A monthly report issued by the Unit of Contemporary Political Thought for the analysis and evaluation of crucial events in the Islamic world

Algeria The Challenges and Realities Of the 2014 Presidential Elections

- Introduction - The Political Crisis - The Power Struggle - Delayed Constitutional Reforms - Threats - Predictable outcome of Elections - Conclusion

March,2014 © KFCRIS, 2014 lgeria is undergoing conflict between its loci Aof power in light of growing discord between those who call for a boycott of the elections and those who advocate participation in voting. This issue of Masarat will shed light on preparations taking place in for the elections and reactions to President Bouteflika’s decision to run for a fourth term despite his deteriorating health. It will also discuss the role the intelligence service has played in the run-up to the presidential race and will analyze the views of some Algerian political leaders on the upcoming election and the outcome of Bouteflika’s almost 15 years of rule. 4

17 April 2014 Profiles of the Presidential Candidates

Abdelaziz Bouteflika Ali Fawzi Rebaine

Running for a fourth term after 15 years An ophthalmologist from a family of of presidency. revolutionaries who fought for Algeria’s independence. He is running for a third time and is known as a human rights ac- tivist. He is the leader of the po- litical party.

Louisa Hanoune

Born in Jijel Province (east of ) to a modest family. She obtained a Bachelor’s degree and has been a political activist since 1979. She was arrested more than once in the 1980s because of her political activities. She has been the Secretary General of Algeria’s Workers’ Party since 2003 and is a well- known figure in the Algerian trade union with a reputation as a human rights activist. She was elected to Parliament in 1997. She is running for presidency for the third time: her first candidacy was in 2004.

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Moussa Touati Abdelaziz Belaid

Born in Medea, he had a military, security Born in the Batna region, east of Algiers. and civil career. He has long been active in He holds an MD and is a Bachelor of Law. many associations and is the president of He is active in the ruling party and in the Algerian National Front party. This is youth organizations. He resigned in 2011 his third time running for election. from the National Liberation Front (FLN) and founded the Party.

Ali Benflis

Worked in the justice system and is now a lawyer. He is a human right activist and served as the chairman of the elec- toral campaign for Bouteflika in 1999. He was appointed prime minister in 2000 and was the Secretary General of the FLN in 2001. He ran for presidency for the first time in 2004.

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Introduction Algeria’s upcoming presidential elections, However, this does not make the country im- due to take place on April 17, will witness the mune to the winds of change. Observers argue nomination of President for that there is, indeed, a crisis in the country: a a fourth term, even after widespread speculation political vacuum that might cost the country its about his deteriorating health and absence from stability and result in waves of revolts similar to media appearances. The nomination of President those of its neighbors. Bouteflika as the official candidate for the -Na The first signs of this crisis appeared after the tional Liberation Front Party is supposed to put announcement of Bouteflika’s nomination for a an end to debate about the legitimacy of a fourth fourth term, which, due to the President’s health term. However, his nomination did not end dis- problems and extensive tenure in office, was re- cussion amongst Algeria’s political elites and ceived negatively. The real struggle, however, party members on the nature of the challenges goes deeper than public disapproval of another Algeria is facing today, the hopes and demands term for Algeria’s longest-serving president. of a large segment of the population and, the out- The political arena in Algeria hosts many new come of Bouteflika’s 15 years of presidency. voices, both popular and partisan, and diverse Algeria, unlike the rest of countries of the figures have emerged on the scene and called Maghreb, did not witness a regime-collapsing openly for change. These political actors and revolution, as Tunisia and Libya did, or large- figures, both inside and outside the regime, ex- scale demonstrations for reform, like the ones emplify the real political crisis and the tensions that took place in Morocco and Mauritania. brought about by the upcoming elections. • • • The Political Crisis

All active parties in Algeria today, members whereas others argue that the structure of the of the regime as well as the opposition, recog- system itself, and its mechanisms for decision- nize the existence of a political crisis that re- making, are responsible for its inability to re- quires not only reform but fundamental struc- spond to the needs of the new generation. tural change. , head of Algeria’s Djamila Bouhired, one of the symbols of the Workers’ Party and the only female candidate National Liberation Movement during the French for the presidency, recently spoke out about the colonial era, recently spoke out about the coun- “serious political crisis that threatens the unity try’s problems, calling attention to systemic brib- and stability of Algeria.” Hanoune’s perspective ery, lack of accountability for corrupt officials, is recognized by other political parties on either and a repressed civil society. In 2009, Djamila side of the regime/opposition divide, but there Bouhired wrote a letter to President Bouteflika is considerable debate about the origins and na- (published by Al-Watan newspaper in 2009) in ture of this crisis. Some argue that the political which she described the difficult conditions she decisions of the government caused the crisis, and other resistance fighters were experiencing

March,2014 7 and rejected a fourth presidential term for Presi- important institutions as well as all government dent Bouteflika. A statement like that, made by an departments to the point that successive govern- important Algerian personality, has deep signifi- ments have failed to manage the country’s affairs cance. Algeria’s current ruling class legitimizes or implement any of its decisions.” its rule based on its involvement in the revolution Hamrouche expressed his opposition to a and the liberation of Algeria; to be called corrupt, fourth term for the president, stating that “the incompetent, decadent and a threat to the unity regime of President Bouteflika has inevitably and stability of the country by the first generation disintegrated.” In a press conference held in Al- of revolutionaries is a deep wound to its image. giers on February 27, 2014, he confirmed that Bouhired’s position is shared by prominent he would be unable to achieve democracy in the Algerian personalities such as Mouloud Ham- country without the support of the army in dis- rouche, who served as the country’s Prime Min- mantling the Bouteflika regime. At the beginning ister from 1989 to 1991. In an interview with Al- of this year, it seemed as though leaders from Khabar on March 24, 2014, Hamrouche stated among the regime and some of the opposition parties had reached an agreement to nominate Hamrouche for the presidency. However, this consensus collapsed after the surprising news of Bouteflika’s decision to run for election for a fourth time. In Algeria, nominations for presi- dent must arrive through a consensus between Mouloud Hamrouche political institutions (such as the Liberation Front Party and other “administration” parties) and the He was born in 1945 in Skikda Province and par- military apparatus (led by the General of Staff ticipated in the of liberation. He holds and the intelligence establishment). Hamrouche, a Master’s degree in political science and served despite having formed a strong network of sup- as prime minister between 1989 and 1991 under porters from among Algerian public figures and President Chadli. He is known as a political and political parties, lacked this institutional consent economic reformist. He announced his candidacy and eventually withdrew his candidacy. for the presidency in 2014, believing that President Opposition to Bouteflika continued when Bouteflika would not run, but withdrew from the Liamine Zeroual, from race after the announcement of the latter’s candida- 1994-1998, published a four-page letter about cy. However, he opposes a fourth term for Boutef- lika and is highly critical of the accomplishments the upcoming presidential election addressed to of Bouteflika’s 15 years of presidency. He has a the Algerian people. In his message, published reform agenda that targets Algeria’s deep-rooted on March 19, 2014, he alluded to his view on problems. He is supported by a large section of the President Bouteflika’s decision to run for a political establishment, both the loyalists and the fourth term. He also expressed his opinion on opposition, as well as by many from among the the outcomes of Bouteflika’s 15 years in office. ranks of the military establishment. Zeroual voiced his opposition to Bouteflika’s nomination for a fourth term, arguing that his that the country was living “a tragic situation that deteriorating health was a major factor in his is impossible for the regime to treat,” adding that ineligibility for the presidency. He also said that “the country, in my opinion, is facing a serious that he was against the President Bouteflika’s situation. The length of this crisis has affected 2008 proposed amendment of Article 74, regard-

March,2014 www.kfcris.com 8 ing the presidential term limit. President Zeroual geria did not go far enough. One of Bouteflika’s is the one who introduced the Article, which lim- achievements was the law of “civil concord,” its the length of presidential terms, in 1996 as a a form of national reconciliation which helped way of introducing reform and allowing peaceful put an end to fighting during the Algerian civil power transfers. He also rejected any public crit- war. However, the ruling elite still argues that icism of the military establishment, in reference country’s current crisis is due to the “aging” of to remarks by Amar Saadani, Secretary General the ruling class, which has been in power since of the ruling FLN party, targeting General Tou- the early 1960s, and its inability to regenerate fik. He argued that such criticism aims at weak- and communicate with a population that is 70% ening the nation’s national and security defense. composed of people under the age of 30. Perhaps Algeria’s ruling party, and even President this is what led ​​President Bouteflika to say in a Bouteflika himself, agree that the country is go- 2012 speech that “jiluna taba janah,” meaning ing through a critical phase of its history and that the generation of Algerian independence is that Bouteflika’s attempts to stabilize the coun- past its prime and that it is time to hand over the try during a decade of the bloody civil war in Al- country to a new generation. • • •

The Power Struggle

Amar Saadani’s remarks reveal the com- plexity of the relationship between the key members of the regime and the people at the top of the civilian and military power pyra- mids. On February 3, 2014, the Secretary Gen- eral of the National Liberation Front attacked General Toufik in an interview on a news General Toufik website. In the interview, he accused the in- telligence and security department headed by Born Mohamed Mediene in Setif, east of Algiers, General Toufik (whose real name is - Moham he is the Commander of the Algerian Secret Ser- med Mediene) for being helpless to protect the vices (DRS). He joined the Algerian People’s interests of the country and Algeria’s most im- Army during the French colonial period and was portant figures. It is noteworthy that General sent to Russia after independence, where he gradu- Toufik has headed the intelligence and security ated from KGB training. He has been appointed to department since 1990. Since then, many seri- different ranks in the military, security and diplo- matic hierarchies and became head of the DRS in ous security breaches and accidents have taken 1990 as a “General”. He was later promoted to the place, causing embarrassment to the Algerian rank of “Major General” and in 2006 was promot- state at home and abroad. Saadani also accused ed again to the rank of Lieutenant. He is opposed to General Toufik of failing “to protect President a fourth term for president Bouteflika. [assassinated in 1992], Ab-

March,2014 9 delhak Benhamouda [Secretary-General of the departments, Bouteflika also brought the Press General Union of Algerian Workers, assassi- and Information Agency, as well as the Direc- nated in 1997], Nigerian monks [7 of whom tory of Army Security, which had been under were kidnapped from the city of Medea in the control of General Toufik, under the com- 1996], the oil bases in the south and United Na- mand staff headed by the Deputy Secretary of tions staff.” He also brought up the assassina- Defense. tion attempt on President Abdelaziz Bouteflika All these amendments were introduced in Batna in 2007, mentioning that “the intel- during a period of change in the government, ligence service has penetrated all aspects of inaugurating a new Secretary of Defense and the state, which gives the impression that the Secretary of the Interior. Many observers saw government in Algeria is not civil.” Saadani President Bouteflika’s changes as essential for explained that “[the intelligence service] is building his candidacy for a fourth term, or for everywhere, in municipalities, the presidency, the candidacy of one of his close associates. and in political parties.” He accused General However, one can also see these amendments Toufik of destabilizing the ruling party through as necessary to addressing two other issues that his affiliations with Colonels in the intelligence plagued Bouteflika. The first was that the in- service, as in recent years the ruling party has telligence community had repeatedly failed to seen a number of conflicts between its leaders prevent terrorist operations. Perhaps the most over the position of Secretary General. Saadani obvious example of this is the attack on the added, “This cannot lead to a civil state.” In his natural gas facility in In Amenas, southeast Al- speech, he demanded the resignation of Gen- geria on January 16, 2013. Media sources men- eral Toufik (see ‘Alamat Online, 03/02/2014). tioned that the intelligence agency removed the These accusations by Saadani spread rapidly in military forces stationed in the area and pre- Algerian media: it was the first time in Algeri- ferred to deal with the kidnappers by sending an history that accusations against the military in some of its own staff to intervene, resulting and security apparatus were openly voiced by in the death of both the kidnappers and hos- a personality like Saadani and referenced Gen- tages. eral Toufik by name. Some political and military officials blame There is certainly conflict between those the intelligence service for the deteriorating sit- loyal to President Bouteflika and those loyal uation in northern Mali, where terrorist groups to General Toufik. Protests of their authority, have proliferated and extended their control. including those made by Saadani, reflect the These officials argue that this intelligence fail- Algerian political class discomfort with the ure allowed to justify its military inter- guardianship that the military has exercised in vention in Mali, a move that stands contrary Algeria since its independence. These state- to Algeria’s regional policies. Even before the ments also reflect the struggle in recent years military intervention in Mali in 2013, a num- between the Presidential team and the intelli- ber of Algerian diplomats were kidnapped in gence community. In September 2013, Presi- 2012 in the city of Gao in Mali. Interestingly, dent Bouteflika managed to introduce some however, the Algerian intelligence service is amendments to the military and security es- known to have penetrated into many militant tablishments in order to strengthen his position groups active in northern Mali and the Algerian against General Toufik. In addition to changing desert. Some even argue that the intelligence the heads of the Internal and External Security service is, in fact, indirectly or directly respon-

March,2014 www.kfcris.com 10 sible for fostering the growth of these militant benefited from deals between Sonatrach (An groups and thus, since the 1990s, has contrib- Algerian government-owned company and one uted to the spread of terrorism and subsequent of the largest oil consortiums in the world) and military intervention in the region. Halliburton. These deals benefited the Ministry It is worth mentioning that the rivalry be- of Defense as well as the country’s oil and gas tween the army and the intelligence apparatus sector. Many contend that these scandals were dates back to the early 2000s. In the early 1990s, revealed by former Prime Minister Ahmed the military and the intelligence community in- Ouyahia at the behest of General Toufik, in an tegrated in order to eliminate rebel movements attempt to target senior officers and some ci- in the aftermath of the election results cancel- vilian officials close to President Bouteflika, lation crisis. Their success in eliminating these including his brother Said. The Sonatrach con- groups was due to the ability of the military es- troversy marked the beginning of a period of tablishment to take responsibility for the Alge- frequent eruptions of corruption scandals. The rian system, including introducing changes and last of these scandals targeted the Minister of appointing officials. But from the beginning of Energy eight months before the presidential the second millennium, when Bouteflika took elections. Some observers argue that General office, there has been a power struggle- be Toufik exposed incriminating files to prevent tween the army and the intelligence service. It Bouteflika from running for presidency for a seems that relations between the army and in- fourth term. Therefore, observers conclude, the telligence service have deteriorated even more intelligence and military amendments by the since 2006, when a corruption scandal broke President were aimed at reducing the influence out that showed how senior military leaders of General Toufik. • • •

Delayed Constitutional Reforms

The Algerian political class and the general Also, one of the issues that provoked the public are divided about introducing new con- opposition and resentment of many was the stitutional reforms. Their disagreements are re- constitutional amendments of 2008, mainly flected in the different positions taken by the Article 74, which specified that a presidential power elite, pro-government parties and the term could last for 5 years without clarifying Algerian opposition on the issue of modifying how many times the sitting president could run some articles of the Constitution. These reforms for office. One of the crucial demands of the were promised in 2011 by President Bouteflika, opposition is to change Article 74 and specify who created a special committee to compile a a presidential term limit. proposal for amendments in response to the de- In a letter addressed to the Algerian people mands of the opposition and large segments of on April 15, 2011, the President also promised the general public. However, the proposed re- to introduce deep political reforms. He pointed forms have never been put into place. out that amendments would be put in place in

March,2014 11 early 2012 in order to enhance the practice of In April 2013, a committee was formed with democracy and to allow greater freedom. He the mission of proposing constitutional amend- promised that the amendments would be part ments to be introduced before the end of 2013. of wider and comprehensive constitutional re- President Bouteflika ensured that this commit- forms. President Bouteflika’s letter was - pub tee would base its recommendations on the pro- lished after January 2011 witnessed a large posal submitted by the previous advisory com- wave of movements and demonstrations in mittee of May 2011. The year 2012 witnessed the capital and various provinces, spurred by the introduction of a number of laws related to young people protesting the high cost of living political life, public rights and freedom, includ- and demanding political reforms. This move- ing issues of party and media law. The commit- ment against the government lasted for several tee included university professors, was headed weeks but never evolved into an uprising that by a constitutional law expert, and also included threatened the stability of the state. former Justice Minister Mekamcha El Ghouti On the domestic level, some see these prom- and Bouzid Lazhari as well as legal expert Ab- ises to introduce reform as part of the power dul Razzaq Zouina and Fawzia Ben Badis. struggle inside the political ruling elite, espe- Nevertheless, the opposition heavily criti- cially between what are called the civil and cized the techniques used by the President to military wings. On the regional level, however, reform the system and amend the constitution. these promises for reform came as a result of The committee set up by the President consisted the revolutions and protests that swept neigh- of a team of legal specialists, headed by one of boring countries and the collapse of regimes Bouteflika’s former ministers. The opposition that are considered allies to Algeria, such as argued that the only way to true reform was Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. In contrast, the King through the formation of a constituent body that of Morocco was able to contain the protests would engage various opposition parties as well that erupted in his country by implementing as Algerian civil society in the reform agenda. constitutional amendments that later brought However, the reforms scheduled to take place in the opposition to power. December 2013 were postponed due to prepa- In May 2011, the President appointed an rations for the elections and the opposition’s advisory committee to work with parties and continuous criticism of the reform process pro- national figures on drafting a proposal for laws posed by Bouteflika. In fact, the only reforms that should be amended and revised, includ- actually adopted concerned media and political ing within the Constitution itself. The commit- party law, resulting in the creation of many new tee worked from May 21 to June 21, meeting parties and media outlets. The government has with various political forces and civil actors a history of postponing reform, citing high secu- and handing in reform reports to the govern- rity risks and threats both inside and outside the ment that were later discussed in Parliament. country. It is especially concerned with terror- However, some parties, such as the Socialist ism in the region, both in the Algerian desert and Forces Front, refused to take part in these ne- on the eastern border with Libya and Tunisia. gotiations, whereas other parties, such as the The fear of foreign aggressors only adds to con- banned , were excluded tinuing anxiety that internal threats will affect by the government. the country’s national unity. • • •

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Observers argue that there are two types of kis goes back to the mid-1980s and was original- conflicts in Algeria: conflicts between the differ- ly triggered by conflicts over land distribution. ent factions of society (horizontal) and conflicts Each side accused the other of being supported between Algerian citizens and the state (verti- by the government, resulting in clashes which cal). Algeria has always witnessed disputes, and erupted again in 2008 and 2013 and which the sometimes-bloody conflicts, along tribal, ethnic, state is unable to resolve. Additionally, citizen and sectarian lines. These conflicts have prolif- conversions to Christianity and Shiism continue erated since the end of the 1980s, intensifying in to disturb and embarrass the government. In the the 1990s and continuing into the present day. city of Oran in 2013, clashes occurred between For example, the tribal region erupted in vast Sunnis and Shiites: the incident was exemplary civil disobedience in 2011, demanding that the of a conflict that threatens to unravel the social Tamazight language be listed as an Algerian of- and cultural fabric of the country. ficial language after . In the summer of Some analysts suggest that these outbursts of 2004, the provinces of Tiaret and El Bayadh violence and confrontation are in fact triggered disputed over water resources and grazing land. by those in power in order to demonstrate the The dispute escalated to such an extent that dangers of disunity within the country. Some armed confrontation between the two neighbor- go so far as to argue that foreign and colonial ing provinces was feared. Moreover, the clashes hands are behind the eruptions of violence: per- that have been ongoing in Ghardaia since March haps this is the only explanation as to why the of this year demonstrate an ethnic sectarian di- state could not put an end to the bloody events mension to the conflicts in Algeria. The conflict in Ghardaia, which claimed the lives of dozens between the Amazigh Ibadis and the Arab Mali- of people. • • •

Predictable outcome of Elections

Conflicting partisan positions rent government. The second category is com- The Algerian people can be sorted into three prised of those who boycotted the elections and different categories regarding their views on the includes people who believe that the election elections. The first category is made up of those results have already been decided and that the who participate in the elections and support a elections are thus null and void. This category particular candidate. This category includes includes Islamist parties as well as the liberals those who are close to the power structure or and leftists who called for an election boycott in those who have decided to align with the cur- March 2014. Among the figures that called for

March,2014 13 an election boycott are Ahmed Ben Bator, for- appears to be a civil and nonpartisan, but it has mer Prime Minister and presidential candidate gained support from some Algerian parties and who withdrew from the elections, the Nahda politicians. The movement is limited geographi- Party, the Movement of Society for Peace Party, cally to the Algerian capital, leading many ob- the New Generation Party, and the Justice and servers to conclude that some of the officials Development Party. The in competition with Bouteflika are behind its Party, however, holds an ambiguous position: it creation. The most vocal and prominent person published a statement on March 7, 2014, stat- in the Barakah movement is Amira Bouroui, ing that either participating in or boycotting the a doctor and a human rights activist who took upcoming elections would be useless and that to the streets on the February 22, 2014, two the only solution to the crisis is to call for a na- days before the movement was formed. She tional consensus and to set a real agenda for a was arrested following a vigil organized by the transitional phase. Some observers argue that movement on March 6. On March 1st, Barakah the party’s historical importance and significant announced its formation and gave a list of its ob- presence in the tribal areas make its stance a vi- jectives. Its stated goals center on the protest of able “third view” on the election process. “humiliation [of citizens], marginalization, brib- ery, corruption, repressive tactics of regime and Popular Opposition: “Barakah” Movement the falsification of historical accounts and the During this period of protest, movements manipulation of the foundations of the nation.” to oppose Bouteflika’s fourth term and call for The movement defines itself as “a movement an election boycott emerged. One of the most that derives its strength from collaboration” in important of these movements is called Bara- order to “find a peaceful political and civil so- kah, which means “enough” in the Algerian dia- lution and compromise out of the current crisis lect. The movement surfaced immediately after caused by the ruling government.” This move- Bouteflika announced that he would run for a ment also declares that it “will take part in peace- fourth presidential term; its leaders are a group ful demonstrations and engage in serious discus- of media and legal personnel as well as the edu- sions and dialogue with all political groups and cated youth who gather every Thursday in front facets within Algerian society to achieve its re- of the university in the capital. This movement form agenda and reject all forms of violence.” • • •

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Conclusion: President Bouteflika is running for a fourth term despite the illness that prevented him from fulfill- ing his role as a national leader. It is not expected that his rival candidate, Ben Ali, will do well in the elections despite his strong connections with different opposition groups and his contact with leaders from the banned Islamic Salvation Front. However, after the elections, it is expected that constitutional changes will take place to create a vice presidency. The position may be given to Mouloud Hamrouche, the reformist former Prime Min- ister, who is accepted by influential figures within the political system, the military and the opposi- tion. Hamrouche is seen as a political figure with a national reform agenda who also respects the role of the military establishment and its importance in the history and stability of the country. Hamrouche has also stressed the importance of a civil state and elected, effective, and credible representative institutions. Hamrouche seems to be, so far, the most suitable candidate for the Algerian people. He also seems to be the candidate for those in power who realize that it is vital to make room for the new generation and for a new political experience based on legitimate elections, not on the legitimacy of the previous generation’s revolution.

References - Alhadath Newspaper, “Al nizam al jazairi yattajih nahu ta’dil aldistur lil tashabbut bil sultah”, 21 December 2013, www. alhadathpcnews.com. - Chebira Boualem, IDE et developpement en Algerie, http://www.scipio.ro/documents/15530/f661fb3d-1684465-b-813e- ba6cd06832f6. - El-Massa, “2011 sanat islahat al taghyir alhadi”, 30 December 2011, www.el-massa.com. - Elkhabar Newspaper, “Ahzab al mihfazah”, 25 July 2013, www.elkhabar.com. - Ennahar Newspaper, “Ahzab al qutb Al-watani tad’u ila irja’ ta’dil aldistur ila ma ba’d al intikhabat”, 9 July 2013, www. ennaharonline.com. - Fathi Bouleras, “Mashru’ ta’dil aldistur al jazairi: al siyaq wa al mawaqif wa al ihtimalat al mumkinah”, AlJazeera Studies, 2013, http:// studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2013201352619840955734/26/5/draft%20to%20the%20Algerian%20 Constitution.pdf. - Isam ben Al Sheikh, “Mashru’ al islah al siyasi fi al jazair”, The Arab Center for Research and Political Studies, Doha: 2011. - Lahouari Addi, Contributions: Marche, Etat et société en Algerie, Le Soir d’Algerie, 28, 01, 2013.

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