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The Eastern Partnership in 2030

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The Eastern Partnership in 2030 Introduction The Eastern Partnership in 2030 Four Scenarios for the Future of the Region Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Regional Office „Dialogue Eastern Europe” Pushkinska Street 34, 01004 Kyiv, Ukraine Phone: +38 044 234 10 38 E-Mail: [email protected] http://www.fes-dee.org The Eastern Partnership in 2030. Four Scenarios for the Future of the Region Kyiv: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2019. Editors: Luca Pusceddu, Nikolaos Gavalakis Copy Editors: Pervoe byuro perevodov, Nataliya Dragan Design / Realization: Alexandr Bubon Illustrations: Sergiy Kolyada, http://www.kolyada.com ISBN 978-617-7157-98-3 The views expressed in this publication are neither necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung nor of any other institution to which the members of the Scenario Group are affiliated. Contents Contents Introduction . 4 Scenario No. 1 – Cohesion . .7 Scenario No. 2 – Cooperation. 13 Scenario No. 3 – Cronyism. 19 Scenario No. 4 – Conflict. 25 About the Contributors. 29 3 The Eastern Partnership in 2030 Introduction widespread corruption, oligarchic influences, and inefficient state structures. Democratic reforms and improvements in The ten-year anniversary of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) of- the rule of law are unfortunately progressing rather slowly. fers an excellent opportunity to take stock of the past achieve- Furthermore, large parts of the population in the countries ments of the initiative as well as to look into the future of the do not feel a positive impact from the Eastern Partnership. six member states and the region in general. Armenia, Azer- Poverty continues to be widespread due to unemployment, baijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine certainly form low wages, and the absence of a functioning welfare state. quite a heterogeneous group. While Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have signed Association Agreements with the EU, From a geopolitical perspective, the region is still in great turmoil. Armenia and Belarus are still members of the Russian-led Five of the six countries are dealing with territorial conflicts, with Eurasian Economic Union. Although, Armenia has signed a the war in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea domi- Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with nating the headlines during the last years. In the eyes of the Rus- the EU, Azerbaijan has decided to stay non-aligned thus far. sian administration, the Eastern Partnership is seen as a vehicle of the EU to advance its interest in the near neighborhood which The aim of the Eastern Partnership was to bring its east- Moscow considers its own sphere of influence. The EU, on the ern neighbors closer to the EU and build a common area of other hand, argues for the sovereign right of the EaP countries shared democracy, prosperity, and stability. Ten years after to choose their own path, but, at the same time, does not want its launch, the results of these rather ambitious goals are to offer them a membership perspective. The deep crisis be- rather mixed. On the one hand, intensified trade and invest- tween the West and Russia is a dilemma, as the countries “in ment flows led to stronger economic growth in the region and the middle” are often caught between the diverging interests of people-to-people contacts have increased through civil soci- the two major actors. Which challenges will the countries of the ety cooperation as well as the launch of visa-free regimes. Eastern Partnership face over the course of the next decade However, on the other hand, the societies still suffer from and what does their future look like? 4 Introduction The Upside and Limitations of Scenarios Building the Scenarios Scenario thinking concepts offer a possibility to approach an The authors behind the Scenario Project are from all six East- uncertain future. Scenarios are supposed to allow the read- ern Partnership countries, Russia, and Germany. During the er to contemplate different possible pathways and to think Sixth Eastern European Academy for Social Democracy in about plausible driving factors which might lead to certain Vienna, the group has concluded that the most important fac- outcomes. The best-case scenario is they will shine a light on tors determining the future of the EaP region were the degree possible solutions which are beneficial to all parties. The task of cooperation in the international environment as well as the of developing short narratives encourages the authors to think socio-political development of the six countries. Therefore, the outside the box, to include unconventional assumptions, and two variables international cooperation (high or low) and so- to consider alternative perspectives. cio-political development (positive or negative) ended up be- ing the axes of a 2 x 2-scenario matrix. Hence, four scenarios Of course, it goes without saying that scenarios are unable to pre- were developed. In mixed groups, the authors then created a dict the future. Often, they might seem improbable, even undesir- descriptive narrative including the agreed upon driving factors. able to the members of the scenario team as well as to the reader. Finally, the participants specified the events that would have Nonetheless, sometimes the course of events goes in a way most to occur in order to lead from today’s status quo to each sce- people would have never considered as being remotely possible. nario in 2030. Who would have thought even a few months before the elec- tions that Volodymyr Zelenskiy or Donald Trump would become The views expressed in this publication are neither necessarily President in their respective countries? The Scenario Project is those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung nor of any other institu- supposed to be an intellectual endeavor which should challenge tion to which the members of the scenario group are affiliated. its authors as well as its readers. It should not be considered as the end of a thought process but rather serve as a basis for discussion. Nikolaos Gavalakis 5 Scenario No. 1 – Cohesion Scenario No. 1 Organization (NATO), since Russia successfully used its political leverage in the international arena to stop Cohesion the accession. Iuliia Kulakova, Polad Muradli, The Road to 2030 Stanislav Makshakov, Nicolae Arnaut After failing to soften Russia’s imperial ambitions in the The State of Affairs in 2030 Eastern Partnership region, the EU ultimately decided to reform their Eastern Neighborhood Policy. Under the Suffering under the confrontation of the main interna- revised policy, the EU acknowledged that any kind of tional actors, the Eastern Partnership countries rather geopolitical project in the region faces an instant and focus on the development of their internal capacities. harsh reaction from the Russian side. Thus, the new EU The Parliamentary elections that took place in the EaP policy refused to pronounce any geopolitical ambitions countries between 2020-2024 brought a new politi- regarding the region, focusing instead on stability and cal elite to power. Only Belarus continues to stick to security, and choosing the role of a technical assistant its old political elite, still being ruled by the Lukash- in the realm of institution building. The EU abandoned enko family. The countries are halfway through the its path of further enlargement and took a rather subtle route of democratic transition thanks to successful approach towards its Eastern neighbors by focusing on political and economic reforms. Civil society organi- good governance practices within Georgia, Moldova, zations are playing a significant role in the preserva- and Ukraine. In the case of Armenia, it continued to pro- tion of civil and democratic rights. However, Georgia, vide increasing financial and technical support, without Moldova and Ukraine are still not members of either requiring Armenia to change its geopolitical orientation the European Union (EU), or the North Atlantic Treaty towards Russia. 7 The Eastern Partnership in 2030 Leaders of Azerbaijan and Belarus focused their atten- “Soviet” elements within the internal administration. For tion on strengthening civil society in order to improve their the first time, these countries held transparent and demo- image in the international political arena. Ultimately, the cratic presidential elections. Enhanced Mobile Broadband visible socio-economic achievements of the Eastern Part- has been significantly widespread in all EaP countries, nership countries increasingly attracted the existing sepa- which caused a rapid development of e-services and e- ratist regions, thus creating a conducive environment for governance. This was particularly the case in Moldova, the resolution of territorial conflicts. which made substantial improvements thanks to a new generation of young and dynamic politicians. The new New Leadership mayor of Chisinau – Ion Popescu – was even awarded the price for “the fastest urban developing city with sus- Parliamentary elections which took place in the EaP coun- tainable solutions.” tries in 2019-2020 brought into power a new generation of politicians that focused on fighting corruption, eradi- Significant developments took place with regards to en- cating poverty, improving the educational system and ergy cooperation between the Eastern Partnership coun- providing affordable medical insurance. The Association tries. Several agreements were signed between coun- Agreements provided a useful framework for Georgia, tries of the EaP that improved and renovated the current Moldova, and Ukraine to improve their democratic institu- infrastructure such as the Trans-Anatolian
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