Burma Policy Briefing Nr 3 October 2010 Unlevel Playing Field: Burma’s Election Landscape On 7 November 2010, the people of Burma will go to the polls, the culmination of an Conclusions and Recommendations electoral process closely controlled by the military State Peace and Development • The elections will be Burma's most defin- Council. The opposition National League ing political moment for a generation. for Democracy (NLD) decided not to par- However the electoral process lacks ticipate and is encouraging a boycott by democratic and ethnic inclusion. Without voters, a tactic that may prove counter- such inclusion, the country's political productive as it will be mainly pro-demo- crises are likely to continue. cracy candidates who lose votes.1 For most • The electoral playing field is tilted in people, casting their ballot will be a novel favour of the regime’s USDP due to strict experience. No one under the age of 38, the regulations on registration, the cost of majority of the electorate, has ever partici- registering candidates, and the limited pated in an election. time for parties to organize. If voting is a new experience, the choice of • Even if the voting is fair, ‘establishment’ candidates on offer may be less so. In many parties, together with military appointees, constituencies, particularly for many re- are likely to control a majority of seats in gional legislative seats in the ethnic Bur- the new legislatures. 37 political parties man heartland, there are only two options: will participate in the elections. But most a candidate representing the current re- have small regional or ethnic support gime’s party, and a candidate representing bases. the party of the pre-1988 socialist regime. In most other constituencies, however, • Despite the restrictions, democratic oppo- there will be at least a more credible third sition parties participating in the polls option: a candidate from one of the main want to make the best use of the limited “democratic” parties (in Burman-majority space available. The elections begin new areas), or a candidate from an ethnic arrangements and contests in Burmese nationality party (in ethnic minority areas). politics, which will play out over several years. Outcomes remain unpredictable. Many of the regime party’s candidates will be familiar, powerful individuals. Nearly all • Ethnic exclusion and lack of polls in many ministers and deputy ministers will be minority areas mean that the election will contesting. And in late August, the regime not resolve the country's ethnic conflicts. carried out a military reshuffle of unprece- The regime’s promotion of Border Guard dented scale, with most senior officers Forces rather than political dialogue with leaving the army in order that they could armed opposition groups has also in- contest parliamentary seats. Across the creased tensions. To establish peace, there country, hundreds of government adminis- must be equitable participation, bringing trators, former military officers, business- rights and benefits to all peoples and men and other prominent local figures are regions. Burma Policy Briefing | 1 running on the regime’s behalf. The regime group to transform into Border Guard For- has gone to extraordinary lengths to avoid ces (BGF). One of these parties, the Kachin a repeat of its 1990 landslide defeat; but State Progressive Party (KSPP), had strong given strong and widespread disaffection support in Kachin areas and planned to with the government, regime party candi- contest a majority of seats in the state. dates face a major challenge to win their seats in any fairly counted vote. While the The cost associated with registering candi- general contours of the election process are dates has been a major impediment to most now clear, precisely how it will play out parties. A US$500 non-refundable registra- remains uncertain, both to observers and tion fee for each candidate has meant that the regime itself. most parties have been able to register fewer candidates than they originally plan- THE PLAYING FIELD ned (or, alternatively, to select wealthy candidates able to cover their own registra- Several political parties have complained tion fees). Contesting all 1,163 national that the electoral playing field has been and regional seats would require approxi- sharply tilted in favour of the regime’s mately US$580,000, prior to any campaign Union Solidarity and Development Party expenses, a sum beyond the means of near- (USDP). In particular, concerns have been ly all parties. Only two, the government- expressed about three aspects: party regis- organized USDP and the National Unity tration requirements, the cost of registering Party (NUP) have been able to contest a candidates, and the limited time for parties majority of seats: the USDP because it in- to organize. herited the formidable organizational and financial resources of the Union Solidarity The party registration process has been and Development Association mass organi- cumbersome and lacking in transparency. zation; and the NUP because it represents Under the electoral laws, prospective par- the old (pre-1988) Socialist establishment, ties had to go through a two-stage registra- which still has access to elite wealth. tion process, first applying to the Election Commission for approval to carry out the There has also been limited time for parties organizational work necessary to establish a to organize themselves. Despite the an- new party (otherwise illegal under the nouncement in early 2008 that elections country’s draconian restrictions on free- would be held this year, the electoral laws dom of assembly); and then subsequently were only issued in March 2010, with regis- seeking formal registration of the party. tration of parties only gathering momen- Such approval obtained, parties then have tum in May. The election date was finally 90 days to meet minimum membership re- announced in August, at which point par- quirements (500 members for regional par- ties were given a mere two weeks’ notice of ties, 1,000 members for national parties). the deadline for registering candidates. Hence parties were obliged to devote signi- This placed considerable pressure on par- ficant effort to registering members and ties that were in most cases still organizing compiling detailed lists for submission to themselves. And given that there have been the Commission, rather than campaigning. no elections for two decades, and most forms of political organization and discus- Three Kachin parties (see box Party regis- sion have been prohibited, parties are bat- tration) never received the Commission’s tling against the learning curve to develop approval of their initial applications, for policies and effectively communicate them reasons that it did not publicly announce – to voters. although it was made clear to the parties that it was due to the refusal of the Kachin Parties also face challenges in finding suit- Independence Organization (KIO) ceasefire able candidates to run for the elections in 2 | Burma Policy Briefing Party registration List of registered parties (in alphabetical order) 31 Union of Myanmar Federation of National Politics 1 88 Generation Student Youths (Union 32 Union Solidarity and Development of Myanmar) Party 2 All Mon Region Democracy Party 33 United Democratic Party 3 Chin National Party 34 Unity and Democracy Party of 4 Chin Progressive Party Kachin State 5 Democracy and Peace Party 35 Wa Democratic Party 6 Democratic Party (Myanmar) 36 Wa National Unity Party 7 Ethnic National Development Party 37 Wunthanu NLD (The Union of 8 Inn National Development Party Myanmar) 9 Kaman National Progressive Party 10 Kayan National Party Parties having had their registrations cancelled 11 Kayin People's Party 12 Kayin State Democracy and Develop- i. Mro National Party ment Party ii. Myanmar Democracy Congress 13 Khami National Development Party iii. Myanmar New Society Democratic 14 Kokang Democracy and Unity Party Party 15 Lahu National Development Party iv. Regional Development Party (Pyay) 16 Modern People Party v. Union Kayin League 17 Mro or Khami National Solidarity All these parties were deregistered for failing to Organisation compete in the minimum three constituencies. 18 National Democratic Force 19 National Democratic Party for Deve- Parties not registered lopment a. Kachin State Progressive Party 20 National Development and Peace Party b. Northern Shan State Progressive 21 National Political Alliances League Party 22 National Unity Party c. United Democracy Party (Kachin 23 Pao National Organization State) 24 Peace and Diversity Party d. People’s New Society Party 25 Phalon-Sawaw [Pwo-Sgaw] Democra- e. All National Races Unity and tic Party Development Party (Kayah State) 26 Rakhine Nationalities Development Party For the first three parties, all representing Kachin 27 Rakhine State National Force of nationals, applications were never approved by the Myanmar Election Commission (with no reason publicly 28 Shan Nationalities Democratic Party announced). The applications of the latter two 29 Taaung (Palaung) National Party parties were approved, but they failed to complete 30 Union Democratic Party the registration process, and were hence dissolved. such a short time frame. After decades of pressure from the authorities and/or the political repression, many people are also USPD to run for them. afraid to join a political party. In some cases both the government-backed USDP REGISTERED PARTIES and opposition political parties have A total of 42 parties were registered with approached the same locally well-known the Election Commission. Five of these people. Some of them felt unable to resist have subsequently been deregistered for Burma Policy Briefing | 3 failing to contest the minimum of three leverage it had to obtain a satisfactory poli- constituencies, leaving 37 to compete in the tical settlement. Similarly, the United Wa election.2 Many of these parties have small State Army ceasefire group has refused to regional or ethnic support bases. The transform into Border Guard Forces, and statistics are striking: has indicated that it will not permit elec- tions to take place in its area.