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Johann Frick JOHANN FRICK Department of Philosophy (609) 258-9494 (office) 212 1879 Hall (609) 258-1502 (fax) Princeton University [email protected] Princeton, New Jersey 08544- http://scholar.princeton.edu/jfrick 1006 AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION Normative Ethics; Practical Ethics (including Bioethics); Political Philosophy. AREAS OF COMPETENCE Metaethics; Causation; Philosophy of Action; Wittgenstein. EMPLOYMENT 2020- Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and the Present Center for Human Values, Princeton University. 2015 – Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy and the 2020 Center for Human Values, Princeton University. Feb 2014 – Instructor in the Department of Philosophy and the Center for 2015 Human Values, Princeton University. EDUCATION 2008 - 2014 Ph.D. in Philosophy, Harvard University. • Dissertation: “Making People Happy, Not Making Happy People: A Defense of the Asymmetry Intuition in Population Ethics”; Committee: T.M. Scanlon, Frances Kamm, Derek Parfit. 2005 - 2008 BPhil degree in Philosophy, Merton College, Oxford University. • Distinction in both the written examinations and the BPhil thesis. • BPhil thesis: “Morality and the Problem of Foreseeable Non- Compliance”; advisor: Derek Parfit. • Specialization in Moral Philosophy (tutor: Ralph Wedgwood); Political Philosophy (tutors: Joseph Raz and John Tasioulas); Wittgenstein (tutor: Stephen Mulhall). 2006 - 2007 Visiting student at the École Normale Supérieure (ENS) in Paris. • Courses and seminars at the ENS, the Institut Jean Nicod, and the Collège de France; tutor: François Recanati. 2002 - 2005 BA (Hons.) degree in Philosophy, Politics & Economics, St. John’s College, Oxford University. • First Class Honours in the Final Examinations (June 2005). • Distinction in the Preliminary Examination (June 2003). FELLOWSHIPS, AWARDS, AND HONORS Richard Stockton Bicentennial Preceptorship, Princeton University (2018-2021), awarded annually to one or two assistant professors from all the humanities and social sciences. Behrman Faculty Fellow with the Princeton Humanities Council (2020-2022). One-day workshop “Risk, Luck, and Future People” on my work, organized by the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University (April 19, 2019). Commentators: John Goldberg, Caspar Hare, Rebecca Henderson, Priyanka Menon, Gina Schouten, Lucas Stanczyk. Two-day workshop “Contractualism, Risk and Population Ethics” on my work, organized by the Einstein Ethics Group, Berlin, led by Prof. R.J. Wallace (Berkeley), (October 6-7, 2017). Commentators: Christoph Fehige, Tim Henning, Ulrike Heuer, Erasmus Mayr, Kirsten Meyer, Lukas Meyer, Véronique Munoz-Dardé, Juri Viehoff, Tatjana Višak. Winner of the American Philosophical Association’s Gregory Kavka/University of California, Irvine Prize in Political Philosophy, for the best paper in political philosophy published in the last two years, for my paper “Contractualism and Social Risk”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 43.3 (2015): 175-223. Visiting fellow at the Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto (fall 2017). Emily and Charles Carrier Prize for outstanding doctoral thesis on a subject in social, political, or moral philosophy, Harvard University, Department of Philosophy, 2015. Dissertation Completion Fellowship, Harvard University (2013-14). Edmond J. Safra Graduate Prize Fellowship in Ethics, Harvard University (2011-12). Full scholarship to attend the Workshop on Measurement and Ethical Evaluation of Health Inequalities, Fondation Brocher, Geneva (June 2010). Francis Bowen Prize, Harvard University, “conferred annually for the best essay upon a subject in moral or political philosophy” for my paper “What We Owe to the Hypocrites: Contractualism and the Speaker-Relativity of Justification” (June 2010). College Prize in recognition of outstanding performance in the BPhil examinations, Merton College, Oxford (July 2008). Postgraduate Award of the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council (2005-08). Gordon Baker Prize in Philosophy, St. John’s College, for best undergraduate student in philosophy, Oxford (July 2005). 2 Philosophy Graduate Scholarship at Merton College, Oxford (declined) and European Trust Scholarship at Trinity College, Cambridge (declined), (March 2005). Scholar of the Studienstiftung (German National Academic Foundation), which supports the top 0.3% of German university students (2003-08). PUBLICATIONS “Context-Dependent Betterness and the Mere Addition Paradox”, in Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit, edited by Jeff McMahan, Tim Campbell, James Goodrich, and Ketan Ramakrishnan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). “Morality and Institutional Detail in the Law of Torts: Reflections on Goldberg and Zipursky's Recognizing Wrongs” (with Tom Dougherty), Journal of Law and Philosophy (forthcoming). “Conditional Reasons and the Procreation Asymmetry”, Philosophical Perspectives: Ethics, Volume 33.2 (2020). “National Partiality, Immigration, and the Problem of Double-Jeopardy” in David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall (eds.), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Volume 6 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 151-182. “Prioritarisme” (with Ekédi Mpondo-Dika) in Patrick Savidan (ed.), Dictionnaire des inégalités et de la justice sociale (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2018). “Zukünftige Personen und Schuld ohne Opfer” (“Future Persons and Victimless Wrongdoing”) in Markus Rüther and Sebastian Muders (eds.) Worauf es ankommt: Derek Parfits praktische Philosophie in der Diskussion (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2017). • With a response by Derek Parfit. “On the Survival of Humanity, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 47.2-3 (2017): 344- 367. • Reprinted in Rahul Kumar (ed.) Ethics and Future Generations (New York: Routledge Press, 2017). “What We Owe to Hypocrites: Contractualism and the Speaker-Relativity of Justification”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 44.4 (2016): 223-265. • Winner of Harvard University’s Francis Bowen Prize, conferred annually for the best essay upon a subject in moral or political philosophy”. “Contractualism and Social Risk”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 43.3 (2015): 175-223. • Winner of the American Philosophical Association’s Gregory Kavka/University of California, Irvine Prize in Political Philosophy, 2017. “Treatment versus Prevention in the Fight Against HIV/AIDS and the Problem of Identified versus Statistical Lives” in Glenn Cohen, Norman Daniels, and Nir Eyal (eds.), Identified versus Statistical Lives: An Interdisciplinary Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 3 “Uncertainty and Justifiability to Each Person: Response to Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve”, in Nir Eyal, Samia Hurst, Ole Norheim and Dan Wikler (eds.), Inequalities in Health: Concepts, Measures, and Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). “Prioritarisme”. With Ekédi Mpondo-Dika. In V. Bourdeau and R. Merrill (eds.), Dictionnaire de théorie politique (2008): http://www.dicopo.fr/spip.php?article100. UNDER REVIEW OR IN PREPARATION “Dilemmas, Luck, and the Two Faces of Morality”. (R&R at Ethics). “Chancy Causation and the Problem of Aggregate Events”. (R&R at Philosophical Studies). Morality Behind a Natural Veil of Ignorance: Risk, Rights, and Responsibility. (In preparation for Oxford University Press). “The Procreation Asymmetry and the Specter of Antinatalism”. (In preparation). “Speciesism and Acceptable Lives” (with Adam Lerner). (In preparation). Review of Samuel Scheffler’s Why Worry about Future Generations? In preparation for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. WORK IN PROGRESS “Risk, Responsibility, and Aggregate Effects”. “A Puzzle About Risk and Compensation”. “Self-Knowledge and Structural Rationality”. “Counterfactual Moral Luck”. “Permissible Partiality to Self and the Concept of Wronging a Person”. TALKS AND PRESENTATIONS “TBD”, Moral Philosophy Seminar, Oxford University (scheduled). “Dilemmas, Luck, and the Two Faces of Morality”, Departmental Colloquium, UC Davis (January 2021). “Dilemmas, Luck, and the Two Faces of Morality”, Departmental Colloquium, Tufts University (October 2020). “Dilemmas, Luck, and the Two Faces of Morality”, Ethics and Epistemology Group, Fordham University (October 2020). 4 “Dilemmas, Luck, and the Two Faces of Morality”, Departmental Colloquium, NYU (Feb 2020). “Dilemmas, Luck, and the Two Faces of Morality”, Departmental Colloquium, UC Berkeley (Feb 2020). “Immigration, National Partiality, and the Problem of Double-Jeopardy”, Departmental Colloquium, USC (Jan 2020). “Immigration, National Partiality, and the Problem of Double-Jeopardy”, Departmental Colloquium, UNC-Chapel Hill (Jan 2020). “Dilemmas, Luck, and the Two Faces of Morality”, Departmental Colloquium, Harvard University (December 2019). “Dilemmas, Luck, and the Two Faces of Morality”, Departmental Colloquium, University of Southern California (October 2019). “Self-Knowledge and Structural Rationality”, Berlin Workshop on Moral and Political Philosophy (July 2019). “Immigration, National Partiality, and the Problem of Double-Jeopardy”, Oxford Partiality Workshop, University of Oxford (July 2019). “Dilemmas, Luck, and the Two Faces of Morality”, Einstein Ethics Group, Berlin, led by Prof. R.J. Wallace (July 2019). “Dilemmas, Luck, and the Two Faces of Morality”, Centre for Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs, University of St. Andrews (May 2019). “Dilemmas, Luck, and the Two Faces of Morality”, Centre for Ethics, Law, and Public Affairs, University of Warwick (May 2019). “Dilemmas, Luck, and the Two Faces of Morality”, ‘The Practical, The Political,
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