Elites, Power and Security How the Organization of Security in Lebanon Serves Elite Interests
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Elites, power and security How the organization of security in Lebanon serves elite interests Erwin van Veen CRU report Elites, power and security How the organization of security in Lebanon serves elite interests Erwin van Veen CRU report May 2015 May 2015 © Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holders. About the author Erwin van Veen is a Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit. He specializes in understanding the politics and change dynamics of security and justice provision, as well as modern conflict dynamics and the nature of associated peace processes. About CRU The Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ is a think tank and diplomatic academy on international affairs. The Conflict Research Unit (CRU) is a specialized team within the Institute, conducting applied, policy-oriented research and developing practical tools that assist national and multilateral governmental and non-governmental organizations in their engagement in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Clingendael Institute P.O. Box 93080 2509 AB The Hague The Netherlands Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.clingendael.nl/ Executive summary Despite the turmoil and the insecurity that is spilling over from the Syrian conflict, Lebanon is not a passive player or victim in the regional security situation. Although it is understand- able that the focus of much current analysis is on the implications of the Syrian conflict for Lebanon – largely out of fear that the country might be sucked into the regional vortex of vio- lence – it overlooks the fact that it is largely the interests of Lebanon’s political elites that determine how the country’s state security organizations perform. It is for this reason that the report analyses how the interests of Lebanon’s political elites influence the organization of security as a crucial perspective to understanding the focus and performance of the coun- try’s security organizations. The key assumption that the report develops and substantiates is that Lebanon’s state security organizations largely exist to protect elite interests and that this is achieved through the provisions of the country’s elite pact, i.e. the arrangement between its elites on how to govern. Because Lebanon’s elites are organized on a sectarian basis, their elite pact reflects a dynamic balance between the interests of different socio- religious groups that are simul- taneously identity-markers, service providers, power-seekers and parts of regional alliances. On behalf of these groups and themselves, Lebanon’s elites seek to maintain or increase their relative power and secure advantages for their constituencies. Because sectarian loyalties tend to trump national ones in political processes and sectarian capabilities trump national ones, this often results in a competitive zero-sum game, and sometimes in a conservative status quo arrangement. In this context of intense political competition for power and iden- tity, it is only logical that Lebanon’s state security organizations first and foremost serve elite interests. Figure 1 below summarizes the main ways in which this works. Elite competition on the basis of sectarian groups ensures that a shared national vision on security is largely absent. The consequences are that state security institutions are deliber- ately kept underdeveloped, that security cannot be provided without consensus between the main sectarian elites and that sectarian influences permeate state security organizations. This makes it difficult for these organizations to provide either national or citizen security that is reliable and transparent. They intervene instead on a case-by-case basis as political consen- sus permits. Only when sectarian interests coincide does a proto-national interest emerge that enables security interventions that are to Lebanon’s collective benefit – but even then some factions are more likely to benefit than others. This situation is entirely by design, ensuring as it does that the interests of Lebanon’s elite are served by the country’s security organizations in four main ways. First, the requirement that sectarian political consensus is a sine qua non for domestic security operations, combined with the sectarian composition of Lebanese security organizations, means that state force cannot be deployed effectively against major sectarian interests. Second, having an underde- veloped state security apparatus with strong sectarian representation also makes it compar- atively easy to use violence in pursuit of political objectives without fear of state retribution. Third, strong sectarian representation within the state security forces increases the ability of elite groups to dispense patronage in order to maintain their social support base. Fourth, an underdeveloped state security apparatus with strong sectarian representation obviously does not have the capacity to guard Lebanon’s borders, and nor does it aim to do so. This results in 4 Elites, power and security | CRU report, May 2015 fragmented border control that enables certain elite players to benefit politically, militarily or financially from controlling sections of the border. Figure 1: How state security organizations serve elite interests in Lebanon Lebanon’s elite pact: Competing groups that define their interests in sectarian terms Resulting principles for the organization of security: #1 #2 #3 The state security Security cannot Sectarian apparatus is be provided representation deliberately kept without sectarian permeates all underdevelopped consensus state security organizations How the organization of security serves elite interests: It prevents the It secures the It enables It enables state security ability to use strengthening sectarian control apparatus from political violence sectarian support of parts of the becoming a without fear of bases through border for serious threat to state retribution patronage in the political or any group security forces financial gain This state of affairs results in the uneven, unreliable and unequal provision of security on the basis of sectarian elite control and affiliation; in the informalization of security provision by state security organizations; in the inability of state security organizations to provide national security as a collective good (since interests are not defined in national terms); and in the perpetuation of the status quo regarding how and for whom security is provided. It is in this context that the security threats that are spilling over from Syria’s conflict have galvanized some of Lebanon’s elite groups. On the one hand, Hezbollah’s leaders (Shia) have realized that they cannot succeed in their Syrian intervention supporting President Assad and at the same time maintain domestic stability against radical extremist groups. On the other hand, the leaders of the Future Movement (Sunni) see their control over Lebanon’s Sunni community threatened by the same radical groups, in part because they offer a more aggres- sive response to Hezbollah’s dominance. This combination results in sufficient convergence between elite interests to enable the Lebanese security forces to address radical extremism in Lebanon. While this seemingly serves both sectarian and national interests, it is perceived as benefiting Hezbollah the most. In turn, this risks communities and/or sectarian groups increasingly taking care of their own security, with an ensuing rise in radicalization and violent responses. 5 Elites, power and security | CRU report, May 2015 The main message of the report is that it would be a severe analytical mistake to regard the inability of Lebanon’s main state security organizations to ensure either national or citizen-ori- ented security as a case of organizational dysfunction. Quite the contrary: their organizational dysfunction is precisely the type of functionality desired by significant parts of Lebanon’s elite and serves their purposes well. In consequence, efforts at reform that fail to take account of the interests of Lebanon’s political–security elites and their sectarian/consociational elite pact are bound to have only limited operational impact. However, if Lebanon’s state security organizations can use the present crisis to assert a more balanced control over the domestic security landscape by serving short-term sectarian elite interests while remaining legitimate in the eyes of the population, they may over time shift popular expectations from security provision on a sectarian basis to security provision on a more national basis. Such a complex and risky endeavor would deserve international support. 6 Acknowledgements This report owes a debt of thanks to the Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) and the Hague-based Knowledge Platform on Security and the Rule of Law (KPSRL) for their gener- ous support. The FBA made possible the field work on which many of the observations of this report are based. The KPSRL sponsored the organization of an expert event on 4 December 2014 that explored the broader issue of how elite interests influence the provision of security. The report is also indebted to Imad Salamey (associate professor at the Lebanese American University) for his thoughtful reflections and peer review, as well as to Ann Fitz-Gerald