P1: KAE 0521857430c20 CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw November 6, 2006 15:55 F. Anthropology/Social Psychology of Consciousness 551 P1: KAE 0521857430c20 CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw November 6, 2006 15:55 552 P1: KAE 0521857430c20 CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw November 6, 2006 15:55 CHAPTER 20 Social Psychological Approaches to Consciousness John A. Bargh Abstract any given phenomenon. However, because these studies focus on the relative influence A central focus of contemporary social psy- of both conscious and automatic processes, chology has been the relative influence there has been a strong influence within of external (i.e., environmental, situational) social psychology of dual-process models versus internal (i.e., personality, attitudes) that capture these distinctions (e.g., inten- forces in determining social judgment and tional versus unintentional, effortful versus social behavior. But many of the classic find- efficient, aware versus unaware). Another ings in the field – such as Milgram’s obe- reason that dual-process models became dience research, Asch’s conformity studies, popular in social psychology is that the dis- and Zimbardo’s mock-prison experiment – tinction nicely captured an important truth seemed to indicate that the external forces about social cognition and behavior: that swamped the internal ones when the chips people seem to process the identical social were down. Where in the social psycholog- information differently depending on its rel- ical canon was the evidence showing the evance or centrality to their important goals internal, intentional, rational control of one’s and purposes. own behavior? Interestingly, most models of a given phenomenon in social psychol- ogy have started with the assumption of a Introduction major mediational role played by conscious choice and intentional guidance of judg- Historically, social psychology has been con- ment and behavior processes. Then, empiri- cerned with the determinants of social beha- cal work focuses on the necessity or valid- vior; specifically, the relative influence of ity of this assumption. As a consequence external (i.e., environmental, situational) there has been a greater research focus on the versus internal (i.e., personality, attitudes) non-conscious than the conscious aspects of causal forces. Many of the most famous 553 P1: KAE 0521857430c20 CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw November 6, 2006 15:55 554 the cambridge handbook of consciousness studies in social psychology focused on this Conscious by Default issue of internal versus external determi- nants of behavior (Wegner & Bargh, 1998). These findings were surprising at the time For example, early attitude research was (to social psychologists as well as to the driven by the belief that attitudes would general public) because they violated peo- prove to be a strong predictor of actual ple’s strongly held assumption that one’s behavior. Yet it wasn’t long after Thur- own behavior was under one’s internal and stone (1928) first demonstrated that inter- intentional control. Compared with cogni- nal, private attitudes could be measured that tive psychology or cognitive neuroscience, LaPiere (1934) caused great consternation by social psychology tends to focus on psy- seeming to show that one’s stated attitudes chological processes of a relatively high toward a social group did not predict one’s order of complexity: for instance, judgment, actual behavior toward that group very well goal pursuit over extended time periods, at all. and behavior in social interaction. Going Asch’s (1952) famous conformity studies back at least to Descartes (1633) there is were surprising at the time because they a deep philosophical tradition of assigning seemed to show that a person’s publicly such complex processes to an agentic “mind” made judgments of the relative lengths of instead of the mechanical “body.” That is, lines presented clearly on a chalkboard were for any given process of such complexity, swayed by the (stage-managed) opinions of the initial assumption tends to be that the the other “subjects” present in the experi- individual plays an active, agentic role in mental session. Thus even in cases where its instigation and operation, as opposed the judgment or behavior should have been to it being a purely mechanical, deter- determined entirely by internal perceptual mined phenomenon (see Bargh & Ferguson, experience, external forces still played a role. 2000). Milgram’s (1963) obedience experiments, in Perhaps as an inheritance or vestige of this which subjects believed they were admin- long-standing philosophical stance, then, istering painful shocks to another subject, social psychology tends to begin its analysis were disturbing and controversial because of any complex, important phenomenon by they demonstrated the power of a situa- assuming a central role for conscious (inten- tional influence over the subject’s behavior tional, effortful, and aware; see next section) (i.e., the experimenter’s authority) to over- choice and monitoring processes. Research ride presumed internal influences (i.e., the then has the effect of discovering the extent subject’s presumed personal values not to and role of non-conscious components of cause pain or harm to another). the process or phenomenon. Note how, in Darley and Latane’s (1968) seminal stud- the classic studies above, the initial starting ies of bystander intervention showed how assumption is that the judgment or behav- the simple presence of other people in the ior is under internal, strategic (i.e., con- situation seemed to inhibit individuals from scious) control. This pattern can be found helping another person in clear distress. And in other traditional areas of social psycho- last but not least, the well-known Stanford logical inquiry as well. Early attribution the- Prison Study (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, ories began with a model of humans as ratio- 1973) provided a powerful demonstration nal scientists, using effortful and intentional of situational forces (social roles, as pris- “analysis-of-variance” methods to draw infer- oner versus guard) swamping dispositional ences of causality (Kelley, 1967). However forces (values, good intentions) in determin- as the research evidence started to come in, ing the behavior of the participants in a real- attribution theory then moved to a more istic prison simulation. automatic and less deliberative model (e.g., Where oh where, in all of these findings, Gilbert, 1989; Taylor & Fiske, 1978). Sim- was the internal, intentional, rational control ilarly, the phenomena of stereotyping and of one’s own behavior? prejudice were initially assumed to be driven P1: KAE 0521857430c20 CUFX049/Zelazo 0 521 85743 0 printer: cupusbw November 6, 2006 15:55 social psychological approaches to consciousness 555 by motivated, conscious processes (see Nis- dual-process models that capture these dis- bett & Ross, 1980), but then were shown by tinctions (e.g., intentional versus uninten- a considerable amount of research to have tional, effortful versus efficient, aware ver- a significant automatic, non-conscious com- sus unaware). Cognitive social psychology ponent (Brewer, 1988; Devine, 1989). has emphasized the study of non-conscious This is how research related to issues processes, whereas motivational social psy- of consciousness has proceeded in social chology is still mainly the study of conscious psychology. The initial models start with processes. But clearly, conscious and non- the default assumption that the phe- conscious components of a complex psycho- nomenon under investigation involves con- logical process are two sides of the same coin. scious, aware, intentional appraisals or By testing the default initial assumptions of behavior on the part of the participants, and a necessary and pivotal role for conscious then this set of presumed necessary condi- processes – showing where conscious pro- tions is whittled down as the research find- cesses are needed versus where they are not – ings warrant. As a consequence there has we learn a great deal about the role and been a greater research focus on the non- function of consciousness. In this subtrac- conscious than the conscious aspects of any tive manner, the social psychological study given phenomenon. of non-conscious judgment and behavioral The main exceptions to this rule are mod- phenomena adds to our understanding of the els of self-regulation and goal pursuit (see purpose of conscious processes. Bandura, 1986; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Locke & Latham, 1990; Mis- chel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996), in which Dual-Process Models: Automatic conscious choice and willpower are fea- Versus Controlled Processes tured as mediating, explanatory variables. This is probably because, even among the Cognitive approaches to social psychology relatively complex phenomena studied in were greatly influenced by the dual-process social psychology, self-regulatory processes models of the 1970s (Posner & Snyder, are the most complex, dynamic, and inter- 1975; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) that dis- active with the shifting, uncertain environ- tinguished between conscious and auto- ment (see Baumeister, 1998; Fitzsimons & matic modes of information processing (see Bargh, 2004). Because of the level of abstrac- Chaiken & Trope, 1999). Conscious or con- tion and complexity of these processes, it is trolled processes were said to be inten- understandable that it has taken longer to tional, controllable, effortful,