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Nathan Robert Howard [email protected] Department of , 301 YMCA Building, College Station, TX 77843-4237 T: 1 (213) 275-9203 http://www.nathanrhoward.com/

Employment Assistant Professor, Texas A&M University, Department of Philosophy, August 2019 — present

Education in Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy, 2019, University of Southern California Philosophy Enrolled: September 2013 – August 2019 Dissertation: The Dual Aspects of Normative Reasons Committee: Professors Mark Schroeder (Chair), Stephen Finlay, John Hawthorne, and Ralph Wedgwood

Master of Arts in Philosophy, 2012, University of Toronto Enrolled: September 2011 – April 2013

Master of Letters in Philosophy, Conferred with Distinction, 2011, University of St. Andrews Enrolled: September 2010 – November 2011 Dissertation: The Factivity Objection to Epistemic Contextualism Advisor: Professor Jessica Brown

Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy, McGill University Enrolled: September 2007 – April 2010

Book in Progress The Fundamentals of Reasons, with Mark Schroeder, under contract with Oxford University Press.

Peer-Reviewed (forthcoming) “The Goals of Moral Worth.” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 16, edited by Russ Articles Shafer-Landau. (> words) (forthcoming) “Primary Reasons as Normative Reasons.” Journal of Philosophy.

(forthcoming) “One Desire Too Many.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12642

(forthcoming) “The World is Not Enough.” with N. G. Laskowski, Noûs. DOI: 10.1111/nous.12293

(2019) “Sentimentalism about Moral Understanding.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5), 1065-1078. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9946-y

Reviews, (2019) “Review of Errol Lord’s The Importance of Being Rational.” 129 (4), 720-726. DOI: Discussion Notes, 10.1086/702980 Etc. • Ethics Review Forum discussion, hosted by PEA Soup: https://bit.ly/2XO6ic3 (< words) (forthcoming) “Broome’s Too-Quick Objection.” Australasian Philosophical Review 5.1. Invited Talks “The Goals of Moral Worth”, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada (May 2020) (Delivered re- motely)

“The Goals of Moral Worth”, Baylor University, Waco, USA (April 2020) (Delivered remotely)

“Possessing Desires”, Fourth Annual Texas Ethics Workshop, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, USA (February 2020)

“Unexemplified Properties” (with N. G. Laskowski), University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain (July 2019)

“The Dual Aspects of Normative Reasons”, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA(De- cember 2018)

“The World is not Enough” (with N. G. Laskowski), 1st Annual Wuhan-Essen Metaethics Con- ference, hosted by the University of Duisberg-Essen, Essen, Germany (July 2018)

“The Metasemantic Lesson of Anankastic Conditionals”, 3rd Belgrade Conference on Condition- als, hosted by the University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia (May 2017)

“Weak Necessity is Strong Necessity in the Subjunctive Mood”, 2nd Belgrade Conference on Con- ditionals, hosted by the University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia (May 2016)

Refereed “What Does the Moral Fetishist Fetishize?”, Annual Meeting of the Pacific APA, San Francisco, Conference CA, USA (April 2020) (Accepted but not presented — APA Pacific 2020 meeting cancelled) Papers “The Goals of Moral Worth”, Wisconsin Metaethics Workshop (MadMeta), Madison, WI,USA (September 2019)

“Beyond Bad Beliefs”, Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, Boulder, CO, USA (August 2019)

“Factualists Can’t Solve the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem”, Annual Meeting of the Pacific APA, Vancouver, BC, Canada (April 2019)

“Sentimentalism about Moral Understanding”, The British Society for Ethical Theory, hosted by the University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK (July 2018)

“The World is not Enough” (with N. G. Laskowski), The Future of Normativity, hostedbythe University of Kent, Kent, UK (June 2018)

“The World is not Enough” (by N. G. Laskowski), New Waves in Normative Concepts, hostedby the Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Frankfurt, Germany (June 2018)

“Buck-Passing and the Problem of Mixed Reasons”, Foundations of Normativity 3, hosted by the University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK (June 2017)

“Buck-Passing and the Quasi-Davidsonian Conception of Normative Reasons”, The Legacy of Donald Davidson, hosted by York University, Toronto, ON, Canada (April 2017)

“The Tension Between Judgment Internalism and Moral Understanding”, Annual Meeting ofthe Pacific APA, Seattle, WA, USA (April 2017) “Right Action, Acting for the Right Reasons, and Acting Rightly”, Atlantic Regional Philosophy Association 2016, hosted by Acadia University, Wolfville, NS, Canada (October 2016)

“Rationally Non-Motivating Practical Beliefs”, The Joint Session of the and , hosted by the University of Warwick, Warwick, UK (July 2015)

“Subordinate Necessity”, Annual Meeting of the Pacific APA, Vancouver, BC, Canada (April 2015)

“A Dynamic Account of Ought and Must”, 12th International Conference on Deontic and Normative Systems (DEON 2014), hosted by the University of Ghent, Belgium (July 2014)

“Dynamic Uses of Epistemic Ought and Must”, Annual Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association (CPA), hosted by Brock University, Saint Catherine’s, ON, Canada (May 2014)

“The Anchor Puzzle for Deontic Necessity Modals”, Annual Meeting of the Pacific APA, SanDiego, CA, USA (April 2014)

“The Good Samaritan Paradox”, Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy, Formal Methods in Ethics, hosted by Ludwig Maximillians Universität, Munich, Germany (October 2012)

Selected “Thinking Beyond Imagining” by Jill Cumby, Annual Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical As- Comments sociation, Montréal, QC, Canada (June 2018)

“Accidentally Doing the Right Thing” by Zoe Johnson-King, USC/UCLA Graduate Conference, Los Angeles, CA, USA (March 2017)

“Getting Expressivism Out of the Woods” by Sarah Raskoff, Annual Meeting of the Pacific APA, San Francisco, CA, USA (April 2016)

“One’s Modus Ponens...” by Una Stojnic, USC/UCLA Graduate Conference, Los Angeles, CA, USA (March 2015)

“Cross Linguistic Ambiguity Tests and How to Fail Them” by Christopher Langston, Annual Meet- ing of the Canadian Philosophical Association, Saint Catherine’s, ON, Canada (May 2014)

Teaching Primary Lecturer: Texas A&M University Fall 2019 PHIL111: Contemporary Moral Issues Spring 2020 PHIL320:

Primary Lecturer: University of Southern California Fall 2015 PHIL122a: Reasoning and Argument 1 Fall 2015 PHIL122b: Reasoning and Argument 2

Supervision Undergraduate Thesis Supervision: Texas A&M University Alexandra Campbell, “Holding Oneself Morally Accountable”, 2020-21 Professional Professional Membership: Service American Philosophical Society, member, 2013-present Canadian Philosophical Society, member, 2013-present

Service: Refereeing: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly; ; The Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy; Journal of Philosophical Research; ; Episteme; Ethical Theory and Moral Practice; ; Theoria; The Journal of Moral Philosophy Research Assistant to Prof. Wedgwood for The Value of Rationality (OUP), 2017 Co-organizer of the 2015 USC/UCLA Annual Graduate Philosophy Conference ’ Cocoon Job Mentoring Project, Mentor 2019-2020 Graduate Student Advisory Committee 2019-2020, Texas A&M University Diversity Excellence Fellowship Referee 2019-2020, Texas A&M University

Selected Awards & Russell Endowed Fellowship, University of Southern California 2018-2019 Fellowships Flewelling Award, University of Southern California 2018 Graduate Student Stipend, The Pacific APA 2014, 2015, 2017-19 Provost’s Fellowship, University of Southern California 2013-2018 Martha Lile Love Essay Award, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Toronto 2010-2012 Cheesbrough Fellowship, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Toronto 2011 Graduate Fellowship, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Toronto 2011-2012 James D. Ross Prize, Dept. of Philosophy, McGill University 2010

References Mark Schroeder (chair), John Hawthorne, Professor of Philosophy, USC Professor of Philosophy, USC [email protected] [email protected]

Stephen Finlay, Ralph Wedgwood, Professor of Philosophy, USC Professor of Philosophy, USC Director of the Institute of Philosophy, ACU [email protected] fi[email protected]

Jonathan Quong (teaching mentor), Professor of Philosophy, USC [email protected]