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Untitled [Adam Siegel on a Very Short War: the Mayaguez and The John Francis Guilmartin, Inc. NetLibrary. A very short war: the Mayaguez and the Battle of Koh Tang. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. xxi + 238 pp. ISBN 978-0-585-17507-2. Reviewed by Adam B. Siegel Published on H-War (June, 1996) In A Very Short War, John Guilmartin pro‐ land to carry Marines airlifted from Okinawa to vides a rich examination of the last episode of the recapture the ship and rescue the crew; air sup‐ U.S. war in Indochina--the multi-service operation port from Air Force aircraft operating from Thai‐ to recover the merchant ship Mayaguez and her land and Navy aircraft from the aircraft carrier crew from the Khmer Rouge less than a month af‐ Coral Sea conducting retaliatory strikes against ter the fnal U.S. evacuations from Phnom Penh the Cambodian mainland. In the intense opera‐ and Saigon. Through a detailed operational-tacti‐ tions over the next three days, U.S. forces killed cal study of this discrete political-military event, perhaps a hundred Cambodians and bombed a Guilmartin seeks to illuminate how the modern variety of Khmer facilities. This came at a high "communications revolution will create as many price, with ffteen Americans killed in action, problems as it solves" (p. 29), rather than being an three more missing in action, and ffty wounded; undiluted good as many may think. four helicopters shot down; and another heli‐ In April and May 1975, the U.S. military con‐ copter crashed with twenty-three killed (p. 28). ducted a series of three discrete military opera‐ The Mayaguez operation raises many points tions that put an end to the (U.S.) Vietnam War: to consider in regard to the "communications rev‐ Frequent Wind (the evacuation of Phnom Penh, olution" in a period when at least some in the U.S. Cambodia, 12 April); Eagle Pull (the evacuation of military believe that the "information revolution" Vietnamese and Americans from Saigon, South might allow total knowledge at higher command. Vietnam, 29-30 April); and the Mayaguez recap‐ President Ford and others in Washington certain‐ ture (12-15 May). Guilmartin opens the book with ly had reason to believe they had (nearly) perfect a discussion of Frequent Wind and Eagle Pull; information for decision-making. As one of the then, after setting the scene, he turns to the events earliest actions during the crisis, a U-2 strategic of the Mayaguez capture and the U.S. response to reconnaissance plane was put in the air to act as a the Khmer actions. President Gerald Ford "quickly communications relay between forces on the settled on three overlapping objectives: recover scene and higher headquarters. Despite (or be‐ the ship and the crew; avoid...hostage negotia‐ cause of) these efforts to have improved commu‐ tions; and mount a demonstrative use of US force nications, White House attempts to control the to bolster America's international credibility" (p. tactical situation caused near disaster on at least 38). The interaction of these three objectives cre‐ two occasions during the operation. ated a time imperative and determined the forces -- At one point, the White House had issued to be used: U.S. Air Force helicopters from Thai‐ orders to sink anything coming off Koh Tang Is‐ H-Net Reviews land. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger years teaching at the Air Force Academy. Thus, stalled for time, unsure of the propriety of this Guilmartin was a trained historian and data gath‐ sort of tactical control. His delay perhaps prevent‐ erer, as well as a decorated rescue pilot with 119 ed an attack on a Cambodian fshing boat carry‐ combat missions in Southeast Asia. With his aca‐ ing the Mayaguez crew from the island to the demic background, Guilmartin began gathering mainland (pp. 55-56). information as the operation proceeded and be‐ -- As soon as the White House learned that the gan interviewing with the idea of helping pre‐ Mayaguez crew had been released, orders went serve (and, in part, create) a historical record of out to cease all offensive operations and "to disen‐ the operation that provides a key basis for this gage and withdraw all forces...as soon as possi‐ book. ble." This order almost prevented a reinforcement This aspect of the work is one that fascinates. of the forces on the island that was crucial to en‐ As Guilmartin phrased his approach, "Even before sure the withdrawal from Koh Tang (p. 107). the smoke cleared, I was automatically trying to As these examples suggest, the realities of this find out what had gone wrong and why" (p. xvi). Very Short War should serve as a cautionary tale This near-participation in the actual events allows for anyone expecting that the increased commu‐ him to provide a much richer context than nications capabilities are an unadulterated good. archival material or (with more modern events) interviews alone can offer. Within this book are many other fascinating insights into the U.S. military in the waning days In a way, Guilmartin's strengths create the ba‐ of Vietnam involvement (and, perhaps, militaries sis for some of the shortcomings of A Very Short in general). For example, Guilmartin discusses the War. After fnishing the book, readers will feel changes occurring in the training and tactics of confident that they have a deep understanding of the helicopter squadrons as they moved from a the U.S. Air Force's helicopter forces involved in wartime environment. Not surprisingly--but per‐ the Mayaguez affair, and a long appendix on the haps dismaying--even by 1975 USAF helicopter principal helicopter involved (the H-53) provides training was constrained by peacetime restric‐ important technical background. When Guil‐ tions. Guilmartin's emphasis on the differences martin moves on to other USAF elements and oth‐ between specific units suggests the point that er services, however, the depth of description these differences might be opaque to higher head‐ and, therefore, understanding decrease. For ex‐ quarters and the civilian leadership not familiar ample, Guilmartin describes the differences be‐ with "tactical" details that are crucial for making tween the two involved helicopter squadrons--one tactical decisions. a special operations and the other a rescue squadron--and how their H-53 helicopters were Guilmartin, then a U.S. Air Force ofcer, was a equipped, how their tactics differed, how peace‐ "participant-observer" in this operation, handling time training rules since the end of the war in maintenance for one of the two USAF helicopter Vietnam had affected their readiness, and their squadrons. Although this book is published twen‐ differing philosophies to life and combat. ty years after the event, Guilmartin brings an im‐ mediacy to the work that only someone so close to In contrast to the treatment of the USAF heli‐ it could. Guilmartin was not, however, simply a copter forces, A Very Short War contains almost participant in the events discussed in this book. In no similar details about the Marines who were, 1975, he had just returned to the operating forces after all, the principal combat troops on the after three years at Princeton University complet‐ ground and who sufered the majority of the casu‐ ing his Ph.D. dissertation [1], followed by four alties. We learn little of their weapons, of their 2 H-Net Reviews training background, or of how the Vietnam expe‐ rather than to any of the numerous books and rience affected their approach to the battle on monographs on the operation.[5] Koh Tang.[2] There is a table listing USAF tactical Thus, A Very Short War is not a perfect work, assets in Thailand (p. 49), but nothing similar for but it is a very good one. In combination with the other services. In a footnote, Guilmartin states Christopher Jon Lamb's Belief Systems and Deci‐ that U.S. Navy aircraft did not provide air support sion Making in the Mayaguez Crisis (Gainesville, to the battle on Koh Tang because "carrier-based University of Florida Press, 1989), A Very Short A-7Es and A-6s were not equipped with radios ca‐ War provides a history of the Mayaguez incident pable of communicating with the Marines on the that should satisfy all but those with the most pro‐ beach" (pp. 211-12, text on p. 99). In contrast to the found interest, and the footnotes and bibliogra‐ detail on the H-53s, Guilmartin does not explain phy will provide the basis for further reading. In why U.S. Navy aircraft did not have the capability addition, Guilmartin provides enough detail and to support Marine Corps operations in 1975 when, context for non-participants to gain an under‐ after all, this had been a principal role for U.S. standing into some of the complexities of modern Navy aircraft during the Vietnam War and re‐ warfare and how Clausewitz's nineteenth-century mained, at least on paper, one of the principal concept of friction can emerge in a twentieth-cen‐ tasks for all naval aviators. In another example, tury battle. while we learn the names of many of the H-53 pi‐ A Very Short War should be on the reading lots, almost none of the involved fghter or recon‐ list of those interested in the command and con‐ naissance pilots receive the same attention. Some‐ trol of military operations, in the interaction of what in line with the focus on the rescue pilots, A policy and tactical military activity, and in the Very Short War has only the briefest references to modern U.S. military in general. Any library with the strike missions into the Cambodian mainland a collection interest in the modern (U.S.) military that occurred in conjunction with the rescue oper‐ should have this on their purchase list.
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