L'effondrement De L'état Centrafricain Au Cours De La Dernière Décennie

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L'effondrement De L'état Centrafricain Au Cours De La Dernière Décennie note n°08/2014 22 avril 2014 Gérard Gerold, Mathieu Merino, Chercheurs associés à la Fondation pour la recherche stratégique L’effondrement de l’État centrafricain au cours de la dernière décennie : origines de la crise et quelques idées pour en sortir Résumé Abstract Après une décennie de grave instabilité, mar- Following a decade of instability characte- quée par l’incurie du « régime Bozizé », la pro- rised by the decay of the Bozizé regime, the lifération de groupes armés puis l’accès au proliferation of armed groups and the taking pouvoir de la coalition armée « Séléka », l’État up of power by the armed coalition “Séléka”, centrafricain s’est désormais effondré, avec de the Central African Republic state has col- lourdes conséquences humanitaires : près lapsed with serious humanitarian conse- d’un million de personnes ont été déplacées, quences. Nearly one million people have been tandis que les conflits confessionnels s’intensi- displaced and religious tensions are intensi- fient. Ni le gouvernement de Transition ins- fying. Neither the Transition government, tauré depuis mars 2013 pour une période de launched in March 2013 for an 18-month pe- 18 mois, ni les missions militaires internatio- riod, nor the international military forces in- nales visant à rétablir un ordre minimal, ne volved in restoring minimal order, will be pourront à elles seules mettre un terme à cette able to stabilise the situation in the country. instabilité. La crise étant profondément so- Given the social crisis in the Central African ciale, un processus de réconciliation doit être Republic, an urgent reconciliation process rapidement initié, qui ne peut se résumer au needs to be launched that is not limited only seul lancement d’un processus électoral, à ce to the (very difficult) planning of general jour hautement fragile. elections. Introduction permis de freiner la chute dans l’anarchie aus- si bien en zone rurale qu’en zone urbaine, par- ticulièrement à Bangui dont la plupart des in- Le 15 mars 2003, le général Bozizé, ancien frastructures de base sont détruites. Cette dé- chef d’état-major, s’empare du pouvoir centra- térioration de la situation sécuritaire a conduit fricain par la force, renversant Ange Félix Pa- à deux résolutions récentes du Conseil de sé- tassé, chef d’État depuis 1993. Depuis cette curité des Nations Unies, respectivement en prise de pouvoir, la République Centrafricaine décembre 2013 et janvier 2014, et au déploie- (RCA) ne connaît plus ni stabilité politique, ni ment d’une Mission internationale de soutien paix civile. L’adoption d’une nouvelle Consti- à la Centrafrique (MISCA) sous la conduite de tution en décembre 2004, l’organisation de l’Union africaine (UA), épaulée par les forces deux cycles électoraux, aux niveaux législatif françaises de l’opération « Sangaris », et celles et présidentiel, en 2005 et 2011, même le lan- de la force européenne 2. Leur premier mandat cement d’un processus de réconciliation, dit est le rétablissement de l’ordre dans Bangui, la « Dialogue Politique Inclusif » (DPI), en dé- sécurisation de l’axe routier Bangui-Bouar- cembre 2008, n’ont pas permis au régime de Garoua-Boulai et la protection des popula- se stabiliser et d’ancrer sa légitimité. Marquée tions. par les arrière-pensées et les perpétuelles hési- tations d’un pouvoir de plus en plus népotique Cette situation délétère impose un retour sur et sourd, la situation politique et sécuritaire une décennie de crise pour mieux en mesurer des dix dernières années n’a cessé de se dégra- les perspectives de sortie. Depuis 2003, le ré- der, à Bangui et dans le reste du pays, avec gime Bozizé a ébranlé les deux socles sur les- l’apparition de mouvements de protestation quels repose la domination du pouvoir d’Etat : qui se sont peu à peu radicalisés et armés. sa légalité, compte tenu d’un scrutin présiden- tiel en 2011 hautement contestable, et sa légi- En mars 2013, la Séléka, une coalition armée timité, par son incapacité patente à maintenir hétéroclite composée majoritairement de com- son contrôle social et territorial sur le pays, battants musulmans, renverse François Bozizé conduisant à la prolifération de groupes armés et impose Michel Djotodia comme président et à la constitution de la Séléka qui finalement de la République. Après son arrivée au pou- déposera le président François Bozizé en mars voir, la Séléka – officiellement dissoute en 2013 (première partie). Cette contestation in- septembre 2013 par M. Djotodia – se mue en terne est accompagnée d’interventions étran- une multitude de groupes armés dont les com- gères, en premier lieu celle du Tchad, dont battants, poursuivant une logique d’accapare- l’influence sur le régime centrafricain est de ment par la violence, terrorisent les popula- plus en plus forte au cours de la décennie tions en particulier dans le nord et le centre du (deuxième partie). La crise étant désormais pays, riche des ressources minières. Elle pro- profondément sociale, la Transition en Cen- voque rapidement la réaction de milices trafrique conduite par la nouvelle présidente, d’autodéfense (les Anti-Balaka) mais égale- Mme Catherine Samba-Panza, n’appelle pas ment la propagation d’un conflit confession- de réponses toutes faites : la seule sécurisation nel, en particulier à l’ouest et au centre du militaire internationale, si elle est indispen- pays. Cette escalade des violences confession- sable pour le rétablissement d’un ordre mini- nelles entre musulmans et chrétiens a atteint mal, doit s’accompagner simultanément d’un son paroxysme au mois de septembre 2013 à processus de réconciliation qui ne peut se ré- Bossangoa, où les combats font une centaine sumer au seul lancement d’un processus élec- de victimes. toral, à ce jour hautement fragile et impro- Cette dernière année, ce qui restait de l’État bable (troisième partie). centrafricain s’est donc totalement effondré, avec de lourdes conséquences humanitaires : 935 000 personnes ont été déplacées depuis mars 2013 selon le Haut-commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés, tandis qu’une aide humanitaire est devenue nécessaire à plus de 1,6 million de personnes (sur 4,5 mil- 1. Déployée à partir de juillet 2008 en RCA, la MICO- lions d’habitants). Ni le gouvernement de PAX était une mission de la Force Multinationale des États d'Afrique Centrale, bénéficiant notamment du Transition instauré par Djodotia depuis mars soutien financier et logistique de l’Union européenne et 2013 pour une durée de 18 mois, ni la force de de la France. Elle a pris fin le 15 décembre 2013. sécurité régionale, la Mission de consolidation 2. « L'ONU approuve l'envoi de Casques bleus en Cen- de la paix en Centrafrique (MICOPAX) 1, n’ont trafrique », Le Monde , 10 avril 2014. 2 Le régime Bozizé (2003-2013) : développement et la marginalisation du Nord- l’effondrement de l’État en tant Est et demande l’intégration de ses hommes qu’institution de contrôle social au sein de l’armée nationale (Forces armées centrafricaines – FACA). Mieux entraînée et et territorial mieux armée que les autres groupes politico- Malgré plusieurs tentatives de DDR militaires, l’UFDR affirmait compter 1 200 (Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinser- combattants. À l’automne 2006, l’UFDR mène tion) soutenues par la communauté interna- plusieurs raids sur la ville de Birao, capitale de tionale, les groupes armés, centrafricains ou la Vakaga et sur plusieurs villes de la préfec- étrangers, ont prospéré et fini par contrôler la ture (Sam Ouandja, Ouanda Djale), obligeant partie nord et nord-est du pays. En septembre les FACA à intervenir avec l’appui du détache- 2012, le regroupement de plusieurs d’entre ment de l’armée française présente à Bangui. eux au sein d’une coalition, la Séléka, aura rai- La signature des accords de Syrte et de Birao son du régime moribond de François Bozizé en février et avril 2007 n’empêchera pas la si- qui finit par s’écrouler en mars 2013. tuation de rester très précaire dans le Nord- Est jusqu’au déploiement permanent, d’abord La prolifération de mouvements armés par l’EUFOR (force opérationnelle multinatio- nationaux nale dirigée par l'Union européenne), puis par Dès la publication des résultats des élections la MINURCAT (Mission des Nations Unies en de 2005 qui officialisaient la victoire contestée République centrafricaine et au Tchad), de 150 de François Bozizé avec 64,6 % des voix, d’an- Casques bleus à Birao. Michel Djotodia, d’eth- ciens membres de la Garde présidentielle nie Goula, né dans la Vakaga, fait partie des d’Ange-Félix Patassé qui avaient été tenus fondateurs de l’UFDR et la présidera. Abakar écartés du scrutin, créent l’Armée populaire Sabone, son porte-parole, se désolidarisera du pour la restauration de la république et la dé- groupe pour créer, en août 2008, le Mouve- mocratie (APRD). Majoritairement composée ment des libérateurs centrafricains pour la de Sara, une ethnie à cheval sur la frontière justice (MLCJ). tchado-centrafricaine, ce mouvement qui s’ap- Le MLJC est une création du capitaine Abakar parente plus à un regroupement de milices Sabone, personnage obscur, mais aussi très villageoises d’autodéfense, développe ses ac- représentatif des liens ambigus qu’entretien- tions dans les préfectures frontalières avec le nent depuis plus de dix ans les régimes de Tchad (Ouham-Pende, Ouham, Nana-Grebizi, N’Djamena et de Bangui. Originaire de la Bamingui-Bangoran). Jean-Jacques Dema- Vakaga, musulman d’ethnie Rounga, ancien fouth, ancien ministre de la Défense du prési- conseiller chargé de la sécurité auprès du pré- dent Patassé, en prendra la direction politique sident Patassé, il rompt avec ce dernier et re- sans jamais posséder un véritable contrôle sur joint François Bozizé en exil au Tchad où les les opérations menées sur le terrain.
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