DOCSLIB.ORG

Pre-Suez Crisis Anglo-American Relations in Egypt, 1950-1954

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Pre-Suez Crisis Anglo-American Relations in Egypt, 1950-1954 PRE-SUEZ CRISIS ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN EGYPT, 1950-1954 A Thesis Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS, HISTORY by Alex M. Bornstein December 2014 Thesis Approvals: Richard H. Immerman, Thesis Advisor, History Eileen Ryan, History ABSTRACT The focus of this paper is Anglo-American relations in Egypt during the early Cold War period. The goal is to show that relations between the Western allies were more contentious than the analysis previously offered by a number of leading scholars. This has been done by examining early Cold War Western strategy for the defense of the Middle East and Anglo-Egyptian negotiations related to the future of the large British military base in the Suez Canal region. What this paper reveals is that rather than working in concert, as others have argued, Great Britain and the United States during this period sparred over tactics and strategy. The major source of contention between the Western powers centered on Britain’s irrational commitment to an antiquated foreign policy based on 19th century principles of imperial domination and exploitation. Whereas Britain wanted to combine Western strategy for the defense of the Middle East with its plan to reconstitute its Empire, the United States sought a new strategic outlook that more thoroughly incorporated the nationalist dreams and economic aspirations of the countries in the region. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ ii CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................1 2. BACKGROUND: BRITAIN ALONE CANNOT SECURE THE MIDDLE EAST..............................................................................................................................6 3. THE COLD WAR AND THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE CANAL ZONE BASE: THE AMERICANS GET INVOLVED, 1950-1957 .............14 4. REVOLUTION IN EGYPT AND TRUMAN LEAVES OFFICE, JULY 1952 TO JANUARY 1953....................................................................................................27 5. THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION TAKES OFFICE AND BRITAIN FINALLY AGREES TO EGYPTIAN TERMS, 1953-1954 .......................................33 6. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................47 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..............................................................................................................50 iii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION At the end World War II, Great Britain remained the predominant Western power in the Middle East. Because of this, Western allied planners agreed that directly after the war the strategically important Middle East would continue to be a part of Great Britain’s sphere of influence. With the onset of the Cold War in the Middle East (roughly 1946), however, both Washington and London came to realize that Great Britain alone could not protect, from both internal and external threats, Western interests in the region. The monumental cost of fighting World War II coupled with the rising tide of post-war nationalist movements had not only decimated Britain’s ability to protect and lord over its vast (though quickly fading) colonial possessions, but the combination also weakened substantially Britain’s capacity to even prop up and support those countries that fell into its sphere of influence. Perhaps the most crucial reason, however, as to why Britain could not eventually exert enough influence and power throughout the region, was the fact that after the war Britain remained irrationally committed, much to the chagrin of American policy planners later, to an antiquated foreign policy based on 19th century principles of imperial domination and exploitation in the areas where it could still exert a modicum of power. Whereas Britain saw an opportunity to wed Western strategy for the defense of the Middle East to its desire to reconstitute its Empire, the United States sought a new strategic outlook that more thoroughly incorporated the nationalist dreams and economic aspirations of the countries in the region. Ultimately, this created a situation where 1 instead of working in close concert to implement a unified plan for the Western defense of the Middle East, London and Washington, especially in Egypt, sparred over strategy.1 These differing strategic goals became a source of great irritation between London and Washington during the early Cold War period. This paper focuses on the clash between these essentially competing strategies, as they played out during the contentious Anglo-Egyptian negotiations (1950-1954) to settle the Canal Zone base dispute. In a word, using the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations to settle the Suez Canal Zone dispute as a case study, this paper will examine and analyze US-Anglo relations during this time. 1 William Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Ritchie Ovendale, Britain, the United States and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East (London: Leicester University Press, 1996); Zach Levey and Elie Podeh, eds., Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to Junior Partner (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2008); William Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006); Michael J. Cohen and Martin Kolinsky, eds., Demise of the British Empire in the Middle East: Britain’s Responses to Nationalist Movements 1943-1955 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998); Michael J. Cohen, Fighting World War Three From the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945-1954 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997); Peter L. Hahn, Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945 (Washington: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005), 1-46; Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 23- 55; Ray Takeyh, The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain and Nasser’s Egypt, 1953-1957 (New York: ST. Martin’s Press, Inc., 2000), 1-47; Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 119-137; Michael B. Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), 407-519; Stephen P. Cohen, Beyond America’s Grasp: A Century of Failed Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 3-203; Tore T. Petersen, “Suez 1956: European colonial interests and US cold war prerogatives,” in European-American Relations and the Middle East: From Suez to Iraq, Daniel Möckli and Victor Mauer, ed. (London: Routledge, 2011), 11-25; Steven Z. Frieberger, Dawn Over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953-1957 (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1992); Diane B. Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991) 6-35; Gail E. Meyer, Egypt and the United States: The Formative Years (Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1980); for a good recent study that focuses on the Persian Gulf and extends the focus to include a later period of the Cold War, see W. Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 2 Most historians agree that the events leading up to and including the 1956 Suez Crisis was essentially the story of the rise of Pax Americana in the Middle East at the expense of the outdated model of world order under European Imperialism. While this paper does not dispute the fact that after World War II American influence in the region was waxing and British power was quickly eroding, it does question the way in which some leading historians have portrayed the Anglo-American relationship during the decade preceding the 1956 Suez Crisis. Peter L. Hahn, who wrote perhaps the most authoritative account of American, British and Egyptian relations prior to the 1956 Suez Crisis, asserts that the United States and Great Britain “consistently maintained a close partnership” throughout the pre-Suez Crisis era in Egypt. Essentially, Hahn contends that the United States, while having some minor disagreements over tactics, “consistently” supported the British in its intransigent imperial stance vis-à-vis Egyptian nationalist aspirations. William Roger Louis, one of the most influential scholars focusing on British Imperial decline in the Middle East, is somewhat divided over the subject of pre-Suez Crisis Anglo-American relations. He sees American policy at times working in unison with British imperial defense policies, while in other instances he believes an anti- colonial trend in United States policy caused fissures in Anglo-American relations. In the end, though, Louis essentially concurs with Hahn, arguing that any American displeasure over British imperial tendencies toward Egypt was trumped by an overriding concern that the United States lacked the means to alone thwart Soviet expansion into the Middle East. The purpose of this paper then is to demonstrate that the Anglo-American relationship during the pre-Suez Crisis was more caustic than the analysis proffered by noted historians such as Louis and Hahn. Moreover, due
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Gendered and Orientalist Language in U.S.-Egyptian Foreign Relations, 1952-1961
    ALL ABOUT THE WORDPLAY: GENDERED AND ORIENTALIST LANGUAGE IN U.S.-EGYPTIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1952-1961 A dissertation submitted to Kent State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Kelly M. McFarland August 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………iii Chapter I. Introduction…..……………………………………………………………………1 II. Chapter One: The Truman Administration and Revolution in Egypt: The Language of Stability and Middle East Defense…..........................................23 III. Chapter Two: Eisenhower and Dulles Tackle Egypt: Old and New Strategic Issues, But the Language Remains the Same………………………………...51 IV. Chapter Three: Alpha and Western Orientation: A Divergence toward Negativity….………………………………………………………………....97 V. Chapter Four: Nasser as Nemesis: Omega, Suez and the Souring of U.S.-Egyptian Relations.......………………..…...…....……………………………………136 VI. Chapter Five: U.S.-Egyptian Relations after Suez: Continued Negativity, 1957- 1958……………………………………...…………………………....….…180 VII. Chapter Six: As It Was in the Beginning, It Shall Be in the End: American Language and the Nasser Regime, 1958-1960…....................................222 VIII. Conclusion………………………………………...........................................…241 iv BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………249 iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS For the great majority of the time, writing a dissertation is a very solitary endeavor. That being said, there are a multitude of individuals behind the scenes that make that writing a possibility. Over the course of my graduate career a number of individuals and groups have played an important part in my life, offering support, guidance, advice, encouragement, friendship, help, and love. Without their patience and help this project would have been much more difficult to complete and taken an exponentially longer time to finish. While I could never fit all of these people into these acknowledgements, I will attempt to do so in the lines that follow.
    [Show full text]
  • Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis of 1956 the Anatomy of a Flawed Personality
    Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis of 1956 The Anatomy of a Flawed Personality by Eamon Hamilton A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of Master of Arts by Research Centre for Byzantine Ottoman and Modern Greek Studies Department of Classics Ancient History and Archeology College of Arts and Law University of Birmingham June 2015 1 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Acknowledgements I am very grateful to the staff at the following institutions: The Bodleian Library, University of Oxford Churchill College Library, University of Cambridge Cadbury Research Library, University of Birmingham Manx National Heritage, Douglas, Isle of Man The National Archives, Kew 2 When Anthony Eden became British Prime Minister on 6 April 1955 it seemed the culmination of a brilliant career in politics. Less than two years later that career was over, effectively destroyed by his behaviour over the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company by the Egyptian President, Gamal Nasser.
    [Show full text]
  • Mcculloch CHURCHILL's AMBASSADORS
    CHURCHILL’S AMBASSADORS – FROM FULTON TO SUEZ Introduction One of the many ironies in the history of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’, as named by Winston Churchill in his iconic Fulton speech, was that in little more than 18 months after his retirement as Prime Minister in April 1955 the Conservative Government of which he had been the head for almost four years was involved in the disastrous Suez episode – considered by many historians to have been the lowest point in Anglo-American relations from the end of the Second World War down to the present day. The responsibility for this debacle on the British side is usually allocated to Churchill’s successor, Anthony Eden, and to a lesser degree his Cabinet, but what of Churchill himself and of Sir Roger Makins, the British ambassador to Washington at the time of Suez, appointed by Churchill on the recommendation of Eden? To what extent were Makins and his predecessors successful in establishing the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ so desired by Churchill and why did this relationship break down during the Suez crisis? 1 The current essay has three main aims. Firstly, to analyse Churchill’s concept of an Anglo- American ’special relationship’ as set out in the Fulton speech and the reaction to it in the United States, especially the criticism, put forward by Walter Lippmann amongst others, that British colonialism was a significant constraint upon an openly close relationship with the US. Secondly, to evaluate the political debate within the US on the Fulton speech that continued for several years after it was delivered.
    [Show full text]
  • Notes to Chapter 1 1. I Have Used the Term 'Conservative Backbenchers
    Notes Notes to Chapter 1 1. I have used the term 'Conservative backbenchers' to describe the entire Conservative party in opposition, and those behind the Treasury bench once Churchill returned to No. 10 Downing Street in October 1951. 2. Gilbert Longden (secretary) memorandum to Charles Mott-Radclyffe, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Affairs Commit­ tee minutes, undated. 1.56. The Conservative Party Archives at the Bodleian Library, Oxford. 3. Lord Thorneycroft interview with author. 4. Sir Cranley Onslow MP, chairman of the 1922 Committee 1984-92, interview with author. 5. For an excellent discussion of the role of the Whips, see Philip Norton: Conservative Dissidents: Dissent within the Parliamentary Conservative Party 1970-74 (Maurice Temple Smith, London 1978), pp. 163-175. 6. The Whips' contact with backbenchers was three-fold: through the area whip, backbench committee whip and personal acquaintance. 7. The Chief Whip's Office. 8. Michael Dobbs: To Play The King (HarperCollins, London 1992). 9. Francis Pym, Chief Whip in Edward Heath's government (1970-74), quoted in Norton: Conservative Dissidents, p. 163. 10. See Donald Watt: Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (Longmans, London 1965), pp. 1-15. Personal affection for a fellow member, no matter how ex­ traordinary his professed views, was very often accompanied by a greater tolerance for an aberrant opinion; conversely, deep-seated dislike would encourage dismissal of an argument: Sir Reginald Bennett interview with author. 11. For detailed discussion of the political elite, see Michael Charlton: The Price of Victory BBC (London 1983).
    [Show full text]
  • Britain's Pacific H-Bomb Tests
    GRAPPLING WITH THE BOMB BRITAIN’S PACIFIC H-BOMB TESTS GRAPPLING WITH THE BOMB BRITAIN’S PACIFIC H-BOMB TESTS NIC MACLELLAN PACIFIC SERIES Published by ANU Press The Australian National University Acton ACT 2601, Australia Email: [email protected] This title is also available online at press.anu.edu.au National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Creator: Maclellan, Nic, author. Title: Grappling with the bomb : Britain’s Pacific H-bomb tests / Nicholas Maclellan. ISBN: 9781760461379 (paperback) 9781760461386 (ebook) Subjects: Operation Grapple, Kiribati, 1956-1958. Nuclear weapons--Great Britain--Testing. Hydrogen bomb--Great Britain--Testing. Nuclear weapons--Testing--Oceania. Hydrogen bomb--Testing--Oceania. Nuclear weapons testing victims--Oceania. Pacific Islanders--Health and hygiene--Oceania. Nuclear explosions--Environmental aspects--Oceania. Nuclear weapons--Testing--Environmental aspects--Oceania. Great Britain--Military policy. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Cover design and layout by ANU Press. Cover image: Adapted from photo of Grapple nuclear test. Source: Adi Sivo Ganilau. This edition © 2017 ANU Press Contents List of illustrations . vii Timeline and glossary . xi Maps . xxiii Introduction . 1 1 . The leader—Sir Winston Churchill . .19 2 . The survivors—Lemeyo Abon and Rinok Riklon . 39 3 . The fisherman—Matashichi Oishi . 55 4 . The Task Force Commander—Wilfred Oulton . 69 5 . The businessman—James Burns . 81 6 . The pacifist—Harold Steele . 91 Interlude—On radiation, safety and secrecy . 105 7 . The Chief Petty Officer—Ratu Inoke Bainimarama .
    [Show full text]
  • Britain's Pacific H-Bomb Tests
    12 The Prime Minister— Harold Macmillan In early 1957, Harold Macmillan inherited a government in crisis. British, French and Israeli forces had invaded Egypt in October 1956, but were forced into an ignominious withdrawal by December—under American pressure—ending their unsuccessful military adventure. The Suez crisis divided the Conservative government and, suffering from chronic depression, British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden fled to Jamaica in November. He spent weeks relaxing with his wife Clarissa at Goldeneye, the tropical retreat of novelist Ian Fleming, creator of the James Bond thrillers.1 Eden’s Personal Private Secretary Evelyn Shuckburgh noted his fragile mental state: A.E. has broken down and gone to Jamaica. This is the most extraordinary feature of the whole thing. Is he on his way out, has he had a nervous breakdown, is he mad? The captain leaves the sinking ship which he had steered personally onto the rocks.2 Eden was certainly ‘on his way out’. Former Foreign Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan moved to replace the ailing leader and succeeded Eden as prime minister on 10 January 1957. 1 Matthew Parker: Goldeneye: Where Bond Was Born (Pegasus, 2015), pp. 210–218. 2 Evelyn Shuckburgh and John Charmley: Descent to Suez, diaries 1951–56 (Littlehampton Book Services, 1986), p. 365, cited in Calder Walton: Empire of Secrets—British intelligence, the Cold War and the twilight of Empire (Harper Press, London, 2013). 177 GRAPPLING WITH THE BOMB British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, 1957 Source: UK Government . The new prime minister quickly moved to revitalise the crumbling British Empire.
    [Show full text]
  • Carving a Diplomatic Niche?: the April 1956 Soviet Visit to Britain
    Diplomacy & Statecraft,24:579–596,2013 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0959-2296 print/1557-301X online DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2013.848690 Carving a Diplomatic Niche?: The April 1956 Soviet Visit to Britain SIMON MILES Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin’s visit to Britain in April 1956 was the first by the new Soviet leadership to a Western bloc country after Josef Stalin’s death. It presented British policy-mak- ers with a unique opportunity for insight and discussion. However, British self-deception regarding their scope for independent action as well as excessive focus on events in the Middle East hampered efforts to build a rapport with Khrushchev and Bulganin. This anal- ysis explores the planning and conduct of what turned out to be a fruitless diplomatic initiative. The visit illustrates British and Soviet policy at the time, as well as Britain’s already clear position as the junior partner in the Anglo-American “special relationship” on the eve of Suez. The visit of First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev and Premier Nikolai Bulganin to London from 18 to 27 April 1956 presented British leaders with a unique opportunity. At the time, Britain’s international commitments outpaced its resources, it struggled to adapt to the emergence of nuclear weapons as the currency of interna- tional power, and public diplomacy gained increased relevance in the Cold War because of this global “balance of terror”. British policy-makers saw the Soviet visit – the first bilateral visit by a Soviet leader to a Western country after the death of Josef Stalin in March 1953 – as an opportunity to ameliorate Downloaded by [University of Toronto Libraries] at 14:35 28 November 2013 both Britain’s relationship with the Soviet Union and the country’s standing in the Western alliance.
    [Show full text]
  • The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration 1951-55 (Leicester, 1988) and Richard Lamb, the Failure of the Eden Government (London: 1987)
    196 Notes Introduction 1. See especially John W. Young (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration 1951-55 (Leicester, 1988) and Richard Lamb, The Failure of the Eden Government (London: 1987). 2. Among the many recent works which consider Palestine are: W. R. Louis and Robert W. Stookey (eds), The End of the Palestine Mandate, (Austin, Texas: 1986), Ritchie Ovendale (ed.), The Foreign Policies of the British Labour Government (Leicester: 1984), and Michael Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers 1945-1948 (London: 1982). There are several books in preparation that address Suez from the newly-released documentary sources; the first that does so is W. R. Louis and Robert W. Owen (eds), Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences (Oxford: 1989). 3. W. R. Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States and Post-War Imperialism (Oxford: 1984), pp. 9-10. 4. See especially Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (Oxford: 1956) and subsequent editions. 5. R.N. Rosecrance, Defence of the Realm (New York: 1968), p. 36. The McMahon Act prevented the continued close collaboration of the US, Britain and Canada on atomic weapons research. When informed some years later of the degree of secret wartime cooperation, McMahon said that he would never have put forward the act if he had known of Britain's role. 6. Orner Zametica, British Strategic Planning for the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East 1944-47 (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Cambridge University: 1986), pp. 66-7. 7. Kenneth Harris, Attlee (London: 1982), p. 299. 8.
    [Show full text]
  • Britannia's Suez Fiasco in Consideration of Anglo-American Diplomacy
    Eastern Kentucky University Encompass Online Theses and Dissertations Student Scholarship January 2016 The Stress of Her Disregard: Britannia’s Suez Fiasco in Consideration of Anglo-American Diplomacy Matthew Gerth Eastern Kentucky University Follow this and additional works at: https://encompass.eku.edu/etd Part of the Diplomatic History Commons Recommended Citation Gerth, Matthew, "The Stress of Her Disregard: Britannia’s Suez Fiasco in Consideration of Anglo-American Diplomacy" (2016). Online Theses and Dissertations. 367. https://encompass.eku.edu/etd/367 This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at Encompass. It has been accepted for inclusion in Online Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Encompass. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Stress of Her Disregard: Britannia’s Suez Fiasco in Consideration of Anglo- American Diplomacy By Matthew C. Gerth Bachelor of Arts Eastern Kentucky University Richmond, Kentucky 2013 Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Eastern Kentucky University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS May, 2016 Copyright © Matthew Gerth, 2016 All rights reserved ii To Dr. Iva Marie Thompson For inspiration comes from the most unlikely of places iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thanks must go to many who aided in the completion of this thesis. Anything worthy of praise within its pages is to their credit; likewise, all mistakes or missteps rest directly on me. First, I cannot overstate my appreciation to the committee chair, Dr. Ronald Huch. For the past two years, he has been my professional and personal mentor.
    [Show full text]
  • The Jugular Vein of Empire : the Imperial Attachment to the Suez Canal from 1875 to 1956
    University of Louisville ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository Electronic Theses and Dissertations 8-2004 The jugular vein of empire : the imperial attachment to the Suez Canal from 1875 to 1956. Matthew Church University of Louisville Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/etd Recommended Citation Church, Matthew, "The jugular vein of empire : the imperial attachment to the Suez Canal from 1875 to 1956." (2004). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 251. https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/251 This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. This title appears here courtesy of the author, who has retained all other copyrights. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Jugular Vein of Empire: The Imperial Attachment to the Suez Canal from 1875 to 1956. By Matthew Church B.A., Bellarmine University, 2001 A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Louisville In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Department of History University of Louisville Louisville, KY August 2004 ii Dedication This thesis is dedicated to my parents Dr. Stephen Church and Diane Church For all their love, encouragement, and support And My late grandfather Leo Goulet, whom I miss constantly and wish was here to read this thesis iii Acknowledgements I would like to begin by thanking my thesis advisor Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Cabinet Government and the 1956 Suez Crisis
    W&M ScholarWorks Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 1995 Cabinet Government and the 1956 Suez Crisis Paul Duckenfield College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd Part of the History Commons, and the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Duckenfield, Paul, "Cabinet Government and the 1956 Suez Crisis" (1995). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539625989. https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-ywqq-fh67 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Cabinet Government and the 1956 Suez Crisis A Thesis Presented to The Faculty of the Department of Government The College of William & Mary in Virginia In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts by Paul Duckenfield 1995 Appr o v a l Sh e e t This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Paul Duckenfield Approved, December 1995 Alan J. Ward QiloJJL Donald J. Baxte Clayton M. Clemens acknowledgements The author wishes to express his appreciation to Dr. Alan Ward, for his patient advice and diligence in reading numerous preliminary drafts of this thesis. The author also wishes to thank Professors Don Baxter and Clay Clemens for their careful reading and criticism of the manuscript, and Kea Duckenfield for her patience, understanding, and support during many long days and late nights of research and writing.
    [Show full text]
  • The Suez Crisis of 1956 and the Anglo-American
    DIVIDED WE STAND: THE SUEZ CRISIS OF 1956 AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 'ALLIANCE' W. Scott Lucas Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in accordance with the requirements of the London School Economics and Political Science UMI Number: U048352 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U048352 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Library British Library of Political and Economic Saence \Vb<o SS3 ABSTRACT The aim of this thesis is two-fold. Firstly, using recently-released American, British, and Israeli documents, private papers, and oral evidence in addition to published work, it re-evaluates the causes and development of the Suez Crisis of 1956. Secondly, it examines the operation of the Anglo-American 'alliance' in the Middle East, if one existed, in the 1950s by considering not only the policymaking structures and personalities involved in 'alliance' but also external factors, notably the actions of other countries, affecting relations between the American and British Governments. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am grateful to the staffs of the British Public Record Office, the U.S.
    [Show full text]