Rebuilding America's Military
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SPECIAL REPORT NO. 223 | MARCH 26, 2020 Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Air Force John Venable Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Air Force John Venable SPECIAL REPORT No. 223 | MARCH 26, 2020 CENTER FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE II REBUILDING AMERICA’S MILITARY: THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE About the Authors John Venable, a graduate of the USAF Fighter Weapons Instructor Course with more than 3,300 hours in the F-16C, is Senior Research Fellow for Defense Policy in the Center for National Defense, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. The Rebuilding America’s Military Project This Special Report is the fourth in a series from the Rebuilding America’s Military Project of The Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense, which addresses the U.S. military’s efforts to prepare for future challenges and rebuild a military depleted after years of conflict in the Middle East and ill-advised reductions in both funding and end strength. The first paper in this series (Dakota L. Wood, “Rebuilding America’s Military: Thinking About the Future,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 203, July 24, 2018, http://report.heritage.org/sr203) provides a framework for understanding how we should think about the future and principles for future planning. The second (Dakota L. Wood, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Marine Corps,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 211, March 21, 2019, http://report.heritage.org/sr211) dis- cusses the current status of the U.S. Marine Corps and provides prescriptions for returning the Corps to its focus as a powerful and value-added element of U.S. naval power. The third (Thomas W. Spoehr, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Army,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 215, August 22, 2019, http://report.heritage.org/sr215) provides con- text and recommendations on how the U.S. Army should approach planning for future conflicts out to the year 2030. This paper examines the impact of service concepts, doctrine, and plans to provide context for the state, status, and mindset of today’s Air Force. It then evaluates critical aspects of the service and recommends specific policies and actions that the Air Force needs to pursue to prepare itself for future conflicts out to the year 2040. Because the Space Force is now an independent branch of the military, recommendations for that service are not included in this paper. This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/sr223 The Heritage Foundation | 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE | Washington, DC 20002 | (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. SPECIAL REPORT | No. 223 MARCH 26, 2020 | III heritage.org Contents Executive Summary ..................................................................................................... 1 Introduction: “A Service of Technology” .......................................................................... 6 I. An Evolving Strategy of Concepts, Doctrine, and Plans: Defined by Technology and Saved by Enduring Truths ....................................................... 7 A. World War I and the Enduring Tenets of Airpower ................................................................ 9 B. The Interwar Years and Airpower’s First Strategic Concept ......................................................11 C. A Strategy for the Nuclear Age ....................................................................................17 D. Concepts and Doctrine 1994–2006 ............................................................................... 25 E. Recent Concepts, Doctrine, and Planning Guidance ..............................................................27 II. Today’s Air Force: Choosing Future Capabilities over Current Readiness and Relevant Capacity ................................................................31 A. Structural Readiness ............................................................................................... 35 B. Operational Readiness ............................................................................................ 35 C. Force Disposition .................................................................................................. 42 D. Deployability ....................................................................................................... 42 E. Mindset ............................................................................................................. 46 F. Organization .........................................................................................................47 G. Funding ............................................................................................................ 53 H. Acquisition ......................................................................................................... 54 III. Integration and Experimentation .............................................................................. 56 IV. Summary of Recommendations ............................................................................... 58 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 62 SPECIAL REPORT | No. 223 MARCH 26, 2020 | 1 heritage.org Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Air Force John Venable fter 28 years of downsizing, combat deployments, and funding challenges, and despite billions of dollars spent on research and A development, the Air Force lacks the capacity to meet the challenges laid out in the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Making do with a minimal, aging force structure while searching for the next revolutionary change puts the United States at risk not just for the present, but also during an almost 20-year acquisition cycle. The Air Force of 2040 will be comprised of current weapons systems and those that can be acquired from active production lines or those that are nearing production. The service needs to acquire as many leading-edge weapons systems as it can now, while the current surge in fund- ing is available. Executive Summary The U.S. Air Force has many different missions, but as stated in Title 10 of the U.S. Code, its primary role is to prepare forces that can respond quickly to demands for sustained offensive and defensive air operations anywhere in the world. Unlike the other services that are optimized for a specific theater or domain (for example, the Marine Corps and the Indo– Pacific region), the Air Force must be able to conduct combat operations in Europe, the Pacific, the Middle East, or any other region as a peacekeeper, door kicker, force sustainer, and supporting arm for other services and allied nations. Operating in its primary domain, the Air Force has the ability to see not only over the next hill, but also over a horizon of much greater depth than that viewed by the other domains. That vantage, coupled with extraordinary technology, gives the Air Force the ability to find, fix, and target an enemy 2 REBUILDING AMERICA’S MILITARY: THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE anywhere on or near the face of the Earth. The speed, radius of action, and advantages inherent to the air domain allow the air force to be the first to a region of conflict or instability, and those same traits often compel it to be the last of the services to depart. How much airpower does the nation need? The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) directed the services to prepare for a large-scale, high-inten- sity conventional war with China or Russia. That mission requires a force that, with little advanced warning, can rapidly deploy, fight, and defeat a regional threat or peer competitor anywhere in the world. Subsequently in 2018, the Air Force released a strategic vision for the capacity and capabil- ities it needs to execute the NDS called The Air Force We Need (TAFWN). Based on thousands of war-game simulations, the plan assessed that the ser- vice needed, among other things, one additional strategic airlift squadron, seven additional fighter squadrons, five additional bomber squadrons, and 14 additional tanker squadrons to execute that strategy and win such a war. From its inception during World War I through today, the Air Force has been guided by more than 41 plans and strategic concepts like TAFWN. Each was designed to put the service on a better footing for the next conflict, but just three went on to infuse the service with the most advanced equipment available in numbers sufficient to execute the missions the nation expected of its Air Force. Their success was based on three principal elements: a plan to acquire the most advanced fieldable technology, commensurate funding to acquire weapons systems in numbers sufficient for the mission set, and exceptionally well-trained airmen to employ those systems. With today’s explosion in technology, some fear that a commitment to fielding relevant, leading-edge technologies like those mapped out by TAFWN will prevent the service from funding a game-changing technol- ogy when it emerges. Almost every technological innovation has been born with—and perhaps in spite of—that same fear; but if the history of land and naval warfare is any guide, the nature of air combat will be changed around the edges over the coming years, not fundamentally transformed by a new breakthrough. The Air Force