Social Psychological Approaches to Consciousness

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F. Anthropology/Social Psychology of Consciousness

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CHAPTER 20 Social Psychological Approaches to Consciousness

John A. Bargh

Abstract any given phenomenon. However, because these studies focus on the relative influence A central focus of contemporary social psy- of both conscious and automatic processes, chology has been the relative influence there has been a strong influence within of external (i.e., environmental, situational) social psychology of dual-process models versus internal (i.e., personality, attitudes) that capture these distinctions (e.g., inten- forces in determining social judgment and tional versus unintentional, effortful versus social behavior. But many of the classic find- efficient, aware versus unaware). Another ings in the field – such as Milgram’s obe- reason that dual-process models became dience research, Asch’s conformity studies, popular in social psychology is that the dis- and Zimbardo’s mock-prison experiment – tinction nicely captured an important truth seemed to indicate that the external forces about social cognition and behavior: that swamped the internal ones when the chips people seem to process the identical social were down. Where in the social psycholog- information differently depending on its rel- ical canon was the evidence showing the evance or centrality to their important goals internal, intentional, rational control of one’s and purposes. own behavior? Interestingly, most models of a given phenomenon in social psychology have started with the assumption of a Introduction major mediational role played by conscious choice and intentional guidance of judg- Historically, social psychology has been con- ment and behavior processes. Then, empiri- cerned with the determinants of social beha- cal work focuses on the necessity or valid- vior; specifically, the relative influence of ity of this assumption. As a consequence external (i.e., environmental, situational) there has been a greater research focus on the versus internal (i.e., personality, attitudes) non-conscious than the conscious aspects of causal forces. Many of the most famous

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studies in social psychology focused on this Conscious by Default issue of internal versus external determinants of behavior (Wegner & Bargh, 1998). These findings were surprising at the time For example, early attitude research was (to social psychologists as well as to the driven by the belief that attitudes would general public) because they violated peo- prove to be a strong predictor of actual ple’s strongly held assumption that one’s behavior. Yet it wasn’t long after Thur- own behavior was under one’s internal and stone (1928) first demonstrated that inter- intentional control. Compared with cogni- nal, private attitudes could be measured that tive psychology or cognitive neuroscience, LaPiere (1934) caused great consternation by social psychology tends to focus on psy- seeming to show that one’s stated attitudes chological processes of a relatively high toward a social group did not predict one’s order of complexity: for instance, judgment, actual behavior toward that group very well goal pursuit over extended time periods, at all. and behavior in social interaction. Going Asch’s (1952) famous conformity studies back at least to Descartes (1633) there is were surprising at the time because they a deep philosophical tradition of assigning seemed to show that a person’s publicly such complex processes to an agentic “mind” made judgments of the relative lengths of instead of the mechanical “body.” That is, lines presented clearly on a chalkboard were for any given process of such complexity, swayed by the (stage-managed) opinions of the initial assumption tends to be that the the other “subjects” present in the experi- individual plays an active, agentic role in mental session. Thus even in cases where its instigation and operation, as opposed the judgment or behavior should have been to it being a purely mechanical, deter- determined entirely by internal perceptual mined phenomenon (see Bargh & Ferguson, experience, external forces still played a role. 2000). Milgram’s (1963) obedience experiments, in Perhaps as an inheritance or vestige of this which subjects believed they were admin- long-standing philosophical stance, then, istering painful shocks to another subject, social psychology tends to begin its analysis were disturbing and controversial because of any complex, important phenomenon by they demonstrated the power of a situa- assuming a central role for conscious (intentional influence over the subject’s behavior tional, effortful, and aware; see next section) (i.e., the experimenter’s authority) to over- choice and monitoring processes. Research ride presumed internal influences (i.e., the then has the effect of discovering the extent subject’s presumed personal values not to and role of non-conscious components of cause pain or harm to another). the process or phenomenon. Note how, in Darley and Latane’s (1968) seminal stud- the classic studies above, the initial starting ies of bystander intervention showed how assumption is that the judgment or behav- the simple presence of other people in the ior is under internal, strategic (i.e., con- situation seemed to inhibit individuals from scious) control. This pattern can be found helping another person in clear distress. And in other traditional areas of social psycho- last but not least, the well-known Stanford logical inquiry as well. Early attribution the- Prison Study (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, ories began with a model of humans as ratio- 1973) provided a powerful demonstration nal scientists, using effortful and intentional of situational forces (social roles, as pris- “analysis-of-variance” methods to draw infer- oner versus guard) swamping dispositional ences of causality (Kelley, 1967). However forces (values, good intentions) in determin- as the research evidence started to come in, ing the behavior of the participants in a real- attribution theory then moved to a more istic prison simulation. automatic and less deliberative model (e.g., Where oh where, in all of these findings, Gilbert, 1989; Taylor & Fiske, 1978). Sim- was the internal, intentional, rational control ilarly, the phenomena of stereotyping and of one’s own behavior? prejudice were initially assumed to be driven P1: KAE 0521857430c20 CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw November 6, 2006 15:55

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by motivated, conscious processes (see Nis- dual-process models that capture these dis- bett & Ross, 1980), but then were shown by tinctions (e.g., intentional versus uninten- a considerable amount of research to have tional, effortful versus efficient, aware ver- a significant automatic, non-conscious com- sus unaware). Cognitive social psychology ponent (Brewer, 1988; Devine, 1989). has emphasized the study of non-conscious This is how research related to issues processes, whereas motivational social psy- of consciousness has proceeded in social chology is still mainly the study of conscious psychology. The initial models start with processes. But clearly, conscious and non- the default assumption that the phe- conscious components of a complex psycho- nomenon under investigation involves con- logical process are two sides of the same coin. scious, aware, intentional appraisals or By testing the default initial assumptions of behavior on the part of the participants, and a necessary and pivotal role for conscious then this set of presumed necessary condi- processes – showing where conscious pro- tions is whittled down as the research find- cesses are needed versus where they are not – ings warrant. As a consequence there has we learn a great deal about the role and been a greater research focus on the non- function of consciousness. In this subtrac- conscious than the conscious aspects of any tive manner, the social psychological study given phenomenon. of non-conscious judgment and behavioral The main exceptions to this rule are mod- phenomena adds to our understanding of the els of self-regulation and goal pursuit (see purpose of conscious processes. Bandura, 1986; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Locke & Latham, 1990; Mis- chel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996), in which Dual-Process Models: Automatic conscious choice and willpower are fea- Versus Controlled Processes tured as mediating, explanatory variables. This is probably because, even among the Cognitive approaches to social psychology relatively complex phenomena studied in were greatly influenced by the dual-process social psychology, self-regulatory processes models of the 1970s (Posner & Snyder, are the most complex, dynamic, and inter- 1975; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) that dis- active with the shifting, uncertain environ- tinguished between conscious and auto- ment (see Baumeister, 1998; Fitzsimons & matic modes of information processing (see Bargh, 2004). Because of the level of abstrac- Chaiken & Trope, 1999). Conscious or con- tion and complexity of these processes, it is trolled processes were said to be inten- understandable that it has taken longer to tional, controllable, effortful, and in awareness, find and isolate their mechanisms and com- whereas automatic processes were charac- ponents. Yet even in the domain of self- terized by the opposite set of features: They regulation research, studies are beginning to were unintended, uncontrollable, effortless, identify non-conscious, automatic compo- and outside of awareness (Johnson & Hasher, nents (see Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004). For 1987). However, at least for psychological example, complex goal pursuit can be put processes of the level of complexity studied into motion by situational features instead of by social psychologists, these qualities did exclusively by consciously made intentions not seem to co-vary together in an all-or- or choices, and it can operate in a flexible nothing fashion (Bargh, 1989). For instance, manner, interacting with the changing envi- stereotypes might become activated auto- ronment over time, just as can conscious goal matically (unintentionally and efficiently), pursuit (Chartrand & Bargh, 2002). but their influence on judgment was con- All of these domains of research, then, trollable (Devine, 1989; Fiske, 1989); mak- recognize the influence and importance of ing dispositional attributions might be the both conscious and automatic processes. It efficient and reflexive default process, but is not surprising then that there has been a still required the intention to understand strong influence within social psychology of the causes of the person’s behavior (Gilbert, P1: KAE 0521857430c20 CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw November 6, 2006 15:55

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1989). Consequently, social psychologists mation moderates whether the individual have tended to study the separate and dis- will deal with it in an effortful and systematic tinct aspects of automatic and controlled manner versus in an off-hand and efficient processes, and I have organized the brief way – holds across many different social review below in these lower-level terms (for psychological phenomena. One of the most more complete reviews see Bargh, 1994, important is impression formation, in particu- 1996; Wegner & Bargh, 1998). lar the degree to which the perceiver will pay attention to and be influenced in his or her judgment by the target person’s individual Effortful Processing: Only When characteristics, as opposed to more superfi- it Matters cial (but less effort-requiring) features, such One reason that dual-process models as race, gender, age, or ethnicity. If a person’s became popular in social psychology is that own outcomes depend on the target person the distinction nicely captured an important (i.e., there is goal relevance), a more indi- truth about social cognition and behavior: viduated and less stereotype-based impres- that people seem to process the identical sion is formed (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neu- social information differently depending on berg & Fiske, 1987) than if the target person its relevance or centrality to their impor- does not have control over the perceiver’s tant goals and purposes. For example, peo- outcomes. ple process a persuasive message differently Taylor and Fiske (1978) coined the if it concerns or affects them directly ver- term “cognitive miser” to refer to this sus when it does not. If a proposed com- human tendency not to think effortfully prehensive exam requirement is allegedly about other people or attitude issues unless to be instituted next year at a student’s really necessary. Underlying this idea is the own university, she will spend more time notion that effortful processing is limited and think more effortfully about the vari- in its capacity at any given moment and ous arguments for versus against it; if it is to so should be used only sparingly, to be occur 5 years from now or at another univer- reserved for the most important stimuli sity, she will not expend the same degree of and events. Consistent with this notion, effort. Instead she will tend to rely on heuris- recent research by Baumeister, Bratslavsky, tics or shortcuts – such as the attractiveness Muraven, and Tice (1998) has confirmed the or expertise of the source of the message – limited-capacity nature of effortful social- to decide her position (Chaiken, 1980; Petty information processing: They found that & Cacioppo, 1984). using it in one domain – even just to make People also were found to use short- a simple choice – seems to severely limit cut heuristics in making causal attributions its availability for other tasks, for some time (Taylor & Fiske, 1978) and even behavioral thereafter. choices in social interaction settings (Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978). Langer and col- Efficient Processing: Automatic leagues argued that people develop men- Components of Social Perception tal representations of common situations (‘scripts’; see Abelson, 1981) that then guide Another important variable moderating their behavior “mindlessly” within those sit- whether people will engage in effortful uations. Heuristic cues such as the size of versus heuristic or superficial processing is a request (e.g., for 1 minute versus 10 min- whether they are able to do so under the cur- utes of your time) determined whether peo- rent circumstances. Conscious, effortful pro- ple would assent to it, not the quality of the cessing is relatively slow and so takes time; reason given for the request. often the individual does not have the time, This basic principle – that the personal as when under time pressure or when there importance or goal relevance of target infor- are multiple people or events to attend to P1: KAE 0521857430c20 CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw November 6, 2006 15:55

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at once. Indeed, such information overload who did not) showed much higher corre- conditions are not unusual in the busy, noisy spondence between those attitudes and their “real world” outside the psychology labora- actual voting behavior (several months later) tory. Under these conditions, efficient, auto- in the election. matic forms of information processing have greater influence than usual, because they causal attribution are not constrained as much by capacity or Because of the immediacy and fluency of time limitations or by the current focus of automatic forms of information process- conscious thought. ing, such as stereotyping, several researchers have proposed sequential or stage mod- attitude activation els of phenomena in which the first or An excellent example of this can be found default stage is relatively reflexive or auto- in Fazio’s (1986, 1990) model of the relation matic, with the second, more controlled between attitudes and behavior. The extent stage occurring only if the person has both to which one’s attitudes determine one’s the ability (i.e., lack of time or overload con- behavior has long been a central research straints) and motivation to do so. Gilbert question in social psychology (see Eagly (e.g., 1989) argued that people have a default & Chaiken, 1993). Faced with evidence or automatic bias to locate causality for that the general correspondence between another person’s behavior “in” that person attitudes and behavior was weak at best him- or herself – in other words, making a (e.g., LaPiere, 1934; Wicker, 1969), attitude dispositional attribution about the reason for researchers began to look for the conditions that behavior. In his model, a causal attri- that supported or fostered the relation. One bution to situational factors is only made such proposal was Fazio’s (1986) automatic within a second, conscious processing stage – attitude activation model. but that stage only occurs if the person has In this model he contended that attitudes the time and processing resources available varied in strength, or the degree of association to engage in it. between the representation of the attitude In several studies, Gilbert and colleagues object and its evaluative tag (i.e., as good or showed that people did not take clear situ- bad). Strong attitudes are those character- ational influences into account when under ized by a relatively automatic association, conditions of distraction or attentional load. such that the mere perception of the atti- When watching a videotape of a woman tude object in the environment was suffi- being interviewed and being asked rather cient to also activate its associated attitude – embarrassing questions, those participants no intentional, effortful thinking (such as under attentional overload (performing a about how one feels about the object) secondary attention-demanding task while was necessary. Weak attitudes, on the other watching the tape) concluded she was a dis- hand, did not possess this automatic associa- positionally shy and anxious person. People tion and so did not become active unless the in the control condition, on the other hand, person happened to think about his or her who watched the tape without having to do feelings toward the object. the secondary task, did not draw that con- In several studies, in which attitude clusion – instead, they attributed the reason strength was either manipulated or mea- for her anxious behavior to the situation of sured, automatic attitudes showed a more having to answer embarrassing questions. consistent influence on behavior than did weak attitudes. Indeed, Fazio and Williams impression formation (1986) showed that those participants who Much research in social psychology has possessed strong, relatively automatic atti- focused on the immediate or spontaneous tudes toward the candidates in the 1984 effects of social stimuli – those that occur so U.S. presidential contest (compared to those efficiently that all it takes for the process to P1: KAE 0521857430c20 CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw November 6, 2006 15:55

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occur is the mere perception of the object, to become active as well to influence impres- person, or event in the environment (Bargh, sions of a target person. 2001). For example, in the case of Fazio’s Devine’s study stimulated a great deal of (1986) model of the attitude-behavior rela- research into the conditions under which tion, discussed above, seeing a rose activates the automatic stereotype activation effect not only the associated concept “rose” but is more or less likely to occur (see review also one’s feelings or attitude toward roses. in Devine & Monteith, 1999). The bottom The activation of the attitude occurs in an line seems to be that cultural stereotypes uncontrollable manner similar to how writ- can be picked up at a quite early age and ten words activate their meanings during can exert a biasing influence on social per- reading. ception, judgment, and even behavior (Fazio When forming initial impressions of other et al., 1995) without the person being aware people, certain forms of information about of such influence (Bargh, 1999). Fortunately, them appear to have a similarly privileged however, racial and gender stereotyping is status; we tend to detect and be influenced one form of unconscious bias that many peo- by these features in the course of percep- ple now seem to accept as a possibility (i.e., tion, in an automatic fashion, without being they have a correct “theory of influence” in aware of it. For example, Higgins, King, and this case; see next section) and so can adjust Mavin (1982) showed that each of us is and correct for it if they have the motivation chronically sensitive to certain kinds of social to do so. behavior but not others, with wide individual differences in the exact content of these Awareness and Control chronic sensitivities. Bargh and Thein (1985) then showed that under information over- People are often unaware of the reasons load (rapid presentation) conditions that and causes of their own behavior. In fact, prevented people in a control group from recent experimental evidence across several being able to differentiate in their impres- different areas of psychology points to a sions between a mainly honest and a mainly deep and fundamental dissociation between dishonest target person, those participants conscious awareness and the mental pro- who were chronically or automatically sen- cesses responsible for one’s behavior; many sitive to the dimension of honesty were still of the wellsprings of behavior appear to be able to differentiate the two target persons. opaque to conscious access. Although that This is because they were able to process and research has proceeded somewhat indepen- be influenced by the honest and dishonest dently in social psychology (e.g., Dijkster- behaviors in an automatic, efficient manner. huis & Bargh, 2001; Wilson, 2002), cognitive psychology (e.g., Knuf, Aschersleber, stereotyping and prejudice & Prinz, 2001; Prinz, 1997), and neuropsy- By far the most researched form of such chology (e.g., Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, spontaneous cognitive reactions to the social 2000; Jeannerod, 1999), using quite differ- environment is social stereotyping (see ent methodologies and guiding theoretical Bargh, 1999; Brewer, 1988; Devine, 1989). perspectives, all three lines of research have In a now classic study, Devine (1989) found reached the same general conclusions. that even non-prejudiced people (at least In social psychology, awareness of sources by one fairly explicit paper-and-pencil mea- of influence on judgment and social behavior sure of racism) show evidence of automatic has long been an important research topic. stereotype activation. In one study (1989, Beginning with the seminal work of Nisbett Experiment 2), she presented participants and Wilson (1977), researchers observed subliminally with stimuli related to positive that people were often unaware of actual aspects of the African-American stereotype strong influences on their choices and behav- (e.g., musical, athletic) and showed that this ior. In one study, for example, some experi- caused the negative aspects (e.g., hostility) mental participants watched a job interview P1: KAE 0521857430c20 CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw November 6, 2006 15:55

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in which the interviewee spilled some to these stimuli is believed to “prime” or coffee; others saw the identical tape with- make that concept temporarily accessible in out the spill incident. Although the former memory. In such experiments, participants group rated the interviewee as significantly are of course aware of the critical word less qualified for the job, they also reported stimuli at the time of working on the test, that the coffee spill (among a list of many yet they have no awareness that such mere possible influencing factors) did not affect exposure to words could possibly influence their judgment. their judgments or behavior (they can and Wilson (2002; Wilson & Brekke, 1994) has do). However, when participants do become extended this line of research to document aware of a potential influence, such as when the many ways in which people seem out the priming stimuli are extreme and salient of touch with the actual determinants and (e.g., “Dracula” as a prime for hostility; Herr, influences of their judgments and behavior. Sherman, & Fazio, 1986), the usual prim- An emergent principle from this research is ing effects are no longer obtained. Thus, in that people have lay “theories” about what social psychology, an important distinction is influences their feelings and decisions, or that between awareness of the stimulus ver- causes them (and others) to behave in cer- sus awareness of its possible effects (Bargh, tain ways, and often if not usually these theo- 1992). The latter and not the former appears ries do not accurately reflect the actual influ- to be the key moderator of whether uncon- ences and causes. scious influences of that stimulus will occur. Priming research, in which social concepts (e.g., traits and stereotypes) are first Intentionality: What We Do activated in an off-hand, subtle manner and Without Meaning To then influence the person’s subsequent judgments or behavior (see reviews in Bargh & impression formation Chartrand, 2000; Higgins, 1996), provides Uleman and his colleagues (1989; Uleman, another example of the dissociation between Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996; Winter & important environmental influences and Uleman, 1984; see also Carlston & Skowron- the person’s awareness of those influences. ski, 1994) have documented a “spontaneous Across many studies, the critical variable as trait inference” effect, in which social per- to whether a person is able to control the ceivers tend to encode the behavior of oth- external effect is not whether the person is ers in trait-concept terms (e.g., as an honest, aware of the influencing stimulus per se (i.e., intelligent,orselfish behavior), automatically whether it was subliminal or supraliminal), and without intending to do so. Using Tulv- but rather whether the person is aware of the ing and Thompson’s (1973) encoding speci- potential influence of that stimulus. Thus, ficity paradigm, these researchers showed priming stimuli presented subliminally have that trait terms corresponding to the behav- the same quality of effect as those presented ior (e.g., generous for “she donated her stock supraliminally (i.e., visible, reportable), as gains to charity”) later served as effec- long as the person does not believe or appre- tive retrieval cues for the behavior, even ciate that the stimulus could have an effect though the experimental participants had on him or her (Bargh, 1992). not been instructed to form impressions of For example, in the popular scrambled the sentence actors (merely to remember the sentence test method of priming (Srull behaviors). Apparently, then, the trait term & Wyer, 1979; see Bargh & Chartrand, had been spontaneously encoded by the par- 2000), experimental participants complete ticipants when reading that behavior. an ostensible language test in which they Spontaneous attitude, trait-concept, and reorder strings of words into grammatically stereotype activation are three important correct sentences. Embedded in this test are ways in which people “go beyond the infor- some words semantically related to a cer- mation given” (Bruner, 1957), such that sem- tain social concept; merely being exposed antic and affective information not actually P1: KAE 0521857430c20 CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw November 6, 2006 15:55

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present in the current environment becomes For example, words related to achieve- activated automatically in the course of per- ment and high performance might be ception to then exert an “unseen” influence embedded along with other, goal-irrelevant on judgments and behavior. words in a puzzle, or words related to cooperation might be presented subliminally in imitative behavior and the course of an ostensible reaction time ideomotor action task. Just as with single forms of social behav- Two streams of research in social psychol- ior such as politeness or intelligence, pre- ogy have converged on the idea that com- senting goal-related stimuli in this fashion plex social behavior tendencies can be trig- causes the goal to become active and then gered and enacted non-consciously. One line operate to guide behavior over time toward of research focuses on ideomotor action or that goal. People primed with achievement- the finding that mental content activated in related stimuli perform at higher levels on the course of perceiving one’s social envi- subsequent tasks than do control groups, ronment automatically creates tendencies to those primed with cooperation-related stim- behave the same way oneself (Prinz, 1997). uli cooperate more in a commons-dilemma Thus, for example, one tends to mimic, with- game, and those primed with evaluation- out realizing it, the posture and physical related stimuli form impressions of other gestures of one’s interaction partners (Char- people while those in a control group do trand & Bargh, 1999). not (see reviews in Chartrand & Bargh, 2002; This “chameleon effect” has been found Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004). to extend even to the automatic activation of Neither the ideomotor action nor the abstract, schematic representations of peo- automatic goal pursuit effects are restricted ple and groups (such as social stereotypes) to the laboratory environment; for example, in the course of social perception (see Dijk- merely thinking about the significant other sterhuis & Bargh, 2001). For example, sub- people in our lives (something we all do tly activating (priming) the professor stereo- quite often) causes the goals we character- type in a prior context causes people to score istically pursue when with them to become higher on a knowledge quiz (Dijksterhuis & active and to then guide our behavior with- van Knippenberg, 1998), and priming the out our choosing or knowing it, even when elderly stereotype makes college students those individuals are not physically present not only walk more slowly but have poorer (Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003). And the non- incidental memory as well (Bargh, Chen, & conscious ideomotor effect of perception Burrows, 1996). Thus, the passive activation on action becomes a matter of widespread of behavior (trait) concepts in the natural social importance considering the mass course of social perception (as experimen- exposure of people to violent behavior on tally simulated by priming manipulations) television or in movies (see Anderson & increases the person’s tendency to behave in Bushman, 2002; Berkowitz, 1984). line with that concept him- or herself. unconscious motivation and Dissociations Between Intention automatic goal pursuit and Action The second stream of research has shown that social and interpersonal goals can also These findings within social psychologi- be activated automatically through external cal research of non-conscious control over means (as in priming manipulations). The higher mental processes, such as support individual then pursues that goal in the sub- behavior in social settings, may seem a bit sequent situation, but without consciously magical or mysterious without a consider- intending to or being aware of doing so ation of related recent findings in cogni- (Bargh, 1990; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, tive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Barndollar, & Troetschel, 2001; Chartrand & Together, though, these streams of research Bargh, 1996). tell a coherent story about the non-conscious P1: KAE 0521857430c20 CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw November 6, 2006 15:55

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wellsprings and governing structures of of “mirror neurons” – first in macaque mon- social judgment, behavior, and goal pursuit. keys (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998) and then in humans (Buccino et al., 2001). In these studies, simply watching mouth, hand, and Non-Conscious Action Control foot movements causes the activation of Several lines of cognitive neuroscience the same functionally specific regions of the research support the idea of a dissociation premotor cortex as when performing those between conscious awareness and intention, same movements oneself. These mirror neu- on the one hand, and the operation of com- rons could be a neurological basis for the plex motor and goal representations on the “chameleon effect” of non-conscious imita- other (Prinz, 2003). One major area of such tion of the behavior of one’s interaction part- research focuses on the distinct and separate ners (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). visual input pathways devoted to perception versus action. Non-Conscious Operation of Working The first such evidence came from a study Memory During Goal Pursuit of patients with lesions in specific brain regions (Goodale, Milner, Jakobsen, & Carey, Clearly, non-conscious goal pursuit must uti- 1991). Those with lesions in the parietal lobe lize the structures of working memory to region could identify an object but not reach guide behavior within the unfolding situ- for it correctly based on its spatial orienta- ation toward the desired goal (see Hassin, tion (such as a book in a horizontal versus 2004). Such complex behavior, which is con- vertical position), whereas those with lesions tinually responsive to ongoing environmen- in the ventral-visual system could not recog- tal events and coordinated with the behav- nize or identify the item but were nonethe- ior of others, has to involve the operation less able to reach for it correctly, when asked of the brain structures that support working in a casual manner to take it from the exper- memory – namely the frontal and prefrontal imenter. In other words, the latter group cortex. However, under the original concept showed appropriate action toward an object of working memory as that portion of long- in the absence of conscious awareness or term memory that was currently in con- knowledge of its presence. scious awareness (e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin, Decety and Grezes` (1999) and Norman 1968), the idea of non-conscious operation of (2002) concluded from this and related evi- working memory structures is incoherent at dence that two separate cortical visual path- best. If working memory was a single men- ways are activated during the perception of tal “organ” that held both the current goal human movement: a dorsal one for action and the relevant environmental information tendencies based on that information, and on which that goal was acting (selecting rele- a ventral one used for understanding and vant information and transforming it accord- recognition of it. The dorsal system oper- ing to the requirements of the current goal; ates mainly outside of conscious awareness, see Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990), whereas the workings of the ventral system then one should always be aware of the are normally accessible to consciousness. intention or goal that is currently residing Thus the dorsal stream (or activated prag- in active, working memory. matic representation) could drive behavior The answer to this apparent paradox, of in response to environmental stimuli in the course, is that working memory is not a sin- absence of conscious awareness or under- gle unitary structure. This idea was originally standing of that external information. It proposed by Baddeley and Hitch (1974; see could, in principle, support a non-conscious also Baddeley, 1986), who envisaged a sys- basis for ideomotor action effects that are tem comprising multiple components, not primed or driven by recent behavioral infor- just for the temporary storage of informa- mational input from other people. tion (the phonological loop and visuospatial Additional support for non-conscious scratchpad) but also for the direction and action initiation comes from the discovery allocation of limited attention (the “central P1: KAE 0521857430c20 CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw November 6, 2006 15:55

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executive”). In a parallel development, movements are normally represented in the psychiatrists working with patients with prefrontal and premotor cortex, but the rep- frontal lobe damage – the frontal lobes being resentations actually used to guide action are brain structures underlying the executive in the parietal cortex. In other words, inten- control functions of working memory (Bad- tions and the motor representations used to deley, 1986) – were noting how the behav- guide behavior seem to be held in anatomi- ioral changes associated with frontal lobe cally separate, distinct parts of the brain. This damage were exceedingly complex and vari- makes it possible for some patients to no able, depending on the exact locations of the longer be able to link their intentions to their damage (Mesulam, 1986,p.320). This too actions if there is impairment in the loca- was consistent with the notion that exec- tion where intended movements are repre- utive control was not a single resource but sented, but no impairment in the location rather comprised several distinct specialized where action systems actually operate. functions, located in different parts of the The finding that, within working mem- frontal and prefrontal cortex. ory, representations of one’s intentions (acc- If so, then at least in theory it becomes essible to conscious awareness) are stored possible that there are dissociations between in a different location and structure from consciously held intentions on the one hand the representations used to guide action (not and the goal-driven operation of working accessible) is of paramount importance to an memory structures on the other. This is understanding of the mechanisms underly- what is manifested in Lhermitte’s (1986) ing non-conscious social behavior and goal syndrome; “an excessive control of behav- pursuit. If it had been the case that inten- ior by external stimuli at the expense of tions and corresponding action plans were behavioral autonomy” (p. 342). Lhermitte’s stored in the same location, so that aware- patients had suffered a stroke which had ness of one’s intention was solely a mat- produced lesions in the same (inferior pre- ter of conscious access to the currently frontal) location of the brain in both cases. operative goal or behavior program, then it The behavior of these patients became con- would be difficult to see how non-conscious tinually driven by cues in the environment control over social behavior could be pos- and by little else. For example, bringing sible. Instead, as Posner and DiGirolamo the man onto a stage in front of a small (2000) recently remarked, the information- audience caused him to deliver an award processing and the neurophysiological levels acceptance speech; bringing the woman into of analysis of psychological processes have the (medical) doctor’s office caused her to achieved a level of mutual support greater give Dr. Lhermitte a physical exam com- than previously imagined. plete with injections of vaccines. Across these and several other situations, neither patient noticed or remarked on anything Implications for the Nature and unusual or strange about their behavior. Purpose of Consciousness Lhermitte (1986) concluded that they had suffered “a loss of autonomy: for the patient, There is a baffling problem about what the social and physical environments issue consciousness is for. It is equally baffling, the order to use them, even though the moreover, that the function of consciousness patient himself or herself has neither the idea should remain so baffling. It seems extraor- nor the intention to do so” (p. 341). dinary that despite the pervasiveness and Subsequent research in cognitive neuro- familiarity of consciousness in our lives, we science has largely supported Lhermitte’s are uncertain in what way (if at all) it is actually indispensable to us. (Frankfurt, deductions that this area of the prefrontal 1988,p.162) cortex is critical for the planning and control of action. Frith et al. (2000) concluded from Action tendencies can be activated and their review of this research that intended put into motion without the need for the P1: KAE 0521857430c20 CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw November 6, 2006 15:55

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individual’s conscious intervention; even James (1890) argued, consciousness tends to complex social behavior can unfold without drop out of those processes where it is no an act of will or awareness of its sources. longer needed and thereby frees itself for Evidence from a wide variety of domains where it is. of psychological inquiry is consistent with In a very real sense, then, the purpose this proposition. Behavioral evidence from of consciousness – why it evolved – may patients with frontal lobe lesions, behavior be for the assemblage of complex non- and goal-priming studies in social psychol- conscious skills. In harmony with the gen- ogy, cognitive neuroscience studies of the eral plasticity of human brain development structure and function of the frontal lobes (see Donald, 2001), human beings – unlike as well as the separate actional and seman- even our nearest primate kindred – have the tic visual pathways, cognitive psychological capability of building ever more complex research on the components of working automatic “demons” that sublimely ﬁt their memory and on the degree of conscious own idiosyncratic environment, needs, and access to motoric behavior – all of these purposes. Intriguingly, then, one of the pri- converge on the conclusion that complex mary objectives of conscious processing at behavior and other higher mental processes the level of the individual person may be to can proceed independently of the conscious eliminate the need for itself in the future as will. Indeed, the neuropsychological evi- much as possible, freeing itself up for even dence suggests that the human brain is greater things. It would be ironic indeed, designed for such independence. given the juxtaposition of automatic and But this is not to say that conscious- conscious processes in contemporary social ness does not exist or is merely an epiphe- psychology, if the evolved purpose of con- nomenon. It just means that if all of these sciousness turned out to be the creation of things can be accomplished without con- ever more complex nonconscious processes. scious choice or guidance, then the purpose of consciousness (i.e., why it evolved) probably lies elsewhere. And the research Author’s Note described above points to one prime candidate. Preparation of this chapter was supported That is, although we do not yet know in part by Grant MH60767 from the U. much about how non-conscious goal pur- S. Public Health Service. Author contact suit capabilities develop, the most plausi- information: Dept. of Psychology, Yale Uni- ble guess is that they develop much as versity, P.O. Box 208205, New Haven, CT other automatic processes develop – out of 06520. E-mail: [email protected]. frequent and consistent experience (Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; see Shiffrin & Dumais, 1981). This means in the case of automatic goal pursuit that the individ- References ual most likely consciously chose at one point to pursue that particular goal in that par- Abelson, R. P. (1981). Psychological status of the ticular situation, then chose it again, and script concept. American Psychologist, 36, 715– so on until that goal representation became 729. associated so strongly with that situation Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2002, March representation that the former became auto- 29). The effects of media violence on society. matically associated with the latter. Then, Science, 295, 2377–2379. entering the situation from then on causes Asch, S. E. (1952). Effects of group pressure both the situation and the goal represen- on the modiﬁcation and distortion of judg- tations to become active, no longer with ments. In G. E. Swanson, T. M. Newcomb, & any need for conscious choice of that goal E. L. Hartley (Eds.), Readings in social psychol- (see Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). As William ogy(2nd ed., pp. 2–11). New York: Holt. P1: KAE 0521857430c20 CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw November 6, 2006 15:55

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