THE NOMINEES Why We Thought We Could Prime Social Behavior

THE NOMINEES

Why We Thought We Could Prime Social Behavior

John A. Bargh Department of Psychology New York University

Susan Fiske (this issue) is right on about the “discom- cused on the extent of direct automatic influences of the fort” some articles cause—but not just in readers! Some- environment on thought, judgment, and behavior. The times (as in our case), they discomfit the authors evidence clearly showed the importance of one’s cur- themselves. Our initial study (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, rently operating goal or purpose as a mediator of one’s 1996, Experiment 1) revealed differences that were quite responses (i.e., judgments and behavior) back to that en- large in the behavior of those participants primed to be vironment. Automatic, environmentally triggered ef- rude versus those primed to be polite: 63% of the former fects on social cognition, then, seemed to be restricted to group but only 17% of the latter group interrupted an on- input processes, not output processes; at least that is going conversation when given an opportunity (and rea- what I had to conclude based on the available evidence. son) to do so. At the time, the size of the effect surprised However, soon after I finished that chapter there oc- us, because the size of these effects on behavior were curred two unrelated and apparently chance influences much larger than those of previous priming effects on soon my thinking on this topic—which today, with the cial-perceptual variables such as impressions. Even after benefit of hindsight, I see not as chance occurrences but replicating the effect three times (at the stereotype rather as the operation of that zeitgeist again. First, Tory Hig- than single-trait level), we were in no rush to publish, gins asked me to contribute a chapter to the second vol- wanting to be very sure of it first. And so it came as a ume of his and Dick Sorrentino’s (1990) Handbook of great and happy relief when Ap Dijksterhuis and Ad van Motivation and Cognition, and at first I demurred be- Knippenberg (1998; and then others) began doing related cause I really did not know much, if anything, about the research that conceptually replicated ours. field of motivation. But Tory insisted (thanks, Tory!), We need not have worried, as it turned out—the ef- saying it would be a stretch and therefore good for me. fect has since proven to be very robust: It has been ob- So that was the writing project I took with me on my tained with more than 20 different stereotypes and 25 first sabbatical, at the University of Mannheim in the different dependent measures (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, spring of 1989. There I not only had the time to think 2001). And although we might have performed the ini- about how automaticity related to goals and motivation tial studies, it was Dijksterhuis and his colleagues who (see Bargh, 1990) but also enjoyed the generous hospi- so painstakingly mapped out the mediators and modera- tality and intellectual stimulation of Norbert Schwarz torsofthebehavior-primingeffectandTanyaChartrand and Fritz Strack and their lab group in Mannheim. whotookitintothedomainofnaturalisticsocialinterac- Second, and also during that stay in Germany, Peter tion and also showed how the effect was related to the Gollwitzer—then at the Max Planck Institute in Mu- long-standing literature on mimicry and behavioral nich—asked me to come down and meet with his re- contagion (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Chen, Burrows, search group. Peter and I discovered, to our mutual and I (Bargh et al., 1996) just happened to be first. surprise, that we were working on the same issue, just Which brings up two questions that the journal edi- from opposite perspectives. I was thinking about how tors asked us to address: What caused us to do those first the externally triggered mental processes that I studied studies, and why were there so many subsequent ones? might link up with motivations and goals, and he was As Fiske suspected, the zeitgeist was in our case a big working on how the motivations and goal pursuits he part of the answer to both of these questions. There were studied—especially implementation intentions—be- several converging reasons for why we designed and came linked to external, situational triggers. Thus be- conducted experiments attempting to prime social began a fruitful collaboration that continues today. havior. First, I had just finished a review of the extant Peter recognized back then that it was important to build social psychological priming and automaticity literature on the efforts of Sorrentino and Higgins (1986), who had (Bargh, 1989) and, in the course of that review, had fo- been encouraging (if not prodding) social psychologists to PRIME SOCIAL BEHAVIOR consider the synergistic interaction of cognitive and motiva- (this issue) analysis, an entirely theoretical notion. But tional variables in their research. And so we made plans to Chen, Burrows, and I (Bargh et al., 1996) tried it out, us- take the next step: to explicitly link social cognitive models to ingthesameoldprimingmethods—theScrambledSen- action and behavior. With generous support from the Max tence Test (Srull & Wyer, 1979) and then subliminal Planck Society, we brought together a formidable group of priming (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982)—but using be- scholars at Ringberg Castle in the Bavarian Alps, and for a havioral instead of judgmental dependent measures. week we all discussed how the various cognitive and motiva- The rest, as they say, is history. tional phenomena we studied connected to or manifested Andspeakingofhistory,therewasaninterestingturn themselves in overt behavior (see Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996). of the wheel of time that was an important influence in In the course of preparing my own contribution to our designs of Experiments 2 and 3 of Bargh et al. that conference and book, I had been pondering any and (1996). Devine’s (1989) article is rightly cited in this is- all possible ways in which the external situation or envi- sue as a modern classic, and the authors herein give two ronment could directly produce behavior; that is, with- reasons for this: the differentiation between the activa- out the need for any intervention by conscious intention tion of a stereotype and its use or application in judg- or construal processes. What were the possible auto- ment (one of which is not controllable whereas the other matic routes from environment to behavior? One was is), and the dissociation between explicit (Modern Rac- the “auto-motive” idea presented in the Higgins and ism Scale; McConahay, 1986) and implicit (stereotype Sorrentino volume (Bargh, 1990). In that approach, priming) indices of prejudice, so that even well-inten- one’s situational goals could be thought of as mental tioned and egalitarian people were found to be suscepti- representations, for which the principles of automatiza- ble to nonconscious stereotyping and prejudice. I want tion (i.e., frequent and consistent pairing with specific tomentionhereathirdimportantcontributionbythatar- situations or environmental settings) were just as appli- ticle (no wonder it is so highly cited!). cable as for any other representation (e.g., stereotypes), Devine(1989)hadbasedherExperiment2subliminal so that it was theoretically possible for those situational primingmanipulationonthatofBarghandPietromonaco goalstobecomeautomaticallytied(overtime)tothesit- (1982) but designed the study with the critical twist of uations in which those goals were chronically pursued. having the priming stimuli (words related to the African However, the other possible route I considered was American stereotype) be semantically unrelated to the more directly related to the Bargh et al. (1996) research dependent measure (ratings of a target’s hostility). This of focal interest here, and it was inspired by another re- was how she could show that the subliminal priming ef- searcher at Max-Planck-Munich: Wolfgang Prinz. fect was not due to the priming of a single trait construct Prinz’s research at the time focused on the learning and (as in Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982) but could only be at- production of language, and he had developed a “common tributabletotheparticipants’“goingbeyondtheinforma- coding” model in which the same mental representation tion given” and applying concepts in the stereotype that was used to understand language as to produce it oneself had not actually been presented. This was an important (see Prinz, 1990). He then began to develop and expand methodological advance, and one that my colleagues and this model to apply to all perception and action, based on I returned the favor by borrowing in our study (Bargh et William James’s (1890) notion of ideomotor action. (This al., 1996, Experiment 2) to show that the effect on behav- research program has been extremely productive and in- ior (walking speed) was due to the activated (elderly) ste- fluential over the past decade, and an interesting recent re- reotype and not merely to the activation of a single and view of it can be found in Knuf, Aschersleben, & Prinz, specific trait concept (of slowness or weakness). 2001.)Thebasicideawasthattherewasanoverlaporeven The many subsequent studies that followed again isomorphism between the (perceptual) representations show the zeitgeist at work. I have already mentioned the one uses to perceive an action and the (motor) representa- subsequent (and rather amazing) work on ideomotor ac- tionsusedtoproduceitoneself,sothatperceivinganaction tion by Prinz and his group at Munich (e.g., Knuf et al., also made the corresponding motor–behavioral represen- 2001). However, entirely separately, in the mid-1990s tation active (i.e., more accessible). there came the discovery in the field of cognitive neuro- Here was a second potential mechanism or route by science of mirror neurons, the likely neural foundation which the external social environment could directly af- of perception–action or ideomotor effects (e.g., fect social behavior—through its effect on perception. Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998). In macaque monkeys, the According to this logic of a direct and passive (auto- same set of neurons in the premotor cortex “lights up” matic) connection between perception and action, then, when the monkey watches the experimenter make a the same priming manipulations many of us had used in reaching, grasping motion as when the monkey makes the 1980s to influence social perception (e.g., impres- that movement itself. The study of mirror neurons and sion formation) should also influence the perceiver’s the overlap between perceptual and motoric representa- own social behavior. At the time, just as for the related tions is today a very hot topic in cognitive neuroscience auto-motive hypothesis, we had no data or evidence that andisbeingtoutedastheneuralbasisofeverythingfrom thiswouldbetrue—itwas,againcongruentwithFiske’s imitation and vicarious learning to the child’s develop-

217 BARGH ment of a “theory of mind” and acquisition of culture Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996). Automaticity of social be- (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Hurley & Chater, in press; havior: Direct effects of trait construct and stereotype priming on action. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 230–244. Meltzoff & Prinz, 2001; Tomasello, 1999; Whiten & Bargh, J. A., & Pietromonaco, P. (1982). Automatic information pro- Brown, 1999). Far from being a mindless or simple ac- cessing and social perception: The influence of trait information tivity that does not require much intelligence, evidence presented outside of conscious awareness on impression forma- for imitation in animals is found only in the most intelli- tion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 437–449. gent animals such as apes and parrots (Hurley & Chater, Carver, C. S., Ganellen, R. J., Froming, W. J., & Chambers, W. (1983). Modeling: An analysis in terms of category accessibil- in press; Whiten & Brown, 1999), and the identical pas- ity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19, 403–421. sive, automatic imitative effects are found in humans as Chartrand, T. L., & Bargh, J. A. (1999). The chameleon effect. Jour- well (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 893–910. All of this ongoing research activity points to an ex- Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and citing time ahead for research on perception–behavior controlled components. Journal of Personality and Social Psy- chology, 56, 5–18. and ideomotor phenomena, as social psychology teams Dijksterhuis, A., & Bargh, J. A. (2001). The perception–behavior ex- up with neuroscience to further explore the extent and pressway: Automatic effects of social perception on social be- parameters of the effect as well as its underlying mecha- havior. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social nisms (Bargh, in press; Hurley & Chater, in press). psychology (Vol. 33, pp. 1–40). New York: Academic. In closing, I’d like to underscore another one of Fiske’s Dijksterhuis, A., & van Knippenberg, A. (1998). The relationship between perception and behavior, or how to win a game of Trivial conditions for an article’s becoming a seminal or classic Pursuit. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, study—being in the right place at the right time. Especially, 856–877. in the case of our article, the right time. There were close Gallese, V., & Goldman, A. (1998). Mirror neurons and the simula- precedents to our article published much earlier—not only tion theory of mind-reading. Trends in Cognitive Science, 12, the very prescient Forgas (1976) study as cited in this issue 493–501. Gollwitzer, P. M., & Bargh, J. A. (Eds.). (1996). The psychology of by Fritz Strack, but also the Carver, Ganellen, Froming, and action: Linking motivation and cognition to behavior. New Chambers (1983) study in which hostility was primed and York: Guilford. shown to affect how long a participant shocked another in a Higgins, E. T., & Sorrentino, R. M. (Eds.). (1990). Handbook of moti- Milgram-like situation and Neuberg’s (1988) priming of co- vation and cognition (Vol. 2). New York: Guilford. operation and competition prior to participants’ engaging in Hurley, S. L., & Chater, N. (Eds.). (in press). Perspectives on imitation: From cognitive neuroscience to social science. Cam- a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Not to mention the article that bridge, MA: MIT Press. originally got me, as a beginning graduate student, inter- James, W. (1890). Principles of psychology. New York: Holt. ested in things automatic: the Langer, Blank, and Chanowitz Knuf, L., Aschersleben, G., & Prinz, W. (2001). An analysis of (1978) studies of “mindless” enactment of interaction ideomotor action. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Gen- scripts. As researchers, all of us build on the work of our eral, 130, 779–798. Langer, E. J., Blank, A., & Chanowitz, B. (1978). The mindlessness colleagues, past and present, and the impact of an idea of ostensibly thoughtful action: The role of “placebic” informa- depends often on factors outside our own control, such tion in interpersonal interaction. Journal of Personality and So- as whether the field is ready for it. In 1996, apparently, cial Psychology, 36, 635–642. the time for this particular idea had finally arrived. Meltzoff, A. N., & Prinz, W. (Eds.). (2001). The imitative mind: Devel- opment, evolution, and brain bases. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. McConahay, J. G. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence, and the modern Notes racism scale. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination, and racism (pp. 91–125). New York: Academic. Preparation of this article was supported by Grant Neuberg, S. L. (1988). Behavioral implications of information pre- MH-60767 from the U.S. National Institute of Mental sented outside of conscious awareness: The effect of subliminal Health. presentation of trait information on behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Social Cognition, 6, 207–230. John A. Bargh, Department of Psychology, New Prinz, W. (1990). A common coding approach to perception and ac- York University, 6 Washington Place, Seventh Floor, tion. In O. Neumann & W. Prinz (Eds.), Relations between per- New York, NY 10003. E-mail: [email protected] ception and action (pp. 167–201). New York: Springer-Verlag. Rizzolatti, G., & Arbib, M. (1998). Language within our grasp. References Trends in Neuroscience, 21, 188–194. Sorrentino, R. M., & Higgins, E. T. (Eds.). (1986). Handbook of motivation and cognition (Vol. 1). New York: Guilford. Bargh, J. A. (1989). Conditional automaticity: Varieties of automatic in- Srull, T. K., & Wyer, R. S., Jr. (1979). The role of category accessibil- fluence in social perception and cognition. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. ity in the interpretation of information about persons: Some de- Unintended thought Bargh (Eds.), (pp. 3–51). New York: Guilford. terminants and implications. Journal of Personality and Social Bargh, J. A. (1990). Auto-motives: Preconscious determinants of so- Psychology, 38, 841–856. cial interaction. In E. T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Handbook of motivation and cognition (Vol. 2, pp. 93–130). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. New York: Guilford. Whiten, A., & Brown, J. (1999). Imitation and the reading of other Bargh, J. A. (in press). Bypassing the will: Towards demystifying the minds. In S. Braken (Ed.), Intersubjectivity, communication, nonconscious control of social behavior. In R. Hassin, J. S. and emotion in early ontogeny (pp. 260–280). New York: Cam- The new unconscious Uleman, & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), . New York: bridge University Press. Oxford University Press.

218