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Submitted to the the London School of Economics and Political Science for the Degree of Ph.D THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONERS IN GERMANY: some aspects of their role in Anglo-German relations, 1949-1955 Submitted to the the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Ph.D. in International History Barbara Schwepcke November 1991 1 LOftriN. UMI Number: U039427 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U039427 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 iHGSeS r 3 1 - 3 8 Library British Library of Political and Economic Science CORRIGENDUM page 5: for taking charge (line 3,4) I am most grateful (line 18) page 8: of (last line) page 9: were able (line 5) quadripartite (line 13) page 10: quadripartite (line 7) page 12: peace treaty (line 18) page 13: alle Rechte (line 33) page 14: developments were (line 13) page 15: (cut 'the', should read: ) was a revised (line 16) page 16: bilateral (line 10) page 18: their (line 2) page 22: (cut one) handling (line 25) page 26: (rearrange) a great deal about the British — at least subconscious — attitude (line 6,7) the former were to be (line 14) page 27: sovereignty (line 17) June (line 21) managing (line 23) page 28: (first main sentence should read:) Sir Brian Robertson's biography contains two important clues, which explain his attitude towards Germany. page 30: allegiance (line 19) page 32: varied: in some fields they governed directly, in others indirectly (line 25-6) page 37: humorous (line 16) page 39: persuade (line 23) page 40: with (line 22) page 41: inevitable (line 30) page 42: of (line 2) page 47: greatest (line 3) page 48: acquired (line 4) (cut out) also (line 8) 1938 he was (line 9-10) 1943 he was (line 11) smouldering (line 24) page 51: commitment (line 26) page 52: (cut out) the (line 28) page 53: impossible (line 19) eloquent (line 28) page 55: the High Commission (line 4) page 56: persuade (line 21) page 57: there (line 2) Statement of Principle (line 5) (cut out) one (line 16) page 60: counsel (line 30) advice (line 33) page 63: nicht (line 23) 1 page 64: though (line 5) (new paragraph starting) General Robertson (line 16) page 65: (the second paragraph of the quotation should read:) My second point of difference is that I do not believe in the conception of a re-united Germany held disarmed, even after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, under the supervision of quadripartite missions or inspectorates. The Germans would not remain tranquil under such a restriction (given their geographical situation, I should sympathize with them in this) and allied unity would not be strong enough to enforce it. page 67: One therefore has to put it in perspective. Britain was not (line 2,3) page 74: (insert) on (line 12) whom (line 14) page 79: after all (line 13) page 80: autobiography (line 8) depreciated (line 27) page 82: (instead of 'chapter') part (line 14) page 86: Gerhard (line 9) page 88: political and diplomatic viewpoint (top line) which (line 2) page 91: Germany to (line 26) page 92: once (line 17) arouse (line 36) page 95: therefore (line 14) page 96: volunteer (line 11) page 97: Statute (line 6) page 99: Brussels Treaty (line 24) page 100: equipped (line 36) page 102: The real (line 14) page 106: solution of the (line 16) preference (line 17) page 107: equality of rights (line 19) page 111: him that as (line 22) page 114: possession (line 8) page 119: alleviation (line 4) page 120: ist (line 25) page 121: Democrats (line 6) page 124: be made (line 4) page 127: (cut out) striking (line 20) page 130: unofficially (line 7) Office's (last line) page 132: that of the Western Powers (line 14) Adenauer's (line 20) page 134: devolved (line 5) page 139: of the High Commissioner (line 8) not (line 15) page 141: here (line 7) (insert hyphen) Al-lies (line 15) page 142: (cut out) the (line 22) (insert spage) Commissioners’ answer (line 25) page 145: (cut out) to arrange (line 13) page 147: (insert space) looking aspirations (line 5) page 149: controls (line 26) page 153: advised (line 15) 2 well nigh line 25) page 154: development line 3) page 161: separate line 16) impairing line 23) page 164: with the High Commissioners line 25) page 166: (cut out) to line 6) page 173: separate line 24) page 176: were line 5) came line 16) page 179: (cut out . and 'therefore') line 23-4) page 180: Denmark line 4) page 181: Commissioners last line) page 185: (delete 'could neither', insert 'Nor could at the beginning of the sentence) line 12) page 187: Republic line 2) Poncet's line 31) page 190: extent line 12) page 197: (new paragraph starting) During this meeting McCloy line 16) that line 24) page 200: (new paragraph starting) It was hoped line 6) High line 25) page 202: collapse line 2) page 207: lose line 5) page 209: (insert) the (infront of 'Foreign Office') line 8) page 213: difficulties last line) page 218: (line 35 to 37 should read:) doubt it is superfluous;" but it apparently met a serious political difficulty of the Chancellor, Kirkpatrick wrote to London. page 219: bearable (line 19) these (line 23) page 223: In Britain too there was (line 22) page 225: assist (line 18) page 226: (instead of 'if') Whereas (line 19) replaced (line 21) page 227: Constitutional (line 3) (insert) be (after 'outcome would') (line 7) page 228: as he ended (line 3) (start new paragraph) However , Frank Roberts (line 1 page 229: (insert) will (before 'remain ' and insert) bound by (before 'the concessions') (line 33) page 236: Rhinelander (line 11) page 241: prey (line 15) page 246: recommendation ... Adenauer (19) page 256: provisions (line 18) page 258: negotiations (line 16) page 259: aircraft (line 4) page 265: renegotiation (line 9) page 266: (change chapter headline to) The Berlin Conference attitude (line 14) page 269: (cut out) to (line 17) page 270: severely (line 17) page 272: were sent (line 14) together with Anthony (line 21) 3 page 273: excellent (line 25) page 275: that if the Conference (line 17) measures (line 27) page 279: Germans (line 17) that (line 25) an excuse (line 26) page 283: sympathise (last line) page 284: National (line 28) annoyance (line 30) page 290: control (line 2) page 291: (change chapter headline to) The Saar Problem page 299: readiness (line 3) As (line 10) page 300: continuing (line 8) page 301: much (line 11) page 304: enormous (line 15) the (line 18) (underline) dementi (line 25) page 309: the (line 2) Frederick (line 6) page 310: (first three lines should read) The chapter entitled The Aftermath of the Treaties described what happened right after May 1952: page 317: separation (line 19 , 27) deduce (line 25) page 318: much (line 32) page 319: sections (line 23) page 322: (insert) on (before 'a minute’) (line 21) page 323: costs (line 13) separate (line 18) page 326: (delete 'been' and insert) being (line 2) page 329: separate (line 20) political (line 27) that he felt (line 29) page 333: reduction (line 29) page 343: rearmament (line 13) ratify (line 23) page 345: separately (line 10,15) Consuls (line 26) institutions (line 27) page 346: separately (line 27) page 348: separately (line 12) (delete 'are' and insert) is (line 23) (delete 'They are’ and insert) It is (line 24) page 353: recepients were (72) page 359 Germany (line 22) page 364: unenthusiastic (line 15) page 365: democratically (line 18) (delete 'were' and insert) was (line 23) from page 370 to page 373: (change underlining) page 373: Morrison page 375: Weber, Alfred (1979) Haben wir Deutschen nach 1945 versaqt throughout the text the name of the French High Commissioner should read: Francois-Poncet 4 ABSTRACT Between 1949 and 1955 the supreme authority in the newly established Federal Republic of Germany did not lie in the hands of the elected representatives, but in the hands of the representatives of the three Western Occupying Powers, the Allied High Commissioners. Surprisingly quickly the character and the role of the Allied High Commission changed and it devolved more and more of its power to the German Government. This thesis recounts the history of the Allied High Commission from the perspective of the British High Commissioner. Three men consecutively held this position: Sir Brian Robertson, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, and Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar. They were three very different men, who had different perceptions of their role, different tasks to accomplish, and different degrees of influence on events in Germany and British policy on Germany. The three men are given epithets, which either describe their perception of their role as British High Commissioner in Germany or the role itself, and which serve as themes for the three main parts of the thesis. Sir Brian Robertson was called a "Benevolent and Sympathetic Viceroy" by his biographer, which not only describes Robertson's own perception of his role in Germany, but also is the best indication of the vast powers of the Allied High Commissioners at the beginning.
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