Burma Policy Briefing Nr 3 October 2010

Unlevel Playing Field: Burma’s Election Landscape

On 7 November 2010, the people of Burma will go to the polls, the culmination of an Conclusions and Recommendations electoral process closely controlled by the military State Peace and Development • The elections will be Burma's most defin- Council. The National League ing political moment for a generation. for Democracy (NLD) decided not to par- However the electoral process lacks ticipate and is encouraging a boycott by democratic and ethnic inclusion. Without voters, a tactic that may prove counter- such inclusion, the country's political productive as it will be mainly pro-demo- crises are likely to continue. cracy candidates who lose votes.1 For most • The electoral playing field is tilted in people, casting their ballot will be a novel favour of the regime’s USDP due to strict experience. No one under the age of 38, the regulations on registration, the cost of majority of the electorate, has ever partici- registering candidates, and the limited pated in an election. time for parties to organize. If voting is a new experience, the choice of • Even if the voting is fair, ‘establishment’ candidates on offer may be less so. In many parties, together with military appointees, constituencies, particularly for many re- are likely to control a majority of seats in gional legislative seats in the ethnic Bur- the new legislatures. 37 political parties man heartland, there are only two options: will participate in the elections. But most a candidate representing the current re- have small regional or ethnic support gime’s party, and a candidate representing bases. the party of the pre-1988 socialist regime. In most other constituencies, however, • Despite the restrictions, democratic oppo- there will be at least a more credible third sition parties participating in the polls option: a candidate from one of the main want to make the best use of the limited “democratic” parties (in Burman-majority space available. The elections begin new areas), or a candidate from an ethnic arrangements and contests in Burmese nationality party (in ethnic minority areas). politics, which will play out over several years. Outcomes remain unpredictable. Many of the regime party’s candidates will be familiar, powerful individuals. Nearly all • Ethnic exclusion and lack of polls in many ministers and deputy ministers will be minority areas mean that the election will contesting. And in late August, the regime not resolve the country's ethnic conflicts. carried out a military reshuffle of unprece- The regime’s promotion of Border Guard dented scale, with most senior officers Forces rather than political dialogue with leaving the army in order that they could armed opposition groups has also in- contest parliamentary seats. Across the creased tensions. To establish peace, there country, hundreds of government adminis- must be equitable participation, bringing trators, former military officers, business- rights and benefits to all peoples and men and other prominent local figures are regions.

Burma Policy Briefing | 1 running on the regime’s behalf. The regime group to transform into Border Guard For- has gone to extraordinary lengths to avoid ces (BGF). One of these parties, the Kachin a repeat of its 1990 landslide defeat; but State Progressive Party (KSPP), had strong given strong and widespread disaffection support in Kachin areas and planned to with the government, regime party candi- contest a majority of seats in the state. dates face a major challenge to win their seats in any fairly counted vote. While the The cost associated with registering candi- general contours of the election process are dates has been a major impediment to most now clear, precisely how it will play out parties. A US$500 non-refundable registra- remains uncertain, both to observers and tion fee for each candidate has meant that the regime itself. most parties have been able to register fewer candidates than they originally plan- THE PLAYING FIELD ned (or, alternatively, to select wealthy candidates able to cover their own registra- Several political parties have complained tion fees). Contesting all 1,163 national that the electoral playing field has been and regional seats would require approxi- sharply tilted in favour of the regime’s mately US$580,000, prior to any campaign Union Solidarity and Development Party expenses, a sum beyond the means of near- (USDP). In particular, concerns have been ly all parties. Only two, the government- expressed about three aspects: party regis- organized USDP and the National Unity tration requirements, the cost of registering Party (NUP) have been able to contest a candidates, and the limited time for parties majority of seats: the USDP because it in- to organize. herited the formidable organizational and financial resources of the Union Solidarity The party registration process has been and Development Association mass organi- cumbersome and lacking in transparency. zation; and the NUP because it represents Under the electoral laws, prospective par- the old (pre-1988) Socialist establishment, ties had to go through a two-stage registra- which still has access to elite wealth. tion process, first applying to the Election Commission for approval to carry out the There has also been limited time for parties organizational work necessary to establish a to organize themselves. Despite the an- new party (otherwise illegal under the nouncement in early 2008 that elections country’s draconian restrictions on free- would be held this year, the electoral laws dom of assembly); and then subsequently were only issued in March 2010, with regis- seeking formal registration of the party. tration of parties only gathering momen- Such approval obtained, parties then have tum in May. The election date was finally 90 days to meet minimum membership re- announced in August, at which point par- quirements (500 members for regional par- ties were given a mere two weeks’ notice of ties, 1,000 members for national parties). the deadline for registering candidates. Hence parties were obliged to devote signi- This placed considerable pressure on par- ficant effort to registering members and ties that were in most cases still organizing compiling detailed lists for submission to themselves. And given that there have been the Commission, rather than campaigning. no elections for two decades, and most forms of political organization and discus- Three Kachin parties (see box Party regis- sion have been prohibited, parties are bat- tration) never received the Commission’s tling against the learning curve to develop approval of their initial applications, for policies and effectively communicate them reasons that it did not publicly announce – to voters. although it was made clear to the parties that it was due to the refusal of the Kachin Parties also face challenges in finding suit- Independence Organization (KIO) ceasefire able candidates to run for the elections in

2 | Burma Policy Briefing Party registration

List of registered parties (in alphabetical order) 31 Union of Federation of National Politics 1 88 Generation Student Youths (Union 32 Union Solidarity and Development of Myanmar) Party 2 All Mon Region Democracy Party 33 United Democratic Party 3 34 Unity and Democracy Party of 4 Kachin State 5 Democracy and Peace Party 35 6 Democratic Party (Myanmar) 36 Wa National Unity Party 7 Ethnic National Development Party 37 Wunthanu NLD (The Union of 8 Inn National Development Party Myanmar) 9 Kaman National Progressive Party

10 Kayan National Party Parties having had their registrations cancelled 11 Kayin People's Party 12 Kayin State Democracy and Develop- i. Mro National Party ment Party ii. Myanmar Democracy Congress 13 Khami National Development Party iii. Myanmar New Society Democratic 14 Kokang Democracy and Unity Party Party 15 Lahu National Development Party iv. Regional Development Party (Pyay) 16 Modern People Party v. Union Kayin League

17 Mro or Khami National Solidarity All these parties were deregistered for failing to Organisation compete in the minimum three constituencies. 18 National Democratic Force 19 National Democratic Party for Deve- Parties not registered lopment a. Kachin State Progressive Party 20 National Development and Peace Party b. Northern Progressive 21 National Political Alliances League Party 22 National Unity Party c. United Democracy Party (Kachin 23 Pao National Organization State) 24 Peace and Diversity Party d. People’s New Society Party 25 Phalon-Sawaw [Pwo-Sgaw] Democra- e. All National Races Unity and tic Party Development Party (Kayah State) 26 Rakhine Nationalities Development Party For the first three parties, all representing Kachin 27 Rakhine State National Force of nationals, applications were never approved by the Myanmar Election Commission (with no reason publicly 28 Shan Nationalities Democratic Party announced). The applications of the latter two 29 Taaung (Palaung) National Party parties were approved, but they failed to complete 30 Union Democratic Party the registration process, and were hence dissolved.

such a short time frame. After decades of pressure from the authorities and/or the political repression, many people are also USPD to run for them. afraid to join a political party. In some cases both the government-backed USDP REGISTERED PARTIES and opposition political parties have A total of 42 parties were registered with approached the same locally well-known the Election Commission. Five of these people. Some of them felt unable to resist have subsequently been deregistered for

Burma Policy Briefing | 3 failing to contest the minimum of three leverage it had to obtain a satisfactory poli- constituencies, leaving 37 to compete in the tical settlement. Similarly, the United Wa election.2 Many of these parties have small State Army ceasefire group has refused to regional or ethnic support bases. The transform into Border Guard Forces, and statistics are striking: has indicated that it will not permit elec- tions to take place in its area. Not surpris- • two-thirds of registered parties (24 out of ingly, then, the Election Commission has 37) represent specific ethnic populations; also excluded the four townships under Wa • more than half of the parties have 11 can- control. The government may declare these didates or less (that is, they will contest in “Union territory” under the direct admini- fewer than one percent of the total num- stration of the president. ber of elected seats); • only 4 parties nominated candidates in CONSTITUENCIES AND CANDIDATES more than 10 per cent of the 1,163 seats. Voters will elect representatives for three At the national level, the race is between different legislative levels: the upper and four parties: two “establishment” parties lower houses of the national parliament, (USDP and NUP) and two “democratic” and the 14 regional parliaments. All voting parties (NDF and DPM). This contest will will be on a first-past-the-post basis in each be decided mainly in the Burman-majority constituency. Regions as there are strong ethnic parties in most ethnic-majority States contesting both The (upper house): Each regional and national seats in their of the country’s 14 regions and states will respective areas. elect 12 representatives to the upper house,3 for a total of 168 elected seats. An addi- The main exception is Kachin State. In a tional 4 seats per region/state are reserved surprising and provocative move, the Elec- for military appointees, thus accounting for tion Commission not only denied registra- 25 per cent of the total seats. tion to three Kachin parties (leaving only one registered Kachin party, a spin-off of The (lower house): Each of the USDP), it also blocked the registration the country’s townships will elect one re- of individual Kachin candidates linked to presentative to the lower house, for a total those parties. This has left the Kachins with of 330 elected seats.4 An additional 110 effectively no political representation. This seats (again, 25 per cent of the total) are blow to the ethnic inclusivity of the elec- reserved for military appointees. The Elec- tions has inevitably led to strong political tion Commission has announced that disaffection among Kachins and could be a elections will not take place in four town- precursor to violence or renewed armed ships in Wa-controlled areas of Shan State conflict in Kachin areas - with potentially (as mentioned above), so these seats will be far-reaching implications for ethnic rela- vacant.5 tions and peace throughout the country. Regional legislatures: Each of the 14 regions Part of the reason behind the exclusion of and states in the country will have a re- Kachin parties and candidates is the refusal gional legislature. The size of these legisla- of the Kachin ceasefire group (the KIO) to tures will vary depending on the number of transform into Border Guard Forces. The townships in each region/state, with each government saw this as the price of entry township electing two representatives. (Two into the electoral process, whereas the KIO areas of the country will not elect regional – along with most of the other major cease- legislative representatives: the eight town- fire groups – felt that retaining an inde- ships that make up the Union territory of pendent military capacity was the only real Nay Pyi Taw; and the four townships

4 | Burma Policy Briefing Profiles of key national parties

Numbers of party candidates are provisional, as the Nyein and , the party has decided Election Commission has not yet announced consolidated (unlike the NLD in 1990) that it will not contest in national numbers of approved candidates. ethnic areas to avoid creating any further competi- Union Solidarity and Development Party tion against the ethnic political parties fighting for (USDP). A government party, formed from the the right to manage their own affairs. Union Solidarity and Development Association The party is a potentially potent political force, but (USDA) mass organization, inheriting most of the its prospects may have been damaged due to administrative machinery (and presumably reve- criticism from various NLD leaders (including nue streams) of the USDA. The party is led by the some attributed to ). The elec- current Prime Minister (Thein Sein) and several torate may thus view it as having broken ranks serving ministers who have resigned from the mili- with the NLD, rather than being its natural suc- tary but not from the cabinet. The Election Com- cessor. As with many other parties, financial mission controversially stated that ministers do constraints have limited its ambitions: it has not fall under the definition of “civil servants” registered 163 candidates, mainly in and (who are otherwise barred from party politics, as Mandalay regions. (brother-in-law of are military personnel). The USDP has registered former intelligence chief ) was a more candidates than any other party, and is run- founding member of the NLD and a member of its ning in almost every constituency. The party has Central Executive Committee. He was released been campaigning informally for months, but after 11 years imprisonment in 2008, along with remains unpopular due to widespread disaffection Khin Maung Swe, a fellow CEC member who had with the regime and with the USDA. spent a total of 16 years in prison since 1990. National Unity Party (NUP). The successor to the Neither of these two leaders are standing for elec- Burma Socialist Program Party (the sole political tion, Than Nyein for health reasons, and Khin party of Ne Win’s pre-1988 socialist one-party Maung Swe because of indications that the Elec- state). The Chairman of the party, Tun Yi, is a tion Commission would bar him because of a prior former deputy commander in chief of the armed high-treason conviction related to his NLD forces. The NUP was the ‘establishment’ party in activities. 1990 – not a proxy of the military, but certainly the Democratic Party (Myanmar) (DPM). Party party it was most comfortable with. Despite the Chairman Thu Wai led the Democracy Party massive organizational resources and party lists which contested the 1990 elections (winning one inherited from the BSPP, it won only 21 per cent of seat), but it was subsequently abolished, and he the vote and just 10 seats. While it has tried to fur- was imprisoned for several years. The re-formed ther distance itself from the government in recent party has a number of other prominent members, years, it still represents the political establishment, including the daughters of three of the founders of and is not considered a threat by the regime. It has the post-World War II Socialist Party, Cho Cho registered candidates in almost 1,000 constituen- Kyaw Nyein, Than Than Nu and Nay Yee Ba Swe. cies, second only to the USDP. This means that it The party has a strong political profile, but limited will compete directly against the latter in most finances scotched its goal of contesting all seats in constituencies, potentially splitting the “establish- the national legislatures: it has registered 47 ment” vote, and perhaps creating a competing candidates, mainly for Lower House seats in the centre of power in parliament. Burman-majority regions. (Thu Wai has a Thai National Democratic Force (NDF). Following the spouse, which does not bar him from contesting a NLD’s automatic deregistration for deciding not to legislative seat, but eliminates him as a potential contest the elections, this new party was estab- presidential nominee; Than Than Nu returned to lished by a number of senior NLD members who Burma in 2003, so is ineligible to stand for election had been in favour of participation. Led by Than because of the ten year residency requirement.)

Burma Policy Briefing | 5 Profiles of key ethnic parties

Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP). The Kayin People’s Party (KPP). A Karen (Kayin) party seeks to represent all Shan State nationals, re- ethnic party focussing on Karen communities living gardless of ethnicity, but its main support base is in outside of Karen State proper. It registered 41 can- Shan communities. It registered 157 candidates, the didates for constituencies in Ayeyarwady, Bago, fourth-largest party by this measure, contesting seats Tanintharyi and Yangon Regions and Mon State, in- in all townships in Shan State, except in the self-ad- cluding seats reserved for minorities under section ministered areas. Headquartered in Yangon, it is also 161 of the Constitution, as well as 4 constituencies in contesting seats in other states and regions with large Karen State. The party leadership is from the Chris- Shan populations (including Kachin State). Chairman tian urban Karen elite. The KPP adopts a political Ai Pao is a wealthy salt trader and former General position independent of but not confrontational to Secretary of the SNLD. Vice-Chairman Saung Si (aka the regime. Party Chairman Tun Aung Myint is a Nelson) was elected as SNLD MP for Kyaukme in retired navy lieutenant-colonel; Vice-Chairman 1990. (The SNLD was automatically deregistered on 7 Simon Tha is a neurosurgeon who has experience May 2010, having decided not to compete in the mediating between the regime and Karen armed elections, as its key leaders are imprisoned.) groups.

Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP). A second Karen party is the Phalon-Sawaw [Pwo- A Rakhine ethnic party, the RNDP was initially refer- Sgaw] Democratic Party (PSDP). It is headquar- red to as the Rakhine Nationals Progressive Party. tered in Hpa-An, the Karen State capital, focussing The party was formed by prominent Rakhine indivi- on Karen State, rather than other Karen communi- duals from Yangon and Rakhine State, including par- ties in the country. The party is linked to the Taun- ty Chairman Aye Maung. Its headquarters are in galay Sayadaw, a well-known local Buddhist abbot, Sittwe. It registered 44 candidates, contesting most and has extensive networks in the state. Funding and seats outside the Muslim-majority northern part of organizational constraints have limited it to register- the state, as well as the minority Rakhine seat for ing 18 candidates. The PSDP is led by Chairman Yangon Region. A second Rakhine party is the Ra- Khin Maung Myint, Vice-Chairman Aung Kyaw khine State National Force of Myanmar (RSNFM), Naing, and General-Secretary Kyi Lin. The party which is trying to reach out to other ethnicities in name refers to two key Karen subgroups, Pwo and addition to Rakhine. It registered candidates in 20 Sgaw. (Phalon derives from “G’ploung”, as the Pwo constituencies, in Rakhine State as well as in other people refer to themselves; Sawaw is a Burmese parts of the country. The party is led by Chairman transcription of “Sgaw”). Another party contesting Aye Kyaing and Vice-Chairman San Tin, and is in Karen State is the Kayin State Democracy and headquartered in Yangon. Development Party (KSDDP), formed after the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)6 trans- Chin Progressive Party (CPP). A Chin ethnic party, formed into Border Guard Forces. It was allowed to the CPP is competing in Chin State, as well as in register almost immediately. This may have been Chin-majority areas in the adjacent Sagaing Region. meant as a clear signal to the KIO that, if it would It registered 41 candidates. Despite being formed by accept the regime’s BGF proposal, the KSPP would retired government officials, it is seen as representing be allowed to register soon after. Chin interests. The leadership was reshuffled in August 2010. Party Chairman is No Than Kap. Vice- All Mon Region Democracy Party (AMRDP). A Chairman Lian Ce is a retired police intelligence Mon ethnic party, it aspires to represent all ethnici- chief, and General Secretary Dai Thung is former ties living in majority-Mon areas, and appears to Matupi township secretary. A second Chin party, the have good networks and strong support from influ- Chin National Party (CNP), is contesting exclusively ential sectors of Mon society. It registered 34 candi- in Chin State, at all legislative levels. It has registered dates, 33 in Mon State and Mon areas of Karen State, 23 candidates. Based in Tiddim, Chin State, it is led and one candidate in Tanintharyi Region. The party by Chairman Zo Zam (aka Zam Kyin Paw), a local is led by Chairman Ngwe Thein (aka Janu Mon), a cartoonist and humanitarian worker. Vice-Chairman well-known song writer and retired State Education is Ceu Bik Thawng. Administrator. Vice-Chairman is Hla Aung.

6 | Burma Policy Briefing under the control of the Wa ceasefire The strategies of different political parties group.) In addition, under section 161 of can be more easily understood in the light the Constitution minority populations of of this distribution of elected seats. The two 60,000 or more in each region/state each big “establishment” parties (USDP and have the right to elect a representative to NUP), with their organizational strength their regional legislature. A total of 29 such and good resources, are each contesting seats have been designated across the nearly all of the seats. Parties and inde- country. As at the national level, 25 per pendent candidates representing ethnic cent of the seats in each legislature are groups are concentrating mainly on the reserved for military appointees. The Elec- seven states, and are fielding about 500 tion Commission has announced that candidates between them for a total of 458 elections will not take place in two regional seats. Other parties (that is, national parties constituencies in Kachin State, so these as well as those representing ethnic Bur- seats will be vacant.7 man areas) are concentrating mainly on the seven regions, and are fielding about 380 The decision of the Election Commission candidates between them for the 699 seats. to exclude certain areas from voting has (There will also be a few dozen independ- affected very few whole constituencies ent candidates.) (only six in total – four in the Wa area and two in Kachin State); in all other cases, only The following general pattern emerges. certain parts of constituencies are im- Voters in most constituencies in the seven pacted, permitting the elections to go ahead ethnic states will be able to choose from in the rest of those constituencies. In the among three candidates: one USDP, one 1990 elections, much more extensive areas NUP, and one ethnic candidate. In the were excluded. seven Burman-majority regions, most voters will face a choice between three The government’s action was not unex- candidates for national seats (one USDP, pected, in light of ongoing insurgency or one NUP, and one from another party), but insecurity in most of these areas. But as only two candidates in many regional seats these are overwhelmingly ethnic areas, it (one USDP and one NUP). does inevitably introduce a further element of ethnic exclusion, in that one cannot assume that voting patterns in the excluded THE BALLOT areas would have been the same as in the On 7 November, voters will cast three sepa- rest of a constituency. rate votes: one for an upper house candi- The total number of elected seats will there- date, one for a lower house candidate, and fore be 1,157 (that is, 6 less than the total of one for a candidate to the regional legisla- 1163 constituencies), distributed as follows: ture.8 Some voters will also have the oppor- tunity to cast a fourth vote, for a candidate National Regional representing their minority population (see legislatures legislatures box: Additional ethnic constituencies). 7 Regions These are legislative elections, so the elec- (majority Burman) 291 408 699 torate will not be voting for a government, or even for a party to form a government. 7 States Rather, the national legislatures will jointly (majority form a presidential electoral college, which ethnic) 203 255 458 will elect a president from among three candidates: one selected by the elected 494 663 1157 members of the upper house, one by the

Burma Policy Briefing | 7 elected members of the lower house, and Additional ethnic constituencies one by the military appointees to both houses. The two unsuccessful candidates According to section 161 of the Constitution, will become vice-presidents. Presidential any minority with a population over 60,000 nominees need not be legislative represen- (0.1 per cent of Burma’s total population) in tatives. a region/state – not including any group that already has a self-administered area in The president will then select a govern- that region/state – can elect an additional ment. Ministers of key security ministries representative to the regional/state legisla- (defence, home affairs and border affairs) ture. The Election Commission has desig- will be appointed by the military, the rest nated 29 such seats, as follows: by the president. Ministers need not necessarily be chosen from the legislative Ayeyarwady Region: 2 seats (Karen, representatives. Rakhine) Bago Region: 1 seat (Karen) To determine the selection of the president, Chin State: no seats a political party would therefore need a Kachin State: 4 seats (Burman, Lisu, simple majority of all seats (elected and Rawang, Shan) appointed) in the national legislatures, that Kayah State: 1 seat (Burman) 9 is, 332 seats. Only the USDP and NUP are Karen State: 3 seats (Burman, Mon, Pao) fielding enough candidates to possibly Magway Region: 1 seat (Chin) obtain this many seats. And as the USDP Mandalay Region: 1 seat (Shan) and the military appointees will most likely Mon State: 3 seats (Burman, Karen, Pao) align themselves in the choice of president, Rakhine State: 1 seat (Chin) the USDP would require only 166 seats, or Sagaing Region: 2 seats (Chin, Shan) one-third of the elected seats, to reach a Shan State: 7 seats (Akha, Burman, Intha, majority. For other parties to force a choice Kachin, Kayan, Lahu, Lisu) of president against the wishes of the Tanintharyi region: 1 seat (Karen) USDP-military bloc, multiple alliances Yangon region: 2 seats (Karen, Rakhine) would be required – assuming they have won enough seats in the first place – in Given that there are no up-to-date census order to obtain 332 votes, or two-thirds of data, the designation of these additional elected seats. seats has not been fully transparent. Mon politicians, for example, have complained Given this situation, it is possible that some that the Mons were unfairly denied seats in alliance of “democratic” and “ethnic” par- Yangon and Tanintharyi, because many ties may be able to influence – or even Mon people are listed as Burman or Bur- determine – the choice of vice-presidents, man-Mon on their identity cards. Other but it is extremely unlikely that they will be groups (like people of Chinese and Indian able to influence the choice of president. descent or the Rohingya Muslims) are not There is as yet no ethnic minority party recognized by the government as ethnic alliance, but one may be formed after the nationalities, and therefore not eligible for election. ethnic seats.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER can take place only after certain procedural steps have taken place. The current State Peace and Development Council regime will continue to rule the The timetable is likely to be as follows. country after the elections for up to three Once all the election results have been months, until the formal transfer of power announced and any challenges dealt with, a takes place. Under the constitution, this procedural session of the lower house will

8 | Burma Policy Briefing be convened, at which a temporary chair- president. These provisions seem intended person for the house will be chosen. This to prevent the emergence of a new strong- will mark the formal start of the five-year man, allowing Senior General Than Shwe legislative term, most likely in December to retire from the leadership position with- 2010 or early January 2011. In the following out threat to his person or to his legacy. seven days a session of the upper house must also be convened, at which a speaker Indeed, Than Shwe and Vice-Senior Gen- will be elected. eral Maung Aye are expected to retire from their current positions when the transfer of Within 15 days of the start of the legislative power takes place (possibly relinquishing term, the first regular session of the con- their military commands even before that). gress (the national legislature, comprising Neither key position in the new govern- the lower and upper houses) must be ment seem acceptable to Than Shwe. As held.10 At this point the 2008 constitution civilian president, he would have to defer comes into force. The election of the presi- on many key decisions to the commander dent and vice-presidents will most likely be in chief, an inconceivable diminishing of held at this session. The president can then his current absolute power. As commander begin the process of selecting a government in chief he would be constitutionally subor- (with appointments to the key security dinate to the president, equally inconceiv- ministries being made by the commander able. The constitution prohibits anyone in chief – that is, Senior General Than from holding both of these positions simul- Shwe, unless he resigns from this position taneously.11 Than Shwe may well opt for before the elections). the Deng Xiaoping scenario, retaining in- fluence by elevating himself to some sym- Finally, the State Peace and Development bolic, extra-constitutional position such as Council will convene the first substantive patron of the armed forces or the USDP. session of the lower house, and formally transfer power. Under the constitution, this In all likelihood, rule of the country will must take place within 90 days of the depend on the interaction of multiple election, that is, by 5 February 2011. The power bases. Executive power will be split lower house will then elect a speaker, who between the government, controlled by the will take over from the temporary chair- president, and the National Defence and person. The new administration can then Security Council, controlled by the com- start functioning, once the president’s mander in chief. Legislative authority will choice of government has been endorsed by be split between the elected representatives the congress, largely a formality. (which the USDP aims to dominate) and military appointees. Here, however, the CONCLUSION situation is likely to be more complex, with the NUP possibly holding a large number In the new constitution the respective pow- of seats, as well as there being potentially ers of the president and the commander in significant ethnic and democrat blocs. chief are balanced so as to prevent either However, the legislatures may convene from wielding absolute power. For exam- only intermittently, and will likely have ple, on key decisions the president must little influence beyond law-making. The consult the National Defence and Security judiciary can be expected to remain weak Council, where the commander in chief and effectively under executive control. holds considerable power; but decisions to declare states of emergency, under which Given the unlevel playing field, even if the the commander in chief is given executive election process on November 7 is fair, the and judicial powers (for a limited time in “establishment” parties, together with the designated places), can only be taken by the military appointees, are likely to control a

Burma Policy Briefing | 9 Election Points of View

“The government has announced that it will “The aim is to maintain the Pao history. hold free and fair elections and we believe Another aim is to play a part in building a and expect this…Our rival party in the 1990 democratic nation, in ensuring the election was the NLD, but the USDP is our perpetuity of the nation and in striving for rival now. They are the powerful party, but Pao nationals to escape from poverty and if the election is free and fair, we will win backwardness.” with a majority in Shan State.” U Khun Min Kyaw, CEC member of Pao SNDP Chairman Sai Aik Paung, August National Organization, September 2010.15 2010.12 “Our position on ethnic parties will be “Think bravely and act accordingly! Go to different from that of the NLD in the 1990 the polling stations and cast your vote. Do election…We don’t have any plan to heavily not give your vote to candidates who will compete against ethnic parties in different only follow orders! And most importantly, states and ethnic-controlled territories. We do not give your vote to those who contest just want them to know what they should be the election because they have money doing and do what they have to do duti- [because they will not benefit the people].” fully.”

U Yan Kyaw, independent candidate, Dr. Than Nyein, NDF chairman, July 2010.16 September 2010.13 “To achieve a 'sustainable and perpetual “The Prime Minister said, the multi-party peace' … the KIO has been conducting democracy general elections to be held on 7 negotiations with the successive govern- November were very important for all ments and will continue to do so to citizens. So they were to prevent any negotiate and carry out a policy dialogue… destructive acts so that the elections would As for the 2010 election being planned by meet with success.” the government, the KIO expresses its desire for a free and fair election.” Prime Minister and USDP chairman, ex- Gen. Thein Sein, quoted August 2010.14 KIO Central Committee, August 2010.17

majority of seats in the national legislatu- serious negative consequences for conflict res. But despite their likely voting as a bloc resolution in the country. on many issues, there is no guarantee they will continue to do so, or that they will do The regime has amassed enormous power so on every issue. The NUP, for example, is – military, political and economic – and more independent of the regime than many wields it very effectively. In such a situation observers opine, and in the future the of power asymmetry, opposition parties USDP and the military may develop con- participating in the elections do not regard flicting agendas. directly confronting the regime as a win- ning strategy, as has been demonstrated The election process is also problematic repeatedly in recent years. They view boy- because of the lack of democratic and cotting the elections as a strategic mistake, ethnic inclusion. The refusal of the Election futile and potentially counter-productive. Commission to register the KSPP is a par- The only way forward for them is to play a ticular concern, and this may have very better game of chess, making the best

10 | Burma Policy Briefing strategic use of the limited space available. 9. Despite there being 664 seats, only 332 seats Seen in this light, the elections are not an are needed for a simple majority, not 333, since endgame that the regime has already won, one of the seats is held by the Speaker, who does but the beginning of a new contest, which not vote in the first instance, other than to determine the result of a tie. will play out over several years, the out- come of which is highly unpredictable. 10. The first regular sessions of the 14 regional parliaments must also be convened within the same period. 11. The new commander in chief is tipped to be Thura Myint Aung (former Adjutant-General) NOTES and the future president is likely to be either Thura Shwe Mann (former Joint Chief-of-Staff) 1. While the party’s official position is that it is or possibly Thein Sein (current Prime Minis- not telling voters to boycott, its campaign to ter). inform people of their right not to vote can hardly be interpreted as anything else. 12. “Shan party eyes State Hluttaw government”, Myanmar Times, August 16-22, 2. Only two of these 37 parties have yet to 2010. submit membership lists to the Election Commission, so it is unlikely that any will be 13. “New Coalition for Election Formed in deregistered for failing to meet minimum Rangoon”, The Irrawaddy, 22 September 2010. membership requirements. 14. “7 November Elections Important to all 3. Twelve upper-house constituencies have been Citizens”, New Light of Myanmar, 23 August formed in each region/state by combining 2010 several adjacent townships into a single consti- 15. “Pao National Organization (PNO) presents tuency or splitting a township into two consti- its policy, stance and work Programmes”, New tuencies, depending on the population distribu- Light of Myanmar, 26 September 2010. tion. 16. “National reconciliation is essential”, The 4. Previously, there were 325 townships in Bur- Irrawaddy, 14 July 2010. ma, but the creation of five new townships in 17. KIO Statement, 30 August 2010. the capital Nay Pyi Taw has increased this to 330, the same as the number of seats in the lower house, as provided for in the Constitu- tion. 5. It is likely that the number of military ap- pointees will remain at 110. However, the con- stitution and election laws are unclear on this point, so it is possible that only 109 military appointees will sit, in order to maintain an approximate 3:1 ratio. 6. The DKBA broke away from the Karen National Union (KNU) in 1995, and made a cease-fire agreement with the military govern- ment. The KNU is still fighting a guerrilla war. For more information see: Tom Kramer, ‘Neither War nor Peace, The Future of the Cease-fire Agreements in Burma’, TNI July 2009. 7. That is, Injangyaung 2 and Sumprabum 2. 8. Since Nay Pyi Taw will be directly adminis- tered, voters in the capital will only cast two votes, for upper and lower house seats.

Burma Policy Briefing | 11 TNI-BCN Project on Ethnic Conflict in Burma Burma Policy Briefings

Burma has been afflicted by ethnic conflict and civil war since Burma in 2010: A Critical Year independence in 1948, exposing it to some of the longest run- in Ethnic Politics, Burma Policy ning armed conflicts in the world. Ethnic nationality peoples Briefing No.1, June 2010 have long felt marginalised and discriminated against. The situation worsened after the military coup in 1962, when mino- Burma’s 2010 Elections: rity rights were further curtailed. The main grievances of ethnic Challenges and Opportunities, nationality groups in Burma are the lack of influence in the Burma Policy Briefing No.2, political decision-making processes; the absence of economic June 2010 and social development in their areas; and what they see as the Unlevel Playing Field: Burma’s military government's Burmanisation policy, which translates Election Landscape, Burma into repression of their cultural rights and religious freedom. Policy Briefing No. 3, October This joint TNI-BCN project aims to stimulate strategic thinking 2010 on addressing ethnic conflict in Burma and to give a voice to ethnic nationality groups who have until now been ignored and isolated in the international debate on the country. In order to

respond to the challenges of 2010 and the future, TNI and BCN believe it is crucial to formulate practical and concrete policy options and define concrete benchmarks on progress that

national and international actors can support. The project will aim to achieve greater support for a different Burma policy, which is pragmatic, engaged and grounded in reality.

The Transnational Institute (TNI) was founded in 1974 as an independent, international research and policy advocacy Other Briefings institute, with strong connections to transnational social movements and associated intellectuals concerned to steer the Burma’s Cease-fires at Risk; world in a democratic, equitable, environmentally sustainable Consequences of the Kokang and peaceful direction. Its point of departure is a belief that Crisis for Peace and solutions to global problems require global co-operation. Democracy, by Tom Kramer, TNI Peace & Security Briefing BCN was founded in 1993. It works towards democratisation Nr 1, September 2009. and respect for human rights in Burma. BCN does this through information dissemination, lobby and campaign work, and the Neither War nor Peace; The strengthening of Burmese civil society organisations. In recent Future of the Cease-fire years the focus has shifted away from campaigning for economic Agreements in Burma. Tom isolation towards advocacy in support of civil society and a Kramer, TNI, July 2009. solution to the ethnic crises in Burma. From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt? The Future of the Transnational Institute Burma Centrum Netherlands Opium Bans in the Kokang and PO Box 14656 PO Box 14563 Wa Regions. Tom Kramer, TNI 1001 LD Amsterdam 1001 LB Amsterdam Drug Policy Briefing No.29, The Netherlands The Netherlands July 2009. Tel: +31-20-6626608 Tel.: 31-20-671 6952 Fax: +31-20-6757176 Fax: 31-20-671 3513 Withdrawal Symptoms in the E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Golden Triangle; A Drugs www.tni.org/page/tni-bcn- www.burmacentrum.nl Market in Disarray. Tom burma-project Kramer, Martin Jelsma, Tom www.tni.org/drugs Blickman, TNI, January 2009.

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