold-exchange standard considerably reduces the sensitivity of spontaneous reactions that tend to limit or correct gold movements. For this reason, in the past the gold-exchange standard has been a source of serious monetary disturbances. It was probably one cause for the long duration of the substantial credit inflation that pre- ceded the 1929 crisis in the United States. The first action of an international conference that was resolved seriously to deal with monetary problems should be to eliminate it. On 17 March 1933, in a lecture given at the Ecole des Sciences politiques under the chairmanship of the Finance Minister, Mr. Pierre-Etienne Flandin, I expatiated in greater detail on the same considerations, as follows: The gold-exchange standard is characterized by the fact that it enables the bank of issue to enter in its mone- tary reserves not only gold and paper in the national currency, but also claims denominated in foreign curren- cies, payable in gold and deposited in the country of origin. In other words, the central bank of a country that applies the gold-exchange standard can issue currency not only against gold and claims denominated in the national currency, but also against claims in dollars or sterling. 18 THE MONETARY SIN OF THE WEST This recommendation did not remain a dead letter. It was followed systematically by the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, which introduced the system in all the countries where it was called upon to intervene: Austria, Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria, Estonia, Danzig..