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2011 Weathering the Storm: Politics during the Administration of Spessard L. Holland in World War II Jon S. Evans

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COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

WEATHERING THE STORM: FLORIDA POLITICS DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF

SPESSARD L. HOLLAND IN WORLD WAR II

By

JON S. EVANS

A Dissertation submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2011

The members of the committee approve the dissertation of Jon S. Evans defended on April 1, 2011.

______James P. Jones Professor Directing Dissertation

______John Fenstermaker University Representative

______Rodney Anderson Committee Member

______V. J. Conner Committee Member

______Maxine D. Jones Committee Member

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members. ii

To my mother and father, Alice L. and Roy B. Evans

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am profoundly grateful to my committee members – Rodney Anderson, Valerie Conner, and Maxine Jones – for direction and patience. I owe a deep debt to my major professor, James P. Jones, for challenging and guiding me, while also giving the maximum amount of freedom during this process. Additionally, I appreciate the contributions of university representative, John Fenstermaker. I truly appreciate your critiques of my work. Thanks also to a former committee member, Albrecht Koschnik. Collectively, they have profoundly shaped me through their roles as teachers, mentors, and exemplars. I am extremely appreciative of the professional and patient assistance of the staff at the Florida State Archives in Tallahassee, Florida. Likewise, thanks to the staff at the P. K. Younge Library of Florida History at the in Gainesville, Florida. Thanks to the many friendly documents librarians and staff at the Robert Manning Strozier Library at Florida State University who assisted me with research or helped to break the monotony by asking about my work. My thanks to the staff at the Department of History for the thousands of things they do behind the scenes to make the department operate. Special appreciation is due Debbie Perry and Chris Pignatello for their patient assistance throughout my graduate career. Thanks to the members of the Dissertators‘ Support Group for comradeship and a friendly push at the end. I must take this opportunity to express my profound and continuous gratitude to Kenneth P. Kato, MD, Francis C. Skilling, MD, and Mark B. Sherwood, MD, for years of the finest care. Thanks to Vu Trinh, a patient and selfless teacher and friend. Finally, I owe an incalculable debt to my family. Thank you to my mother and father, Alice L. and Roy B. Evans, for their love and sacrifices on my behalf. Thanks to my brother Phil for encouraging me over the years. To my beloved wife Loree who has stood by me through every challenge. To my wonderful daughter Katherine, who delights and inspires me. Thank you all, your generosity and love overshadow everything else.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iv

ABSTRACT ...... vi

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

1. POLITICS IN THE SHADOW OF WAR: THE 1940 GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN .... 12

2. FLORIDA ON THE EVE OF WAR ...... 100

3. FLORIDA ADAPTS TO WAR ...... 129

4. ―WE MEET AT THE TIME OF THE GRAVEST CRISIS IN OUR NATION‖: ...... 170

5. GOVERNOR HOLLAND AND THE 1943 LEGISLATURE ...... 170

6. STATE POLITICS IN AN ELECTION YEAR ...... 221

7. ―IGNORANCE AND BRUTALITY DIE HARD‖: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND THEHOLLAND ADMINISTRATION ...... 264

CONCLUSION ...... 303

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 306

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 314

v

ABSTRACT

World War II represents a transition period in Florida‘s recent history. The southernmost state went from a sparsely settled frontier-like environment before the war to one of the nation‘s most populous and fastest growing areas soon after the war. Much of the historical literature focusing on this period described the impact of military and naval installations, as well as the shipbuilding industry, on the state‘s economy and population. Other works note the affect of the war on the citrus and tourism industry. Very little, however, has been written about how the war influenced politics in the Sunshine State during this pivotal period. Forces of geography, economics, and demography profoundly shaped Florida politics during the twentieth century. A relatively large, linear state, Florida featured an extraordinary range of differences between its northern regions bordering Alabama and Georgia to its southernmost keys less than one hundred miles from Cuba. In general, the panhandle featured staple crop agriculture, expansive rural areas, and traditional southern culture. The central and southern regions of the state, for the most part, produced a more varied array of farm products – winter vegetables and citrus, had a higher percentage of urban population, and contained the state‘s highest proportion of northern migrants and seasonal visitors. The state‘s four largest cities – Pensacola, Jacksonville, Tampa, and – were separated by miles, economic interests, and culture. The diversity of qualities between the regions prompted pundits to refer to northern residents as ―Pork choppers‖ and inhabitants of the southern region as ―Lamb choppers.‖ These divergent qualities resulted in extreme factionalism in politics as each group sought representation and voice in state government. Rather than one or two powerful factions leading state politics like many of its regional neighbors, Florida had numerous blocs centered on local or economic interests competing for influence. Because of the atomization of politics, lawmaking in the state was dominated by local interests. This, in combination with a somewhat rudimentary biennial legislative system, yielded a somewhat directionless state government. As a result, policy decisions were too frequently made to resolve problems rather than to prevent them. The absence of a strong chief compounded this lack of direction in Florida government. Institutional characteristics made the office of governor inherently weak in Florida.

vi

The state‘s chief executive had to share authority with other officers on numerous boards and commissions. Additionally, a constitutional prohibition on gubernatorial self succession forced the governor to compete for influence with cabinet members who could repeat in office indefinitely. This resulted in a relatively weak chief executive with little influence except that generated by patronage and persuasion. Because of these limitations, gubernatorial power and programs had usually been eclipsed by other forces by the governor‘s second biennial legislative session. A number of factors, including political factionalism and a relatively weak chief executive, severely hampered the development of sound fiscal policy in the state. The state‘s philosophy of minimal taxation manifested itself in several ways – a constitutional prohibition on income taxation, an exemption on inheritance taxation, the repeal of the state ad valorem tax, and the underassessment of real property. Furthermore, the largest proportion of the state‘s tax revenues came from regressive consumption taxes on gasoline and alcohol. As a result, Florida‘s fiscal system was too often unable to fund needed services and occasionally ran a deficit. World War II brought further difficulties to bear on state government‘s ability to meet the demands of its citizens. Voluntary, and then mandatory, gasoline rationing severely restricted state revenues and threatened tourism, the state‘s most lucrative commercial enterprise. A brief campaign against Allied shipping off the Florida coasts by the German U-boat forces also undermined the tourism industry. Federal authorities eventually imposed a national ban on nonessential travel to conserve rubber and gasoline, thereby closing down the state‘s horse racing industry, the primary source of funds for old age pensions and a contributor to revenues shared by the state with the governments. The war challenged state government leaders to respond and adapt. Florida reached a cross roads in race relations during the war era. While few acknowledged it, the days of universal white hegemony had passed but the era of greater liberties for African Americans had not yet dawned. During this period authorities and private citizens worked to defeat the ever-present threat of lynch violence in Florida. The following study explores how the state‘s political leaders responded to the many and varied challenges initiated by World War II. For instance, how did the war color political campaigns and shape the voters‘ choice of leaders? What affect did the state‘s atomized political structure have on governance during the war? How did the state‘s problematic system of

vii governance deal with wartime challenges? What forces did the war exert on the state and how did its elected leaders respond? These are some of the questions considered in the following study.

viii

INTRODUCTION

The economic, social, and political environment of the preceding era influenced Florida‘s 1940 gubernatorial election. The vigorous national economy of the Harding-Coolidge era manifested itself in Florida through dramatic inflation of property values and an increase in real estate transactions, particularly in the state‘s southern regions. Several factors contributed to the Florida Land Boom – the semi-tropical climate, the development of transportation infrastructure, the growth of American industry, consumer confidence, the availability of credit, a growing tourism industry, and the peculiar benefits to the state from prohibition.1 Beginning around 1921, vigorous expansion and steady improvement in real estate values characterized the first two years of the boom. Growth acquired a self perpetuating momentum with the subdivision of more land and the initiation of more building projects. As domestic, construction, and tourism industry workers came to the area a housing shortage developed, leading to a surge in apartment construction. The cost of living also increased as food and railroad tickets became scarce and more expensive. This, in turn, led to an epidemic of speculative real estate investment in which, much like the stock market later in the decade, purchasers bought on margin in the belief that the land would soon be re-sold for a price that would cover both the original note and a handsome profit.2 The influence of the boom on Florida‘s overall economy appeared most clearly through gains in population and employment in the state. Florida‘s population grew by an estimated 338,000 persons in the 1920s, nearly three times the total of the previous decade. Within the state, the largest gains in population occurred in ―Broward, Dade, Hillsborough, Palm Beach,

1 Merlin G. Cox, and J. E. Dovell, Florida: From Secession to Space Age (St. Petersburg, Fla.: Great Outdoors Publishing, 1974), 155; William W. Rogers, ―Fortune and Misfortune: The Paradoxical Twenties,‖ in Michael Gannon, ed., The New (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 1996), 291; and William Frazer, and John J. Guthrie, Jr., The Florida Land Boom: Speculation, Money, and the Banks (Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books, 1995), 3.

2 Cox and Dovell, 159; Alfred Jackson Hanna, and Kathryn Abbey Hanna, Florida’s Golden Sands, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1950), 339-340.

1 Pinellas, Polk, Orange, and Duval counties, in that order.‖3 Not surprisingly, three of the four counties with the largest population gains resided at the center of the boom. The 1920s witnessed a transformation of employment opportunities in Florida. While all occupational sectors, with the exception of forestry and mining, made substantial gains during the 1920s, only two areas – trade and transport, and services – increased their shares relative to other areas. By the end of the decade agriculture no longer employed the largest proportion of the state work force, having fallen from first in 1920 to fourth in 1930 behind services, trade and transport, and manufacture. This occurred despite a net increase in the number of farmers and farm laborers. Among those workers classified as trade and transportation, the most dramatic expansion took place in the number of salesmen from 5,500 to 16,500; real estate agents from 2,300 to 5,500; insurance agents from 931 to 3,362; railroad officials and supervisory staff from 295 to 478; and chauffeurs and other professional drivers from 2,800 to 11,400. Within the service occupations, the number of domestic servants rose from 18,500 to 40,000. For probably the first time in the state‘s history, the number of those employed as elevator operators (411) exceeded those earning their bread as hunters, trappers, and guides (346).4 Concurrent with growth in population and employment, Florida‘s state and national banks enjoyed bountiful years. Between 1900 and 1926 the number of national banks in Florida increased from sixteen to fifty-nine, while the number of state banks went from twenty-three to two hundred seventy one during the same period. Total state bank assets grew from $4,773,000 in 1900 to $539,100,000 in 1925, with the greatest increase in resources paralleling the real estate boom between 1922 and 1925. Bank stability remained high despite the inflationary trends in the state economy. No national banks failed in Florida from 1920 to 1925, although eighteen state banks failed during that period.5 The scale of the land boom and reports of shady practices generated concern and alarm in those regions losing residents and bank assets to Florida. The funds fueling Florida‘s boom

3 Since these figures also reflect the post boom years of 1927-1930, the actual boom time population and employment gains were probably even more dramatic. Wallace Martin Nelson, ―The Economic Development of Florida, 1870-1930,‖ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida, 1962), 274-275.

4 Ibid, 293-294, 299-300.

5 J. E. Dovell, and J. G. Richardson, History of Banking in Florida, 1828-1954. (Orlando, Fla.: Florida Bankers Association, 1955), 99, 103, 104, 110-111.

2 came from other states. National press reports of unsound investment practices and fraud by land developers in Florida spurred investigations by the Florida Real Estate Commission, the state Association of Real Estate boards, and the National Better Business Bureau.6 As the boom expanded a dark cloud developed over the Sunshine State. Proponents of Florida development responded with publicity and substantive action to counter allegations of speculation and fraud. Governor John W. Martin and a delegation of Floridians traveled to New York City to initiate a campaign to dispel public fears over investing in the state. At home, developers and the business community turned to self-regulation to curb some of the worst excesses of the boom. New rules mandated minimum down payments of five per cent, required current title abstracts, and prohibited the indefinite postponement of closing dates. Despite these efforts, the volume of real estate transactions began to ebb.7 One observer of the boom and its contraction, Alfred I. duPont, heir to the duPont gunpowder and chemical fortune, recognized the potential for profit and influence. Alfred‘s unconventional personal relationships and a long court struggle over the corporation made him a self-exile from his wealthy family. By 1926, the year he changed his residence from Delaware to Florida, Alfred had spent nearly a decade away from the family business searching for a base of operations outside of the duPont sphere of social and political influence. Although his cousin, Senator Coleman duPont, of Delaware, speculated in real estate, this did not deter Alfred, whose interest centered on the northern part of the state. Alfred believed undeveloped northern Florida had better potential for return on investments. Florida‘s prohibition on state inheritance and income taxes provided a further incentive for the wealthy heir to relocate to the state.8 Residence in Florida offered Alfred I. duPont a refuge from both his family and confiscatory taxation, as well as opportunities to further increase his wealth. Alfred I. duPont‘s initial investments included 66,081 acres encompassing tracts in Franklin, Bay, and Walton counties. He also purchased shares in the Atlantic National, Barnett National, and Florida National banks in Jacksonville. In making these investments duPont relied

6 Charlton W. Tebeau, A History of Florida. (Coral Gables, Fla.: Press, 1971), 386; Frazer and Guthrie, 9. 7 Tebeau, 386-387.

8 Tracy E. Danese, and Ed Ball: Politics, Purpose, and Power. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 29, 35; Marquis James, Alfred I. duPont: The Family Rebel. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1941), 398, 401.

3 heavily on the reports and advice of his brother-in-law and assistant Edward Ball. Originally engaged at the request of duPont‘s wife, Jessie Ball duPont, to help compensate for Alfred‘s advancing deafness, Ed Ball quickly demonstrated his business acumen and ability. Upon Alfred‘s death in 1935, Ball became the primary trustee of duPont‘s Florida interests.9 Based on real estate and banking investments, duPont‘s Florida empire continued to flourish and shape the state‘s economy and politics for decades after his death. Frequently attributed to the devastating hurricanes of 1926 and 1928, the demise of the Florida land boom began as fundamental economic forces restrained the market prior to the storms. Interruptions in both ship and rail traffic during 1925 revealed the inadequacy of south Florida‘s transportation system. Accidents obstructed the main shipping channel of the Miami harbor, preventing ships from reaching port to load and offload passengers and cargoes of food, building supplies, and other goods. A reduction in railroad freight capacity during the summer of 1925 due to repair work necessitated by increased traffic exacerbated the situation. The resulting massive backlog of freight led to an embargo on incoming rail shipments bound for south Florida. The region‘s spectacular growth outstripped the capacity of the transportation network to sustain it. Rail and shipping problems caused construction delays, higher costs, and more adverse publicity for Florida.10 Other factors also contributed to the decreasing real estate transactions and construction start-ups. Concerns about tax liabilities and increased internal revenue scrutiny dampened investor activity during the summer of 1925. Bad publicity generated by transportation problems, combined with the earlier reports of fraud and questionable business dealings, shook investor confidence. Bank deposits in the state, steadily increasing from 1922 through 1925, began to diminish. By 1926 many of the state‘s smaller banks began to fail because of withdrawals and loan defaults. The flow of bank assets into the state reversed; the surplus of funds and days of easy credit ended.11 The catastrophic hurricane of 1926 destroyed whatever public enthusiasm for Florida vacation properties and real estate development that remained. The first major storm since 1910,

9 James, 400, 403; Danese, 30, 26-27.

10 Hanna and Hanna, 342; Cox and Dovell, 161.

11 Tebeau, 387; Cox and Dovell, 162; Frazer and Guthrie, 8.

4 it surprised most newcomers to south Florida, who had never experienced a hurricane and were ignorant of the potential for destruction. Few people responded to the storm warnings by stockpiling emergency supplies of food and water, or taking other precautions. When the storm hit on the night of September 18, 1926, and for weeks afterward, many regretted their negligence.12 The hurricane inflicted staggering human casualties and property damage on south Florida. The dead in Dade county numbered one hundred and thirteen, with eight hundred and fifty-four injured. The storm caused three hundred and ninety-two deaths in all, with an additional six thousand casualties. Estimated property damage ran between $75,000,000 and $150,000,000. The absence of stringent building codes and enforcement contributed to the extensive destruction of property. The storm also severely damaged south Florida agriculture, particularly the lucrative citrus industry. High winds demolished acres of grapefruit, lemon, and orange trees. Already waning interest in Florida real estate and tourism declined even further as word of the storm‘s destruction spread. The 1926 hurricane exacted a staggering toll on the state‘s residents and their property.13 The forces of nature dealt the Florida peninsula an even more severe blow in the form a hurricane that struck Palm Beach on September 16, 1928. As the storm blew inland it caused severe flooding in the region of Belle Glade, Pahokee, and Pelican Bay, resulting in massive loss of life in those communities. The United States Department of Commerce estimated between 1,850 and 2,000 deaths resulted from this storm. Only the Johnstown and Galveston floods surpassed this disaster in number of deaths attributable to flooding. Slowly receding flood waters and a crop killing freeze on December 30 hindered recovery efforts.14 A combination of forces, manmade and natural, arrested the phenomenal development of Florida in the 1920s. The latter 1920s and early 1930s brought monumental challenges for Florida and the nation. The state‘s economic decline pre-dated the national depression and therefore it may appear that the state suffered comparatively less. However, because of the earlier economic

12 Tebeau, 387; Helen Muir, Miami, U.S.A. (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1953), 163-164.

13 American National Red Cross, The Florida Hurricane, September 18, 1926: Official Report of the Relief Activities (Washington, D.C.: n.p., n.d. [1926]), 3-6, 7; Tebeau, 387, 388; Muir, 163-164, 165; Hanna and Hanna, 343.

14 Tebeau, 388.

5 reversal the state had fewer resources, and greater debts, than other regions of the nation.15 Several key areas revealed the impact of the depression on Florida. Per capita income dropped from $631 to $345, a forty-five per cent decrease, between 1926 and 1931. From 1926 to 1933 income fell fifty-eight per cent. Consequently, state and local tax collections from 1926 to 1931 fell from $62.23 to $47.84 per capita, a thirty per cent difference.16 Reported net income of corporations fell from $815,000,000 in 1925 to $84,000,000 in 1930, while state bank resources fell from $325,740,000 in 1926 to $51,168,000 in 1933.17 Tampa radio station WDAE stopped claiming their call letters stood for ―Wonderful Days and Evenings,‖ substituting ―We Don‘t Always Eat‖ in its place.18 Florida‘s proportionately huge county and local public debts further aggravated the state‘s economic straits. While the state constitution prohibited Florida from incurring bonded debt except in very limited circumstances (in the event of invasion or insurrection), other governmental entities exercised the freedom to issue bonds to finance special projects and improvements. The majority of Florida‘s bonded indebtedness dated from, and came as a result of, the land boom. Local government units sold bonds to pay for infrastructure and projects related to development. Florida‘s bonded debt load stood at $13,527,000 in 1913, rose to $86,203,000 in 1922, but soared to $234,818,000 in 1925 and $364,975,000 in 1926.19 The state‘s post boom economy made it very difficult to retire these debts and bond defaults became widespread.20 In 1928 Florida voters chose former state legislator and Wauchula native Doyle E. Carlton to lead the state through this economic morass. Elected on a platform of ―good government, good schools, and good roads,‖21 Governor Carlton advocated a program of

15 Ibid., 393.

16 Florida, Special Committee on Taxation and Public Debt, Report. (Tallahassee, 1935), 1.

17 Tebeau, 394; Dovell and Richardson, 119.

18 Michael Gannon, Florida: A Short History. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), 89.

19 Special Committee on Taxation and Public Debt, 149, 150, 151.

20 Tebeau, 394.

21 David R. Colburn and Richard K. Scher, Florida’s Gubernatorial Politics in the Twentieth Century (Tallahassee, Fl.: University Presses of Florida, 1980), 38, 70.

6 governmental austerity and a state sales tax to offset the shortfall in state revenues. Carlton also proposed a curb on the amount of bonded debt local governments could incur. Additionally, Carlton steadfastly opposed inheritance and income taxes, as well as the legalization of pari- mutuel wagering. The legislature defied Carlton by passing a pari-mutuel wagering bill over his veto in 1931 in the hope of increasing state revenues, drawing more tourists, and establishing a new industry in the state.22 In an attempt to stem the swelling tide of bank failures Governor Carlton supported stricter regulation of state financial institutions. The legislature responded by passing the Banking Act of 1931, a measure restricting customer withdrawals and calling on banks to maintain greater resources to meet their obligations. Despite these efforts bank failures continued, not only in Florida, but nationwide. The banking crisis became so severe that many states declared ―banking holidays‖ to prevent panicked depositors from emptying banks of assets. Carlton‘s successor, born Dave Sholtz, declared a bank holiday in Florida on 4 March 1933. Immediately after his inauguration, President Franklin D. Roosevelt proclaimed a four day national bank holiday to begin on 6 March 1933. These measures, in conjunction with Roosevelt‘s direct appeal for public confidence, halted the banking crisis.23 Initially, Florida‘s unemployment relief and public welfare programs mirrored the national efforts in emphasizing local self sufficiency and rejecting direct relief to the needy. Unfortunately, demand outstripped the capacity of Florida counties and cities to provide assistance, in some cases due to their bonded debt burdens. Of the state‘s sixty-seven counties, only seventeen operated public assistance programs in February 1931. Existing programs had been designed to serve a limited number of people unable to work, not the overwhelming number of workers unemployed due to the depression. Not until the 1931 legislative session did the state begin to allocate funds for relief and recovery measures.24 Federal relief funds would not reach the states in appreciable amounts until the creation of the Hoover administration‘s Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) in July 1932. Florida received $3,886,512 in RFC funding to meet relief needs before the Roosevelt administration

22 William W. Rogers, ―The ,‖ in Michael Gannon, ed., The New History of Florida, 305; Tebeau, 395, 396, 397.

23 Rogers, 304, 309.

24 Rogers, 309.

7 supplemented the program with the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) in May 1933. These funds augmented the direct aid provided to the slightly more than twenty per cent of Florida‘s families receiving relief assistance in early 1933.25 The federal government implemented other programs on the heels of the RFC and FERA. These included the Public Works Administration (PWA), a fully fledged work relief program, and the Civilian Works Administration (CWA), a hybrid program incorporating the immediate benefits of direct relief while also requiring recipients to work and thereby avoid the charity label. Floridians benefited also from the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Works Progress Administration, and other New Deal programs. The tangible and enduring accomplishments of these projects included initiating the state park system, numerous public buildings and schools, and the Federal Writers‘ Project‘s Florida: A Guide to the Southernmost State.26 Elected in 1932, Yale educated Dave Sholtz took the governor‘s chair at the commencement of the New Deal. Sholtz ran on a platform of increased governmental services encompassing free school books, nine month school terms, back pay for teachers, a workers‘ compensation law, increased bank regulation, and more funding for public welfare. Sholtz‘s victory over a field of seven other Democratic opponents, including former governors Cary Hardee (1921-1925) and John W. Martin (1925-1929), represented a rejection of the programs and policies of the past as much as it was an endorsement of the candidate.27 James William Dunn asserted that the same tide of voter discontent with the status quo that elected Franklin D. Roosevelt also swept Sholtz into office.28 During Sholtz‘s tenure state funding for schools increased nearly twofold, the budget deficit gave way to a surplus, and by 1935 the number of citizens on state relief rolls fell to a quarter of the 1933 total. State government became more involved with public welfare, and worked more closely with the federal government under Sholtz‘s administration. Increased

25 Rogers, 306; Tebeau, 398.

26 Rogers, 310; Tebeau, 406.

27 Tebeau, 399; Colburn and Scher, 70-71.

28 James William Dunn, ―The New Deal and Florida Politics,‖ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University, 1971), 99.

8 activism also brought growth in state government and bureaucracy. The entities created during Sholtz‘s term included the state beverage department, an industrial commission, conservation commission, and a state employment service.29 Questions about ethics – such as employing the spoils system in patronage and appointments, and profiting from bond deals after leaving office – and the strained fiscal circumstances attributable to the depression clouded Sholtz‘s record as governor.30 Floridians selected sixty-five year old attorney and banker Fred P. Cone of Lake City in Columbia county to succeed Sholtz in 1936. Cone emerged victorious over a field of fourteen gubernatorial candidates, including former president of the state senate William C. Hodges and speaker of the state house of representatives Peter Tomasello, Jr. Cone‘s political résumé included two stints as mayor of Lake City and service in the state senate from 1907 to 1913, including a turn as senate president in 1911. Additionally, Cone represented Florida as a delegate to the Democratic National Convention in 1924 and 1928 and as delegation chair in 1932.31 Cone‘s passive approach to his duties as governor, his extremely conservative fiscal policies, and problems stemming from the national depression hamstrung his administration‘s ability to effectively cope with the state‘s problems. Cone believed in a limited role for the governor in the day-to-day business of state agencies and consequently, with some exceptions such as the Citrus, Budget, and Racing commissions, did not involve himself in their operations. Similarly, Cone held the governor had no right to interfere in legislative affairs and rarely attempted to intervene in lawmakers‘ deliberations. As a result, some legislators criticized him for a lack of leadership and they generally ignored the governor when he tried to influence them. Cone‘s passive approach to government did not, however, prevent him from vetoing more bills than any of his predecessors, leading to general inertia in state government. Furthermore, Governor Cone failed in attempting to resolve the state‘s economic problems through conservative fiscal policies based on lower taxes and leaner budgets. Historian David R.

29 Tebeau, 407.

30 Colburn and Scher, 134, 143, 291, 294, 295.

31 Colburn and Scher, 43, 45, 48, 51, 71-72; New York Times, 29 July 1948. At sixty-five, Cone was the oldest individual to assume the office of governor. Cone was admitted to the Florida Bar in 1892 without having attended law school. In addition to his legal and political careers, Cone served as president of the Columbia County Bank.

9 Colburn and political scientist Richard K. Scher rated Cone‘s approach to governing as potentially the most passive and conservative of any chief executive in the first eighty years of the twentieth century.32 Lack of accomplishment and a discernable contrast in levels of activity between the house and senate characterized Governor Cone‘s final legislative session in 1939. Led by Speaker J. Pierce Wood, a duPont-Ball executive from Liberty county, the state House feverishly sought to implement programs sponsored by two of the most influential men in the state – Roy E. Crummer of the Brown-Crummer Company, a Kansas securities firm, and Ed Ball, head of the duPont-Ball interests. Crummer supporters fashioned bills to divert additional gas tax revenues to bonded debt service, while the Ball camp set their sights on the defeat of the state‘s ad valorem tax on real estate, which bit heavily into Ball‘s extensive holdings of land. Neither camp met with success. The senate heavily revised the Crummer legislation before passage and the Ball forces met unexpectedly strong and persistent opposition from a group of young legislators led by LeRoy Collins of Tallahassee.33 The level of activity in the senate contrasted with that of the house. Led by President J. Turner Butler, of Jacksonville, the upper chamber spent most of the session rejecting old issues, such as a tax on chain stores, a state Townsend plan, and the re-drawing of senatorial districts. For his part, Governor Cone continued to advocate a policy of fiscal conservatism and efficient government. In the meantime, the session ground on, ignoring other important issues.34 Many participants and observers of Florida government considered tax revision the single most important component of any program to improve the state‘s fiscal situation. The ad valorem tax on real property constituted the foundation of Florida‘s tax system. The counties and cities relied upon the property tax most heavily for revenues, the state to a lesser degree. The gasoline tax provided the main source of revenue for the state, with a portion of gas revenues shared with the counties. The continuing need for maintenance and development of governmental services, combined with massive bonded indebtedness at the local level, burdened existing revenue sources to the limit. Potential new revenue sources had inherent problems

32 Colburn and Scher, 148-149, 164, 181, 194, 243, 279, 285, 292.

33 Fuller’s Florida Letter, 5 June 1939 (Fuller’s Florida Letter was a private weekly state financial newsletter written by state Representative Walter P. Fuller of St. Petersburg); Danese, Claude Pepper and Ed Ball, 58.

34 Ibid.

10 preventing their adoption. A constitutional amendment adopted in 1924 prohibited a state tax on personal income. State merchants organized to oppose a state sales tax on the grounds that it shifted the burden from the wealthy to the working man. The state‘s tax problem received much study and debate, but little constructive action.35 The challenge of servicing and paying down bonded debt constituted another component of the state‘s fiscal dilemma. In order to prevent further bond defaults Governor Carlton urged the 1929 legislature to adopt a bond refund program formulated by Roy E. Crummer. Under this plan defaulted bonds would be paid off with funds generated by the issuance of new bonds at lower interest rates. The legislature financed the new bonds through reallocation of gas tax revenues initially earmarked for road building and education. A long and determined battle over the Crummer plan took place in the 1929 legislature. The relatively debt free counties in the underdeveloped northwestern panhandle generally opposed the measure, while the debt ridden southern counties largely supported it. Ed Ball opposed the plan because of the anticipated consequences for his extensive land holdings and banking interests, while Roy Crummer not only initiated the plan, but expected to profit from increased bond activities in Florida. A freshman representative from Taylor county, Claude D. Pepper, served as one of the most vocal and effective of Ed Ball‘s allies against the Crummer program. Bonded debt remained a controversial issue even after legislative approval and implementation of the Crummer plan.36 Economically, Florida experienced boom and bust during the twenties and thirties. Economic and political necessity pushed the state to retreat from traditional fiscally conservative policies to cope with the tremendous burden of social welfare and relief needs following the collapse of the boom. Despite weathering the worst of the depression years Florida remained on shaky financial ground due to bond debt and an inadequate tax structure. As the 1940 elections approached many of the old challenges remained, while new, distant dangers threatened.

35 Florida. Special Committee on Taxation and Public Debt, Report, 53, 60; Danese, 56-57.

36 Danese, 56-63.

11 CHAPTER ONE

POLITICS IN THE SHADOW OF WAR: THE 1940 GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN

A number of factors combined to make Democratic politics in Florida the most atomized and least continuous of the . This unusual degree of factionalism resulted from geographic, demographic, and economic factors. Florida‘s large, linear geography resulted in relatively long distances between population centers and regions within the state. These spans deterred the formation of state-wide political networks. Additionally, because Florida was the most urbanized and had the lowest farm population of any southern state, its politics featured an unusual mixture of rural and urban concerns. Furthermore, the lower half of Florida‘s peninsula had a higher proportion of residents migrating in from other states. This led to a more diverse population than the northern portion of the state. Economically, Florida featured a highly diverse assortment of enterprises, including staple crop agriculture, naval stores, banking, cattle raising, phosphate mining, fishing, sponge harvesting, and tourism. These circumstances produced an all inclusive Democratic party organization embracing nearly all political viewpoints, while rendering itself incapable of promoting a single candidate or philosophy. The resulting lack of organized and persistent factions prevented the state party organization from selecting and advancing candidates for nomination in statewide primaries. Therefore, in Florida‘s gubernatorial first primaries, the electorate often chose from large fields numbering as many as fourteen (1936), eleven (1940), six (1944), and nine (1946) Democratic candidates. Because of the inordinately long ballot and the candidates‘ tendency to emphasize personality over policy, the initial gubernatorial primaries resulted in, as V. O. Key, Jr. described them, ―something of a lottery.‖1 The self-nomination process for the initial 1940 gubernatorial primary became even more amorphous as a result of the lackluster accomplishments of the 1939 legislative session. Traditionally the legislative session preceding the election functioned as a stage from which

1 V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation, (Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1996 reprint edition), 82, 83, 85-87, 90-91, 101, 410-413; William C. Havard and Loren P. Beth, The Politics of Mis- Representation: Rural-Urban Conflict in the , (Baton Rouge: State University Press, 1962), 12-13

12 prospective candidates demonstrated their worthiness for higher office. In the eyes of many observers the performance of the legislature in the foregoing session made membership a burden rather than an asset for all but those who had previously established their reputations in other sessions or other ways.2 Two men who had already validated their political credentials figured prominently in early speculation regarding potential candidates for the governor‘s office – William McL. Christie of Jacksonville, and William Cabot Hodges of Tallahassee. Christie represented Duval county in the Florida House of Representatives for four terms, including a stint as speaker in the 1937 session. Christie earned high marks for his parliamentary skills and able leadership of the house while speaker. Christie and duPont-Ball executive G. Pierce Wood had very close connections with Florida‘s junior U.S. Senator Claude Pepper, an ardent New Dealer. The three comprised the nucleus of what was then known as the Pepper machine, a north Florida political alliance sharing common interests with the powerful duPont-Ball enterprises.3 Newspaper discussions of Christie‘s potential candidacy dissected the impact on state politics. Given his ties to Sen. Pepper and the duPont-Ball interests, observers expected Christie to support future New Deal initiatives and advance the senator‘s plans for Florida. As a candidate, Christie probably would have clashed with anti-New Deal ex-congressman and potential gubernatorial contender Mark Wilcox, of Miami. If he decided to run, Christie could expect the support of the Pepper organization backed by the substantial resources of the duPont- Ball enterprises.4 Christie‘s death on 9 July 1939 scrambled the early gubernatorial field and shifted attention on to other potential candidates. The Duval county legislator drowned in his car after it flipped into a water filled ditch as he returned from a weekend of fishing on Lake Wilson, near Kissimmee.5 State political observers eulogized Christie while calculating the affect of this death on the political landscape. Former legislative colleague Walter Fuller wrote,

2 (Tallahassee) Florida State News, 7 July 1939.

3 Florida State News, 7 July 1939; Miami Herald, 9, 10, 16, July 1939.

4 Miami Herald, 9, 10 July 1939.

5 Ibid.

13 Christie was perhaps the finest and certainly the most popular figure in Florida public life. Had he lived he probably would have been Florida‘s next governor, in spite of his Dupont [sic] tag. His death so completely shocked and disrupted political circles, the race for Governor is jelling slower than usual. By this time [four] years ago there were half a dozen hats in the ring.6

Christie‘s death profoundly impacted the Pepper organization. James Hodge of the Miami Herald wrote, ―Had Christie been spared … the Pepper crowd might have succeeded in its plan to dominate Florida politics. Now that he is gone Pepper and his friends are likely to draw a blank in 1940.‖7 The sudden and tragic absence of the presumptive frontrunner also encouraged numerous speculative candidacies, further prolonging and complicating the self-nomination process. As one pundit noted, ―There probably have been as many candidates for the governorship mentioned thus far this year as have been entered in all of the last three or four races….‖8 Christie‘s death deprived one of the state‘s most powerful political factions of its likely gubernatorial standard bearer and encouraged those who might have declined to run prior to the fatal accident. Immediately following Christie‘s accident, the focus of political speculation turned to sixty-four year old state Senator William ―Homestead Bill‖ Hodges of Tallahassee. Designated the ―dean of the Florida State Senate‖ and a gubernatorial contestant on two previous occasions, Hodges also had good relations with the duPont organization. In his two earlier campaigns Hodges ran as a Bull Moose candidate in 1912 and as a Democrat in 1936. Hodges conducted an effective campaign in 1936, barely missing the second primary. As a senator, Hodges built his reputation on wit, showmanship, sarcasm, and the successful sponsorship of the homestead exemption amendment, ratified in 1934.9 Appraisals of Hodges‘s candidacy weighed his perceived strengths and weaknesses. Political handicappers acknowledged his proven ability as a campaigner and statewide reputation. At the same time, Hodges‘s age and poor health represented serious impediments to

6 Fuller’s Florida Letter, 21 August 1939.

7 Miami Herald, 16 July 1939.

8 Florida State News, 18 August 1939.

9 Miami Herald, 16 July 1939; (St. Augustine) Record, 17 January 1940; , and Allen Morris, How to Win in Politics (Tallahassee, Fl.: Peninsular Publishing, Co., 1949), 193.

14 a successful gubernatorial campaign. Questions about Hodges‘s physical condition reflected a reaction against the restricted schedule forced upon Governor Fred P. Cone due to serious health problems during his administration, and an acknowledgement of the grueling nature of statewide campaigning. Political observers acknowledged Hodges‘s experience, reputation, and valuable connections in state government; however, they questioned his health and capacity to wage a campaign and govern effectively throughout his administration. The Hodges campaign never came to pass, the senator died of an apparent heart attack at Goodwood, his Tallahassee home, on 17 January 1940.10 Former St. Joe Paper Mill, and Apalachicola and Northern Railway president G. Pierce Wood also became the subject of much political gossip during the early days of the 1940 gubernatorial campaigning. Because of his association with the duPont interests and his reputation as ―an excellent manipulator behind the scenes,‖ many observers assumed Wood would inherit William McL. Christie‘s role in the organization of Sen. Claude D. Pepper. Wood‘s strengths included familiarity with the state‘s problems, strong support in rural areas, and a statewide network of acquaintances developed through his long association with the duPont enterprises. Identification with the duPont-Ball interests and his inability to push through a sales tax package in the 1939 legislature represented Wood‘s most prominent political weaknesses. The stigma of his close ties to the duPont-Ball enterprises remained even after Wood resigned his post with the organization in December 1939, and probably contributed to his decision to forgo a statewide race. Wood chose to run instead for Florida‘s Third District seat in the U.S. House of Representatives, vacated by Representative Millard F. Caldwell‘s decision not to seek re-election. Woods managed a third place finish among voters in the western region of the panhandle, behind eventual winner Robert F. Sikes, of Crestview, and Parkhill Mays, of Monticello, in the first primary.11 Two members of the Cone administration – state conservation commissioner R. L. Dowling and hotel commissioner Bill Taylor – enjoyed brief appearances in the gubernatorial spotlight. Some pundits questioned the legitimacy of their aspirations, arguing the candidacies

10 Florida State News, 7 July, 3 August 1939; Miami Herald, 16, 30, July, 17 August 1939; Tampa Morning Tribune, 18 January 1940.

11 Miami Herald, 16 July, 6 August, 19 November 1939; Florida State News, 18 August 1939; Tampa Morning Tribune, 29 January 1940; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 10 May 1940.

15 served no other purpose than to set themselves up as potential threats in order to secure a deal with the leading contenders to retain their current jobs. Rumors of Dowling and Taylor campaigns circulated into the late summer of 1939, but neither officially entered the race. Assuming a sincere desire to run, these administration candidacies never materialized, perhaps because of difficulty in raising money and the burden of overcoming the electorate‘s reluctance to choose anyone perceived as the Cone administration‘s handpicked successor.12 Several additional factors contributed to the prolonged state of uncertainty affecting the gubernatorial contest. The reluctance of potential financial backers to commit to a particular candidate as early as in past seasons delayed development of the field. Campaign funds became, in the words of the Miami Herald, ―as scarce as fuzz on a frog,‖ largely because interests contributed heavily to losing candidates in the 1936 governor‘s contest and then had to hire ―someone with influence who could get them front row seats on the Cone bandwagon….‖ As a result, potential candidates remained undecided in the face of funding uncertainty. Furthermore, those with outside funding ran their operations with a tight fisted approach to spending. As the race developed, those with ample war chests enjoyed an even greater advantage than usual over their more penurious opponents.13 A persistent rumor of a deal involving President Roosevelt‘s appointment to the soon to be vacated federal judgeship held by Alexander Ackerman, in Tampa, contributed to instability in the upcoming 1940 elections. Known as the ABC Deal after its purported participants – U.S. Senator Charles O. Andrews, President of the J. Turner Butler, and Governor Fred P. Cone – it consisted of a triple job switch affecting both the U.S. Senate and gubernatorial races. Beginning in early October a story made the rounds that Senator Andrews might prefer the ―safety and security of a federal judgeship‖ over ―the dignity of the Unites States Senate, in which a seat must be fought for every six years….‖ Speculation arose that Andrews might be chosen by President Roosevelt for the federal judgeship in Tampa. This spawned conjecture over a circuitous sequence in which Cone resigned as governor, senate president Butler assumed the governorship per the provisions of the state constitution and appointed Cone to complete the remainder of Andrews‘s term in the U.S. Senate. At the end of

12 Miami Herald, 6 August 1939; Florida State News, 7 July, 3 August 1939.

13 Miami Herald, 1 October 1939; Florida State News, 18 October 1939.

16 their migrations, each man would have advanced up the political ladder, and Butler and Cone would likely find themselves in stronger positions to wage primary campaigns for election to their newly acquired offices in May 1940. Andrews‘s earlier service as a circuit judge and commissioner of the Florida Supreme Court prior to his appointment to fill the remainder of the late Senator ‘s term in 1936, as well as rumors the senator had already been vetted by the U.S. Justice Department, bolstered the story‘s authenticity. Possible constitutional barriers to Butler‘s candidacy for governor had been dismissed earlier in Cone‘s administration when the stricken governor appeared near death. Political pundits assumed the would allow Butler, as acting governor, to run for the governorship despite the state constitution‘s prohibition on gubernatorial succession.14 The potential ramifications of the rumored deal reached throughout Florida politics. Andrews‘s appointment to the federal bench reportedly decreased the chances of a split in the state‘s delegation at the upcoming Democratic National Convention. Many feared Senator Andrews would not back the administration‘s candidate for the presidential nomination if denied the appointment. The plausibility of the deal appeared to increase after Governor Cone failed to disclaim interest in the senate appointment. Additionally, a shift in potential candidates from the senatorial and gubernatorial races promised to alter significantly both races. The withdrawal of Andrews, seemingly in control of the senate contest, and the addition of Cone and others would have made it more competitive. Observers believed the patronage and visibility associated with the governor‘s office would strengthen Butler‘s position in the gubernatorial primaries.15 The public‘s reaction to these complicated maneuverings constituted another factor in the equation. Carl Hanlon, of the Fort Myers News-Press wrote,

This business of being elected to one office and using it as a stepping stone to something entirely different doesn‘t sit so well with the people and they are quite likely to express their disapproval at any opportunity the forthcoming primary may give them.16

Rumors of a deal involving one of the state‘s U.S. Senate seats and the governor‘s office further hindered the consolidation of the field of candidates in both contests.

14 Florida State News, 7, 25 October 1939; Miami Herald, 15, 29 October 1939.

15 Florida State News, 25 October 1939.

16 Fort Myers News-Press editorial quoted in Florida State News, 28 October 1939.

17 The speculation came to an end in late October after Senator Pepper met with President Roosevelt to discuss potential candidates to succeed Judge Ackerman on the federal bench. Officials informed Pepper that Andrews would not receive the appointment because his age exceeded the administration‘s self-imposed age limit of sixty. The sixty-two year old Andrews had reportedly been otherwise approved for the position according to unofficial sources. Circuit Judge W. J. Barker, of Bartow, ultimately received the nomination for the post.17 After the ABC Deal fell through, the rumored participants looked to their future prospects and wondered if the speculation had harmed their reputations with the voters. For Senator Andrews, the damage from the long simmering rumors appeared to be minor. Andrews retained his dominance over his announced opponents – Governor Fred P. Cone and author Charles Francis ―Socker‖ Coe – largely due to his independence in the Senate and ability to avoid making enemies. However, observers questioned Andrews‘s supremacy should state Senator Spessard L. Holland, of Bartow, decide to enter the contest. As late as mid-November 1939 Holland reportedly wavered between the senate and the governor‘s races.18 Even after the ABC Deal evaporated a close connection existed between senatorial and gubernatorial politics. A skilled and ambitious lawmaker, state Senator Holland had long wanted to represent his home state in the U.S. Senate and knew well the damage a term as governor might inflict on his political career, as it had on so many of Florida‘s chief executives. Reflecting on his desire to serve in the U.S. Senate, Holland wrote,

For years prior to my race for United States Senator in 1946, I had been ambitious to be a United States Senator from Florida. My hopes dated back at least to the time when I was a member of the Florida State Senate, where I served two four- year terms, from 1932 to 1940.19

Despite his apprehensions, Holland decided to enter the governor‘s race and announced his candidacy on 4 December 1939.20 Looking back on the decision, Holland noted,

17 Miami Herald, 1 November, 31 December 1939; Lakeland Ledger, 31 December 1939.

18 Miami Herald, 19 November 1939; Florida State News, 26 August 1939.

19 Biographical material, Spessard L. Holland Papers, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, Fl., Box 626, FF ―Autobiography (fragments)‖.

20 St. Petersburg Times, 4 December 1939.

18 I had run for Governor in 1940 with much misgiving since the records showed that Florida governors who ran for the Senate frequently found themselves under heavy handicaps because of their gubernatorial services….21

Feelings of deference and respect towards the veteran Senator Charles O. Andrews and the daunting challenge of mounting a statewide campaign against the incumbent likely figured prominently among the many reasons Holland chose to pass on the Senate race. Both the state senator and gubernatorial hopeful and Mrs. Mary Groover Holland proudly noted their family antecedents. Holland‘s paternal grandfather, Lindsey Holland, came from English roots. The family of his paternal grandmother, Elizabeth Lassetter, originated from France. On his mother‘s side, Holland‘s grandfather, Jacob Peters Spessard (originally spelled Speshardt) migrated from Germany just after the American Revolution. The family of the Bartow native‘s maternal grandmother, Elvira Eakin, claimed Scotch-Irish heritage. Mary Groover Holland, the proud spouse of the newly announced gubernatorial candidate, came from similar ancestry. The family of her father, Dr. William Rowan Groover (originally Gruber) migrated from Salzburg, Austria. Mrs. Holland‘s mother, Mollie Knowles, descended from English roots. Both of Mary Groover Holland‘s parents were born in Columbia county, Florida. The pride Holland felt regarding his family lineage came from a sense it mirrored the American norm rather than a sense of exceptionalism. Writing about his family‘s ethnic heritage, Holland observed,

The various families mentioned all had many intermediate marriages in our direct family line since coming to this country in its early days. Thus we know we are of the several root stocks mentioned and we may be of others. We are, therefore, a somewhat typical American family.22

A native Floridian, Holland‘s own brief history to that point reflected a deeply felt connection to the South and a record of achievement. The son of Benjamin Franklin (a Confederate States Army veteran) and Fannie Virginia , he attended Emory College and graduated magna cum laude in 1912 and earned a Rhodes Scholarship. Unable to accept the scholarship due to the war in Europe, Holland commenced the study of law at the University of Florida in 1914. He earned an LL.B in 1916 and began the practice of law. When

21 Holland Papers, Box 626, FF ―Autobiography.‖

22 Ibid.

19 the United States entered the First World War Holland enlisted in the army. Initially assigned to the 31st Heavy Artillery Brigade in France, Holland volunteered for service as an aerial observer with the 24th Aero Squadron. Serving on the Meuse-Argonne, Champagne, St. Mihiel, and Luneville fronts, Holland earned the Distinguished Service Cross for ―extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy‖ in 1918.23 Following the war, Holland returned to Bartow in July 1919 to practice law. He immediately received an appointment to serve as county prosecuting attorney. The Bartow native sought and won election as county judge in 1920.24 In addition to earning respect as a jurist, Holland emerged as a talented politician during his tenure on the bench. A combination of his loyalty to party, religious affiliation, and stand on a controversial question made Holland a particularly effective campaigner during the 1928 Democratic primaries. Because of his unswerving commitment to the Democratic party ticket, his active Methodism, and his opposition to the repeal of Prohibition, making him a ―dry,‖ Holland proved a persuasive advocate for his party‘s presidential nominee, New York Governor Al Smith. Republicans and bolters from the Democratic fold attacked the Democratic presidential candidate on the grounds of his Roman Catholic faith and his advocacy of the repeal of Prohibition. Holland rose to Governor Smith‘s defense in a letter to his hometown paper, the Polk County Record, calling the attack based on religious beliefs ―thoroughly wrong, unfair, and un-American.‖ On the issue of repeal, Holland noted Smith‘s promise to make ―an honest effort to enforce the law.‖ Furthermore, he wrote,

All of the outstanding dry leaders of our own party and one of the two great Republican drys, Senator Norris, are supporting our candidate with full confidence that better enforcement and a wholly more wholesome situation than that prevailing under the Mellon controlled enforcement of the last two Republican administrations will result under Democratic rule.25

23 Miami Herald, 19 November 1939; Florida State News, 26 August 1939; St. Petersburg Times, 4 December 1939; Charlton W. Tebeau, Florida From Indian Trail to Space Age (Delray Beach, Fla.: Southern Publishing Col, 1965), 3:1.

24 Campaign Announcement, 4 December 1939, Holland Papers, University of Florida, Box 103, FF ―Press Releases and Statements.‖

25 Judge Holland to Roy T. Gallemore, 5 November 1928. Holland Papers, University of Florida, Box 25, FF ―Politics, 1928-31.‖

20 Holland also delivered well-received addresses on behalf of the Democratic ticket in Bartow, Bradenton, and Miami.26 Despite the efforts of Judge Holland and numerous other Democratic activists and voters, Governor Smith lost the state of Florida and the election to the Republican nominee Herbert Hoover. In a post-campaign appraisal, Holland blamed Smith‘s defeat on a number of factors, but singled out religious intolerance as the foremost reason. Writing to a fellow Smith supporter, Holland observed,

Various causes might be assigned such as the turning back to Republicanism of the many former Republicans here who have always voted Democratic for want of a party, the luke-warmness of Doyle Carlton and Park Trammell, the desire for a tariff protecting our fruits and vegetables, and the stand of Governor Smith on the prohibition issue as well as others. I do not hesitate, however, after a careful resume of my own experiences in the campaign to state that the religious issue is the one thing which by itself was sufficient to make possible this calamity…. I blush to admit it but I am quite sure that religion was the chief contributing cause to the debacle at least in every section where I spoke unless it was Dade County. The preachers in this county [Polk], or a large part of them, made an issue of prohibition and of religion and preached politics from the pulpit during the last thirty or sixty days of the campaign until they literally had thousands of good people believing that it was their actual religious duty to vote for Mr. Hoover. It is a sad commentary to have to make but I believe it to be a truthful one that if Smith had been a Protestant of any denomination he would carried Polk County and I believe the State of Florida without the slightest difficulty. Maybe the shame which will come to thousands of our citizens when time gives a fairer perspective of the matter will be the quickest and most permanent cure for the unreasoning intolerance which I am sure must be most hateful to you as it is to me.27

Holland‘s insights reflected his own hustings-level political observations of the historic 1928 presidential contest and the disappointment of a campaigner for an unsuccessful cause. After serving two four-year terms as county judge Holland returned to the private practice of law. Holland joined with William F. Bevis to form the partnership of Holland, Bevis, and Hughes. The firm specialized in ―probate, corporation, federal estate tax, and real estate‖

26 Holland Papers, University of Florida, Box 25, FF ―Politics, 1928-31.‖

27 Holland to Louis F. Snedigar, 14 November 1928. Holland Papers, University of Florida, Box 25, FF ―Politics, 1928-31.‖

21 law. The 1939 edition of The Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory gave its top ranking (―very high‖) for legal ability to the firm.28 In 1932 Holland entered and won the contest to represent Polk county in the Florida State Senate. During his eight year tenure as a senator, Holland sponsored legislation to increase salaries and provide retirement benefits for teachers. Additionally the Bartow lawmaker advocated for old age assistance bills, an unemployment insurance act, and a workmen‘s compensation act, as well as drafting several laws regulating the state‘s citrus industry. Holland opposed the implementation of a state sales tax and the existing state levy of ad valorem taxes.29 During his time in the Florida Senate, Holland developed a reputation as a capable lawmaker. Holland‘s announcement of his gubernatorial candidacy contained a well crafted outline of his priorities. The candidate called for the continued development of Florida‘s ―attractions as the nation‘s playground.‖ He declared taxation to be ―the state‘s principal problem,‖ and cited the need ―to establish our tax structure on a more equitable basis.‖ Additionally, he reminded potential voters of his ―active interest in and support for … more adequate assistance to the needy aged and blind, and for dependent children, … and improved conditions for the working man.‖30 At this early stage of the race, observers recognized Holland‘s potential to be a serious candidate. Two candidates with strong local support but relatively little experience in state politics joined Holland on the gubernatorial ticket – Francis P. Whitehair of DeLand, and Walter B. Fraser of St. Augustine. A native of Kansas, Whitehair attended Florida‘s Southern College, studied law at Stetson University, and pursued graduate studies in political science at Columbia University. Whitehair earned a commendation for his service as an infantry sergeant in the First World War. At the time of his candidacy for governor Whitehair partnered in the DeLand firm of Hull, Landis, and Whitehair. Qualified to practice in ―all civil and criminal courts; state and federal,‖ the firm earned the highest rating in the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory. The bond houses of Brown-Crummer Company, of Wichita, Kansas, and R. E. Crummer & Company, of

28 ―Campaign Announcement.‖ Holland Papers, University of Florida, Box 103, FF ―Press Releases and Statements‖; The Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory (New York: Martindale-Hubbell, Inc. 1939), 1:116.

29 Tebeau, Florida From Indian Trail to Space Age, 3:1.

30 ―Campaign Announcement.‖ Holland Papers, University of Florida.

22 Chicago, Illinois, and Orlando, Florida, employed Whitehair‘s firm. The DeLand lawyer‘s personal assets reportedly exceeded $100,000.31 In his November 15 official campaign announcement, Whitehair acknowledged the state‘s many assets but charged ―poor local, county, and state government has restricted the development that merit warrants.‖ The prosperous attorney advocated ―the application of plain business principles‖ to remedy the situation. Furthermore, Whitehair wanted to ―arouse in all Florida a militant spirit for civic righteousness, … absolute honesty in public office, … progressive, humane and forward-looking administration in city, county and state.‖32 Whitehair appeared to be positioning himself as an outsider capable of repairing a broken government. A third candidate combined business success with political experience at the local level. As a successful businessman, community leader, and mayor of St. Augustine, Walter B. Fraser could point to accomplishments in the private and public spheres. Born in Georgia, Fraser, like fellow candidate Spessard L. Holland, was the son of a Confederate Army veteran and an alumnus of Emory College. Like Holland, Fraser served in the military during the First World War but never saw overseas service, spending his war years at an officer‘s training camp in Atlanta, Georgia. After moving to Florida in 1925, Fraser developed the Fountain of Youth Park resort, owned and operated radio station WFOY, and presided over several civic, business, and development organizations in St. Augustine.33 An active participant in Democratic politics, Fraser supported Governor Dave Sholtz and first won election to the St. Augustine board of City Commissioners in 1932. The St. Augustine businessman had served as both a city commissioner and mayor since 1932. Successful opposition to the collection of tolls on Jacksonville‘s St. Johns River bridge and the Bridge of Lions over Mantanzas Inlet at St. Augustine counted as Frazer‘s most notable accomplishments prior to his candidacy for governor. In announcing his candidacy for governor, Fraser declared,

The solution to virtually all of our current ills can be accomplished by bringing more people into the state. This would be the answer not only to the state‘s fiscal problem but also to the individual‘s economic situation. I feel any investment the

31 Junius E. Dovell, Florida: Historic, Dramatic, Contemporary. (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Co., 1952), 3:47; The Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, 1:119.

32 St. Augustine Record, 15 November 1939.

33 W. T. Cash, The Story of Florida. (New York: American Historical Society, Inc., 1938), 4:749-751.

23 state may make in such a program will be a sound investment, and this can be done without burdening the people of Florida with any additional taxes.

Fraser‘s vision for Florida called for economic growth through more development.34 In the early days of the campaign, political handicappers gave Francis Whitehair high marks because of his wealth and relative youth. Some observers perceived Whitehair‘s capability to finance his own campaign as an indication he would not be beholden to his underwriters if elected. Youth bestowed special advantages because of current Governor Fred P. Cone‘s well-known health problems. A ―remarkably brilliant legal record‖ stood out as Spessard Holland‘s chief asset during the opening days of the contest. Many commentators expected Whitehair and Holland to split the citrus vote, Whitehair as a grove owner and Holland because of his record of aiding the industry in the legislature and as a citrus lobbyist. Whitehair‘s position as ―the ruler of a political hierarchy that has prevailed for more than a quarter of a century‖ in his home county constituted something of a double edged sword. While enjoying near invincibility in Volusia county, this dominance made Whitehair vulnerable to charges of ―bossism‖ and the taint of profiting from a political machine. Pundits regarded Walter Fraser as a careful campaign planner who, because of advertising expertise developed in promoting his resort and running his radio station, knew how to craft an effective appeal to the voters. Additionally, Fraser, like Whitehair, had the resources to finance his own campaign. In an appraisal of the three early leaders, the Miami Herald declared Holland, Whitehair, and Fraser ―represented brains, money, and influence in abundance.‖35 Several influential candidates representing significant regional or state factions joined the frontrunners in the contest. Duval county state Representative Fuller Warren headed the second tier of candidates. Born in Blountstown, in Calhoun county, in 1905, Warren‘s considerable political experience belied his age. First elected to the state legislature from Calhoun county in 1926 while still a student at the University of Florida, Warren returned to Tallahassee to represent Duval county in 1939. In the interim between his legislative terms, Warren completed his law degree at Cumberland University in Lebanon, Tennessee, and relocated to Jacksonville. Warren practiced law and served on the Jacksonville city council from 1931 to 1937. The youthful Warren frequently drew comparisons to former Governor Sydney J. Catts for his ability

34 Cash, 4:749-751; Miami Herald, 15 October 1939.

35 Florida State News, 22 July, 3 August, 18 October 1939; Miami Herald, 10, 24 September, 10 December 1939.

24 to mesmerize an audience, earning the designation as ―the boy orator of .‖ Warren‘s gubernatorial hopes rested on his ties to both rural and urban north Florida. In announcing his candidacy, Warren claimed his experiences in rural Calhoun and urban Duval put him ―in the unique position of being able to understand both the viewpoint of the representative from small counties and from large counties in this great state.‖ Referring to his record in the 1939 legislature, Warren boasted he had ―vigorously opposed a sales tax,… advocated highway safety measures and led a fight for rural electrification.‖36 Warren‘s candidacy infused the race with energy. A West Palm Beach attorney and a Tampa businessman joined Warren in the second rank of candidates. B. F. Paty, an attorney and partner in the West Palm Beach firm of Paty, Warwick, and Mooney, had the distinction of contesting the 1936 governor‘s race, finishing firth out of a field of fourteen in the first primary. Paty based his 1940 campaign on a program to ―end sectionalism in Florida, develop the state‘s resources to the utmost and uproot waste and extravagance in state government.‖ Observers noted that while Paty‘s prior campaign experience potentially yielded residual assets in the form of organization and supporters, it also revealed his political weaknesses and potentially deterred contributors.37 Burton F. Schoepf, president of the Tamiami Trails Tours bus line and a former protégé of late advertising tycoon and Florida booster Baron G. Collier, Sr. entered the second tier of candidates with Warren and Paty. Despite his big business ties to the Collier interests in Florida, Schoepf ran as an advocate of the Townsend old-age pension program. As the presumptive Townsend candidate Schoepf hoped to draw the support of the organization‘s membership and sympathizers in the election.38

36 Cash, 4:621; Dovell, 3:2-3; Miami Herald, 10 December 1939; Panama City News-Herald, 4 January 1940; Tampa Morning Tribune, 4 January 1940.

37 The Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, 1:293; Annie Mary Hartsfield and Elston E. Roady, Florida Votes 1920- 1962 (Tallahassee, Fl.: Institute of Governmental Research, 1963), 71; St. Petersburg Times, 19 January 1940; Miami Herald, 10 December 1939.

38 The Townsend plan consisted of monthly payments to all retired persons over sixty who agreed to spend the funds in the month received. The plan funded the payments through a national value-added tax. Townsend claimed the plan would aid the aged, raise wages and reduce unemployment by decreasing the labor pool, and energize recovery through increased consumption. David M. Kennedy, Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 224. While Schoepf enjoyed the closest ties with the Townsend forces, other candidates attempted to establish a rapport with, and win the support of, Florida‘s retirees, most often through advocacy of increased state funding for pensions. Francis P. Whitehair, Walter B. Fraser, and Fuller Warren provided notable examples. Miami Herald, 10 September, 1 October 1939, 21 January 1940; Florida State News, 18 October 1939; Florida Times-Union, 4, 19 January 1940.

25 Political observers split in their opinion on the strength and solidarity of the Townsend forces in a race for state, rather than national, office. While some believed the Townsendites represented a solid bloc at the polls, others perceived the movement‘s waning influence as a result of repeated defeats in Congress and doubts about the feasibility of the plan.39 The third tier of candidates included the Reverend James A. Barbee of Jacksonville, James H. Clancey of Panama City, Carl Maples of Wakulla county, Frederick Van Roy of Crystal River, and Hans Walker of Ocala. Born in in 1896, Reverend Barbee moved to Jacksonville to minister at the Riverside Avenue Christian Church in 1925. No clergyman had run for governor of Florida since former Governor Sydney J. Catts‘s unsuccessful bid for a second term in 1928. Capitalizing on his reputation as an ―anti-crime and [anti-]slot machine crusade leader,‖ Barbee entered the race ―with a promise to keep racketeers out of Florida and let legitimate business profit from tourist spending.‖40 James H. Clancey, a retired attorney from Detroit and former lyceum speaker, established his candidacy on a promise to address the state‘s bonded debt problem. Clancey‘s adopted home of Panama City stood in the forefront of those communities most encumbered by debt. Clancey advocated ―legislative measures to alleviate the tragic conditions of ... counties … hopelessly mired in bonded indebtedness.‖41 Lumber operator Carl Maples of Wakulla county unsuccessfully sought the gubernatorial nomination in 1936, finishing twelfth in the first primary voting. Running as an advocate of ―local self-government,‖ Maples indentified himself with the ―principles of democracy as conceived by Jefferson and Jackson and Lincoln.‖42 Frederick Van Roy of Crystal River proposed relocating the state capital to his hometown and the ―legalization of all games of chance‖ so the state could tax them. The candidacy of Hans Walker, of Ocala, intrigued many because the candidate had once been a ward of the Florida

39 Florida State News, 18 August, 14 September 1939; Miami Herald, 3 August 1939.

40 Tampa Morning Tribune, 13 April 1940; Ellwood C. Nance, Florida Christians: Disciples of Christ (Winter Park, Fl.: College Press, 1941), 253; William W. Rogers, ―Fortune and Misfortune: The Paradoxical Twenties,‖ in Michael Gannon, ed., The New History of Florida (Gainesville, Fl.: University Press of Florida, 1996), 287; St. Augustine Record, 21 November 1939.

41 Miami Herald, 3 December 1939; Tampa Sunday Tribune, 14 April 1940.

42 Fuller Warren, How to Win in Politics (Tallahassee, Fl.: Peninsula Publishing Co.: 1949), 188-189; Tampa Sunday Tribune, 14 April 1940; St. Augustine Record, 2 February 1940.

26 Children‘s Home. Walker had become a successful businessman and reportedly had the backing of the major oil companies.43 The slate of candidates in the first gubernatorial primary confirmed perceptions of Florida‘s state Democratic politics as highly amorphous and factionalized. The relatively local power of the leading candidates reflected the dispersal of political power in the state. Fraser, Holland, Warren, and Whitehair each enjoyed significant local strength but no pre-existing statewide political foundation. Of the group, Holland possessed the most extensive political resume, yet he had not served in a prominent capacity representing the entire state such as speaker of the state house, president of the senate, or delegate to the party‘s national convention. Two events demonstrating the limitations of the Pepper machine further corroborated the lack of political continuity in the state. The loss of key strategist and potential gubernatorial candidate William McL. Christie and the Pepper organization‘s lack of a replacement revealed the limits of that coalition. Similarly, the frustration of Sen. Pepper‘s efforts to secure a federal judgeship for his senate colleague illustrated the limits of one of the state‘s most influential organizations. Despite the backing of the duPont-Ball interests and access to a wealth of patronage and appointments, the Pepper machine experienced formidable difficulties in developing a statewide power base. Economic and social factors also influenced the candidate selection process. The large number of candidates and their identification with tourism, timber, citrus, business, and oil interests reflected the state‘s economic diversity. Additionally, the relatively large number of new residents also shaped the field. Recent arrivals without long term political associations hindered the development of more continuous political organizations. The state‘s economic diversity and relatively large proportion of new residents further contributed to the atomized character of Florida politics. Florida‘s geographic size, economic and social diversity, and the peripheral role of the state Democratic party resulted in numerous candidates representing a variety of backgrounds and positions. The size of the field, plus the difficulty of conducting a statewide campaign, and attracting financial and electoral support resulted in an arduous and complex campaign leading up to the first primary on 7 May 1940. While each candidate possessed apparent strengths and

43 St. Augustine Record, 24 April 1940; Tampa Sunday Tribune, 14 April 1940; Miami Herald, 25 November 1939.

27 weaknesses, most observers acknowledged the race would be a difficult one in which virtually any of the candidates might prevail. The Florida Times-Union described the 1940 election season as a ―three-ring show in public interest with vigorous contests for governors [sic], Unites States senator and delegates to the National Convention.‖ If the general election resembled a circus, the campaign for the governorship constituted the center ring. The eleven qualified gubernatorial candidates crisscrossed the state expounding upon their own virtues and programs for the state, often also pointing out weaknesses in their opponents‘ platforms and personalities. Following an unusual public challenge of one candidate by another, the Evening News of Daytona Beach declared, ―It looks as if this Florida gubernatorial free-for-all is going to be something colossal, stupendous, and gargantuan in the way of fights.‖44 Several factors, in addition to the perceived potential for direct confrontation between candidates, represented innovations in the 1940 gubernatorial race. Foremost, for the first time in nearly fifty years, a general election campaign would take place without the requirement of a state poll tax. Originally enacted by the Florida legislature in 1889 as an impediment to electoral participation by African Americans, as well as poor and non-Democratic whites, by the time of its repeal by the 1937 legislature the Democratic party‘s political hegemony and the all-white primary superseded the need for the levy. State Senator Ernest R. Graham, of Miami, led the repeal campaign in an effort to prevent certain interests – specifically gambling and race track concerns – from perpetrating fraud by sponsoring the poll taxes for their controlled voting bloc. The repeal legislation passed through the 1937 legislature with only minor opposition and the first gubernatorial primary election since poll tax abolition took place in 1940.45 Voter turnout as a percentage of adult white population increased from 43.1 per cent in the 1936 gubernatorial primary, to 50.7 per cent in the 1938 senatorial primary, to 54.9 per cent in the 1940 gubernatorial primary. While voter participation increased markedly after 1937 the change cannot automatically be attributed to poll tax repeal because, as V. O. Key, Jr. noted, the ―interpretation of the boost in turnout rates … is fraught with hazard since other events in motion concurrently contributed to a heightened interest in voting.‖ President Roosevelt‘s attempt to

44 Florida Times-Union, 12 February 1940; Daytona Beach Evening News, 18 January 1940.

45 H. D. Price, The Negro and Southern Politics: A Chapter of Florida History (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), 13, 14, 22-23; V. O. Key, Jr., 605.

28 purge Congress of southern Democratic conservatives contributed to higher voter interest in 1938. Likely causes of greater participation in the 1940 election included the contentious character of the gubernatorial race, the high number of open seats in the state legislature, and the escalating turmoil in Europe.46 Many in Florida politics expected poll tax repeal to result in greater influence for the individual voter and, it was hoped, less influence for the local courthouse ring or political machine. One pundit observed of the 1940 election,

The ‗controlled vote,‘ that group of ballot casters who are dictated to by county political machines, may not be able to swing this election as elections have been swung in the past. It may mean … that, instead, the candidate with the greatest popular appeal, … whose record is clean and unassailable … who can truly offer an administration ‗of, for, and by the people‘ will have a real chance of being named Governor of Florida.47

Volusia and Hillsborough counties numbered among those counties considered the most dominated by political machines or rings. The Volusia organization, known as the Possum Club, had originated years earlier as a social organization in New Smyrna Beach and became increasingly active in politics. Variously described as a bloc vote or a coalition of political factions combining to ―carry county elections against ‗anti-ringers,‘‖ the club‘s political strength and acumen generated influence within Volusia county and, to a much more limited degree, across the state as well. Former Possum Club associates included Cary D. Landis, state attorney general from 1931 to 1938, and Judge Bert Fish, the Roosevelt administration‘s minister to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Leadership of the Possum Club reportedly passed to gubernatorial candidate Francis P. Whitehair following Judge Fish‘s appointment to diplomatic duties.48 The White Municipal Party, under the leadership of state Senator Pat Whitaker, reputedly controlled Hillsborough county elections. The Tampa senator served as president of the state senate from 1931 to 1933. Whitaker reportedly derived his political power from close relations with the Ku Klux Klan and organized labor in Tampa. Even though Tampa Electric Company

46 Key, 605-606; Florida Times-Union, 15 February 1940. The Roosevelt administration attempted to liberalize the party by replacing conservative southern Democratic politicians with more liberal, pro-New Deal candidates. Kennedy, 346.

47 Jacksonville American, 12 January 1940.

48 Daytona Beach Evening News, 15 April 1940; Sidney Johnston, ―Bert Fish: From Volusia County Courthouse to American Embassy,‖ in Florida Historical Quarterly 78 no. 4 (Spring 2000), 431-450.

29 president Peter O. Knight challenged his dominance, Whitaker retained his influence in Hillsborough county politics. In the coming election ―the tide of battle…[was] expected to turn on the Tampa courthouse steps.‖ Despite the expansion of suffrage following poll tax repeal and the opposition of local anti-machine leaders, the influence of the political machines remained a significant factor in the race.49 Speculation about the degree of influence exerted by special interest blocs and political rings on the individual candidates‘ campaigns became an important theme of the 1940 gubernatorial contest. Awareness of the dangers of machine domination of state government increased because of the recent focus on the Louisiana machine of the late Huey P. Long and the Thomas J. Pendergast organization in Kansas City, Missouri. Of the gubernatorial candidates, Volusia county Possum Club leader Francis P. Whitehair seemed the most vulnerable to charges of political bossism. The revelation that Senator Pat Whitaker, reputed leader of the Tampa machine, backed the DeLand attorney lent additional credence to allegations that Whitehair sought to create a statewide organization to control Florida politics.50 Fuller Warren, state legislator and candidate from Duval county, led the field in attempting to exploit this perceived vulnerability in the Whitehair campaign. In a public letter, dated 15 January 1940, Warren invited Whitehair to attend a Jacksonville rally for the purpose of discussing the latter‘s connections with various special interests and ―the condition of Volusia County during your control of it.‖ Those interests included the Crummer bond firm, Senator Pat Whitaker, and ―certain Labor leaders.‖ Warren justified his challenge of Whitehair in a statement,

I feel that the kind of clients an attorney-candidate represents, the kind of people and corporations who are supporting him, and his alliances with certain practicing politicians, as well as the kind of government he has given the County he controls, ought to be fully and freely discussed in campaign for the Governorship.

Warren promised Whitehair a cordial reception and adequate time to address these issues or discuss any other subjects should he accept the invitation. Whitehair, responding in an open

49 Tampa Morning Tribune, 9 November 1939; Miami Herald, 10 September 1939; Tampa Tribune-Times, 20 August 1995; Jacksonville American, 2 February 1940.

50 For coverage of the Long machine in Florida newspapers see: Tampa Morning Tribune, 26, 27, 28, 30 June 1939. For reports on the Pendergast organization, see: Florida Times-Union, 23 May 1939; Tampa Morning Tribune, 30 June 1939; Daytona Beach Evening News, 30 January 1940.

30 letter of his own, declined Warren‘s challenge, citing scheduling conflicts, and made no effort to rebut the charges or make counter accusations.51 The Daytona Beach Evening News, in Whitehair‘s home county, took note of Warren‘s challenge. Describing the invitation as the ―most interesting development in the gubernatorial campaign since the announcements‖ of primary candidates and agreed that Whitehair had ―a great deal of explaining to do about his career as boss in Volusia county.‖ Should he fail ―to meet this issue,‖ the Evening News warned, ―he will lose much support in this county as well as elsewhere.‖ Meanwhile, Warren continued to hammer at the DeLand attorney‘s connections with the Crummer bond interests and the Tampa ring in speeches across the state.52 The Whitehair campaign benefited from the backing of the Whitaker organization in the form of official endorsements from some of the state‘s labor unions. In December 1939, the non-partisan political committee of the Florida Federation of Labor (FFL) and delegates of the Standard Railroad Labor Legislative Association of Florida endorsed Whitehair‘s candidacy. It quickly became apparent that the endorsement neither represented the united voice of labor in Florida nor constituted the political windfall it appeared to be. Spokesmen for both the Southeastern Association of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the Cigar Makers International disclaimed any endorsement of Whitehair by their organizations. Dissension among the ranks of organized labor in Florida led the Miami Herald’s Allen Morris to observe,

The growing turmoil in labor circles daily grows louder over the endorsement which union labor gave Whitehair long before it was determined who else would be in the race. Members of the miscellaneous crafts which combined with the railroad brotherhoods…for the DeLand candidate are confident they can hold their lines, and swing the bulk of Florida labor with them. The present minority with the numerically powerful carpenters‘ union, the Tampa cigar makers and others, are equally positive they can upset the apple cart before May.

Florida labor split between one faction backing Whitehair and another supporting Walter F. Fraser. Morris anticipated the showdown between opposing factions to come at the state convention of the FFL at Daytona Beach in April 1940.53

51 Florida Times-Union, 17, 18 January 1940; Daytona Evening News, 17 January 1940.

52 Daytona Evening News, 18 January 1940; Tampa Morning Tribune, 31 January 1940.

53 Miami Herald, 5 November 1939, 4 February 1940.

31 The anticipated leadership struggle materialized during the FFL‘s fortieth annual meeting at Daytona Beach on 8 through 10 April 1940. The opposing factions presented resolutions favoring and criticizing the earlier endorsement of Whitehair. The convention initially referred the resolutions to committee for consideration. An indication of the relative strength of the opposing factions came when all but a small group of delegates rose to give Whitehair a standing ovation following his introduction to the convention as the legal representative for the Daytona Beach Central Labor Union. On the final day of the convention, the delegates approved a resolution confirming the non-partisan committee‘s endorsement of Whitehair‘s candidacy. Whitehair had the official support of the FFL.54 While organized labor feuded over endorsements, the various candidates strove to put together a winning combination of organization and program. While platforms received the most attention, organization served as the foundation for the campaign. Miami Herald columnist Allen Morris wrote of its importance,

Organization makes it possible for a candidate to move fast, to speak to more people, to be present at more worthwhile gatherings than his less ably organized opponent, and, if he is a good salesman, to win.55

A campaign organization consisted not only of staff members, but prominent supporters willing to write letters and gather information as well. An efficient organization made it possible for the candidate to sell his program and himself. Observers regarded the Whitehair operation as one of the top two organizations in the state because of experienced personnel, ample financing, and powerful backers. The DeLand attorney recruited experienced workers to man the offices, operate the sound truck, and generate publicity for their candidate. Henry Balch, the executive editor of the Orlando Morning Sentinel, handled publicity for Whitehair while on leave of absence from the newspaper. Whitehair‘s personal fortune allowed him to finance his own campaign, prompting the Orlando Morning Sentinel to endorse him because his financial resources allowed him ―to serve without

54 Florida Federation of Labor, Proceedings of the Fortieth Convention (n.p., n.d.), 1, 15, 21, 25-26, 36-37, 45, 46; Daytona Beach Evening News, 8, 10 April 1940.

55 Miami Herald, 2 April 1944.

32 taking orders from any man, machine or master‖ if elected.56 Several prominent state legislators – including Senator Philip D. Beall of Escambia, Senator R. S. Adams of Hamilton, and Senator Pat Whitaker of Tampa – endorsed the DeLand attorney‘s candidacy.57 The Whitehair campaign enjoyed the benefits of an efficient staff, ample funding, and powerful supporters. In addition to the planks shared by nearly every other candidate, Whitehair‘s campaign platform attempted to position him as a pro-business candidate who would increase governmental efficiency while reducing red tape. Nearly all platforms shared common planks: avoid new taxes, nine month terms for the state‘s public schools, increased assistance to the aged, increased tourism promotion, and increased efficiency in government. In addition to these, the Whitehair campaign vowed to promote citrus, livestock, and limit government regulation of business. The candidate promised to ―work for the adoption of a program with due consideration for the grower, shipper, and consumer.‖ At the time, the state citrus industry remained mired in a slump and many blamed their plight on over-regulation. The Palatka Daily News described Florida citrus as ―an industry which is being kicked around like a hound dog with the mange by selfish interest inimical to the grower.‖ Criticism of state regulation also, indirectly, struck at gubernatorial opponent Senator Spessard L. Holland, himself a small grower and citrus belt resident who had supported many of the regulations during his tenure in the state senate.58 Whitehair took a similar approach to boosting the livestock industry. The DeLand attorney promised his administration would protect the cattle industry ―from the clutches of governmental interference,‖ lest ―the cattle … be ruined – just like our 30,000 citrus growers who no longer can make a profit from their groves.‖ The candidate from Volusia county cited a proposed state fence law as an example of interference leading to additional ruinous regulation.

56 Fearing the accoutrements of wealth would alienate Florida‘s working men and women, Whitehair switched from a chauffeured limousine to a more modest automobile in October 1939. Daytona Beach Observer, 6 January 1940; Quoted in the Miami Herald, 8 October 1939; 14 April 1940.

57 Daytona Evening News, 30 January 1940; James William Dunn, ―The New Deal and Florida Politics‖ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University, 1971), 59-60; (Jacksonville) Herald Tribune, 2 January 1940; Daytona Beach Evening News, 20 February 1940.

58 ―Francis P. Whitehair for Governor‖ campaign pamphlet, 1 February 1940, Spessard L. Holland Papers, Special and Area Studies Collections, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, Box 148, FF ―Whitehair‖; see Miami Herald, 5 November 1939, and Florida Times-Union, 4,5,9 April 1940 for a sampling of opinion on citrus regulation; Palatka Daily News, 9 December 1939.

33 Whitehair‘s stand against the fence law also happened to put him in direct opposition to fence law advocate and gubernatorial opponent Representative Fuller Warren of Duval county.59 Whitehair‘s position on citrus and livestock regulation echoed his resistance to government interference in private industry. ―Government wasn‘t designed to regulate private business, …but is supposed to encourage and assist in any way possible,‖ said the candidate. The Whitehair platform advocated honest, efficient, responsive, yet limited government that advanced the state‘s business interests. Through his platform and stump rhetoric, Whitehair attempted to establish himself as a non-politician with considerable executive talents who would solve the state‘s problems by increasing governmental responsibility while reducing regulator interference in the lives of its citizens.60 Whitehair‘s most formidable opponent, Spessard L. Holland, seemed the antithesis of the political outsider. Having served Polk county at various times as prosecuting attorney, county judge, and state senator, Holland ran on his record. While not as experienced or well-funded as the DeLand candidate‘s organization, Holland‘s campaign operation managed to push their candidate into contention for frontrunner status early in the race. An observer compared the two staffs and noted,

Holland, on the other hand, has an organization which makes up in enthusiasm what it may lack in financial resources. His boys may blow an occasional sour note, but the band is playing all the time.

Much like the Whitehair campaign, Holland employed a newspaper veteran, former Pensacola Journal editor Sam Ellis, as publicity manager.61 Holland‘s organization, while lacking in resources and experience, possessed a wealth of energy and zeal. Holland‘s candidacy benefited from the stalwart support of several of his senate colleagues and others with strong political connections. Senate President J. Turner Butler, of Duval, Senator Ernest R. Graham of Dade, Senator H. B. Coulter of Levy, and D. Stuart Gillis of Walton backed the Bartow native‘s gubernatorial bid. Former U.S. Senator William L. Hill chaired the ―Holland-for-Governor‖ campaign committee in Alachua county. Additionally,

59 Florida Times-Union, 13 April 1940.

60 Ibid.

61 Miami Herald, 14 April 1940; (Daytona Beach) Observer, 6 January 1940.

34 Senator Hill, Senate President Butler, and Tampa Tribune editor Ed Lambright served as advisors to Holland.62 In order to finish in one of the two top spots in the first primary, and thereby earn a spot in the second primary, Holland needed to counter the Whitehair-Whitaker forces in Tampa, the state‘s third largest city. Peter O. Knight, ―lawyer…businessman…philanthropist…real estate tycoon…political kingpin,‖ and founder of Tampa Electric Company came to Holland‘s aid. As a stubborn political adversary of Sen. Pat Whitaker, Knight made a natural ally for Holland. Additionally, Holland‘s electoral battle for Tampa benefited from the endorsement of . In addition to the Tampa daily, the Miami Herald, Miami Daily News, St. Petersburg Times, and Volusia county‘s Daytona Beach News Journal gave the Bartow senator their editorial approval.63 The Holland organization featured a vigorous staff and solid support from political leaders and state newspapers. Holland‘s platform planks relied upon an active government to address several long standing problems plaguing the state. The Bartow native advocated expanded old age assistance through an increased tax on horse and dog tracks, safer highways, continuation of the prohibition on poll taxes in state elections, creation of the National Park, state aid for economic development, state regulation of salary buyers, repeal of the gross receipts tax, and better working conditions for labor. Additionally, Holland promised ―liberal-minded and tolerant governmental policies in regard to tourists, but a firm hand against racketeers and gangsters.‖ Holland‘s campaign emphasized his platform derived from his years of experience in Florida government.64 As the candidate with the most extensive political record, Holland drew criticism for his votes on controversial issues considered during his tenure. Holland‘s vote against a 1935 bill to impose a special tax on chain stores attracted particular attention from opponents. Political rivals portrayed Holland‘s opposition to the 1935 Florida Recovery Act as evidence he favored the interests of national chain stores over local businesses, and charged him with being a ―yes man‖

62 Daytona Beach Evening News, 30 January 1940; Florida Times-Union, 6 March 1940; Spessard L. Holland to Kenneth Ballinger, 2 December 1939, Holland Papers, University of Florida, Box 67, FF General Correspondence.

63 Jacksonville American, 2 February 1940; Tampa Morning Tribune, 25 September 1994; Florida Times-Union, 6 May 1940.

64 Tampa Daily Times, 4 March 1940; Florida Times-Union, 1 March 1940; St. Petersburg Times, 25 April 1940.

35 for the larger merchants. Holland defended his record, pointing out the chain store tax, while designed to give small Florida merchants an edge against multiple outlet interstate competitors, ―would have added at least ten per cent to the cost of living in Florida.‖ Additionally, Holland argued passage of the bill, christened the ―Wreckover‖ Act by the state press corps, invited economic retaliation by other states, and discouraged out-of-state investment in Florida. Furthermore, Holland claimed to have won the support of ―many thousands of independent merchants‖ through his opposition to a state sales tax and promise to repeal the gross receipts tax. Holland parried attacks on his record by explaining his votes and pointing to the support of the group he supposedly had angered.65 The Holland organization dealt with two additional criticisms in very different ways – by refuting one and embracing the other. Campaign rumor linked Holland with the powerful and influential duPont-Ed Ball interests. When queried by a Duval county voter about his ties to the duPont organization, Holland sent the following reply,

As to the duPont interests, I beg to assure you positively that I am not receiving their support, either financial or otherwise. I have consistently opposed a sales tax throughout my eight years in the Senate and have also strongly opposed the Ball plan for a constitutional amendment to abolish ad valorem taxes. I have been told by Mr. Ball direct that he could not support me because of my stand on taxation.66

Holland‘s freedom from obligation to Ball and the Crummer bond interests, who publicly backed Whitehair, allowed the Bartow senator to position himself as a truly independent candidate. The Holland organization faced a different challenge in dealing with perceptions of their candidate as a ―bluenose‖ or puritan in his personal life because of his well known support for prohibition and active membership in the Methodist Church. Initially fearful of the political effect of the strait- laced label, Holland eventually viewed it as a political asset, particularly in South Florida. Kenneth Ballinger, Miami attorney and Holland supporter, counseled the candidate,

Some may regard you as strait-laced, but that the element which might deplore that quality wasn‘t the one that elected the last governor, and under the circumstances probably won‘t elect the next one…I consider it more of an asset

65 For the Florida Recovery Act (SB 101) see Florida, Senate, Journal, Twenty-fourth Session, 1935 (Tallahassee, Fla: n.p., 1935), 24; St. Petersburg Times, 25 April 1940; Florida Times-Union, 3 May 1940.

66 Spessard L. Holland to Mrs. Malcolm McClellan, 18 March 1940, Holland Papers, University of Florida, Box 67, FF General Correspondence.

36 than otherwise that you are not one who sways this way and that with the racket crowds down here.67

After considering his advice, Holland wrote to Ballinger,

I believe you are wholly right with reference to my designation as ‗strait-laced,‘ and I believe it is an excellent political strategy to so classify me particularly in the Miami area…. I have always made it a matter of some personal pride that I could claim close friends in every group of people, and that I have never allowed my own personal way of living to interfere with my appreciation of others and my ability to work with them and for things they considered important. I want to be classed always as tolerant and liberal but never to such a degree as to have anyone doubt my willingness to fight always for decency and honesty in government which has always been a ‗first‘ objective with me.68

In embracing the strict designation, Holland positioned himself alongside fellow gubernatorial candidate Reverend James Barbee, an anti-gambling, anti-racketeering reformer from Jacksonville. Recognizing he would compete with Barbee for the same sector of the electorate, Holland queried Ballinger, ―Do you think that Barbee‘s announcement will hurt me materially?‖ Ballinger replied, ―I don‘t think Barbee will have much effect. A crusading parson is not very effective as a vote-getter.‖69 While employing very different tactics, the Holland organization dealt with both challenges in ways that emphasized their candidate‘s independence from the influence of the duPont empire and south Florida racketeers. The 1940 campaign of Fuller Warren, once known as the boy orator of west Florida, featured an ambitious populist platform promising state government providing ―its citizens protection, prosperity and happiness.‖ The Jacksonville legislator promised lower electric rates through state regulation of utilities, opposition to ―a sales tax in any form, guise, or camouflage in which it may be presented,‖ a state fence law, and tourism promotion. Additionally, Warren made an extraordinary promise to ―…use the power of the office of Governor to create a winning

67 Kenneth Ballinger to Spessard L. Holland, 20 November 1939. Spessard L. Holland Papers, University of Florida, Box 67, FF General Correspondence, Bak-Ban.

68 Holland to Ballinger, 21 November 1939, Holland Papers, University of Florida, Box 67, FF Bak-Ban.

69 Holland to Ballinger, 21 November 1939, Holland Papers; Ballinger to Holland, 21 November 1939, Holland Papers.

37 football team at the University of Florida….‖70 Warren‘s platform promised vigorous government intervention on a number of fronts. As a campaigner the thirty-five year old Warren possessed the advantages of youth, energy, and eloquence. Allen Morris compared him to Sidney Catts, ―the greatest rabble-rouser this state had known.‖ Warren‘s opponents took a slightly different view of his speaking style, referring to him as ―Fuller Bull‖ because of his predisposition to oratorical excess.71 Warren‘s platform played well in some areas of the state and poorly in others. Observers expected Warren to draw strong support in his home county of Duval and those mostly rural counties west of Tallahassee where his populist platform attracted voters. Warren anticipated earning the allegiance of the state‘s younger voters. The Warren campaign appeared most vulnerable in the cattle regions of central and south Florida. Additionally, pundits questioned Warren‘s capacity to compete for votes with opponents possessing established reputations and extensive records such as those of Whitehair, Holland, and St. Augustine Mayor Walter B. Fraser.72 Questions and rumors about the identities and sincerity of Warren‘s campaign backers persisted throughout the campaign and undermined the candidate‘s chances of success. Warren appeared to have the public backing and support of Fred ―Kingfish‖ Valz, ―the potentate of city politics in the Duval metropolis.‖ Despite this, rumors claimed either Warren‘s gubernatorial campaign was really intended to position him to run for mayor of Jacksonville, or Valz and others had run the Duval legislator for the purpose of weakening the Whitehair campaign through repeated attacks on his connections to the bond interests.73 If this was not sufficient intrigue, a $10,000 donation to Warren‘s campaign from a law firm tied to the duPont interests convinced many observers of an alliance with Ed Ball.74 The inability of the Warren camp to defuse these rumors reflected weakness or inefficiency in the all important campaign organization. Regardless of their validity, these rumors likely further undermined the potential

70 Florida Times-Union, 4 January 1940.

71 Miami Herald, 20 August 1939; Daytona Beach Evening News, 8 January 1940.

72 Daytona Beach Evening News, 8 January 1940.

73 Tampa Evening News, 30 December 1939; Miami Herald, 10 September 1939; Sarasota Herald Tribune, 2 February 1940.

74 Sarasota Herald Tribune, 23 February 1940.

38 of a campaign already weakened by the candidate‘s relative inexperience, a narrow populist platform, the antagonism of the cattle industry, and limited geographic base. Prior to the commencement of the campaign political observers expected Walter B. Fraser, mayor of St. Augustine, to run at the front of the pack. Fraser possessed experience, a good record of service to his community, sufficient personal wealth to finance his campaign, and the backing of his hometown. Unfortunately, Fraser, while an able municipal politician and public servant, did not reveal these strengths in the gubernatorial race. Described as shy and modest on the stump, he had difficulty with the little things that made an effective campaigner, like remembering the names of people he met. Recognizing his liabilities as a campaigner, Fraser surrounded himself with experienced and able staffers. William T. Comer, Orlando resident and ex-commander of the state joined Fraser‘s state campaign staff as field manager. The organization added Comer in hopes of aiding Fraser in connecting with audiences at public appearances. The Fraser campaign emulated the practice of employing newspaper men in key positions by hiring Rex Salter, former business manager of the Florida State News, as campaign manager. Fraser‘s hometown newspaper, the St. Augustine Record, endorsed his candidacy and predicted he would enjoy the same success as governor he had as mayor of St. Augustine.75 Fraser campaigned on a platform of applying business principles to government. By employing business methods, Fraser promised to stimulate commerce, increase tourism, and realize greater profits from citrus through reduced regulation. Fraser planned to energize the tourism industry through ―a judicious and sustained national publicity and advertising campaign.‖ A major component of Fraser‘s program envisioned stimulation of gas tax revenues by reducing auto tag license fees to three dollars. The St. Augustine mayor dismissed critics charges that reduced tag sales would cut funding for state schools (tag revenues augmented educational funding), claiming that more numerous auto registrations would result and yield higher gas tax revenues.76 The biggest questions surrounding the Fraser campaign focused on the candidate‘s ability to sell the program rather than the platform itself.

75 Miami Herald, 3 March 1940; Florida Times-Union, 19 February 1940; Daytona Beach Evening News, 26 February 1940.

76 ―Let‘s Develop Florida,‖ Fraser campaign pamphlet, Holland Papers, University of Florida, Box 148, FF Walter B. Fraser; Florida Times-Union, 21, 24 March 1940.

39 Anti-slot machine, pro-integrity candidate James Barbee ran a modest race for the governorship and against the forces of vice and corruption. The candidate expressed one of his main themes, honesty in government in a letter mailed to potential supporters,

Since I am not a politician, my purpose is to serve the whole State instead of being just an errand boy for the political machines. No matter what your needs, they will best be served by a man of integrity who will not sell you out. State government can become an efficient business rather than a political racket. Many people are saying ‗It‘s time for a change.‘

The platform pamphlets accompanying these letters emphasized the many benefits his administration would bring through honest government, as well as a crusade against corruption and vice. Arguing that racketeers hurt tourism, commerce, and reasonable taxation, Barbee committed to driving the lawless element out of the state. The Jacksonville minister‘s platform also included a plan to create a south Florida branch of the governor‘s office ―so citizens could transact business without making a trip to Tallahassee.‖77 Clearly an idealist, Barbee ran an idealist‘s campaign. West Palm Beach attorney and 1936 gubernatorial candidate B. F. Paty ran on an audacious platform in 1940 but had to contend with rumors regarding his backers. Paty advocated immediate tax code revision as his primary goal, promising to tackle the problem after his nomination in May rather than wait for inauguration. Paty‘s program incorporated several other unique planks, including the endowment of public education ―with the mineral and oil rights reserved in all state owned lands, hereafter disposed of by the state,‖ development of resources and port facilities to increase trade with South America, and the allocation of lands reverting to the state due to tax delinquency for single family subsistence farms. Paty‘s candidacy, always considered a dark horse effort, suffered following press reports that ―the duPont dynasty in Florida coupled with the utility interests headed by Colonel Peter O. Knight of Tampa were large factors‖ in his campaign. Paty‘s campaign, despite several innovative ideas, lacked the momentum to overcome the rumored associations with the duPont interests and Peter O. Knight, and the head start of the leading candidates.78

77 James Barbee to Marvin Walker, 13 December 1939, Holland Papers, University of Florida, Box 148, FF James Barbee; ―Platform of James Barbee for Governor,‖ Holland Papers, Box 148, FF James Barbee.

78 ―B. F. Paty: Candidate for Governor,‖ pamphlet, Holland Papers, Box 148, FF B. F. Paty; (Jacksonville) Herald Tribune, 5 April 1940.

40 Burton Shoepf also fit the mold of a dark horse candidate with innovative ideas. The Tampa businessman ran on his ties to the Townsend Pension Plan and hoped to draw support from the state‘s Townsend clubs and many retired residents. Additionally, Shoepf advocated equalization of state taxes through the creation of the office of tax commissioner, construction of a national highway system to aid national defense with federal funding, and utility regulation. Handicappers gave Schoepf little chance of making an impact due, in part, to the unpredictability of the Townsend affiliated vote.79 Running under the campaign slogan ―From the Orphan‘s Home to the Governor‘s Mansion,‖ Hans Walker, of Ocala, led all candidates in sentimental, if not electoral, interest. An orphan and ward of the Children‘s Home Society of Florida, Walker claimed he ―want[ed] to be governor of the state because he [felt] grateful for what the state did for him in giving him a home.‖ Walker‘s platform advocated increased teacher salaries, improved highways, reduction in business and citrus regulation, state aid to the cattle industry, and no new taxes. Walker‘s campaign literature summarized his program as ―The Golden Rule, common horse sense, and practical business management.‖ Walker ran a modest campaign based mainly upon his personal appeal and drawing little attention outside of his hometown of Ocala.80 Gubernatorial candidate John H. Clancey of Panama City ran a confrontational campaign centered on opposition to the Roy E. Crummer bond interests and its perceived candidate Francis P. Whitehair. Clancey, a self-described ―reformed corporate lawyer,‖ denounced the ―bond racketeers‖ in literature and speeches. He warned ―if Crummer can clamp one of his attorneys in the governor‘s office you might as well change the name of this state to the state of Crummer.‖ Clancey directed his inflammatory rhetoric at other targets, including the duPonts, carpetbag bond speculators, and ―a few Judas Iscariots of labor…trying to hand organized labor over to the Mouthpiece of some Bond House Shylocks.‖ By employing such aggressively negative campaign tactics, Clancey scored hits on his opponents and made for sensational news copy, but offered little to attract voters to his own candidacy.81

79 Florida Times-Union, 26 March 1940; Miami Herald, 17 September 1939.

80 Palatka Daily News, 16 March 1940; Florida Times-Union, 21 January 1940.

81 Lakeland News, 15 December 1939; Sarasota Herald Tribune, 11 December 1939; ―My Platform‖ pamphlet, Holland Papers, Box 148, FF James H. Clancey.

41 Crystal River resident Frederick Van Roy conducted a brief low key campaign based on radical changes in state government. Van Roy‘s platform, announced in April 1940, included the legalization and state-regulation of gambling, with revenues from a gaming tax to benefit public education. Revenues from gambling would also enable the state to underwrite larger pensions for the aged and infirm. Van Roy also advocated relocating the state capitol to , and the abolition of the state‘s automobile tag system. Van Roy‘s program, while innovative, brought little notice from the press, his opponents, or the voting public.82 Wakulla county lumberman Carl Maples, a veteran of the 1936 gubernatorial primary, ran in 1940 as an advocate of ―local self-government.‖ Maples referred to himself as ―an old line Democrat who believes in God and the Bible, free men and free enterprise.‖ A champion of ―less law – more business,‖ Maples appeared to have some support among his fellow lumbermen in Wakulla county.83 As the 7 May primary drew near candidates intensified efforts to reach the voters and veteran political observers speculated on the many ways of stealing an election. In a pre-election editorial the Daytona Beach Evening News discussed several effective methods for perpetrating vote fraud and suggested one means of preventing it,

Machines can be tampered with, no machine can stop ‗repeating,‘ negroes registered as Republicans can be allowed to vote in the white Democratic primary. The best way to insure a clean primary in Volusia county, and perhaps elsewhere in Florida, is to obtain the services of the FBI,…which guarded the polls in the recent primary in Louisiana.

The Volusia paper cautioned vigilance against attempts to steal the primary election. As if to confirm the prescience of the Daytona Beach Evening News editor, a minor furor arose over the ballot in Volusia county. The names of certain candidates, including Francis P. Whitehair and other Possum Club candidates, appeared on the printed ballots in bolder type than that of their opponents. Volusia County Judge John E. Peacock notified Secretary of State Robert A. Gray of the irregularity appearing to favor candidates of the county machine. An

82 Florida Times-Union, 23 April 1940.

83 Tampa Sunday Tribune, 14 April 1940; Florida Times-Union, 7 May 1940.

42 investigation reported certain names had to be printed in bold face type to fit them on the ballot because of length. Gray ordered the ballots reprinted with all names in uniform type.84 After receiving petitions requesting state supervision of the Volusia county election, Judge Peacock requested action by Secretary Gray‘s office. Gray refused on the grounds his office had complied with state law in investigating the earlier ballot complaint and inspecting the voting machines. Peacock subsequently persuaded the state supreme court to allow poll watchers to observe voting machine precincts in Volusia county. However, county officials denied the poll watchers access to the polling places on the grounds the court order did not compel admission. Despite the exclusion of the observers only a few reports of unverified voting irregularities occurred.85 Following the official vote count, Spessard L. Holland finished first with 118,962 votes, Francis P. Whitehair second with 95,431 votes, and Fuller Warren third with 83,316 votes.86 As the top finishing candidates, Holland and Whitehair prepared for the second primary. At the same time, the campaign ended for Warren and the other candidates. Due to the extreme atomization of Florida politics, electoral success required the unification of several diverse factions behind a candidate. Advancement required an alliance among various, and sometimes overlapping, economic, geographic, and demographic groups. The broader and more encompassing the alliance, the better for the candidate‘s electoral potential. Analysis of election returns from the first gubernatorial primary of 1940 indicated the extent of several factors – economic, geographic, and demographic – presumed to be important in Florida politics of that period. Furthermore, the interrelation of electoral with census data also indicated the effectiveness of the candidates‘ campaign platforms and ability to sell themselves to the voters. Additionally, examination of voting patterns tested the assumptions regarding support of the candidates by bloc voting groups. Electoral success among the state‘s urban population constituted a key to advancement in the primary. The three counties with the largest urban populations were Dade, with 161,031 (16

84 Daytona Beach Evening News, 9 April, 1 May 1940; Tampa Morning Tribune, 2 May 1940.

85 Daytona Beach Evening News, 5, 6, 7 May 1940.

86 Annie Marie Hartsfield and Elston E. Roady, Florida Votes, 1920-1962:Selected Election Statistics (Tallahassee, Fla.: Institute of Governmental Research, 1963), 70.

43 per cent of the state‘s urban population); Duval with 148,202 (15 per cent); and Hillsborough with 108,547 (11 per cent).87 B. F. Paty won a plurality of Dade county‘s gubernatorial primary votes with 37 per cent, followed by Francis P. Whitehair‘s 26 per cent, Spessard L. Holland‘s 21 per cent, and Fuller Warren‘s 6 per cent. Paty‘s success in Dade probably resulted in part from ―friends and neighbor‖ support for the south Floridian and Palm Beach county resident. Other voters likely approved of the anti-regulation, pro-business programs of Paty and Whitehair for economic reasons. Some Dade county resident undoubtedly voted against Holland fearing the effect of a church-going Methodist with a reputation as a ―blue-nose‖ on the region‘s tourism industry.88 Duval county voters supported their hometown candidates, awarding Fuller Warren a plurality of 27 per cent and James Barbee 21 per cent. Spessard L. Holland ran third with 20 per cent and Francis P. Whitehair finished fourth with 14 per cent of the Duval total. Given Warren‘s narrow victory over Barbee it appeared Duval county political leader Freddy ―Kingfish‖ Valz failed to deliver a significant local voting bloc in the primary.89 State Senator Spessard L. Holland won Hillsborough county with 28 per cent of that county‘s vote, followed by Francis P. Whitehair with 21 per cent, and Walter B. Fraser with 16 per cent. Holland‘s relatively narrow victory over Whitehair indicated the competitiveness of the campaign for Hillsborough‘s gubernatorial votes. The contest between Tampa Electric Company president Peter O. Knight and the political machine of state Senator Pat Whitaker underpinned the primary election. Holland‘s victory indicated effective support from the Knight and anti- Whitaker forces.90 Examination of primary results by geographic region provided another means of interpreting primary results. Herbert J. Doherty, Jr. observed ―pattern(s) of liberal-conservative voter alignment‖ appeared in Florida ―in races … fought around clearly liberal or conservative issues and in which the voter had a clear choice before him.‖ Doherty argued that the counties of north and west Florida exhibited economically liberal and socially conservative tendencies. He

87 The state‘s urban population totaled 989,743. Florida, Sixth Census, 65.

88 Primary Election Returns.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

44 attributed this predisposition to economic liberalism to these regions‘ earlier support of the Populist Party and the Farmers‘ Alliance movement, reliance upon staple crop agriculture, the persistence of farm tenancy, and beneficial effects of the New Deal agricultural programs. Despite these tendencies, Doherty pointed out these counties ―often vote[d] conservative when social questions are prominent, particularly if social questions are brought up in times of prosperity.‖ The status of African Americans presented the most pressing social question in north and west Florida due to the higher proportion of black population, and, therefore, the perceived necessity of preserving white hegemony.91 Conversely, Doherty described south Florida as a center of economic conservatism and social liberalism. He ascribed this to large numbers of immigrants from northern states and the stability of south Florida‘s agricultural base. The region‘s main crops of citrus, cattle, and vegetable produce withstood market fluctuations and surpluses better than the staple crops of cotton and tobacco. As a result, south Florida farmers tended to view government regulation as a hindrance. Doherty also noted south Florida tended to be more socially liberal than north Florida, largely due to the less numerous African American population. According to Doherty, south Floridians viewed the threat of black encroachment on white political, economic, and social dominance as less severe in their region because of the smaller African American population.92 While the first gubernatorial primary of 1940 did not present clearly defined liberal or conservative choices to the electorate, voting patterns demonstrated certain general regional preferences which coincided with Doherty‘s model. Doherty‘s model designated panhandle counties west of the Suwannee River as west Florida; those counties east of the Suwannee and north of the northern boundaries of Citrus, Sumter, Lake, and Volusia counties comprised north Florida; and the remaining counties made up south Florida.93

91 Doherty associated social conservatism with opposition to civil rights programs and opposition to the repeal of prohibition. Reduced resistance to increased African American participation in society, as well as greater acceptance of the legalization of alcohol and gambling constituted social liberalism. Doherty tied support for economic programs to benefit farmers through promotion of high commodities prices with economic liberalism. He defined economic conservatism as opposition to and a lack of dependence upon government regulation and aid. Herbert J. Doherty, Jr. ―Liberal and Conservative Voting Patterns in Florida,‖ The Journal of Politics, 14, no. 3 (1952): 403-404, 407.

92 Ibid., 407-408.

93 Ibid., 408.

45 In socially conservative but economically liberal west Florida Fuller Warren carried thirteen of twenty-one counties and 32,670 votes. Spessard L. Holland won six counties and 22,514 votes. Francis P. Whitehair prevailed in one west Florida county (Wakulla) and earned 16,790 of the region‘s votes. B. F. Paty also carried a single west Florida county (Walton) and 9,894 of the region‘s votes. Reverend James Barbee earned the fifth highest vote total with 8,513, but failed to carry a county in the region.94 In north Florida, Fuller Warren earned the largest vote total (21,448), but carried only three of fifteen counties. Spessard L. Holland followed closely with 19,978 votes and seven counties. James Barbee won 14,816 of the region‘s votes without carrying a county. Francis P. Whitehair took 14,103 votes, but no counties, and Walter B. Fraser garnered 12,994 votes and two counties. Hans Walker won two counties and 8,639 votes.95 Spessard L. Holland won 76,470 votes and fifteen of thirty-one counties in the populous south Florida region. Francis P. Whitehair polled 64,538 votes and carried only three of the region‘s counties, while B. F. Paty earned pluralities in eight south Florida counties and 59,829 votes. Fuller Warren won 29,198 votes and three counties.96 Of the four top candidates in the first primary – Holland, Whitehair, Warren, and Paty – Warren clearly won the west Florida region. Warren‘s regional total of 32,670 votes accounted for 32 per cent of the region‘s total gubernatorial first primary votes. Holland polled 22 per cent of the region‘s votes. Whitehair earned 17 per cent, and Paty attracted 10 per cent. Warren also ran well in north Florida, polling 22 per cent of the region‘s votes, followed by Holland with 20 per cent, Whitehair with 14 per cent, and Paty with 6 per cent. Warren‘s success in these economically liberal, socially conservative regions derived from his populist platform – advocating regulation of utility rates, opposing cattle on the highways, higher taxes, and promising a championship football team at the University of Florida (Warren carried Alachua county by 1,167 votes over fellow alumnus Holland) – and his rabble rousing speeches. Additionally, Warren also benefited from ―friends and neighbor‖ support in west and north Florida as a result of his connections to both Calhoun and Duval counties. The success of

94 Primary Election Returns.

95 Ibid.

96 Ibid.

46 Reverend James Barbee, the anti-vice and anti-racketeering candidate, in north Florida mirrored the region‘s social conservatism. By garnering 15 per cent of the votes Barbee out polled Whitehair and Paty in the region.97 Spessard L. Holland led all candidates in south Florida with 76,470 votes, accounting for 27 per cent of the region‘s votes. Francis P. Whitehair came in a close second with 64,538 votes and 23 per cent; B. F. Paty followed in third place with 59,829 and 21 per cent; and Fuller Warren a distant fourth with 29,198 and 10 per cent of the regional vote total. Holland emerged victorious in south Florida despite his legislative record favoring governmental and his personal social conservatism. Holland‘s success suggested he not only successfully defended his legislative record against attack, but ably turned it to his advantage. Platform planks supporting completion of the , state aid for economic development, repeal of the gross receipts tax, and the promotion of tourism while suppressing racketeers may have also contributed to Holland‘s win in the region. The strong showing of economic conservatives Whitehair and Paty appeared to confirm Doherty‘s premise of regional liberal-conservative voting patterns.98 The proportion of the leading candidates‘ vote totals derived from south Florida demonstrated the importance of success in that populous region. Sixty-four per cent of the 118,962 votes accrued by first place finisher Holland came from south Florida, 17 per cent from north Florida, and 19 per cent from west Florida. Runner-up Francis P. Whitehair garnered 68 per cent of his 95,431 vote total in the southern region, 15 per cent in the northern region, and 17 per cent in the western counties. Significantly, third-place finisher Fuller Warren earned only 35 per cent of his total of 83,316 in south Florida, but 26 per cent in north Florida, and 39 per cent in west Florida. Fourth-place finisher B. F. Paty earned 79 per cent of his 75,608 vote total in the south, 8 per cent in the north, and 13 per cent in the west.99 Regional balance appeared to contribute to Spessard L. Holland‘s ascendancy in the first gubernatorial primary. No other candidate matched his feat of winning at least 20 per cent of the total vote in each of the three regions: 22 per cent in the west; 20 per cent in the north; and 27 per

97 Primary Election Returns.

98 Primary Election Returns.

99 Ibid.

47 cent in the south. Whitehair, by comparison, polled only 17 per cent of the western region‘s total vote, a meager 14 per cent in the northern region, and a healthy 23 per cent in the southern region. Warren drew a substantial 32 per cent of the west‘s vote, a respectable 22 per cent in the north, but only 10 per cent in the south. The regional support for Warren virtually mirrored that of the Whitehair and Paty campaigns. Whereas the former ran well in the west and north Florida regions and faltered in south Florida; the latter ran poorly in west and north Florida while drawing well in south Florida.100 While the two candidates perceived as frontrunners prevailed in the first primary the order of finish surprised some observers. Despite possessing many advantages – ample funding, labor support, and an experienced campaign organization – Whitehair could not match Holland‘s appeal in north and west Florida. Potential factors in Whitehair‘s failure to do better in these counties included his economic conservatism, the stigma of bossism from his association with Volusia‘s Possum Club and Sen. Pat Whitaker, and his close association with the bond interests. Fuller Warren‘s assault on Whitehair‘s background badly damaged the DeLand attorney. Despite these liabilities Whitehair made it to the second primary. It remained to be seen whether his campaign could overcome these weaknesses and Senator Spessard L. Holland to win the Democratic nomination for governor. Following the first primary political observers noted several trends appearing to foreshadow shifts in Florida gubernatorial politics. The first, a record number of votes cast in a Florida election – 486,327, an increase of more than seventy-one thousand over the previous record of 415,000 set just two years earlier in 1938 – likely reflected the effect of poll tax repeal and increased state population. The second, the relative ineffectiveness of the notorious Whitaker and Possum Club machines, probably resulting, at least in part, from poll tax repeal. The third – the German Wehrmacht‘s onslaught on France and the Low Countries – cast a shadow of uncertainty over the future. These three elements – high voter participation, anti- machine sentiment, and the European war – along with others, would significantly influence the outcome of the second gubernatorial primary.101

100 Ibid.

101 Tampa Morning Tribune, 16 May 1940; St. Petersburg Times, 16 May 1940; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 10, 17 May 1940; Miami Herald, 10 May 1940.

48 Editorial analysis of the first primary suggested a direct relationship between high voter participation and the travails of the political machines. The Tampa Morning Tribune noted the machines fared best with low voter turnout because their supporters, while in the minority, displayed unusual levels of loyalty. Large numbers of non-aligned voters, especially if voting against the machine ticket, tended to negate that advantage. The Tribune described the first primary results as ―an impressive victory for the people against the bosses on practically all fronts.‖ After studying the first primary results, the concluded,

The Whitaker-Silva organization has proven much less powerful than it has been and much less powerful than it was reputed to be this year…. The identification of this and other machines with the [gubernatorial] campaign has resulted in a sharp division among Florida voters so that there is in progress a permanent alignment without precedent.

Observers watched the second primary for signs of this predicted realignment.102 Holland and Whitehair began their campaigns for the second primary by acknowledging their supporters. Holland issued a statement thanking the voters and defining the results as a sign Floridians wanted ―clean, economical, and progressive government for the next four years.‖ Holland noted with pride, ―No appeal was made by my friends or myself … on the demerits of any candidate. This victory is all the more pleasing because it was won cleanly.‖ Holland‘s refusal to engage in personal attacks allowed him to solicit the endorsements of eliminated candidates and their supporters. Holland‘s strategy bore fruit when several campaign leaders for Hans Walker, Walter B. Fraser, Fuller Warren, and B. F. Paty from the crucial Tampa area announced they supported Holland.103 Francis P. Whitehair also acknowledged his supporters following the first primary. The Whitehair campaign released a statement interpreting his second place finish as indicating interest in ―our program to give the government back to the people.‖ This suggested the DeLand attorney would continue to offer his campaign as an alternative to the status quo in Tallahassee.104

102 Tampa Morning Tribune, 9, 10 May 1940; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 17 May 1940.

103 Tampa Morning Tribune, 9 May 1940; Miami Herald, 9 May 1940; Florida Times-Union, 13 May 1940.

104 Tampa Morning Tribune, 11 May 1940; Florida Times-Union, 11 May 1940.

49 Many observers considered Whitehair‘s second place finish an underachievement given the campaign‘s numerous assets and speculated about his strategy and tactics in the second round. Pundits predicted Whitehair would continue to utilize his funding edge to spend lavishly on print and radio advertisements, and continue his aggressive rhetorical attacks on his opponent. Allen Morris, noting Holland had so far parried attacks on his senatorial record, expected Whitehair to portray his opponent as a social conservative. The issue of social conservatism remained very important to the tourism centers of south Florida. Spectators wondered how the Whitehair campaign would respond in the second primary. Whitehair began the second primary with renewed and reinvigorated attacks against his opponent. Speaking in Tampa on 14 May, apparently perturbed by his second place finish in the initial primary, Whitehair portrayed Holland as the candidate of ―‗an invisible government‘ of duPont interests, chain stores, and a fertilizer trust.‖ The DeLand attorney also lashed out at the state‘s major newspapers, whom he accused of ―racketeering in unanimity of thought‖ because of their near universal endorsement of his opponent.105 Whitehair continued to wage an aggressive campaign, denouncing Holland‘s record and alleging the senator fronted for nefarious interests seeking to control of the state. In speeches, statements, and radio broadcasts Whitehair sought to hammer home the charge that Holland participated in a ―gigantic conspiracy…to steal the state government of Florida away from the people.‖ At the same time, Whitehair proclaimed his own independence from either politicians or vested interests. Despite Holland‘s previous success in deflecting criticism of his record and the general perception of him as a highly principled person, Whitehair‘s second primary strategy focused on attacking these areas.106 Meanwhile, Holland portrayed his opponent as a machine politician and cautioned supporters against complacency. Speaking in Leesburg on 16 May, Holland warned the state‘s political bosses, have their backs to the wall …. Machine politicians are desperate in this campaign. As machines they will poll their full strength, rain or shine, and our only protection is to keep ‗on our toes,‘ so that we can get out every vote for clean and progressive government.

105 Tampa Morning Tribune, 15 May 1940.

106 Tampa Morning Tribune, 15 May 1940; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14 May 1940; Miami Herald, 15 May 1940; Florida Times-Union, 19 May 1940.

50

In other appearances Holland reminded audiences of the notorious political machines in Missouri and Louisiana, the damage inflicted on those states, and the difficulty of eliminating machines once established.107 Holland‘s second primary strategy focused on Whitehair‘s ties to the political organizations in Volusia and Hillsborough counties. News of the German invasion of France dominated the front pages of Florida newspapers even during the heated second primary campaign. Both gubernatorial candidates discussed their plans and policies for governing the state during an international crisis, and the effect of the European war on American defense. Spessard L. Holland, speaking in Miami on 14 May, reminded his audience of his service in the previous war and said he would pursue three aims if the United States became involved in the present conflict. The Bartow senator promised to keep politics out of the state National Guard, to ensure service men from Florida received every comfort and consideration, and to ―urge the establishment and expansion of military and naval institutions in the state,‖ as well as ―cooperate with the national government in every way in promoting the preparedness program.‖ Referring to the coming election, Holland warned democracy was ―on trial in Florida as it is elsewhere in the world,‖ and the ―state must have the kind of government which will command respect of all the people.‖108 Whitehair also emphasized national defense in his campaign. In appearances in Tallahassee and Madison on 18 May, Whitehair sought to associate himself with President Roosevelt. Whitehair declared if war came to the United States, ―I hope that Franklin D. Roosevelt, the greatest president of them all, will be up there at the helm.‖ Whitehair‘s invocation of the president came at a time of great speculation and uncertainty about Roosevelt‘s intentions and his potential successor.109 Without offering specifics, the DeLand attorney

107 Miami Herald, 17 May 1940; Tampa Morning Tribune, 17 May 1940; Florida Times-Union, 18 May 1940; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14 May 1940.

108 Florida Times-Union, 15 May 1940; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 15 May 1940; Tampa Morning Tribune, 15 May 1940.

109 At the time of the state Democratic primaries in May 1940 President Roosevelt had not announced whether he would run for an unprecedented third term or not. Historian Jean Edward Smith suggests isolationist sentiment in Congress and the Republican‘s nomination of Wendell Willkie convinced Roosevelt to seek another term in office. Jean Edward Smith, FDR (New York: Random House, 2007), 441-444, 446-447, 456-457.

51 promised a ―strong, vigorous, understanding, and co-operative government‖ for Florida as a means of combating both domestic and foreign threats to democracy.110 From the beginning of the second primary, Holland demonstrated greater ability to attract the supporters and campaign workers of the eliminated candidates. This resulted from Holland‘s refusal to engage in personal attacks and his focus on the merits of his program. Additionally, the pervasive perception of Whitehair as a machine politician and the strong anti-machine sentiment among the electorate also contributed to the migration of support to Holland. As the second primary approached its conclusion Holland attracted additional support from backers and campaign workers previously aligned with eliminated candidates. In particular, the campaign welcomed crossover support from those areas carried by Whitehair in the first primary. As the race entered its final week Holland received crucial endorsements from key areas. State Senator Amos Lewis, Fuller Warren‘s godfather and Jackson county campaign manager, announced his endorsement of Holland during the candidate‘s 18 May appearance in the north Florida community of Marianna. J. B. Powell, state campaign manager for B. F. Paty‘s campaign, subsequently announced a widespread swing to Holland among the former members of his organization. These two endorsements potentially bolstered Holland‘s support in both north and south Florida.111 The Whitehair campaign also drew supporters from the ranks of the eliminated candidates. Charles Warwick, law partner of B. F. Paty endorsed the DeLand attorney at a West Palm Beach appearance. The Whitehair organization also claimed to have the support of numerous first primary backers of James Barbee, Walter Fraser, B. F. Paty, and Fuller Warren. Furthermore, according to the Whitehair campaign, Florida‘s business and industrial leaders had ―taken the gloves off and were hitting on all twelve cylinders to get the votes out for the people‘s candidate.‖112

110 St. Petersburg Times, 15 October 1940; Tampa Sunday Tribune, 19 May 1940; Florida Times-Union, 19 May 1940. Then Judge Holland campaigned for then Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt during the 1932 presidential campaign. ―Dry Law‘s Repeal Is Looming, Young Democracy Hears,‖ undated newspaper clipping, Holland Papers, University of Florida, Box 25, FF Politics 1932 (2).

111 Florida Times-Union, 19, 22 May 1940.

112 Florida Times-Union, 20 May 1940.

52 Considerable controversy arose following a Miami Herald story claiming Whitehair‘s campaign received sub rosa support from the political organization of Governor, and defeated U. S. Senate candidate, Fred P. Cone. Herald political editor Allen Morris reported, according to leaders with the Cone administration, ―Whitehair was the Cone crown prince of the … gubernatorial aspirants….‖ Morris reported ―numbers of state employees traveling Florida, ostensibly on public business, but actually to urge the election of Whitehair….‖113 The Volusia attorney immediately disclaimed any link with the Cone administration and charged the story was designed to damage his campaign. ―I feel confident the article was published to prejudice my candidacy because the true facts do not justify such conclusions,‖ he declared. Whitehair then proceeded to again portray Holland as the beneficiary of powerful machines in Tampa, Fort Myers, Fort Pierce, Miami, and Jacksonville. Despite his vociferous denials, the Cone allegations further marked Whitehair with the stain of bossism.114 The Holland campaign received a spate of endorsements from the eliminated candidates in the final week of the campaign. B. F. Paty publicly endorsed Holland and rebuked Whitehair at a rally in Miami‘s Bayfront Park on 24 May. Paty revealed he made a private pledge to Holland following the first primary but had only decided to publicly back the Bartow attorney to squelch rumors of his support for Whitehair. Paty characterized Holland as ―a man of unimpeachable integrity and fearless honesty,‖ and Whitehair as ―a man who [had] no regard whatsoever for political honesty.‖115 Holland subsequently picked up the support of Walter B. Fraser. The St. Augustine mayor released a statement revealing,

I had intended to take no part in the run-off, but I feel it is incumbent upon me to correct erroneous reports that are being circulated through the state. My support of Spessard Holland is the best means I have at this time to the people of Florida in promoting the development of the state and their own welfare.116

113 Miami Herald, 20 May 1940. See Miami Herald, 29, 30, 31 May 1940, for further assertions of Cone‘s support for Whitehair.

114 Miami Herald, 21 May 1940.

115 Tampa Morning Tribune, 24 May 1940; Miami Herald, 24 May 1940.

116 Tampa Morning Tribune, 25 May 1940; Miami Herald, 25 May 1940.

53 First primary candidates James Barbee and Carl Maples joined in endorsing Holland‘s candidacy. These endorsements from former opponents appeared to stem as much from antipathy to Whitehair as from affinity for Holland. Of the leading former candidates only Fuller Warren remained publicly neutral throughout the second primary. Contrary to rumors, Warren doggedly refused to endorse either candidate. The Duval legislator assured the Holland campaign, in typically verbose style, of his neutrality,

Any statement written or spoken by anybody that I am supporting either candidate for governor in the second primary is wholly and utterly false and made with the full knowledge of its falsity. I resent any attempt to misrepresent my position. I have been neutral thruout (sic) second primary[.] I will pay five hundred dollars for proof that I have asked anybody to vote for either candidate.117

Mindful of his future, the ambitious young lawmaker refrained from public involvement in the second primary. On the eve of the election, many state newspapers forecast a Holland victory. Allen Morris attributed the outcome to influence of,

War, ...a nimble-witted opponent who spiked charges while they still echoed, and – most important of all – a swing from those candidates thought to represent ―machine politics….‖

According to Morris, the war ―may be credited with a major assist in nullifying Whitehair‘s second primary campaign of charge and counter-charge,‖ because the news from Europe overshadowed sensational campaign rhetoric. In its pre-election recap the Tampa Sunday Tribune predicted the combined support of B. F. Paty and Walter B. Fraser appeared sufficient to clinch the second primary for Holland. Noting the two eliminated candidates polled 112,463 votes between them, the Tribune estimated seventy-five per cent or more of the Paty-Fraser vote would swing to Holland. A small item appearing in the St. Petersburg Times under the heading ―Campaign Humor‖ reflected both perceptions of Holland‘s commanding lead and the influence of the war on political discussion – ―Q. What is it that Hitler can do and Whitehair can‘t? A.

117 Fuller Warren to Holland, telegram 27 May 1940, Holland Papers, University of Florida, Box 148, FF Fuller Warren.

54 Take Holland!‖118 During the course of the campaign Whitehair‘s candidacy tumbled from front runner to the butt of humor. The shadow of war loomed over the second primary. The German invasion of France and the Low Countries began on 9 May, only two days following the first primary. War news pushed election coverage from the front pages of the state‘s newspapers. America‘s defense and preparedness quickly became important issues in Florida‘s U. S. Senate and, to a lesser degree, gubernatorial races. As they headed to the polls on 28 May, thoughtful Floridians considered which gubernatorial aspirant would best lead the state in the event war spread to America.119 The second gubernatorial primary, ―a slugfest between Spessard L. Holland and Francis P. Whitehair,‖ concluded 28 May. The next day the Miami Herald reported the outcome,

Holland blitzkrieged Francis P. Whitehair, the DeLand ‗kingfish‘ who had the indorsement of just about everybody – except a majority of the voters. Whitehair was backed by the Florida Federation of Labor, Dr. Francis E. Townsend, and a bevy of backroom political machines. With the Democratic nomination tantamount to election (the Republican nominee John F. Walter dissenting) the count at 1,135 of the state‘s 1,429 precincts was: Holland 202,211 Whitehair 150,703.120

Despite the apparent backing of labor, retirees, and several local political organizations Whitehair failed to win a majority of the voters. Several factors accounted for Holland‘s victory, but Francis P. Whitehair‘s reputation as a political dictator combined with the ominous tidings from Europe likely proved extremely influential with voters. Whitehair‘s reputed domination of Volusia politics, his numerous alliances with other political bosses, and his belligerent campaign tactics lent an air of oppression. In contrast, Holland appeared the safer, more democratic candidate. For many in the electorate so recently awakened to the potential danger of dictatorship it must have seemed the prudent choice. The second gubernatorial primary marked the end of a relatively brief, but vigorous campaign for the candidates and the electorate. As after the first primary, pundits searched for

118 Miami Herald, 26 May 1940; Tampa Sunday Tribune, 26 May 1940; St. Petersburg Times, 20 May 1940.

119 Robert Lecke, Delivered From Evil: The Saga of World War II (New York: Perennial Library, 1988), 154, 169.

120 Miami Herald, 28, 29 May 1940.

55 trends and meaning following the election. The most prevalent interpretations focused on the candidates‘ campaigns and the tactics they used. In a post-primary editorial the Tampa Morning Tribune suggested the candidates‘ campaigns reflected their characters. Of Spessard L. Holland, whom the paper endorsed in primaries, the Tribune observed,

His campaign has been, like himself, vigorous, but clean and honorable. He has had strong provocation to meet dirt with dirt, mud with mud, attack with attack; but he has steadfastly refused, through both first and second campaigns, to descend, as a candidate, from the high standards he has maintained as a citizen.

Of the Whitehair campaign, however, the Tribune noted,

The character of the campaign he has conducted since [May] 7, when, after making a clean and fair representation of his candidacy in the first primary, he seemed to go suddenly berserk with desperation, and launched a tirade of abuse and calumny against the honorable and distinguished Floridian who is his opponent and all those supporting him. In none of these particulars has he shown the strength of character, the independence of action or the balance of mind that a Governor of Florida should posses.

Clearly, in the opinion of the Tribune editorialist, the campaign revealed the temperament and character of the candidates.121 Allen Morris, writing in the Miami Herald, also suggested the outcome of the election hinged on the electorate‘s perceptions of the candidates‘ personalities and style of governance as revealed by their campaigns. Spessard L. Holland, according to Morris, demonstrated he,

belonged to that class which believes that government should exert itself in the protection of the people through the possibly slow method of constitutional legislation, but nevertheless a method subject to the checks and balances of the courts and the electorate.

In contrast, Whitehair,

held out the promise of being a strong, benevolent governor who would brook no interference from the legislature, summarily reshuffle bureaus, and allow nothing to prevent the achievement of his admittedly admirable program for the betterment of Florida.

121 Tampa Morning Tribune, 28 May 1940.

56 While conceding ―Whitehair might have done Florida a world of good,‖ Morris argued that the war undermined the appeal of that type of powerful, independent leadership:

If the great German offensive had been delayed a few weeks, Whitehair might have sold the people of Florida upon his scheme of government. But the cannons‘ roar abroad made democratic government sweet and dear to American, and potential dictators – however benevolent – became persons to suspect.

Therefore, in Morris‘s view, Whitehair‘s campaign platform and aggressive tactics, seen in the shadow of the European war, frightened voters who might otherwise have supported his candidacy. Holland, on the other hand, with his long record of public service as a county prosecutor, judge, and state senator, seemed a safer choice for an uncertain future.122 In addition to the influence of the war on the state‘s voters, the results of the second gubernatorial primary also provided a snapshot of the prevailing economic and social blocs at a crucial juncture in state and national history. In 1940, Florida, and the nation in general, had escaped the depths of the Great Depression but had not yet achieved the affluence it would experience during the war years. Unlike previous elections, the 1940 gubernatorial primary results reflected the concerns and desires of a people at a crossroads between depression and war. The results of the second gubernatorial primary also revealed a more coherent, if simplified, picture of the social, economic, demographic, and political factionalism in the state. The public perceived Holland‘s platform, with its emphasis on the governmental process, business regulation, repeal of the gross receipts tax, better working conditions for labor, and policies to promote tourism while restricting vice, as economically liberal and socially conservative. Voters perceived Francis P. Whitehair‘s program, focusing on easing governmental regulation of business and promote the state‘s economic growth through limited government, as more economically conservative and socially liberal than Holland‘s. Analysis of the election results indicated the tendencies and preferences of the various counties and geographic regions within the state. Holland won the second Democratic gubernatorial primary with 272,718 votes out of a total statewide vote of 478,875. Whitehair received 206,159 votes. Holland accumulated a 66,559 vote advantage over Whitehair, and a majority of 57 per cent to 43 per cent. While Holland accrued a substantial margin of victory, when compared with the second Democratic

122 Miami Herald, 2 June 1940.

57 primaries of 1932 – in which defeated John Martin by a majority of 63 per cent to 37 per cent – and 1936 – Fred P. Cone defeated Raleigh Petteway 59 per cent to 41 per cent – the 1940 contest was more competitive.123 Holland‘s success in the individual counties belied his actual margin of victory. Holland won a majority in fifty-one out of the state‘s sixty-seven counties. Of the sixteen counties carried by Whitehair, eight fell within rural west Florida, one in north Florida, and seven in populous south Florida. Notable south Florida counties in which Whitehair won majorities included the candidate‘s home county of Volusia – Whitehair 7,970 (50.2 per cent) to Holland 7,919 (49.8 per cent) – and Holland‘s home county of Polk – Whitehair 11,840 (50.1 per cent) to Holland 11,834 (49.09 per cent). The narrow margins in these two counties suggested the existence of strong antipathies toward both candidates in their home districts. In Holland‘s case this may have resulted from unpopular rulings and decisions dating from his service as county prosecutor, judge, and state senator. For Whitehair, potential animosity may have resulted from his association with the county political rings.124 Holland won majorities in each of the state‘s three geographic regions. Of the twenty- one west Florida counties, Holland won majorities in thirteen. Of the region‘s 102,013 votes cast in the second primary, Holland accumulated 55,185 (54 per cent) to his opponent‘s 46,828 (46 per cent). Holland carried Escambia, the region‘s most populous and urbanized county, with 11,585 (55 per cent) votes. Holland also won a majority in Leon county, the center of state government, with 4,227 (64 per cent) votes to Whitehair‘s 2,388 (36 per cent) votes. Whitehair carried the coastal counties of Franklin, Santa Rosa, Taylor, Wakulla, and Walton, as well as the inland counties of Hamilton, Jackson, and Washington. Holland carried a similar mixture of the region‘s coastal and inland districts, including Fuller Warren‘s birth place, Calhoun county.125 Holland earned his largest regional majority in north Florida, winning 58,166 (60 per cent) of the region‘s 96,911 votes, to Whitehair‘s 38,746 (40 per cent) votes. The governor- designate carried fourteen of the region‘s fifteen counties, with Baker county going to Whitehair. Populous Duval county represented the region‘s biggest prize due to its large population.

123 Secretary of State, Florida, Primary Election Returns, 28 May 1940; Florida Votes, 1920-1962, 73, 71.

124 Whitehair won majorities in Baker, Franklin, Hamilton, Hardee, Jackson, Lee, Manatee, Pasco, Polk, Santa Rosa, Taylor, Volusia, Wakulla, Walton, and Washington counties. Primary Election Returns, 28 May 1940.

125 Primary Election Returns, 28 May 1940.

58 Holland won 25,494 (60 per cent) of Duval‘s 42,775 total gubernatorial votes. Whitehair accrued 17,281 (40 per cent) of the county‘s votes.126 In terms of numbers of voters, south Florida stood out as the most important of the three regions. The 279,951 votes cast in the second primary in south Florida surpassed the total votes of north and west Florida combined. The region also included two of the state‘s three most urban counties – Hillsborough, with 108,547 or 11 per cent of the state‘s urban population, and Dade, with an urban population of 161,031 or 16 per cent of the state‘s metropolitan population.127 The importance of Hillsborough county derived not only from the number of votes it represented but also because of the struggle between Holland supporter, and Tampa Electric Company president, Peter O. Knight and Whitehair backer state Senator Pat Whitaker. Holland, with Knight‘s aid, prevailed in Hillsborough. Holland won 24,850 (60 per cent) of that county‘s 41,355 gubernatorial votes. Whitehair earned 16,505 (40 per cent) of Hillsborough‘s votes. The Whitaker machine‘s inability to deliver in the first primary had carried over into the second.128 Holland won a similar victory in Dade county, taking 31,872 (54 per cent) of the county‘s 58,875 votes. Whitehair managed to draw 27,003 (46 per cent) of Dade county‘s votes. Holland‘s success may have come, in part, from the endorsement of B. F. Paty, Dade‘s choice in the first primary.129 In south Florida as a whole, Holland won majorities in twenty-four out of the thirty-one counties, while Whitehair captured electoral majorities in seven. Holland won 159,367 (57 per cent) of the region‘s 279,951 votes. Whitehair drew 120,585 (43 per cent) votes. Holland‘s proportion of south Florida votes matched his share of the total second primary votes cast – 53 per cent. Holland defeated Whitehair by 38,782 votes in south Florida and 66,559 votes statewide.130

126 Ibid.

127 Primary Election Returns, 28 May 1940; The Sixth Census of the State of Florida, 1935, 65.

128 Primary Election Returns, 28 May 1940.

129 Ibid.

130 Ibid.

59 Both candidates polled approximately the same percentage – 30 per cent for Holland and 29 per cent for Whitehair – of their total votes from the three counties with the highest urban populations – Dade, Duval, and Hillsborough. Holland drew more votes than his opponent from these three counties – 82,216 compared to 60,789. Holland earned 60 per cent of the total gubernatorial votes cast in both Duval and Hillsborough counties. Whitehair finished with 40 per cent in both counties. Whitehair attracted 46 per cent of Dade county votes, Holland 54 per cent. Both Duval and Hillsborough had active and effective political rings or machines and both gave the anti-machine candidate Holland significant majorities. Dade, while not noted as a machine county, but was tourism and pari-mutuel gambling center, gave the socially conservative Holland a less substantial majority. The absence of a well-known political machine in Dade probably minimized the importance of anti-machine sentiment as a voting issue in that county.131 The results from those counties with the highest proportion of population employed as skilled labor – Monroe, Hillsborough, and Dade – indicate the effectiveness of the Florida Federation of Labor (FFL) endorsement of Francis P. Whitehair. Holland won Monroe county in an extremely narrow second primary race. The Bartow native polled 1,797 (51 per cent) votes, while his opponent won 1,733 (49 per cent) votes. Whithair‘s second primary vote total in Monroe county actually decreased from his first primary tally of 1,795 (42 per cent). Holland won both Hillsborough and Dade counties. Holland‘s sweep of the leading labor counties indicated the reluctance of FFL rank and file to follow the lead of the organization‘s hierarchy.132 The citrus region provided another indication of the Whitehair platform‘s electoral appeal. A strong advocate of reduced regulation of the industry, Whitehair hoped to run well among the citrus communities. Unfortunately for his candidacy, Whitehair failed to win a majority in any of the three leading citrus counties of Lake, Indian River, or Brevard. Holland won Lake (61 per cent), Indian River (63 per cent), and Brevard (57 per cent) by relatively secure margins. Holland‘s strong showing in these counties suggested attacks on his record regarding regulation of the industry failed to achieve the intended result.133

131 Primary Election Returns, 28 May 1940.

132 The 1935 state census reported 9.3 per cent of Monroe‘s residents working as skilled laborers,9.2 per cent in Hillsborough, and 9.1 in Dade. Sixth Census, 1935, 128; Primary Election Returns, 28 May 1940.

133 Sixth Census of Florida, 126, 120; Primary Election Returns, 28 May 1940.

60 Holland‘s victory in the second primary and nomination as the Democratic gubernatorial candidate virtually assured his election as governor. No Republican candidate had won election to the governor‘s office in Florida after 1876, and only one third party candidate had won the position – Sydney J. Catts on the Prohibition party ticket in 1916. Following the second gubernatorial primary Holland enjoyed a brief vacation with his family and began making appearances around the state in support of national unity and Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s unprecedented third term.134 The Republican party in Florida nominated John F. Walter, a retired banker from Daytona Beach, to oppose Holland in the November general election. Despite nominating a full slate of candidates for state-wide offices, some Florida Republicans argued that the party should abandon state races in order to concentrate support behind G.O.P. presidential candidate Wendell L. Willkie. Gubernatorial candidate Walter, after some initial hesitation, followed the example of Republican U. S. Senate candidate Miles H. Draper, of Tampa, and voluntarily withdrew from the race. As a result, only one Republican candidate for statewide office appeared on the 5 November general election ballot – H. George Griffin for Railroad Commissioner.135 In the 5 November general election Holland, running without opposition, polled 334,152 of the 334,220 total gubernatorial votes cast. Those receiving write-in votes included Francis P. Whitehair (6) and Fuller Warren (5). In addition to Holland, U. S. Senator Charles O. Andrews, U. S. Representative J. Hardin Peterson (District One), and Congressional Nominee Robert Sikes (District Three) ran without opposition in the general election.136 The composition of the state cabinet changed as two recently elected members joined the new governor. In addition to Holland, State Treasurer Edwin Larson and Attorney General J. Tom Watson won election to office. Larson replaced departing Treasurer W. V. Knott. Watson defeated incumbent Attorney General George Cooper Gibbs in the second primary. The three new officeholders constituted the largest number of newly elected members in the history of the

134 David R. Colburn and Richard K. Scher, Florida’s Gubernatorial Politics in the Twentieth Century (Tallahassee, Fla.: University Presses of Florida, 1980), 13,67; St. Petersburg Times, 26 July, 4 September, 15 October 1940.

135 Walter died of a reported heart attack on the evening of 8 November 1940, just three days after the general election. Walter was 62 at the time of his death. St. Petersburg Times, 28 July, 16 August, 4, 9 November 1940.

136 Secretary of State, Florida General Election Returns, 4 November 1940; St. Petersburg Times, 7 November 1940.

61 cabinet. They joined Superintendent of Education Colin English, Commissioner of Agriculture , Secretary of State Robert A Gray, and Comptroller J. M. Lee.137 In the presidential race Roosevelt soundly defeated Willkie in Florida despite Republican efforts to focus their resources on the contest. President Roosevelt won 359,334 votes (74 per cent), while Willkie drew 126,158 ballots (26 per cent) in Florida. The 1940 presidential race drew a record 485,492 votes. Roosevelt‘s success at the polls probably reflected a desire for proven leadership in a time of international turmoil.138 The war also shaped Florida‘s gubernatorial election in numerous ways. The second gubernatorial primary campaign ran concurrently with the Battle of France, and the two contests competed for space in state newspapers. In late May 1940 Floridians voted not only for greater prosperity, better schools, and improved highways, but also for the continuity of democratic institutions. In many ways Whitehair conducted precisely the wrong second primary campaign for the prevailing conditions. Rather than positioning himself as a moderate who would work within the existing system, Whitehair advocated greater exertion of power by the executive branch, and reliance upon his own strong leadership. Instead of defusing allegations of bossism, he repeatedly reintroduced the topic by making corresponding charges against his opponent. In the end, Francis P. Whitehair not only failed to overcome his largest liabilities – perceptions of bossism and potential despotism – his campaign seemed to substantiate the accusations. Given the abundant evidence of the dangers of dictatorship from Europe and Asia, this constituted a grave error for Whitehair‘s campaign. Holland, to his credit, ran a disciplined campaign and refused to respond in kind to Whitehair‘s attacks. Running primarily on his record of service to the state, Holland appeared to epitomize honor and stability. By sticking to its original themes, the Holland campaign avoided the creation of opportunities for the Whitehair campaign to make up ground in the race. In many ways the 1940 gubernatorial race confirmed William C. Havard and Loren P. Beth‘s assertion that in the absence of strong statewide political factions and organized unity the candidates‘ personalities often overshadowed policy as decisive factors. Similarly, Holland‘s victory also resonated with V. O. Key‘s description of Florida politics of the period as the most

137 St. Petersburg Times, 26 November 1940.

138 Hartsfield and Roady, 36, 37; St. Petersburg Times, 15 November 1940.

62 atomized and least continuous in the South. In a state as highly factionalized as Florida, the electorate found common ground most readily on basic issues such as credibility and integrity.139 Holland‘s election placed him in a position of stewardship over Florida during the Second World War. During Holland‘s administration Florida‘s economy finally achieved full recovery from the depression and laid the foundation for a period of great prosperity. Federal spending for defense provided the primary stimulus for economic recovery. War related construction of military bases, housing, and transportation infrastructure drew thousands of workers and their families to the state. These influences allowed the state to begin to realize its economic potential during the Holland administration.140

139 William C. Havard and Loren P. Beth, The Politics of Mis-Representation: Rural-Urban Conflict in the Florida Legislature (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), 12-13.

140 David R. Colburn, ―Florida Politics in the Twentieth Century,‖ in Michael Gannon, ed., The New History of Florida (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 1996), 357.

63 CHAPTER TWO

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION REPORT AND THE 1941 LEGISLATURE

Speaking from the capitol steps in a cold rain on his inauguration day, Governor Spessard L. Holland reminded a crowd numbering in the thousands of his campaign commitments and told of the obstacles facing Florida in the coming four years. He renewed pledges to establish and maintain harmonious working relations between public officials, appoint qualified officeholders, remove politics from welfare and education agencies, practice and promote economy in state activities, and make the public interest ―the dominant consideration in all matters.‖ The urgent need to reform Florida‘s tax system and to meet the pressing demands of both state and national defense topped the list of challenges and received the most emphasis in his inaugural remarks. From the very first days of his term, problems of public finance and defense constituted the primary focus of the Holland administration.1 Following his inauguration, Holland assumed an office with singular weaknesses and limitations. Under the Constitution of 1885, Florida‘s governor could not succeed himself and had very few powers other than patronage and persuasion. To compound matters, he competed for influence with an elected cabinet whose members regularly succeeded themselves and built their own formidable political organizations through appointive powers and continuity in office.2 The degree of success achieved by the new governor would be determined by a multitude of factors, however, overwhelming executive power would not be one of them. In what might have been an understated commentary on the financial stewardship of the previous governor, the Tampa Morning Tribune published a brief comparison of the state‘s financial status at the beginning of the Cone and Holland administrations. Upon Governor Fred P. Cone‘s inauguration on 4 January 1937, Florida had no outstanding bills, a balance of $598,650 in the general revenue fund, and a total balance of funds of $2,306,469. On his inauguration, Holland inherited $1,768, 343 in outstanding debt, only $4,129 in the general

1 Florida Times-Union, 8 January 1941; Tampa Morning Tribune, 8 January 1941.

2 Federal Writers Project. Florida: A Guide to the Southernmost State (New York: Oxford University Press 1939), 64.

64 revenue fund, and a total balance of funds of $88,636.3 Clearly, despite the Cone administration‘s commitment to economy in government and balanced budgets, Florida faced a financial mess.4 Holland described taxation and revenue as ―the most critical internal problems facing our state.‖ The situation resulted, he said, from ―pursuing for years an aimless tax policy, patching and temporizing here and there from time to time, but making no serious sustained effort to discover the basic ills and to constructively cure them.‖ Holland warned that state government could not meet future challenges under the existing tax structure.5 In its simplest terms, demand for services increased while available funds diminished. Prior to 1941, the State of Florida derived revenues from an ad valorem or general property tax, tangible personal property taxes, excise (primarily gasoline and beverage) taxes, license taxes, non-business license taxes, and special taxes (including the estate tax).6 Numerous factors contributed to the current problems and the dismal forecast for the future. First, a 1938 constitutional amendment exempted homes with a value of up to $5,000 from state and local taxation. The homestead exemption resulted in an ongoing loss of revenues for the state, local government, and the schools.7 Second, the state legislature‘s practice of allocating funds through continuing or biennial appropriations made it impossible to effectively budget state funds and contributed to the deficit in the general revenue fund. Third, at the 1940 general election Florida voters adopted a constitutional amendment prohibiting the state from levying an ad valorem tax on real property.8 Projected losses in operating revenue from this measure exceeded $1.5

3 Tampa Morning Tribune, 8 January 1941.

4 Colburn. ―Florida Politics in the Twentieth Century,‖ 355.

5 Tampa Morning Tribune, 8 January 1941.

6 Brookings Institution, A Preliminary Report to the Tax Inquiry Council of Florida on the Florida Fiscal Situation (Tallahassee, 1941), 36-45 (hereafter referred to as Brookings Report).

7 Then-State Senator Holland initially opposed the homestead exemption measure in the 1937 legislature because he believed it would reduce operating revenues for public schools. He reversed his position after receiving assurances that the school funds would come from other sources. Miami Herald, 5 January 1941.

8 Martin Dyckman, former editor of the St. Petersburg Times, writes that Edward Ball, manager of the Florida duPont interests, greatly desired the ad valorem repeal amendment. As one of, if not the largest, property owners in the state, the duPont holdings realized a sizeable tax reduction after ratification of the amendment. Martin Dyckman, Floridian of His Century: The Courage of Governor LeRoy Collins. (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 2006), 32.

65 million. Fourth, it was widely expected that the 1941 legislature would repeal the gross receipts tax on merchants, resulting in an annual reduction of approximately $2 million from school revenues.9 These measures had the overall effect of reducing revenues coming into state and local governments at the same time the state‘s population and need for services grew. This patchwork of revenue policy had resulted in the current budget deficit and ensured graver fiscal problems unless the system received much needed reform. A shared commitment to finding a solution to Florida‘s public finance problems resulted in the creation of the Tax Inquiry Council of Florida in July 1940. This statewide organization consisting of representatives of agriculture, business, education, industry, labor, and professionals commissioned the Washington, D.C. based Brookings Institution to study and report on the state‘s fiscal system.10 Even though unfinished on inauguration day, Governor Holland referred to the Brookings Institution report in his address, expressing his eagerness to receive it and the hope that it would result in a blueprint for comprehensive tax reform leading to ―a safe and secure basis for continuing government.‖11 Unlike his peroration on tax policy, Holland‘s remarks on Florida‘s obligations for defense needed very little background. In just the previous six months, his audience had noted with alarm the defeat of France, devastating air raids against Great Britain, the invasion of Greece, and the initiation of military conscription in the United States. Holland, a World War I veteran, told them that while they hoped, worked, and prayed for peace, they must prepare for war. The new governor described how geography and climate had uniquely suited the state to military training and resulted in the clustering of military bases ―in a great arc from Pensacola to .‖ The presence of these bases and the thousands of military and civilian personnel associated with them meant increased demand for transportation infrastructure, housing, health services, and recreational facilities. In addition to these obligations, the state also needed to organize, prepare, and mobilize its civilian population for the defense of their homes, businesses,

9 Tampa Morning Tribune, 8 January 1941.

10 LaMar Sarra to Ralph Davis, 4 October 1941, Spessard L. Holland Papers, Record Group 102, Series 406, Box 109, File Folder 8, Florida State Archives (FSA), Tallahassee, Fl (hereafter referred to as Holland Papers).

11 Tampa Morning Tribune, 8 January 1941.

66 and communities.12 Meeting these challenges would require preparation, resources, and sacrifice in the coming months and years. The new administration quickly acted to make sure the state‘s limited resources went to meeting the defense priorities outlined in Holland‘s inaugural address. Within a week of taking office, Holland ordered a review of an ―unprecedented‖13 $7 million in outstanding State Road Department contracts awarded by the Cone administration. The governor sought to cancel non- defense projects so that those funds could be used to construct and improve the transportation network serving the state‘s many military and naval bases.14 The State Road Board negotiated with seven contract holders and received their agreement to defer work and payment of the contracts in return for reimbursement for expenses incurred to that point.15 Holland would ultimately transfer the responsibility for designating and prioritizing defense road construction to the State Defense Council, an agency created during the Cone administration to co-ordinate emergency civil and military defense.16 At the same time they sought to prioritize transportation spending, the Holland administration also looked for other sources of road building revenues. Governor and Mrs. Holland traveled to Washington, D.C. in late January to attend President Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s third inauguration. While in the nation‘s capitol, Holland conferred with Florida‘s congressional delegation and federal authorities on acquiring additional revenues for defense road construction. Meeting with Bureau of Public Roads head Thomas H. MacDonald, the Floridians urged federal construction of a statewide road system adequate for military purposes. Holland and the members of the congressional delegation argued the number

12 Florida Times-Union, 8 January 1941; Tampa Morning Tribune, 8 January 1941.

13 Florida Times-Union, 16 January 1941.

14 Florida Times-Union, 11, 12, 16 January 1941.

15 Governor Cone canceled about $500,000 in road contracts inherited from the administration of Governor Dave Sholtz. The 1941 agreement to defer some road construction contracts freed up approximately $1 million for defense roads. Florida Times-Union, 16, 17, 18 January 1941

16 In August 1941, President Roosevelt asked state governors to establish state and local defense councils. Florida was the first southeastern state to comply with the request. Glenn L. Ferguson, III, ―Florida State Defence [sic]: Civilians and Civilian Defense in World War II‖ (Ph.D. Diss., Florida State University, 1999), 12, 46. St. Petersburg Times, 31 January 1941; Florida Times-Union, 31 January 1941. When creating the State Defense Council in October 1940, Governor Cone resisted the temptation to use the appointments to reward his political supporters. Instead, he appointed men from a list of suggested councilors submitted to him on behalf of the then- Democratic nominee Holland. This undoubtedly streamlined the task of state defense organization for the Holland administration. Miami Herald, 12 January 1941.

67 and importance of military and naval installations in the state created a demand for roads that the state could not meet without assistance. MacDonald told the Floridians that his agency would help once Congress provided the funds.17 The State Road Department began $12 million in defense road construction soon thereafter, using funds provided through the Federal Bureau of Roads and the Works Projects Administration.18 The new administration had begun making progress on its defense priorities. Upon his return to the state, Holland acted to replace the recently federalized Florida National Guard. He ordered the creation of an all-volunteer Florida Defense Force to respond to disasters, civil disturbances, or other emergencies throughout the state. The order also provided for the incorporation of existing local militias into the state organization. Composed of able- bodied males between the ages of 18 and 55, neither officers nor enlisted men received payment for their services. The federal government provided 1,700 rifles to the new state militia. Holland designated the State Defense Council‘s Adjutant-General Vivian Collins as commander of the force.19 Winter tourism provided considerable revenues for businesses and state government in Florida. Taxes on gasoline and pari-mutuel gambling at legal horse and dog racing tracks and jai alai frontons accounted for a large proportion of tourism-generated funds collected by the state. In early February 1941, acting upon complaints of illegal slot machines, Governor Holland ordered the sheriffs of three counties – Dade, Volusia, and Charlotte – to arrest slot operators and seize their machines. At the same time, Alec M. Balfe, chairman of the State Racing Commission, threatened to call upon the governor to intervene if the sheriffs of Dade and Broward counties did not act to close illegal bookmaking operations in their jurisdictions.20 In March, Holland suspended Baker county S. R. Green for allowing the operation of slot machines and drunkenness.21 State authorities took a dim view of illicit gambling of any kind

17 Florida Times-Union, 28 January 1941.

18 Florida Times-Union, 18 February 1941.

19 St. Petersburg Times, 31 January 1941, 9 February 1941; Florida Times-Union, 31 January 1941, 9 February 1941; Tampa Tribune, 9 February 1941.

20 St. Petersburg Times, 9 February 1941; Florida Times-Union, 9 February 1941.

21 Tampa Tribune, 6 March 1941.

68 because it violated state law, and, perhaps most importantly, because it reduced the state‘s tax revenues from legal wagering.22 Calls for enforcement of the state‘s gaming laws would be a recurring issue during Holland‘s tenure. The first copies of the much-anticipated Tax Inquiry Commission-sponsored Brookings Institution report reached the Governor‘s Office on 26 February 1941.23 The governor, most of the state cabinet, and legislative leaders attended a highly-anticipated public roundtable in the cabinet room of the capitol to discuss the report with Brookings Institution representative Hale T. Shenefield. Entitled ―A Preliminary Report to the Tax Inquiry Council of Florida on the Florida Fiscal Situation,‖ the document frankly and explicitly attributed the state‘s financial problems to the past actions and long-standing practices of the executive and legislative branches. Allen Morris wrote in his Cracker Politics column that ―those responsible for the Brookings inquiry, Governor Holland among them, took their medicine with good grace and set about promptly to carry the recommendations into effect….‖ Pledges of support for the Brookings recommendations from Senate President John R. Beacham and Senator Rayburn C. Horne, closely identified with the anti-Holland faction in the state senate, encouraged those hoping for action on reform during the coming session of the legislature.24 The one-hundred-seventeen page Brookings Institution report examined and analyzed the state‘s political and economic characteristics, fiscal situation, revenues, and expenditures. The Brookings analysts identified three ―immediate problems‖ plaguing public finance in Florida: (1) poor fiscal management and a weak tax base at state and local levels, (2) replacing revenue lost through tax repeal measures, (3) developing a tax policy, reforming state aid to local government, and strengthening administrative practices for state and local government. The analysis recommended that of these three problems, the strengthening of fiscal management and tax base, and reforming tax policy, state aid, and administrative practices take priority over replacing revenue. The report included specific conclusions and recommendations for action on these points.25

22 St. Petersburg Times, 9 February 1941; Florida Times-Union, 9 February 1941.

23 LaMar Sarra to Ralph Davis, 4 October 1941, Holland Papers, FSA.

24 Miami Herald 9 March 1941.

25 Brookings Report, 93.

69

The Brookings analysts considered lack of effective fiscal control the primary weakness of the state‘s administrative system. Failure to exercise fiscal control took two forms. The legislature allocated almost ninety percent of state revenue through continuing appropriations and earmarks, thus allowing it to escape the budgetary process entirely. The Brookings consultants wrote that the use of appropriations ―is probably the greatest single obstacle to achieving real economy in expenditure.‖ The legislature resorted to the practice of continuing appropriations in response to pressure from groups seeking to secure perpetual and protected sources of revenue for agencies serving their particular needs or interests. Continuing appropriations and earmarks resulted in subversion of budgetary control by the governor and legislature, failure to check extravagance, and the contraction of expenditures for other state services. Those agencies receiving continuing appropriations and earmarks jealously guarded their allocations, making real reform a formidable challenge.26 The process of distributing the remaining state funds also contributed to the fiscal control problem. The state Budget Commission, consisting of the Governor and cabinet, allocated the remaining ten to fifteen percent of state revenues not subject to continuing appropriations or earmarks. The Brookings report found a long list of faults with the budget process. The analysis found the commission understaffed, noting that budget creation was considered ―a part time job.‖ The budget itself tended to be ―a mere collection of inadequately reviewed departmental estimates.‖ Additionally, the budget did not report estimated revenues. The Brookings inquiry found that the state budget ―does not present a complete set of financial statements necessary to furnish a comprehensive understanding of the state‘s financial situation, its biennial requirements and resources.‖ Furthermore, the cabinet members, serving as the Budget Commission, undermined the effectiveness of the budgetary process through reciprocity in supporting each other‘s requests for agency funding. Moreover, organization and designation of items in the budget did not correspond to the same items in the appropriations act created in the legislature, and division or consolidation of funds did not match. The report noted the ―results of such a budget system are failure to control in any way the expenditures of 85 per cent of the state‘s funds and inadequate control of 15 per cent.‖27

26 Brookings Report, 83, 13.

27 Brookings Report, 83, 84.

70

The report offered three recommendations to bring greater fiscal control to state government in Florida. First, abolish the practice of continuing appropriations. Second, revise the organization of the budget commission, the budget procedure, and the supervision and qualifications of the budget staff. Third, adopt standard designations for the budget, the appropriations, and the accounts. These initial recommendations censured the legislature and cabinet for poor fiscal management while also calling for extensive changes in the allocation and budgetary processes.28 Another area of major fiscal difficulty addressed by the Brookings Institution concerned the declining productivity of the ad valorem or general property tax due to faulty assessment practices and weak collection policies. While the state no longer derived funds directly from a general property tax, increased ad valorem productivity would allow a reduction in state aid to local governments and the public schools, and, therefore, free funds for deficit elimination and other purposes. Prior to repeal of the state ad valorem tax, the amount realized by the state from that levy between 1934 and 1940 declined from $3,000,000 to $1,600,000 (from about eleven percent to about 3 percent of total tax revenues.) The general property tax remained the main revenue source for city and county governments, and, after state aid, the main revenue source for public schools. Total county tax valuations for real property in Florida diminished from just over $500 million in 1933 to $325 million in 1936. Real property valuations rebounded slightly to just over $350 million in 1939. Four factors accounted for the general downward trend: first, the decline in inflated real estate values resulting from the collapse of the Florida bubble; second, the impact of the 1935 homestead exemption amendment; third, the undervaluation of real property value by local assessors; and, fourth, poor collections due to depressed conditions and lenient laws.29 The Brookings analysts recommended reforms to address decreased county ad valorem productivity caused by homestead exemption, assessment, and collection practices. Faulty assessment practices formed the core of Florida‘s ad valorem predicament. As in most other states, the state of Florida vested responsibility for assigning property value in local assessors. Unlike most other states, Florida did not have a tax commission or other supervisory agency responsible for advising local assessors and obtaining equalization of assessments. At

28 Brookings Report, 84.

29 Brookings Report, 36-37.

71 the same time, while state law required property owners to report the ―true cash value‖ of real estate, the Brookings report found that ―true cash value had been converted by the county and city assessors through informal understanding to a 50 per cent valuation ratio which, in turn, [had] itself been honored in the breach rather than in the observance.‖30 The tendency of local assessors to under value property resulted, primarily, from an attempt by legislatively underrepresented large counties to avoid paying what they perceived to be a disproportionate share of the cost of government; and, secondarily, from small counties following the example of the larger counties.31 Furthermore, local assessments ranged from full cash value to below 50 per cent value within assessment districts. The result was widespread underassessment and failure to achieve uniformity either within or between assessment districts. The report blamed the ad valorem dilemma on inadequate state supervision of local assessments. 32 The Brookings report also noted that the homestead exemption amendment aggravated the problem of underperforming real estate taxes. It found grave abuses in the administration of homestead exemption, specifically application of the exemption to non-qualifying property, including commercial properties, and undervaluation of qualifying property. The Brookings analysts discovered that the addition of the homestead exemption to the largely unsupervised ad valorem situation only increased the chaos.33 The Brookings Institution analysts made several recommendations for reform of the muddled tax assessment situation. First, the state must provide ―proper and adequate supervision over local assessments‖ to restore the productivity of the ad valorem tax, protect public credit, and preserve local government services. Second, the state must provide penalties for failure to report taxable property. Third, the appropriate state agency must equalize assessment between counties and within individual counties. Fourth, all county assessing must be centralized within

30 Brookings Report, 48.

31 Brookings Report, 50.

32 Studies made in the case of Atlantic Coast Railway vs. Lee revealed the extent of real property underassessment in Florida. The railway argued assessment by the state Railway Assessment Board at 33 1/3 percent of true cash value constituted discrimination because other property in the counties in which the railway operated were taxed at a lower rate. Railway sponsored studies found an assessment ratio of 19.78 percent. A state sponsored study in the same counties found an assessment ratio of 27.72 percent. Brookings Report, 48-49.

33 Brookings Report, 46.

72 a single assessing office.34 Fifth, assessment and classification problems arising out of the homestead exemption amendment required close examination. The report clearly called for more state oversight and coordination of the tax assessment process.35 The Brookings Institution found that weak tax collection practices further contributed to the decline in property tax productivity. These policies resulted from a succession of state laws intended to provide tax relief following the collapse of the Florida real estate bubble and continuing into the national depression. In practice, these measures functioned to ―weaken tax paying morale and give preferential treatment to those who failed to pay while discriminating against those who paid promptly.‖36 The state‘s misguided tax collection policies also contributed to impairing the public credit of local government. The Brookings fiscal experts recommended revision of tax collection and tax sale laws, combination of local tax billing and collection, prompt and prudent disposition of tax-reverted properties, and the implementation of state supervision over local tax administration. These recommendations would play an important role in the Holland administration‘s tax revision program. The problem of declining local support for the public school system also received attention from the Brookings analysts. The general trend in local and state sharing of public school expenses moved toward increased state assumption of the expense of public education. The ratio of local to state spending on public schools went from ninety-two percent local and eight percent state in 1920, to thirty-eight percent local and sixty-two percent state in 1940.37 Expenditures for education accounted for over twenty-two percent of all state spending in 1940, the largest single state expenditure. Per capita state aid for exceeded that of any other southeastern state and the national average. Additionally, the combination of the repeal of the ad valorem tax and predicted repeal of the gross receipts tax would reduce revenues for the state teachers‘ salary fund by approximately $4 million in the next biennium.38 In light of

34 Brookings Report, 51.

35 Brookings Report, 46.

36 The report specifically refers to Chapters 7806 (1919); 14572 (1929); 15054 and 15791 ―The Gomez Act‖ (1931); 16242 ―The Futch Act‖ (1933); and 18296 ―The Murphy Act‖ (1937). The Brookings Report, 52-55.

37 The state funding of public education consisted of contributions to the teachers‘ salary fund and the provision of free textbooks to elementary and high school pupils. Brookings Report, 58, 60-61.

38 Brookings Report, 96-97. 73 the present high level of state aid and the impending reduction in state funds available for aid, the Brookings report recommended that ―counties and districts should be compelled to carry their share of the costs of public schools to the full limit of their ability.‖39 The Brookings report also addressed a problem afflicting every level of fiscal administration in Florida – bonded indebtedness. Originally incurred by city and county governments, and special taxing districts, to finance needed roads, bridges, and infrastructure improvements during the Florida land boom, bonds became a concern of state government after widespread defaults following the collapse of the boom and beginning of the depression damaged the credit of first the issuing governmental units and then the state itself. The inability of many local governments to even minimally service bonded debt and provide crucial community services led to state intervention. Because of strict and specific limitations on state indebtedness, the legislature resorted to a subterfuge to justify its actions. The Brookings report summarized the legislative program:

As the constitution prohibits a state debt, the legislature was compelled to adopt a circuitous device for aiding the counties in retiring this debt. The device was to allocate the proceeds of a state tax (the second gas tax) for this purpose, but the purpose had to be made a state purpose. The road construction costs were declared to have been incurred for a state purpose for which the state would reimburse the counties. The Governor, Comptroller, and Treasurer, as the Board of Administration, were given power to administer county road and bridge bond retirement though the bonds were to remain county bonds.40

As part of the debt assistance program, counties conveyed roads and bridges to the State Road Department. Additionally, the counties transferred assets held in sinking funds and delinquent taxes previously imposed for bond retirement to the Board of Administration. The county debt for principal and interest totaled $295,868,423 at the inception of the program in 1930. As of September 1940, a reduction of $84,609,004 had been achieved through gas tax payments, bond refunding, sub-par bond purchases, application of sinking funds, and county taxes. Gas taxes

39 Brookings Report, 62.

40 Brookings Report, 85. The system of state assumption of debt applied only to county and special road and bridge district bond debt. Cities and other special districts managed their debts as best they could, usually through increased ad valorem taxation.

74 payments accounted for $70,405,629 of the total reduction.41 Thus, debts originally incurred by the counties became the shared burden of the counties and the state. State law capped the amount payable for county debt to a total of $107,688,461. As a county exhausted its shares of funds, or retired its debts, those gas tax revenues reverted to the State Road Department for improvement of roads in that county. Under current law, the debt reduction plan ended in November 1950. Attempts by the 1939 legislature to extend the cap on county benefits fell victim to Governor Cone‘s vetoes and invalidation by the State Supreme Court.42 The Brookings analysts recommended greater efficiency in debt payment and more study of bond administration. The report found exorbitant interest rates and excessive finance fees on most municipal bonds.43 They strongly advised more state supervision of bond management, the purchase of road and bridge bonds below par, and extensive bond refunding at lower rates of interest to achieve greater economy in debt redemption. Additionally, the report called for further study of gas tax and debt administration, debt policy, and plans to extend the gas tax benefits. More effective bonded debt management would obviously benefit the state by freeing additional funds for roads and other purposes.44 The Brookings fiscal analysts also undertook the examination of state revenue sources and found them to be largely regressive. Excise taxes produced the most revenues by far - $32 million out of total state revenues in excess of $50 million during fiscal year 1939 to 1940. A seven cents per gallon gasoline tax45 and a levy on alcoholic beverages accounted for the

41 The legislature created the Board of Administration and modified the existing gas tax to fund county debts in 1929 (Acts of 1929, Chaps. 14575, 14573). A court challenge forced modification of the gas tax program in 1931 (Acts of 1931, Chap. 15659). Brookings Report, 86-87, 40-41.

42 Brookings Report, 86, 87.

43 Brookings Report, 15.

44 Brookings Report, 99.

45 The gas tax served the function of cash cow for state government, producing a reliable source of funds for a variety of uses. The legislature enacted the state‘s first gasoline tax – one cent per gallon – in 1921. Legislators imposed a five cent tax in 1927; dividing the proceeds as follows: one cent to schools, one cent to the counties, and three cents to the State Road Department. In 1929, the distribution was altered to take one cent away from the SRD for distribution to the counties in proportion to their bonded debt. Additionally, the legislature imposed another one cent gas tax for schools and created the State Board of Administration to administer gas tax funds earmarked for county bond debts. In 1931, the state enacted a six cent gasoline tax, providing one cent to the counties according to area; an additional cent in proportion to state road mileage; another cent to the counties on the basis of population; and the remaining three cents to the SRD. Legislators also approved the addition of a seventh cent to the gas tax for 75 majority of excise funds. Non-business license fees – automobile licenses, registration, drivers‘ licenses, and other fees – brought in over $9 million in revenues. A general property tax on real and intangible assets generated only $2.6 million.46 Just over sixty percent of state revenues came from taxes on consumption.47 The Brookings investigators urged the state to shift policy away from reliance on consumer taxes. They called for more effective assessment and collection of taxes on tangible (non-real estate assets including agricultural and manufacturing equipment, and livestock) and intangible (stocks, bonds, and secured notes) property. Additionally, the analysts recommended higher taxation of intangible assets.48 The report also argued for the reduction of the $100,000 estate tax exemption to increase assets subject to state taxation.49 The net result of these reforms would have shifted a greater share of the tax burden from consumers to property owners, thus decreasing the regressive character of the tax system. In addition to the expansion of existing taxes, the report suggested study of exemptions for development. The Brookings investigators viewed the state‘s practice of providing tax exemptions for industrial promotion with skepticism. Although the favored industries provided employment, the overall benefit of the exemptions was doubtful ―since they will require municipal and other local governmental services which have to be financed to the end of the tax exemption period by other local taxpayers.‖ This practice shifted the tax burden from the industry to other property holders, in essence another means of tax avoidance. Additional research would show whether the exemption contributed to sound fiscal development in Florida.50

the general revenue fund in 1931. The seventh cent gas tax was divided equally between the schools and the general revenue fund. As of 1940, the gas tax provided three cents to the counties, three cents to the SRD, one half cent to the schools, and the other half cent to the general revenue fund. The tax accounted for over $25 million in revenues for the fiscal year 1939 to 1940. Brookings Report, 39-40.

46 Brookings Report, 106-107.

47 Those consumer taxes were the gasoline tax, the retailers‘ occupation tax, and the beverage tax. Retailers passed the cost of the occupation tax on to their customers, making this a tax on consumption. Brookings Report, 94, 47.

48 Brookings Report, 37, 38.

49 Brookings Report, 47.

50 Brookings Report, 46.

76

The report also examined the feasibility and necessity of enacting additional state taxes. The study recommended investigation of the state‘s constitutional prohibition on an income tax. It found the ban ―unusual,‖ especially given the state‘s fiscal problems, and obliquely suggested revision of the constitution to remove it. Repeal of the prohibition would enable the state to impose some form of income tax, possibly through revision of the existing occupational license, basing the fee on income. Regarding the implementation of a state sales tax, a very controversial and much discussed idea, the Brookings experts cautioned against it, noting, ―…numerous special consumption taxes have already introduced much of the regressivity usually attributed to a general sales tax. Therefore, to the usual case against a sales tax, must be added in the case of Florida, the fact that it would be adding a regressive consumer tax to a system already burdened with such taxes.‖ The Brookings report advised that the enactment of new taxes would be unnecessary if the state‘s current fiscal problems were rectified. It predicted ―that proper budgetary and tax procedures will enable the state to achieve a balance between revenues and expenditures at approximately the present level of public service.‖51 The Brookings Institution report confirmed what most residents already knew - that Florida operated under a haphazard and ineffective fiscal system. The budgetary processes failed to impose order and efficiency over the allocation of limited state funds. Ad valorem and other taxes did not approach their revenue producing potential, primarily because the state failed to provide adequate supervision. Much of the responsibility for poorly administered bond debts of the individual counties became the burden of the state as a whole. This chaotic system stood on a foundation of regressive consumption taxes and fees. The overall impression was of a system that failed to impose effective control at all levels of government. The report made numerous recommendations for reform of fiscal policies. To address problems of allocation and budgetary processes, the Brookings auditors called for abolition of continuing appropriations and earmarks, as well as the reorganization of budget making staff and practices. Regarding the collapse of ad valorem assessment and collection, the investigators advised more state supervision and laws to discourage tax delinquency. After consideration of the problem of the massive county bonded debt, the analysts suggested greater state administration of debt management, especially the purchase and refinance of bonds. To reduce

51 Brookings Report, 47, 83.

77 the regressive character of the state‘s tax system, the researchers called for reform of tangible and intangible assessment and taxation, revision of the estate tax, and urged study of repealing the prohibition on a state income tax. The report emphatically opposed the imposition of a state sales tax. Now that the Brookings report had outlined the fiscal situation and suggested solutions, it was up to the state‘s political and community leaders to decide what to do. A sampling of state newspapers revealed general agreement and acceptance of the Brookings report‘s findings and suggestions. An editorial in the Tallahassee Daily Democrat noted the negative reaction of some county officials to the report‘s emphasis on ―state control‖ to solve fiscal problems, but largely concurred with the call for greater state supervision of local government. In light of past policy, it seemed a wise precaution to implement some form of oversight to guard the individual counties from injury caused by another county or other counties. Obviously referring to the ad valorem and bond debt problems, it asked,

Shall the people of Florida, together, be protected from the mistakes or purposeful mismanagement of any local unit which may shirk its duties, dissipate its resources, fail or refuse to pay its own way and then come whimpering to the people of the entire state to be pulled out of the mire?

Responding to his own question, the editorialist endorsed the idea of an umpire or referee ―to see that … no county or group of counties shall be penalized for honesty, good business judgment or sound policies.‖52 The tone of this opinion piece revealed resentment of the state‘s lenient treatment of its prodigal counties. A follow-up editorial acknowledged the difficult task outlined in the Brookings report, but argued that the state‘s financial problems left only two options – implement a program of fiscal reform or enact ―a general sales tax or a combination of nuisance taxes….‖ Continued adherence to the current policies would result in ―disaster.‖53 The Tampa Times asserted with some satisfaction that the Brookings report had merely stated what everyone knew already – collection of taxes must be tightened and the practice of granting exemptions should be curbed. Despite the absence of revelatory disclosures, the Times felt the Brookings report would be well worth its $15,000 cost if ―it result[ed] in definite legislative action to

52 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 2 March 1941.

53 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 3 March 1941.

78 remedy the situation.‖54 Attention shifted now from the Brookings report to developing a plan for reform. The challenge of formulating a plan to correct the state‘s fiscal problems required the cooperation of community and state leaders. The Tax Inquiry Council met with representatives from business, government, and education to create a legislative program for fiscal reform based on the Brookings Institution report.55 Council president James T. Wilson, of Miami, named committees to study and recommend legislation to address a number of the problems identified in the report. The study groups excluded current members of the legislature because the house speaker designate and senate president designate committed to appoint advisory groups to assist the council members.56 The committees‘ labors produced a series of recommendations for action in the upcoming biennial legislative session. The study groups investigated and reported independently on a specific problem or set of problems identified in the Brookings report. Regarding reform of the state budgetary procedures, the Sub-Committee on State Budget and Local Government Finance Supervision advised abolishing the existing budget commission and delegating that duty to a budget director acting under the jurisdiction of the governor. The new budget director would implement a rational and orderly system to prepare and monitor the biennial state budget. The committee recognized the need to eradicate the practices of continuing appropriations and earmarks, but warned ―that this desirable end can not be achieved at the present time without running the risk of too hasty action and serious results.‖ They called for further study and action at a later time. After examining local government finance supervision, the committee recommended the review of local government budgets by a state officer empowered to determine sufficiency of appropriations to meet obligations and, if necessary, to require increased funding and revenues. The committee also urged close state oversight of any proposed changes to existing or future local government debt. These recommendations for better management of both the state budgetary procedures and local government finances emphasized increased state supervision.57

54 Tampa Times editorial reprinted in Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 4 March 1941.

55 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 10 March 1941; Tampa Tribune, 11 March 1941.

56 Tampa Tribune, 16 March 1941.

57 Report of Sub-Committee on State Budget and Local Government Finance Supervision to James T. Wilson, 3 April 1941, Holland Papers, FSA. 79

The findings of the sub-committee directed to consider the second gas tax also emphasized increased state control. The committee advised reallocation of the present six cents gas tax to provide four cents to the State Road Department and two cents for retirement of county road and bridge debts. Most significantly, the committee suggested the legislature approve a constitutional amendment committing the two cents of gas tax funds for county debt retirement for a period of fifty years after adoption of the amendment. The revised gasoline tax distribution plan provided more funds for highway construction while also maintaining revenues for bond redemption. The proposed amendment would place full authority for county debt management, refunding, and payment in the State Board of Administration. The amendment would also provide for sharing of gas tax funds with individual counties after the retirement of their debt. The committee asserted that, if approved, the gas tax amendment would result in rejuvenation of the ad valorem tax base by reducing the debt of the counties and providing greater efficiency in debt management. Furthermore, the committee expected a reduction in bond finance rates resulting from the pledge of tax funds and vesting of management in the Board of Administration. In essence, the committee advocated a change from virtual to actual assumption of county bond debt management by the state.58 The Tax Inquiry Council forwarded these and other proposals to the governor and legislative leaders for their use as a blueprint for fiscal reform in the coming legislative session. Governor Holland, who had assisted the council in acquiring the Brookings study, incorporated many of the recommendations in his messages to the 1941 legislature.59 The difficult task of reforming the state‘s patchwork of temporizing fiscal policies now fell to the very body that had contributed so much to its creation, the Legislature of the State of Florida. The prevailing view of the legislature as a whole, as represented in the state‘s press, was of an often unruly, inefficient body with an excessively parochial mentality. This perception was due to several factors. For one, the state‘s ―peculiarities in geography and social composition‖ resulted in what V. O. Key, Jr. called ―an incredibly complex mélange of amorphous factions,‖ each pursuing its own particular interests.60 For another, the legislature suffered from the malady known as the ―local-bill evil‖ whereby the house and senate spent much time and energy dealing

58 Report of the Sub-Committee on Second Gas Tax to James T. Wilson, 4 April 1941, Holland Papers, FSA.

59 LaMar Sarra to Ralph Davis, 4 October 1941, Holland Papers, FSA.

60 Key. Southern Politics in State and Nation, 83, 82. 80 with local government issues because municipalities operated under legislative charters. Candidates for legislative office ran on local issues and the problems of the state were often a lower priority.61 The infrequency of sessions and the rudimentary character of the legislature also served to undermine the quality of lawmaking in Florida. Meeting every other year, legislators had no permanent staffs and relied upon cabinet officers and lobbyists for their information. Furthermore, in the words of former St. Petersburg Times associate editor Martin Dyckman, ―The absence of even cursory conflict-of-interest safeguards allowed Florida‘s part- time lawmakers to become full-time representatives of banks, railroads, and other commercial interests that were susceptible to legislation and regulation.‖62 Moreover, legislators were notorious for disregarding decorum and engaging in fisticuffs, caning, and the brandishing of firearms during session.63 While numerous individual lawmakers held the public‘s esteem, the legislature as an entity seemed to be viewed as something of a spectacle. The azaleas, dogwood, and crabapple bloomed as usual on the eve of the 1941 session, however, some veteran observers of Florida politics noted the influence of the distant international crisis on the formerly quiet capital city of Tallahassee as it prepared for the legislature. For one thing, the population of the small capital city had grown because of the army air training base under construction on the western fringes of the community. Competition and prices for housing in the city increased, as did the demand for other commodities and services such as restaurants, transportation, and recreation. This prompted the city‘s chamber of commerce to create a listing of available apartments and rooms to help legislators and attaches find housing in Tallahassee. 64 Additionally, the availability of lucrative war related employment diminished the numbers who usually thronged the city seeking five dollar per day jobs as stenographic and clerical attaches. Furthermore, at least one pundit claimed to see evidence of an unusual commitment to harmony and a new focus on taking care of the state‘s business,

61 Federal Writers‘ Project, Florida, 66.

62 Dyckman, Floridian of His Century: The Courage of Governor LeRoy Collins, 28.

63 For legislative scuffling, see Florida Times-Union, 1 May 1941; for caning, see St. Petersburg Times, 3 June 1939; Florida Times-Union, 11 April 1941, and Miami Herald, 20 April 1941; for firearms, see St. Petersburg Times, 1 June 1941.

64 The economic effect of the legislative session in Tallahassee was comparable to the tourist season in other Florida communities. The session brought ―a great influx of people who [spent] a lot of money, maybe as much as a million dollars.‖ Florida Times-Union 3 April 1941.

81 which he attributed to the looming shadow of international war.65 Because of the war, and other factors, this session had the potential to be atypically productive. On 8 April, with a copy of Gilbert Stuart‘s portrait of George Washington behind him,66 Governor Holland took the rostrum in the house chamber to address the lawmakers and spectators gathered for the opening session of the state legislature. Wearing a white gardenia in his lapel, the governor laid out an extensive list of his legislative priorities. To meet the immediate requirements of the ―grave national crisis,‖ he asked the legislature to confirm statutorily his executive order creating the Florida State Guard. Additionally, he requested a stringent anti-sabotage program to protect the state‘s many defense industries and military installations. Noting that the state failed to receive its full share of federal matching funds because of the level of contributions to its old age assistance program, the governor called for an increase in the pari-mutuel betting tax, as well as collection of the ―odd-cents break‖ from betting pools currently retained by the racetracks.67 Enactment of these measures would allow the state to boost pensions to qualify for full federal matching funds. Holland also recommended two measures to streamline state government – revision of the constitutional amendment process to allow for ratification at special election, and the synchronization of the terms of state officials with those of the governor to prevent overlap. The governor reminded the legislature of its duty to establish a state parole board as authorized by a constitutional amendment approved the previous November. With the exception of the pari-mutuel tax and the ―odd-cents break,‖ these issues promised minimal legislative controversy.68 Probably the most complex and contentious segment of the governor‘s program concerned distribution of state gas tax revenues. The governor formally announced the details of his program for state roads and county bonds. Declaring the revenues from the present gas tax distribution inadequate to meet the need for new road construction, he proposed a plan that

65 Legislators and attaches received the same rate of pay from the state. Florida Times-Union 3 April 1941, and Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 7, 8 April 1941.

66 Federal Writers Project. Florida: A Guide to the Southernmost State, 278.

67 Racetrack cashiers paid off bets in five-cent increments with the track rounding down and keeping the ―odd cents break.‖ Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 8 April 1941.

68 Florida House of Representatives, Journal of the House of Representatives, Twenty-Eighth Regular Session, April 8th to June 7th, 1941. (Tallahassee, Fl.: n.p., 1941), 6-13 [hereafter House Journal, 1941]; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 8 April 1941.

82 would both provide needed roads and assist those counties with bonded debt. Under his plan, the State Road Department would receive four cents of the total seven cents per gallon gasoline tax. The counties‘ share dropped from three to two cents, but their eligibility for state debt assistance was expanded through extension of gas tax credits. The portions of the gas tax distributed to the public schools and general revenue fund remained unchanged. In anticipation of county objections, Holland pointed out that recent increases in gasoline sales had resulted in a two cent per gallon share yielding more revenue in 1940 than at the time of the levy‘s approval in 1931. Furthermore, he proposed the long-term commitment of the counties‘ two-cent share of the gas tax to bond payment through a constitutional amendment. The governor believed the new gas tax program would realize four main objectives:

First, to set up ample credits for the counties. Second, to prevent defaults in all counties. Third, to provide for the permanent retirement of the bonds and for lower interest rates by pledging two cents of the gas tax thereto. Fourth, to use money not needed by the counties for the retirement of bonds, for maintenance and construction of state roads.

In reference to bond retirement, Holland reminded his audience of ―certain bond promoters in our midst who are interested in high interest rates for the bonds, in non-callable bonds, in frequent refundings and large refunding fees … regardless of … how badly the money is needed to serve the people of the state.‖69 With his proposal to overhaul gas tax distribution, the governor directly challenged other powerful interests within state politics. In proposing to increase pari-mutuel taxes for old age pensions and redistribute the gas tax, Holland was treading on politically perilous ground. Reporting the governor‘s address, the Tampa Morning Tribune noted that the racetrack tax and gas tax redistribution ―recommendations opened questions that tied up the entire 1939 legislature and appeared to provide the first major matters for the current session.‖70 As the governor probably anticipated, his proposals aroused the opposition of powerful interests, including county officials, the racing industry, and bond dealers. The state Association of County Commissioners presented a gas tax distribution plan sharply at odds with Governor Holland‘s proposal. Association President V. G. Phillips, of

69 House Journal, 1941, 12-13; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 8 April 1941.

70 Tampa Morning Tribune, 9 April 1941.

83

Tallahassee, asked the legislature to override Governor Cone‘s vetoes of 1939 legislation broadening and extending gas tax distribution to counties for bond redemption. As Phillips explained, some counties felt betrayed by Cone‘s actions,

Many counties are distrustful because they feel they were ‗sold down the river‘ by former Governor Cone‘s veto, after the 1939 legislature, of senate bills 1216, 1217 and 1219, passed at that session with only three dissenting votes.

Holland‘s proposal to give the road department one of the cents going to the counties, according to Phillips, would necessitate increased ad valorem taxes for many counties to meet bond maturities and interest.71 Reporting on the association‘s annual convention, Allen Morris wrote that some county attorneys shared the commissioners‘ opposition to the Holland plan. Morris theorized that the county attorneys feared the proposed gas tax redistribution would curtail the ―lucrative legal employment‖ generated by bond exchange and bond management in general. At the same time, the Florida League of Municipalities, after promising full support to Governor Holland in return for assistance with homestead exemption abuses, began raising funds to fight the Brookings report tax reforms. Morris reported that the city officials opposed consolidation of tax assessing and collecting functions because it would curb available municipal patronage. County and city officials preferred the status quo to a plan giving the state more authority over local bonds and taxes.72 The 1941 legislative session opened with exceptional activity in the house of representatives. Under the leadership of Speaker Dan McCarty, the lower house began its first full day by introducing forty-six bills and passing the four defense bills requested by the governor. Three of the bills – pertaining to sabotage, regulation of explosives, and the state defense force – passed the house unanimously. The fourth, strengthening the state defense council, passed with only a single opposing vote.73 The sabotage bill would provoke a minor controversy in the senate because it provided alternative punishments of from one to ten years or the death penalty for attempted and actual acts of sabotage. Some critics believed the bill should

71 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 3 April 1941.

72 Miami Herald, 10 March 1941.

73 House Journal, 1941, 19-20; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 9 April 1941, and Florida Times-Union, 10 April 1941.

84 provide a median penalty between the two extremes.74 The senate approved the house-passed defense measures, amending the sabotage bill, on motion of Senator Pat Whitaker of Tampa, to remove the provision for the death penalty.75 A brief standoff between the two chambers ended after a conference committee of house and senate members eventually modified the bill to limit the application of the death penalty to actual cases of sabotage. The press called the speed with which the defense measures passed ―unprecedented.‖76 The house also turned its attention to the highly anticipated issue of salary buying in the first full day of deliberations. Salary buying or salary loans referred to the practice of loaning money on the security of future pay checks, often at interest rates as high as two hundred percent. The regulation of interest rates on salary loans consumed a prodigious amount of time, energy, and good will during the 1939 session. Bills regulating salary buyers passed the 1939 house three times, only to fail in the senate.77 Then-Senator Holland waged a determined campaign on behalf of regulation during the 1939 legislature. Debate over the measure grew so heated Senator R. Lucas Black, of Gainesville, struck Holland on the shoulder with a cane.78 Numerous civic and professional groups had endorsed regulation since then but it was expected to remain a very controversial issue.79 Legislative observers received a surprise when the house passed a salary buying bill unanimously and the senate approved the same measure by a comfortable margin. This led several reporters and editors to comment on the unusual efficiency and harmony demonstrated in the early days of the legislature.80

74 Florida Senate, Journal of the Senate, Twentieth Regular Session, April 8th to June 7th, 1941. (Tallahassee, Fl.: n.p., 1941), 9, 10, 11, 18 [hereafter Senate Journal, 1941]; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 10 April 1941.

75 Florida Times-Union, 16 April 1941,.

76 House Journal, 1941, 494; Senate Journal, 1941, 259; St. Petersburg Times, 23 April 1941, Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 29 April 1941, Florida Time-Union, 30 April 1941.

77 Florida Times-Union, 10, 11 April 1941; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 11 April 1941.

78 The incident occurred in the waning hours of the final day of the 1939 session. Then-Senator Holland did not retaliate against Black; who suffered from a heart ailment. St. Petersburg Times, 3 June 1939. Black died on 28 March 1940 and the 1941 Senate memorialized the former legislator in Senate Resolution 8. Senate Journal, 1941, 79.

79 Florida Times-Union, 11 April 1941; Miami Herald, 20 April 1941.

80 House Journal, 1941, 17, 76; Senate Journal, 1941, 47, 52; Florida Times-Union, 16 April 1941; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 16 April 1941. 85

The Holland proposal to fund increased old age pensions by increasing the state‘s share of horse racing revenues was the first administration measure to encounter determined opposition. Some small county legislators opposed the five percent increase in the tax on horse racing wagers because they believed the measure might inhibit betting and reduce the approximately thirty three thousand dollar share of the current race tax distributed to each county.81 Warnings that the new tax would ―kill racing in Florida‖ from the management of the state‘s two Miami horse racing tracks, Tropical Park and Hialeah Park, inflamed those fears.82 Some other legislators, including Senate President John R. Beacham of West Palm Beach, and former Senate President Pat Whitaker of Tampa, argued that the new tax and plan to take the odd cents break for increased old age pensions did not provide adequate funds to achieve that goal. They called for pension funding from a more consistent, but unspecified, revenue source.83 A small but determined group hoped to block passage of the racing tax program. Supporters of the Holland horse racing bills introduced the measures in both houses during the first week of the session. The racing tax bill, the more controversial of the two measures, received the sponsorship of majorities in the house and senate.84 The senate bill giving the state the odd cents break passed that body unanimously, to the surprise of many in the press.85 The house referred both horse racing bills to the Finance and Taxation Committee, chaired by Orlando bond dealer and Holland-ally Rep. L. C. Leedy.86 The senate referred the racing tax to the Miscellaneous Legislation Committee, chaired by Senator J. W. Gideons, of Webster.87 The Gideons committee reported the bill unfavorably, forcing senate supporters to muster a two-thirds majority to place it on the calendar for debate, but only a simple majority to

81 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 11 April 1941,.

82 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 25 April 1941.

83 Florida Times-Union, 26 April 1941.

84 House Journal, 1941, 33; Senate Journal, 1941, 39; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 11 April 1941.

85 Tallahassee Daily Democrat; 15, 16 April 1941; Florida Times-Union, April 16, 1941.

86 Florida Times-Union, 21 April 1941. Prior to the 1941 session, Leedy wrote to Holland of his initial reluctance to take the chair of the Finance and Taxation Committee, but decided ―you are pretty apt to need the help of all your good friends, and so I told Dan [McCarty] definitely that I would take that post.‖ Letter from Leedy to Holland, March 5, 1941, File Folder ―Gas Tax,‖ Box 68, Series 406, Spessard L. Holland Papers, FSA.

87 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 16 April 1941.

86 pass. Advocates of the racing tax easily overrode the committee‘s unfavorable report and passed the bill thirty-four to four in ―the first rough and tumble debate of the session.‖ The senate sought to meet concerns of opponents by amending the original bill to guarantee the counties‘ share of revenues and to provide for expiration on 1 July 1943.88 As expected, the house Finance and Taxation Committee approved the amended horse racing proposals following a public hearing.89 As the measures approached final approval in the house, representatives of the racetracks stepped up their opposition. They warned that the tax might ―drive away big bettors, reduce profits and prevent racing on the highest plane.‖ Furthermore, track operators refused to commit to continued operation if the tax passed. Hialeah Park took the unprecedented step of closing its grounds to the public as an ―economy measure.‖90 After both measures passed the house unanimously, Rep. H. Earnest Overstreet of Miami said, ―I do not entertain a single fear that the tracks will not open next season because of increased taxes.‖91 Following senate approval of corrective measures, the racing measures went to the governor for his approval.92 With the passage of the horseracing program, the legislature not only completed one of the governor‘s priorities for the session, but they also advanced yet another issue unsuccessfully championed by then-Senator Holland in the 1939 session.93 In passing the racing program, the legislature, with a few exceptions, again demonstrated remarkable harmony and a willingness to follow the governor‘s leadership. While the governor‘s horse racing tax progressed through the legislature, administration leaders worked with county commissioners on the contentious gas tax program. Governor Holland proposed changing the existing gas tax distribution from three cents each to the State Road Department and the counties, to four cents for the state and two cents for the counties. Additionally, he proposed a constitutional amendment pledging two cents of the tax to road construction and bonded debt retirement. The Association of County Commissioners opposed

88 Florida Times-Union, 26 April 1941.

89 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 28 April 1941.

90 Florida Times-Union, 1 May 1941.

91 House Journal, 1941, 254, 262; Florida Times-Union, 2 May 1941.

92 Senate Journal, 1941, 474; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 6 May 1941; Florida Times-Union, 7 May 1941.

93 Florida Times-Union, 26 April 1941.

87 the tax redistribution plan. Observers and participants feared the gas tax question would consume the current legislative session as it had the 1929 session, and the regular and two special sessions in 1931.94 Representatives of the Holland administration and the county commissioners met repeatedly to reach a compromise consisting of the original administration gas tax plan with the addition of credits to the counties for interest paid on bonds issued for the construction of roads granted to the state. Holland had originally opposed this provision because he considered it a dubious claim on the state, and he doubted the constitutionality of the measure. In the end, however, he was willing to accept the compromise if the counties assumed the risk of judicial reversal.95 The senate subsequently approved the entire gas tax program after less than an hour of debate.96 The measures achieved unanimous approval in the house a few days later. Passage of the new gas tax program, along with the reenactment of the emergency seventh cent gas tax earlier in the session,97 provided additional gas tax credits and allowed counties to use ad valorem revenues previously dedicated to bonded debt service for other purposes.98 Commentators noted with a mixture of surprise and pride that an issue that had previously immobilized the legislature had been solved quickly and without apparent rancor.99 On 14 May, Holland delivered his special message on finance and taxation to a joint meeting of house and senate members. Praising the work they had done to that point, the governor outlined his proposals to replace lost tax revenues, bring greater economy to state government, and strengthen and equalize county and district tax systems. Holland had held this message, waiting for approval of the main pieces of his legislative program as outlined in his initial message.100

94 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 30 April 1941, 1 May 1941; Florida Times-Union, 1 May 1941.

95 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 20 April 1941; Florida Times-Union, 20 April 1941.

96 Senate Journal, 1941, 194-195; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 30 April 1941; Florida Times-Union, 1 May 1941.

97 House Journal, 1941, 128, 388; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 25 April 1941.

98 Florida Times-Union, 1 May 1941.

99 Florida Times-Union, 6 May 1941. Wrangling over the gas tax became so acrimonious during the 1931 session that then-Rep. R. C. Horne and then-Rep. J. Tom Watson, of Hillsborough, came to blows. May 1, 1941, Florida Times-Union.

100 House Journal, 1941, 744-750; St. Petersburg Times, May 15 1941; Tampa Tribune, May 15 1941; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, May 14 1941.

88

To replace the revenues lost through abolition of state ad valorem taxation and the expected repeal of the gross receipts tax, Holland proposed several measures. First, a measure increasing the license tag fee from ten dollars to fifteen dollars on cars weighing up to 2,500 pounds.101 Second, a retail store inventory tax.102 Third, revision of a tax on heavy trucks and trailers recently enacted over former Governor Cone‘s veto to allocate the revenue to dependent children and the indigent blind. Fourth, requiring contributions to the general revenue fund by most state agencies possessing special funds.103 Administration leaders believed these measures, along with the transfer of $750,000 in proceeds from Murphy Tax Redemption Act sales recently awarded to the state revenue fund,104 would make up the shortfall expected from the repeal of the ad valorem and probable repeal of the gross receipts tax.105 Additionally, Holland asked the legislature to enact a series of economizing measures to help alleviate the state‘s revenue woes. He asked the solons to reject a request for emergency school appropriations, decrease the state allotment for free textbooks, and suspend the state‘s contribution to the state teachers‘ retirement fund for 1940-1941. Holland hoped that the state could temporarily trim educational expenditures to avoid a deeper deficit.106 The third component of Holland‘s message focused on providing a ―stronger and fairer‖ county and district tax system through implementation of a series of supplemental tax measures. The first would create a state tax commissioner to supervise reconstruction of the ad valorem system. The second would require full cash value assessment of real estate. The third would prevent abuses of the homestead exemption law through a more narrow definition of qualifying properties. The fourth would require strict enforcement of tax collection. The fifth, and final, measure would provide for stronger tangible personal property tax liens. Years of tax avoidance and abuses led to this new program. In Holland‘s words, ―I know of no other way to reduce the

101 House Journal, 1941, 745; St. Petersburg Times, 15 May 1941.

102 House Journal, 1941, 747; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, May 14 1941.

103 House Journal, 1941, 747, 749; Tampa Tribune, 15 May 1941.

104 Florida Times-Union, 10, 13 May 1941.

105 House Journal, 1941, 745, 748; St. Petersburg Times, 15 May 1941.

106 House Journal, 1941, 745-746; St. Petersburg Times, 15 May 1941; Tampa Tribune, 15 May 1941; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14 May 1941.

89 burden of the faithful taxpayers who have always carried their part of the load and more, than by having and enforcing a real tax collection law, with teeth in it.‖107 Legislators generally endorsed, or at least promised to consider, the governor‘s new proposals. Speaker Dan McCarty said, ―I think his recommendations present a sound solution to our financial problems.‖ Representative Charles A. Luckie, of Duval county, declared, ―For constructive financing of the state, without levying additional taxes on the people who … are least able to pay, I think it was far better than any of us had hoped.‖ However, some legislators expressed reservations about additional taxes on motorists. ―It was a damn good speech, and a constructive program but I have some reservations about the automobile tag increases,‖ admitted Rep. Leo Wotitzky, of Charlotte county.108 Overall, the legislators appeared receptive to the second phase of the governor‘s legislative program. The push to win approval of Holland‘s revenue proposals began with the approval of the automobile tag increase by the house finance and taxation committee.109 The bill was expected to yield an estimated $1.5 million annually for public education by lowering the minimum weight for the fifteen-dollar tag from 3,050 to 2,500 pounds. Additionally, the measure created a forty-five dollar tag classification for cars weighing over 4,500 pounds.110 A well-organized bloc of supporters managed to guide the tag increase to passage in the house by a sixty to twenty- five vote despite vigorous attempts to amend and delay the measure.111 In the senate, the proposal survived the opposition of Senators Drummond and Horne to achieve approval by a vote of twenty-five to eleven.112 The passage of the auto tag increase extended the governor‘s surprising string of legislative victories. Another of Governor Holland‘s revenue proposals, contributions to the general revenue fund from agencies possessing special funds, received unanimous approval in both the house and senate. The administration‘s version of the bill calling for a two per cent cut from the Citrus

107 House Journal, 747-748; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14 May 1941.

108 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14 May 1941.

109 Florida Times-Union, 17 May 1941.

110 Florida Times-Union, 18 May 1941; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 20 May 1941.

111 House Journal, 1941, 972; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 20 May 1941.

112 Senate Journal, 1941, 651-652; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 22 May 1941; Florida Times-Union, 23 May 1941.

90

Commission, the Hotel Commission, the Milk Board, and other agencies was amended by the house finance and taxation committee to increase the deduction to three per cent.113 This measure indirectly addressed the problem of continuing appropriations identified in the Brookings report by diverting some of the funds without fundamentally altering the system. With the session nearing its scheduled end, legislators began to grapple with the most controversial items of the governor‘s tax and finance program. The governor‘s store inventory tax drew opposition from Florida merchants. The so- called store tax was intended, along with the increased auto tag fees, to substitute for the repealed state ad valorem tax and the soon to be repealed one-half percent gross receipts tax. In its preliminary form, the measure consisted of a one per cent inventory tax on retail store stocks over one thousand dollars and an occupational license fee. The proposal allocated the first six hundred thousand dollars of revenue to public education, with the balance going to the general revenue fund. The state‘s retail merchants divided over the details of the bill.114 Merchants chose sides according to the size of their enterprises. Large independent merchants and chain stores called for low per unit license fees. Smaller merchants lobbied for a one thousand dollar stock exemption from the inventory tax. The Holland administration, and its supporters in the legislature, worked to ensure that whatever measure came out of the process provided adequate funds to substitute for the gross receipts tax.115 After a vigorous debate, the house devised a compromise consisting of a one-half per cent inventory tax and a sliding scale license fee ranging from ten to four hundred dollars per Florida store based on the total number of stores operated.116 This cleared the way for repeal of the gross receipts tax. The senate approved both the tax repeal and the house-passed store tax measure.117 With the completion of this portion of Holland‘s tax and finance program, the legislature focused on the governor‘s proposals to strengthen tax assessment and collection in the districts and counties.

113 House Journal, 1941, 1006, 1140; Florida Times-Union, 25, 27 May 1941.

114 Florida Times-Union, 18, 19 May 1941.

115 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 20 May 1941; Florida Times, Union 21 May 1941.

116 Florida Times-Union, 30 May 1941.

117 Florida Times-Union, 4 June 1941.

91

Drawing on recommendations from the Brookings Institution report, Holland‘s proposals sought to remedy long-standing weaknesses in local tax assessment and collection practices. In brief, the Holland program called for a state tax commissioner, full cash value assessment of real and personal property, strengthening of collection laws for tangible and intangible personal property, and revision of collection and enforcement of taxes. Advocates of the program said it would bring more equity and strengthen the tax system.118 Opponents of the Holland plan made several alarming claims about the program. Adversaries of the plan objected to the creation of the office of tax commissioner because, they said, it would lead to a state dictatorship over the counties. A closely related allegation held that the program as a whole would result in the destruction of local government. Additionally, claims were made that full value assessment and stronger collection laws would inevitably result in the seizure of property for delinquent taxes. Supporters of the plan responded that a strong local finance system would be the best way to protect the autonomy of local government. Furthermore, they argued that the plan would decrease taxes on those paying too much and raise taxes on those paying too little. 119 As the session progressed to its scheduled close, the interests on either side of this issue dug in and prepared for a legislative struggle. Early evidence of the resolve of both camps was evident at a meeting of the house finance and taxation committee on 23 May. State Comptroller J. M. Lee led the opposition with charges that the since the state no longer levied an ad valorem tax, the proposal to create a state tax commissioner amounted to ―locking the stable after the horse has gone.‖ Furthermore, Lee said the new office would be ―just one more sure and well-advanced step toward killing local self-government by taking tax control away from the threshold of the people paying the bills and bringing it up here to Tallahassee.‖ Holland defended his plan in a written statement, reassuring the public that ―people who have been paying their taxes heretofore have nothing to fear from this system.‖120 It began to appear that the string of easy victories and compromises achieved on other components of the administration‘s legislative program had ended.

118 Florida Times-Union, 24 May 1941.

119 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 25 May 1941.

120 Florida Times-Union, 24 May 1941. The causes of Lee‘s opposition are not clear, however, the comptroller may have been attempting to protect his own agency from encroachment by a new cabinet officer with supervisory authority over taxation. Friction between Holland and Lee may also have contributed to the situation. Immediately 92

Recognizing the strength of opposition, Governor Holland replied to charges against his program and reiterated his belief in the potential benefits. In an indirect response to Comptroller Lee‘s accusations of centralization of taxing power in Tallahassee, Holland said, ―Actually, the shoe is on the other foot because this bill would simply aid the counties to collect enough of their own revenue to retain financial independence. When the counties don‘t collect their own money but instead come to the state for it, the state naturally controls the expenditure of it.‖ Asserting the merit of the tax revision measures before the house, Holland signaled his willingness to accept what he called the ―three essentials‖ of his program: one-hundred percent assessments, strengthening of tax deeds, and some state agency to develop and enforce standards for county assessors and collectors.121 Recognizing the strength of the opposition, the governor defended his proposals and restated his belief in the essentials of his program. Supporters of tax revision sought to counter what they termed the ―alarming half-truths‖ spread by opponents of the program. The Florida Taxpayers Association issued a statement charging that ―special interests‖ wanted to derail the administration proposals so they could continue to avoid taxation. According to the association, the opposition consisted of large cattle owners, the ―duPont-Ball empire,‖ local political machines, and hotel and real estate men ―who want to shift all taxes off their property and onto the small consumer.‖122 Governor Holland made a similar argument when he commented that tax revision opponents were ―those who aren‘t paying taxes now because they think it will make them pay. I commend them for their sagacity. That is exactly what we are trying to do.‖123 Recognizing the strength of the opposition, advocates of the plan sought to build support. As the session reached the end of its penultimate week proponents of tax revision recognized the proposal for a state tax commissioner had drawn too much hostility and might endanger the entire program. The administration abandoned the original proposals and substituted revised bills to the house finance and taxation committee. The most significant

following the 1941 session, Allen Morris observed there was ―little love lost between governor and comptroller.‖ Miami Herald, 8 June 1941.

121 Florida Times-Union, 26 May 1941.

122 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 26 May 1941.

123 St. Petersburg Times, 28 May 1941.

93 change conferred to the comptroller the assessment supervision authority originally intended for a state tax commissioner.124 The house finance and taxation committee approved the revised bills by a vote of sixteen to four.125 Debate began in the house before galleries packed with spectators eager to witness the proceedings. The bills immediately encountered parliamentary maneuvering by an opposition bloc seeking to delay consideration by refusing motions to waive the reading of the bills. Once Holland supporters succeeded in waiving reading of the bills, opponents, led by Rep. Harrell of Hamilton county, began efforts to amend the bills. Speaker Dan McCarty took the floor on behalf of ―this program to eliminate the tax dodgers from Florida.‖ The bill giving the state authority over personal property assessments passed by a vote of sixty-seven to twenty-seven. The second bill, authorizing state supervision of real estate assessment and taxation, won by a vote of sixty-four to twenty-eight.126 The measures then went to the senate, where they faced determined opposition. The Holland tax proposals encountered well-organized obstruction in the state senate. Adversaries launched a campaign to ―filibuster‖ the tax measures through delay and amendments. Cognizant of the session‘s scheduled end the next day, Senator Addison Drummond, of Bonifay, sought to stall consideration of the bills by requesting the reading of bills and messages preceding the tax bills on the calendar. Once the senate reached the bills on its calendar, Senator Drummond led efforts to dilute the effectiveness of the bills through amendment. A ―hectic, rip-roaring filibuster‖ stretched into the early morning hours. Realizing it had reached an impasse, the senate eventually postponed further consideration until the next day, the final day of session.127 Facing the expiration of the session, supporters of the governor‘s plan accepted the opposition‘s amendments to avoid defeat of the tax revision program. Amendments struck the provision for a standard system of assessments from the personal property tax and a provision giving the comptroller final approval over county budgets from the real property proposal. The opposition compromised in allowing the addition of a provision giving the comptroller the

124 House Journal, 1941, 1007, 1183, 1675; St. Petersburg Times, 31 May 1941; Florida Times-Union, 1 June 1941.

125 Florida Times-Union, 3 June 1941.

126 House Journal, 1941, 1593, 1594, 1595; Florida Times-Union, 4 June 1941.

127 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 5 June 1941; Florida Times-Union, 6 June 1941.

94 authority to investigate and recommend the removal of county officials ―for his willful failure to properly perform the duties imposed upon him by the Constitution, this act and the rules and regulations pursuant to this act….‖ Senator Drummond, opposition leader, claimed the compromise constituted an ―overwhelming victory.‖128 Another foe of the tax program, Senator Walter Rose of Orlando, said of the amended bills, ―We‘ve cut the guts out of them.‖ The governor‘s senate allies seemed content with the outcome in light of the effectiveness of the previous night‘s filibuster against the measures. Senator LeRoy Collins, of Tallahassee, said the bills remained effective despite the amendments. The governor declared that even in the amended forms, the bills‘ essential functions ―are all accomplished in the legislation without any substantial impairment.‖ The house unanimously approved the amended measures and forwarded them to the governor‘s desk for his signature.129 Two failed legislative proposals – a push to prohibit union labor‘s closed shop, and a married women‘s rights bill – merit exposition because both reappeared in the 1943 session. Attorney General J. Tom Watson drafted the open shop bill, claiming that it would prevent the interruption of vital defense work by labor agitators.130 Former Florida Federation of Labor president Wendell C. Heaton charged that Watson‘s bill had ―for its principal purpose the complete dissolving of our trades unions.‖131 At least one editorialist, noting that work stoppages had been few, labor plentiful, and relations between management and unions amicable, questioned the necessity of the bill.132 Allen Morris observed that strikes on defense projects in other regions had resulted in strong public sentiment against the closed shop in Florida.133 In general, the most consistent legislative resistance to the closed shop ban came

128 Florida Times-Union, 7 June 1941.

129 St. Petersburg Times, 7 June 1941.

130 Florida Times-Union, 14 April 1941; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14 April 1941. Watson, speaking at the Florida Federation of Labor annual convention in Tampa, assailed the closed shop as undemocratic. Charles Silva, retiring FFL president, said the attorney general ―has a hell of a lot to learn about organized labor and its principles.‖ Additionally, Silva promised to oppose Watson‘s reelection if he did not change his views. Florida Times-Union, 18 March 1941,. V. O. Key, Jr. described Watson as ―a labor baiter of the first order.‖ Key, Southern Politics In State and Nation, 82.

131 Florida Times-Union, 25 April 1941.

132 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 25 April 1941.

133 Miami Herald, 18 May 1941.

95 from representatives from larger counties, presumably a reflection of a large and politically active union constituency.134 The house referred the bill to both the labor and Americanism committees for consideration. While the Americanism committee reported the bill favorably, the labor committee rejected it, necessitating a two-thirds vote in the house to override the labor committee and place the bill on the calendar.135 Following their failure to muster the necessary votes, supporters of the closed shop ban, led by Attorney General Watson and Rep. Joe C. Jenkins of Alachua, introduced a new proposal to ban the closed shop in the state through constitutional amendment.136 The house committee on constitutional amendments approved the measure and sent it to the floor of the chamber for debate.137 The proposed amendment failed to win the necessary two-thirds majority required to forward it to the senate.138 The opponents of labor‘s closed shop failed during the 1941 session, but would renew their campaign under more favorable circumstances in the next session. Advocates of greater rights for married women briefly brought a bill expanding contract rights to the senate floor. During debate on a bill sponsored by Sen. Dewey Johnson, of Brooksville, to allow married women to make contracts, sue, and be sued without their husband‘s permission – described as ―free dealer rights‖ – opponents charged the bill would deprive women of Florida of the ―protection‖ of their husbands. Despite an endorsement from the state bar association, the senate defeated the proposal by a vote of thirteen to twenty.139 This issue would arise again in vastly different conditions during the next legislative session. Analyses of the just-completed session praised both the legislators and the administration. A Tampa Tribune editorial entitled ―An Exceptional Legislature‖ represented the generally laudatory tone of many editorial summaries of the session:

134 Florida Times-Union, 3 May 1941; Tampa Tribune, 3 May 1941. Estimates of union membership in Florida included 65,000 American Federation of Labor craft unionists; 3,500 members of the Workers Alliance, employed on Works Progress Administration projects; and 1,925 Congress of Industrial Organizations members. Centers of union membership included Jacksonville, Tampa, Miami, Daytona Beach, Ocala, and Orlando. Florida: A Guide to the Southernmost State, 98.

135 House Journal, 1941, 1019, 1186; Florida Times-Union, 29 April 1941.

136 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 12 May 1941.

137 House Journal, 1941, 405, 638, 691; Florida Times-Union, 31 May 1941.

138 House Journal, 1941, 1499; Florida Times-Union, 1 June 1941.

139 Senate Journal, 1941, 112, 525; Florida Times-Union, 8 May 1941; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 8 May 1941.

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As it recedes into Florida history, the 1941 Legislature will be remembered as one which did its work with promptness and dispatch, with little of the wangling and wrangling, political pulling and hauling, putting off vital measures to the last minute that have marred the record of many of its predecessors.140

The accomplishments of the session, in the opinion of many editorialists, resulted from the willingness of the legislators to follow the governor‘s leadership.141 Members of the Holland administration joined the chorus praising the 1941 legislature, and with good reason. One end of session summary reported that ―99 per cent‖ of the new governor‘s legislative program achieved passage.142 Governor Holland called the work of the session ―a grand job‖ despite revision of his tax program. ―The three essentials of the original program are still there. There was no impairment of any sort,‖ he said. Holland acknowledged disappointment at his lone defeat of the session – failure of the proposed amendment to create the office of state tax commissioner.143 Considering the inherent weakness of the executive and the independent nature of the legislature, it was a very successful session for the new governor. Several factors may account for the success of the Holland program. Some of these circumstances resulted from the conditions surrounding the 1941 session. The 1941 legislature was comprised of an unusual number of freshmen legislators – seventeen of thirty-eight in the senate and sixty-one of ninety-five in the house.144 Consequently, these men probably had not formed the biases and allegiances of more experienced lawmakers and were, presumably, more open to the new governor‘s ideas and leadership. The European war exerted a strong influence on the public and the legislators. Many of the issues addressed during the session had either a direct or an indirect relationship to state

140 Tampa Tribune, 8 June 1941.

141 Florida Times-Union, 7 June 1941; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 8 June 1941; Tampa Tribune, 8 June 1941.

142 Tampa Tribune, 8 June 1941.

143 Ibid. Allen Morris wrote that the defeat of the state tax commissioner resulted in the ―shrewdest political maneuver of the closing days of the 1941 session … the ricochet through which the Holland administration popped the hot potato of state tax commissionership into the willing hands of Comptroller J. M. Lee.‖ Morris predicted Lee‘s new duties would put him squarely between those tax assessors pushing for full valuation and those seeking to avoid it. This, according to Morris, would likely result in a strong challenger if Lee ran for reelection. Morris seemed to think this an ironic outcome of Lee‘s opposition to the tax commissioner proposal. Miami Herald, 8 June 1941.

144 Florida Times-Union, 2 April 1941.

97 defense. Measures directly related to defense, or presented as directly related to defense, included an anti-sabotage program, the closed shop bill and amendment, as well as those bills related to the State Defense Council and State Defense Force. Indirect defense proposals included virtually all of the governor‘s finance and tax reforms; which, according to proponents, better prepared the state for the shock and strain of war.145 The shadow of the European war certainly shaped the 1941 session. The Tax Inquiry Council also deserved a portion of the credit for the successful session. The council brought together representatives of a wide spectrum of business, professional, and civic interests to formulate a program to identify and address the state‘s most serious problems. They commissioned and paid for the Brookings Institution report; which served as a blue print for reform of the state‘s finance and revenue system. Additionally, Council members helped draft legislative proposals. Clearly, the Tax Inquiry Council helped shape and promote the Holland administration‘s legislative program. The new governor‘s legislative associations and political skill also contributed to the success of the administration program. Holland‘s background as a legislator yielded firsthand knowledge of the general legislative process. Additionally, Holland had developed working relationships with his fellow lawmakers, like Finance and Taxation Committee Chairman L. C. Leedy. Allen Morris wrote of Governor Holland, ―He knows the ropes, and he knows the men.‖146 Yet another important factor was the effective use of public relations to build citizen support for the components of his legislative program. Dubbed the ―New Deal technique‖ by the Tampa Tribune, it was said to be the first time a governor had succeeded in ―sell[ing] certain groups and public first on proposed legislation, and they, in turn, automatically sold the legislature.‖ Observers credited the Holland public relations strategy with focusing public sentiment to partially at least overcome lobbyists‘ influence on important legislative issues.147

145 For editorials arguing for tax and finance reform as a means of indirect defense, see Tallahassee Democrat, 7 April 1941 and 3 June 1941. The June editorial, entitled ―Legislating Only For Peace Time,‖ accurately predicted the impact of American involvement in the war on state and local finances. Noting that war would almost certainly reduce available gasoline supplies, the editorial presciently forecast severe reductions in gas tax and auto tag revenues. Furthermore, according to the column, the high potential for decreased state revenues made the reform of local financial policies ―essential.‖

146 Miami Herald, 25 May 1941.

147 Miami Herald, 25 May 1941; Tampa Tribune, 8 June 1941.

98

Holland benefited as well from the support of that portion of the business and professional sector represented by the Tax Inquiry Council and a relatively cooperative legislature. As demonstrated by their success in the 1941 legislature, the Holland administration had passed their first major political test. Following the 1941 session, Governor Holland responded to a compliment on the success of his legislative program with the remark, ―We certainly got the breaks.‖148 Considering the many influences that made the legislature more cooperative – a relatively high number of new men, the threat of war, and the work of the Tax Inquiry Council – one might certainly agree with his assessment. However, random good fortune alone did not account for the legislative record of the new administration. The governor wisely chose to pursue a selective legislative program based upon the recommendations of the Brookings Institution. He relied upon skillful public relations, as well as his knowledge of the institution and the men, to overcome opposition and guide his proposals to passage. Additionally, when the program encountered an all-imperiling impediment over a state tax commissioner, the administration pragmatically adopted a compromise. The result was a realistic and highly successful program that quickly, albeit briefly, brought financial stability back to the state. The Holland administration may have caught the breaks during the 1941 legislative session; however, they also knew how to use them.

148 Miami Herald, 10 August 1941.

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CHAPTER THREE

FLORIDA ON THE EVE OF WAR

The months preceding America‘s entry into the World War brought many challenges to the state‘s political leadership. From the closing moments of the legislative session, the Holland administration labored vigorously to improve the state‘s financial situation through implementation of its hard-won tax revision program. Preparations for war brought mixed blessings in the forms of restrictions on gas and electricity usage, an explosion in defense related construction, and an influx of military personnel and workers. With few exceptions, the state‘s citizens, like those in other southern states, strongly supported the Roosevelt administration‘s program of vigorous assistance for Great Britain and her allies. Closer to home, the Holland administration acted to balance increasing demand for fuel with the necessity of energy conservation. They also acceded to requests for assistance in a campaign to eliminate vice and political corruption in Miami. This was a time of both prosperity and shortage; a period when the state‘s representatives actively intervened to resolve conflicts across Florida. The Holland administration, recognizing that enactment without enforcement would render their tax reform program fruitless, immediately set about persuading, coaxing, and compelling local officials to implement the new laws. The most visible aspect of the campaign took the form of a public relations offensive featuring addresses to local officials and civic groups and the continuation of press releases on behalf of administration policies. The initial challenge was to overcome the influences and interests that had led to the current system of under assessment and poor revenue collections. Governor Holland called a conference of county assessors, collectors, clerks of circuit courts, school board superintendents, and school board and county commission chairmen in Tallahassee for a ―discussion of general assessment and collection of taxes, budget making, and … the financial support of the counties and the county schools.‖1 Nearly four hundred officials representing the state‘s sixty-seven counties listened as the governor and Comptroller Jim Lee instructed them on implementation of the full cash value assessment of real and personal

1 Florida Times-Union, 14 June 1941.

100 property. The comptroller reminded the audience that the old tax laws required full cash value assessments, although tax officials followed custom in assessing at an average of twenty-five per cent of value. Holland declared the new laws ―are no idle gesture and they‘re going to be enforced, so that each man will pay his just share of the cost of government.‖ The governor and comptroller predicted that, if properly implemented, the new tax laws would spread the taxation burden more equitably, reduce tax millages, and decrease the tax bills of those who paid. State Superintendent of Public Instruction Colin English promised the new laws would receive the support of local school groups. The officials in attendance ―pledged their full co-operation in revising and remodeling the taxation system.‖2 In the following weeks the governor, comptroller, and superintendent of public instruction traveled the state speaking to civic clubs and community organizations on behalf of the new tax program. The governor appeared before civic leaders in metropolitan Jacksonville and at the annual tupelo festival in rustic Gulf County. Comptroller Lee journeyed to Tampa on behalf of tax reform. Holland, Lee, and English traveled to Orlando to discuss the revised tax laws at a luncheon with Orlando civic leaders. The initial speeches in this lobbying campaign promised to lower tax bills by including property that had been undervalued or escaped assessment entirely. As county officials began to implement full cash value assessment and report the effect, the speeches changed to emphasize the tremendous growth in assessed values. In his July 28 address in Orlando, Holland revealed ―that in one county alone, Dade, the tax roll will pass the half billion mark – totaling more than the entire assessed valuation of the state of Florida last year.‖3 The Holland administration, with the aid of the comptroller and the superintendent of public instruction, waged a vigorous and effective campaign for implementation of the new program.4

2 Florida Times-Union, 25 June 1941; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 24 June 1941.

3 Florida Times-Union, 6, 16, 29 July 1941; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 11, 28 July 1941; Miami Herald, 29 July 1941.

4 A memo from Assistant Secretary to the Comptroller Gilbert Freeman to Governor Holland provided a brief glimpse into the process of crafting the governor‘s message. Freeman suggested, and the governor appeared to follow, a theme of ―‗they said it couldn‘t be done‘‖ but were proven wrong. Comparison of the Freeman memo with the governor‘s speech as reported in the Florida Times-Union and the Tallahassee Democrat suggested the memo served as a template for the speech. Gilbert Freeman memorandum to Governor Holland, 24 July 1941, Spessard L. Holland Papers, Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fl, Record Group 102, Series 406, Box 109, File Folder 13; Florida Times-Union, 29 July 1941; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 28 July 1941.

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In addition to a campaign-style speaking tour of the state, the administration sought to shape public opinion on a second front by distributing copies of pro-tax reform news stories and editorials to the newspapers in the hope that they would republish them. In a cover letter with the salutation ―Hey Gang,‖ dated 24 July 1941, Gilbert Freeman, executive secretary to the comptroller, listed ―several reasons why we hope you can use the attached story from Dade County‖ describing the dramatic increases in that county‘s tax roll under the recently passed laws. Freeman promised additional information as it became available and closed noting that ―I have been asked by both Governor Holland and Comptroller Lee to extend to you their heartfelt thanks also.‖ In an undated memo accompanying two additional editorials Freeman wrote:

Hey Gang – Here‘s a couple more editorials which we hope you will find interesting enough to use in whole or in part – all to the end that the public become more tax consious [sic] and more interested in solving their problems through the new tax laws. Both the Governor and the Colonel will appreciate anything you can ―do‖ with these editorials as well [as] the other items being sent you from time to time.5

Through its two-pronged public relations effort the administration attempted to raise awareness and rally support across the state for its tax reform program. While the team of Holland, Lee, and English sought to build public backing for the new tax program, taxpayers in two counties challenged the legality of the reforms in the courts. In the first case, a group of Bay County taxpayers filed a mandamus suit in circuit court asking that the state be compelled to accept that county‘s tax roll because it was completed and presented to the county commission before passage of the new tax laws. The submitted tax roll assessed property at an average of twenty-eight per cent of full value. In defense of the new program, the state argued that acceptance of anything less than full value would ruin the new tax system because the railroads would then challenge any assessment based on full value placed on their properties. Attorney General Tom Watson made the additional argument the Bay county suit was improper because the taxpayers‘ could not demonstrate material injury through increased assessments. He noted that the new law required tax millages to go down as assessed values

5 Gilbert Freeman to ―Hey Gang,‖ 24 July 1941, and Gilbert Freeman to ―Hey Gang,‖ undated, Spessard L. Holland Papers, Record Group 102, Series 406, Box 109, File Folder 13, Florida State Archives (FSA), Tallahassee, Fl.

102 increased, thereby maintaining roughly the same tax bill as in 1940.6 Circuit Judge E. C. Welch ultimately refused to compel acceptance of the 1941 tax roll, ruling ―that the legislature [had] the power to change the tax procedures at any time, subject only to the constitution‘s requirement for uniform taxation throughout the state.‖ The Bay county suit was a major legal hurdle for the tax reform effort. Having cleared this early challenge, state officials voiced expectations that all counties would prepare their 1941 tax rolls based on full cash value assessment.7 The second suit, filed in circuit court by three Clay county taxpayers, essentially duplicated the first in asking for an order compelling acceptance of that county‘s already completed tax roll. Judge Bayard B. Shields dismissed the suit, declaring that the petitioners failed to show injury and were not entitled to relief from enforcement of the new tax laws. This ruling cleared the way for the state railroad assessment board, which had delayed valuation of railroad and telegraph company properties pending the outcome, to make and report assessments to county assessors. The county assessors assigned valuations to most property in their counties with the exception of railroad and telegraph company property, which were assessed by the state railroad assessment board.8 Resolution of the Bay and Clay county suits shifted the focus of the tax reform campaign to the railroad assessment board. Consensus did not come easily to the railroad assessment board. Consisting of Attorney General Watson, Comptroller Lee, and State Treasurer Ed Larson, each board member saw the tax reform issue from a different perspective. Watson and Lee could not reach agreement on when and how the board should assess the railroad and telegraph property under their purview. Lee, looking to provide county officials with the necessary information to complete their tax rolls and budgets, favored action before resolution of the Bay and Clay county mandamus suits.

6 Florida Times-Union, 1, 7 August 1941. Watson‘s assertion that the new tax laws were intended to reduce millages was confirmed when Comptroller Lee rejected the Gilchrist county 1941 tax roll because the county commission had failed to proportionately reduce tax millages. Lee recommended that the Gilchrist county commission reduce the proposed 21 mill levy to 18 mills; the previous year‘s millage had been 37 mills. Florida Times-Union, 20 August 1941.

7 Miami Herald, 12 August 1941.

8 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 22 August 1941; Florida Times-Union, 23 August 1941; Miami Herald, 23 August 1941.

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Watson, on the other hand, defending the new tax laws in court, pushed for delay until resolution of the suits. Treasurer Larson declared his readiness to meet at any time.9 Watson dropped his objections after dismissal of the Clay county suit, declaring, ―It is my opinion the decks are now cleared for railroad assessments and the board will meet as soon as engagements of the three members permit.‖10 When the State Railroad Assessment Board met on 13 September, each member proposed a different formula for valuation. The meeting adjourned without agreement after an exchange of heated words between Comptroller Lee and Attorney General Watson.11 The board eventually voted two to one – Lee in opposition – to adopt assessed valuations of approximately three-and-one-half times those used in 1940. A comparison of the new assessed value with the previous year‘s value for the state‘s three largest railroads illustrated the remarkable shift achieved under the new tax program – Atlantic Coast Line: $8.7 million in 1940, $30 million in 1941; Seaboard Air Line: $6.8 million in 1940, $22 million in 1941; and Florida East Coast: $4.8 million in 1940; $16 million in 1941. Immediately following adoption of the valuations , Lee put his staff to work determining each county‘s proportion of the railroad tax. The comptroller‘s office prorated the total assessment based on railroad mileage in each county, and other factors, to determine individual county shares of the assessed valuation.12 The railroad assessment board acted cautiously in determining railroad valuations because of the very real threat of legal action from the rail lines. As reported by the Florida Times-Union prior to the board determination of valuations,

Railroad spokesman said here recently they would not oppose full valuation if all other property is assessed accordingly, but they promised action in the courts if there is any differential in valuations.13

Agreement on railroad and telegraph property values shifted the focal point of tax reform to the county assessors, to whom the duty of preparing the county tax rolls fell.

9 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 19 August 1941; Florida Times Union, 20 August 1941.

10 Miami Herald, 24 August 1941.

11 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14 September 1941.

12 Florida Times Union, 18 September 1941; Miami Herald, 18 September 1941.

13 Florida Times-Union, 20 August 1941.

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As the assessors submitted completed tax rolls to the comptroller‘s office the potential impact of the tax reform program became apparent. Comptroller Lee issued a preliminary report disclosing the assessed valuation of forty-three approved county tax rolls to be in excess of $1.2 billion, almost four times the amount for the same counties in the previous year. Furthermore, Lee predicted the total valuation for the state would exceed two billion dollars once the remaining twenty-four county tax rolls were approved. This dramatically outstripped the 1940 state total of $524,389,103.14 As his office gradually worked through the task of approving county commission budgets, Comptroller Lee reported that they were realizing the second component of the full value tax program – reduction of county tax millages. After approving operating budgets for six counties, Lee declared that millage decreases ranged from one-sixth to one-third of the previous year‘s rates. The most notable decline occurred in Palm Beach county, from 32.75 mills in 1940 to 5.8 mills in 1941.15 Early indications revealed that the intermediate goals of the Holland administration‘s tax reform program – expansion of the tax base and reduction of millages – had been achieved. Additionally, the tax revision program received partial credit for improvement in the prices of Florida government bonds and the State‘s overall financial status. Bond dealers and government officials reported the prices of bonds, including school district, municipal, and road and bridge bonds, had increased substantially over the past year and were now highly sought as investments. Credit for this transformation was given to gasoline tax reallocation and the tax reform program.16 When Governor Holland, speaking before the State Chamber of Commerce‘s annual convention, announced the repayment of the $1,770,000 debt inherited from the previous administration, he attributed it to increased tax collections, economy in government, and the new tax laws passed by the 1941 legislature.17 The tax reform program broadened the tax base of the individual counties, strengthened tax collection practices, and thereby decreased local government reliance on state revenues. This resulted in more attractive local government bonds and more money in the state general revenue fund.

14 Tampa Tribune, 19 October 1941; St. Petersburg Times, 19 October 1941.

15 Florida Times-Union, 23 October 1941; Miami Herald, 23 October 1941; St. Petersburg Times, 23 October 1941.

16 St. Petersburg Times, 10 November 1941.

17 Florida Times-Union, 2 December 1941; Miami Herald, 2 December 1941.

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While tax reform undoubtedly bolstered government financial underpinnings at all levels, increased state collections from motor vehicle, beverage, and gasoline taxes had a more direct and immediate effect. Revenues from automobile license tag and titles totaled $845,114 for the initial six months of 1941, exceeding those for all of 1940. Motor Vehicle Commission officials expected an overall increase of approximately fifteen per cent for 1941. Beverage tax revenues for fiscal year 1941 totaled $532,000 above the previous year‘s revenues – an increase of eleven per cent. Revenues from the reallocated gas tax increased by $3,107,091 – about twelve per cent above the previous total. Gasoline tax collections for fiscal year 1941 totaled $28,608,466. Gas tax collections for fiscal year 1940 equaled only $25,501,375.18 Gas consumption continued to rise during 1941. The comptroller‘s office reported a gas consumption record of 33,453,459 gallons for July 1941, yielding $2,341,742 in taxes. This exceeded the 32,141,020 gallon total for June 1941 and the 28,029,379 gallons used in July 1940.19 Gasoline consumption remained strong during August, with reported sales of 33,546,626 gallons and gasoline tax collections of $2,349,103.20 State officials attributed this dramatic increase in motor vehicle, beverage, and gas taxes predominantly to defense building in the state and secondarily to a strong tourist season during the winter of 1940-1941.21 Defense industry spending in Florida increased dramatically over a very brief period, nurturing the hopes and dreams of state business leaders. The state chamber of commerce calculated defense spending in Florida between September 1940 and September 1941 exceeded $125,000,000. The chamber estimated annual payroll of new military and naval bases at approximately $54,000,000. The high rate of defense spending in the state caused the chamber to predict that defense expenditures might eventually exceed tourism as the state‘s primary

18 Tampa Tribune, 19 July 1941.

19 These high gas consumption figures for the state are even more remarkable considering they do not include the 3,297,739 delivered to United States government agencies, or the 570,477 gallons used in aviation. Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 25 August 1941; Florida Times Union, 26 August 1941.

20 Reported gas consumption for August 1940 equaled 29,341,491 gallons with tax revenues of $2,053,904. Dade and Duval regularly led all other Florida counties in gas consumption. Florida Times-Union, 24 September 1941; Miami Herald, 24 September 1941.

21 Tampa Tribune, 19 July 1941.

106 economic force.22 As the nation prepared against the expansion of the distant war, defense expenditures within the state grew tremendously and effected many sectors of the economy. The state‘s construction industry proved one of the leading benefactors from the early phases of the defense buildup. Construction of Camp Blanding, in northeastern Bradford county, near Starke, required a massive effort to create a training facility for 45,000 infantry troops from swampy lowlands and sand hills. Initial construction cost the federal government approximately $20,000,000. An upgrade of housing and recreation facilities during the latter half of 1941 added around $6,000,000.23 The Navy‘s southeastern air station at Jacksonville initially cost an estimated $25,000,000, and the base was scheduled to receive a $15,000,000 expansion and upgrade near the end of 1941.24 Similar defense related construction expenditures undoubtedly occurred at each of the state‘s eleven U. S. Army Air Corps training schools.25 In addition to military bases, the defense build up necessitated public works projects, such as schools and electrical generation facilities, to provide community resources for defense workers and personnel of the armed forces.26 Defense related construction brought employment and an infusion of funds throughout the state. Florida‘s shipbuilding industry, essentially moribund since the close of World War I, experienced a revival from the defense buildup. The earliest signs of life appeared when the Tampa Shipbuilding and Engineering Company won a contract for the construction of four cargo ships in 1938.27 By late 1941 the Tampa yards had received a $37,650,000 Navy contract for three destroyer tenders.28 As with many other Florida industries, shipbuilding benefited from early defense expenditures and continued to grow during the coming years.

22 By comparison, the state hotel commission estimated the tourism business for the 1940-1941 season exceeded $300,000,000. Florida Times-Union, 7 September 1941; Miami Herald, 7 September 1941.

23 Florida Times-Union, 14 September 1941.

24 Florida Times-Union, 7 September 1941; Miami Herald, 7 September 1941.

25 Miami Herald, 23 September 1941.

26 Florida Times-Union, 28 October 1941.

27 Lewis N. Wynne and Carolyn J. Barnes, ―Still They Sail: Shipbuilding in Tampa During World War II,‖ in Lewis N. Wynne, Florida At War (Saint Leo, Fla.: Saint Leo College Press, 1993), 90-91.

28 Florida Times-Union, 7 September 1941; Miami Herald, 7 September 1941.

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Statistics for employment and unemployment compensation reflected the effect of the defense buildup in Florida. In August 1941 the Florida Industrial Commission reported a ten per cent increase in employment accompanied by a sixteen per cent decrease in unemployment compensation over that same month in 1940. The commission noted the largest increases in employment came in construction, shipbuilding, and aircraft industries.29 Expenditures for defense preparation resulted in jobs for Florida workers. Reports from state and federal sources revealed that the economic improvement extended beyond the construction and industrial sectors. Commissioner of Agriculture Nathan Mayo announced that sales of Florida farm products through the State Farmers‘ Markets increased from $7,184,934 in fiscal year 1940 to $11,088,065 in fiscal year 1941, a surge of $3,903,131.30 The expansion of Florida‘s agricultural sector resulted in an increase in farm income of $18,131,000 for the month of September 1941 according to the Sixth District Federal Reserve Bank. Similar growth in farm income occurred in other southeastern states. The reserve bank reported year to date total farm income for the southeastern region at $465,211,000, an increase of $64,485,000 over the same period in 1940.31 As in construction and defense related industries, 1941 brought increased activity to much of Florida‘s agricultural economy. Additional figures from the Sixth District Federal Reserve Bank indicated general growth in economic activity throughout the southeastern region. Total reserves of sixth district member banks attained a new record in September 1941. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve Bank reported,

Total assets and total deposits of member banks in this area were at record peaks that far exceeded the heights of the middle 1920‘s, and loans and investments of these banks were slightly above the 1926 peak.32

These figures suggest the welcome return to a level of prosperity unknown in the state since the real estate bubble of the 1920s.

29 Florida Times-Union, 6 September 1941.

30 Florida Times-Union, 9 November 1941.

31 Miami Herald, 1 November 1941.

32 Miami Herald, 1 November 1941; Florida Times-Union, 9 November 1941.

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However, state leaders quickly realized that the necessities of national defense could also prove burdensome as well. By early May 1941, Floridians began to hear predictions of potentially onerous federal mandates to reduce consumption of electricity and gasoline. By July, these predictions were realized. Political and commercial leaders found themselves compelled to balance state and national priorities. On July 15, President Roosevelt requested that eight southeastern states adopt daylight saving time by moving their clocks ahead one hour to conserve electricity for defense purposes. A sustained drought in the southeast had reduced the reservoirs necessary for hydroelectric power generation and resulted in a potential shortage of electricity across the region. Alabama, Tennessee, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia complied with Roosevelt‘s request with minimal delay. Georgia‘s Governor Eugene Talmadge refused to implement the president‘s request. Governor Holland, of Florida, deferred his answer until he had studied the situation.33 On July 20, Governor Holland wrote President Roosevelt that he would not place Florida on daylight saving time. Holland listed several reasons for refraining from implementing Roosevelt‘s request. First, Holland noted the majority of the state relied on power plants using non-hydroelectric generation, and, therefore, its supply of electricity remained unaffected by the drought. On the contrary, Florida power plants were experiencing lower than peak demand and operating at below generation capacity. Second, he reported that only one transmission line for sharing the state‘s excess power with other states existed, and Florida‘s power plants had been transmitting the maximum load that line could handle to its neighboring states. Holland wrote the president that, in his view, daylight saving time:

would involve substantial losses to public and private power establishments, to transportation companies and to certain industries. Doubtless these same losses occur elsewhere, and the people of Florida will gladly sustain these losses as a part of their contribution to the national defense, but I must be sure that the losses sustained will be adequately offset by contributions effectively made to national defense before I issue an executive order so vitally affecting the economic life of our people and our state. I have not yet been able to see any such contribution which we can make at this time … by taking this step and I do not, therefore, feel justified in now taking it.34

33 Florida Times-Union, 18 July 1941.

34 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 20 July 1941.

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In declining the president‘s request to implement daylight saving time, Holland found the suggested remedy to be based on false premises – unlike many southeastern states, Florida had a surplus of electrical power and already transmitted electricity to its neighbors at maximum capacity. To accede to FDR‘s call for a change to daylight saving would risk economic harm without substantive gain. President Roosevelt replied to Governor Holland, conceding the governor‘s position on daylight saving time because of the lack of transmission facilities between Florida and the other southeastern states. Roosevelt informed Holland that ―steps are being taken to assure stronger transmission ties between the power systems serving Florida and the systems serving states immediately to the north.‖ Regarding the potential for economic harm posed by the implementation of daylight saving time, Roosevelt wrote, ―I think that your advisers tend to exaggerate the effect of the change.‖ Holland responded to the president‘s letter, reiterating the readiness of the state‘s citizens to cooperate to further national defense and the matter rested there for the time being.35 The new governor had demonstrated a degree of independence in weighing the facts and declining to comply with the president‘s request. Floridians and other residents of the eastern seaboard would soon face a much more serious challenge to their economic growth in the form of federally mandated gasoline conservation. On 19 July, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, acting in his capacity as defense petroleum coordinator, requested the governors of sixteen Atlantic seaboard states, the commissioners of the District of Columbia, and eastern oil companies to implement a voluntary reduction in gasoline consumption. Secretary Ickes advised that a one-third reduction in gasoline usage would be needed to avoid mandatory rationing. Ickes attributed the gasoline crisis to a transportation shortage caused by the temporary loan of fifty American oil tankers to Britain. The absence of the tankers led to a serious shortage in petroleum carrying capacity from the Gulf Coast to the Atlantic seaboard resulting in reduced gasoline reserves in the East. Ickes acted to prevent a deficit of eastern stocks of petroleum products, including industrial oil, home heating oil, and motor fuel, under the increased demand during the winter months. Consumption would have to go down to avoid shortages. Ickes defined the reduction campaign as an obligation, declaring,

35 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 1 August 1941; Florida Times-Union, 2 August 1941.

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It has become the patriotic duty of everyone in the states affected by the impending shortage of petroleum products to reduce their consumption of such products. Loyal Americans, in view of the seriousness of the situation, will cooperate.36

The recognition of the necessity of gasoline conservation, and the fear of mandatory rationing, spread throughout the state. Despite his appeal to patriotic duty, Ickes soon found it necessary to order a nighttime curfew on noncommercial gasoline sales on the eastern seaboard. Taking effect on Sunday, 3 August, the ―blackout‖ affected an estimated 100,000 service stations from to Florida; effectively banning gas sales from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m., seven days a week. Ickes advised the measure would remain in force until the danger of oil shortage ended or the implementation of other conservation measures, including rationing.37 The curfew order contained one bright spot for Floridians – it limited the service station closings to ―peninsular Florida‖ and the Keys, excluding that portion of the state west of the Apalachicola River.38 The curfew order brought the reality of gasoline shortage to Floridians in a tangible way. As might be expected anywhere, and especially in a geographically large and economically diverse state, Floridians responded to the gasoline conservation campaign in a variety of ways. Tourism conscious residents of the Miami area welcomed the curfew, predicting, in the words of Stuart Wright, manager of the South Florida Motor Club, it would ―bring the seriousness of the situation home to the motorists.‖39 An editorial in the Miami Herald reiterated the Miami Chamber of Commerce‘s invitation to ―the whole state to join in a campaign of voluntary saving of fuel‖ in hopes that it ―might release more gasoline for those who live in Northern states.‖ Their goals were to ensure the necessary gasoline for Northern motorists to reach South Florida and to avoid compulsory measures. The implementation of rationing, they warned,

36 Ickes‘ ―voluntary curtailment‖ order applied to Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, , Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and the District of Columbia. Miami Herald, 20 July 1941; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 20 July 1941. On the transfer of oil tankers to British service, see Miami Herald, 2 May 1941.

37 Florida Times-Union, 1 August 1941; Miami Herald, 1 August 1941.

38 Miami Herald, 5 August 1941.

39 Miami Herald, 1 August 1941.

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would kill off 50 per cent or more of our tourist business, thereby eliminating the income of hotels, apartment house operators, restaurants, amusement enterprises – in fact, reduce the revenue of every phase of our business life.40

Many South Floridians hoped voluntary conservation could reduce consumption sufficiently to meet Secretary Ickes‘ requirement and save the coming tourist season. While many in the southern part of the state dreaded the economic impact of rationing, at least one influential voice in North Florida preferred compulsory measures to voluntary. An editorial in the Tallahassee Daily Democrat called for immediate restriction of gas use to military, defense, and business purposes. Those who used their automobiles for pleasure purposes or ―joyriding‖ – including, presumably, tourists – would find their gas supply strictly limited. Rationing, the Democrat declared,

would be a much better approach to the problem than to limit the hours of sale in such a way that no assurance whatever is provided that total sales will actually decline and with the twin dangers of unemployment and business loss, without a real contribution to defense.41

Whether it resulted from regional bias or a genuine concern for the economic viability of service stations was not clear; however, this North Florida editorialist appeared unconcerned over the fate of the South Florida tourism industry. Reports of gasoline consumption provided the best indicator of public compliance with voluntary restrictions. Prior to enactment of the curfew, many service station operators expressed skepticism regarding the potential for success. They predicted the majority of motorists would just purchase more gas during the restricted operating hours.42 Early reports following the first evening of the curfew seemed to confirm their forecasts, revealing a high level of cooperation from station owners, accompanied by an apparent increase in gas purchases, including the filling of supplemental gas cans, by motorists.43 A subsequent regional survey indicated general compliance with the early closings but little reduction in gas consumption

40 Miami Herald, 13 August 1941.

41 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 3 August 1941.

42 Florida Times-Union, 1 August 1941; Miami Herald, 1 August 1941.

43 Florida Times-Union, 4 August 1941.

112 across the Atlantic seaboard region.44 Secretary Ickes wrote to the governors of Eastern states, warning that public indifference to conservation requests would hasten gas rationing in their areas.45 Based on their gasoline consumption, it appeared motorists on the Eastern seaboard were not yet ready to put the sufficiency of regional fuel supplies ahead of their own driving requirements. On 15 August, Ickes made good his warning to impose mandatory gas rationing on the east coast. The Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, at Ickes‘s suggestion, ordered a ten per cent cut in gasoline supplies, based on the previous month‘s gas consumption level, delivered to stations and delegated the responsibility for equitable distribution of gas stocks to the station operators. Officials estimated the rationing edict, described as ―unprecedented in peace-time,‖ would cut gas available for non-essential purposes by twenty per cent. The reduction order did not apply to fuel supplies for commercial vehicles, emergency purposes, and agricultural use. Ickes explained the intended benefit of the order,

This action will provide more tanker space in which to bring more aviation gasoline, fuel oil, and heating oil to the east coast, thereby materially strengthening our defense effort. It will be accepted, I am certain, by the American people, in an American way.

The ration order, like the voluntary curfew, applied to that portion of Florida east of the Apalachicola River.46 The distant war that had brought so much hardship and suffering in other lands now began to cast its shadow over Florida. The federal rationing order forced commercial, civic, and governmental leaders in Florida to confront a perplexing predicament – how to balance the necessity of fuel conservation while protecting the economically vital tourism industry. Initial reactions included a request for exemption for interstate travel, pleas for increased conservation, and calls to the state‘s congressional delegation and Governor Holland for assistance.47 In response, Governor Holland appealed to the federal government for action on several fronts. Noting that Florida‘s gas

44 Miami Herald, 5 August 1941.

45 Florida Times-Union, 13 August 1941.

46 Florida Times-Union, 16 August 1941; Miami Herald, 16 August 1941.

47 Miami Herald, 16, 17, 19 August 1941; Florida Times-Union, 19 August 1941; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, August 19 1941.

113 consumption increased substantially during the winter tourism and agricultural seasons, he asked that ration levels be determined on a seasonal basis in hopes of minimizing disruption of those enterprises. Additionally, Holland conferred with transportation agencies about using barges as a substitute for the absent tankers to transport fuel from producing areas to Florida.48 Subsequently, Governor Holland, along with U. S. Senator Claude Pepper, announced the promise of acting Petroleum Coordinator Ralph K. Davies to set Florida‘s gasoline allotment on a seasonal basis and to consider the state‘s proximity to Gulf Coast oil producing centers when determining the ration quota. Pepper expressed optimism that the increased reliance on barges to transport oil would allow the complete lifting of fuel restrictions in the state. The Miami Herald was apparently so encouraged by these developments that it proclaimed ―Winter Season Gas Is Assured‖ in a front page headline.49 The following weeks saw a flurry of contradictory statements and claims about fuel supplies on the East coast and the necessity of gas restrictions. On 11 September, 1941, the Special Committee to Investigate Gasoline and Fuel Oil Shortages, chaired by Senator Francis Maloney of Connecticut, issued a preliminary report declaring no actual fuel shortage existed in the East and calling for immediate removal of restrictions. The committee found that a shortage of surplus fuel existed but denied this justified the measures imposed.50 In his response to the committee report, Secretary Ickes declared a shortage of surplus was a shortage nonetheless and said it would be ―stupid‖ to lift the restrictions at that time.51 Despite Ickes‘s best efforts to

48 Florida‘s winter gasoline sales averaged approximately 10,000,000 gallons more per month than in the summer. In addition to sustaining the state‘s tourism and agricultural interests, the governor undoubtedly hoped to minimize state gas tax revenue losses. A ten per cent cut in state gas consumption would result in approximately $2,800,000 less in gas tax levies based on 1940 sales. Florida Times-Union, 24 August 1941.

49 While Gov. Holland and Sen. Pepper sought accommodations from the federal petroleum administration, Florida‘s other U. S. Senator C. O. Andrews and Representative A. Pat Cannon, of Miami, pushed back at Interior Secretary Harold L. Ickes‘s authority. Sen. Andrews introduced a resolution abolishing Ickes‘s position as appointed petroleum administrator and replacing it with a senate-confirmed successor. Rep. Cannon promised to introduce a resolution demanding Ickes‘s removal as petroleum coordinator. Florida Times-Union, 28 August 1941; Miami Herald, 28 August 1941.

50 T. H. Watkins, Righteous Pilgrim: The Life and Times of Harold L. Ickes, 1874-1952 (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1990), 716; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 11 September, 1941.

51 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 18 September; Florida Times-Union, 19 September 1941.

114 defuse the situation, a chorus of complaints and calls for an end to gas restrictions followed the Maloney report.52 Even as it became apparent that federal authorities stood by their pledge to consider Florida‘s unique geographic and seasonal circumstances, state leaders repeatedly requested release from gas restrictions. On 6 October, Secretary Ickes advised state officials Florida‘s gasoline allotment would increase to 97.5 per cent of the amount used during that month the previous year. This came while other Eastern states continued to experience a ten per cent reduction in gasoline supplies.53 Shortly thereafter, Senator Charles Andrews delivered a written request for complete exemption from gasoline restrictions prepared by State Road Department Commissioner Tom Johnson and Governor Holland. They argued that Florida did not have a gasoline shortage and could meet its fuel needs using barges. In fact, Florida technically had more gas in storage than at the same time the previous year, but much of this fuel was subject to trans-shipment to Alabama and Georgia for military use.54 As the end of October approached, a crisis developed as gas stations in Key West, Sebring, and Fort Myers exhausted their quotas of gasoline and distributors would not deliver more despite having ample supplies. Governor Holland telegraphed the Office of the Petroleum Coordinator asking them to send a representative with authority to resolve the problem. Holland stressed the point that the gas quotas were incompatible to the state‘s vastly increased demand for fuel, which he attributed to a recent spike in population due to defense work and the needs of defense bases either under construction or already in operation. His telegram described the situation,

As now being patriotically observed the order is creating chaos and confusion and no one has authority to correct the same and gasoline distributors are unwilling to take independent action to meet emergencies for fear of complications. In Key West and Fort Myers for instance, distributors advise that they have ample supplies but are unwilling to be charged with unpatriotic conduct and have not felt that they are authorized to rectify the situation by releasing additional supplies locally.55

52 Miami Herald, 1, 2, 3 October 1941.

53 Miami Herald, 7 October 1941.

54 Miami Herald, 9 October 1941.

55 Miami Herald, 23 October 1941; Florida Times-Union, 23 October 1941. Many operators of service stations in South Florida took it upon themselves to determine and enforce acceptable conduct for their industry. Some station operators who chose to disregard the voluntary night curfew experienced a nuisance campaign waged by ―gas vigilantes‖ who sought to disrupt operations by paying for small purchases with large denomination bills and 115

Faced with the twin pressures of increased demand and an apparent absence of shortage, Governor Holland asked the federal petroleum authorities to intervene to end the confusion in his state. Unknown to Governor Holland, Secretary Ickes had recently determined that the nation had averted the anticipated fuel shortage and the gas restrictions on the East coast could end. Acting on reports from oil company officials that no shortage of gasoline existed and the information that the British were prepared to return some of the borrowed tankers, Ickes ordered the release of a statement lifting the restrictions.56 Ickes attributed the end of the East coast gasoline restrictions to the return of tankers on loan to the British, low demand for home heating oil due to unusually warm autumn weather, and the success of the program implemented by the Office of Petroleum Administration.57 Although only lasting just over three months, the petroleum administrator‘s gas conservation program proved difficult, divisive, and highly unpopular in Florida. Floridians greeted the lifting of the restrictions with joy, gratitude, and a fair degree of cynicism. Governor Holland probably spoke for a majority of those in the tourism industry when he lauded the federal government‘s decision, declaring,

We are happy about the decision to abandon the restrictions, and happy that conditions warrant abandonment. The gasoline rationing was the only cloud on the horizon of Florida‘s tourist season.58

The editorial board of the Miami Herald joined the governor in welcoming the lifting of restrictions, but could not resist taking a few jabs at Interior Secretary Ickes and Washington. In a front-page editorial, Herald staff writer H. Bond Bliss observed,

So another Washington exhibition of nonsense is finished. Like that of gathering the old aluminum pots and pans. .... Frightened officialdom finds that the United

requesting extra services. Independent gas station operators who observed the night curfew were believed responsible for this campaign. Florida Times-Union, 23 October 1941; Miami Herald, 23, 24 October 1941.

56 Harold L. Ickes, The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941. Volume III of The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 630-632.

57 Florida Times-Union, 24 October 1941; Miami Herald, 24 October 1941.

58 Miami Herald, 24 October 1941.

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States still has plenty. …. Most of the fears in Washington seem to be imaginary. Scaring the people as an aid to war propaganda. Effective too.59

The St. Petersburg Evening Independent professed unconcern about the validity of the crisis and Secretary Ickes‘s judgment, and expressed relief over the end of restrictions, observing,

We in Florida don‘t care, now, whether Mr. Ickes was wrong or not. We needn‘t even feel annoyed because of the fact that there never was a real shortage in Florida. All we know is that a great threat to Florida‘s tourist season has been removed, and that all‘s well that ends well.60

Many Floridians, like many Americans, questioned whether the fuel shortage was genuine or a creation of Secretary Ickes.61 For some this no doubt reflected a degree of skepticism about the federal government or government in general. For others it came from a fear of damage to the state‘s economy, either directly through the tourism industry or indirectly through lowered tax revenues. Perhaps some of the people‘s animus toward the gas restrictions stemmed from fear and resentment of the war that spawned them. Yet these citizens probably considered themselves patriotic Americans, willing to sacrifice for their country‘s security, provided the crisis was genuine. The Holland administration formulated a pragmatic response to the fuel shortage crisis. At the outset, the governor and advisors informed federal authorities of the special circumstances pertaining to Florida relative to the fuel shortage - the seasonal fluctuations in the state‘s gas consumption and the potential for the use of non-tanker transport. Holland successfully requested revision of the state‘s fuel quota based on these conditions. Subsequently, as it became obvious that the state‘s gas quota did not coincide with increasing demand caused by either population growth and base expansion, or the actual fuel supply, Governor Holland

59 Miami Herald, 24 October 1941.

60 (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 24 October 1941.

61 For his part, Secretary Ickes adamantly defended the decision to impose restrictions and expressed resentment over the public‘s resistance to the program. On October 25, he wrote, Our predictions as to supply had held up, but our predictions as to demand had all gone haywire, largely on account of the weather …. The return of the tankers put solid ground under our feet, as a result of which we could take off all restrictions. We moved in this matter both with expedition and with caution. Now we can breathe freely and I have told my people that there won‘t be any more restrictions on the sale of gasoline until people drive their cars to the filling stations and find empty pumps. I am not going to kid myself ever again that the dear American people will voluntarily ration themselves or even cut out waste in the public interest in order to prevent a scarcity. Ickes, The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941, 633-34. 117 requested intervention by the petroleum administrator. Throughout the relatively brief span of the gas conservation program, the Holland administration attempted to balance federal requirements with the state‘s specific economic needs, geographic circumstances, and the actual fuel supply. For Floridians, the East coast gas conservation campaign during the late summer and early fall of 1941 had much in common with the earlier Daylight Saving Time controversy. Both asked Floridians to practice conservation of a commodity of questionable scarcity in their state. Likewise, in each instance Florida found itself grouped with its neighboring states based on apparent shared geographical traits and despite significant differences of circumstances. In both cases, the Holland administration advised the federal authorities of conditions specific to the state and managed to achieve some amelioration of federal directives. Despite public chafing and protests over gasoline restrictions, support for national defense and President Roosevelt‘s policy of aiding Great Britain and her allies was very strong, although not universal, in Florida. A nation-wide study released by the American Institute of Public Opinion, under the direction of George Gallup, in early May described Florida as ―the most ‗interventionist‘‖ state in America. Based on interviews with more than thirty thousand voters, the survey revealed thirty five per cent in Florida favored American participation in the war. The report found respondents who favored immediate American involvement in the war most numerous in Southern and Rocky Mountain states.62 While the state‘s residents generally favored the Roosevelt administration‘s interventionist policies, anti-interventionist feelings also existed and sought expression. The planning and staging of a rally in Miami by the anti-interventionist America First Citizens Committee demonstrated not only the existence of a dissenting point of view, but also a circumspect tolerance of that perspective. Organized in the spring of 1940 to advocate hemispheric defense instead of intervention in the European conflict, America First became the most recognized anti-interventionist organization in the country.63 Initial efforts to win permission for the America First rally from the local governments met with failure as officials

62 The ten ―most ‗interventionist‘ states‖ according to the poll were Florida, Arizona, , Texas, Alabama, North Carolina, Colorado, Mississippi, Virginia, and Arkansas. The ten ―most ‗isolationist‘ states‖ included , , , Indiana, Ohio, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Illinois, Michigan, and . Miami Herald, 16 May 1941.

63 A. Scott Berg, Lindberg (New York: Berkeley Books, 1999), 411.

118 refused permission for the use of either the courthouse or Bayfront Park. Additionally, a Dade county circuit court judge dissolved the group‘s charter for failure to comply with state law regulating non-profit corporations.64 A reorganized America First Citizens Committee of Miami reapplied for permission to use Bayfront Park, winning approval from a cautious city commission. City officials acceded to the anti-war group‘s request after considering and then dropping requirements for an investigation of the organization and pre-approval of speeches delivered at the event.65 A sampling of local opinion from the Miami Herald, suggested civic leaders faced the challenge of balancing their opposition to the anti-interventionist cause with the necessity of avoiding the appearance of suppressing the right of free speech and expression of the anti-war faction.66 Organizers of the America First rally listed two objectives for the Miami event – to bring the group‘s message to the most interventionist states and to take on Senator Claude Pepper in his own state. O. K. Anderson, national field representative for America First and former professor at the University of Florida, described the Miami rally as ―the opening gun in an intensified campaign … in the states named by the [Gallup] poll as leaning toward involvement in the war.‖ Furthermore, Anderson noted, ―We are particularly glad to inaugurate this intensified campaign in Florida to answer Senator Pepper‘s drum-beating for war.‖67 The Miami rally gave America First the opportunity to both undermine support for interventionism and strike at one of the most interventionist Senators in his own backyard. Next-day press coverage of the Miami rally depicted the event as a celebration of free speech, an enthusiastic show of support, and an exhibition of fiery yet fair oratory. A panel of speakers, featuring Florida author and attorney Charles F. ―Socker‖ Coe and former Wisconsin Governor Philip LaFollette, addressed a ―capacity crowd‖ of approximately eight thousand spectators at Miami‘s Bayfront Park on the evening of Saturday, 17 May. The Herald, declaring

64 Miami Herald, 2 May 1941.

65 Miami Herald, 4, 8 May 1941.

66 Miami Herald, 9, 18 May 1941. For comparison, in early May administrators at the Carnegie Institute of Technology at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, denied permission for an America First Committee rally featuring former Wisconsin Governor Philip LaFollette because they could not find a speaker to represent the opposing viewpoint. Miami Herald, 11 May 1941.

67 Miami Herald, 17 May 1941.

119

―the constitutional right of free speech rode untrammeled through Miami,‖ described LaFollette‘s speech as ―an address stirring and compelling in its ring of sincerity and was delivered before an audience outstandingly sympathetic to the cause….‖ The evening‘s lone discordant note came when the anti-war activist Coe vowed to a heckler, ―I‘ll flatten your nose … so flat you won‘t be able to see over it for three weeks.‖ In his speech, LaFollette expressed great regard for President Roosevelt while attacking his policy of aiding Great Britain. The former governor advocated building America‘s defenses while avoiding any meddling in the European war. LaFollette directed his harshest criticism at Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of Navy Frank Knox, describing them as the ―two jokers‖ who ―are pushing us into the war.‖ The events associated with the Miami America First rally demonstrated the existence of a small but organized group of anti-interventionists in the state. Additionally, in hosting the event, the citizens and revealed an unusual level of tolerance in the historically intolerant South.68 The significance of the Miami rally was best seen against the background of state and regional support for President Roosevelt‘s larger policy of ―pro-British nonbelligerency.‖69 Most southerners, and their representatives in government, stood behind their president‘s foreign policy. During the heated and prolonged congressional debate over Roosevelt‘s proposal to transfer armaments and war material to Great Britain and her allies with payment deferred – known as Lend-Lease – Governor Holland expressed his strong support for the measure in response to a poll of southern governors. Holland declared,

The most important factor in assuring the safety of our Nation is the prompt giving of all possible aid, short of war, to Great Britain. …. If by these means Great Britain is enabled to win the war, our own security will be most cheaply and most effectively accomplished. If such aid does not enable Great Britain to win the war, it will give us more time to prepare for our defense and greater assurance of having Great Britain left as a friend and ally.70

The former World War I aviator‘s endorsement of the lend-lease proposal was representative of the sentiments of most citizens in the South and the nation as a whole. After weeks of public

68 Miami Herald, 18 May 1941.

69 David M. Kennedy, Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 469.

70 Florida Times-Union, 30 January 1941; St. Petersburg Times, 30 January 1941.

120 analysis, contentious debate and numerous amendments, Congress approved the Lend-Lease bill by large majorities in early March 1941.71 The commencement of lend-lease gave America a stake in the outcome of the battle for life and death – both literally and figuratively – raging in the Atlantic Ocean. The continued survival of the island nation of Great Britain depended on the steady importation of food, fuel, war material, and other products across the perilous seas. During 1941, German naval forces sank British shipping at nearly five times the replacement rate. The Roosevelt administration, recognizing that the fate of Britain hinged on the outcome of the Battle of the Atlantic, sought a way to reconcile the desire to provide protection for supply-laden ships bound for Britain while maintaining public support and compliance with the Neutrality Act and the restrictions on convoying in the Lend-Lease Act. The recovery of the survivors of the American freighter Robin Moor, sunk illegally outside the designated war zone by a German U-boat, fueled debate over the appropriate role for America in the Atlantic struggle.72 It was in this environment that Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox addressed the thirty-third annual conference of state governors in late June, calling for the immediate use of the U. S. Navy ―to clear the Atlantic of the German menace.‖ Knox urged immediate action, noting,

Now is the time to strike. If, while Hitler is assaulting Stalin, we can clear the path across the Atlantic, and deliver, in safety, the weapons our factories are producing, ultimate defeat for Hitler is certain.

Governor Holland, attending the Boston conference, speaking for his own state agreed with Knox‘s plan to remove the German menace,

I think that as far as Florida is concerned, Florida has been thinking in accord with his speech a good long time – that we should use the navy to keep the ocean lanes open.73

On the issue of naval intervention in the Atlantic, Holland took a position consistent with that publicly advocated by the Roosevelt administration.

71 The amended Lend-Lease bill passed the Senate by a vote of 60 to 31, and the House by a vote of 317-71. Kennedy, 469-474.

72 Kennedy, 488-90.

73 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 1 July 1941.

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Continued losses to U-boats in the Atlantic during September and October 1941, including the sinking of the American destroyers Kearney and Reuben James, led the Roosevelt administration to request Congress to remove Neutrality Act prohibitions on the arming of American merchant ships. Florida‘s congressional delegation backed the president in revising the neutrality law. Representative Bob Sikes, of Crestview, a member of the House Foreign Affairs committee, asserted, ―we have adopted the policy of aiding England and her allies in defeating Hitler and we must do whatever is necessary to implement this policy.‖74 The state‘s delegation unanimously shared Sikes‘s view on neutrality revision. The House approved modification of the neutrality law by a narrow margin, but the measure initially stalled in the Senate. Neutrality revision eventually passed the Senate by thirteen votes on 8 November, with both of Florida‘s senators contributing to the measure‘s passage.75 As the nation moved closer to war, Florida‘s political leaders joined Southerners in supporting President Roosevelt‘s anti-Axis policies. As the nation debated America‘s role in the war, South Floridians initiated a new campaign in their long running crusade to banish vice and corruption from their community.76 In July 1941, the Miami Herald began a series of front page editorials decrying conditions in the city. Under a headline declaring ―Civic Decency or Cicero – the Decision is Yours,‖ the Herald warned the time had come for the city to,

make up its mind what sort of a community it will be henceforward; whether it will allow present conditions of vice, political corruption, graft and gambling to continue until Miami achieves the dubious distinction of being known as ‗the Cicero of the South‘; or whether it will embark on a course of civic decency,

74 Miami Herald, 30 November 1941.

75 Southern support for neutrality revision came with a price. The White House ―in order to show its appreciation, and to prevent the chance of defections later,‖ reportedly agreed ―to back some sort of anti-strike legislation, the milder the better from the President‘s viewpoint. This legislation is primarily to appease … such elder statesmen as Charles Andrews of Florida and Walter George of Georgia.‖ Doris Kearns Goodwin, No Ordinary Time: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II (New York: Touchstone, 1994), 282-83; Miami Herald, 5 October 1941, 30 November 1941.

76 Newspaper-led anti-crime campaigns in Miami dated at least to 1928, when the Miami News vehemently denounced the presence of ―‗Scarface‘ Al Capone … the notorious beer and brothel baron of Chicago‖ in the city. During the tumultuous 1934-35 winter season, the Miami Beach Tribune ran news stories, editorials, and cartoons illuminating political corruption, graft, and racketeering. Helen Muir, Miami, U.S.A. (Gainesville, Fl.: University Press of Florida, 2000), 163, 187-188.

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clean living, orderly administration of city government; and eliminate the corruption that is spewed on every side today.77

In a follow-up editorial, the Herald called for ―an independent, competent and aggressive inquiry into underworld conditions.‖ Furthermore, because of the pervasive influence of the racketeers,

We do not believe it would be possible to have an independent investigation unless we could induce Gov. Spessard L. Holland to exercise the power of his office to select a capable attorney … name him special state attorney, and send him to Miami to work as long as may be necessary in arriving at the facts. …. The people have confidence in Governor Holland. They know him to be honest, sincere, civic, rather than political-minded; an ardent advocate of clean government, clean living, and community decency.78

In subsequent editorials, the Herald would ask the public to write the popular new governor asking for his intercession in cleaning up their city. This was not the first time a sitting governor had been called upon to use the powers of his office to stem the tide of vice and political corruption in Miami. During the 1935-36 winter season, the National Crime Prevention League warned Governor Dave Sholtz that special investigators would be dispatched to Dade county if racketeering activity there was not curbed.79 In the summer of 1941, conditions in Miami led civic leaders to look to Tallahassee for assistance.80 Governor Holland, keenly aware of the political perils and legal obstacles of intervening, considered the request before provisionally agreeing to help. Because of the tendency of Miamians to pursue a public policy of denouncing illegal gambling on the one hand, and a private policy of encouraging it as a draw for tourists on the other,81 Holland consented to

77 This anti-vice campaign apparently was the culmination of a series of sordid events, including the indictment of a former Dade county solicitor on white slavery charges, the suicide of a Miami police detective, and public bickering among police officials over responsibility for rampant gambling in the city. Miami Herald, 12 July, 28 December 1941. For the La Paloma Club white slavery trials, see the Miami Herald, July, August, and October 1941; and Muir, Miami, U.S.A., 190.

78 Miami Herald, 13 July 1941.

79 Governor Sholtz ordered Dade county Sheriff D.C. Coleman, widely believed to be complicit in gambling activities in the county, to investigate and report to him on the situation. Muir, 190.

80 According to the Miami Herald, ―big time gambling‖ in Miami began with the opening of the Palm Island Club circa 1924. ―Horse books‖ under the control of local operators commenced operation during the winter of 1925. Other northern organized crime figures followed Al Capone to the Miami-Dade area after 1928, and set up operations, often in competition with each other and local gambling interests. Miami Herald, 16 November 1941.

81 Muir, 163-164. During a meeting in July 1941, Dade County State Attorney G. A. Worley admitted to Governor Holland that, ―I‘d be a liar if I said there was no gambling in Miami last winter. There was. I knew it then. But the 123 intervene provided ―that the people affected are desirous of being helped and are also willing to help themselves to the limit of their local resources and authority.‖ In addition to the necessity of public support, Attorney General J. Tom Watson advised Holland that the local state attorney or county solicitor would have to consent to the assignment of a special vice prosecutor to assist them.82 The governor cautiously considered moving to check gambling and corruption in Miami. The reactions of local officials to charges of underworld rule and the governor‘s offer ranged from amazement to reluctant acquiescence. Dade county Solicitor Robert R. Taylor initially professed surprise that ―conditions are so terrible here‖ and indicated that he would not accept the governor‘s offer of assistance, asserting, ―I believe I can do as good a job as any special prosecutor the governor might select, perhaps a lot better one.‖83 Meanwhile, Dade county State Attorney G. A. Worley agreed to cooperate with an outside special prosecutor while stipulating his actions did not constitute an admission of inability to execute the duties of the office of state attorney. Worley‘s action came at the close of a week in which the governor‘s office received requests for his help in destroying crime and investigating corruption from three hundred Dade county residents.84 If the proposal for an anti-corruption campaign lacked support from local prosecutors, it received strong backing from the public. In response to public pleas and State Attorney Worley‘s promise of cooperation, Governor Holland announced that he would tentatively consider sending a special prosecutor to Miami. Explaining his apparent reluctance to intervene, the governor said,

I want the public to understand, that we don‘t like to be called into a local affair, and that we will go into it only when requested by a large number of reputable citizens who are dissatisfied with the functioning of local officials. If we go into a community, we will go not only after any official corruption that may exist but also we will go after the source of corruption – bookmaking and illegal gambling

people wanted it.‖ On the eve of the governor‘s vice crackdown in November 1941, Miami police chief H. Leslie Quigg explained, ―Miami has operated under a more of less liberal policy, known to everyone, for the past 20 years. I have no desire to shift any responsibility, but it is not mine alone to change this policy.‖ Miami Herald, 16 November 1941.

82 Miami Herald, 16, 21 July 1941.

83 Miami Herald, 27 July 1941.

84 Miami Herald, 1 August 1941.

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and vice of all kinds. The way to stop any official corruption is to clean up the source of it.

Holland continued, explaining that the special investigator would act as an independent assistant to State Attorney Worley and commence work with the start of the fall grand jury term in November. According to the governor‘s plan, the outside investigator would work with Worley but have ―exclusive charge of the investigation and handling of matters before the grand jury ….‖85 Setting aside his aversion to intervention in a local problem, Holland made sure that his man in Miami would have the freedom to curb crime and corruption. The crackdown on gambling began as the 1941-42 winter tourism season commenced in November. Speaking from a suite at the bay front McAllister Hotel, Governor Holland ordered a cleanup of illegal gambling in Dade and Broward counties. While promising ―state investigators will be in the area continuously and the co-operation of the federal law enforcement agencies has been assured,‖ Holland put the primary responsibility for executing his orders on Dade County Sheriff D.C. Coleman and Broward County Sheriff Walter R. Clark. Holland personally directed the sheriffs ―to use every lawful means and all possible diligence to bring this situation to an end and to close out these gambling and bookmaking establishments and keep them out.‖ Holland, while acknowledging the ineffectiveness of anti-gambling edicts from his predecessors in Tallahassee, promised to aid the citizens of Miami in snuffing out gambling and corruption.86 Holland‘s actions stemmed from several considerations – the necessity of responding to the demands of his constituents, a desire to protect the image of tourism dependent South Florida, and the need to maximize horse racing tax revenues. Holland responded to requests for aid from the press and public as any young politician with aspirations and potential for higher office might – he took action to address their demands. In announcing the crackdown, Holland disclaimed any intention to meddle in local affairs while promising to come to the aid of any community when its citizens asked for help. In addition to the local angle, the anti-gambling offensive was intended also to dispel the perception of Miami as vice ridden and corrupt – an image that was hardly conducive to a thriving tourism center. Furthermore, state officials recognized that wagers with illegal bookies escaped taxation. A curb on illegal betting would

85 Florida Times-Union, 1 August 1941.

86 Miami Herald, 16 November 1941; Florida Times-Union, 16 November 1941; Tampa Tribune, 16 November 1941; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 16 November 1941; St. Petersburg Times, 16 November 1941.

125 almost certainly result in increased tax revenues and more state welfare funds.87 Disregarding his misgivings about intervening in a complicated and difficult situation, Holland weighed the potential for political and economic loss and decided to act. Despite the dramatic newspaper coverage of the corruption and vice that initiated it, the actual crackdown relied upon the commonplace operation of law enforcement and the courts. Application of anti-gambling laws became more vigorous in the months before the official commencement of the governor‘s campaign; attributable, no doubt, to the publicity generated by the Herald.88 Press reports of raids and arrests of bookies became common following the implementation of the gambling embargo. Following Holland‘s edict, the criminal courts increased the required bonds and fines for gambling related charges.89 At the same time, the previously recalcitrant Miami police chief H. Leslie Quigg pledged the complete cooperation of his department in the ―strict application‖ of anti-gambling laws.90 Energetic press coverage, vigorous enforcement, and aggressive prosecution forced many gambling operators out of Miami and into the neighboring communities and counties.91 The Miami police department reported collecting a record $103,739 in vice fines for 1941.92 The combination of journalistic scrutiny, public petition, and the governor‘s intervention, induced local government to take long overdue action against corruption and vice in South Florida. While few would dispute the threat embodied by rampant vice and corruption, to the American people, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in early December represented a threat of

87 Horse racing tax revenues went to pensions for the aged, dependent children, and the blind. Miami Herald, 16 November 1941.

88 Miami Herald, 1 October 1941. Officers of the Miami vice squad reported collection of a record amount of fines for gambling infractions in September. Increased enforcement did not necessarily result in consistent or universal enforcement – a group of bookies picketed rival gambling establishments in protest of alleged police favoritism. Police supposedly ignored the activities of the ―ins‖ while raiding the operations of the ―outs.‖ One picketer reportedly carried a sign reading, ―Attention Police Department. The Second floor of this place is a bookie joint, where bets are accepted on horse races in violation of the law. What are YOU going to do about it?‖ Miami Herald, 12 October 1941.

89 Miami Herald, 18 November, 2, 11 December 1941.

90 Miami Herald, 18 November 1941.

91 Florida Times-Union, 25 November 1941; Miami Herald, 2 December 1941. Some visitors to Miami reportedly traveled in auto ―ferries‖ to visit illegal betting operation in West Palm Beach. Miami Herald, 23 December 1941.

92 The previous record, set in 1940, stood at $82,515. Miami Herald, 28 December 1941.

126 a different order. According to press coverage, most Floridians received the news of the crisis calmly and with determination. The many army and naval bases throughout the state went on heightened alert, with the Third Air Force command at Tampa canceling leaves, readying all planes, and augmenting security at the twelve bases under its command. Navy guards with fixed bayonets patrolled the Miami docks. Governor Holland ordered the state highway patrol to standby to assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation in taking custody of Japanese or other alien nationals.93 After Congress approved a declaration of war, Governor Holland sent a telegram to President Roosevelt reassuring him that,

In this grave national hour, I want you to know that the people of Florida are united in backing you and the Federal Government to the uttermost limit in defending our Nation and our people and all that we hold dear against the treacherous and ruthless attack of Japan. Florida is backing you without limitation or reservation.94

In the coming months and years, the war would bring novel demands, new opportunities, and unforeseen challenges to the people and political leaders of Florida. Each individual and each community would address these challenges according to their own strengths, needs, and values. In the months following his first legislative session, it became obvious the governor and his administration possessed considerable political and governmental skills. The passage and successful implementation of the long overdue tax revision program evinced an aptitude for cultivating the support of legislators, local officials, and the press, as well as overcoming the considerable forces in opposition. Additionally, the cautious overtures to the federal government over energy conservation measures revealed a propensity for developing astute arguments, and a sensitivity to both local and national imperatives. Furthermore, in making the decision to intervene in South Florida the Holland administration demonstrated the willingness to risk political hazard to prevent further damage to state revenues and the region‘s vital image as a premier tourism center. It became apparent that the former county prosecutor, judge, and state senator‘s previous governmental service, as well as the qualities of character developed in his youth, had well prepared the young governor to lead the state as it faced the challenges of war.

93 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 8 December 1941; Florida Times-Union, 8 December 1941. Third Air Force fields in Florida included those in Tampa, Tallahassee, Orlando, and West Palm Beach.

94 Florida Times-Union, 9 December 1941; Tampa Tribune, 9 December 1941; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 9 December 1941. 127

128

CHAPTER FOUR

FLORIDA ADAPTS TO WAR

World War II, so long a distant threat, ultimately broke upon Florida with the suddenness of a swift moving storm. The war imposed numerous demands on Florida‘s citizens. The state‘s residents and leaders faced both internal and external challenges during the initial year of the war. The organization of the state‘s resources and manpower for war, begun as a precaution during peacetime, became an imperative. The long dreaded enemy assault on the state materialized from an unexpected quarter with far reaching consequences. Federal wartime policies repeatedly conflicted with the state‘s economic interests and political philosophy. Additionally, wartime conditions exacerbated preexisting weaknesses in the state‘s public health services and threatened both civilian and military populations. The war severely tested the ability of Florida‘s political leadership to reconcile the needs of their state with the demands of a nation at war. In the weeks following Pearl Harbor, the initial shock subsided, to be replaced by a defiant commitment to waging war against the nation‘s enemies. As in other states, many of Florida‘s male citizens rushed to military recruiting centers to enlist. Individuals urged the patriotic display of the American flag for the duration of the war. Most residents of Florida eagerly directed their energies to the new demands of war.1 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent attacks on shipping off the California coast2 made many geographically conscious Florida residents ponder the potential for enemy action along the Sunshine State‘s extensive coastline. Participants in a special defense course held at the University of Florida during January 1942 heard a procession of speakers warning of the high probability of attack on coastal cities and the necessity of preparations to

1 Paul S. George, ―Submarines and Sailors: Fort Lauderdale and World War II,‖ in Lewis N. Wynne, ed., Florida At War (Saint Leo, Fla.: Saint Leo College Press, 1993), 108-109.

2 V. R. Cardozier, The Mobilization of the United States in World War II: How the Government, Military and Industry Prepared for War (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 1995), 50, 51. 129 deal with ―bomb-shattered buildings and streets.‖3 Fortunately, federal and state officials had already begun to implement limited measures to meet the exigencies of war. The onset of war in Europe in 1939 had focused the attention of the federal government on preparations for defense. On 8 September 1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt proclaimed a limited national emergency for ―the strengthening of our national defense within the limits of peace-time authorizations.‖4 The president established the National Defense Advisory Commission in May 1940. In addition to branches aimed at the efficient utilization of resources at the national level, the federal commission also included the Division of State and Local Cooperation, an agency intended to promote state and local production of defense goods and mobilization of the population for national defense.5 In planning for the possibility of American involvement in the war, federal officials delegated substantial authority and responsibilities to the states. Despite the declaration of a limited national emergency and the creation of the National Defense Advisory Commission, America‘s civilian defense program made halting progress prior to Pearl Harbor. Perennial conflicts over the appropriate delegation of responsibility and power between the states and federal, as well as among the local and state, governments hindered the creation of a national civilian defense plan. Even after the creation of the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) in May 1941, conflicts over authority would bedevil the program. The OCD lacked the power to enforce its own policies, including the enactment of lighting restrictions and punishment of violations, which were addressed through state or local laws. In time, each state created a central civilian defense organization and the federal OCD established regional offices in each of the nine domestic Army commands. Tensions over the delegation of authority and the resulting weakness of the national OCD hampered development of the national civil defense program.6 The official commencement of Florida‘s organization for war production and home defense came in October 1940 when Governor Fred P. Cone, at the request of President

3 Florida Times-Union, 13, 17, 20 January 1942.

4 New York Times, 9 September 1939.

5 Cardozier, 106-107.

6 Cardozier, 33-34, 185.

130

Roosevelt, convened a meeting of state leaders for preliminary defense planning. Governor Cone appointed members to the State Defense Council (SDC) in November 1940 after consulting with Governor-elect Spessard L. Holland.7 In its operational form, the Council consisted of Governor Holland as chairman, Carl D. Brorein as vice-chairman and acting head of the organization, and twelve division chairmen. Additionally, the state attorney general and adjutant general served as ex officio members of the SDC. The Council also included an advisory commission made up of cabinet members, current and former state legislators, state supreme court justices, and members of civic organizations.8 Florida‘s SDC was the first defense council organized in the Southeast. Initially created as advisory bodies, after 7 December 1941, the regulatory authority of state defense councils generally increased following the commencement of hostilities.9 However, the first task of the new defense agency was to define its mission and organize for effective operation. The challenge of designing the state‘s civilian defense program began with a series of planning conferences held by Council members in early 1941. On 1 March 1941, the Council members appointed George L. Burr, Jr. to serve as executive director and opened the organization‘s state headquarters in Tallahassee. The SDC would subsequently invite county officials and community leaders to organizational meetings held in each of the state‘s five congressional districts. Participants in the district meetings were asked to organize county civilian defense councils. The county civilian defense councils were then tasked with coordinating local organizations. By 1943, Floridians could boast of 137 county and local defense councils. Every county, large city, municipality of 2,500 or more residents, and many

7 Cone passed on the opportunity to play politics with the State Defense Council appointments to promote continuity in the organization. Had he used the new agency to repay past political favors it may well have retarded the organization‘s development due to turnover in membership following the inauguration of the governor-elect in January 1941. The State Defense Council‘s Executive Director George L. Burr, Jr., would later note, ―This proved to be a wise precaution as in fully half the States … changes in State administration seriously hampered the orderly development of the program.‖ SDC membership demonstrated great continuity through the first two years of the Council‘s existence. The organization added members to head newly created divisions, and lost one member through resignation after election to the state legislature disqualified him for membership. State Defense Council of Florida, Biennial Report (Tallahassee, Fl: n.p., 1943), 5, 6.

8 As of March 1943, the SDC divisions were: Agriculture; Civil Protection; Finance and Budget; Food, Health and Housing; Home and Community Services; Industry and Material Resources; Information, Education and Morale; Labor and Personnel; Power and Fuel; Transportation and Communications; and Water Supply and Fire Protection. State Defense Council, Biennial Report, 5.

9 Ferguson, 46, 43.

131 smaller communities, organized defense councils or, in the less populous areas, defense committees. Floridians managed to complete the initial organization of these county and local defense groups in less than a month. With the task of creating the framework for the defense agency accomplished, members of the state council turned to other organizational problems.10 Council leadership next tackled the job of planning the civilian defense program and recruiting volunteers to implement it. The absence of federal guidelines complicated the job of designing the civilian defense organization. The Office of Civilian Defense did not yet exist.11 Furthermore, neither the national Defense Advisory Committee nor the Federal Bureau of State and Local Cooperation offered a prototype program. Florida State Defense Council members and staff managed to formulate an organizational plan and divisional programs that, with only minor changes, served the state well into the war. With the framework of the state organization defined, the SDC switched its emphasis to recruitment.12 The job of recruiting and registering volunteers for the state‘s new civilian defense program brought a strong response from the state‘s residents. The mass registration of Floridians willing to volunteer their time and energies for civilian defense was the first assignment given to the new county and local councils. The subsidiary councils relied on a variety of recruitment methods, including solicitations through clubs, civic groups, and veterans organizations.13 During the registration process, prospective volunteers completed registration cards listing their skills, training, and preferred assignment. These registration cards were then processed and used to assign the volunteers. The initial registration drive drew nearly 750,000 volunteers and exceeded the available opportunities for participation in the civilian defense program. Despite

10 SDC, Biennial Report, 7.

11 The federal Office of Civilian Defense produced a model defense council plan, but it appeared after the creation of the Florida State Defense Council. Richard R. Lingeman, Don’t You Know There’s A War On? The American Home Front, 1941-1945 (New York: G. P. Putnam‘s Sons, 1970), 34.

12 SDC, Biennial Report, 7-8.

13 For example, an American Legion of Florida bulletin begins with the emphatic admonition to ―OFFER YOUR 100% COOPERATION TO YOUR COUNTY DEFENSE COUNCIL….‖ The bulletin concludes by ordering members to ―SEE TO IT THAT YOUR DEFENSE COUNCIL HAS SUFFICIENT MAN POWER TO DO ANYTHING THAT IS NECESSARY. If they don‘t have it FURNISH IT.‖ American Legion, Department of Florida, Bulletin No. 48, 22 December 1941. Florida State Defense Council Files, Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Florida (FSA), Record Group 191, Series 419, Box 3, file ―American Legion.‖

132 numerous services provided across the state by the program, some volunteers remained without assignments two years after their initial registration.14 Florida‘s civilian defense program consisted of two branches. The Action Divisions, also known as protective services and the Citizens Defense Corps, protected life and property, and maintained public services in the event of air raids or other emergencies. Major General Albert H. Blanding, recalled from the National Guard retirement list, served as Coordinating Director of the Action Services. War Services, also referred to as the Civilian Mobilization service, directed community support for the war, and included all sections outside of the Action Division. Those units within War Services associated with the community war effort made up the Citizens Service Corps. Council Executive Director George L. Burr, Jr. oversaw the War Services branch.15 The State Defense Council‘s civilian defense program attempted to meet a vast range of the state‘s wartime needs, spanning protective services, education and training, labor allocation, housing, childcare, fuel distribution, and coordination of agricultural production. At the most basic level the program mobilized the state‘s residents to meet the many demands of modern warfare. On a more abstract level, the civilian defense program undoubtedly provided opportunities for civilians to feel they were making a substantive contribution to the war effort.16 In this way, the civilian defense program engendered a sense of common cause and strengthened morale at the state and national levels. Florida‘s civilian defense preparations experienced an early and unexpected test when the Battle of the Atlantic expanded into America‘s coastal shipping lanes. Immediately upon learning of the Japanese attack on the United States, Admiral Karl Dönitz, commander of the German submarine forces, anticipating the commencement of hostilities between Germany and America, began planning a devastating attack upon an inexperienced and unprepared foe. The commander of the U-boat fleet believed a coordinated offensive would achieve several benefits for the Axis forces – demonstrate America‘s vulnerability, intimidate the population, and, most significantly, destroy vital shipping and material needed to build up the American arsenal and

14 SDC, Biennial Report, 8.

15 SDC, Biennial Report, 9.

16 Cardozier, 207.

133 sustain England‘s ability to wage war. Dönitz calculated that the destruction caused by a sustained U-boat campaign along the American eastern seaboard and Gulf Coast could easily exceed the damage wrought by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.17 Dönitz‘s plan came to fruition just five weeks later when North American coastal shipping fell prey to the U-boats assigned to execute Operation Paukenschlag (―Operation Drumbeat‖).18 In the months to come, German U-boats would fulfill Dönitz‘s expectations as they sank shipping along the American eastern seaboard and, in time, along the Gulf Coast throughout much of 1942. Operational orders called for the submarines to attack vessels of over 10,000 tons in North American coastal waters. Dönitz‘s directive allowed for an exception to the 10,000 ton restriction in the case of tankers, which were the priority target for the U-boats.19 Residents of Florida did not have long to wait for the U-boat campaign to impact the state. In the days and weeks following Pearl Harbor, Florida‘s officials and residents prepared for air attack and coastal raids. Beginning in late December 1941 and continuing into January 1942, the SDC and local defense councils, at the request of the Army, staged practice air raid and blackout drills across the state.20 Unfortunately, federal and state preparations against enemy action did not go much beyond these practice drills and limited dimming and screening of coastal lighting.21 This lack of precaution would prove disastrous for the seamen aboard the tankers and freighters plying the coastal waters. Florida residents witnessed visible fireballs at sea and the distressed faces of rescued mariners brought to coastal ports as a result of the U-boat campaign. The first sinking off the state‘s shores occurred on 19 February 1942, with the torpedoing of the tanker SS Pan Massachusetts twenty miles off .22 The next days and weeks brought additional

17 Michael Gannon, Operation Drumbeat: The Dramatic True Story of Germany’s First U-Boat Attacks Along the American Coast in World War II (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991) xv-xvi.

18 The first victim was the steamer Cyclops, torpedoed off Halifax, Nova Scotia, on 12 January, 1942. Gannon, xvii, 208 ff.

19 Robert Goralski, and Russell W. Freeburg, Oil & War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WWII Meant Victory or Defeat (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1987), 105.

20 Evening Independent (St. Petersburg), 30 December 1941; Palm Beach Daily News, 30 December 1941; St. Petersburg Times, 24 January 1942.

21 Gannon, 185, 186, 344.

22 Florida Times-Union, 22 February 1942; Gannon, 347. 134 attacks. An account of the sinking of the tanker Republic appeared in the 24 February edition of the Tallahassee Daily Democrat; surviving crewmembers were transported to West Palm Beach.23 The Florida Times-Union reported a U-boat attack on the tanker Cities Service Empire on 25 February; survivors were landed at Fort Pierce.24 Press coverage of the incidents frequently included interviews with the crew and vivid accounts of the destruction caused by the U-boats. These accounts often depicted the submariners as merciless and sinister killers. After a brief lull in Florida waters during March, perhaps the most dramatic U-boat attack occurred within sight of Jacksonville Beach on the evening of 10 April when a crowd of beach goers watched the blazing destruction of the tanker SS Gulfamerica. Despite the proximity to shore and the presence of hundreds of eyewitnesses, the incident went unreported for several days due to a recently implemented U.S. Navy embargo on the immediate release of information related to attacks on shipping.25 When it finally appeared, coverage emphasized the sensational nature of the U-boat torpedo and cannon attack, the injuries and loss of life suffered by the crew, and the presence of spectators on shore.26 The specter of the enemy subs was burned into the public consciousness. Less sensational, but perhaps equally significant was the reappraisal of coastal measures following a news report blaming on-shore lighting for the torpedoing of a small freighter in coastal waters. The April 15 front-page Florida Times-Union story, headlined ―Shore Lights Enable Sub To Find Mark,‖ reported,

One torpedo that smashed into a cargo hold of a small freighter ‗off the Atlantic Coast‘ last Thursday morning while the ship, according to members of the crew,

23 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 24 February 1942; Florida Times-Union, 25 February 1942.

24 Florida Times-Union, 25 February 1942.

25 One paper explained the delay and vagueness in coverage by noting, ―In accordance with U. S. Navy policies, release of the news of this ship sinking was withheld until it ‗can no longer profit the enemy,‘ and newspapers also were requested to withhold the name of the ship, its tonnage, cargo, and ports of departure and destination.‖ Florida Times-Union, 16 April 1942. A Saturday Evening Post story on the ―Battle of Florida‖ attributed the policy to the need to notify victims‘ families and ship owners. Additionally, the Navy wanted to deny potentially useful intelligence to the enemy, as well as protect efforts to salvage damaged ships. Philip Wylie and Laurence Schwab. 1944. "The Battle of Florida." Saturday Evening Post 216, no. 37: 14-58.

26 For narratives of the attack on the Gulfamerica from the perspectives of the U-boat and tanker crews, as well as some of the spectators, see Gannon, 364 ff. Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14, 15 April 1942; Florida Times-Union, 15 April 1942.

135

was silhouetted against the reflection of shore lights increased the toll of Axis submarines last week and sent 39 surviving seamen into Jacksonville.27

Shortly after, SDC Vice-Chairman Carl D. Brorein wrote to General A. H. Blanding calling his attention to the story. Regarding the enforcement of existing lighting restrictions and the potential for additional measures, Brorein wrote,

I presume the Army or Navy will certainly follow through on this matter and see that proper precautions are taken if they have not been. At the same time I believe this gives the Defense Council and County Organizations ample opportunity to crack down and get full cooperation in the shore line blackouts and screening necessary to protect the coast in ocean traffic.28

Federal and state authorities belatedly stepped up the implementation of coastal lighting restrictions following the spectacular destruction of coastal shipping. The continued presence of illumination on the Atlantic seaboard resulted not from a failure to act on the part of military commanders as much as the inadequacy of the actions taken. In March 1942, military officials ordered a coastal ―dimout‖ on the eastern seaboard from New York to Florida.29 Significantly, the dimout order required ―immediate elimination of ‗brilliant coastal lighting at night,‘‖ but did not implement a blackout or total prohibition of on-shore lighting. Furthermore, news reports indicated only sporadic compliance with the initial dimout order along the Atlantic coast of Florida.30 In a delayed response to the success of Dönitz‘s U- boat campaign, on 15 May 1942, the Army declared the entire Atlantic Coast from Maine to Florida a military area and assumed control of all artificial lighting along the coasts and inland areas.31 The commander of the Fourth Corps Area, which included Florida, subsequently issued additional lighting restrictions for the North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida

27 Florida Times-Union, 15 April 1942.

28 Carl D. Brorein to General Blanding, 17 April 1942, Florida State Defense Council Files, FSA, RG 191, S 419, Box 1, Folder – ―Action Divisions, A. H. Blanding, 1944.‖ Chairman Brorein‘s expectation of action on the part of the Army or Navy arose from the delegation of authority over coastal lighting to those services by Executive Order 9066, issued on 19 February 1942. Gannon, 344.

29 St. Petersburg Times, 2, 22 March 1942.

30 Miami Beach reportedly implemented lighting restrictions and speed limits for night driving while hotels and motorists in neighboring Miami failed to comply. St. Petersburg Times, 22 March 1942.

31 New York Times, 17 May 1942.

136 coasts. Intended to prevent ―silhouetting of friendly shipping to the advantage of enemy submarines,‖ the order restricted, but did not prohibit,

All lighting for a distance of 10 miles inland from the coast line, and all city lighting, in communities of 5,000 or more inhabitants with a distance of 30 miles inland from the coast line which have objectionable loom as determined by inspection from the sea.32

Authorities would not extend a similar order to Florida‘s Gulf Coast until June 1942.33 The military continued with its policy of dimout rather than blackout, believing that restrictions on only the brightest lights were necessary. Despite the dimout, Allied shipping on the eastern seaboard would remain vulnerable to attack because of silhouetting against coastal lights.34 Historian Michael Gannon has called this policy a ―tragic misjudgment‖ leading ―by omission to further loss of lives and of treasure.‖35 Thanks to a belatedly developed antisubmarine campaign, the destruction caused by the U-boat offensive diminished after May 1942. A combination of small sea craft antisubmarine patrol, improved air patrol of the seaways, and the implementation of coastal convoys made life difficult, and significantly more dangerous, for the U-boats operating off shore. By late July 1942 Admiral Dönitz had transferred most of his U-boats to the mid-Atlantic. Other than sporadic attacks along the coasts and a less ambitious U-boat campaign spanning the months of April through December 1943, the submarine menace ended.36

32 The order barred outdoor illuminated signs, bright lighting at sporting events or places of amusement, exterior lighting (except streetlights), and bonfires and other lighting on beaches. The edict required the dimming of streetlights, storefronts, interior lights, and automobile driving lights. The directive applied to Florida east of the Apalachicola River. The Spartanburg (S.C.) Herald-Journal, 16 May 1942.

33 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 12 June 1942.

34 The reluctance on the part of military authorities to impose an effective coastal blackout has been attributed to ―intense pressure exerted by coastal business interests such as beach resort operators who did not want to ‗inconvenience tourists.‘‖ Gannon, 344. Additionally, eastern seaboard defense authorities and mayors blamed lighting restrictions for an increase in crime and automobile accidents, and a decrease in nighttime economic activity, and opposed them for those reasons. Clay Blair, Hitler’s U-boat War: The Hunters, 1939-1942 (New York: Random House, 1996), 500 fn.

35 Clay Blair and Michael Gannon disagree on the peril posed by onshore lighting. Blair writes that ―Only rarely were moon, weather, and tactical conditions such that distant shorelights were advantageous to the very few U-boats operating in Florida waters.‖ Blair 500 fn. Gannon, citing the testimony of torpedoed seamen, Navy reports, and Army studies, asserts that coastal illumination greatly aided the targeting of shipping by U-boats operating in Florida‘s coastal waters. Gannon, 344-345.

36 Gannon, 352, 355, 383-389. 137

The German submarine offensive impacted Floridians in multiple and varied ways. The debris of war littered Florida‘s famed beaches, causing the temporary closure of a stretch from Ponce de Leon Inlet to Ormond Beach because of the presence of explosives in the flotsam of a torpedoed freighter.37 Beginning in May 1942, naval officials began implementation of restrictions on the movement of fishing and sponging vessels along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts at night. Despite vociferous protests from those affected, the Navy refused to back down, noting the difficulty of discerning between small commercial vessels and U-boats, and the potential threat posed by the landing of seaborne enemy saboteurs and spies.38 The landing of four German saboteurs on Ponte Vedra Beach, near Jacksonville, in June 1942 led the Army to order the closure of all Florida beaches at night.39 In addition to the night closings, an all-volunteer mounted guard patrolled many Florida beaches after dark as a precaution against further landings of enemy agents.40 Without doubt, the most serious material impact of the U-boat offensive fell upon petroleum transportation facilities. Further magnifying the damage inflicted by the enemy submarines – forty-three vessels sunk in March 1942 alone – was the high number of tankers falling victim to their depredations. Tanker losses detrimentally affected the entire war effort; seriously threatening oil supplies necessary to the survival of Great Britain and other allies, as well as the continued growth of the American defense industry. British naval historian Captain S. W. Roskill remarked, ―What made these losses more serious was that a high proportion of the sunken ships were tankers, of which we were woefully short.‖41 Prior to the initiation of Operation Paukenschlag, the American tanker fleet had a capacity of about 5.6 million aggregate tons. German U-boats sunk roughly one-quarter of these vessels during 1942. Despite the best efforts of shipyards, new tanker construction in 1942 could only replace one million tons of

37 Florida Times-Union, 12 May 1942.

38 Florida Times-Union, 5, 16 May, 1, 7 November 1942; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 8 July, 15 October, 11 November 1942.

39 Florida Times-Union, 1 August 1942.

40 The Coast Guard Auxiliary organized and directed the beach patrol. Florida Times-Union, 6, 18, August 4, 5, 13, 15, 26 September 1942; Palm Beach Post, 2 August 1942; St. Petersburg Times, 11, 14 August 1942; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 2 August 1942.

41 Goralski and Freeburg, 111.

138 capacity. This net loss of tanker volume came as the demands – both domestic and foreign – for U.S. oil and shipping increased due to the spreading global war.42 Facing a severe squeeze on petroleum supplies due to diminished transportation capacity and growing demand, on 14 March the Roosevelt administration‘s War Production Board (WPB) ordered a reduction in gasoline deliveries to bulk consumers and service stations in seventeen Eastern states, the District of Columbia, Washington, and Oregon. The edict also restricted hours of operation for gas stations in those areas. Additionally, the WPB simultaneously issued a separate order essentially prohibiting the installation of new fuel oil heating equipment in the affected areas. The New York Times explained, ―The order was in line with the move to conserve fuel-oil stocks in East and West Coast areas remote from the sources of supply.‖ Furthermore, the story noted, ―The [WPB] order cutting gasoline deliveries and limiting service- station operation is similar to that in effect last summer ….‖ At the same time, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to all state governors requesting them to establish a forty mile per hour speed limit to conserve the nation‘s precious rubber stock pile.43 Thanks to the success of the U-boat offensive, gas restrictions returned to the Eastern seaboard.44 Florida officials responded to the imposition of the new federal gas reduction order by taking up the same arguments they had used only the previous fall. Governor Spessard L. Holland renewed his case against inclusion of Florida within the restricted area, reasserting the state should properly be classified as a Gulf, rather than an Eastern seaboard, state. Furthermore, because of its numerous Gulf Coast ports, the state‘s fuel needs could largely, if not entirely, be met through the use of readily available coastal barges rather than tankers.45 Fuel delivered to Gulf Coast ports, it was further argued, could then be transshipped by tanker truck, railroad tank

42 Goralski and Freeburg, 116.

43 The war in the Pacific cut off access to sources of raw rubber in Asia. New York Times, 15 March 1942.

44 The WPB order, in effect on March 19, cut gas deliveries in the affected areas by twenty per cent, limited service station hours to twelve or less hours per day on any six days in a week. The edict exempted consumers deemed ―essential to the war effort,‖ such as vehicles and boats needed for public safety; local, state, and federal vehicles and boats; commercial vehicles such as cabs; agricultural and industrial equipment; and school buses. The order applied to that portion of Florida east of the Apalachicola River. Florida Times-Union, 15 March 1942; Tallahassee Daily-Democrat, 15 March 1942.

45 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 15 March 1942.

139 car, or inland waterway to destinations within the state or to other states.46 Governor Holland wrote to Interior Secretary Harold L. Ickes, in his capacity as federal petroleum coordinator, seeking removal of both Florida and Georgia from the gas restricted area, informing him that,

It is my considered judgment … that the continued inclusion of Florida and Georgia in the rationed area simply works additional hardship on both of these States and their people without helping anybody else.47

Members of the state‘s congressional delegation quickly joined Governor Holland in seeking relief from gasoline rationing. Florida‘s U.S. Senators Charles O. Andrews and Claude Pepper stood in the front rank of the state‘s Washington D.C. representatives in pursuing increased fuel supplies. Andrews energetically attacked the gas problem on several fronts, arguing that the inclusion of the state in the rationed area was unjustified and especially harmful, as well as vociferously supporting the revival of the cross-state canal project. Representative Lex Green and Senator Pepper joined Andrews in calling for a renewed effort to build a cross-state canal as a means of alleviating the transportation problems causing the Eastern seaboard fuel shortage.48 Initiated in 1935 as a sea level cross-state canal, the Florida Ship Canal was to extend from the Gulf of Mexico to the St. Johns River. The project was abandoned after the expenditure of $5,400,000 in federal funds on preliminary construction.49 By 1942, the proposal had evolved into an above sea level lock canal designed as a shortcut for barges traveling between the Gulf and the East coasts. The canal, whether for ships or barges, was one of the most controversial and divisive issues in Florida politics. The proposed canal attracted both enthusiastic supporters and determined detractors. Proponents hailed the project‘s economic potential. Opponents warned the canal would pollute the state‘s underground water supply, diminish trade at seaports in Miami and Tampa, and take freight away from the state‘s railroad lines. Additionally, economy-minded members of Congress opposed the project, which they portrayed as a boondoggle. Despite these arguments,

46 Florida Times-Union, 9 April, 17 May 1942; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 9 April 1942.

47 Florida Times-Union, 17 May 1942.

48 Florida Times-Union, 24, 30 July 1942.

49 In addition to $5.4 million in federal funds, the counties along the canal corridor reportedly spent $3 million for right-of-way, bringing the total expenditures to $8.4 million in 1935 funds. Florida Times-Union, 3 August 1942.

140 the canal was very popular in the six Florida counties comprising the canal district.50 The opposition of Reps. Pat Cannon, of Miami, and J. Hardin Peterson, of Lakeland, and the support of Reps. Lex Green, of Starke, Robert L. F. Sikes, Crestview, and Joe Hendricks, DeLand revealed the regional divisions over the canal.51 Governor Holland thought it best to avoid taking a position on the matter, explaining to the editor of The Marine News,

The Canal has been such a controversial issue in this State, on which our people are so thoroughly divided that I have not felt and do not feel that it is sound policy for me, as Governor, to participate on either side of the argument. There are many of our good citizens who support the measure and many who oppose it, and we have an abundance of things which need to be done in Florida which are sound and helpful from the standpoint of all sections of the State. I prefer to let this issue remain a National one.52

While Governor Holland remained neutral, Florida‘s two U.S. Senators energetically worked on behalf of the canal. Both Pepper and Andrews advocated revival of the canal in its modified form. On 31 March, Pepper introduced a proposal to construct a canal and temporary pipeline simultaneously along the ship canal route to alleviate the petroleum shortage on the Eastern seaboard.53 After initial setbacks, the bill authorizing construction of the pipeline and canal as a means of relieving petroleum transportation problems passed the House and Senate, and received President Roosevelt‘s signature on 23 July.54 Unfortunately, for canal advocates, the bill authorized but did not fund the project.

50 Benjamin F. Rogers attributes the election of Charles O. Andrews to fill the late Senator Park Trammel‘s seat to Andrews‘ support for the project. Benjamin F. Rogers, ―The Florida Ship Canal Project,‖ Florida Historical Quarterly 36 (1957): 15-20.

51 Daytona Beach Morning Journal, 18 June 1942; Florida Times-Union, 15, 30 July 1942.

52 The governor initially endorsed, and then withdrew his endorsement, of Rivers and Harbors Authorization Bill, HR 5993. He reversed position after learning that the bill contained ―the highly controversial measures such as the Florida Cross State Canal and the St. Lawrence Waterway ….‖ Governor Holland to S. Willson Richards, 2 February 1942, Charles Oscar Andrews Papers, Box 33, FF Atlantic Gulf Ship Canal 1940-1942, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.

53 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 1 April 1942.

54 Representative Lex Green, of Starke, was another stalwart supporter of the canal project in both its ship canal and barge canal incarnations. Green was so closely identified with the cause that President Roosevelt presented him with one of the pens used to sign the bill authorizing canal construction. Florida Times-Union, 24, 30 July 1942.

141

Senator Andrews promptly launched a rhetorical offensive in the Senate to win funding for canal construction. Taking the floor on three consecutive days in August 1942, the Florida senator related a list of arguments in support of funding the canal project. Andrews pointed out to his colleagues that had the original canal project been completed, it likely would have saved the lives of five hundred seamen ―who have gone down to watery graves off our Southeast and Gulf coasts‖ as a result of the German submarine campaign.55 Additionally, he urged construction of the lock canal to provide winter employment for the thousands recently dropped from the WPA rolls and those facing idleness due to an expected decline in tourism.56 Furthermore, he informed the Senate of an average drop in gasoline tax revenues of twenty-two per cent in the affected area because of gas rationing, resulting in a potential fiscal crisis in those states. This too could be alleviated by the speedy construction of the barge canal according to Andrews.57 Despite its promise of saving lives, providing employment, and restoring the flow of petroleum and its sustaining tax revenues, the necessary appropriations for construction of the barge canal were not approved during the war. The reasons for its defeat were numerous and varied – doubts that it could be completed in time to contribute to the war effort; high cost in manpower, material, and funds; Secretary of the Interior and Petroleum Coordinator Harold L. Ickes‘s preference for pipelines; and the belief among some in Congress that the project was too big and too wasteful.58 The imposition of nation-wide gas rationing as a rubber conservation measure on 1 December 1942 made the barge canal‘s capacity to alleviate the Eastern oil shortage a moot point. Initial notice of the administration‘s intention to impose gas rationing came on the heels of a report by President Roosevelt‘s special rubber investigating committee headed by financier Bernard M. Baruch calling for immediate rubber conservation measures to avoid ―both a military and a civilian collapse.‖ The committee warned that in the matter of rubber supplies, the nation had to choose between ―discomfort and defeat.‖59 The commission recommended saving tires by

55 Florida Times-Union, 3 August 1942; St. Petersburg Times, 5 August 1942.

56 Florida Times-Union, 4 August 1942; Miami News, 8 August 1942.

57 Florida Times-Union, 5 August 1942.

58 Alexander R. Stoesen, ―Claude Pepper and the Florida Canal Controversy, 1939-1943,‖ Florida Historical Quarterly 50 (1972), 248-249.

59 Florida Times-Union, 26 September 1942. 142 limiting driving. The commission specified gas rationing, speed reduction, and a prohibition on nonessential motoring to limit mileage.60 Extension of gas rationing to the entire nation definitively precluded any hopes Floridians had for lifting restrictions in their state. Travel restrictions of any kind posed a serious threat to Florida‘s biggest economic sector – tourism. Despite the hardships imposed by gasoline rationing during 1941, state Hotel Commissioner Hunter G. Johnson reported that it had been ―a banner year and that receipts were well ahead of any year in the past.‖ Johnson attributed the strong hotel and restaurant activity to an unusually good winter season and an unprecedented level of summer tourism business. Regardless of cancellations because of the demands of the defense industry or the draft board, Hunter expressed optimism for the tourism industry‘s prospects for 1942.61 Despite dire forecasts that the war, higher taxes, increased living costs, tire rationing, and restrictions on automobile sales doomed the nation‘s tourism industry for the duration,62 other Florida officials echoed Hotel Commissioner Johnson‘s optimistic outlook. Frank Winchell, manager of the Jacksonville Tourist and Convention Bureau, noting the drastic curtailment of furloughs for military personnel posted to bases in Florida following Pearl Harbor, reported an increase in tourism inquiries from parents seeking to visit their young men. Describing them as ―a new tourist crop,‖ Winchell observed, ―it seems now that the war emergency, instead of discouraging visits of this type, actually will promote them.‖63 Speaking to the Florida State Cattlemen‘s Association convention in St. Augustine, Governor Holland, while acknowledging the potentially disruptive affect of the war, cautiously declared,

While we do not expect [tourism] to reach a new peak this year, I do think this will be a prosperous year. Despite the fact that this nation is going forward in a fight for victory, Florida still has lure.64

60 Lingeman, 238.

61 Florida Times-Union, 4 January 1942.

62 Pittsburgh Press, 10 January 1942.

63 Florida Times-Union, 6 January 1942.

64 Evening Independent (St. Petersburg), 15 January 1942.

143

Early reports from hotel and apartment house owners in Miami, Coral Gables, and Orlando supported official optimism. Even with an initial slump, by early February, Hotel Commissioner Johnson could declare, ―the fact remains that travel to the state is on the increase.‖65 Recognizing the potential perception of conflict between the promotion of civilian recreational trips and the nation‘s wartime priorities, Florida officials requested clarification of the federal government‘s travel policy. Governor Holland, in cooperation with the Florida Publicity and Public Relations Association, hoped for a statement similar to President Roosevelt‘s recent recommendation for the continuation of professional baseball for morale purposes.66 Florida officials were pleased when Ickes responded with a news release supportive of vacations in the interest of public and individual morale. The report cited evidence from England, Canada, and even Germany that working long hours under high pressure without adequate recreation could result in poor morale and decreased productivity. Ickes‘s statement reiterating the United States Travel Bureau slogan, ―Travel Strengthens America Through Building the Nation‘s Health, Wealth and Unity,‖ must have at least partially alleviated the concerns of those relying upon tourism for their livelihood.67 Even with the approval of the federal government, tourism operators and state officials recognized the war drastically altered circumstances, and strove to adapt. The City of Miami revised their publicity and advertising program to ―de-glamorize‖ the resort area in response to the gravity of the war. ―Photographs of cuties in scanty bathing suits[,] … for years the mainstay of the resort area‘s publicity effort‖ were dropped after ―the city publicity director … ruled them too frivolous while the nation battle[d] for its existence.‖ The new wartime marketing program emphasized ―housing facilities for those who can be spared from the war effort and rich agricultural lands which back up the defense of the nation‖ according to newspaper coverage. At least in Miami‘s marketing efforts, pastoral utility would supplant frivolity for the duration.68

65 Florida Times-Union, 12 February 1942; St. Petersburg Times, 13 February 1942.

66 Florida Times-Union, 17, 21 January 1942; Daytona Beach Morning Journal, 21 January 1942; Palm Beach Post, 21 January 1942.

67 St. Petersburg Times, 1 February 1942.

68 Florida Times-Union, 27 February 1942.

144

State officials also responded to wartime changes. Speaking before the annual convention of the Florida State Hotel Association at the Belleview-Biltmore Hotel, State Hotel Commissioner Johnson estimated that tourism volume for the 1941-42 season had declined by approximately thirty to forty per cent over the record business of the 1940-41 season. Despite this setback, he cautiously predicted the state‘s tourism industry would ―undergo an amazing metamorphosis‖ in the coming year. Johnson based his prediction on two important developments – first, recent negotiations for the takeover of Florida hotels and apartment buildings for potential use as military training facilities and hospitals, and, two, the strong likelihood that the families of personnel stationed in Florida would want to visit them. Referring to the example of his own son, a member of the Marine Corps, Johnson said,

I visit him. I go to see him often. So it is with thousands of other fathers and mothers. With the men of the armed forces moving into our hotels, it is just common sense that these parents will come to Florida somehow, to see their boys. And we must bear this in mind, too. Out of all these soldiers and all these parents, who will come down here to see them, Florida stands to gain thousands upon thousands of new winter visitors when the war is over. Moreover, hundreds of them may become permanent citizens, so enamored of Florida, will they become.69

In essence, Johnson and other Florida officials, by embracing the wartime transformation of the state‘s leading economic sector, sought to make a virtue out of necessity. The inspiration to bring military training bases to Florida resorts reportedly came to state Senator Ernest R. Graham while attending a luncheon at Hialeah Park in January 1942. According to the Miami News, ―Senator Graham made the suggestion that both the government and hotel owners would profit from such an arrangement….‖ A Miami veterans‘ organization took up the idea and passed it on to receptive officials in Washington, D.C.70 The conversion of tourism facilities to temporary military use conveniently met the requirements of the federal government and businesses in the affected communities. The federal government started leasing hotels and apartment buildings in Miami Beach for use as hospitals, training facilities, and barracks in February 1942.71 Military advocates of the use of hotels,

69 (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 3 April 1942.

70 Miami News, 19 April 1942.

71 Daytona Beach Morning Journal, 26 February 1942; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 27 February 1942.

145 apartments, and other existing facilities, sometimes called ―quick system training,‖ claimed it saved ―more than eight months in getting the men into actual training.‖72 The conversion from civilian to military use began modestly when the Army leased five small hotels to house approximately nine hundred staff and students for its new Air Corps administrative officers‘ candidate school.73 The state hotel commission subsequently initiated a statewide survey of hotel and apartment properties to identify those suitable for war use as convalescent homes for wounded soldiers and sailors, as well as training schools for civilian defense workers or military personnel.74 In the coming weeks, the Army conducted surveys of and negotiations for the use of hotels, warehouses, and restaurants in numerous resort communities.75 Eventually, nearly every major resort city hosted some type of military training facility.76 Many hoteliers, apartment house owners, restaurateurs, and tourist attraction operators perceived the military occupation of the state‘s premier resorts as a decidedly mixed blessing. On the one hand, the presence of servicemen in these tourist havens represented a secure and steady source of income in a time of great uncertainty. On the other, in the interest of greater income, resort area businessmen undoubtedly preferred civilian visitors who spent their days golfing, boating, dining, and night clubbing over those who drilled, studied, and went to chow. Despite this bias toward the lucrative tourist trade, the military presence, and other factors, contributed to an economic transformation in Miami. Whereas the city had generally experienced its lowest business activity in the summer months followed by a peak during the winter tourism season, the advent of military training bases and other war related activity brought with them a year round business cycle. During the summer of 1942, retail activity, non- military hotel and apartment rentals, as well as air, bus, and train transportation, showed a substantial increase above previous summers to a level just below that of the 1941-42 winter

72 Major General Walter R. Weaver, commander of Air Corps training activities, quoted in the St. Petersburg Times, 24 July 1942.

73 St. Petersburg Times, 22 February 1942.

74 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 27 February 1942.

75 Miami News, 24 March 1942; (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 25 March 1942; St. Petersburg Times, 23, 28 June, 11 July, 7, 22 August 1942; Florida Times-Union, 8 November 1942.

76 Tebeau, 417.

146 season.77 Thanks to defense activities and the military presence, many business operators in the Miami area not only avoided severe economic difficulty but also enjoyed a previously unknown year round business cycle. While undoubtedly grateful for their khaki-clad visitors, state officials and tourism operators continued to woo civilian guests through a multifaceted marketing campaign. Tourism promoters faced several interconnected hurdles stemming from the war – the perception that wartime leisure travel was unpatriotic; travel restrictions related to gasoline and tire shortages, and reports that Florida resort areas were either full or unsuited to recreation due to the war. State newspapers, chambers of commerce officers, as well as local and state officials did their best to parry these allegations. Florida State Chamber of Commerce Executive Vice President Harold Colee argued that the allocation of gasoline to winter visitors would actually yield substantial savings in petroleum resources in the North. Colee asserted,

Fuel oil running into a staggering number of millions of gallons will be saved for essential war needs in eastern and northern industrial areas if petroleum officials will … not hinder thousands of home owners who would come to Florida for the winer [sic] months.78

At about the same time, tourism boosters in Miami, Daytona Beach, Palm Beach, and other areas reported an allegedly nefarious rumor campaign intended to undermine tourism. The lament of Miami Beach city manager Claude A. Renshaw illustrated the problem,

Groundless rumors … are costing us thousands of dollars daily…. The Army has taken over only about one-third of the hotels here. Our beaches are not lined with barbed wire. Civilians are not prohibited from swimming in the daytime. And if you could see the size of the payments some of the hotels are making for water, you would laugh at the story about their swimming pools being drained and used as gun emplacements.79

Denials of this sort appeared in newspapers all over the state80 as businessmen and officials struggled to keep tourism from becoming a casualty of war.

77 Miami News, 17 May, 2 August 1942.

78 (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 28 July 1942.

79 St. Petersburg Times, 7 August 1942.

80 Florida Times-Union, 1 June 1942; St. Petersburg Times, 22 August 1942; Miami News, 13 September 1942; Palm Beach Post, 24 September 1942.

147

The job of promoting Florida to the nation fell primarily to the Florida National Exhibits. Established in 1931 as a non-profit governmental-private partnership to extol the state‘s agricultural, commercial, and recreational virtues at the 1933 Century of Progress Exhibition in Chicago,81 the organization continued to function as ―the State‘s leading promotional agency.‖82 In the summer of 1942, the exhibit traveled with its motion picture theater, dioramas, murals, and ―Florida singers and musicians‖83 to the Heinz Pier and Steel Pier at Atlantic City, New Jersey; the Boston Sportsmen‘s Show; the National Sportsmen‘s Show in New York; and other conventions and travel centers in the North.84 Hopes for some semblance of a winter season received yet another setback when the Office of Defense Transportation banned the special winter tourist trains that usually ferried visitors from the North and Mid-West to Florida. The ODT order froze passenger train schedules as of 26 September. The decree prohibited the operation of the special seasonal trains running to and from Florida for the duration of the war. Among the trains affected were the lyrically named Orange Blossom Special, Florida Sunbeam, Dixieland, Florida Arrow, and Sunchaser. Florida officials immediately began efforts to have the order rescinded or modified.85 Recognizing the potentially harmful consequences of the railroad schedule freeze, state officials and members of Florida‘s congressional delegation earnestly protested the order. Warning that the inconveniences of ―crowded regular trains‖ would discourage winter tourism, Florida Representative Robert Sikes predicted, ODT Director Joseph B. ―Eastman‘s order will

81 The creation of the Florida National Exhibit (FNP) was spearheaded by a politically influential team consisting of perennial Florida Agricultural Commissioner Nathan Mayo, land, bank, and railroad mogul Edward Ball, and State Senator William Hodges of Tallahassee. David Nelson, ―Florida Crackers and Yankee Tourists the Civilian Conservation Corps, The Florida Park Service and the Emergence of Modern Florida Tourism.‖ (Ph. D. diss. Florida State University, 2008), 74. Funds for the FNP came from legislative appropriations, Florida Department of Agriculture funds, private donations, and contributions from participating Florida cities and counties. Sarasota Herald, 2 September 1942; Evening Independent (St. Petersburg), 18 September 1941; Governor Spessard Holland Collection, Florida State Archives (FSA), Record Group 102, Series 406 (Holland Collection), Box 37, FF 11, Florida National Exhibits,.

82 Governor Spessard Holland, letter to ―The Good People of Florida,‖ 16 January 1942. Holland Collection, Box 37, FF 11, Florida National Exhibits.

83 Florida National Exhibits publicity release, 6 January 1942. Holland Collection, Box 37, FF 11, Florida National Exhibits.

84 Holland to ―The Good People of Florida,‖ Holland Collection, Box 37, FF 11, Florida National Exhibits.

85 Florida Times-Union, 2 October 1942; Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 2 October 1942.

148 just about complete the breaking down of the Florida tourist trade.‖ Senator Charles Andrews, noting that winter conditions would be especially hard on elderly northern residents accustomed to wintering in Florida, forecast, ―there are going to be a lot more funerals in the Northeast than they‘ve ever had before.‖ Governor Spessard Holland agreed that the suspension could potentially harm the state‘s winter tourism industry, but promised to work with the congressional delegation to obtain railroad transportation for winter visitors.86 The governor and members of Florida‘s congressional delegation quickly made good on their promise to seek train transportation for the state‘s winter visitors. On 19 October, Governor Holland, Senator Pepper, Hal Phillips (secretary to Senator Andrews), Representatives Cannon, Green, Peterson, and Sikes met with ODT Director Eastman to explain Florida‘s need for additional train service during the winter. The Florida delegation emphasized that they were seeking a relaxation of the railroad schedule freeze to enable aged and infirm northerners to spend the winter in the state‘s warmer clime.87 Holland asserted that this seasonal relocation would aid in fuel conservation and ―cut down the chance of epidemics in crowded areas.‖ Holland also noted that following the imposition of restrictions on automobile travel the state was more dependent than ever on railroad transportation. Furthermore, Holland explained, they had no desire to undermine the war effort, but, ―we think our seasonal needs entitle us to more consideration.‖ At the conclusion of the conference, ODT Director Eastman promised to consider the problem of adequate train resources for travel to the state.88 Shortly after the October 19 meeting, ODT Director Eastman‘s office issued an enigmatic order authorizing additional railroad passenger service between New York and Florida, while simultaneously rejecting the Florida delegation‘s request for additional train service to the state. The new directive allowed one extra section on a regularly scheduled train running between New York and southern Florida on both the Atlantic Coast Line and the Seaboard Railway. Eastman

86 Florida Times-Union, 2 October 1942; Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 2 October 1942.

87 According to Thomas W. Hagan‘s ―Cracker in the Capital‖ column, during the meeting with Eastman, Governor Holland cited a special train for trips between Chicago and Miami permitted to Fred B. Snite, Jr., a well-known and widely celebrated polio sufferer, as a potential justification for allowing other ―invalids and semi-invalids‖ to winter in Florida. Eastman reportedly denied the setting of any precedent and predicted that if exceptions were granted for Florida, other resort states would want similar treatment. Miami News, 15 November 1942. For information on Mr. Snite, also known as the ―Boiler Boy‖ because of his portable iron lung, see New York Times, 13 November 1954.

88 Sarasota Herald Tribune, 19 October 1942.

149 explained that, due to numerous new industrial, army, and navy facilities in the Southeast, demand for travel between New York, Washington, and south Florida had exceeded scheduled railroad capacity. Furthermore, while Eastman hoped that those maintaining winter homes in Florida would find transportation,

In providing for one additional train daily over these two different routes from New York, ODT is in no way sanctioning tourist travel as usual to Florida resorts. All pleasure travel to and from southern points must be dispensed with for the duration. The railroads have neither the locomotives nor the cars to provide the resort visitor with travel accommodations.89

The additional trains pleased Governor Holland, who said the ODT order,

makes it very clear that the action was not taken with the idea of building up a gay, giddy, tourist travel, and we did not ask for that. It does show that they realize there are thousands to whom winter in Florida is almost a necessity if not entirely so.

Furthermore, the governor expressed the belief that the combination of the military personnel already in residence and those seasonal residents who could now reach the state because of the additional railroad capacity, ―will pretty well fill‖ Florida‘s tourist accommodations for the winter.90 Despite wartime travel restrictions and anti-tourism perceptions, Florida‘s elected officials and tourism boosters employed a campaign of promotion and lobbying to salvage a semblance of the state‘s winter tourism season. Wartime travel restrictions deeply affected the state‘s most reliable sources of revenue and necessitated profound alterations in state government operations. The combination of the embargo on new automobile construction, tire restrictions, and gas rationing severely reduced revenues generated by the state gas tax, automobile registrations, and drivers licenses. In January 1942, anticipating a potential revenue shortfall, the Holland administration ―put its operations on a strict cash-in-hand basis, the better to cope with financial stringencies that may arise during the war.‖ While the state‘s general revenue fund began 1942 with a positive

89 Evening Independent (St. Petersburg), 3 November 1942. As predicted by ODT Director Eastman, following the granting of extra sections on trains serving Florida, California made a request for additional train capacity based on arguments very similar to those used by the Florida delegation. Miami News, 15 November 1942.

90 Florida Times-Union, 5 November 1942. The ODT would further weaken train travel restrictions. The ODT permitted the Florida East Coast Railway to add sections serving New York and Miami, and Chicago and Miami during the 1942-1943 winter season. Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 25 November 1942.

150 balance, officials sought to reduce expenditures to conserve funds.91 State Road Department projections of a gas revenue drop of fifteen per cent or more, approximately $2.5 million below the 1941 total of $15 million, caused the agency to revise drastically operations for 1942. The department announced plans to limit projects to federally funded strategic defense roads and necessary maintenance of existing roads.92 From the first months of the war, before the reinstitution of gas rationing in Florida, the Holland administration anticipated the need for economy measures. As the 1941-42 fiscal year drew to a close, Governor Holland sought to reassure Floridians concerned about the state‘s finances. While acknowledging that collections from the seven cents per gallon gas tax and the coming year‘s auto license fees would decline,93 the governor remained optimistic about revenues. Holland informed residents that the state had at least partial funding for much of the state‘s financial obligations. Funds for the state‘s old age pensions were in hand, the state‘s teachers had been paid most of the money due to them for 1941-42, and nearly all biennial ―lump sum‖ appropriations had been funded. Holland did express concern over funding of teachers‘ salaries in 1943 due to the expected drop in auto license fee payment and gas tax revenues, but suggested that the counties might be able to help in that area as a result of higher property tax collections attributable to greater implementation of full value ad valorem assessment. The governor confidently predicted,

We‘ll finish this fiscal year in the black. We‘ll hold expenditures to a minimum during the lean summer months. Heavy collections such as occupational licenses and insurance premium taxes, beginning in October will put us into the black again, and it appears now that we‘ll be even or better when the legislature convenes. There is no present indication that any special session of the legislature will be necessary.94

91 Florida Times-Union, 9 January 1942.

92 St. Petersburg Times, 20 January 1942.

93 For example, figures for taxable gasoline sales during January and February 1942 compiled by Comptroller J. M. Lee‘s office revealed the decline. January 1942 consumption of 33,905,939 gallons yielded $2,373, 416 in tax revenues, compared with 39,779,675 gallons and $2,794,577 in January 1941. February 1942 consumption of 30,969,020 gallons provided $2,167,831, compared with sales of 36,873, 283 gallons and $2,721,129 in February 1941. In September 1942, Comptroller Lee reported that over the previous twelve months, federal gas rationing cut the state‘s taxable gasoline consumption by thirty-seven per cent. Florida Times-Union, 27 February, 22 September 1942; St. Petersburg Times, 25 March 1942.

94 Several factors limited the immediate problems caused by the drop in gas tax revenues. Funds from the seven cent per gallon tax were divided between the State Road Department (4 cents), municipal and county bond finance (2 cents), general revenue fund (one-half cent), and the state teachers salary fund (one-half cent). Road maintenance 151

Despite the disruption of the state‘s revenue sources caused by the war, for the time being, at least, Florida had sufficient resources to meet its financial obligations. The struggle to provide necessary state services under tight financial conditions continued through 1942. At the close of the 1941-42 fiscal year, Governor Holland and Comptroller Lee reported a general revenue fund balance of $585,000. They attributed this accomplishment to ―rigid economy‖ and the withholding of approximately $3.8 million appropriated to the general revenue fund but unspent.95 Additionally, in the opening days of the 1942-43 fiscal period Governor Holland asked cabinet departments and other agencies to cut their budgets by at least ten per cent.96 Most departments managed to exceed, or at least come very near, meeting Holland‘s request.97 Careful stewardship averted financial disaster and the always unpredictable special legislative session. However, many Floridians recognized that matters of finance and funding would be priorities in the future. During the latter months of 1942, state leaders and political observers turned their attention to the coming 1943 legislative session and potential measures to fortify the state‘s finances. The unpredictable affect of the war made the difficult task of finding revenue even more complex. Preventing the expected shortage in the teachers‘ salary fund for the coming fiscal year presented the most obvious and immediate problem. Some legislators and interested parties argued for temporarily diverting one or more cents from gas tax revenues allocated to road construction or bond repayment to schools for the duration of the war. This approach would allow the state to maintain the teachers‘ salary fund without new taxes. However, and construction projects were scheduled to correspond to available funding. Additionally, war related scarcity of road building material preempted much of the State Road Department work not related to defense. The State Board of Administration had a $17 million balance with which to pay maturing county and municipal bonds. The general revenue fund had a $1 million balance as of 1 April, and State agencies implemented an economy program to stretch that fund through the summer. The state teachers salary fund, deriving its funds from one-half cent of gas tax money and automobile license fees, was in the most precarious situation. The main sources of funding for state‘s welfare pension program – a beverage tax on wine, beer, and liquor, and horse and dog racing taxes – had increased during 1942. A minor portion of the beverage tax went to public schools. Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 1 May 1942; Florida Times-Union, 2 May 1942; St. Petersburg Times, 2 April 1942.

95 Florida Times-Union, 7 July 1942.

96 Florida Times-Union, 11 July 1942; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14 July 1942.

97 Some departments – the Attorney General‘s Office, the State Geological Survey, and the State Defense Council – could not achieve significant budget reductions because of increased workloads due to the war. St. Petersburg Times, 22 July 1942; Florida Times-Union, 29 July 1942.

152 diversion of gas tax revenues to the schools would require the defeat of a proposed constitutional amendment pledging two cents of gas tax monies to bond retirement approved by the previous legislature with the backing of Governor Holland. Funding for the state‘s pension programs for the aged, indigent children, and blind presented another potential worry for state leaders. The strong possibility of a decline in, or total cessation of, horse and dog racing in the state, and the accompanying reduction in pari-mutuel gambling taxes, forced consideration of possible replacement revenue sources for the state‘s welfare pension funds. Despite statements from horse and dog track management of their intention to race during the coming winter season, Governor Holland described the chances for normal racing operations as ―a gamble‖ because of potential wartime restrictions. Consequently, many legislators and the governor advocated preparing for a temporary suspension of racing while hoping for its continuance. While pari- mutuel wagering on horse and dog racing faced an uncertain future, lobbyists for the gaming industry sought support from some legislators for legalized gambling – casinos, bolita, and slot machines – as a source of replacement revenue. While most Floridians reportedly opposed the more quotidian forms of gambling such as bolita and slot machines, some legislators seemed inclined to consider taxation of legalized games of chance in the event of a financial emergency.98 As the 1943 legislative session grew nearer, the invention and promotion of new sources of state revenue became an increasingly popular pastime for lawmakers, journalists, and political pundits. Walter P. Fuller, former Florida legislator and author of Fuller’s Florida Letter, proposed diverting one-and-one-half cents of the gasoline tax from the four cents allocated for road construction and maintenance to the general revenue fund.99 Attorney General J. Tom Watson urged implementation of a one cent per barrel tax on oil pumped through the proposed Trans-Florida Pipeline.100 Various sources advocated the implementation of so-called ―luxury taxes,‖ essentially sales taxes on various items, including cigarettes, soft drinks, and

98 Allen Morris, ―Cracker Politics,‖ in the Miami Herald, 21 June 1942.

99 Miami News, 15 November 1942.

100 The feasibility of Watson‘s plan hinged on whether the pipeline oil was considered interstate or intrastate commerce. Oil moved between states – interstate commerce – would not be subject to state taxes. Oil sold within the state – intrastate commerce – would be subject to the state‘s gasoline tax. Florida Times-Union, 16 September 1942.

153 cosmetics.101 Longtime advocates of a state sales tax argued it was the most equitable tax and would be shared by the state‘s many visitors. Opponents pointed out that the sales tax disproportionately affected citizens of modest means. Governor Holland reportedly opposed the sales tax in any form, except as a last resort.102 The members of the 1943 legislature would consider these and many other proposals in the new session beginning in April. Many of the individuals charged with guiding the state through its difficulties would be selected during the elections of 1942, the nation‘s first wartime campaigns since World War I. As an off-year contest, Florida‘s 1942 referendum lacked the high profile statewide races that characterized the quadrennial presidential and gubernatorial balloting. However, in addition to local, district, and some state races of lesser interest, the race for Congressman-at-large and an amendment authorizing the state to pay off county and municipal bonds drew considerable attention across Florida. Furthermore, the war added several unusual elements to the election. The race for Congressman-at-large, a seat representing the entire state rather than a congressional district, resulted from population growth and the inability of the 1941 legislature to reapportion the state to create a sixth congressional district. The reluctance of south Florida counties, with the exception of Collier, to sharing a congressional district with Dade county accounted for at least some of the problems in achieving redistricting. Representative George C. Leaird of Broward explained the qualms over redistricting,

The people in my county don‘t want to be in the same district as Dade. They want to be in district with small counties where their vote will mean something.103

The legislature‘s failure provided an opportunity for Florida politicians to test their popularity in a statewide race for an office Allen Morris described as ―a politically impotent one, since the congressman represents everyone – and no one.‖104 The race for Congressman-at-large featured two Florida politicians with ambitions for higher office. United States Representative Robert Alexis ―Lex‖ Green, of Starke, the most senior member of Florida‘s congressional delegation, decided to forego a bid for re-nomination

101 Florida Times-Union, 28 September 1942; St. Petersburg Times, 28 September 1942.

102 Miami News, 15 November 1942.

103 ―Cracker Politics‖ in Miami Herald, 18 May 1941.

104 ―Cracker Politics‖ in Miami Herald, 7 September 1941.

154 to his Second District seat and try for the office of Congressman-at-large. Observers speculated that Green intended to use the contest to develop a statewide political organization and build support for a U.S. Senate bid.105 State Representative H. Earnest Overstreet, of Miami, also waged a campaign for the new seat. Overstreet, it was generally believed, intended to run for governor in 1944, and, similarly to Rep. Green, hoped to use the race for Congressman-at-large to develop a statewide presence and test his popularity. Overstreet was considered a political ally of Governor Holland because of his efforts on Holland‘s behalf during the 1940 gubernatorial campaign. Additionally, Overstreet, considered ―an administration stalwart‖ and ―one of Holland‘s most useful men‖ during the 1941 legislature, had worked long hours aiding the new governor‘s legislative goals.106 Despite his ties to the Holland administration, political handicappers declared his candidacy a long shot because of the opposition of Jacksonville and Tampa voters to a second congressman from the city of Miami (Rep. Pat Cannon represented Florida‘s Fourth district which included Miami).107 Rep. Green drew some criticism for his advocacy of the cross state canal, supposed abuses of congressional franking privileges, and his support for a congressional pensions bill.108 Two additional candidates – Wallace Tervin of Bradenton and Barney J. Cohen of Orlando – completed the field.109 The May 5 Democratic primary produced low voter turnout and a clear victory for Rep. Lex Green. The veteran congressman received 133,347 votes to 87,708 for Overstreet, 19,599 for Tervin, and 18,014 for Cohen. Green won fifty-seven of the state‘s sixty-seven counties, running especially well in north Florida. Overstreet drew most of his support from the state‘s southeast coast.110 In a post-primary analysis, Allen Morris attributed Green‘s victory to the

105 Morris suggested that Green‘s interest in running for the U.S. Senate did not necessarily indicate a desire to oppose incumbent Sen. Claude Pepper in 1944. Green, according to Morris, was counting on a vacancy created by Pepper‘s appointment to the cabinet or other position in the Roosevelt administration. ―Cracker Politics‖ in Miami Herald, 7 September 1941.

106 ―Cracker Politics‖ in Miami Herald, 6 April, 1 June, 7 September 1941.

107 ―Cracker Politics‖ in Miami Herald, 13 July 1941.

108 Miami News, 26 April 1942; Evening Independent (St. Petersburg), 5 May 1942.

109 Miami News, 22 March 1942.

110 Overstreet led in Broward, Collier, Dade, Hardee, Indian River, Martin, Osceola, and St. Lucie counties. Tervin took Manatee and Sarasota counties. Green prevailed in the remaining fifty-seven counties. Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 6, 13 May 1942.

155 strong tendency of north Floridians to vote on sectional grounds in statewide elections, and the failure of south Florida voters to do the same.111 Perhaps the most important, and interesting, aspect of the off-year elections of 1942 was the affect of the war on the process. The demands associated with the war effort shaped the election in two fundamental ways – voter participation and candidate selection. Prior to the Democratic party primary, politicians and interested observers expressed concern over an apparent lack of public enthusiasm for the coming contests. This reported apathy was attributed to a lack of compelling races and a tendency for potential voters to focus on the war and war- related concerns. As the primary approached, state officials found it difficult to predict how many of the state‘s approximately 750,000 registered voters would turnout. As one official explained, ―There just seems to be nothing that would serve as a good barometer of the probable vote.‖ Additionally, both the number of ―get out the vote‖ rallies and attendance at surviving rallies decreased.112 Diminishing crowds led Circuit Judge H. L. ―Tom‖ Sebring, of Gainesville, to suggest that the era of the traditional political rally had passed. One candidate blamed rationing for the decline in attendance, ―Voters don‘t want to wear out their tires, when no more are in sight, to come to rallies.‖113 The desire to preserve rationed commodities represented just one example of the ways in which the war shaped the 1942 election. The war led to increased mobility of individuals due to the requirements of Selective Service, defense employment opportunities, and other factors. Consequently, a significant proportion of Florida‘s male population relocated for military service and defense work. An unusually high number of incumbent Florida legislators – five of thirty-eight in the senate and sixteen of ninety-eight in the house – did not seek reelection in 1942, due in part to military service.114 General consequences of this wartime dislocation included the increased presence of women in the workforce and greater participation by women in defense activities. Females also enjoyed increased political influence and opportunities. As one pundit, writing as Peter K. Pinellas, explained,

111 ―Cracker Politics‖ in Miami Herald, 10 May 1942.

112 Palm Beach Post, 24 April 1942.

113 Miami News, 26 April 1942.

114 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 12 March 1942.

156

There‘s about 50,000 Florida men in the Army this year, and you know how many of them are gonna stop slappin‘ the Japs to send a ballot back home. The women are still here though and that means their votes are gonna count bigger this year. Besides that the women have been messin‘ around with this civilian defense stuff and they‘re hell-bent-for-election to do bigger and better things. Votin‘ is gonna be one of them bigger and better things. …. And another thing. The woods are full of women candidates this year and how the girls are gonna get out and beat the tom-tom for their sisterhood.115

The temporary relocation of men during the war resulted in increased political clout and office holding opportunities for Florida women. The war brought not only increased political consciousness and greater pull for Florida women, it also resulted in a number of female candidates for office. Mary Lou Baker, a twenty- seven year old attorney from Pinellas county, entered the contest for the state house of representatives from her home county. Baker was well qualified for office, and had good capital connections, having served as an indexer for the senate and house journals during the 1941 legislative session and contributed to the Florida Bar Journal. Baker practiced law, under her maiden name, with her father, Judge Lee Baker of Clearwater. Her husband, Sergeant Searle H. Matthews, served with the field artillery at Fort Benning, Georgia. Baker‘s challenge to incumbent Representative Stanley Minshall, a florist from St. Petersburg, described by Allen Morris as ―one of the undistinguished members from Pinellas,‖ was a rematch of the 1940 contest.116 Speaking to Pinellas voters at a sparsely attended political rally and fish fry, Baker emphasized the past and present contributions of women to the nation and the world,

Women have helped to mold our America, women like Dolly Madison, Lucy Stone, Susan B. Anthony, Jane Addams and host of others. A Chinese woman, the wife of Chiang Kai-shek, is waging war. Millions of American women are stiffening the backbone of America today. Millions of English women are oiling the war engines of England. They say Russian women are in the trenches and we know they are sailing some of their vessels into our very harbors….

Regarding her own candidacy for the legislature, Baker proclaimed,

115 ―Your Pinellas‖ column in St. Petersburg Times, 6 April 1942.

116 ―Cracker Politics‖ in Miami Herald, 29 March 1942.

157

I have come back to the platform and I shall continue to come back until you … come to realize that whether your lawmakers wear skirts or pants, the issue is in ability and vision.117

Several other female candidates joined Baker in attempting a ―petticoat revolution‖118 in the 1942 primary. In addition to Baker, the list of politically connected female candidates for the legislature included Polly Rose Balfe, of Jacksonville. Balfe, known as the ―Rose of Pinellas‖ during her earlier residence in St. Petersburg, was the great-grand niece of Zachary Taylor, Second war veteran and twelfth president of the United States. She was also the sister-in-law of Alec M. Balfe, Miami shipbuilder and state racing commission chairman. A veteran of unsuccessful campaigns to represent Duval in the state legislature in 1938 and for a seat on the Democratic national committee in 1940, Balfe sought election to the state house of representatives from Duval county in 1942.119 Helen Hunt West, of Jacksonville, sought the second district congressional seat vacated by Rep. Lex Green. Ms. West, a graduate of Florida State College for Women and a former society page editor for the Florida Times-Union, contended with three male candidates for the office. 120 The first primary results suggested some Floridians considered the female candidates to be more than novelties. Attorney and former legislative attaché Mary Lou Baker outpolled incumbent Representative Minshall and the two advanced to a second primary showdown.121 Helen Hunt West finished fifth out of six candidates for the second district House of Representatives seat.122 Polly Rose Balfe finished last in her bid to represent Duval county in the

117 St. Petersburg Times, 26 March 1942.

118 Allen Morris‘s phrase. ―Cracker Politics‖ in Miami Herald, 29 March 1942.

119 St. Petersburg Times, 22 March 1942.

120 ―Cracker Politics‖ in Miami Herald, 29 March 1942. For an overview of Helen Hunt West‘s career and contributions to Florida politics, see James R. McGovern, ―Helen Hunt West: Florida‘s Pioneer for ERA,‖ Florida Historical Quarterly 57 (1978): 39-53.

121 Baker (5,034) outpolled Minshall (4,763) by 251 votes. Evening Independent (St. Petersburg), 6 May 1942; Miami Herald, 17 May 1942.

122 West (2.142) finished well behind the two leaders, J. G. Cary (16,506) and Emory H. Price (15,435), but ahead of sixth place finisher T. W. Parsons, Jr. (1,707). Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 13 May 1942.

158 state house.123 While only Baker advanced to the second primary, both West and Balfe ran competitive races against male opponents. Baker, who had led the field in her first primary race, was more than a match for the incumbent Stanley C. Minshall. In the second primary, Baker carried sixty-nine out of Pinellas county‘s seventy-seven precincts, and tied Minshall in one precinct. The incumbent prevailed in only seven precincts. Baker drew 5,988 votes to Minshall‘s 3,978, for an easy victory.124 Given that Florida was essentially a single-party state, Baker and most other candidates did not face Republican opposition in the November general election. Baker and the other female candidates continued the tradition of political involvement established by Floridians Ruth Bryan Owen, Mary McLeod Bethune, and Edna G. Fuller while also capitalizing on the opportunities for greater participation provided by the war.125 With only two contested races for offices of statewide interest during the general election,126 most of the public‘s attention focused on the slate of nine proposed amendments to the state constitution.127 Governor Holland backed the proposed gas tax amendment, the

123 Florida Times-Union, 6 May 1942.

124 Baker was only the second woman elected to the Florida legislature. Orange county resident Edna G. Fuller won election to the state house of representatives in 1928. Rep. Fuller reportedly prayed for the defeat of bill legalizing pari-mutuel wagering on the floor of the house during the 1929 session. Legalized gambling passed during the 1931 session. Evening Independent (St. Petersburg), 27 May 1942; William W. Rogers, ―The Paradoxical Twenties,‖ in Gannon, ed., The New History of Florida (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996), 291.

125 For more on female candidates and legislators see Allen Morris, ―Florida‘s First Women Candidates,‖ Florida Historical Quarterly 63 (1985): 406-422; and Mary Carolyn Ellis and Joanne V. Hawks, ―Creating a Different Pattern: Florida‘s Women Legislators, 1928-1986,‖ Florida Historical Quarterly 66 (1987): 68-83.

126 G.O.P. candidate Bert Leigh Acker, of Miami, challenged U.S. Representative Pat Cannon for his Fourth District seat, and Republican Emory Ackerman, of Orlando, sought U.S. Representative Joe Hendricks‘s Fifth District seat. Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 1 November 1942; Florida Times-Union, 3 November 1942.

127 Florida voters considered ratification of the following proposed amendments: 1.) a gas tax amendment creating a fifty year plan to pay off county and district highway bonds and construct roads without using ad valorem taxes; 2.) a quick amendment plan providing for amendments to the state constitution to be recommended by regular or special legislative sessions and face ratification in regular or special elections; 3.) a provision for direct election of circuit (who were nominated by the people and appointed by the governor); 4.) creation of a constitutional agency to regulate seasons and limits for freshwater fish and game, and depriving the legislature of the power to approve local or special fish and game laws; 5.) making the State Conservation Commission a constitutional agency with authority to regulate salt water fishing seasons; 6.) a tax exemption on property used or owned to one-fourth extent by fraternal, religious, educational, or charitable organizations; 7.) allowing the garnishment up to 25 per cent of the income of a married man not subject to garnishment under existing laws; 8.) providing four year terms and freezing districts for Dade county commissioners; 9.) creating two new state senate districts, one in Broward county and another for Gulf and Calhoun counties, to expand membership from thirty-eight to forty. Florida Times-Union, 3 November 1942. 159 provision for streamlining the constitutional amendment process, and the creation of a state freshwater fish and game commission. The governor traveled the state making appearances to generate interest in the election and build support for the gas tax amendment, which he referred to as a top priority of his administration and ―absolutely necessary to lift the debt burden from our people and put our counties on a solid financial condition.‖128 Regarding participation in the balloting, Holland told the audience of a statewide radio address,

If you fail to vote, you have failed to support your democratic way of life. You should solemnly determine what you think to be good and support it, and likewise, whatever you feel to be wrong, you should vote against. This you can only do by going to the polls and voting.129

The Holland administration, and many of its supporters, mounted a strong campaign on behalf of the proposed gas tax amendment because it represented the final component of the governor‘s fiscal reform program from the 1941 legislative session. While the gas tax amendment benefited from strong support, the nine proposed amendments faced little organized opposition. All sixty-seven county commissions, twenty-two of the state‘s newspapers, and several state organizations joined the governor in calling for ratification of the gas tax amendment. The proposal to streamline the amendment process spawned rumors that Holland wanted to amend the constitution to allow for his reelection to consecutive terms.130 Opposition to the creation of additional senate districts appeared to be concentrated in Miami, Fort Myers, St. Petersburg, and Tampa.131 After the casting and counting of ballots, it became evident that about one-tenth of Florida‘s approximately 650,000 registered voters had ratified six of the nine proposed amendments. Some newspaper accounts blamed the low turnout on widespread voter apathy. Those who did participate rejected the proposed amendments creating two new senate districts, authorizing garnishment of a married man‘s wages, and liberalizing property tax exemptions.

128 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 3 November 1942.

129 Florida Times-Union, 3 November 1942.

130 Governor Holland replied that the proposed amendment was intended to meet wartime emergencies or respond to future changes in the U. S. Constitution. Removal of the constitutional ban on consecutive succession would have required approval of an amendment by the legislature, in regular or special session, and a special election prior to the 1944 elections. Florida Times-Union, 3 November 1942.

131 Tallahassee Daily-Democrat, 5 November 1942.

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The Holland administration‘s gas tax amendment passed easily by a six to one margin. The governor, upon returning from a one-day hunting trip in Georgia, welcomed the news and said ratification ―indicates that the people regarded it as vital from the standpoint of their own welfare. It is gratifying to see such harmony and unity on this matter.‖132 Post-election analyses gave full credit to the governor for building support for the popular gas tax amendment. Cecil R. Warren, writing in the Miami News, reported the pervasive feeling that,

Governor Holland is ‗more responsible than anyone‘ for the overwhelming vote … given the 50-year plan for pooling gasoline tax revenues to amortize Florida‘s numerous road and bridge debts ….133

Allen Morris voiced a similar opinion,

By sheer force of personal popularity, since the subject was mighty cold meat for the man-in-the-street, the governor put across the gas tax amendment by an overwhelming majority.

Furthermore, Morris argued the strength of the pro-amendment vote demonstrated the public‘s overwhelming confidence in their governor and indicated Holland would avoid the loss of influence most Florida chief executives suffered in their second legislative sessions.134 The Tallahassee Daily Democrat joined the chorus praising Holland for passage of the gas tax amendment, proclaiming,

To the governor goes most of the credit for the magnificent vote in support of the gas tax amendment because his explanation of the issue, beginning back at the last legislative session, attracted the aid of newspapers and officials.135

Even though he was not actually on the ballot, the 1942 general election brought Governor Holland an important political victory in terms of his program and his sustained influence among the state‘s voters.

132 Miami News, 4 November 1942; St. Petersburg Times, 5 November 1942.

133 Miami News, 29 November 1942.

134 ―Florida Politics‖ in Miami Herald, 8 November 1942.

135 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 10 November 1942.

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While Florida voters seemed content with their congressional representatives, voters in other regions were not so complacent. At the national level, the 1942 Congressional election demonstrated a movement away from the New Deal. Outside of the South, Republicans gained forty-six seats in the House and nine in the Senate. George Brown Tindall attributed this swing to ―the gathering storm of wartime discontent – with Negro demands, price controls, labor shortages, rationing, and a hundred other petty vexations….‖ As a result of this electoral upheaval, within Congress and the party found their strength and influence strengthened.136 As if German U-boats, rationing, and fiscal constraints were not enough, yet another grave threat emerged during the first year of the war – a wave of venereal disease infections swept the state. The South in general, and Florida in particular, had for many years a higher venereal disease infection rate than the rest of the nation.137 Even before America entered World War II, Florida residents suffered from social diseases in disproportionately high numbers. In order to effectively treat individuals infected with venereal diseases, the State Board of Health established Venereal Disease Isolation Hospitals in the county jails of Monroe, DeSoto, Hillsborough, Palm Beach, Duval, and Dade counties in early 1941.138 The campaign to reduce Florida‘s venereal disease infection rate – the nation‘s highest – would require the combined efforts and cooperation of federal, state, and local agencies during 1942 and beyond. In addition to undermining the health of Florida‘s citizens, venereal disease threatened the overall war effort by reducing military effectiveness and the productivity of war workers. Army service examinations found one-hundred-seventy syphilis infections for every one thousand Florida men examined. Florida‘s infection rate exceeded that of all other states and far outstripped the national average of 45.2 infections per one thousand tested.139 Furthermore, the State Planning Board, in an April 1942 letter to Governor Holland, reported an overall syphilis

136 George Brown Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 722.

137 Francis Butler Simkins, A History of the South (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), 391.

138 Florida State Board of Health, ―Minutes of the State Board of Health‖ 15 January 1941, Record Group 894, Series 272, microfilm reel 3, FSA, Tallahassee, Florida.

139 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 12 March 1942.

162 infection rate of one out of every six selectees and volunteers from Florida.140 The potential damage to the war effort from venereal disease prompted U.S. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to write Governor Holland,

I hardly need remind you that among these healthy young men of our army, venereal disease produces more disability than any other single cause, and that among industrial workers it is one of the most serious causes of disability and inefficiency, especially in the boom towns of war industry…. Specifically, I request you to assume responsibility for stimulating adequate state and local law enforcement not only in cities but in rural areas …. This means closing segregated districts and ending the farce of periodic examinations of prostitutes, as well as intelligent police follow-up that keeps out the profiteers on vice.141

Alarmed at the venereal disease rate in Florida, federal officials wanted action. Assuming that prostitution was at the root of the state‘s venereal disease problem, federal, state, and local authorities targeted practitioners of the sex trade. The Holland administration responded by coordinating a federal, state, and local program to suppress prostitution and venereal disease in the state. The difficult task of reducing the state‘s venereal disease infection rate required the cooperation of local, state, and federal governments. To promote their effort to control prostitution and the spread of venereal disease, the Federal Bureau of Investigation held a series of regional meetings to present an enforcement program to advisory groups consisting of county sheriffs, prosecuting officials, and judges.142 One of the primary themes of these conferences was the means of apprehension and incarceration given the fact that prostitution was not a direct violation of Florida law.143 A newspaper account of a regional meeting reported,

140 The report separated the rates by race and found an infection rate of one of every twenty-one whites and two of every five African Americans. Additionally, the document lists fifty-one Florida cities in order of infection rate per one thousand. Charley Helfenstein to Governor Holland, 7 April 1942, in FF 2 ―Health VD,‖ Box 52, Holland Papers, FSA, Tallahassee, Florida.

141 Stimson to Holland, 25 March 1942, in FF 2 ―Health VD,‖ Box 52, Holland Papers, FSA, Tallahassee, Florida.

142 Governor Holland to J. H. Hunter, 11 July 1942, in FF 2 ―Health VD,‖ Box 52, Holland Papers, FSA, Tallahassee, Florida.

143 The 1943 legislature passed a series of vice reform laws, including a prohibition on prostitution. Sarasota Herald Tribune, 2 May 1943.

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Tom Sebring, nominee for supreme court justice, addressing the afternoon session, explained that Florida had no statutory provisions making prostitution a crime and added that the only effective way local law enforcement officers could take legal action is through charging vagrancy and vagabondage. He said that the nearest thing to a statutory provision for prostitution was in the health statutes making confinement and isolation mandatory in cased of infectious diseases.

R. G. Danner, FBI special agent assigned to Miami, also addressed the conference, calling prostitution ―as vicious a form of sabotage as the destruction of vital military and defense industrial operations.‖ Furthermore, Danner warned that if local law enforcement efforts proved ineffective in combating prostitution, the federal government would take over under provisions of the May Act, a federal law making vice activities near military installations a federal offense.144 Faced with the threat of federal intervention, state and local officials embarked on an aggressive campaign to suppress prostitution and curb venereal disease across Florida. Shortly after implementing the program to eradicate prostitution in the state, officials encountered deficiencies in resources and facilities. The increase in the number of prostitution arrests and detentions for treatment of venereal disease quickly led to overcrowding at some city and county facilities. While some counties managed to provide food and treatment for the large numbers arrested, other communities lacked the resources to do this.145 The growing population of jailed women held as prostitutes not only strained community resources but they also prevented additional detentions. Speaking to the Orlando City Council, Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert Osincup, senior surgeon of the U.S. Public Health Service in Florida, said that more than seven hundred diseased prostitutes were detained in Florida jails ―and we could pick up thousands more if we only had the places to put them.‖ However, Dr. Osincup reported federal and state officials were pursuing implementation of a plan to convert abandoned Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) camps in the state to treatment and rehabilitation hospitals.146

144 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 21 July 1942. The May Act made prostitution in the vicinity of military facilities a federal crime punishable by fine and or imprisonment. Jane Mersky Leder, Thanks for the Memories: Love, Sex, and World War II (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2006), 33; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 5 June 1942.

145 Ralph Davis memorandum to Dr. Ed Annis, 27 October 1942, in FF 2 ―Health VD,‖ Box 52, Holland Papers, FSA, Tallahassee, Florida.

146 Florida Times-Union, 19 September 1942.

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Their efforts to resolve the prostitution problem stymied by overcrowded detention facilities, Florida officials turned to the federal government for help. Following a brief visit to Florida, Eliot Ness, Director of Social Protection in the federal Office for Emergency Management, informed Dr. Osincup of the necessity of a survey to determine the CCC camps most suited for use as treatment and rehabilitation hospitals. Ness briefly described the steps for approval of the facilities,

The U.S. Public Health Service has indicated a willingness to operate as many as four camps in Florida from the medical standpoint…. It is … necessary for two offices besides our own to pass upon these matters before they are concluded. These are: The Federal Works Agency, which will pass upon application for … maintenance and operation funds and the Army with reference to particular assignment of certain camps. The President of the United States must approve the application…. I believe Florida can look forward to seeing the operation of several CCC camps before very long, assuming that these other agencies besides our own see with us on this matter. We anticipate that they will.147

In the meantime, venereal disease eradication efforts continued. As the weeks and months passed, it became obvious that Ness‘s prediction that the camps would be operational ―before very long‖ was too optimistic. The pace of the official approval process by federal officials for the camps moved more slowly than state and local officials expected. To further complicate and delay the matter, Sarasota residents and the State Board of Forestry and Parks objected to establishing a hospital at a former CCC camp located at .148 The frustration of state officials was evident in a letter from Governor Holland to state Representative Newman Brackin, of Crestview, advising,

I suggest that you get Bob Sikes to raise some hell with R. W. Rigsby, Principal Budget Examiner, Bureau of the Budget. The lamentable fact is that with 800 or 900 women in jail, this whole campaign has been held up by the inavility [sic] or the unwillingness of somebody in Washington to make these CCC camps available. As soon as they are made available and functioning, the local

147 Eliot Ness to G. C. Ossincup [sic], 14 July 1942, in FF 2 ―Health VD,‖ Box 52, Holland Papers, FSA, Tallahassee, Florida.

148 Ralph Davis memorandum to Dr. Ed Annis, 27 October 1942, in FF 2 ―Health VD,‖ Box 52, Holland Papers, FSA, Tallahassee, Florida.

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authorities will have their jail capacity again available to go aggressively after their local problems.149

Despite the delay in establishing the camps, state, military, and local officials persevered in their program to reduce the venereal disease infection rate in Florida. These efforts yielded a decline in infections among service personnel.150 State and local officials continued to pursue the apprehension and treatment of women believed to be prostitutes while they waited for the resolution of the Myakka River State Park camp controversy and final clearance for the use of CCC camps from Washington, D.C. The federal government eventually approved facilities to aid in the fight against prostitution and venereal disease in Florida. Two camps, designated as Florida State Board of Health Hospitals, finally opened in early March 1943. Hospital Number One was located at Wakulla in north Florida, and Hospital Number Two at Mill Dam Lake in the near Ocala, in central Florida. The state received $396,157 in funding from the Federal Works Agency for hospital maintenance and operation. The State Board of Health operated the facilities in cooperation with the U.S. Public Health Service. Florida did not contribute to the funding of the hospitals.151 The first two hospitals provided both treatment and rehabilitation for up to 200 white females at each location. Florida State Board of Health Hospital Number One, located about fourteen miles south of Tallahassee, featured four renovated CCC camp barracks, a garden, and outdoor recreation facilities. Patients underwent treatment programs of ten weeks or longer depending upon the infection. While taking treatment, the women performed compensated work, including ―serving, cleaning, working around the hospital, servicing the grounds,‖ and ―working in their large Victory garden.‖ Additionally, patients received ―vocational training, including defense plant courses, home nursing, first aid and sewing.‖ Hospital authorities

149 Governor Holland to Honorable Newman Brackin, 23 September 1942, in FF 2 ―Health VD,‖ Box 52, Holland Papers, FSA, Tallahassee, Florida.

150 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 28 February 1943.

151 St. Petersburg Times, 28 February 1943. Florida Division of Health documents also refer to the hospitals as Rapid Treatment Centers (RTC). Additional RTC facilities opened in Jacksonville, in late 1943, and Pensacola, in 1944. Florida Division of Health, ―Venereal Disease History,‖ Record Group 810, Series 899, File Folder 101 ―Venereal Disease – Control,‖ FSA, Tallahassee, Florida.

166 emphasized that their job was ―not to deal with a moral or criminal problem. Their task‖ was ―to cure the sick, and get them back into the war effort as useful citizens, if possible….‖152 A newspaper report on the Wakulla hospital furnished a snapshot of the inmates sharply at odds with the stereotypical image of the professional prostitute. A representative sample of eight-five patients at the Wakulla facility included forty-nine girls under the age of twenty. Seventeen women in this sample said they were married, six were widowed, and thirty-eight reported they were separated or divorced from their husbands. Pensacola led all other places of origin for patients at this hospital. The newspaper account attributed the high proportion of younger women among the hospital‘s patients to an increase in juvenile delinquency ―brought on by the dislocations of war.‖153 Along with the military installations and defense industry, World War II brought an increased venereal disease infection rate to Florida. Several interrelated factors accounted for this problem. Despite some improvement during the New Deal, states in the Southeast ―spent the least on health care.‖ Additionally, the region fell below the national average in the number of physicians per capita and the ratio of hospital beds to population.154 The resulting scarcity of public health resources resulted in increased vulnerability to health problems and an inadequate capacity to respond to those crises when they occurred. In January 1942, national health experts, speaking before the Florida State-Wide Public Health Association‘s conference, noted many deficiencies in the state‘s health services. John A. Farrell, an associate director of the Rockefeller Foundation, warned that Florida‘s venereal disease problems could not be eliminated ―with only a thin veneer‖ of public health service. Farrell attributed the state‘s high venereal disease infection rate to meager funding and insufficient numbers of public health workers.155 To compound the state‘s health care deficiencies, the migration of civilian war workers and military personnel often brought an increase in the incidence of commercial prostitution and

152 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 23 May 1943.

153 Of the forty-nine patients under twenty-one were four aged fifteen, twelve aged sixteen years, seven aged seventeen, seven were eighteen years, eleven aged nineteen, and eight were twenty years. Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 23 May 1943.

154 Tindall, 489.

155 Florida Times-Union, 18 January 1942.

167 venereal disease.156 Additionally, social dislocation caused by the war has been blamed for increased levels of promiscuity and incidence of social disease among young girls and women.157 The war brought an influx of workers and service personnel liberated from the restraining ties of home together with young girls and women willing to provide comfort and consolation. Florida‘s latent venereal disease problem grew to crisis proportions under these wartime circumstances. State health services were inadequate to meet this challenge, forcing the federal government to intervene to reduce venereal disease infection rates. The war brought many new things to Florida – the U-boat danger, an escalation of rationing, a greater military presence, economic reorientation, changes in the body politic, as well as new demands on law enforcement and health services. Nearly all of these innovations also entailed a higher level of federal government intervention in the state‘s affairs. Activist, positive governance had characterized the Roosevelt administration from its earliest days in the depths of the Depression. However, as the national priority changed to defense, the emphasis of the federal government shifted from economic stabilization to maximization of productivity to win the war. Expansion of productive capacity required federal government intercession to reallocate resources and eliminate impediments to the war effort.158 This resulted in new demands by the federal government on the government of Florida. Many of these new requirements conflicted with the economic interests, governmental resources, and political traditions of the state. Typical of southern states, Florida espoused a political philosophy encompassing ―business progressivism‖159 and states‘ rights. Florida‘s leaders sometimes found themselves caught between the necessity of advocating for the interests of their constituents and facilitating the nation‘s struggle to defeat fascist tyranny. Due to the severity of the military threat, in nearly every contest between the demands of the nation and the desires of the state, the national interest prevailed. Despite lamentations at the

156 Kenneth D. Rose, Myth and the Greatest Generation: A Social History of Americans in World War II (New York: Routledge, 2008), 89.

157 Lingeman, 88.

158 Kennedy, Delivered From Evil, 623.

159 In post 1920s Southern politics, the term progressive came to mean ―efficiency and development rather than reform.‖ Business progressivism was characterized by good government, the promotion of industry, business development, and enhanced schools. Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945, 223.

168 state level over the impact on Florida‘s tourism industry and tax base, the federal government imposed gas rationing, rubber conservation measures, and restrictions on train travel. When the high incidence of venereal disease infections in Florida threatened the war effort, federal officials supervised a new program aimed at more effective suppression of vice and treatment of disease. During the first year of the war, Florida found its short-term interests subordinated to the larger needs of the nation. Through coordinated effort and innovative thinking, Florida‘s leaders sought accommodations from the federal government and capitalized on opportunities presented by the war. Florida‘s U.S. Senators Andrews and Pepper, as well as Representatives Green, Sikes, and Hendricks, seized the opportunity created by the U-boat offensive and resulting fuel shortage to reanimate at least partially the dormant cross-state canal project. When restrictions on automobile and train travel appeared to imperil the economic viability of Florida‘s resort areas, Governor Holland and members of the state‘s congressional delegation appealed for additional railroad resources to allow the aged and infirm to winter in the state and thereby conserve fuel oil and relieve housing shortages in the North. The crowning achievement was the conversion of underutilized Florida tourism facilities into military training bases. The blessings of hotel conversion were many. In addition to speeding the training process for the military, the program brought much needed income to Florida resort communities and foreshadowed the coming of the postwar year round economic cycle. Throughout the first year of the war, Florida‘s political leaders worked to reconcile the needs of the state with the larger demands of a nation at war.

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CHAPTER FIVE

“WE MEET AT THE TIME OF THE GRAVEST CRISIS IN OUR NATION”:

GOVERNOR HOLLAND AND THE 1943 LEGISLATURE

Despite serious reductions in revenues caused by the war, Florida‘s state government began 1943 on stable financial footing due to previously enacted fiscal reforms, the implementation of strict economy measures, vigorous collection of current and delinquent taxes, and the willingness of some large taxpayers to make early payments. Speaking in Tallahassee on 2 January, Governor Spessard Holland reviewed state finances and looked to the coming legislative session. The first year of war exacted a heavy toll on state revenues. Gasoline tax proceeds to the general revenue and school funds for the initial eleven months of 1942 decreased by $921,000 each compared with 1941. Similarly, revenues of the State Road Department and bond retirement fund fell by $5,526,000 each. Income from documentary stamp taxes fell from $822,000 in 1941 to $578,000 in 1942. Preliminary reports on the current winter horseracing season indicated a decline of approximately thirty per cent in state taxed pari-mutuel wagering. Nonetheless, the state still enjoyed adequate revenues, winter tax receipts partially replenished state funds, and Governor Holland said, ―I see no reason why we can‘t come to the legislature with bills paid and without any critical problem requiring hasty action.‖1 The state‘s relatively healthy financial condition resulted from fiscal reforms enacted by the previous legislature, efforts by cabinet agencies, and the assistance of taxpayers. Income from increased automobile tag fees, a handling charge on special funds collected by the state, and the sale of tax delinquent properties under the Murphy Act help partially offset revenues lost due to rationing and other war-related conditions. Additionally, the overall fiscal situation of county governments improved because of property tax reforms enacted in 1941. The state‘s ability to maintain operations without a deficit resulted from the implementation of economy measures by the cabinet agencies and other departments. Moreover, Comptroller Jim Lee and

1 Florida Times-Union, 3 January 1943; Sarasota Herald Tribune, 3 January 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 3 January 1943.

170 his staff employed ―progressive efforts‖ to collect current and delinquent taxes.2 Furthermore, several state utility companies voluntarily made advance payments totaling $250,000 ahead of the February utility tax due date.3 The combination of these factors helped the state to have a cash balance at the close of the 1942 calendar year. Within days of Governor Holland‘s report on the state‘s financial situation, the federal government imposed additional restrictions on gas and fuel oil consumption. Blaming diminishing gasoline and fuel oil supplies in the East, the Office of Price Administration (OPA) ordered the cessation of pleasure driving and a reduction to forty-five per cent of normal fuel oil use in non-residential establishments in seventeen Atlantic seaboard states. The edict applied to all of Florida east of the Apalachicola River. Specifically, the ban on ―driving for fun‖ prohibited motoring to places of amusement or for ―social purposes.‖4 While Americans were not yet as dependent upon the automobile as they would become in the postwar era, this most recent OPA directive had extensive social and economic ramifications. A day after the announcement of the ban on pleasure driving, OPA officials issued a follow-up statement detailing prohibited behavior and provisions for enforcement. A summary of the regulations announced,

No basic [gasoline] ration may be used for pleasure driving which shall include (but shall not be limited to) driving for the purpose of attending places of amusement, recreation or entertainment (such as theatres, amusement parks, concerts, dances, golf courses, skating rinks, bowling alleys or night clubs) or sporting or athletic events (such as races or games) or for sight seeing, touring, or vacation travel, or for making social calls, except that naval or military personnel on leave or furlough may use such a ration for the purpose of visiting relatives or making social calls.

2 The comptroller‘s ―progressive efforts‖ included the employment, with Governor Holland‘s approval, of a private Miami-based law firm – Casey, Walton, and Spain – to assist in the collection of delinquent intangibles taxes on a fee basis. This special collection campaign aroused much resentment among its targets and their elected representatives at the local and state levels. Critics of the aggressive collection campaign claimed it drove wealthy residents from the state. Governor Holland defended the campaign as necessary because of widespread abuses of the intangibles tax system. Florida Times-Union, 3, 30 January 1943; Sarasota Herald Tribune, 3 January 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 3, 29 January 1943.

3Companies making advance payments included Florida Power and Light, Florida Power Corporation, Florida Public Service Company, and Tampa Electric Company. Florida Times-Union, 3 January 1943; Sarasota Herald Tribune, 3 January 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 3 January 1943.

4 Evening Independent (St. Petersburg), 7 January 1943; Sarasota Herald Tribune, 7 January 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 7 January 1943.

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Approved uses of a motor vehicle included necessary shopping, obtaining medical care, going to religious services, attending professional meetings, travel to aid the war effort, or responding to an emergency. State and local law enforcement officers assisted OPA inspectors in monitoring the presence of passenger automobiles at places of amusement, entertainment, and recreation. Enforcement officials reported suspected violators to local rationing boards or to OPA offices for action. OPA inspectors had the authority to impound ration books in the case of flagrant violations.5 The impact of the non-essential driving ban reverberated throughout the state and nation. The federal prohibition on driving for pleasure wrought swift and drastic changes upon the winter recreation scene in Florida. The driving ban caused one of the state‘s most visible winter sporting activities – horseracing – to eliminate its winter season. Because of the new gasoline restrictions, both of Florida‘s horse tracks immediately suspended operations. Tropical Park, fifteen days into its season, halted all racing. Hialeah Park, scheduled to open for a forty- six day session on 13 January, canceled its season due to the driving ban. The cessation of racing stranded approximately fifteen hundred thoroughbred horses in Miami, and threatened the livelihoods of stable hands, exercise boys, and others employed at the tracks during the racing season.6 Suspension of thoroughbred racing came on top of the earlier elimination of professional baseball spring training in Florida. Major league owners decided to move their teams‘ spring training camps closer to home in response to a suggestion from Office of Defense Transportation (ODT) Director James B. Eastman for a reduction in baseball travel. This resulted in the cancellation of baseball‘s Florida-based spring training circuit, known as the Grapefruit League. Among the teams forsaking Florida training sites were the World Champion St. Louis Cardinals (St. Petersburg), New York Yankees (St. Petersburg), Brooklyn Dodgers (West Palm Beach), New York Giants (Miami), Cleveland Indians (Clearwater), and Cincinnati Reds (Tampa).7

5 Palm Beach Daily News, 8 January 1943.

6 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 7 January 1943. Dog racing tracks in Miami, Hollywood, St. Petersburg, and Orlando closed following the OPA pleasure driving ban. However, those tracks accessible by public transportation – Miami Beach, Tampa, West Palm Beach, Jacksonville, and the West Flagler track in Miami – continued to operate. Pittsburgh Press, 10 January 1943; (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 22 January 1943.

7 The St. Louis Browns, Chicago White Sox, Chicago Cubs, and Pittsburgh Pirates similarly abandoned plans to hold spring training camps in California. (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent,, 23 December 1942. 172

These and other major league teams sought spring training facilities nearer to their home cities.8 The cancellation of thoroughbred racing and baseball‘s spring training led sportswriter John B. McDermott to lament that Florida had gone from ―the winter sports capital of pre-war years‖ to ―virtually a ‗ghost‘ kingdom‖ because of the ban on non-essential driving.9 The cancellation of the horseracing season cut off a wellspring of revenues that had generated $3,472,521 the previous year, and forced state officials to consider replacing those revenues or reducing services. A special five per cent tax on horserace betting, enacted following the 1941 legislature, generated $1,900,000 for old age pensions. These funds supplemented $3,400,000 in pension funds produced through liquor taxes. A separate tax on horse and dog racing produced a pool of funds from which each county received an equal share of $31,793. This racing tax payment represented the major source of funds for many smaller counties. Additionally, officials expected the pleasure driving ban would depress the sales of automobile license tags, thereby reducing the major contributor to the state‘s $13,000,000 annual school fund. The OPA pleasure-driving ban eliminated vital revenues needed for old age pensions, school teacher salaries, and county government.10 For state officials, the pleasure-driving ban emphatically underscored the uncertainty of Florida‘s financial situation. Government leaders cautioned the public about the necessity of economy and the potential for painful revenue measures. Governor Holland, speaking as chair of the State Budget Commission, said all appropriation requests approved by that body for submission to the 1943 legislature must be kept to the minimum because of ―the indefinite and somewhat stormy future‖ in state finances. Holland elaborated on that theme, declaring,

We must draw these budgets on a belt-tightening basis. I think the Legislature very properly will be economy minded, and the recommendations we make should be based on actual operating experiences during this year.

The governor suggested limiting budgets to the amounts expended in operations during the current year, a move that would yield substantial savings because most departments had already cut expenses five to fifteen per cent due to declining revenues. The other commission members,

8 Sarasota Herald Tribune, 7 January 1943.

9 St. Petersburg Times, 10 January 1943; Pittsburgh Press, 10 January 1943.

10 Florida Times Union, 13 January 1943; Palm Beach Post, 13 January 1943.

173 consisting of the cabinet officers, agreed with Holland‘s general outline while also recommending provisions for emergency salary and wage increases that might become necessary during the coming biennium.11 Wartime measures made appropriations, economy, and revenues prevalent themes in advance of the coming legislative session. The uncertainty surrounding state finances led Senator Collins, of Tallahassee, to warn the public about potential tax problems. Noting the affect of wartime regulations on state revenues, Collins conceded the state legislature,

can have no control over whether restrictions will be continued, modified or released. Such may well depend upon how effectively a bomb sight is working in Africa, a strike in Detroit, or the elusive whims and fancies of a bureaucrat in Washington. I am confident that the Legislature will not impose new taxes unless the revenue is essential for the public good. At the same time, the public should steel itself for what may be inevitable when we face the conditions which will exist next May.

Collins referred to conditions existing in May because he assumed the legislature would spend the initial weeks of the session dealing with appropriations and not be ready to act on revenues until then. The Tallahassee senator outlined priorities of the coming session as he saw them,

The Legislature‘s first job will be to find out how much revenue the state must have to insure a minimum adequate program of operations. We know now of many reductions which can be made in appropriations and expenditures, programs which under present conditions can be considered non-essential. We must diligently seek others. When we have discovered the amount of the [biennial general appropriations] bill, we must then provide the revenue to meet it. All present sources of revenue should be carefully appraised, not only on what they must be expected to produce but also as to fairness to taxpayers and economy of collection. Then a tax plan should be evolved either wholly within the old framework, or with new or substituted features which will be reasonable, fair and just.

The remarks from Collins, at thirty-four years old the senate‘s youngest member despite being a veteran of four legislative sessions, were especially significant because he chaired the Senate Finance and Taxation Committee.12 Additionally, since he was considered a political ally and

11 Florida Times-Union, 12 January 1943.

12 Collins served in three house sessions and one senate session prior to 1943. Florida Times-Union, 24 January 1943; Tallahassee Democrat, 24 January 1943.

174 friend of Governor Holland, Collins‘s remarks might have foreshadowed the chief executive‘s own program for the coming session. As the scheduled start of the legislative session approached, state officials, legislators, interested organizations, and pundits put forth their own thoughts about the state‘s fiscal problems. Given the choice, many legislators probably would have avoided the politically perilous question of replacing the revenues lost to the pleasure-driving ban. However, the continuation of both public welfare program funding and revenue sharing with the counties ranked high in importance to their constituencies and were therefore critical to the reelection hopes of many in the legislature.13 Members of the house and senate made a wide-range of recommendations, including the diversion of funds from the large surpluses accrued by the State Road Department and the state unemployment tax fund.14 Representative L. C. Leedy, of Orlando, a Holland ally and chairman-designate of the House Finance and Taxation Committee, called for consideration of a temporary cigarette tax or even a short-term sales tax in the event of an emergency.15 Other revenue sources mentioned included a tax on soft drinks, the legalization of gambling, and the extension of the dog-racing season.16 A broad outline of Governor Holland‘s plans for strengthening state revenues slowly emerged in addresses and statements made in advance of the session. The main points of Holland‘s program included the necessity of replacing the $3.5 million in revenues lost due to the suspension of horseracing, limiting the ceilings on school district and intangibles taxes through constitutional amendments, the reinvestment of State Road Department surplus funds, and aggressive collection of delinquent taxes. Holland came out against the diversion of surplus funds, arguing that postwar road construction could provide employment for returning soldiers during the adjustment to postwar conditions. Similarly, he opposed diversion of revenues from the unemployment compensation fund, because those funds would be needed by demobilized

13 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 17 March 1943.

14 The Road Department surplus resulted from suspension of non-defense related road construction because of the diversion of materials to defense needs and a shortage of manpower. The state unemployment compensation fund developed a large surplus because of high employment due to defense building and other activities. Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 22 January, 17 March 1943.

15 Florida Times-Union, 31 January 1943.

16 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 24 March 1943.

175 military personnel after the war.17 A Fort Myers News-Press editorial predicted that, unlike most of his predecessors as Florida chief executive who suffered from diminished clout during their second biennial legislature, Holland‘s political influence remained very strong and his program stood an excellent chance of success.18 The Florida Tax Inquiry Council (TIC), the unofficial volunteer organization responsible for the Brookings Institution Report on state financial conditions that vitally influenced Governor Holland‘s financial reform program in the 1941 session, issued a report containing its own recommendations for addressing the state‘s fiscal problems. The Council‘s program included a call for economy in government, continued state supervision of county commission and county school board budgets, and funding of the Florida Economic Advancement Council (a state funded Washington, D.C.-based lobbying office). The TIC agreed with the governor on reinvestment of road department surpluses and a constitutional limit on intangibles tax millages. The Council and Governor Holland parted ways on limiting county and district school tax millages, the TIC favoring a statutory limit over a constitutional limit. Despite this difference, the governor endorsed most of the TIC report and the two appeared to continue their harmonious partnership on behalf of fiscal reforms.19 On the eve of the state‘s twenty-ninth legislative session, lawmakers found Tallahassee a changed city. Previously a quiet Southern town moving at its own slow pace, Florida‘s capital now brimmed and bustled with unaccustomed activity. Changes in pace and population resulted primarily from the area‘s two new military installations – Dale Mabry Field in Tallahassee and Camp Carrabelle approximately fifty miles south of the city. On weekends and holidays, military personnel crowded the city, ―overtaxing the facilities of restaurants, laundries, lodging establishments,‖ and ―stores.‖20 City residents expected the coming session to exacerbate the existing housing shortage. An editorial in the Tallahassee Daily Democrat predicted, ―the influx of legislators and their officers and essential attaches will place a strain upon the housing

17 Florida Times-Union, 17 January 1943; St. Petersburg Times, 24 March 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 11 March 1943.

18 Editorial reprinted in Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 17 March 1943.

19 St. Petersburg Times, 25 March 1943.

20 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 1 January 1943.

176 facilities of a community staggering under the burden of providing for those already here.‖ At the same time, the source anticipated high wartime employment, gas and tire rationing, the thirty-five mile-an-hour speed limit, and general travel uncertainties would combine to reduce the usual number of lobbyists and job-seekers attending the session.21 Due to the crowded conditions at Tallahassee hotels, the majority of legislators found accommodations in private homes. Others lodged in the few available hotel rooms, auto courts, or with local friends. Many lawmakers found shelter due to the efforts of a special committee of the Tallahassee Chamber of Commerce established to aid legislators, their wives and families, attaches, and newspapermen in finding accommodations. A chamber hospitality committee, recognizing that many South Florida lawmakers could not make their accustomed weekend trips to their homes, worked to ensure suitable entertainment and recreation for those attending the session. Crowding of area recreational facilities and food rationing complicated this task.22 Those attending the session were never far from the war‘s influence. When the gavel dropped to start the 1943 legislature, it marked the first time state lawmakers had opened a session during wartime since adoption of the 1885 state constitution.23 At least one observer present at the opening of the session had a unique perspective on the operation of the Florida legislature. Eighty-two year old Willis Ball, editor of the Florida Times- Union, was a seasoned observer of the lawmaking process. Ball had reported the constitutional convention of 1885 and every session since, with the exception of 1887 when he was unable to attend. The veteran newsman observed, ―Every legislature is different – different people, different problems.‖ Ball agreed with the consensus that this session‘s biggest problem would be finding revenues. Ball predicted,

There is no chance of an income tax. There is strong opposition to a general sales tax – the Florida cracker doesn‘t want any tax on his bacon and grits.

21 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 26 January 1943.

22 Even with overcrowding, rationing, and other war-related changes, the legislative session retained an intimate, personal character as evidenced by a newspaper feature titled ―‗Who‘s Who‘ Lists Legislature‖ providing the Tallahassee addresses and phone numbers for most members of the house and senate. Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 4 April 1943.

23 The 1917 legislature convened on April 3, three days prior to American entry into the First World War. The war ended in 1918 before the next session. The Spanish American War began and concluded in 1898; the biennial legislature met only during odd years. Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 2 April 1943.

177

Comparing the climate surrounding the 1917 legislature with the current atmosphere, the editor observed that this war had affected the current legislature more due to resignations for military service.24 In 1917, ―there was very little difference because that war was a minor one compared to this one.‖ When asked about the election of women to the legislature, Ball described Rep. Mary Lou Baker, of Pinellas, as ―brilliant,‖ and voiced the opinion that women in the legislature would bring ―a good effect on the sessions – it might stop so much drinking.‖25 As the session opened it remained to be seen how this wartime legislature would manage the state‘s problems. Representatives, senators, newspapermen, and guests gathered in the State Capitol at noon on Tuesday, 6 April, for the opening of session. Flower banked desks formed a colorful backdrop as President Philip D. Beall of the senate and Speaker Richard H. Simpson of the house gaveled their respective chambers to order. Spectators, including many in military uniforms, filled the galleries to witness the ceremonies. Both chambers turned their attentions to completing organizational chores while they waited for Governor Holland‘s message to a joint session of the house and senate at 3 p.m.26 Governor Holland‘s biennial message to the legislature was both a report on the condition of the state and an outline of his recommendations for the legislative session. In case any member of his audience at this festive occasion had forgotten their serious purpose, Holland reminded them,

We meet at the time of the gravest crisis in the life of our nation. We are engaged in a war which is challenging our deepest patriotic convictions, and demanding the most effective and sacrificial service we can render, as individual citizens and as a member of the family of states.27

When the governor began to explain his legislative program, he gave first priority to his defense related requests. Referring to a ruling by Attorney General J. Tom Watson that the federal

24 Fifty-four of ninety-six house members from 1941 did not return for the 1943 session, the senate had fourteen new members out of a total contingent of thirty-six. Florida Times-Union, 6 April 1943.

25 According to his obituary, Willis Manville Ball was born in Tallahassee on 25 August 1859 and attended West Florida Seminary. Ball began his newspaper career in 1878 and worked at papers in Tallahassee and Pensacola before moving to the Times-Union in 1902. Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 4 April 1943; (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 12 September 1947.

26 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 6 April 1943; Florida Times-Union, 7 April 1943.

27 Florida, House of Representatives, Journal of the House of Representatives, Twenty-Ninth Regular Session, April 6th through June 4th, 1943 (Tallahassee: n.p., 1943), 14.

178 government was liable for payment of state gasoline taxes, Holland suggested, ―To help the war effort, and maintain Florida business, there should be no state gallonage taxes on federal gasoline purchases in lots of [five thousand] gallons or more.‖ Federal gas purchases from retail vendors in lots of less than five thousand gallons, however, should be taxed according to the governor.28 Addressing the epidemic of social diseases among the state‘s civilian and military personnel, Holland told the legislators, journalists, and spectators,

We have been humiliated in this state by the results of the medical examinations made of service men and those offering for service to find that our rate of infection with venereal diseases is one of the highest in the nation. Likewise, the incidence of venereal disease among men of the armed forces stationed in Florida is very high so as to bring grave and justified complaints from the Army and Navy.29

To help eradicate this embarrassing situation, Governor Holland requested the passage of legislation to more effectively treat infected persons, suppress prostitution, and regulate hours for the sale of alcoholic beverages. To further aid defense efforts in the state, Holland called for the sharing of fire-fighting equipment by towns, and executive authority to set speed limits.30 Having outlined his program to meet problems arising from the war, Holland continued to address other needs. Holland switched topics to current fiscal policy, asking for the re-enactment of the seventh cent emergency gasoline tax first approved in 1931 and renewed by each subsequent legislature.31 Continuing on a similar theme, Holland looked to the main component of his fiscal reform program from the previous session and declared,

I am glad to report that … the 1941 full-value tax assessment laws have succeeded, to a very large degree, in preventing in many counties the collapse of local tax structures, which was a definite threat in 1941. There has been, in general, a fairer distribution of the tax burden and a larger percentage of tax payments, together with a reduction of taxes on many thousands of properties.32

28 House Journal, 15.

29 House Journal, 15.

30 House Journal, 15; Miami Daily News, 6 April 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 6 April 1943; Florida Times- Union, 7 April 1943.

31 House Journal, 18.

32 Ibid. 179

To improve this system, the governor called for uniform guidelines for assessment of state and county taxes. The governor‘s program for the current legislature included further fiscal reforms to limit the tax burden on citizens. He explained,

As I see it, the principal threat which has developed to the successful establishment of the 1941 tax program on a permanent basis has been the fact that, in some counties, the schools have too greatly increased their burdens for local operating revenue…. Difficulties have arisen in less than a dozen counties, but they do, in my opinion, call for corrective action by this legislature if the program and the good results which have flowed out of it … are to be safeguarded and retained….33

Governor Holland recommended conferring limited oversight over local school board budgets to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and the State Board of Education. Additionally, Holland suggested,

In order to have greater security for taxpayers after this biennium, it seems imperative that the constitutional ceiling on millages for the operating revenue of public free schools should be reduced by constitutional amendment.34

To ensure taxes did not exceed the taxpaying capacity of property, Holland further urged a constitutional amendment repealing authority to levy and collect district school taxes. Governor Holland also recommended a constitutional amendment to limit the ceiling on the state intangibles tax

In my opinion the present ceiling of five mills allowed by the constitution for intangible taxation operates largely to destroy the value of our constitutional prohibition against state income taxes…. I believe it would promote the permanent welfare of the state for the constitution to be amended so as to reduce the ceiling for intangible taxation from five mills to two mills, and I so recommend.35

33 Holland revealed that four counties - Polk, Escambia, Dade, and Duval – had increased 1942 school taxes ranging from sixty to fifty-two per cent over 1941 levels. Five other counties increased local taxes for school budgets by slightly lesser amounts. Holland declared ―the schools of these nine counties have given just cause to their taxpayers to complain and have claimed for themselves vastly greater benefits from the 1941 tax program than have the other counties or than was intended.‖ House Journal, 19; Florida Times-Union, 7 April 1943.

34 House Journal, 19.

35 House Journal, 20; Florida Times-Union, 7 April 1943.

180

These recommendations for constitutional limits on tax millages reflected the governor‘s apprehension that the combination of excessive millages with full value property assessment would overburden the tax system. Continuing to outline his legislative program, Holland offered, ―a … group of recommendations constituting a partial program to meet the problems that may fall heavily upon our state immediately after the war has ceased.‖ The governor explained,

It is my conviction that the amount of money available to be paid out in unemployment benefits after the war should be built to much larger proportions than we now have. Unemployment is almost sure to plague us when labor and industry readjust themselves from war production to pursuits of peace and there is no stronger insurance against an utter breakdown of purchasing power than a large unemployment compensation pool.36

Looking to peacetime construction projects as a means of easing the transition to a postwar economy, Holland recommended, ―that as large a reserve as possible be built up for road construction after the war.‖ Similarly, he called for legislative approval of a state program for the construction of institutions and colleges that ―would constitute a reservoir of after-the-war construction.‖ Furthermore, ―counties and cities should be authorized and encouraged to set up reserves for post-war public works,‖ according to the governor. Holland also asked the legislature to authorize state investment of State Road Department (SRD) funds designated for county road building in short-term certificates created under terms of the gas tax amendment ratified in 1942.37 Several components of his program would put the chief executive at odds with legislators determined to avoid new taxes by diverting surpluses from the Road Department and unemployment compensation funds. As the governor‘s message continued to the topic of lost proceeds and the need for new sources of revenue, he came to the most controversial and politically dangerous portion of his program. Noting that in 1942, ―war restrictions‖ had resulted in an approximately twenty-five per cent decrease in gas consumption and a loss of over seven million dollars in state gasoline tax receipts, Holland predicted continued declines in gas tax revenue, perhaps by as much as forty per cent below 1941 collections. Additionally, the recent suspension of the winter

36 House Journal, 20.

37 At the time of the governor‘s message, the state unemployment compensation fund had a balance of approximately $22.5 million. House Journal, 21; Florida Times-Union, 7 April 1943.

181 horseracing season, and the accompanying loss of tax income, created the necessity for the legislature to provide ―new revenue in the amount of $3,500,000‖ for the continuation of public welfare programs and revenue sharing with the counties. As to the means of generating these funds, Holland said,

I strongly believe the best available source of revenue is a cigarette tax of the same size as that levied in our two neighbor states, Georgia and Alabama, this is a tax of [one-and-one-half] mills per cigarette, or three cents on a package of [twenty], and two cents on a package of [ten]. I think such a tax will meet our needs. No tax on cigars or pouch tobacco is involved.

Governor Holland acknowledged he had opposed similar measures in the past.

…I want to make it perfectly plain that in [the gubernatorial election of] 1940 I went on record specifically against this tax. I was outspokenly against any additional tax as I did not believe additional taxes were necessary. I helped kill a proposal for this tax in the 1941 session and wish that neither this nor any other tax were necessary now.

Holland explained his reversal on the cigarette tax, noting,

Nothing can becloud the fact that the war has broken down or destroyed sources of public revenue which were regarded as most dependable. We are now confronted with the necessity of finding new revenue or else permitting vital public functions to suffer and aged citizens and dependent children go without help which the state alone can give them.

Governor Holland estimated the proposed cigarette tax would generate $2 million for welfare programs for the aged, blind, and indigent children, as well as revenues to be shared with the counties. Holland made it clear that he would consider other alternatives, promising that,

If there is some other tax that can be imposed with equally certain and adequate results and without harmfully affecting the future of our state or the continued prosperous existence of the industry taxed, I shall be more than glad to hear of it.38

The governor also announced he would ask the legislature to re-enact the five per cent tax on horseracing enacted by the 1941 legislature. Governor Holland concluded his message saying, ―It is, and will continue to be my earnest hope and prayer that Divine guidance may be always

38 House Journal, 21, 23. 182 present during your deliberations.‖39 Having heard Holland‘s message, legislators and journalists expressed a mixture of opinions on his program. Editorial reactions to Governor Holland‘s message varied from a Tallahassee Daily Democrat piece hailing it as ―a message packed with proposals of deep and far-reaching significance,‖ to a Miami Daily News critique calling the address ―a sane, sincere, constructive but essentially conservative document.‖ While conceding that the cigarette tax proposal constituted the ―surprise of the message and therefore the ‗big news,‘‖ the Democrat viewed the proposals for tax ceilings, and the preservation of the unemployment and SRD funds for postwar construction as ―the two most important recommendations in our opinion.‖ The Daily News observed that while the 1941 session achieved major reforms, for 1943 the governor apparently wanted ―to keep things on an even keel while conserving and advancing the state‘s interests … without stirring up too much of a maelstrom.‖ According to the Daily News, those desiring ―a thorough overhauling of the constitution through the calling of a state convention,‖ and others hoping ―for sweeping surgical operations on some of the state boards and bureaus and for radical incisive economies‖ were disappointed. The Daily News praised the governor‘s program for preparing the state for the transition to a peacetime economy, calling the components ―sound, broad-gauged recommendations.‖40 Regarding the cigarette tax, the editorial offered an unenthusiastic endorsement, observing that ―if new revenue has to be found …the governor has hit on a sound expedient.‖41 On the whole, however, the Daily News conceded that,

Altogether, Governor Holland has sent to the legislature a sound and well- balanced, if not spectacular program. It is a program pitched on a high note of sincerity and a lofty conception of public service. If the legislature will lay aside petty bickering and political trading, it can make this program the core, although not necessarily the be-all and end-all of the deliberations.42

39 House Journal, 23; Florida Times-Union, 7 April 1943..

40 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 6 April 1943; Miami Daily News, 7 April 1943.

41 The Daily News advocated reducing expenses instead of or in addition to raising revenues and had earlier advocated a comprehensive economy plan encompassing the elimination or consolidation of state, county, and local functions, curtailment of state hiring of private attorneys, and more efficient operation of the legislature itself. Miami Daily News, 6, 7 April 1943.

42 Miami Daily News, 7 April 1943.

183

Just as editorial opinion on the governor‘s recommendations varied, so did those of the lawmakers tasked with managing the state‘s problems. Judging from the actions and comments of a sampling of legislators, the questions of revenue and taxation topped their list of concerns. The wide ranging views of lawmakers on this question was evidenced by preparation for early introduction of numerous bills proposing abolition of several different state agencies, the diversion of money from the State Road Department and other agencies for the remainder of the war, various new taxes, and the repeal of existing taxes. House and senate leadership joined in promising an economical session.43 Rep. W. E. (Buck) Hancock, of Madison, announced his intention to introduce legislation to abolish the Florida Industrial Commission and its unemployment compensation division, and to allow for transfer of the agency‘s accumulated funds to the old age pension fund. Hancock pledged to also offer a measure to prohibit payment of unemployment compensation to anyone refusing work. Hancock said he intended the bills to end abuses of unemployment compensation payments, which he referred to as ―rocking chair money.‖44 The reality of a tight budget and potential for increasing taxation brought a range of responses from law makers. Legislators showed marked divisions on the question of Governor Holland‘s proposal to impose a temporary cigarette tax to raise three-and-one-half million dollars for pensions and aid to counties. Some lawmakers took stands against the tax to protect local tobacco related interests. Senate president Philip D. Beall, of Pensacola, opposed the tax, noting, ―My city gets [thirty thousand dollars] a year from its own cigaret tax and both can‘t tax them.‖ Senator S. A. Hinely, of Live Oak, took a stand against the tax, declaring,

I can‘t support the cigaret tax. We have in our area the only cigaret tobacco warehouses in the state, and the tax would be a direct threat to our local production.

Hillsborough county representatives Harry G. McDonald and Edward Paul Martin pledged to fight the measure, Martin warning, ―The bill would destroy the tobacco industry in North Florida and the cigar industry in Tampa.‖ Senator Raymond Sheldon, of Tampa, pledged, ―I‘m opposed

43 The agencies targeted for dissolution included the Barber Sanitary Commission, the Hotel Commission, and the Milk Control Board. The house eliminated the positions of messenger and janitor, each $6 per day jobs, as an economy measure. House Journal, 32, 33; Florida Times-Union, 6, 7 April 1943.

44 House Journal, 119, 309; Florida Times-Union, 6 April 1943.

184 to any increase in state taxes.‖ Not surprisingly, Rep. Buck Hancock, of Madison, declared, ―I don‘t think any new taxes are needed.‖45 Legislators representing constituencies involved in tobacco cultivation and marketing opposed Holland‘s proposed tax out of the conviction that it would harm the industry. Even though the governor‘s proposal specifically excluded cigars, it was probable that lawmakers representing the cigar-manufacturing hub of Tampa did so out of the belief that the cigarette tax increased the likelihood of an eventual tax on their local industry. Several of the more notable legislators thought to have potential for higher political office either opposed or qualified their position on the tax plan. Senator William A. Shands, of Gainesville, explained his thoughts on the measure, ―I am unalterably opposed to such taxation, at least until this legislature shall have had opportunity to study present revenues and determine whether economies can be affected.‖ Senator Ernest R. Graham, of Miami, said, ―I hope we can get by without any new taxes at all.‖ Senate Finance and Taxation Committee chairman Collins, of Tallahassee, observed,

A farsighted message. As to the cigaret tax, I am not fully convinced new taxes will be necessary. Unless I am so convinced by facts established before our committee, I shall oppose any new tax.

Past senate president John R. Beacham, of West Palm Beach, questioned the measure, saying, ―I‘ve always been against nuisance taxes and cigaret taxes. I hope we can find some way around it.‖ Senator Walter W. Rose, of Orlando, called for addressing the deficit through cutting expenses rather than raising revenues.46 On the politically risky issue of new taxation, these prominent lawmakers exhibited a range of positions from outright opposition to an understandable reluctance. At the same time, legislators from those less affluent counties not involved in tobacco industry tended to favor the levy on cigarettes. Representatives H. T. Cook, of Flagler, Leo Wotitsky, of Charlotte, and C. Bourke Floyd, of Franklin, expressed their support for the measure. Chairman of the House Finance and Taxation Committee L. C. Leedy, of Orange, announced, ―I‘ve always been for the cigarette tax, and today I feel it is our salvation.‖ Representative C. L. Clark, of Calhoun, apparently backed the measure wholeheartedly,

45 Palm Beach Post, 7 April 1943.

46 Ibid.

185 declaring, ―I‘m for it if all tobacco is included. Otherwise, I‘m for it any way.‖47 For these and numerous other legislators, the continued funding of state revenue sharing and pensions outweighed reluctance to impose a new tax. Governor Holland, having made his case for the necessity of the new revenues, responded to those predicting the levy would harm the state‘s tobacco industry. He pointed out that,

Every other southern state, save North Carolina, already has this tax and it has not proved hurtful to our sister states nor destructive to business in those states. Some of these states produce much more tobacco than does Florida …. Three products have, in the tax experience of the states and the nation, shown their ability to carry heaviest taxation without destruction, namely, gasoline, liquor and cigarets. We already tax the first two of these products in Florida at the highest rates.48

From early indicators, it appeared that the cigaret tax would become a major controversy in the coming weeks. The first week of the 1943 session saw the introduction of two controversial topics that would command a large share of the legislature‘s time and interest. The first of these measures authorized the creation of a special investigating committee with the subpoena power to request the names of all regular or special state employees, their duties, and the amount of salaries, fees, or compensation paid to them.49 Speaking on behalf of his resolution in committee, Senator Shands said it was,

not directed at any particular board or any particular individual in this state. It is always beneficial to turn the light on expenditures of any public funds. This state has never taken any inventory in any intelligent way of spending and receipts and what we‘re getting for it.50

The intent of his resolution, according to Shands, was budget reduction to avoid the need for additional revenue.

47 Ibid.

48 Florida Times-Union, 8 April 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 7 April 1943.

49 Florida, Senate, Journal of the Senate, Twenty-Ninth Regular Session, April 6th through June 4th, 1943 (Tallahassee: n.p., 1943), 11; Florida Times-Union, 8 April 1943.

50 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 8 April 1943.

186

After learning of the proposed investigating committee, State Comptroller Jim Lee remarked he had heard ―rumblings that such a resolution would be introduced because of my delinquent tax collecting campaign.‖51 Lee‘s statement gained credibility when Senator Beacham, of West Palm Beach, told the senate committee considering the Shands resolution forty-four millionaires with combined intangible personal property valued in excess of twenty- four million dollars had moved from Florida because of the methods employed by a law firm hired by Comptroller Lee to collect intangible taxes.52 Following approval in committee and the senate, President Beall named Sen. Shands chair of the investigating committee and Sen. Rose vice chair. Senators Beacham, Franklin, and Baker made up the remainder of the committee.53 Comptroller Lee responded to Sen. Beacham‘s criticism of his department‘s handling of intangible tax collections by asking for the names of the West Palm Beach millionaires who reportedly left the state. Lee said,

I sincerely assure you that I will go to the trouble of getting in touch with them to determine what, if any, offenses were offered by the employes of the comptroller‘s office.

Furthermore, Lee reported his policies had resulted in the collection of more than one-hundred- thousand dollars in delinquent taxes missed by the county assessor.54 Continuing, Lee declared, ―Palm Beach county shows the greatest evasion of any county we have got to so far, by almost three times….‖55 The sniping between Sen. Beacham and Comptroller Lee continued through the early weeks of the session as each tried to make a case for his particular argument. The Shands committee would dig into state expenditures seeking elusive economies. The second controversial topic initiated during the first days of session was the prohibition of union labor‘s closed shop in employment contracts. Essentially a continuation of

51 Ibid.

52 In addition to the resolution creating what would be called the Shands committee, Rep. Buck Hancock, of Madison, introduced a house bill prohibiting officials, agencies, or boards from hiring of outside attorneys and requiring them to use the attorney general as counsel. Furthermore, on 8 April, Attorney General J. Tom Watson filed a circuit court injunction in Tallahassee to block the comptroller from hiring outside attorneys for tax collection. Florida Times-Union, 9 April 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 8 April 1943.

53 Florida Times-Union, 10 April 1943.

54 Florida Times-Union, 11 April 1943.

55 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 11 April 1943.

187

Attorney General Watson‘s failed effort to abolish the closed shop by statute during the 1941 session, this time the anti-closed shop forces proposed both statutory and constitutional bans on the closed shop. Rep. Joe Jenkins, of Alachua, and seven other house members introduced the bill which in its initial form provided that all citizens be given equal opportunity to work and

Any qualified person shall be eligible to accept any job or employment regardless of whether or not such person is a member of a labor organization, guild, association, fraternity, sect, race or other special grouping of individuals.56

Violators of the proposed would be subject to two to three years imprisonment, fine of five- hundred to three thousand dollars, or both. Speaker Simpson referred the closed shop bill to the Labor Committee, headed by Representative Martin of Hillsborough. A constitutional amendment guaranteeing that ―the right of citizens to work shall not be abridged or denied on account of non-membership in any organization‖ was introduced by Rep. Jenkins. House leadership referred the proposed amendment to the constitutional amendments committee, chaired by Rep. Jenkins.57 Jenkins‘s amendment committee approved the plan by a vote of nine to four. The house debated the measure the next day, Friday. Opponents of the amendment charged backers with ―railroading this thing,‖ and warned the fight over the ban ―will rip this house wide open.‖ A forty-four to forty-one vote in favor of sending the proposal back to the constitutional amendments committee failed to achieve the required two-thirds but was seen a sign that the bill lacked the support for the three-fifths vote of all elected members required for legislative approval and submission for ratification. Following additional debate and maneuver, Rep. E. P. Martin of Hillsborough, chair of the labor committee, proposed killing the bill by deleting the required resolving clause. Martin warned that approval of the amendment would result in ―civil war between capital and labor‖ at a time when harmonious labor relations were most needed. The house approved a motion to table Martin‘s revision by a vote of fifty-two to thirty-eight. Opponents of the closed shop appeared to gain strength on succeeding test votes but failed to

56 The other introducers of the bill were Thomas Dowda of Putnam, L. C. Leedy of Orange, Lacy G. Thomas of Lake, Olin G. Shivers of Washington, J. D. Dugger of Baker, Joe Henry Scales of Taylor, and Buck Hancock of Madison. Florida Times-Union, 9 April 1943.

57 House Journal, 31; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 8 April 1943.

188 pass the measure before adjournment on Friday.58 The bell had sounded in a fight that would last for much of the session. At the same time the Shands Committee and the closed shop debate seemed to draw the most attention, the legislature worked on other measures. Pinellas Rep. Mary Lou Baker introduced the first component of her program to give women equal property and contractual rights. Baker‘s bill revised rules for the qualification of jurors making it lawful for women to serve on trial juries and provide female bailiffs to accommodate mixed juries. House leadership referred Baker‘s bill to the House ―C‖ Committee.59 Legislative committees from both chambers scheduled joint public hearings to study proposals to control venereal disease for the second week of the session. A committee consisting of members of the State Board of Health, the State Medical Association, the Navy and Army, local and state law enforcement agencies, and civic organizations appointed by Governor Holland prepared the bills. The House and Senate committees on Public Health, Military Affairs, and Temperance slated the bills, targeting prostitution and limiting the hours of liquor sales, for study.60 Consideration of the proposed closed shop amendment continued into the second week of the session. Over the weekend recess opponents of the ban argued the measure‘s language was so broad it would prevent employers from excluding a member of any organization, including the German Bund, or make it impossible for a church to require its pastor belong to its own denomination. Critics of the closed shop ban also claimed the measure would allow African American teachers in white schools. Opponents of the amendment, headed by Hillsborough Rep. E. P. Martin, chair of the Labor Committee, pledged to seek immediate defeat to eliminate the contentious issue.61 When house debate resumed on Monday, proponents of the closed shop amendment, led by Alachua county‘s Joe Jenkins and Gulf county‘s Clay Lewis, changed the amendment language limiting it to membership or non-membership ―in any labor union or labor

58 House Journal, 155; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 9 April 1943.

59 House Journal, 31; Florida Times-Union, 9 April 1943.

60 House Journal, 31; Senate Journal, 48, 53; Florida Times Union, 10 April 1943.

61 Florida Times-Union, 12 April 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 12 April 1943.

189 organization‖ to meet objections raised by opponents. Jenkins said the revised proposal was aimed at ―labor racketeers‖ and would not alter existing laws and constitutional provisions pertaining to interracial relations. Duval Rep. Mabry Carlton spoke against the amendment, asserting, ―I‘m against labor racketeers, and racketeers in business.‖ Claiming that an amendment was unnecessary, he advised the legislature to ―enact some laws with teeth in them. When you have rats, the best thing to do is to get a few house cats.‖ The house approved the narrowed version of the proposed amendment by a surprising margin of sixty-six to twenty five, nine votes more than needed. The measure then went to the senate, where it faced an uncertain fate.62 Passage of the closed shop amendment did not complete the agenda of those house members favoring stronger restrictions on organized labor in the state. On the heels of the closed shop amendment, Rep. Harry Johnson of Lake county led a bloc of forty-six house members – nearly half of the total membership of ninety five – proposing tight regulation of labor unions.63 In its statement of legislative intent, the bill stated ―so-called labor leaders and labor organizations … which had developed into major rackets for the … personal profit of certain individuals and groups‖ had victimized the public.64 The bill required unions to incorporate and regulated elections and fees charged. The measure barred convicted felons and aliens from serving as officers, officials, or organizers unless their rights of citizenship were restored. It also banned labor unions from contributing to candidates or political parties.65 Additionally, the bill prohibited picketing except under specific circumstances and limited the number of picketers to four.66 House leadership referred the proposal to the labor committee, where it joined a previously introduced measure to outlaw the closed shop immediately by statute.67 The senate

62 Florida Times-Union, 13 April 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14 April 1943.

63 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 13 April 1943.

64 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14 April 1943.

65 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 13 April 1943.

66 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14 April 1943.

67 House Journal, 366, 383, 386-388; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 13 April 1943.

190 referred the house-approved closed shop amendment to its constitutional amendments and labor committees.68 While restrictions on organized labor garnered headlines, the legislature methodically went about its business. By the end of the second week lawmakers had approved three components of Governor Holland‘s legislative program. Both houses quietly reauthorized the seventh cent emergency gas tax, authorized investment of State Road Department gasoline tax surpluses in State Board of Administration tax anticipation certificates, and exempted bulk purchases by the federal government from the state‘s seven cent per gallon gas tax.69 Only one large appropriation, $175,000 annually for free hog anti-cholera serum, passed the legislature in the initial two weeks of session. Legislators introduced several sales taxes and proposals for funds transfers, but the finance committees of both chambers deferred action upon them.70 Meanwhile, the handling and fate of major issues like the cigarette tax and general appropriations measures inspired much interest among legislators, newspapermen, and the public. Much as he had in his initial session as chief executive, Governor Holland timed the release of his legislative proposals based on the progress of deliberations and the items‘ potential for controversy. During the 1941 session, the newly inaugurated governor held the introduction of his most ambitious proposals – tax reforms centered on the implementation of full value ad valorem assessment – until after lawmakers completed work on other vital matters. Just prior to the third week of the current session, the governor announced most of legislative proposals, including recommendations for reducing the school tax millage ceiling and cutting the intangibles tax maximum limit, were ready for lawmakers‘ consideration. Holland said he would hold his cigarette tax bill until legislators had dealt with ―less controversial measures.‖71 Comptroller J. M. Lee and members of the Shands committee continued their back-and- forth over the employment of special attorneys to collect delinquent taxes as the third week of session began. In a press release addressing the special attorney issue, Lee revealed that the state

68 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 15 April 1943.

69 House Journal, 182, 262, 286, 287; Senate Journal, 25, 59, 71, 85.

70 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 15, 16 April 1943; Florida Times-Union, 16, 17 April 1943.

71 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 18 April 1943; Florida Times-Union, 18 April 1943.

191 government paid the firm of Casey, Walton, and Spain $85,870 for 5,389 investigations of taxpayers‘ intangible taxes between 18 April 1941 and 31 March 1943. These investigations discovered two-hundred-ninety-five delinquencies and resulted in collections amounting to $285,598. In the release, Lee said, ―The average cost per investigation made is $15.09 each, and is the lowest cost price on delinquencies of this kind I have yet been able to establish.‖ Addressing the question of why outside attorneys were needed, Lee explained that the state auditor‘s and comptroller‘s offices had done,

a good job of investigating and certifying unreturned intangibles to the tax assessors. Through their efforts millions of dollars of intangible property was placed upon the tax roll which had not been returned…. I think you will agree that the finding of only 295 unreturned delinquents out of 5,389 that were investigated will itself bespeak a good job done by the auditing department…. But the fact remains that … defaulters owing $285,598.57 escaped this investigation and still went unreturned and uncollected until they were discovered through this investigation and called upon to pay just as those found by the auditing department were … required to pay.

Lee‘s press release defended the use of outside attorneys, explaining that,

The object in view was the collection of money that actually belonged to the State of Florida, under and by virtue of law, that had been withheld undisclosed and payment evaded. It is through this kind of service, and this only, we can avoid an increase in the tax demand from those who patriotically pay the legal state demands.72

After enduring two weeks of criticism, Lee responded with a robust defense of his department‘s use of special attorneys. Leading members of the Shands committee responded by implying poor stewardship on the part of the comptroller. Senator Shands commented, ―for the fees he‘d paid we could command the services of the outstanding lawyers of this country to do it cheaper and do nothing

72 Lee‘s statement also contains an explanation of how the state came to employ Casey, Walton, and Spain revealing an unintended consequence of Florida‘s minimal tax system and lenient collection policies. Lee said an associate of the firm, ―advised me that he represented other states in the collection of evaded taxes; and he had come to Florida in that interest, and he had been successful in collecting a sizable sum of money from former taxpayers and citizens of his client states who claimed to be residents of Florida but who, after investigation, were found not to have established citizenship and were not paying these taxes in either state; that he had also found people who had moved to and actually established residence in Florida who were heavy taxpayers in the state from which they came but they were not returning and paying taxes in anything like the sum that they should be returning and paying. He asked that Florida take such action as would be necessary to collect from such people the amount of taxes properly due the state and thus prevent Florida from becoming a rendezvous for the evasion of large sums of tax money by heavy taxpayers who were amply able to pay.‖ Florida Times-Union, 19 April 1943.

192 else.‖73 Simultaneous with the senate‘s investigation of purported excessive spending by the comptroller, the house considered a bill to bar state officers and departments from hiring special attorneys. The bill, introduced by Representative Buck Hancock, also designated the attorney general as the exclusive legal officer for state officers and agencies. The house judiciary committee rejected the measure, and an attempt to bring it to the floor despite the committee decision failed.74 After failing to halt the proposed closed shop amendment in the house, opponents of the measure attempted to derail the measure in the senate. Senate President Philip D. Beall and Senator Raymond Sheldon jointly introduced a pair of measures to regulate labor unions in the state. The first measure, referred to as an ―anti-strike‖ bill, made it illegal ―to strike, organize or encourage a strike on any work or service necessary to the national war program.‖ The second proposal, described as an ―anti-racketeer‖ bill, required unions to register with the secretary of state, list officers, and prohibited aliens, vagrants, and convicted felons from holding office in any labor organization. Beall, of Pensacola, and Sheldon, of Tampa, offered the bills as ―substitutes‖ for the house approved closed shop amendment. Both Beall and Sheldon had declared their opposition to the amendment. The senate referred the measures to the labor committee headed by Senator Sheldon.75 The next day the debate over the closed shop amendment took center stage as Senator Sheldon‘s labor and Senator Wallace Sturgis‘s constitutional amendment committees met in joint session to consider the matter. Spectators packing the senate galleries witnessed a torrent of rhetorical fireworks and historical distortion. The committees heard testimony from representatives of American Federation of Labor (AFL) and Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) affiliated unions, Attorney General J. Tom Watson, and World War I flyer and Congressional Medal of Honor recipient Captain Eddie Rickenbacker. Rickenbacker wired his comments on the proposed amendment from New York. Attorney General Watson read Rickenbacker‘s message endorsing the amendment as necessary to guarantee freedom of

73 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 20 April 1943; Florida Times-Union, 21 April 1943.

74 House Journal, 31, 138, 155; Florida Times-Union, 22, 23 April 1943.

75 Senate Journal, 68, 73; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 19 April 1943; Florida Times-Union, 20 April 1943.

193 opportunity. Comparing the situation of American workers with antebellum slavery, Rickenbacker wrote,

The slaves of the South under honest and fair masters had all the benefits of the Four Freedoms. They were free to worship, free to speak their minds, free from want and free from fear, but they didn‘t have freedom of opportunity until their emancipation. Certainly the writers of our Constitution or so-called bill of rights felt that the freedom of opportunity was included but in recent years this freedom … has been abridged through selfish, malicious interests on the part of some of our courts through the enactment of laws such as the Wagner Labor Relations Act and other instruments. In the name of fairness and decency and the welfare of our soldiers when they return – those who do return – I hope the legislative body of the great State of Florida and its citizens will see fit to rededicate themselves to the efforts of our forefathers and the composers of the Bill of Rights.

After completing Rickenbacker‘s statement, Watson added his own opinion that the closed shop amendment was necessary ―to protect the public from court decisions that ignore the right to enjoy property, including the right to work on equal basis.‖ Implying that labor could not manage their own affairs, Assistant Attorney General Lawrence A. Truett said, ―They don‘t know what‘s good for them. They consider it bad medicine, but it would put them on the highest plane [sic] they‘ve ever been on.‖ Speaking as a representative of capital, C. G. McGahee, president of the Jacksonville Paper Company, dropped all pretense of concern for the workers, conceding,

we as employers haven‘t any fuss with labor – with organized labor. We are willing to have union organizations but we don‘t want a plan that will dominate our business and that‘s what the closed shop does.76

In their statements in support of the amendment, proponents offered a variety of arguments. Rickenbacker and Watson argued that the closed shop effectively denied freedom of opportunity to non-union workers. Representative Joe C. Jenkins, one of the measure‘s sponsors, declared,

The common everyday American citizen who is able to work, wants to work and is available for work should have the right to work without making a payment to any individual or any group.

76 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 21 April 1943; Florida Times-Union, 21 April 1943.

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Assistant Attorney General Truett called for approval of the measure for the good of labor and despite their objections. Mr. McGahee, speaking for employers, objected to the potential of the closed shop to exert undue influence over their operations. Opponents of the closed shop amendment emphasized the harm the measure would do to the war effort and working people. Former Florida Federation of Labor president Wendell C. Heaton told the committees,

I am sure you can understand the concern that will be felt by the laboring men – it‘s a life and death matter with the unions – if the legislature passes this amendment. It will affect their production in the war effort. You will see disruptions of all kinds. It will be unintentional but unavoidable.

Dan P. Ellis of Jacksonville, representing the railway brotherhoods, blamed the National Association of Manufacturers for creating ―all this anti-labor activity.‖ ―The closed shop is the only way we will have peace between labor and employers,‖ Ellis warned. Orlando resident Otis Nation, a vice president of the CIO, suggested approval of the amendment would be a disservice to Americans working to win the war. He declared,

while thousands of men under the closed shop are sailing the seas delivering war supplies and millions of our people – both CIO and AFL – are working in war industries, we think this is a most inopportune time to begin stabbing labor in the back.

At the end of four hours of testimony, the committees adjourned, postponing the vote on the measure until the following week. Opponents of the closed shop amendment focused their arguments on the potential damage the measure would inflict on American workers and the war effort. While the fight over the closed shop in the senate took a temporary breather, opponents of tighter restrictions on labor achieved victories in the house labor committee. The committee voted ten to nine to reject Rep. Jenkins‘s bill to outlaw immediately the closed shop by statute. The labor committee also gave an unfavorable report to Rep. Clay Lewis‘s bill imposing strict regulations on unions and restrictions on picketing. An unfavorable committee report meant a two-thirds vote of the house would be required to overrule the committee and bring the proposals to the floor. An unfavorable committee report generally defeated a bill.77

77 Florida Times-Union, 22 April 1943.

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At the same time labor fought to preserve the closed shop, members of the legislature struggled to expand the rights of women in Florida. While many Floridians shared this goal, Representative Mary Lou Baker of St. Petersburg led the effort. Rep. Baker, invariably described in the press as ―attractive,‖ doggedly lobbied for the expansion of women‘s legal rights, explaining,

If a married woman wants to buy a stove, we think she should have the right to make a contract for it. If she owns an apartment house, we want her to have the right to control it and lease it. If she has grounds to sue somebody, we want her to be able to sue without having to bring in her husband. And we want women to serve on juries.78

The first of Rep. Baker‘s women‘s rights proposals to be debated in the house was a bill to make women eligible for jury duty. Arguing for the measure, Baker said,

Women on trial for crime might be brought to trial before a woman judge, prosecuted by a woman , defended by a woman lawyer, brought into court by a woman bailiff, and yet forced to trial before a jury of men. Such is the present situation in Florida.79

Opponents of the measure raised numerous specious objections, including female disinterest in legal matters, added expense, the potential for opening the jury box to African American women, and the necessity of shielding wives and mothers from the sordid facts of criminal trials. Rep. Warren Sanchez of Suwannee asserted that a mother would be ―more concerned about her children at dinner time than she would about listening to testimony in a trial.‖ Rep. George Scofield of Citrus decried the additional expense required to provide female bailiffs and separate restroom facilities for women jurors. Responding to the claim that women would be upset by testimony in some trials, Rep. Baker said,

In cases involving sex offenses a mixed jury is especially desirable. The man is not a god, but rather a beast when he gets the smell of cosmetics in his nostrils and the worst philanderer is inclined to condemn the unheard man accused of a sex offense and pose as the defender of womankind.

Furthermore, according to Rep. Baker women would improve the quality of juries. ―One can hardly over-estimate the ignorance of the average juror in our juries composed solely of males,‖

78 Florida Times-Union, 19 April 1943.

79 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 22 April 1943.

196 she noted. Rep. Walter Walker of Volusia, a supporter of the bills, observed, ―I trust my wife with raising my children. I am willing to trust her with the responsibilities of jury service.‖ Opponents failed in their attempt to pass an amendment striking out the proposal‘s enacting clause; however, a move to indefinitely postpone the measure passed, fifty to thirty-eight.80 For the time being, opponents of the bill had prevailed. At the close of the third week of session, the chairs of the all-important finance and taxation committees offered insights into their approaches to the vital question of state revenues. On the senate side, Collins reported his group would seek to avoid any new taxes. ―Our committee is still hopeful that we can work out minor increases in some existing taxes to avoid any new taxes, including cigaret taxes,‖ the Tallahassee lawmaker reported. In the house, Rep. L. C. Leedy endorsed Governor Holland‘s cigarette tax proposal and said he would ask his committee to report it favorably soon after introduction. On Governor Holland‘s claim that the cigaret levy would be sufficient, Leedy said, ―I‘m willing to take the governor‘s word for it.‖ Leedy also announced he would seek additional time for his finance committee to consider tax bills before they were recalled due to lack of committee action under house rules.81 Both chambers held tax bills awaiting determination of revenue needs for the coming biennium and receipt of administration recommendations. At a meeting with senate appropriations committee members, Governor Holland outlined the State Budget Commission recommendations for general funds appropriations. Holland explained that the commission requested $21,105,428 for the coming biennium. However, the governor explained that figure reflected surplus appropriations for unexpected emergencies arising out of the war. Holland said the actual funds probably would not be available and would not be spent even if they were. A similar formula had been followed in the previous biennium when $21,854,044 was appropriated and a smaller sum spent. Holland clearly hoped the appropriations process would adhere to prior practices. An Associated Press appraisal of the initial three weeks of the legislature reported an unusually productive and harmonious session. The senate managed to speed proceedings by introducing and passing many general bills under waiver of the rules requiring consideration of

80 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 22 April 1943; Florida Times-Union, 22 April 1943.

81 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 22 April 1943.

197 all bills by committees. In the house, committees completed deliberations and reported on most bills quickly. These maneuvers allowed both chambers to stay on top of each day‘s calendar. With the exception of the closed shop amendment, the session had thus far been unusually free of the progress-halting controversies of the past. As a result, the legislature had ―set some records‖ for staying on top of bills introduced on a day-to-day basis.82 As the fourth week of session began, observers looked to the senate for legislative fireworks generated by the proposed closed shop amendment. Before the measure could return from committees to the senate, a parliamentary tangle had to be unraveled. Referred by Senate President Beall to both the constitutional amendments and labor committees, confusion existed over whether the bodies would vote on the proposal separately or jointly. Senator Sturgis assumed separate votes were appropriate and his amendments committee approved the measure by a vote of four to two. After some deliberation and consultation, Senator Sheldon‘s labor committee voted against the measure six to three, while also revising it to preserve the right of employees to bargain collectively.83 The proposed amendment reached the senate floor by a voice vote. That chamber adopted the revised closed shop amendment by a vote of twenty-three to eleven, the minimum margin required for approval. The revised proposal went back to the house, where it was approved. The prohibition on the closed shop was now set to go before the voters for ratification in the 1944 general election.84

82 The cattle fencing bill had been a perennial source of contention in and out of the legislature for many years. As ranches voluntarily fenced their herds and local bills requiring cattle fencing in particular counties were enacted the issue lost much of its former significance. The only fencing related issue to arise during the early days of the 1943 session provided for a local referendum on banning free roaming hogs in Manatee county. Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 23 April 1943; Florida Times-Union, 23 April 1943.

83 Had the two committees voted jointly, it appears they would have rejected the closed shop amendment by a vote of seven for and eight against. Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 26, 28, 29 April 1943; Florida Times-Union, 27, 28, 29 April 1943.

84 Organizations publicly lobbying the senate on behalf of the closed shop amendment included the Lime Rock Association of Florida, Insurance Economics Society of America, Jacksonville Association of Accident and Health Underwriters, Florida Citrus Canners Co-operative, Southern Cypress Manufacturers‘ Association, Jacksonville Junior Chamber of Commerce, Master Printers of Greater Miami, Inc., Florida Citrus Exchange, Greater Miami Restaurant Association, Winter Haven Citrus Growers Association, Associated Industries of Florida, Florida State Hotel Association, Florida Farm Bureau Federation, Waverly Growers Co-operative, Campbell Cattle Company, Princess Groves, Inc., United Growers and Shippers Association, Florida Citrus Producers Trade Association, and Sheriff W. H. Robinson of Alachua county, secretary of the Florida Peace Officers‘ Association. Florida Times- Union, 27 April 1943. Governor Holland declined comment on the measure which did not require his approval before submission to the electorate. Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 2 May 1943; Florida Times-Union, 2 May 1943.

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Also on the senate side, the Shands committee heard public testimony and issued a preliminary report on fees paid by the state to special attorneys. Comptroller J. M. Lee appeared before the committee to provide details of his office‘s employment of the firm of Casey, Walton and Spain to collect delinquent intangibles taxes on commission. Lee pointed out that because he lacked the legal authority to contract for this type of services, he had secured the approval of Governor Holland before employing the firm. The 1941 legislature subsequently gave the comptroller‘s office that power. Lee defended the practice and expense of hiring special attorneys, declaring,

Our sole purpose was to make this state a more desirable place in which to live by making tax collections [one-hundred] per cent if possible and thereby bring relief to the hundreds of thousands of taxpayers who annually return their property and pay all the legal tax.

Additionally, he noted, ―The intangibles tax collections for the current year, to date, are $500,000 greater than the previous year.‖85 Lee defended his hiring of outside attorneys based on prior authorization, worthy purpose, and results. On the house side of the capitol, Rep. Mary Lou Baker shepherded the first component of her women‘s rights program to legislative approval. Baker steered a senate-approved bill giving married women the right to execute power of attorney with their husbands to passage after some debate. Speaking against the measure, Rep. E. P. Martin of Hillsborough claimed,

I‘m not opposed to women‘s rights. God knows they have more rights now than any man can ever have. I‘m trying to protect them. A drunken husband with power of attorney could dispose of the family home without his wife‘s consent.

Noting that in other states husbands going away to war often executed a power of attorney before leaving home, Baker said this convenience was denied in Florida. Looking to Representatives L. C. Leedy of Orange, G. Warren Sanches of Suwannee, Martin of Hillborough, and George W. Scofield of Citrus, Baker reminded them the bill was not compulsory, and told them,

You and those like you who may have a complex that prejudices you against reposing any trust in women are entirely free to continue to name only persons of

85 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 26 April 1943; Florida Times-Union, 27 April 1943.

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the masculine gender, but please remember there are some men who trust their wives and sincerely desire those wives to act in their place and stead.

The bill passed the house fifty-six to twenty-six and Rep. Baker had achieved a victory in her campaign for women‘s rights.86 By the close of the fourth week, the legislature had largely completed work on another component of Governor Holland‘s legislative program, implementation of stringent laws to fight prostitution and prevent the spread of venereal disease. The legislature passed, and the governor signed, five new laws recommended, at Holland‘s request, by a committee of military, civilian law, and public health officials. The laws included provisions making it illegal to rent a dwelling or vehicle for prostitution, provided for the revocation of rooming house, hotel, apartment, or restaurant licenses upon conviction of the operator for violation of prostitution laws, and, most significantly, made prostitution a direct violation of Florida law. The laws became effective immediately.87 On May 1, Governor Holland reviewed the accomplishments of the session and expressed hope the legislature would be able to address his tax and appropriations recommendations in the coming week. The governor said, the ―deck seems to be getting pretty well cleared for legislation.‖ In his message to the legislature, Holland had called for revision of the general tax laws, including the reduction of the intangibles tax ceilings and the elimination of school district tax millages limitations. Holland had asked also for appropriations for welfare programs, public schools, and the counties to replace lost horse racing tax revenues. Additionally, the governor requested $3,500,000 in new tax revenues to make up for racing tax losses in other areas. Governor Holland had recommended a cigarette tax of three cents per pack to provide these funds. He reported that the house and senate Committees on Finance and Taxation had scheduled a joint public hearing for Wednesday of the coming week on all proposals to revise the tax structure. Holland said that he saw no indications that the committees would take up the cigarette tax proposal at that meeting.88

86 Senate Journal, 49, 94, 120, 167; House Journal, 97, 139, 233; Florida Times-Union, 30 April 1943.

87 Florida Times-Union, 2 May 1943.

88 Florida Times-Union, 2 May 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 2 May 1943.

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The fifth week of the 1943 brought action on the governor‘s intangibles tax ceiling, married women‘s rights, and appropriations, as well as more rumblings about labor. Additionally, legislators and attaches took a break for the traditional lampoon of state government known as the Third House. Many legislators and observers shared a feeling the session was making good progress toward its most important tasks.89 The house addressed the intangibles tax ceiling early in the week. At the time the state constitution set a ceiling of five mills but only one mill was then levied. In making his case on behalf of the revision, Governor Holland said that the five mill limit ―operates largely to destroy the value of our constitutional prohibition against state income taxes‖ as a means of drawing affluent persons to move their legal residences to Florida. As an example of his point, Holland said taxation at the maximum rate of a bond paying four per cent interest amounted to a tax of twelve-and-one-half per cent. House sponsors of the two-mill ceiling claimed it would ease the fears of the wealthy that their income from securities would be subject to high taxation, and would entice them to move to Florida. Speaking against the proposed amendment, Rep. Lanas Troxler of Marion, said the revision would shift taxes from the wealthy to the poor. Troxler predicted, ―If this amendment is adopted, the next thing we‘ll hear about will be a general sales tax.‖ The house approved the measure by a vote of seventy-one to fifteen less than half an hour after introduction by administrative floor leader Rep. Marshall Wiseheart of Dade county. The resolution then went to the senate.90 The senate passed the house-approved resolution reducing the constitutional ceiling on intangibles but only after a vigorous effort to extend similar protection to real estate. Senator Walter Rose, of Orlando, attempted to amend the resolution to include a twenty-mill overall limit on real estate taxes (excepting taxes for existing bonds). Rose, former president of the Florida Association of Real Estate and former chair of the Florida Real Estate Commission, claimed Florida gave preferential treatment to wealthy securities investors without aiding owners of real estate. ―We‘ve got to give some protection to the property owner – the man who built this country. Let‘s don‘t go wild for the millionaire,‖ Rose declared. The senate defeated Rose‘s amendment by a vote of sixteen to fifteen before easily approving the resolution, with a minor

89 Florida Times-Union, 3 May 1943.

90 House Journal, 341; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 3 May 1943; Florida Times-Union, 4 May 1943.

201 amendment, by a vote of twenty-five to seven. The amended resolution went back to the house for final action and then on to the governor for his signature.91 Both chambers considered the question of married women‘s rights during the fifth week of session. Rep. Baker introduced her ―married women‘s emancipation bill‖ intended to give them the right to manage their own property, enter into contracts, as well as sue and be sued. Baker said the measure had the support of the Florida Federation of Women‘s clubs, the Florida Bar Association, and other organizations. As might be expected following the response to earlier women‘s rights measures, Baker‘s bill inspired a long and vigorous debate. Opponents, led by Rep. E. P. Martin of Hillsborough, charged that inexperienced women would sign disadvantageous contracts and subject their husbands to court judgments arising from these contracts. Baker made an impassioned defense of the measure, declaring that current law placed,

the married woman, the infant and the idiot in one common category. The unmarried woman is free, but her sister, the woman with a Mrs. before her name, may not contract lawfully even to buy a piece of lipstick unless the guardian joins her. We women do not ask for or want kindness, sympathy, or tolerance. We want our rights as human beings.92

During a debate stretching over parts of two days, the measure‘s opponents attempted numerous parliamentary maneuvers to nullify or kill the bill. Legislative veterans Rep. Archie Clement of Pinellas and Clay Lewis of Gulf, eventually succeeded in amending the bill to include a referendum clause, effectively eviscerating the measure because the constitution made no provision for referendums on statutes. Despite the hostile revision, Rep. Baker called for passage of the bill in hopes that the senate would remove the referendum clause. The amended bill passed by a vote of fifty-four to twenty-eight.93 The married women‘s rights proposal found a better reception in the senate. Setting aside the house-amended version, the upper chamber approved a bill giving married women the right to manage their own property, but not before adding amendments of their own. The initial version of the bill, introduced jointly by Senators Harrison Barrington of Sarasota, W. H.

91 Senator Rose was selected as president-designate of the 1945 senate by the members of the holdover caucus – senators whose four-year terms did not expire until after the next session. Senate Journal, 288, 381, 426; House Journal, 744, 785, 846; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 7 May 1943; Florida Times-Union, 7 May 1943.

92 Florida Times-Union, 5 May 1943. 93 House Journal, 789, 822; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 4 May 1943; Florida Times-Union, 5, 6 May 1943.

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Brewton of Dade City, James A. Franklin of Fort Myers, and Dewey Johnson of Brooksville, was changed to give husbands the right to alimony and provide a husband ―courtesy rights,‖ similar to the dower rights of a widow, in the property of his wife. The senate approved the bill by a vote of thirty to five, and sent the bill to the house, where it lay dormant until the seventh week of session.94 The much anticipated maneuvering on the budget for state government began in earnest following the release of a general appropriations bill by the senate Appropriations Committee. The bill provided $19,784,429 for the coming biennium, $1,374,798 below the amount requested by the economy-minded State Budget Commission. The senate committee reduced the amounts provided for nearly every recommended area. For example, the bill trimmed funding for the University of Florida from $1,940,850 to $1,748,765 and the Florida State College for Women from $1,253,896 to $1,128,508. Additionally, the proposed measure reduced funding for the Comptroller‘s office, the free school textbook fund, the State Board of Health, the Confederate Pension fund, Florida A and M College, the Attorney General‘s office, and numerous other state functions. The committee did not change the budget commission recommendations for the State Hospital and the Agricultural Experiment Station of the University of Florida. The only department for which the committee increased appropriations over those requested by the budget commission was the State Parole Commission. Senate leadership positioned the bill for attention in the coming week, preparing the way for consideration of tax measures in the remaining weeks of the session. Budget Committee chair Ernest F. Householder promised that his committee members would push for passage of the bill.95 Legislators, state officials, and legislative attaches took time out from their normal tasks to stage the biennial ―Third House‖ burlesque of the legislature on the evening of Wednesday, 5 May. House Speaker Richard Simpson and Speaker Pro-Tem Archie Clements of Tarpon Springs took on the duties of janitors, complete with brooms. Other legislators served as pages, clerks, doorkeepers, and sergeants-at-arms while the regular attaches impersonated lawmakers

94 Senate Journal, 215, 217, 232; Florida Times-Union, 6 May 1943.

95 The general appropriations bill did not cover those departments and functions funded through continuing appropriations. These included the gas tax funds for the State Road Department and the Board of Administration, and the Beverage Department and Motor Vehicle License funds for schools and welfare pensions. General appropriations applied to approximately one-tenth of all the funds handled by the state. Senate Journal, 242; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 7 May 1943; Florida Times-Union, 8 May 1943.

203 and state officials. During the 1943 entertainment, the audience enjoyed impersonations of Comptroller Lee, Attorney General Watson, and Governor Holland. According to newspaper accounts, the amusement ran for ninety laughter-packed minutes before full galleries in the house chamber. The American Legion home hosted a ball for the attaches following the Third House.96 The legislature revisited the issue of organized labor, this time weighing in on the ongoing dispute involving the United Mine Workers (UMW) and their bitterly unpopular leader John L. Lewis. Seeking to assert his union‘s independence from federal wartime labor restrictions, increase his own influence, and put more money in his miners‘ pockets, Lewis took his UMW members out on strike in 1941 and 1943. These strikes severely imperiled the nation‘s defense build-up and made Lewis ―the most unpopular man in America.‖97 Members of the Florida House of Representatives demonstrated their disdain for the UMW leader by unanimously passing a resolution declaring him a ―traitor.‖ Introduced by Reps. E. Clay Lewis of Port St. Joe, R. B. Gautier of Miami, Marshall Wiseheart of Miami, and C. P. Peters also of Miami, the resolution stated,

The actions, attitudes and efforts of John L. Lewis, as a citizen of the United States of America, in calling a strike of his union and thus interrupting the flow of vital war materials to the front, be and the same is hereby branded, named and designated as traitorous action against his own government.

Additionally, the house approved a memorial praising President Roosevelt for his response to the emergency. The senate would later concur in the resolution condemning Lewis.98 Attorney General Watson announced an offer of assistance from the Association of State Attorneys General in dealing with the coal strike to the White House and U.S. Justice Department. Additionally, Watson expressed his personal belief that Lewis had provided ―aid and comfort to the enemy.‖99 The pugnacious Attorney General Watson came in for some critical remarks of his own in a response to an injunction he filed in Leon county circuit court. The suit sought to block the

96 Florida Times-Union, 6 May 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 6 May 1943.

97 David M. Kennedy, Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, 639, 641, 642-643.

98 House Journal, 269, 270, 352, 396, 399, 428, 475, 530, 532; Senate Journal, 198, 201, 222, 270, 271.

99 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 4 May 1943; Florida Times-Union, 5, 6, 7 May 1943.

204

State Cabinet from hiring Stafford Caldwell as a special attorney to handle litigation arising out of the transfer of the estate of John Ringling to the State of Florida. In a lengthy written response to Watson‘s court action, the cabinet members said they had been forced to seek special counsel because Watson would not accept their decisions and instructions related to the Ringling estate litigation. The Ringling estate included the Ringling Art Museum at Sarasota and other properties. The response explained that in proposing a large cash settlement of claims made by Ringling‘s ex-wife, Mrs. Emily Ringling, Watson had acted without authorization and against the desires of the cabinet. A court subsequently nullified Mrs. Ringling‘s claims. Additionally, the cabinet response claimed that the Attorney General acted to block the state‘s efforts to settle a $13,000,000 federal tax claim against the estate for $850,000. Because of these and other actions by Watson, the cabinet contended they found it necessary to employ counsel that would follow instructions. The response further contended that to allow Watson to substitute his judgment on questions of policy for that of a constitutionally authorized board would ―thus nullify the power and paralyze the function of said board contrary to the Constitution and law of the State.‖ The court did not immediately rule on the suit.100 The sixth week of session opened with a flurry of activity by administration leaders in the house seeking to line up support for Governor Holland‘s cigarette tax proposal. Initially intending to delay introduction of the bill until a majority of forty-eight members signed on as co-introducers, Rep. L. C. Leedy of Orange, changed course and submitted the measure with thirty-six other members just before adjournment on Monday, 10 May. Leedy apparently hoped that by advancing the bill‘s introduction it would expedite consideration by the Finance and Taxation Committee and perhaps come up for a floor vote before the end of the week. Administration supporters appeared confident that the Finance and Taxation Committee, chaired by Rep. Leedy, would approve the cigarette tax.101 The decision by the House Finance and Taxation Committee to hold public hearings on the proposed cigarette tax slowed the progress of the proposal and provided an opportunity for the measure‘s foes to unlimber their heavy guns. The hearing took a dramatic and confrontational turn when former state senate president Pat Whitaker, of Tampa, read from a

100 Florida Times-Union, 9 May 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 9 May 1943.

101 House Journal, 375; Florida Times-Union, 10, 11, 12 May 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 10, 11 May 1943.

205 letter from then-candidate Spessard L. Holland to Eli Witt, statewide distributor of tobacco products, dated 26 March 1940. Whitaker, attorney for Witt, quoted candidate Holland‘s statement that he believed any tax

upon cigarettes would amount to a sales tax of [twenty] to [thirty] per cent and would be borne largely by the working man and the average man on the street. For those reasons, if I am elected governor, I will oppose the imposition of any new or additional tax upon cigars, cigarettes, or tobacco, and if such a bill should be passed by the Legislature, I will veto it.

Speaking of Holland‘s reasons for opposing a tax on cigarettes in 1940, Whitaker proclaimed, ―They‘re just as potent and vital, those reasons being true, this bill should be killed.‖ Furthermore, when Witt learned in early 1943 of Holland‘s intention to recommend a tax on cigarettes, he wrote to the governor,

It would be astounding to me that any one [sic] who was held in the esteem of the people to the extent that he was elected Governor would go back on a commitment as definite as the one that you made to me regarding the tax on cigarettes.102

Witt, through Whitaker, sought to defeat the bill by attacking Governor Holland‘s integrity. Campbell Thornall, Holland‘s legislative secretary, responded to Whitaker‘s testimony noting that throughout his legislative career Holland had opposed cigarette taxation and sales taxes. Furthermore, in a written reply to Witt, Holland reminded the cigarette distributor that ―we are in the midst of the greatest war in history‖ and the war made new sources of revenue imperative. The governor further noted that Witt and his business partner Hoyt Woodberry had been ―in thorough accord with me on the necessity for additional revenue, but apparently unwilling to tax the cigarette business though perfectly willing to pass other taxes,‖ including corporate capital stock taxes, insurance premium taxes, and intangibles taxes, as well as new taxes on gambling, and a general sales tax. Holland informed Witt that he was ―specifically committed against a general sales tax and a gross receipts tax and these are the only sources of which I know, other than the cigarette tax, to which we could now turn for sufficient revenue to meet the present need.‖103 For his part, the governor responded to Witt‘s attack by pointing out

102 Miami Daily News, 11 April 1943; Florida Times-Union, 14, 15 May 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14 May 1943.

103 Florida Times-Union, 14, 15 May 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14 May 1943. 206 that the war made his change of position on the cigarette tax necessary and suggested the distributor had put his own interests above all other considerations. As he knew before the start of the hearing, Whitaker‘s attacks on the governor‘s cigarette tax faced an unsympathetic audience in the house. Committee chairman Leedy announced before the hearing that the bill would receive a favorable report because a majority of members supported the bill. In fact, eleven of the twenty-one committee members had co-sponsored the levy.104 Whitaker‘s attack probably served two purposes. The first, to broadcast the anti- cigarette tax argument through the press, hoping it would gain in volume and find a more sympathetic reception when the bill came before the senate. The second, to fulfill a threat the former senate president reportedly made to Governor Holland to create what Miami Daily News columnist Cecil Warren termed ―a lot of fireworks‖ if the chief executive proposed a tax on cigarettes in his annual message to the legislature.105 It was ironic that in threatening Holland, Whitaker may have actually forewarned his former senate colleague and aided in preparing an effective rebuttal. House proponents of stricter regulations on union activity brought the labor question back into the spotlight. Overriding an unfavorable report by the Labor Committee, house members voted fifty-seven to twenty-eight to place the bill on the house calendar. The recalled bill required unions to report financial data, regulated elections, set qualifications for officers and agents, prohibited the collection of initiation or work permit fees, and banned contributions by unions to any political party or candidate. When the labor regulation bill came to the house floor the next day, a ―well-organized‖ majority won passage of the measure after soundly defeating several attempts to weaken it through amendment. The final vote on the measure was sixty-three in favor and twenty-two against.106 The labor regulation bill proceeded to the senate, where the Labor Committee shelved the house-approved version and substituted one created by its own sub-committee. The senate bill required licensing of business agents, outlawed strikes except by majority vote of members, required accurate financial accounting and inspection of financial records, limited picketing, and established a right to organize and bargain collectively. In a

104 Florida Times Union, 15 May 1943.

105 In reporting the Whitaker threat, Warren wrote, ―Rumors are not worth repeating unless well founded, of course, and here is on that is exceptionally so.‖ Miami Daily News, 11 April 1943.

106 Florida Times-Union, 11, 12 May 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 10, 11 May 1943.

207 significant departure from the house regulation bill, it limited rather than abolished work permit fees. The substitute measure passed the senate twenty-nine votes to two votes. The senate- passed bill went to the house for approval. Some observers believed differences from the house bill would result in an impasse and kill labor regulation in the current session. 107 The senate also completed its version of the biennial general appropriations bill. The upper chamber restored over a million dollars cut by its own Appropriations Committee, and then voted to take five per cent from several departments for the state welfare program. Senators Sheldon, Rose, and Maines proposed the diversion of funds, which they said would generate about five hundred thousand dollars to be divided between old age assistance and aid to dependent children. The senate restored most of the Appropriations Committee‘s wide-ranging cuts to departmental budgets through amendments. The bill also included a two million dollar appropriation for postwar construction of a new state university in South Florida. The new university, referred to as the University of South Florida, would have schools of medicine and dentistry, the first public institutions of that kind in the state. Senators Amos Lewis, of Jackson county, and Ernest Graham, of Dade county, pushed the measure as a public construction project to create jobs after the war. The twenty-seven million dollar appropriations bill exceeded the request of the State Budget Commission by about six million dollars and the Appropriations Committee proposal by approximately seven million dollars. The 1941 legislature had approved a biennial appropriation of almost twenty-two million dollars. The bill went to an uncertain reception in the house, where members had been developing their own appropriations plan.108 While much of the legislature focused on the cigarette tax, labor regulation, and appropriations, the Shands committee continued its investigations. Originally created to investigate state expenditures, the committee received additional authorization to expand its probe into school textbook purchases. Speaking in favor of the inquiry, Senator Sheldon, of Tampa, said,

If any racket needs to be investigated by the Shands committee it is the school book racket. Why do they have to change the arithmetic books every few years

107 Senate Journal, 362, 418, 426, 450; Florida Times-Union, 13, 22 May 1943.

108 Senate Journal, 332, 340, 354; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14 May 1943; Florida Times-Union, 15 May 1943.

208

with a new cover and new pictures, then teach it sideways and backwards when two plus two still makes four?109

Sheldon‘s seemingly innocuous statement initiated a series of events that led to an unprecedented action – the barring of a cabinet member from the senate chambers. Following the legislature‘s recess for the weekend, Senator Sheldon received a call from State Superintendent of Education Colin English‘s office asking him to come by. According to Sheldon‘s version of events, he went to English‘s office, where the Superintendent claimed Sheldon had made untrue statements about textbook purchases, called him a ―damned liar,‖ and, along with two others present in the office, attacked the senator. ―Several of them poked me either with their fists or knees, threw me on the floor,‖ claimed Sheldon. English‘s prepared statement on the affair differed substantially from Sheldon‘s. According to English, he ―invited‖ Sheldon to his office ―to ask if he would not correct‖ assertions ―…made on the floor … that the school textbook business was a racket and that the books were changed every year.‖ English claimed Sheldon advised him to ―run my office and he would handle things in the senate,‖ English said Sheldon then

…made a pass at me. I grabbed … him and the others present tried to separate us. I turned him loose, started back to my chair and he rushed at me the second time attempting to hit me. …We fell to the floor at which point we were again separated.

Senate President Beall immediately initiated an investigation and warned that ―any contempt of the Senate or any violation of the rules or regulations‖ would be reported to the senate for consideration and action.110 Upon returning from the weekend recess, the senate met in closed session for several hours over two days to consider the scuffle between the elected officials.111 Returning to open

109 Both the validity of Senator Sheldon‘s statement and the necessity of a textbook buying probe appeared dubious. Senator Collins of Tallahassee recommended delaying action until prices paid by Florida and other states could be compared. Collins said, ―I have been informed that this state is buying books just as cheap or cheaper than any other state.‖ Collins noted that state book contracts required rebates if the same texts were sold at lower prices in any other state. Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14 May 1943. A preliminary report on school book costs by the Shands committee found average per pupil costs for free textbooks lower than any other state. Florida Times-Union, 29 July 1943.

110 Florida Times-Union, 15 May 1943.

111 Florida Times-Union, 18 May 1943.

209 session, the senate approved a formal resolution proclaiming that Senator Sheldon ―was free from fault and insult, assault and battery on the part of Mr. English was unprovoked and wholly unworthy of one holding high public office.‖ The resolution further ―censored and condemned‖ English‘s behavior and withdrew from him ―the privilege of the floor and the gallery of the senate for remainder of this session.‖ Following the adoption of the resolution, a letter of apology from English was read. The senate ordered that the resolution and English‘s letter be published in the chamber journal.112 Upon conclusion of its investigation of state hiring of special attorneys, the Shands committee issued a report declaring spending on outside counsel legal but ―exorbitant.‖ The report explained,

Many of the payments to attorneys are entirely regular and proper and are not subject to criticism, but in several instances our investigation indicates that the employment of attorneys may not have been justified in the first instance, and, further, that attorneys were employed on a commission or contingent basis and that the services rendered did not justify the payment of compensation in the amounts paid.

The report singled out the comptroller‘s office for criticism, calling the fees related to railroad tax litigation, inheritance tax and intangibles tax collections ―so large and unreasonable as to amount to an improper distribution of public funds.‖ The committee recommended restrictions on the number of attorneys engaged and their compensation.113 Proposals to implement committee recommended restrictions on the hiring of outside counsel were introduced but failed to become law.114 Administration allies in the house prepared to push for passage of Governor Holland‘s cigarette tax as the seventh week of the session opened. Called to the floor from the special order business calendar prepared by the rules committee, debate on the bill featured a determined minority seeking to outmaneuver a well organized majority through amendments designed to defeat or delay the measure. Opponents of the levy, mostly from North Florida tobacco growing

112 Senate Journal, 396; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 18 May 1943; Florida Times-Union, 19 May 1943. Of the severity of English‘s punishment by the senate, Allen Morris wrote, ―Since the state superintendent never had ventured [into the senate chamber] the punishment was regarded as token.‖ Miami Herald, 6 June 1943.

113 For the report of the Shands Committee, see Senate Journal, 475-480; Florida Times-Union, 22 May 1943.

114 Miami News, 6 June 1943.

210 counties and cigar industry city of Tampa,115 unsuccessfully offered amendments to substitute a three per cent gross receipts tax, include a tax on oranges, include an unconstitutionally broad exemption for merchant marines, and an excessive tax on cigars. Proponents of the bill, led by L. C. Leedy of Orlando, E. Clay Lewis of Gulf, Newman Brackin of Okaloosa, and Archie Clement of Pinellas, effectively marshaled their forces to defeat each amendment.116 The strength of the forces behind the bill led anti-tax Rep. George Inman of Bradford to make the motion for the final vote on the measure as a tobacco auctioneer‘s chant, culminating in the cry, ―Sold to the Governor of Florida.‖ The cigarette tax bill passed sixty-five votes for over twenty- seven against.117 The measure went to the senate. Upon its arrival in the upper chamber, President Philip D. Beall, a cigarette levy opponent, surprised some observers by referring the measure jointly to two committees – finance and taxation, and miscellaneous legislation. Senator Collins of Tallahassee, chair of the Finance and Taxation Committee, argued that the bill was the sole province of his committee. Beall ruled that a two-thirds vote would be needed to overrule the referral to committees. An attempt to overturn Beall‘s decision failed by a split vote of twelve to twelve, with many members absent from the chamber. Beall‘s referrals withstood the challenge and the uncertainty surrounding the cigarette tax increased.118 The cigarette tax reached the senate floor with the approval of both committees assigned to consider the measure. During debate, opponents of the levy attempted unsuccessfully to amend the measure to appropriate all revenues generated by the tax for public welfare programs. Senator Collins led the effort to block the amendment. The senate approved several friendly amendments designed to exempt cigarette purchases made in merchant marine ship stores and to transfer enforcement of the new tax from the comptroller to the beverage department. An apparent attempt by Senator John R. Mathews, of Jacksonville, to filibuster the measure failed. The amended version of Governor Holland‘s cigarette tax passed by a vote of twenty-five to

115 Hillsborough county‘s three representatives – E. P. Martin, Harry G. McDonald, and Neil C. McMullen – stood together in opposing the measure as a threat to the future of the cigar industry. Florida Times-Union, 18 May 1943.

116 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 17 May 1943.

117 House Journal, 520, 525, 526; Florida Times-Union, 18 May 1943.

118 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 18 May 1943.

211 eleven.119 The house quickly approved of the senate amendments and sent the bill to Governor Holland for his signature. Despite predictions of a court challenge, the law was widely expected to become effective on 1 July.120 As a result of skillful management at the executive and legislative levels, one of the most controversial components of Governor Holland‘s legislative program made its way into law. The senate-approved version of a labor regulation bill arrived on the house floor early in the eighth week of session. Rep. E. P. Martin, chair of the labor committee, unsuccessfully attempted to have the less stringent bill referred to his committee. Following the defeat of Martin‘s motion, Rep. E. Clay Lewis moved that the house accept the senate bill, saying ―This senate bill isn‘t all that we wanted, but if I can‘t get a whole loaf, I‘ll take half.‖ Among the differences between the two bills, the senate version did not prohibit the closed shop and set a ceiling on rather than banned outright fees for initiation or work permits. House members accepted the senate bill by a vote of sixty-five to twelve. It was the first time the Florida legislature had voted to regulate labor in this way. The vote sent the measure to Governor Holland.121 As the legislature moved through its final weeks, the married women‘s emancipation bill traveled a convoluted path taking it from near extinction to an unexpected revival. Rep. Baker‘s bill had been saddled with a nullifying referendum clause and sent to the senate. The upper chamber set the house-version aside and passed its own. The house subsequently killed the senate bill. Refusing to let the measure die, the senate amended the house version to eliminate the referendum clause and sent it to the house, where a motion by Rep. Baker to concur in the senate amendment met defeat. The bill was resuscitated following approval of a motion by Rep. T. A. Delegal, of Suwannee, to reconsider refusal to concur in the senate amendment by a vote of forty-eight to thirty-five. The measure carried on a final tally of forty-six to thirty-seven. Following the improbable passage of the bill, Rep. E. Clay Lewis, a leading opponent of the measure, said, ―This thing seems to have more lives than all my cats. We‘ve killed it at least three times.‖ After the house approved the married women‘s rights bill, Rep. Archie Clement,

119 Senate Journal, 406, 442; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 20 May 1943.

120 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 24 May 1943.

121 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 25 May 1943; Florida Times-Union, 26 May 1943.

212 another determined opponent of the proposal, congratulated Rep. Baker. Governor Holland signed the measure before the session adjourned.122 Several measures that had stalled or been bypassed entirely in favor of other items received consideration during the final fortnight of the session. Among these was a measure that could be considered a holdover from the 1941 session – the redistricting of the state to create a sixth congressional district. The previous legislature had been unable to resolve a number of contentious issues and the additional congressional representative due the state following the 1940 census was elected from the state at large. Under terms of the approved redistricting bill, the district included the following South Florida counties – DeSoto, Charlotte, Lee, Glades, and Hendry counties from the First District; and Okeechobee, Indian River, St. Lucie, Martin, Palm Beach, and Broward counties from the Fourth District. The newly created district replaced the congressman-at-large position held by U. S. Rep. Lex Green.123 The legislature approved two other significant election related measures – revision of the absentee voting law to allow Florida resident military personnel stationed outside of the state to cast ballots, and the repeal of a law giving political parties the power to determine qualifications of members. Final approval of the absentee voting measure came when the house approved a senate-passed bill creating a procedure for sailors and soldiers to vote by mail. Previously, qualified voters cast their ballots with the county judge if planning to be away on the day of voting.124 Repeal of the law allowing political parties the right to determine membership qualifications came in response to federal court decisions prohibiting the practice of using party membership rules to bar otherwise qualified citizens from voting in party primaries. Lawmakers believed that their action would forestall court action that might lead to African American voting in Democratic party primaries. Supporters of repeal argued that while all citizens might vote in general elections, parties had inherent power to determine qualifications of primary voters. ―It

122 House Journal, 789, 822, 1030; Florida Times-Union, 27 May 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 27 May 1943; Miami Daily News, 4 June 1943.

123 J. Hardin Peterson of Lakeland represented the First District. Pat Cannon of Miami represented the Fourth District. The Second, Third, and Fifth Districts remained unchanged. House Journal, 1099; Florida Times-Union, 2, 3 June 1943.

124 Senate Journal, 542, 684; Florida Times-Union, 30 May 1943.

213 will keep Sister Eleanor and her crowd from cramming these negroes down our throats in the next election,‖ declared Rep. Buck Hancock of Madison. Following house approval of the senate-passed proposal, the measure to maintain the white primary went to Governor Holland.125 The governor approved the bill on 10 June.126 Governor Holland received a rare setback in the legislature when the senate, meeting in executive session, refused to confirm his suspension of Broward county Sheriff Walter R. Clark. The sheriff‘s suspension resulted from charges that he permitted gambling and bookmaking in his county. Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent R. G. Danner testified at a senate hearing that gambling ―flourished‖ not only in Broward, but ―along the east coast of Florida,‖ including Dade county. The senate action returned Clark to office and entitled him to payment of his regular salary from the date of his suspension, 23 July 1942. Following the announcement of the senate action, Sheriff Clark said, ―I am very happy to be vindicated.‖ Governor Holland had no comment.127 Governor Holland received yet another disappointment when lawmakers failed to approve limitations on school taxes as he had requested in his message to the legislature. During the first week of session county school administrators made clear their opposition to the elimination of special school district millages, as well as a constitutional provision that combined county and district millages could not exceed ten mills. The measures stalled in the house after receiving an unfavorable report from the amendments committee. The plan made it onto the senate calendar but was not called to the floor. With no apparent pressure from the administration, the proposal languished, finally expiring when the session adjourned.128 School teachers appeared to achieve a victory when the legislature approved a pay raise for the state‘s educators. The proposed salary hike began in the house when Rep. Jerry Collins of Sarasota sponsored a bill increasing the state appropriation to allow a pay increase for white teachers from eight hundred dollars per year to nine hundred and fifty dollars per year.

125 In a predominantly one-party state like Florida, winning the Democratic party nomination virtually assured success in the general election. Therefore, participation in party primaries was essential to having a voice in government. House Journal, 450, 656, 1047; Senate Journal, 746, 815, 832; Florida Times-Union, 3 June 1943.

126 State of Florida, Laws of Florida: General Acts and Resolutions. Tallahassee, Fl., 1943, 550.

127 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 25 May, 2 June 1943; Florida Times-Union, 2 June 1943.

128 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 28 May, 2 June 1943.

214

―Everybody knows the teachers need more money because of the increases in living costs,‖ Collins said.129 The house measure was of questionable benefit to educators because while it increased salaries it did not provide the revenues necessary to fund the raises. The senate unanimously approved the house-passed measure and it went to the governor.130 The final weeks of the legislature typically featured hard negotiations on general appropriations measures and the 1943 session did not deviate from this tradition. The senate and house versions of the general appropriations differed markedly. The house appropriations committee had shelved the senate-passed appropriations measure and used the recommendations of the State Budget Commission as a beginning point. However, the house approved version radically departed from traditional appropriation practices by abolishing continuing appropriations, consolidating services, and including a philosophy of financial practices. The house measure contained about five million dollars less than the senate version. Major differences arose over the senate proposals for $2.5 million for old age pensions and $2 million for creating the University of South Florida. 131 The house measure included increased old age pensions funded by a three per cent ―rider‖ or reduction from overall appropriations. Neither chamber could accept the other‘s version and the measures went to a compromise committee composed of four members each from the house and senate.132 Following days of sometimes contentious negotiations, the legislature eventually gave unanimous approval to a $20,827,000 biennial general appropriations bill on the day before scheduled adjournment. The compromise version of the bill contained a five per cent reduction, or rider, in appropriations for most state agencies, excluding the state hospital and state prison, to provide over $357,000 annually for old age pensions. Some legislators questioned the sincerity and the constitutionality of the pension rider. Others raised questions about the validity of new budgetary practices retained from the house appropriations bill.133 Senate approved

129 Florida Times-Union, 29 May 1943.

130 House Journal, 785, 846, 900, 909, 976; Senate Journal, 670, 765, 771; Florida Times-Union, 29 May, 1 June 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 1 June 1943.

131 Florida Times-Union, 25, 26 May 1943.

132 Florida Times-Union, 2 June 1943.

133 Senator Collins, the only senator to vote against the compromise, questioned the constitutionality of new budgetary practices. Miami Daily News, 4 June 1943. 215 appropriations for the proposed University of South Florida at Miami and its plan for increased pensions did not make it into the final bill. Total appropriations came in $278.000 under the State Budget Commission recommendation.134 Several bills approved by the legislature ran afoul of the governor‘s veto. Most prominent among them were the unfunded raise given to the state‘s public school teachers and portions of the biennial appropriations bill. Governor Holland‘s vetoes would not be the last word on either of these topics as they would reemerge as subjects of political rhetoric and judicial proceedings. Holland warned of dire consequences arising from the increase in state teachers‘ salaries without a definite source of funds. Regarding the revenue to fund the pay hike, the governor said, ―It just doesn‘t exist. There is only one possibility – that is if horseracing may be resumed.‖ If that happened, or some unlooked for windfall came to the state, Holland promised to call a special session to address teacher pay. The governor reminded advocates of the unfunded appropriation that the 1938 school parity amendment to the State Constitution required deductions from other state funds to make good any shortfall in appropriations for school revenues. This would hamstring other departments and functions according to Holland. The governor justified his veto based on his conviction that the raise would cause a crisis in the state‘s general revenue fund.135 Governor Holland used his veto pen to excise portions of the legislature‘s biennial general appropriations bill. The governor justified his veto of a $357,000 annual old age pension rider on several grounds. First, because the five per cent reduction of appropriations for most state departments constituted an income tax levy and was therefore unconstitutional. Second, the governor said ―It is discriminatory class legislation in that it undertakes to levy a tax on a small class of individuals … to procure funds for a general State purpose.‖ Third, Holland questioned the wisdom of reducing funds for essential functions of government without considering whether those functions could continue with reduced means. Since the pension rider came from a reduction in allocated funds, removing that portion of the bill did not reduce overall

134 Some opponents of the proposed medical and dental programs at USF argued for establishing these schools at the University of Florida in Gainesville. Others argued it was premature to plan such an extensive construction project when building materials were unavailable and future availability was uncertain. Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 30, 31 May 1943; Florida Times-Union, 4 June 1943.

135 Florida Times-Union, 10, 15 June 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 10, 15 June 1943.

216 appropriations. The politically popular but constitutionally doubtful old age pension measure did not survive to become law.136 Governor Holland also applied his veto powers to a large section of the general appropriations bill pertaining to the House Appropriations Committee‘s philosophy of financial methods. Similarly to the old age pension rider from the same bill, the governor found many problems with this portion of the measure. His chief objections centered on requirements for additional personnel and machinery that were neither available nor funded, and the unconstitutional inclusion of legislative philosophy only remotely related to appropriations for salaries and expenses.137 In the coming months, advocates of the vetoed financial philosophy would turn to the judiciary for redress. Editorial analyses of the completed legislative session generally found much to praise and little to criticize. An editorial in the Miami Daily News declared the legislature had turned in ―A Good Performance,‖ and cited accomplishments in social measures, promoting economical government, and preparing the state for the transition to a postwar economy. Specifically, the News applauded news laws to suppress venereal diseases, modernize laws regulating the adoption of children, and extend greater legal rights to married women. The ability of lawmakers to limit new taxation, lower appropriations, and block the transfer of funds from the State Road Department and unemployment compensation funds also received praise.138 For the Tallahassee Daily Democrat the most notable feature of the just completed session was the absence of serious conflict among lawmakers. The Democrat remarked that debate had been,

Spirited but seldom bitter and never prolonged. An atmosphere of sober seriousness has prevailed in both houses and has been pronounced in the house of representatives. Members have disagreed but there has been no prolonged wrangling.139

136 Florida Times-Union, 13 June 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 13 June 1943.

137 Florida Times-Union, 13 June 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 13 June 1943.

138 Miami Daily News, 5 June 1943.

139 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 3 June 1943.

217

Like the 1941 session, this legislature, with the exception of the Sheldon-English incident, had been unusually tranquil. Both the Democrat and the News commented on the remarkable degree of influence retained by Governor Holland in his second legislative session. Numerous factors accounted for the typical decline in political clout of Florida‘s chief executive between his initial and final session. A newly inaugurated governor was generally at the peak of popularity having only recently taken office. His newness to the position meant he had committed a minimal number of mistakes and offended few constituents. Additionally, at the beginning of an administration, most lawmakers had either recently obtained or hoped to get the governor‘s help on some problem. By the second session, however, a governor had usually exhausted his patronage appointments and incensed the many people who had hoped to get a job but did not. Furthermore, by this point in his tenure the governor had made many decisions which displeased numerous citizens. Furthermore, speculation over potential successors to the current governor may draw attention and influence away from the lame duck incumbent. Despite the existence of these conditions, the Democrat claimed that the 1943 legislature ended ―with the governor at least as victorious in his second session as any of his predecessors.‖140 The News observed,

At this point it is well to remark – and with intense satisfaction – that for the first time in many administrations the governor‘s throat was not cut by his second legislature. Governor Holland retained all the force and facility of leadership which he had exercised in 1941, and he deserved to on the merits of his program. The state has benefited greatly by the absence of the usual tug-of-war between a governor soon to quit the scene and an aggressive, patronage hungry legislature. Of course, the situation adds greatly to Governor Holland‘s political luster.141

Governor Holland avoided the tendency of many of his predecessors to suffer a loss of influence in their final legislative session. Governor Holland‘s surprising ability to retain influence and leadership well into his term derived, at least in part, from conditions related to the war. Because of the resignations of an unusually large number of state officials and jobholders called to military service and other war- related duties, Governor Holland‘s power of patronage remained strong well into his administration. Under normal conditions, Florida‘s chief executive would have filled most if not

140 Ibid.

141 Miami Daily News, 5 June 1943.

218 all of his appointed positions by this point in his tenure. For Holland, open jobs translated into opportunities to make appointments and retain political influence.142 The high rate of turnover among state officials indirectly sustained the governor‘s influence. The war and other factors resulted in an unusual number of new legislators during the 1943 session. This meant a loss of experience among the members and weakened the influence and power of the legislative branch relative to the executive. As a result of resignations for military service and other factors, fifty-four out of ninety-six house members from the 1941 session did not return for the 1943 session.143 Veteran political columnist Allen Morris attributed the progress of Governor Holland‘s legislative program to the inexperience of newcomers who preferred to expend their energies in floor debate rather than behind the scenes lawmaking.144 A related phenomenon occurred in the senate where due to war-related- resignations, electoral defeat, and illness, fourteen new members took their places in the total membership of thirty-six.145 In addition to reducing the overall number of experienced lawmakers, losses in the senate fell disproportionately among members of the anti-administration faction from the 1941 session. This had the affect of strengthening the influence of Holland‘s many allies and former colleagues in that chamber.146 The war and other factors contributed to a high degree of turnover among appointed and elected officials and strengthened the position of the state‘s chief executive. Several other factors associated with the governor‘s management of administrative proposals undoubtedly contributed to the success of his administration‘s legislative efforts. Prior to both the 1941 and 1943 sessions, Holland crafted legislative programs designed to address the

142 Miami Herald, 11 April 1943.

143 Florida Times-Union, 6 April 1943.

144 Miami Herald, 9 May 1943.

145 Florida Times-Union, 6 April 1943.

146 Allen Morris listed N. Ray Carroll of Kissimmee, Collins of Tallahassee, Ernest R. Graham of Pensuco, S. A. Hinley of Live Oak, and W. A. Shands of Gainesville among Holland‘s ―staunch friends‖ who were likely to provide ―aggressive support of his legislative program.‖ Miami Herald, 11 April 1943. The senate vote on the controversial cigarette tax provides an example of this support. Of those senators included in above list of allies, only Senator Shands sided with the ―Nays‖ on that issue. This was notable because Senator Collins and Senator Graham had expressed qualified opposition to the tax in early April. Senator Hinely, of Live Oak, voted for the tax despite earlier protestations. State of Florida, Journal of the Senate. Tallahassee, Fl., 1943, 443; Palm Beach Post, 7 April 1943.

219 state‘s problems and carefully managed the timing of their introduction into the legislature. Additionally, the advantages derived from his experience as a legislator and the assistance from Holland‘s many allies and former colleagues among the lawmakers should not be underrated. Furthermore, Holland‘s avoidance of public involvement in extremely controversial issues like the cross-state barge canal, closed shop amendment, women‘s rights issues, and other questions served the dual purpose of avoiding unnecessary antagonisms and preserving focus on his program. These elements contributed to an overarching approach to legislative affairs that served the governor well. A comparison of the 1943 session with the one immediately preceding it revealed an instructive contrast. Where the peacetime 1941 legislature implemented sweeping reforms of the state financial system, the wartime 1943 session largely confined itself to the refinement of existing systems and the search for economies. Measures to suppress the spread of venereal disease, further improve the full value assessment program, prepare for postwar conditions, secure existing sources of funds, and replace lost revenues focused mainly on preserving the status quo. Even the newly approved labor and women‘s rights measures appeared to be less innovative considering that they essentially completed efforts begun in the previous session. The house-driven attempt to implement a far-reaching reform of the state financial system represented the most dramatic departure attempted during the session. As the governor noted in a post-session summary, the legislature, ―has left the state in a position where … we can carry on for the next two years without any real hardship or the necessity of abandoning any vital functions.‖147 Given the numerous disruptions visited on the state by the war, this represented no mean accomplishment.

147 Miami News, 6 June 1943. 220

CHAPTER SIX

STATE POLITICS IN AN ELECTION YEAR

The remarkable period of political cooperation and unity between executive and legislative branches ended following the 1943 legislative session. The degeneration of relations resulted in part from Governor Holland‘s vetoes of questionable legislative enactments, the temptation to partisanship during an election year, and a sometimes contentious controversy over the necessity and conditions for calling a special legislative session. Despite escalating conflict between the governor and some legislators, Governor Holland ended his term with robust public approval and a solid record of accomplishment. The first post-legislative session test for the Holland administration came with implementation of the controversial cigarette tax. Collection of the new three cents per package levy fell to the State Beverage Department and was scheduled to begin on 1 July 1943. Beverage Department Director Edgar W. Scarborough announced his agency had made an initial purchase of fifty-million tax stamps for the first few months of operations. Scarborough estimated 125,000,000 stamps would be needed for the first year. In order to license Florida‘s approximately forty-thousand cigarette wholesalers and retailers, the department planned to operate thirty-two temporary and six permanent offices. In addition to the requirement to stamp their existing stocks of cigarettes beginning on 1 July, retailers and wholesalers were required to

221 pay an annual license fee of one dollar.1 State officials projected the new tax would yield approximately $3,500,000 annually for pensions and aid to the counties.2 Civilian cigarette smokers received an unexpected reprieve from the tax on their smokes when a shortage of revenue stamps caused state officials to temporarily suspend enforcement of the levy. The Beverage Department ordered sixty-million stamps in early June, but received only five-million by the enforcement date. Beverage Department officials expected enforcement to begin as soon as the stamps arrived.3 Once sufficient tax stamps arrived to allow enforcement of the cigarette tax on 6 July, revenues flowed into state coffers far in excess of expected levels.4 During the first three weeks of collection, the tax yielded over $600,000, enabling the state to make its first revenue sharing contribution to each of the sixty-seven counties. The heavy flow of revenues increased confidence that sufficient funds would be available to replace the two-million dollars of old age pension funds lost to the suspension of horse racing the preceding winter.5 Annual dealer permit fees augmented the sale of stamped cigarettes by $12,042.6 The initial seven months of cigarette tax collections yielded $3,430,546 in collections, almost equal to the projected take for the first year of operation.7 The unexpected production of the emergency cigarette tax yielded much needed funds for pensions, revenue sharing, and a surplus in the general revenue fund; however, it also made an irresistible target for opponents of the tax.8 Adversaries of the cigarette tax claimed the measure was uncalled-for and an onerous burden on taxpayers. One persistent opponent called on the governor to repeal ―the unnecessary

1 Florida Times-Union, 9 June 1943.

2 Florida Times-Union, 28 June 1943.

3 Florida Times-Union, 30 June, 1 July 1943.

4 Florida Times-Union, 15 July 1943.

5 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 1 August 1943.

6 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 4 August 1943.

7 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 2 February 1944.

8 In addition to the unexpectedly lucrative tax on cigarettes, the resumption of horseracing at the beginning of the 1943-44 season, along with dog racing tax receipts, brought in around five-hundred-thousand dollars in pari-mutuel taxes per week. Federal authorities re-imposed a ban on racing in December 1944. Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 13 February, 24 December 1944.

222 and burdensome tax on cigarettes.‖ Noting that the measure had originally been enacted to prevent a shortage of funds for old age pensions and revenue sharing, this critic observed,

Instead, the funds from this source have risen to the largest figures on record, and there are millions of dollars now in the State treasury. It certainly is not necessary that this iniquitous and burdensome cigarette tax should be imposed on our citizens any longer. We have very heavy federal taxes now in connection with paying the war expenses and I think it is the duty of the state officials to reduce state taxation or local taxation wherever possible.9

The cigarette tax contributed to a growing general revenue fund surplus that provided a means for the governor‘s critics to challenge his administration‘s policies. The tax on cigarettes was only one of many legislative actions to garner public attention following the 1943 session. A new law requiring state and county licenses for emigrant labor agents received its first test with the arrest of Otis G. Nation, a business agent of the Florida Citrus and Allied Workers Union, a Congress of Industrial Organizations local in Orlando. Nation‘s arrest came after 438 African American laborers departed Orlando by chartered train on 31 July 1943, for employment at a Campbell Soup Company plant in Camden, New Jersey. The new law, a response to an intensifying agricultural labor shortage blamed on the draft and the allure of high-paying defense industry jobs, was intended to restrain the recruitment of labor for out-of-state employment.10 The severity of the state‘s labor shortage resulted in competition between growers for workers;11 the recruitment of non-traditional laborers, including high school students, retired adults,12 and prisoners of war;13 and the temporary importation of laborers from the Caribbean.14 Growers warned they could not plant the crops necessary to the war effort without sufficient laborers.15

9 Joseph H. Ross to Governor Spessard L. Holland, 6 June, 1944. Holland Papers, Series 406, Box 67, File Folder (FF) 10 ―Legislation,‖ Florida State Archives (FSA), Tallahassee, Florida.

10 Florida Times-Union, 1, 5 August, 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 1 August 1943.

11 Lisle Smith to Governor Spessard Holland, 18 May 1942. Holland Papers, Series 406, Box 66, FF 1 ―Labor,‖ FSA.

12 Florida Times-Union, 17 November, 1943.

13 Florida Times-Union, 25 February 1944.

14 Florida Times-Union, 28, 29 September, 28 October 1943.

15 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 8 August 1943. 223

The Nation case spotlighted the problem of recruitment of Florida labor for out-of-state employment. Orange county Sheriff Jim Black arrested Nation on a charge of recruiting labor ―to be employed beyond the limits of the State of Florida without first obtaining a license,‖ based on the opinion of County Solicitor O. Raymond Ellars that the action was within the sheriff‘s authority.16 Attorney General Watson became involved after Murl E. Pace, general manager of the United Shippers and Growers Association of Florida, asked him to investigate the situation.17 Watson claimed to have learned that another attempt to transport labor to New Jersey would take place and promised to intervene.18 Campbell Soup Company personnel director Robert E. Worden claimed the federal War Manpower Commission (WMC) had assisted in the recruitment of the citrus pickers and packers from Orange county to help with the picking and processing of tomatoes in New Jersey during that region‘s peak season. Worden pledged that his company would cooperate in transporting the men back to Florida when their jobs in the citrus industry became open again.19 Governor Holland contacted War Manpower Commissioner Paul V. McNutt asking for federal assistance in returning the workers to Florida and charging the WMC with acquiescing to the transfer contrary to labor stabilization regulations and the urgent need for laborers in Florida.20 Otis G. Nation stood trial in Orlando for violating the state‘s law requiring the licensing of labor recruiters.21 The union official was convicted and sentenced to pay a fifteen-hundred dollar fine and court costs or serve one-year in jail. Judge W. M. Murphy overruled Nation‘s motion for a new trial but granted an appeals bond.22 In April 1944, the state supreme court refused to review Nation‘s conviction.23

16 Florida Times-Union, 5 August 1943.

17 Florida Times-Union, 1 August 1943.

18 Miami Daily News, 5 August 1943.

19 Florida Times-Union, 2 August 1943.

20 St. Petersburg Times, 7 August 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 11 August 1943.

21 The law required labor recruiters to have a one-thousand dollar state license and a five-hundred dollar county license. Florida Times-Union, 19 October 1943.

22 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 20 October 1943.

23 Florida Times-Union, 12 April 1944.

224

Shortly after Nation‘s conviction on the license violation, Attorney General J. Tom Watson wrote a series of letters to Orange County Solicitor Raymond Ellars urging prosecution of the labor representative and a female associate for adultery.24 The warrant for the arrest of Nation and his supposed companion had been based on an affidavit made by an official of the Florida Farm Bureau Federation.25 When Ellars initially failed to reply to Watson‘s requests for reports on the matter, the attorney general prevailed upon Governor Holland to obtain a response. Ellars‘s subsequent reply to Watson revealed the solicitor‘s reluctance to pursue prosecution due to misgivings about the strength of the evidence supporting the charge. Ellars wrote to Watson,

When you ask me if I differ with you on the reasonable possibility of conviction of these defendants, I can only state that no evidence has been presented to me, nor made available to me, nor have I been able to uncover any, which would justify me, under my oath of office, in filing an information.26

Orange County Solicitor Ellars wrote separately to Governor Holland explaining why he had not responded to Watson‘s letter. Referring to his previous experiences working with the attorney general on the Nation license case, Ellars explained,

So far as gathering any evidence for the trial of that case or preparation of the trial, Mr. Watson was a positive and definite obstacle and hindrance rather than a help. Mr. Watson wrote a lot of letters, made a lot rash statements and promises, and had his fighting Tom picture in the paper a number of times, but Nation was tried and then convicted, in spite of Mr. Watson rather than on account of him. I was amazed, stupefied and baffled at Mr. Watson‘s lack of knowledge of simple rules of evidence and law, of what could be done and what could not be done, at some of the contents of the letters I received from him. I found him very difficult to work with or even to understand…. I am mindful of my obligations to the oath of office, to the Governor that appointed me, and to the people that elected me.

24 J. Tom Watson to Raymond Ellars, 24 November, 27 December 1943. Holland Papers, Series 406, Box 65, FF 6, FSA.

25 Doubts about the legitimacy of this affidavit apparently contributed to Ellars‘s hesitance to pursue the case. Ellars wrote to Attorney General Watson, I have talked with Mr. J. A. Cargill, an attorney at law representing Mr. John Ford, secretary of the Florida Farm Bureau Federation, who made the affidavit upon which the warrant was issued, and he stated to me that his client had no knowledge of the facts to support the warrant, but had made the affidavit upon the advice of Mr. Rogers Wells, an attorney representing the Growers & Shippers League of Fla., but that he, Mr. Cargill, was interested in seeing that his client, Mr. Ford, was not sued for malicious prosecution. I talked with Mr. Rogers Wells and he stated that he acted on the advice of the Attorney General…. Raymond Ellars to J. Tom Watson, 18 December 1943. Holland Papers, Series 406, Box 65, FF 6, FSA.

26 Raymond Ellars to J. Tom Watson, 18 December 1943. Holland Papers, Series 406, Box 65, FF 6, FSA.

225

And so it is, that after much thought and consideration, I decided that I could best fulfil [sic] those obligations by having to do with Mr. Watson as little as possible, consistent with my position. And that is why I did not answer his letter of Nov. 24th.27

The events described and opinions expressed in the documents pertaining to the Nation adultery prosecution presented an unflattering portrait of Attorney General J. Tom Watson. Ellars‘s statement to Governor Holland depicted the attorney general as unknowledgeable, self- promoting, and capricious. Add to this assessment the questions about the affidavit supporting Nation‘s adultery arrest and a much more sinister picture of manipulation and prosecution for political ends emerged. Considered in light of his ongoing campaign to prohibit the union closed shop, his upcoming reelection campaign, and his frequent clashes with others on both personal and policy matters, these documents suggested a worrisome lack of impartiality and objectivity on the part of the state‘s chief law enforcement officer. Another legislative controversy returned to the headlines when two members of the Florida House of Representatives filed suit challenging Governor Holland‘s authority to veto the so-called ―House Philosophy‖ section of the 1943 General Appropriations Bill. The suit, filed in Leon County Circuit Court by Rep. Thomas B. Dowda of Palatka and Rep. Joe C. Jenkins of Gainesville, disputed Governor Holland‘s authority to nullify a portion of the bill that did not pertain to specific appropriations and sought an order forcing the comptroller to set up a more comprehensive system of financial accounting as required in the vetoed section.28 Dowda chaired the House Appropriations Committee and Jenkins led the sub-committee that authored the bill. The legislators justified the accounting change because under the current system,

Various state boards, bureaus, commissions, departments and other agencies of the state government are enabled to successfully hide large sums of state monies disbursed extravagantly, wastefully, needlessly, and improperly for various and sundry purposes.29

27 Based on the labor files of the Holland papers and examination of state newspapers, it did not appear the prosecution of Nation on charges of adultery occurred during this period. Raymond Ellars to Governor Spessard Holland, 18 December 1943. Holland Papers, Series 406, Box 65, FF 6, FSA.

28 Florida Times-Union, 19 September 1943.

29 Florida Times-Union, 15 October 1943.

226

Comptroller J. M. Lee wasted no time in commenting on the suit, responding to both the practicality of the accounting changes and the charges of waste. Noting that his department currently audited all state expenses and maintained statements for public inspection, Lee explained that the vetoed House Philosophy section required additional personnel and auditing equipment that were both unfunded and presently unavailable. Additionally, Lee proclaimed, ―There isn‘t any waste and extravagance going on in state operations as was inferred by statements‖ related to Dowda and Jenkins‘s suit.30 The legislators would expand their assault upon the governor‘s veto in a separate suit asking the Leon Circuit Court to compel Secretary of State R. A. Gray to restore the vetoed section to the 1943 General Appropriations Bill.31 The issue eventually made its way to the State Supreme Court, where the House Philosophy section was ruled unconstitutional. In an opinion by Justice Armistead Brown, the court said,

It is manifest that the legislature considered this matter of appropriations laws so important that it required they should be freed from all log rolling by putting into such bills riders dealing with any other subject whatsoever.32

While the attempt to overturn the governor‘s veto failed, it indicated the degree of residual displeasure over events from the 1943 legislature felt by Dowda, Jenkins, and a few others. These dissenters would make their feelings known in other ways. A combination of events and circumstances, including the discontent of some members of the 1943 legislature, coalesced to create a groundswell of sentiment for a special legislative session prior to the regular biennial meeting scheduled for April 1945. The first public call for an extra session came in a proposal by Sen. Wallace Sturgis of Ocala for revision of the 1943 absentee voting law to allow for registration of Floridians serving outside of the state. Sturgis‘s suggestion drew the backing of Sen. Ernest F. Householder, president pro-tem of the state senate.33 As the take from the cigarette tax continued to expand the state‘s general revenue fund,

30 St. Petersburg Times, 19 September 1943.

31 Florida Times-Union, 19 November 1943.

32 St. Petersburg Times, 1 November 1944.

33 Householder took on the duties of senate president following the death of Senate President Philip Beall of Pensacola on 14 December 1943. Florida Times-Union, 15, 16, 17 December 1943.

227 producing $2.9 million in its first six months, advocates of cigarette tax repeal soon joined the call for a special session.34 While outlining his program for the remaining months of his term, Governor Holland attempted to quell enthusiasm for a special session. Of plans to revise the absentee voting laws to allow for registration of those who reached voting age after leaving the state, or to facilitate voting in the second primary, Holland said,

The 1943 law takes good care of first primary voting by service men except in the case of men who became [twenty-one] since they left the state, and I don‘t see that any plan is going to let any man overseas vote in the second primary because there is too little time between it and the first primary to get ballots to the service men and back again. Certainly I can‘t get very excited about any plan that affects only the general election because our election is in the primaries.

The governor manifested a similar reticence for the prospect of cigarette tax repeal. Acknowledging the healthy revenues generated by the resumption of horseracing, Governor Holland still claimed the state‘s financial situation was far from stable. He warned that,

Nobody can know what will happen to racing, and we may feel a decrease in liquor tax revenue – as other states already have – at any time….We don‘t know what we will be called upon for in connection with gasoline, food and other war requirements, but we‘ve got to meet it when it comes. And each requirement will have some effect on local and state government.35

In addition to these reservations, Holland wanted to avoid a special session to preserve his considerable accomplishments from the 1943 session and to avoid potential legislative excesses committed with an eye to the 1944 primary election.36 A January 1944 letter from the governor to state senator and gubernatorial candidate Raymond Sheldon illustrated Holland‘s stance on an extra legislative session. Responding to a telegram in which Sheldon offered to serve ―at my own expense‖37 if a special session were

34 Florida Times-Union, 4 January 1944; St. Petersburg Times, 4 January 1944; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 4 January 1944.

35 Florida Times-Union, 4 January 1944; St. Petersburg Times, 4 January 1944; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 4 January 1944.

36 St. Petersburg Times, 16 January 1944.

37 Sen. Raymond Sheldon to Governor Holland, 3 January 1944. Holland Papers, Series 406, Box 68, FF ―Legislators, 1944,‖ FSA.

228 called, Holland wrote, ―There is not the slightest chance of such a special session at any time in the near future for any reasons now known to me.‖38 In his public and personal statements, Holland maintained his opposition to a special session. Despite Governor Holland‘s attempts to discourage it, the prospect of a special session became a campaign issue in the 1944 primaries. State Senator Frank D. Upchurch of St. Augustine, another gubernatorial aspirant, beat his opponents to the punch in publicly requesting the governor call a special session to create legislation to raise teacher salaries, increase state assistance to the aged, blind, and indigent children, facilitate soldier voting, and protect the state‘s interest in mineral rights following a reported oil discovery in the Everglades. Upchurch cited the unexpected recent increases in state revenue as the source for teacher raises and increased welfare programs. Political observers attributed Upchurch‘s gambit to a bid for publicity and the votes of the teacher and old-age blocs. Upchurch‘s motives notwithstanding, his statements energized the ranks calling for a special session.39 Among those advocating a special session, there existed a faction motivated, at least in part, by a desire to discredit Governor Holland by forcing a reversal of his vetoes of teacher pay raises and the House Philosophy section of the appropriations bill. Representative Thomas B. Dowda and Representative Joe C. Jenkins stood at the forefront of this anti-Holland cohort. Dowda and Jenkins‘s public differences with the governor centered on his controversial vetoes. Jenkins wrote to Holland urging a special session to ―re-establish the teacher unit appropriations passed by the last Legislature….‖40 At the same time, Dowda and Jenkins pursued legal action to negate the governor‘s veto of the House Philosophy portion of the appropriations bill. In addition to sincere differences over policy, Dowda and Jenkins may well have sought to build their own political fortunes by playing to anti-Holland sentiment that appeared to be gaining volume in the latter months of the governor‘s tenure. Dowda‘s name was linked to potential future candidacies for speaker of the 1947 state house of representatives, supreme court justice, and governor.41 Additionally, personal reasons may have influenced Jenkins‘s actions. A

38 Governor Holland to Sen. Raymond Sheldon, 4 January 1944. Holland Papers, Series 406, Box 68, FF ―Legislators, 1944,‖ FSA.

39 St. Petersburg Times, 16 January 1944.

40 Florida Times-Union, 20 January 1944.

41 Miami Herald, 21 May 1944. 229 legislative colleague admonished Jenkins for opposing Holland‘s proposal for a special session ―for past prejudiced reasons, of which, the public is uninformed.‖42 For this faction, a special session offered an opportunity to overturn Holland‘s vetoes and potentially build a following among the governor‘s critics. As the calls for action continued, Governor Holland and members of his administration responded by noting the many obstacles to a successful special session. Proponents of soldier voting reform cited two flaws in the existing law. First, individuals reaching voting age while stationed outside of Florida had no way of registering and therefore were not eligible to receive absentee ballots. Second, the short time span, three weeks, between first and second Democratic primaries did not allow sufficient time to get second primary ballots to the out-of-state voters and back by election day. Administration officials observed that the only way to solve the registration problem would be to eliminate it, allowing service members to vote in the Democratic primaries regardless of race or party membership. No one expected the state legislature to approve that solution. To cope with the short turnaround between the first and second primaries, U.S. Representative and gubernatorial candidate Lex Green suggested a return to the Bryan single primary system of using first and second choice votes to determine nominees.43 Florida employed the Bryan system from 1920 to 1931, when the legislature abolished its use. Very little public or legislative support existed for a return to the Bryan system.44 Passage of a measure to use surplus revenues for a teacher pay increase required a compromise between groups favoring different approaches to the question of how best to provide aid to education. On one side, a group favored re-enactment of the nine-hundred-fifty dollar teacher unit appropriation approved by the previous legislature. On the other, the Holland administration and its supporters wanted a stabilization pool to aid the poorest counties. In the

42 These reasons were not specified. Rep. Newman Brackin to Rep. Joe C. Jenkins, 3 July 1944 (copy in Holland files). Holland Papers, Box 67, FF 10 ―Legislation,‖ FSA.

43 Under the Bryan system, voters cast first- and second-choices for each contest. When no candidate received a majority of first-choice votes, the second-choice votes for the two leading candidates were added to the first-choice votes to determine the nominee. Florida switched to runoff primary elections after 1931. Annie Mary Hartsfield and Elston E. Roady, Florida Votes, 1920-1962: Selected Election Statistics. (Tallahassee, Fl.: Institute of Governmental Research, Florida State University, 1963) vii.

44 Palm Beach Post, 23 January 1944.

230 middle, the Florida Continuing Education Council called for both the stabilization pool and a one-thousand dollar teacher unit appropriation. The difficulty of compromise was further complicated by residual hard feelings from the recently completed session and the temptation to play politics in an election year.45 The very real danger of a run-away special session hovered over all of the administration‘s calculations regarding the matter. While the governor could call the session for a single purpose, a two-thirds vote in each house would allow legislators to consider and pass bills on any subject. Without some sort of commitment to the governor‘s program by a third of the legislators there would be no restrictions on legislation created during the twenty days constitutionally allotted to a special session.46 Practical obstacles to voting reform, the difficulty of compromise on aid for education, and the perils of election-eve lawmaking made it unlikely Governor Holland would call a special session. In addition to these impediments, Governor Holland saw other dangers inherent in ordering a special session before the primaries. With many legislators actively campaigning for re-election or selection for higher office, the governor recognized the potential temptation to use the legislative forum to advance the candidacies of self and friends or attack those of political enemies. With four state senators – J. Edwin Baker, Ernest R. Graham, Raymond Sheldon, and Frank D. Upchurch – running for governor and one representative – E. P. Martin – seeking the attorney general post, Holland feared they would become targets for political tricks. Allen Morris described the causes of Holland‘s reservations,

As the governor realizes, a foe easily might be maneuvered into voting during a legislative session on some tricky, double-meaning proposition which could not be explained to the electorate in time before the state balloting. Then, too, with two powerful groups, teacher and pension, having their eyes on the multi-million dollar jackpot, the governor has indicated he feels conscientious legislators unfairly might be placed at the mercy of pre-election promisers [sic]. A further complication is the fact that in a number of counties one or more legislators have resigned to enter military service or for other reasons. Dade and Duval counties, for instance, have left but two each of their four members…. All and all, the situation adds up in the governor‘s thinking to one in which the public interest

45 Florida Times-Union, 23 January 1944.

46 Florida Times-Union, 23 January 1944; Palm Beach Post, 23 January 1944.

231

best would be served by getting the politicking over before the spending of the people‘s money starts.47

The numerous barriers to good legislation reinforced Governor Holland‘s general reluctance to call a special session and gave him sufficient grounds to postpone consideration of the matter until after the first and second primaries in May. Florida‘s 1944 Democratic gubernatorial primary largely fit the mold of what V. O. Key, Jr. described as the state‘s ―amorphous politics‖ in which candidates selected themselves rather than being recruited by organized factions within the state Democratic party. Key described the result of this self-recruitment process,

The array of candidates finally lined up for the primary race usually includes representatives of the principal geographic sections, although they are not sponsored by sectional machines. The candidate‘s strength in his home area reflects friendship and local prominence. Florida‘s pre-primary nominating practices thus come down in large measure to the personal volition of the would-be candidate…. Individuals put themselves forward and if it looks as though they have a remote chance they can attract enough financial support to make a campaign. The sifting of candidates is performed by the voters in the first primary. The voter chooses from a long list of self-nominated individuals, and in the multiplicity of candidates and general confusion the primary becomes something of a lottery. At times candidates of the extreme right, and less frequently, of the extreme left, turn up on the ballot and make their views well-enough known for the electorate, with its usual good sense, to bat them down. More often, the voter must choose from among indeterminate shades of gray.48

In addition to the typical confusion inherent in Florida‘s gubernatorial primaries, the war imposed restrictions on travel that made it more difficult for voters to get a read on candidates and compounded the lottery-like quality of the process. In number the 1944 Democratic gubernatorial primary field of six candidates fell well short of the fourteen aspirants in 1936 and eleven hopefuls of 1940.49 Typical of state-wide races in Florida, each candidate represented a particular geographic region. Listed in order of

47 In the event of a post-primary special session, Holland intended to call special elections to select representatives to fill vacant seats. It was assumed that those elected to the 1945 legislature would be the interim choices. Miami Herald, 20 February 1944.

48 Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, 412-413.

49 William W. Rogers, ―The Great Depression,‖ in Michael Gannon, ed., The New History of Florida. [Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996), 307-308.

232 announced candidacy, the field consisted of U. S. Representative and former state legislator Robert A. ―Lex‖ Green of Starke; former U. S. Representative and state legislator Millard F. Caldwell of Tallahassee; state Senator Ernest R. Graham of Miami; state Senator Frank D. Upchurch of St. Augustine; state Senator J. Edwin Baker of Umatilla; and state Senator Raymond Sheldon of Tampa. Of these six, three – Green, Graham, and Sheldon – anticipated the hometown support of major urban areas in the state. Similarly, two – Green and Caldwell – probably expected to attract the support of the constituents, in Caldwell‘s case former constituents, in their extensive congressional districts.50 All the aspirants could boast of service in the state legislature. Two of the six – Baker, and Green – could claim the distinction of being Florida-born.51 The remaining candidates originated in Tennessee (Caldwell), Michigan (Graham), Canada (Sheldon), and Georgia (Upchurch).52 An overview revealed a field strong in legislative experience, at least three candidates with expectations of urban support (Graham, Green, and Sheldon), and two more candidates with the potential for strong rural backing in north Florida (Caldwell and Green). Newspaper accounts of veteran Congressman Robert A. ―Lex‖ Green‘s entry into the race for governor emphasized his many years of service and the numerous federal projects brought to the state. Green received credit for introducing legislation resulting in the establishment of the Jacksonville Naval Air Station, a forestry experiment station at Olustee, a United States Veterans facility at Bay Pines, and federal buildings throughout Florida‘s Second Congressional District. Additionally, Green championed the development of Florida‘s rivers, harbors, and inland waterway system, security for the aged, farm relief, business development, and national defense.53 While his opponents could justly point to their own legislative experience, Green‘s years of service as a state and national legislator set him apart from the remainder of the field.

50 Green represented Florida‘s Second District from 1925 to 1942. He won election to Florida‘s new sixth congressional seat representing the state at large in 1942. Caldwell served the Third Congressional District from 1933 through 1940. Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 16 July, 14 October 1943; Miami Herald, 9 April 1944.

51 Miami Herald, 5 December 1943, 19 March, 9 April 1944.

52 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14 October 1943; Florida Times-Union, 18 November 1943; Miami Herald, 13 February 1944.

53 Florida Times-Union, 12 August 1943; Miami Daily News, 12 August 1943, Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 12 August 1943.

233

Simultaneous with the announcement of his candidacy, Green released a sweeping ten- point program. Described as goals of his administration, Green pledged to work to realize restoration of state rights and local government after victory in the war; equity and justice for industry and labor; harmony and cooperation between governor and cabinet; matching of federal grants for aid to the aged, blind, and dependent children; advancement of tourism and virtually all other commercial enterprises; and increased salaries for school teachers.54 Green‘s program appeared designed to appeal to voters supportive of small government, commerce, welfare programs, and teacher pay increases. Green‘s gubernatorial candidacy continued a highly successful political career dating at least to his days as a classmate of Governor Spessard Holland at the University of Florida. Holland and others reportedly remembered ―Pea‖ Green as a campus politician with ambitions of eventually rising to the governor‘s office. After receiving his degree from the University of Florida and studying law at Yale, Green pursued dual occupations as educator and politician. At the same time the future congressman worked as teacher and principal, he served successively as messenger, clerk, and member of the Florida House of Representatives. He held the office of county judge from 1920 until his election to represent Florida‘s Second Congressional District in 1924. Green held that seat from 4 March 1925 until he resigned to successfully pursue the state‘s new congressman-at-large position in 1942. In bidding to achieve his long-held dream of sitting in the governor‘s chair, Green mounted his second statewide campaign in two years.55 Like practically every officeholder with a similarly extensive record, Rep. Green had numerous political advantages and handicaps. Green‘s most formidable assets derived from his long tenure in the U. S. House. During his nearly twenty-year career in Congress, Green had built up the civilian equivalent of a small army reliant upon him for patronage through the federal appointments and contracts he controlled or influenced. Additionally, Green reputedly exceeded most other congressmen in taking care of the general requests for assistance from his constituents. The hardships of the Great Depression and the economic conditions prevalent in many rural areas of Green‘s district probably magnified the importance of the aid he dispensed. The ranks of those beholden to Green were said to be both loyal and active on his behalf. In

54 Florida Times-Union, 12 August 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 12 August 1943.

55 Miami Herald, 9 April 1944.

234 addition to those materially or otherwise obligated, there existed a second contingent, described by Allen Morris as the ―little people,‖ who regularly received ―cookbooks and first aid hints and flag manuals,‖56 as well as speeches by Green and others excerpted from the Congressional Record, courtesy of their congressman.57 Pundits believed these favors brought Green name recognition and a strong bond with constituents in the rural and isolated areas of his district. Furthermore, Green possessed a knack for oratory described as a ―mesmeric, disarming gift of tongue,‖ well suited to delivering the speeches and radio broadcasts vital to an effective campaign.58 Like his numerous political assets, many of Green‘s political liabilities derived from his long record in Congress. Curiously, the most commonly voiced criticisms of Green focused on his use of congressional privileges to lay ―down a continual barrage of literature‖ directed at his constituents. Detractors repeatedly hit Green for employing federally subsidized printing and the congressional privilege of free mail to produce and distribute his many missives to his district. This fostered the impression that Green used his office to enhance personal power rather than fully devoting himself to his constituents, the state, and the nation.59 A Fort Myers News-Herald editorial reviewing potential opponents referred to Green as ―a mail order congressman‖ and cautioned his election would result in ―four years of political shysterism in the governor‘s chair.‖60 The volume of political animus directed at Green seemed disproportionate to his supposed offense of abusing the privileges of office and may have reflected discontent over his distribution of patronage. A common tenet of Florida politics held that patronage could be a double-edged sword, creating loyal supporters among recipients and bitter opponents from those

56 Miami Herald, 16 January 1944.

57 For examples of the material Rep. Green provided his constituents, see ―List of Available Farmers‘ Bulletins and Leaflets of the United States Department of Agriculture,‖ dated 15 January 1944; and ―Congressman Green‘s Achievements: Speech of Hon. Patrick H. Drewry,‖ dated 8 March 1944; in Ernest R. Graham Papers, Box 28, FF ―Campaign Correspondence – Green, Richard ‗Lex,‘‖ Special Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.

58 Miami Herald, 9 April 1944.

59 Miami Herald, 9 April 1944.

60 Fort Myers News-Herald editorial reprinted in Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 13 August 1943.

235 denied.61 For Green, perceptions of his nearly twenty-year record in Congress represented both his greatest asset and most serious liability. The second entrant into the race for governor, Millard F. Caldwell, like Green, could also point to his service in the Florida legislature and Congress. Caldwell attended Carson-Newman College in his home state of Tennessee and the University of Mississippi before volunteering for service in the First World War. Caldwell studied law at the University of Virginia following the war and later joined a law practice in Milton, Florida. He held posts in the Milton city government and the Santa Rosa county government. Caldwell served as a member of the Florida legislature in 1929 and 1931. He was a late entry in the 1932 Democratic primary contest for Florida‘s Third Congressional District seat held by Representative Thomas A. Yon. Caldwell financed his candidacy by taking a loan backed by his World War life insurance policy. Caldwell defeated the incumbent Yon by a substantial majority. While in Congress, Caldwell served on the important Foreign Affairs and Appropriations committees. He paid special attention to American foreign policy and promoted national defense. Caldwell voluntarily retired from Congress on 1 January 1941 and moved to Tallahassee where he practiced law, operated a dairy farm, and raised cattle.62 In announcing his candidacy, Caldwell committed to wage an energetic campaign to carry his message to the people of Florida. In a brief statement of his candidacy, Caldwell promised,

My campaign will be direct and vigorous. I will openly and frankly discuss the issues and the problems of government in Florida. My appeal will be based on ability and fitness for the job without emotional and political leap-frogging. Government must be simplified and brought back to the people. I will not swap promises for votes.63

His announcement initiated an unusual campaign characterized by an avowed refusal to engage in the horse-trading and promise-making that generally characterized political contests.

61 Miami Herald, 11 April 1943.

62 Florida Times-Union, 15 October 1943; New York Times, 30 June 1932; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14 October 1943.

63 Florida Times-Union, 15 October 1943.

236

For the most part, Caldwell made good on his promise by focusing on the state‘s problems and avoiding the appearance of political dealing. A newspaper profile of the candidate described how, while at the Carrollton hunt, an annual three day gathering of state politicians ostensibly held as a shooting party, Caldwell actually took his gun into the fields in pursuit of game rather than join the other gubernatorial candidates present in shaking hands and electioneering. ―I don‘t mix my hunting and my politicking,‖ Caldwell reportedly replied to friends who needled him about his failure to mix with the crowd.64 A formidable legislative record in Congress buttressed the Tennessee-born candidate‘s no-nonsense demeanor. As a congressman, Caldwell identified the need for national self-sufficiency in war materials as early as 1934 and unsuccessfully attempted to embargo shipments to Japan and build strategic reserves in the U.S. Furthermore, Caldwell advocated the expansion of both the Army and Navy.65 This combination of the appearance of candidness, his disavowal of political trades, and an impressive congressional record made Caldwell a serious contender and clearly differentiated him from his main opponent and former congressional colleague Lex Green. These factors in addition to the backing of Florida banking, railroad, and real estate mogul Edward Ball, and other conservative interests, 66 made Caldwell a formidable candidate.67 Another experienced politician with state-wide name recognition joined the race when Dade county state Senator Ernest R. Graham announced his candidacy. Born in Croswell, Michigan, and educated at Michigan State College, Graham came to Florida after working as an engineer in the gold mines of South Dakota and ten months overseas service with the U.S. Army

64 Miami Herald, 9 January 1944. Caldwell promoted the impression that he was a politician who said what he meant and meant what he said. A 1987 profile at the time of Caldwell‘s death quoted Allen Morris, ―He was a straight-talking person. He wouldn‘t soft-soap anybody. He was blunt.‖ Boca Raton News, 24 October 1984.

65 Florida Times-Union, 15 October 1944; Miami Herald, 9 January 1944; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14 October 1944.

66 Martin Dyckman, Floridian of His Century: The Courage of Governor LeRoy Collins. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006), 43.

67 Files generated by the Caldwell campaign suggest a well organized and financed campaign employing, in addition to print advertisements, a torrent of direct mailings to the individual members of civic, commercial, and professional organizations. These files contain reams of membership and other lists targeting voters in communities, cities and counties across the state. Additionally, files indicate the carefully planned and monitored use of pre-recorded speeches – called ―platters‖ – in radio markets around the state. Millard Fillmore Caldwell Papers, Boxes 3,4, 5, 6, 7, 8, Special and Area Studies Collections, George B. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.

237 in World War I. Following the war, the Pennsylvania Sugar Company sent Graham to south Florida to drain a portion of the Everglades for sugarcane cultivation. Graham remained in the state and established a dairy which evolved into a six thousand acre farm producing cattle and truck vegetables eighteen miles northwest of Miami. During his eight years in the Florida Senate, Graham built a strong reputation battling horse racetrack management and advocating for increased old age pensions.68 The Dade county resident had been instrumental in steering the recision of the poll tax as a prerequisite for voting through the state senate in 1937.69 Additionally, Graham enjoyed a long-standing personal and political friendship with Governor Holland dating back to their shared time in the state senate.70 The mining engineer turned agriculturalist ran on a program of achieving statewide prosperity through self-sufficiency and sectional interdependence. According to Graham‘s economic vision, the tourism and industrial centers of the state would serve as markets for the agricultural products of northern and western Florida, thereby bringing cash to rural areas of the state and reducing the demand for tax dollars from the more prosperous urban areas. Furthermore, Graham predicted that increased intrastate commerce would yield additional revenues to the state through gas, auto, and other taxes. Referring to the potential of his program, Graham declared,

In sound business principles lies the solution of the state‘s financial problems, and by application of these principles and without new taxes, state finances at the war‘s end will be sufficient to complete the too-long delayed program for adequate old age assistance, teachers‘ salaries, child welfare, public health, charities and post-war employment…. Now is the time for a practical and successful business man to continue this good work by taking stock of our true resources and by realizing that, only in the closest cooperation and harmony between all sections of the state, can we bring to immediate reality, the true prosperity for which our state is destined.71

68 Florida Times-Union, 18 November 1943; Miami Daily News, 18 November 1943; Miami Herald, 7 November 1943.

69 H. D. Price, The Negro and Southern Politics: A Chapter of Florida History. (Westport: Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), 23.

70 Miami Daily News, 18 November 1943; Miami Herald, 2 April 1944.

71 Miami Daily News, 18 November 1943.

238

In crafting a program emphasizing sectional interdependence and harmony, Graham sought to overcome the barrier of sectional antagonism said to have previously prevented Dade county residents from winning state office.72 Additionally, Graham had to defeat the assumption that he could not draw trans-sectional support in order to prove himself a viable candidate. The Dade senator addressed this problem by announcing his candidacy at a south Florida gathering of business, civic, and state leaders from all sections of the state. Many of those present at the event, including State Senator W. A. Shands, of Gainesville, endorsed Graham‘s campaign.73 Over the following days, influential north Florida Senator Amos Lewis of Jackson county and Senator A. L. Wilson of Gadsden county committed to Graham‘s candidacy.74 Additionally, the Michigan-native drew the active support of a number of other state leaders, including state Senator LeRoy Collins of Tallahassee; Rep. and Speaker Richard Simpson of Monticello; and Rep. E. Clay Lewis of Port St. Joe.75 Graham crafted his campaign program to appeal to the sectional interests of north and south Florida, the old age pension forces, and teacher pay increase advocates. Political observers generally considered the three remaining candidates for the governorship as dark horse contenders for a number of reasons including their relative lack of experience, organization, and name recognition.76 St. Augustine attorney and state Senator Frank D. Upchurch led the second contingent of candidates. Born in Race Pond, Georgia, Upchurch graduated from Duval High School in Jacksonville, attended the University of North Carolina, and read law at the University of Florida, graduating in 1915. Upchurch practiced law in Jacksonville until volunteering for Marine Corps service in World War I. Following the war, the former leatherneck moved to Fernandina where he served in city government and represented Nassau county in the 1921 state house of representatives. The peripatetic Upchurch moved back

72 Miami Herald, 28 November 1943.

73 Miami Daily News, 18 November 1943.

74 Miami Herald, 28 November 1943.

75 List of ―Key Men,‖ undated, Ernest R. Graham Papers, Box 28, FF ―Campaign Correspondence – Shands, William A.‖ Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville.

76 Miami Herald, 19 March 1944.

239 to Jacksonville before settling in St. Augustine, where he served as mayor in 1928.77 Upchurch represented St. Johns county in the 1943 state senate, where he offered an amendment to the controversial closed shop amendment preserving the right to bargain collectively through labor unions. Senator Upchurch ran on a program of improved support for public schools, including pay raises for teachers; increased welfare services featuring higher pensions for the aged and better care for the blind and dependent children; and an uncommonly sympathetic plan for the rehabilitation of returning service men and women who suffered illness or injury while in the military.78 Recognizing that the public perceived an ambiguous connection between his candidacy and the closed shop question, Upchurch attempted to tread a narrow path, promising that the proposed amendment would protect both labor and employers from unfair practices.79 Upchurch presented a solid if unspectacular candidacy with his record of service at the municipal and state level and his program for increased state services. State Senator J. Edwin ―Ed‖ Baker of Umatilla entered the gubernatorial contest on the strength of a scant political record, a well-know family name, extensive service in civic organizations, and the reported backing of a political organization led by former Governor David Sholtz.80 Despite the relative brevity of his political resumé, Baker had perhaps the most diverse background of any of the gubernatorial aspirants. Born in Hillsborough county, Baker‘s family moved to Palm Beach county where his father served as sheriff from 1909 until 1920. Baker attended Palm Beach county public schools prior to enlisting in the U. S. Navy in 1917. Returning from military service, Baker opened Edwin Baker, Incorporated, a haberdashery he operated from 1921 until 1930. The Florida native worked as business manager of the Palm Beach Times from 1930 until relocating to Umatilla, in Lake county, in 1934 to serve as superintendent of the Harry-Anna Crippled Children‘s Home. Lake county voters selected Baker to finish the unexpired term of former Senator Thomas H. Cooley, who resigned to join the military. Baker‘s experience at the children‘s home and his extensive participation in civic and fraternal organizations, including Elks, Kiwanis, American Legion, and State Chamber of

77 Florida Times-Union, 2 December 1943; Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 3 December 1943.

78 Florida Times-Union, 2 December 1943; Miami Daily News, 2 December 1943.

79 Miami Herald, 5 December 1943.

80 Miami Herald, 19 December 1943, 19 March 1944.

240

Commerce, probably influenced the senate leadership to appoint him as chair of the 1943 Senate Committee on Public Welfare.81 Baker‘s platform called for ―more rapid development of our three key income-producing factors‖ – agriculture, manufacturing, and business – through promotion, research, and training, but without ―federal interference.‖ The senator‘s program endorsed increased teacher salaries, coeducation at the University of Florida and Florida State College for Women, increased welfare allotments, rehabilitation of returning veterans, better health facilities in rural areas, and the anti-closed shop amendment.82 In summary, Baker‘s program advocated the state provision of increased educational, health, welfare, and commercial services without specifics about funding. In announcing his bid for the governor‘s office, State Senator Raymond Sheldon, the sixth and final candidate to announce, sought to differentiate himself from the rest of the field. Stating that the citizens of Florida wanted a ―young progressive governor,‖ Sheldon said, ―I think it is vitally important that we have as our next governor a man prepared to meet the problems of the future and not one who is contented with living in the past.‖83 Born on a farm in MacGregor, Manitoba, Sheldon moved with his family from Canada to Hillsborough county while a youth. Following law school, Sheldon established his legal practice and ran for public office. Hillsborough voters first selected Sheldon for the state house of representatives in 1936, and re- elected him in 1938 and 1940. The Tampa lawyer served as speaker pro tem of the 1941 house. In 1942, Sheldon won the upper chamber seat vacated by the retirement of state senate veteran Pat Whitaker. Sheldon achieved statewide identification for representing Tampa Shipbuilding Company unions in their successful defense against State Attorney General Tom Watson‘s suit seeking to nullify the closed shop contract at the shipyard.84 Additionally, Sheldon fought to stem the tide of anti-union legislation during the 1943 session. Sheldon gained even more notoriety following his scuffle with State Superintendent of Instruction Colin English following the senator‘s remarks questioning school textbook purchasing practices. Regarding Sheldon‘s

81 Florida Times-Union, 13 January 1944; Miami Daily News, 13 January 1944; Miami Herald, 19 March 1944.

82 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 31 March 1944.

83 Florida Times-Union, 23 January 1944; St. Petersburg Times, 23 January 1944; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 23 January 1944.

84 Florida Times-Union, 23 January 1944; St. Petersburg Times, 23 January 1944; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 23 January 1944.

241 relationships with Attorney General Watson and Superintendent English, political columnist Allen Morris wrote, ―It would be grim joke should Sheldon become governor, with English and Atty. Gen. J. Tom Watson re-elected to sit as members of his cabinet.‖85 The Canadian-born senator ran on an expansive program embracing increased state funding for dependent children to match maximum federal funds; teacher salary increases sponsored by Sheldon during the 1943 legislature; a prohibition on changing of school textbooks except by vote of teachers; increased payments and faster decisions on applications for old age pensions; provision of unemployment compensation for women absent during childbirth; granting state lands for homesteads for returning veterans; permanent registration for elections; permitting the legislature to convene without the governor‘s consent upon two-thirds vote of members of both houses; and allowing business and labor the right to manage their own affairs.86 Win or lose, Sheldon stood to benefit from the 1944 gubernatorial contest. The statewide campaign provided Sheldon with a forum to disseminate his ideas about labor and welfare to a larger audience. This would undoubtedly boost his influence during the two years remaining in his senate term. At the same time, Sheldon‘s candidacy directly undermined the efforts of three other aspirants. The Tampa resident stood to draw a large percentage of the Hillsborough county vote that might have otherwise gone to the two other contenders with ties to the region – Plant City-born J. Ed Baker and Tampa-educated Frank D. Upchurch. Additionally, Sheldon was expected to win some labor and old age pensioner votes counted upon by Congressman Lex Green‘s campaign. The scrappy lawyer‘s candidacy had the potential to boost his career in state politics and shake up the gubernatorial race.87 The 1944 first gubernatorial primary demonstrated how candidates attempted to cope with Florida‘s atomized political system by making promises to the state‘s numerous political interest groups in order to win the nomination. In the absence of powerful factions, the candidates, with the possible exception of Caldwell who claimed to eschew public commitments, ran on platforms offering something to everyone. These political promises often plagued the

85 Miami Herald, 13 February 1944.

86 St. Petersburg Times, 30 April 1944.

87 Miami Herald, 30 January 1944.

242 successful candidate by reducing his freedom to act independently and saddled him with obligations to inexpedient policies.88 In addition to the six announced candidates, two other Florida politicians cast long shadows over the 1944 contest for the governor‘s office – former state legislator, 1940 gubernatorial aspirant, and current U. S. Navy officer Fuller Warren, and Governor Spessard L. Holland. The influence of Warren loomed over the race as a result of his periodic messages to state newspapers,89 speculation over his potential last-minute candidacy, or the possibility he would be drafted by his supporters,90 and campaign advertisements goading Rep. Lex Green placed by the ―Legion for the Dissemination of Truth About Politicians‖ – a political organization believed to be the brainchild of the loquacious Warren.91 In view of his unexpected third place finish in the 1940 governor‘s race and his penchant for attacking opponents, the potential of a bid by Warren warranted the attention of the leading candidates, especially Green. Because they both needed strong support from the voters of north Florida to make the second primary, Green and Warren would be direct competitors if Warren entered the first primary. Warren exerted such a strong political pull, that even while ―somewhere at sea,‖ he influenced the campaign.92 In addition to his considerable political ambitions, Warren bore strong enmity for Rep. Lex Green as revealed in a private letter to Orlando Morning Sentinel publisher Martin Andersen. Even while participating in an exhausting naval training program, Warren found time and energy to undermine Green‘s candidacy. In the letter, Warren explains his opposition to Green and urges Andersen to lend assistance to the cause. Warren wrote,

I‘m trying to prevent this unprincipled little b-t-d [sic] from becoming Governor. Just because I am out of the race doesn‘t mean that I have lost interest in the welfare of the State. I believe it would do irreparable damage to Florida if this spineless little s.b. [sic] should be elected.

88 Colburn and Schur, Florida’s Gubernatorial Politics in the Twentieth Century, 2.

89 (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 23 December 1943.

90 St. Petersburg Times, 29 August, 30 December 1943.

91 Miami Herald, 24 October 1943.

92 Warren‘s ―Christmas Greetings to the People of Florida‖ concluded with the signature line ―Fuller Warren, Somewhere at Sea.‖ (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 23 December 1943.

243

Warren provided a numbered list of Green‘s purported personal and political misdeeds, describing them as ―a few of the reasons why he is so contemptible to me….‖ This brief catalogue encompassed allegedly dodging military service in the First World War, simple mendacity, and vacillation on important issues before Congress. Warren described opposition to Green as ―doing a genuine public service.‖ In justification of his actions, Warren wrote,

I don‘t see much good in fighting a war to save our form of government, and then turning the government of one of the great states over to a scoundrel who considers public office solely as an instrument for aggrandizing himself.

Warren advised Andersen that he would be ―sending you copy for another ad about this mountebank.‖ The message revealed Warren as a source of campaign advertisements adversarial to the Green campaign although not providing a definitive link with the grandiosely titled ―League for the Dissemination of Truth About Politicians.‖ This ―confidential‖ 93 letter confirmed the existence of an active if covert campaign to undermine Rep. Green‘s campaign for governor.94 While Warren and others sought to surreptitiously influence the campaign, perhaps the state‘s most visible and influential political figure followed a policy of non-interference. Despite a publicly proclaimed ―hands off attitude in the governor‘s race,‖95 Governor Holland exerted a pervasive influence over the 1944 gubernatorial contest. As his administration approached its end, Holland continued to enjoy the trust and high esteem of many of his constituents. Editorials lamented the constitutional ban on gubernatorial succession blocking Holland from a second

93 Fuller Warren to ―My dear Martin,‖ dated 20 September 1943. Ernest R. Graham Papers, Box 28, FF ―Campaign Correspondence – Green, Robert ‗Lex‘,‖ Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.

94 Warren‘s surreptitious campaign against Green was hardly unique to politics in Florida. For examples of other anonymous attack advertisements see the ―Is Hitler Coming to Florida?‖ pamphlet from the second gubernatorial primary of 1940; ―League for the Dissemination of Truth About Politicians‖ handbills from the first gubernatorial primary of 1944; and copy for ―The Pepper-Caldwell Asphalt Deal‖ ad also from the first primary of 1944. The ―Hitler‖ pamphlet is found in the Spessard L. Holland Papers, Box 151, FF ―Propaganda,‖ Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida. The handbills and ad copy are in Ernest R. Graham Papers, Box 28, FFs ―Campaign Correspondence – Green, Richard ‗Lex‘,‖ and ―Campaign Correspondence – Upchurch, Frank D.,‖ Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.

95 Governor Holland to Sen. Raymond Sheldon, 5 May 1944. Holland Papers, Box 68, FF ―Legislators 1944,‖ FSA.

244 term.96 With high expectations for the postwar period, Floridians naturally hoped Holland‘s successor would meet the standards he had established. Looking ahead to the race, the St. Petersburg Times advised the next governor must be qualified to,

Do as good a job as Holland has done. He is a remarkably good chief executive. His tax and bond program has given Florida new life. His successor will have a high mark to shoot at.97

It would have been difficult for Holland to back a candidate in the first primary without damaging the bonds of friendship or offending a political ally. Holland and former U. S. Rep. Millard F. Caldwell held some common political views and became friends during Holland‘s residence in Tallahassee. As an original supporter of Holland‘s gubernatorial candidacy and a floor leader for his legislative programs, Senator Ernest R. Graham may have had the strongest claim to the governor‘s support. Senator Frank D. Upchurch and Senator J. Edwin Baker also aided the governor‘s cause in the legislature and could therefore also expect his backing. The political views of each of the two remaining candidates – Congressman Lex Green and Senator Raymond Sheldon – differed from Holland‘s to a degree that prevented him from aiding either.98 While the governor had declared neutrality in the contest, this pledge did not bind officials in his administration. Members of the governor‘s official family lined up behind the first primary candidacies of Caldwell and Graham. Columnist Allen Morris reported that Governor Holland intended to cast his vote for his good friend Graham, but had done nothing to discourage support for Caldwell.99 The first primary contest took place against the backdrop of the war in Europe and the Pacific. The war shaped the campaign both directly and indirectly. Rationing of tires and gasoline severely limited the candidates‘ ability to canvas the state for votes and forced them to adopt new campaign strategies and techniques. With opportunities for personal appearances sharply curtailed, candidates relied more on newspapers, radio, and surrogates to get their names

96 St. Petersburg Times, 7 October 1943.

97 St. Petersburg Times, 16 October 1943.

98 Tampa Times editorial reprinted in Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 6 March 1944.

99 Miami Herald, 2 April 1944.

245 and programs to the voting public.100 Transportation restrictions, as well as low attendance at political rallies, led Millard F. Caldwell to propose a joint campaign tour to,

Enable the citizens to see and hear all candidates for governor by making one trip from their homes to the meeting place, this saving them time, gasoline and tires, all of which are at a premium in this critical war period.101

The joint tour never took place because of the difficulty of conforming to individual candidates‘ schedules.102 The war also shaped the candidates‘ campaign itineraries. Expectations that the long anticipated European cross-channel invasion would take place in the spring of 1944 caused candidates to abandon the traditional practice of initiating their campaigns among the state‘s many rural communities and appearing in the urban areas just before the first primary. Speculating that the landings in France would push the campaign out of the public spotlight, political aspirants sought to maximize their opportunities by visiting the state‘s urban centers before the expected offensive distracted the voting public.103 To a large degree, the war shaped how and where candidates waged their first primary campaigns. The six entrants in the race for the governor‘s office shared common themes in their programs and stump speeches. To varying extents each advocated raises for teachers, an improved welfare program, and some form of postwar economic promotion. Allen Morris wrote that with such similar platforms, ―personality and past performance‖ would guide voters in making their first primary decisions.104 The field of six gubernatorial candidates faced the voters on Tuesday, 2 May. Initial returns gave Senator Ernest R. Graham the lead, with Congressman Lex Green and following closely.105 As more precincts reported, Graham‘s lead evaporated and it became apparent that Caldwell and Green would advance to the second primary. The official

100 Miami Herald, 16 January 1944.

101 Florida Times-Union, 4 April 1944; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 4 April 1944.

102 Florida Times-Union, 7 April 1944.

103 Miami Herald, 27 February 1944.

104 Miami Herald, 30 April 1944.

105 Florida Times-Union, 3 May 1944.

246 vote tally gave a narrow victory to Caldwell (116,111), followed by Green (113,300), Graham (91,174), Upchurch (30,524), Sheldon (27,940), and Baker (27,028).106 Returns confirmed early predictions of a three-way race between Caldwell, Graham, and Green.107 The second primary pitted two north Floridians against each other. Observers declared the race too close to call because of a number of unknown factors. Chief among these was the question of how, or even if, south Florida would vote now that all of that region‘s candidates had been eliminated.108 Additionally, low voter turnout seemed a real possibility because all other statewide races and most local contests had been settled in the first primary, leaving the Caldwell-Green contest as the only big item on the second primary ballot.109 These unknowns and the short interval between the first and second primaries resulted in a vigorously paced second primary campaign. The remaining candidates waged markedly different second primary campaigns. Congressman Green made an audacious gamble in claiming to have the won over not only the supporters of the eliminated candidates, but all four of the defeated candidates themselves. This caused a shortlived sensation in the press, after which it emerged that only Sen. J. Edwin Baker and Sen. Ernest R. Graham110 publicly aligned themselves with Green. Additionally, Green made a great show of confidence in the election‘s outcome, publicly declaring victory at nearly every campaign appearance.111 For his part, Caldwell continued to emphasize his record in

106 Sixty-one per cent of Florida‘s 658,013 registered voters cast gubernatorial ballots in the first primary. Florida Times-Union, 12 May 1944; Annie Mary Hartsfield and Elston E. Roady, Florida Votes, 1920-1962: Selected Election Statistics, 68-69.

107 Miami Herald, 23 April 1944.

108 Miami Herald, 21 May 1944.

109 Miami Herald, 14 May 1944; Sarasota Herald Tribune, 14 May 1944.

110 Graham‘s decision to back Green surprised political pundits across the state. Generally believed to share more political principals with Caldwell than Green, Graham‘s endorsement generated considerable speculation regarding its cause. For a sampling of commentary, see Miami Herald, 21 May 1944; (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 27 May 1944; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 12, 23 May 1944. A post-election letter from Jackson county resident Hays Lewis, Jr. asserted, ―You ran a damn good race but it appeared to me that some ‗gypping‘ was handed you at the last minute.‖ Graham Papers, Box 28, FF ―Campaign Correspondence – Lewis, Amos and Hays,‖ Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.

111 Florida Times-Union, 16 May 1944; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14, 18, 21 May, 1944.

247

Congress, particularly noting his support for Roosevelt administration programs. At the same time, Caldwell sought to reinforce negative perceptions about his opponent, declaring,

As a Congressman I did not make speeches about myself or have them mailed out at the taxpayers‘ expense under government frank. As a candidate I have kept my record clean…. We have not and will not publish anonymously or otherwise any eleventh-hour smear sheets and misleading advertisements.112

With the second primary approaching, both Green and Caldwell targeted the forty-three per cent of the total vote garnered by the eliminated first primary candidates.113 On 23 May, Floridians went to the polls under cloudy skies and amid scattered showers.114 Afterward, the vote count demonstrated that Millard Caldwell had achieved a substantial victory in the Democratic gubernatorial runoff. Final returns revealed Caldwell had garnered 215,485 ballots (55.3 per cent of votes cast) to Green‘s 174,100 (44.7 per cent). Caldwell carried the three populous counties of Dade, Duval, and Hillsborough. Victory in the second primary qualified Caldwell to face Republican nominee Bert L. Acker of Miami in the November general election. The impending Caldwell – Acker contest was a mere formality due to the perennial strength of the Democratic party in Florida.115 For his part, G.O.P. nominee Acker refused to publicly concede the futility of his campaign. After reading published accounts describing the efforts of Governor Holland to promote a smooth transition of administrations by allowing Democratic nominee Caldwell access to state government department personnel and organizational information, Acker requested a similar opportunity. Acker wrote to Holland, ―Now, my dear governor, are you not a little presumptuous making that kind of statement … or is it possible we have eliminated our general elections?‖ In replying to Acker, Holland wrote,

If you think that you have a chance to be the next governor, I invite you to spend as much time as you would care to spend in making the same sort of study of the situation at Tallahassee that Mr. Caldwell is making.116

112 Florida Times-Union, 16 May 1944; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 18, 21 May 1944.

113 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 21 May 1944.

114 (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 23 May 1944.

115 Florida Times-Union, 24 May 1944; Annie Mary Hartsfield and Elston E. Roady, Florida Votes, 1920-1962: Selected Election Statistics, 68-69.

116 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 27 August 1944. 248

On 12 September, Acker visited the capitol to meet government officials and study records.117 Acker‘s apparent faith in his chances did not alter the facts that no Republican Party nominee had won election as Florida‘s governor since the Reconstruction era, and the number of registered Democratic voters (658,000) greatly exceeded the number of registered Republican voters (46,000) in the state.118 With the primaries concluded and the general election months away, attention returned to the possibility of a special legislative session. Nearly everyone concerned, including Superintendent of Public Instruction Colin English, Governor Holland, Democratic gubernatorial nominee Millard F. Caldwell, and state school leaders, agreed on the need for more public school resources. They disagreed, however, on the best method for aiding education. The teachers, Superintendent English, Caldwell, and those legislators backing the previously vetoed teacher pay increase favored a raise of from one-hundred to one-hundred-fifty dollars per teacher.119 Meanwhile, Governor Holland, the sole official with the authority to call the legislature into special session, advocated a one-year emergency program to create an educational stabilization fund of fifty dollars per teacher unit to be spent in the state‘s poorer counties. Holland proposed a compromise combining an increase in appropriations for teacher salaries from eight hundred to nine hundred dollars and the additional stabilization fund. The governor explained his opposition to the across the board pay increase, telling school leaders,

You can see how hopelessly unfair the present system of aiding counties by teacher units is when it is considered that the state-wide average for white teachers‘ annual salary is $1,351. Dade County has an average of $1,851 and Lafayette County has only $852.87.

Holland predicted the combined salary increase and stabilization pool would ―mean not less than five per cent improvement in financial affairs of the wealthiest counties and up to [fifteen] per cent or more in the poorer counties.‖ The governor regretted that the entire increase could not go to the poorer counties through the stabilization fund, but acknowledged that the

117 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 13 September 1944.

118 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 27 August 1944.

119 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 7 May 1944; Florida Times-Union, 26 May 1944.

249 program stood little chance of passage in the legislature if it excluded the larger counties.120 Competing approaches to helping the schools became a major issue in negotiations over the special session. The prospect of a special session posed numerous political risks for the governor and his administration. Holland‘s popularity with lawmakers stood at low ebb as a result of the cigarette tax, and his vetoes of the teacher pay increase bill and the House Philosophy section of the general appropriations bill. As if that were not enough, two senators vanquished with Governor Holland‘s aid – William Cliett of Bowling Green and John S. Taylor of Largo – and four of the defeated gubernatorial candidates would have ample opportunities for retribution or vindictiveness in the extra session.121 The obvious political peril compelled Holland supporter and Polk county resident L. C. Olive to urge caution. Olive wrote the governor,

You have had a wonderful administration as Governor, and I believe unless something develops to change the situation will go out of office with a record of one of the best Governors Florida has ever had. So many things could develop in a Special Session of the Legislature that I believe you would be wise in refusing to call a Special Session of the Legislature at this time. It is true that there are measures of importance that could be taken up, but there is nothing of so much importance but what it could wait until the regular Session of the next Legislature which meets next year.122

In order to minimize the political risk, Governor Holland took precautions to ensure that if an extra session occurred, it took place under his terms. To restrict the actions of the legislators, Governor Holland announced that he would call the legislature into special session only under certain conditions. First, a majority of each chamber had to commit in advance to approve the teachers‘ appropriation plan, consider other components of the governor‘s special session program, and forgo introduction of measures not included in the governor‘s program. Second, the governor required a commitment from legislators to sustain his veto of the 1943 teacher pay raise act because it conflicted with the new

120 Florida Times-Union, 6 June 1944.

121 Miami Herald, 4 June 1944.

122 L. C. Olive to Governor Holland, 30 June 1944. Holland Papers, Series 406, Box 67, FF 10 ―Legislation,‖ FSA, Tallahassee, Florida.

250 school appropriation plan.123 Additionally, Governor Holland asked the Florida Council of Continuing Education – an organization of state civic and school leaders – to draft the bills to be presented to the lawmakers in advance of the special session and to secure the required commitments from the legislators.124 Political commentator Allen Morris speculated that using the Council of Continuing Education as intermediaries to convey the proposed program and secure the legislators‘ commitments allowed Governor Holland to ―sidestep‖ those solons irritated by the cigarette tax, his vetoes, and the recent election results.125 The raw feelings engendered by the lingering issues of the 1943 legislative session and the results of recent primary elections appeared mild compared to the responses following the announcement of Governor Holland‘s conditions for calling a special session. Rep. Joe C. Jenkins of Gainesville, a leading critic of the governor‘s vetoes, released the text of a telegram sent to A. M. Anderson, President of the Florida Association of School Superintendents. Regarding the required commitments, Jenkins wrote,

The conditions imposed by the governor convince me that it is an effort of the governor to use the influence of the school people and school needs as a club to beat the members of the Legislature into complete submission to a much broader program of the governor by which he hopes to extricate himself from a number of political hotspots, in fact to get the members of the Legislature to completely abdicate their responsibilities, allow themselves to be used as rubber stamps, and let the governor completely dictate a special Legislative session in violation of the spirit and intention of the constitution and the principles of constitutional government.126

In essence, Jenkins accused Governor Holland of using the school issue as leverage in an attempt to wield dictatorial powers over the legislature in violation of the state constitution. Rep. Tyn Cobb, Jr. of Orange county, another of the governor‘s antagonists, addressed the special session controversy in a mimeographed circular distributed around the state. Cobb,

123 In addition to the teachers‘ appropriation plan, Governor Holland requested commitments to raise the old age pension guarantee, and consider earmarking approximately two-and-a-half million for postwar construction, amending the soldier voting law, and purchasing lots adjacent to the Capitol for inclusion in a state government complex. Florida Times-Union, 6 June 1944; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 7 May 1944.

124 Florida Times-Union, 16 June 1944; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 15 June 1944.

125 Miami Herald, 4 June 1944.

126 Florida Times-Union, 24 June 1944.

251 citing the governor‘s required commitment, urged his fellow lawmakers to reject the special session and delay action until the upcoming regular legislative session. Cobb wrote,

I believe that we should in all fairness to the Governor-Elect and the [forty-one] new members, refuse to sign away their rights to decisions that should be made by them in 1945.127

Defeated gubernatorial candidate Sen. Raymond Sheldon recognized the difficulty of holding a productive session and the potential for lasting disaffection among the participants. Sheldon reported to Governor Holland,

I do not believe an agreement will be reached for a Special Session unless you can modify your requests to the Legislature…. From comment and observation I am convinced that there will not be two-thirds of the members to agree to commit themselves in advance either going for or against the entire program…. A Special Session of the Legislature is not needed. It would be an added cost to the taxpayers and would be an extreme inconvenience, both to the members of the Legislature and to the citizens of Tallahassee because of the present crowded living conditions in the State Capital. A Special Session could bring about considerable disunity, the effects of which would be felt next April when we meet at our next regular session.128

Senator John R. Beacham added his voice to the chorus grumbling over the governor‘s conditions for calling an extra session. ―The governor wants to tie us up. He wants us to abdicate as senators. I don‘t think two-thirds of the senators will sign up,‖129 he declared. When asked about his reaction to the opposition of some lawmakers to the commitment requirement, Holland described his request as ―a good faith effort to see if a mutual agreement can be reached.‖ Furthermore, he said,

If it can‘t, there will be no feeling about it and we‘ll begin to think about something besides a special session. I simply want to be sure that we won‘t be put in the position of wasting time and money. The only way to do that is to have prior commitments. I personally have not asked and won‘t ask any legislator to sign the commitment. I don‘t want them to do so unless they think this is the way to get some needed and worthwhile things done at a minimum of inconvenience

127 ―Pledge for Extras Session Made Public‖ mimeograph, undated. Spessard L. Holland Papers, Series 406, Box 68, FF ―Legislators, 1944,‖ FSA, Tallahassee, Florida.

128 Sen. Raymond Sheldon to Governor Holland, 24 June 1944. Holland Papers, Box 68, FF ―Legislators, 1944,‖ FSA, Tallahassee, Florida.

129 Florida Times-Union, 27 June 1944.

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and expense. It will be much better to find out ahead of time if the program doesn‘t meet with the approval of the legislators, rather than subject them and the public to the hazards of a special session. Incidentally, this is a pattern which has been followed in other states, particularly during wartime, to the great advantage of the public as well as to members of the Legislature.130

The governor appeared to be offering his opponents a take it or leave it proposal – hold the session under his terms or not at all. The senate caucused in Jacksonville to consider whether or not to accede to Holland‘s conditions. Meeting in closed session, senators rejected the governor‘s conditions by a vote of twenty-two to eight. Reports from the meeting indicated most senators favored increasing teacher pay and old age pensions, but opposed Governor Holland‘s foundation plan and prior commitments for calling the legislature into special session.131 The senators adopted a counter proposal boosting the annual teacher unit appropriation from eight hundred to one thousand dollars and increasing yearly old age pension appropriations by two million dollars, instead of the one million dollar increase proposed by the governor. The caucus adopted the alternative program by a vote of twenty-four to six.132 The Jacksonville meeting served to formalize senatorial opposition to Holland‘s position and put these two branches of state government, which had previously cooperated so closely, at loggerheads. Governor Holland‘s response to the caucus‘s vote seemed to put the possibility of a special session out of reach. Remaining steadfast in his position, Holland said, There can be no special legislative session this summer upon the counter -proposal suggested by a senate majority … in caucus yesterday. I do not think that the counter-proposal is sound or constructive, and I certainly will not approve it in the amounts indicated, or with the exclusion of a minimum program for schools.

The governor specifically noted that he considered the foundation program more necessary than the teacher pay increases. Additionally, Holland warned that the combination of the teacher pay and old age pension increases at the levels included in the senate proposal

130 Florida Times-Union, 27 June 1944. Governor Holland displayed a similar detachment regarding the special session in personal correspondence on the issue. See Governor Holland to Sen. Walter R. Rose, 21 June 1944; and Governor Holland to Rep. Tyn Cobb, Jr., 28 June 1944; Holland Papers, Box 68, FF ―Legislators, 1944,‖ FSA, Tallahassee, Florida.

131 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 29 July 1944.

132 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 30 July 1944.

253 threatened the surplus of state funds if horse racing should be suspended in the near future. ―I am unwilling to create a possibility of turning over the state next January without substantial reserves to help solve the troublesome problems which lie ahead,‖ he declared.133 Based upon Holland‘s statement, the chances of holding an extra session appeared slim. Apparently unwilling to allow Governor Holland the last word, president-designate of the 1945 senate Walter W. Rose, an Orlando real estate investor, issued a formal statement on the special session impasse. Ignoring the governor‘s arguments in favor of fiscal responsibility, educational opportunity, and legislative efficiency, Rose blamed the governor for the ongoing deficiency in teacher pay, declaring,

The legislature is not responsible for the present emergency existing with reference to the teachers‘ salaries. That was brought about by the veto of the governor of a bill passed at the 1943 session. …If the governor wishes to call an extra session to consider this or any other matter … he does not have to accept the recommendation of the senate caucus … nor does he have to have the consent of the legislature.

Regarding the school stabilization plan, Rose demeaned it as excessively complicated, declaring, ―the formula used to arrive at the ability of a county to pay is so ridiculous that it is almost laughable.‖ The senator questioned why Escambia, a county he described as ―rich in natural resources,‖ should qualify for additional funding under the governor‘s school program.134 Rose‘s comments further highlighted the erosion of comity formerly existing between the senate and the governor. That Governor Holland continued the back and forth with Rose suggested the degree to which tempers had become strained. Holland used an address delivered during an inspection at the Port of Tampa to rebut Rose‘s comments on the stabilization program. The governor said,

I feel that any approach to the problem by horizontal increase ignores the really grave problem. We have in Florida a considerable number of counties which through no fault of their own and after a tax levy much higher than others, still are unable to reach a reasonable minimum educational standard.

Holland listed four causes for this dilemma: the inability to collect taxes on lands used for federal military installations; exemption of principal industries from taxation under the state

133 Florida Times-Union, 1 July 1944.

134 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 2 July 1944.

254 constitution; taxes allocated by court orders to payment of county debts; and counties comprised of small farms exempted from taxation under the Homestead Act.135 Regarding Senator Rose‘s example of Escambia county, Governor Holland said,

Critics object to Escambia county being classed with the poor counties because of its naval yards and big pulp mills. They forget that naval installations and new industries canont [sic] be taxed. Six districts in Escambia levy 17.7 mills for schools because they are made up of small farms.136

The governor‘s words appeared to belie earlier statements about there being ―no feeling‖ about the special session one way or the other. South Florida political pundit Allen Morris described the sparring between the senatorial and gubernatorial branches over the special session as ―a dismaying display of bad temper on both sides.‖ Morris summarized the opposing positions on the teacher unit appropriations veto –

With the treasury brimming, legislative critics of Governor Spessard L. Holland may argue the crisis could have been avoided had the governor not vetoed a 1943 act increasing the teacher unit from $800 to $950. With an eye to his political future, they ask why he should be allowed to escape the consequence of this mistake. The governor can point to the fact the legislators, without any more idea than he that the subsequent racing season would be a revenue record-smasher instead of duplicating 1942-43‘s flop, failed to earmark a source of additional money to meet the appropriation, thereby writing the teachers what seemed a rubber check.

Morris sounded a mildly critical note in his commentary on the special session controversy, noting the public had every right to expect leaders to forget past controversies and address both the teacher salary and inequality of educational opportunity issues.137 For all its unproductive political infighting, the special session controversy brought the problem of inequality of educational opportunity to the attention of the general public. Initially recommended to boost soldier voting, special session proposals expanded and evolved to emphasize teacher pay increases and the need for an educational stabilization fund.

135 Florida Times-Union, 7 July 1944. Governor Holland used similar reasoning to justify the stabilization fund in letters to Rep. Tyn Cobb, Jr., and Sen. Walter W. Rose. Governor Holland to Rep. Cobb, 10 June 1944; and Governor Holland to Sen. Rose, 21 June 1944; Holland Papers, Box 68, FF ―Legislators, 1944,‖ FSA, Tallahassee, Florida.

136 Florida Times-Union, 7 July 1944.

137 Miami Herald, 9 July 1944.

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Superintendent of Public Instruction Colin English made a strong statement on behalf of the program,

We cherish the belief that America is the land of equal opportunity. Yet in Florida the educational opportunity of a boy or girl in one county may be less by far than that of their cousins in a nearby county. That disparity neither squares with the constitutional mandate for a ‗uniform system of public free schools,‘ nor with the spirit of fair play.138

The special session clamor may have resulted in little other than bringing this issue to the public forum. The possibility of a special session expired as the positions of the governor and opposing lawmakers hardened over the coming days and weeks. School leaders pointed to the likelihood of increased appropriations in the coming legislative session as they attempted to retain teachers on the eve of the new school year. A special committee of the Continuing Educational Council requested,

In order that the grave problem now facing school officials may be relieved, and that teachers may be encouraged to continue with their work, it is the hope of this committee that the members of the house and senate will see fit at a very early date to indicate to the state and county school officials that legislators will co- operate with the incoming governor to make available by April 15, 1945, the following emergency increases: 1. Raising the instruction unit from $800 to $1,000; and 2. Setting up a foundation program for needy counties.139

With political leaders at impasse on increased education funding, school teachers and officials recognized that they must look to the future for assistance. Once it became apparent that Governor Holland would not call law makers into special session, the attention of the politically-minded, and those not riveted to increasingly dramatic developments in the European and Pacific theatres of war, turned to the impending general election. With the statewide races out of the way, state leaders looked to President Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s unprecedented bid for a fourth term. Floridians, like many of their fellow

138 Ibid.

139 St. Petersburg Times, 26 July 1944.

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Southerners, took exception to some of the Roosevelt administration‘s domestic initiatives while supporting other policies, particularly those pertaining to the war.140 For the most part, Florida‘s political leaders backed President Roosevelt‘s nomination for a fourth term in order to expedite final victory over the Axis. Florida Democratic Committee Chairman Judge T. W. Conely‘s belief in FDR moved him to make an unprecedented and audacious proposal, declaring,

The man I suggest for the joint candidate of the Democrats and Republicans is Franklin D. Roosevelt. I do so because he is in close touch with other leaders of our Allied nations, because he is familiar with the plans for winning this war, possibly more so than any other person in the United States, and certainly because if re-elected he will continue to give wholehearted co-operation to the other Allied nations so that this war can be won at the earliest possible moment. I realize there are many Democrats who are opposed to Mr. Roosevelt and the New Deal and would like to see another Democratic candidate. I realize the Republicans are actively trying to find a suitable candidate. But this is no time for speculation.

Judge Conely qualified his support for the president, noting, ―If we were not involved in war I would be among the first to say ‗No‘ to any proposal for Mr. Roosevelt to be the party‘s candidate.‖141 While not as inventive or bold in his pronouncements as Judge Conely, Governor Spessard Holland also wanted President Roosevelt to remain for a fourth term if the war continued. Regarding Roosevelt‘s political standing in his state, Holland said, ―I don‘t believe anyone in Florida wants President Roosevelt for a fourth term if the war is over, but if it is still going on they will vote for him.‖142 If these and other Floridians had their way, Roosevelt would remain Commander-in-Chief for the duration. President Roosevelt did not enjoy unanimous support in Florida. A small but determined coterie of citizens opposed to Roosevelt‘s reelection held a mass meeting of the ―Byrd-for- President‖ organization at the George Washington Hotel in Jacksonville on 1 March. The group was committed to securing the Democratic presidential nomination for U.S. Senator and Office of War Mobilization chief Harry F. Byrd of Virginia. Alachua county Representative Joe C.

140 Southern political leaders cited inaction on discretionary freight rates, efforts to repeal the poll tax, patronage, and attempts to undermine traditional southern racial institutions as causes of disaffection with the Roosevelt administration. Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 23 June 1944.

141 Miami Herald, 2 January 1944.

142 Daytona Beach Morning Journal, 17 September 1944.

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Jenkins addressed the gathering.143 Jenkins advocated the Virginian‘s nomination ―to restore the political and economic liberties‖ of the country.144 Jenkins stumped the state on behalf of Byrd‘s candidacy and against the New Deal. At a meeting of the Sarasota Byrd organization, Jenkins promised,

…Harry F. Byrd will be a leader, following [in] the footsteps of Thomas Jefferson, following in the footsteps of , to help unravel the complicated paternalism into which we have been thrown, in order that your children and my children may have the opportunity of carving out their careers in a democratic America, untrammeled by the blairing [sic] of bureaucrats and the regimentation of communistic paternalism.145

The efforts of the Florida and other Byrd for President organizations failed to carry the rest of the Democratic party.146 Roosevelt was re-nominated at the party‘s Chicago convention and Governor Holland, governor-designate Caldwell, and U.S. Senator Claude Pepper traveled the state making joint campaign appearances on behalf of his reelection.147 The general election results showed Floridians remaining true to tradition in supporting Democratic party nominees. Florida voters delivered a decisive plurality to President Roosevelt (339,377 votes and 70.3 per cent) over his G.O.P. rival New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey (143,215 votes and 29.7 per cent). Voters delivered an even more dramatic Democratic triumph in the gubernatorial race, giving Caldwell 361,077 votes (78.9 per cent) to Acker‘s 96,321 votes (21.1 per cent).148 The most controversial issue on the general election ballot, the amendment to prohibit union labor‘s closed shop in Florida, passed by vote of 147,860 to 122,770.149 Unsurprisingly, Floridians retained their traditional loyalty to the Democratic party in 1944.

143 Florida Times-Union, 27 February 1944; David M. Kennedy, Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 792.

144 St. Petersburg Times, 2 March 1944.

145 Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 26 April 1944.

146 Some Democrats unsuccessfully attempted to secure their party‘s vice presidential nomination for Byrd. The Virginia senator‘s lapsed Catholicism and two marriages were deemed too objectionable to the party‘s ethnic voters for his addition to the ticket. Kennedy, Freedom From Fear, 789.

147 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 22 October 1944. Senator Charles O. Andrews also backed a fourth term for FDR. Florida Times-Union, 11 May 1944.

148 Hartsfield and Roady, Florida Votes, 1920-1962, 35, 69.

149 Palm Beach Post, 21 November 1944. 258

Even as he traveled the state campaigning in the company of his successor, Governor Holland prepared for an orderly transition between gubernatorial administrations. Upon taking office in 1941, Holland inherited sixteen death warrants leftover from his predecessor waiting for his signature. As a result of that disagreeable experience, Holland made a concerted effort to leave that burden of office ―in good clean shape‖ for governor-elect Millard F. Caldwell. Both Governor Fred P. Cone and Governor Holland had cancelled recently awarded road construction contracts of their predecessors upon taking office and put the projects out for rebidding. In order to avoid repeating this costly and time-consuming process, Holland and Caldwell cooperated to minimize carry over problems. Additionally, because his department heads had kept records of their operations updated, Holland promised complete and current records of operations and finances on the day he left office. Because of lengthy litigation and a deadly fire at a Ringling Circus performance, Holland could not meet his goal of achieving settlement of outstanding claims against the John Ringling estate. As a result, the state could not take possession of the Ringling Art Museum at Sarasota before the close of Holland‘s tenure in office. In addition to administrative affairs, Holland‘s staff had both the Executive Mansion and the governor‘s suite of offices in the capitol repaired and refurbished in advance of the new governor‘s arrival.150 On a more personal level, the governor devoted some of his time and attention to consideration of the immediate future. Governor Holland unsuccessfully enlisted the aid of U.S. Senator Claude Pepper in securing a military commission near the end of his gubernatorial tenure.151 Earlier in his administration, Holland declined a war department offer of a commission to serve in military government in Europe. The military had sought him out because his background – judicial, legislative, and executive experience, a fine military record, and the ability to speak French – matched the capabilities needed to establish civil governments in the aftermath of the invasion of Europe.152 Referring to his refusal of the earlier opportunity, Holland said, ―I told them I had to finish this job.‖153 Having served with honor in the First

150 Florida Times-Union, 10 December 1944.

151 Undersecretary of War Robert P. Paterson to Senator Pepper, 24 February 1945. Claude Pepper Collection, Pepper Library, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, Series 201, Box 93, FF 5.

152 Miami Herald, 6 August 1944.

153 St. Petersburg Times, 31 December 1944.

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World War, receiving the Distinguished Flying Cross for ―extraordinary heroism in action,‖ Holland did not need a commission to inflate his political resumé. Realizing the uncertainty of a commission, Holland said, ―If I don‘t get in the Army, I‘ll go back to Bartow and my law practice.‖154 While Holland publicly discussed the possibility of military service or a return to tortes and briefs in Bartow, political pundits across the state weighed the unusually popular governor‘s potential for higher office. Rumors that Holland would run for the U. S. Senate seat held by Charles O. Andrews in 1946 were bruited about the state. These reports gained strength from reports of Andrews‘s growing dissatisfaction with service in Washington, D. C. and Holland‘s strong regard among Floridians. Following Andrews‘s surprising double announcement that he would seek re-election and back a fourth term for President Roosevelt, observers interpreted his actions as an attempt to strengthen his position by allying himself with the popular president in the event of a challenge from Holland.155 When asked if Holland would oppose him, Andrews said, ―I do not believe he will. I do not see how he can. If the positions were reversed, I would not run against him.‖ Responding to queries regarding Andrews‘s statement, Holland said, ―I have no comment to make. I don‘t think it is timely to discuss the matter. I certainly am most friendly to Senator Andrews.‖156 The soon-to-be former governor‘s answer left the door open to a Senate run in 1946.157 During the final days of his administration, Floridians reflected on Governor Holland‘s tenure and accomplishments. In Tallahassee, the Junior Chamber of Commerce hosted a testimonial dinner honoring the outgoing governor and his family. Dr. Edward R. Annis acknowledged the achievements of the Holland administration in state finances, public health, and welfare. In addition to these attainments, Annis said,

154 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 5 July 1943.

155 Pittsburg Press, 12 May 1944.

156 Florida Times-Union, 11 May 1944; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 11 May 1944.

157 Allen Morris wrote that ―everyone here takes for granted‖ Holland‘s challenge to Sen. Andrews. Miami Herald, 25 June 1944.

260

His greatest accomplishment is, in our opinion, that he has done more than any other man in Florida‘s recent history to bring back a feeling of respect and confidence in government.158

Other appraisals of Holland‘s record lauded the improvements in public finance made under his leadership. Recalling that he began his administration in 1941 with four thousand dollars in the general revenue fund and unpaid debts of $1,700,000, commentators noted that Holland would leave the state with all bills paid and a general fund balance of between eight and ten million dollars. Additionally, Holland-initiated revision of property tax laws to implement equal full value assessment brought much needed funds to county coffers. Improvements in county tax revenues made possible increases in local school funds and county funded teacher pay raises during Holland‘s tenure.159 The generally high public opinion of the outgoing governor inspired political columnist Allen Morris to contrast public feeling for Holland with that of his predecessors, noting, ―many another recent governor has left amidst the scarcely suppressed raspberries of the citizenry.‖ While acknowledging that the conditions deriving from the war contributed to many of Holland‘s administrative attainments, Morris wrote, ―yet that fact does not reduce his stature as a matchless governor in whose makeup are combined grit, brains and energy.‖160 Those commentators evaluating the Holland administration expressed high regard and appreciation for its accomplishments. After more than two years of unusual harmony and cooperation, in the final months of his tenure relations between Governor Holland and the legislators were characterized by increased levels of conflict and dissension. The causes derived from Holland‘s vetoes of the House Philosophy section of the general appropriations bill and the teacher unit appropriation increase, and the governor‘s conditions for calling a special session. Holland‘s vetoes of the politically popular, but unfunded, measures engendered feelings of rebellion in some lawmakers and the special session controversy increased the intensity and distribution of this mutinous sentiment. The timing of the vetoes of these politically expedient measures on the eve of the primary

158 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 19 December 1944.

159 St. Petersburg Times, 31 December 1944.

160 Miami Herald, 24 December 1944.

261 elections undoubtedly magnified the feelings of resentment. Political partisanship ultimately ended the remarkable collaboration that took place between the executive and legislative branches during much of Governor Holland‘s tenure. The commitments required by the governor as prerequisites for calling a special session were unusual in the limits imposed on lawmakers and at the same time consistent with the approach to managing legislation Governor Holland had used earlier. In his two regular legislative sessions, the governor had carefully prepared and presented clearly defined programs which he and his allies managed to passage. In developing his legislative agendas, Holland worked to build support for his programs by working with interested parties in their development and promotion.161 Holland‘s wary approach to the politically risky special session showed similar traits in his attempt to strictly limit the issues considered and his efforts to enlist the aid of school leaders on behalf of his program. Furthermore, just as political considerations influenced legislators, Governor Holland‘s approach to the special session demonstrated awareness of both his political past and future. His attempt to place restrictions on the lawmakers clearly demonstrated the former state senator well-knew their potential for mischief. Additionally, Holland‘s efforts to preserve his accomplishments and his careful statements regarding a potential bid for the U. S. Senate suggested ambitions for higher office. Governor Holland‘s approach to the special session shared many traits with his earlier legislative programs. The 1944 gubernatorial primaries ran true to the pattern established in previous contests for that office and demonstrated that active campaigning was not strictly limited to the qualified candidates. Once again the first primary voters made their choices from a field of largely self- selected candidates with sufficient support to attract organized backing. As in prior elections, unnamed factions attacked candidates with anonymously produced campaign materials such as those propagated in the name of the League for the Dissemination of Truth About Politicians. These factors served to confirm V. O. Key‘s description of Florida politics as chaotic and leaderless.

161 For example, prior to and during the 1941 session Holland worked with the Tax Inquiry Council to develop public finance revisions based upon the Brooking Institution report and used statements to the press to build public support for the program. The governor employed a similar approach in creating an anti-VD program and derailing funds transfers during the 1943 legislative session. Additionally, in both sessions the Holland administration managed the introduction of its legislative proposals to allow for passage of the least controversial measures before advancing more contentious items. 262

Despite the increased political conflict generated by his vetoes, the primaries, and the special session controversy, Holland remained remarkably popular through the end of his gubernatorial term. This achievement resulted from a number of factors, including a strong record, relatively high prosperity across the state, and the general impression that Holland had placed good policy over political expediency. Holland received credit for implementing much needed tax reforms, initiating a program to effectively reduce local bonded debt, increased funding for schools and welfare programs, and managing the many complex state problems brought by the war. As a result, Floridians looked to his retirement with regret rather than the more commonly experienced relief.162

162 For valedictory assessments of the Holland administration, see Florida Times-Union, 31 December 1944; Miami Herald, 24 December 1944; and St. Petersburg Times, 31 December 1944. 263

CHAPTER SEVEN

“IGNORANCE AND BRUTALITY DIE HARD”1: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND THE

HOLLAND ADMINISTRATION

Southern racial attitudes permeated and shaped the viewpoints and choices of Florida‘s chief executives toward race relations and racial violence in particular. As a southern state, Florida inherited the traditional racial views supportive of the doctrines of white superiority and segregation. Since the majority of Florida‘s governors came from rural areas in Florida or other states, they shared the racial attitudes that predominated in those regions. As state officials, these men carried the prejudices from their early years as a matter of inculcation and political expediency. While the racial attitudes and decisions of Florida‘s chief executives varied from benevolent paternalism to demagogic race baiting, they all supported the racial status quo and tolerated an atmosphere of racial antagonism that frequently resulted in violence. Much fine work has been done on lynching in the South and Florida. Tameka Bradley Hobbs studied four lynchings occurring in Florida between 1941 and 1945. She described the incidents and the responses of local, state, and federal authorities, as well as the press. Hobbs concluded the fight against fascism during World War II resulted in a new moral structure intolerant of lynching.2 This chapter focuses on racial violence during the Holland administration and explores the competing forces seeking to wield and defeat lynch law in Florida. State and local authorities demonstrated a greater willingness and ability to thwart the mob during this period due to a number of factors – pressure from groups and individuals opposed to lynching, greater federal interest in racial violence, and an increased inclination to act to protect blacks from the mob. The practice of lynching had a long and pervasive history in the American South from the latter eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries. By the 1940s, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) defined lynching as

1 From Westbrook Pegler column on the lynching of A. C. Williams. Tampa Tribune, 19 May 1941.

2 Tameka Bradley Hobbs, ―‗Hitler is Here‘: Lynching in Florida During the Era of World War II,‖ (Ph. D. Dissertation – Florida State University, 2004). 264

an activity in which persons in defiance of the law administer punishment by death to an individual for an alleged offense or to an individual with whom some offense has been associated.

Additionally, lynch mobs justified violence under the pretext of upholding ―justice, race, or tradition.‖3 Southern apologists commonly explained the lynching of African Americans as ―an indirect act of self-defense against the Negro criminal as a race,‖ and necessary ―in order to hold in check the Negro in the South.‖4 The use of lynching as a punishment for and preventer of interracial rape of white women constituted the ultimate, albeit erroneous, vindication of lynch law in the minds of many white southerners. Behind all the rationalization, lynching served as the ultimate support of the white supremacy system.5 Although it happened in every state of the nation and against both African Americans and Caucasians, lynching occurred most frequently in the South and most often targeted blacks. In the sixty-five year period between 1882 and 1946, authorities reported a total of 3,905 lynchings in the region. This constituted over eighty-two per cent of all reported lynchings. These figures far exceeded the totals and ratios for other regions of the country – North Central states totaled four-hundred-twenty-four or nine per cent; Western states amassed three-hundred-seventy-six or eight per cent; and the North Eastern states accounted for eleven or two-tenths per cent. Of the 4,716 total lynchings documented between 1882 and 1946, blacks suffered in 3,425 cases and whites in 1,291 instances.6 Clearly, lynching constituted a predominantly southern crime against black people. The South not only accounted for the largest share of the lynching total but, not surprisingly, southern states led the nation in the number of reported incidents in the years spanning 1882 and 1946. Mississippi had the highest total in the U.S. with 533 African

3 Julia E. Baxter to Lawrence Nicholson, 5 October 1942, in Mark Fox, Randolph Boehm, and August Meier. Papers of the NAACP. Part 7, The Anti-Lynching Campaign, 1912-1955. Series A. Anti-lynching investigative files, 1912-1955. (Black studies research sources. Frederick, Md: University Publications of America, 1981) Reel 24, Frame 942.

4 Winfield H. Collins, The Truth about Lynching and the Negro in the South; in Which the Author Pleads That the South Be Made Safe for the White Race (New York, 1918) quoted in George B. Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1967), 170.

5 Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945, 170.

6 Jessie Parkhurst Guzman, ed., The Negro Year Book: A Review of Events Affecting Negro Life, 1941-1946. (Tuskegee Institute: Tuskegee, Ala., 1947), 308-309.

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American and 574 total lynchings. The states with the next greatest number of incidents were – Georgia (487/525), Texas (346/489), Louisiana (335/391), Alabama (299/346), and Florida (256/281).7 The number of lynchings in the southern states reflected both the proportion of African Americans in those states and the role of racial violence in buttressing white supremacy in the region. While the number of lynchings in Florida fell well below the totals of many of its southern neighbors, the state led the nation in the proportion of its African American citizens preyed upon by mobs. Between 1882 and 1930, Florida‘s rate of lynching per one-hundred- thousand of its black residents led the country at just under eighty.8 The total number of lynchings in Florida lagged behind other southern states, but its black population experienced the terror of lynch law at a higher proportion than those of any other state. Low population, large areas of open acreage, and a frontier-like environment may have contributed to Florida‘s high proportion of lynching. The southernmost southern state had the lowest population of any state in the region for most of the first half of the twentieth century. Additionally, Florida featured more open property and frontier characteristics than any other southern or eastern state.9 In Florida, sparse population and open spaces coincided with the highest per capita rate of lynching. In addition to lynching its black citizenry at the highest rate of any state, white Floridians also demonstrated a propensity for extreme cruelty. Following the apparent murder of a twenty- year-old white female resident of Jackson county in October 1934, a mob abducted, tortured, and murdered Claude Neal, a twenty-three year old African American sharecropper. Members of the mob hanged Neal‘s mutilated body from a tree adjacent to the county courthouse in Marianna.10 Local and state law enforcement failed to stop the Neal lynching despite prior knowledge of the mob‘s intent. Furthermore, officials made no arrests for the abduction, torture, and murder of

7 Guzman, 306.

8 Stewart E. Tolnay and E. M. Beck, A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882-1930. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 38.

9 Colburn and Scher, Florida’s Gubernatorial Politics in the Twentieth Century, 12.

10 ―The Lynching of Claude Neal,‖ pamphlet (New York City: NAACP, 1937 reprint) in NAACP Papers, Part 7, Series A, Reel 24, Frame 911ff; James R. McGovern, Anatomy of Lynching: The Killing of Claude Neal. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982).

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Neal even though hundreds witnessed this ―carnival of sadism.‖ The Neal lynching touched off a wave of revulsion in the press and a renewed attempt to pass federal anti-lynching legislation.11 The atrocities associated in the murder of Claude Neal demonstrated the depths to which a Florida mob could descend. Florida‘s political leaders, especially its chief executives, bore a large share of responsibility for the state‘s horrific record of lynch violence during the first half of the twentieth century. The lynch mob operated, in part, because state authorities countenanced racist attitudes and failed to act against it. Governor Park Trammell (1913-1917) took no action to prevent or punish those responsible for four lynchings during his administration. Governor Sidney J. Catts (1917-1921), in addition to waging war on Catholicism and booze, loudly proclaimed a theory of supposed black inferiority and attempted to shift the blame for a double lynching in 1919 onto the African American community. After failing to send National Guard troops to prevent the torture and murder of Claude Neal, Governor Dave Sholtz (1933-1937) further compounded his mistake by overseeing a perfunctory investigation yielding no arrests. Expressing a racism common to his rural Florida roots, Governor Fred P. Cone (1937-1941), a banker from Lake City, denounced the salary of the president of the Florida A & M College because ―no Negro is worth $4,000 to teach school.‖ While some decried the depredations of the mob, by and large Florida‘s governors during this period failed to act to prevent or punish racial terrorism.12 A national upsurge in the frequency of lynchings during the Depression led to a corresponding increase in anti-lynching advocacy efforts. Attempts to reduce and eradicate mob terrorism against African Americans dated at least to the work of T. Thomas Fortune, Frederick Douglass, and Ida B. Wells in the 1890s. One of the first campaigns initiated by the NAACP after its founding employed publicity, investigation, negotiation, and lobbying to fight the lynching evil.13 In the 1930s the Commission on Interracial Cooperation (CIC), and the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching (ASWPL) worked with the NAACP to form the vanguard of the ongoing campaign to eradicate lynching.14

11 Tindall, 551-552.

12 Colburn and Scher, 222-223, 278.

13 Robert L. Zangrando, The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching, 1909-1950. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), 12-13, 15, 17.

14 Zangrando, 11. 267

White Floridians continued to employ extralegal violence at a high rate in the years prior to the inauguration of Governor Spessard L. Holland. From 1937 through 1940, the Tuskegee Institute reported six Floridians died at the hands of mobs in five separate incidents. The killings took place in the following counties: Leon, Santa Rosa, Taylor, Bay, and Volusia. With the exception of the lynching in Volusia county, all of the outrages happened in the state‘s panhandle region. Of the lynchings reported during this period, three occurred in 1937; one took place in 1938; two happened in 1939. Florida achieved a lynch-less year in 1940. During this span, across the nation twenty-two people suffered lynching in twenty different cases. Of the lynching incidents reported nationwide from 1937 through 1940, a quarter occurred in Florida.15 The first lynching during the Holland administration took place at Quincy, in Gadsden county, over a period of approximately twenty-nine hours on 12 and 13 May 1941. On the morning of Sunday, 11 May, the Quincy police department arrested and detained A. C. Williams, a 22 year-old African American male, in the Gadsden county jail on charges of sexually assaulting a twelve-year-old white girl and breaking and entering. At about 2:30 a.m. on Monday, 12 May, a group of four masked men armed with pistols seized Officer Dan Davis of the Quincy police department and forced him to unlock the unguarded jail and open the cell holding A. C. Williams. The armed men abducted Williams and locked Officer Davis in the jail. Davis began to call for assistance and eventually attracted the attention of Gadsden Sheriff M. P. Luten, who lived near the jail. After releasing Davis, Sheriff Luten and other officers of the sheriff‘s and police departments began to search for Williams. The abducted prisoner‘s whereabouts remained a mystery until that night when Williams‘ mother informed Sheriff Luten that the her wounded son was hiding at her home. A subsequent examination of Williams by Dr. S. E. Wilhoit determined the prisoner had been shot ten times, three wounds piercing his chest and lungs. After conferring with Circuit Judge E. C. Love, Sheriff Luten arranged for the local African American undertaker to transport Williams to hospital in Tallahassee. While in route from Quincy to Tallahassee two armed men stopped the unescorted ambulance and seized Williams a second time. Luten conducted a fruitless search for Williams and his abductors during the early morning hours of Tuesday, 13 May. At about 5 a.m. a logger phoned the

15 Two double lynchings took place in 1937 – the first in Montgomery county, Mississippi, on 19 April, and the second in Leon county, Florida, on 20 July. A Florida lynch mob shot a man white to death in Panama City on 1 April 1939 after he did not receive the death sentence in a murder trial. Guzman, 304-305.

268 sheriff‘s office to report the discovery of the body of a black man approximately five miles north of Quincy on a bridge over Withlacoochee Creek. Sheriff Luten went to the scene and found the body of A. C. Williams.16 The lynching of A. C. Williams, and the unusual circumstances associated with it, drew the attention of the press, government officials, and anti-lynching organizations from across the state and the nation. The State‘s involvement in the Williams case began within hours of the initial abduction. Orion C. Parker, state attorney for the Second Judicial Circuit, conducted a preliminary investigation into the seizure of Williams in Quincy on the morning of Monday, 12 May. Despite the timely response by state officials, the inquiry failed to determine Williams‘ whereabouts or the identities of his kidnappers.17 Initial newspaper accounts of the incident emphasized the double abduction and lynching, and the inexplicable failure of local authorities to provide protection for the black prisoner accused of raping a young white girl. The St. Petersburg Evening Independent ran the story on its front page under the banner headline ―Florida Negro Is ‗Lynched‘ Twice.‖ In addition to a narrative of the abductions and murder, the Associated Press news service account also focused on Sheriff Luten‘s performance, noting,

There was no extra guard at the jail when Williams first was removed. Sheriff Luten declared there had been no advance indication of any violence and ‗I wasn‘t dreaming of any such thing.‘‖ When the negro was placed in the ambulance and started toward Tallahassee, Luten did not assign any guards. ‗I didn‘t expect trouble of any kind,‘ he said.‖18

The Call, an African American paper published in Kansas City, Missouri, reported the murder under the headline ―Florida Man Is Lynched By Two Mobs.‖19 The Atlanta Daily World focused on the ―Utter laxity of the law in protecting the prisoner, who the lynchers took a second

16 Report of Maurice H. Tripp on death of A. C. Williams, 25 May 1941. Papers of Governor Spessard L. Holland, Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Florida, Series 406, Box 72, FF Lynching, 1942; Sheriff M. P. Luten to Governor Holland, 14 May 1941. Holland Papers, Box 72, FF Lynching, 1942; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 13 May 1941; (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 13 May 1941.

17 Transcript of investigation into the seizure of A. C. Williams. Holland Papers, FSA, Box 72, FF Lynching 1942.

18 (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 13 May 1941.

19 (Kansas City, Mo.) The Call, 16 May 1941, in Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching, Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching Papers, 1930-1942. (Anne Arbor: Microfilming Corp. of America, 1983) Reel 2, Frame 1592 no. 26.

269 time after he had survived one fussilade [sic] of bullets….‖ The story questioned Sheriff Luten‘s actions, noting,

No extra men were put on guard at the jail because, Sheriff Luten said, there had been no indication of any mob violence. Why he left the ambulance unguarded after the first attempt [at] lynching failed, however, was not explained. It was said the youth might have been saved had he reached the hospital.20

As the first press coverage of the story indicated, the failure of authorities to provide adequate protection for A. C. Williams raised serious questions about the ability and willingness of local law enforcement to thwart mob violence. The lynching of A. C. Williams in Quincy brought the focus of both the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching to Florida. The organizations, while united in purpose – the eradication of lynching – employed different means to achieve that goal. The NAACP campaign against lynching combined investigation, documentation, lobbying, and legal action. Passage of a federal anti-lynching law constituted a major goal of the NAACP‘s campaign against lynching.21 The energy for the formation of the ASWPL resulted from the demands of black female civil rights activists that southern white women assist in ending racial violence and objections arising from the exclusion of women from the Southern Commission on the Study of Lynching – a biracial group created to analyze racial violence. A decentralized organization primarily comprised of members of church organizations and civic groups, the ASWPL emphasized field work, especially personal contact to persuade and pressure local and state officials to stamp out lynching. Organizationally, the ASWPL consisted of an Atlanta-based Central Council and numerous state councils charged with the duties of disseminating the organization‘s ―program to the state‘s women‘s groups, investigate and respond to local lynchings, and bring political pressure to bear on local and state politicians.‖22 While their activities sometimes overlapped, the campaigns of the NAACP and ASWPL largely complimented each other.

20 (Atlanta) Daily World, 16 May 1941, in ASWPL Papers, Reel 2, 1594 no. 26. 21 Zangrando, 11, 51.

22 Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, Revolt Against Chivalry: Jessie Daniel Ames and the Women’s Campaign Against Lynching. (New York: Columbia University Press, revised edition, 1993), 161-163, 172.

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The ASWPL learned of the trouble in Quincy within hours of Williams‘ initial abduction and immediately began its own investigation. Utilizing the organization‘s network of members across the state, Jane Havens, ―Chairman‖ of the Florida Council of the ASWPL wired the Tallahassee vice-chairman for information on the incident.23 Havens also contacted the recently inaugurated Governor Spessard Holland lamenting the breaking of Florida‘s nearly two year streak of no lynchings and requesting a report on the administration‘s investigation.24 At the same time, Havens updated Jesse Daniel Ames, ASWPL executive director on the progress of the investigation.25 Ames contacted Holland, urging him to bring the killers of A. C. Williams to justice. ―…If during your administration Florida lynchers are tried for murder and punished, you will set a record that future governors of your state … would have to follow,‖ she wrote.26 The ASWPL responded to the Williams lynching with a program of investigation, publicity, and appeals to elected officials. In addition to the response from the press and civil rights organizations, the Williams lynching inspired citizens from across the nation to share their views of the incident with Governor Holland. The impetus for many of the cards, letters, and telegrams undoubtedly came from the efforts of organizations committed to civil rights, like the NAACP, ASWPL, and the CIC, to rally public revulsion over the murder.27 These messages varied in tone and theme. C. D. Bateman wrote from Chico, California, cautioning of the impending demise of the state‘s tourism industry because, ―…No vacationer will feel safe or secure in a state where their personal rights cannot be protected so Florida has in this way started her own downfall.‖28 Not content with the possibility of the state‘s self-destruction, L. Wishwell, of New York City, warned,

23 Havens to Mrs. Park, 14 May 1941. ASWPL Papers, Reel 5, Frame 1667 no. 99.

24 Havens to Governor Holland, 14 May 1941. Holland Papers, FSA, Box 72, FF Lynching 1941.

25 Havens to Ames, 16 May 1941. ASWPL Papers, Reel 2, Frame 1595 no. 26.

26 Ames to Governor Holland, 29 May 1941. Holland Papers, FSA, Box 72, FF Lynching 1941.

27 For example, see Jessie Daniel Ames to Officers and Members of the Executive Committee of the ASWPL, 20 May 1941, in which Ames advised ―It might be well if you would write Governor Spessard L. Holland … expressing your deep disappointment in the fact that Florida has broken our lynchless record for 1941.‖ ASWPL Papers, Reel 2, Frame 1602 no 26.

28 C. D. Bateman to ―Mr. Governor,‖ no date. Holland Papers, FSA, Box 72, FF Lynching 1941.

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If Sheriff Luten is not fired and jailed for criminal neglect, and public action taken against the lynchers, I swear to start a campaign against all Florida resorts. I will spend every cent I have to see to it that decent, God-fearing Americans keep away from Florida and its lawless people.29

The incident in Quincy focused the energies of an existing network of activists on Florida. The press coverage and letter writing campaigns of civil rights organizations like the NAACP and ASWPL represented only one side of the forces at work on public officials following an outrage like the Williams murder. Numerous factors worked to influence officeholders to look the other way or even condone the crime of lynching. Southerners traditionally justified extralegal violence on the basis of a number of spurious assertions, such as the ineffectiveness of law enforcement, the uncertainty of the legal system, the necessity of controlling an inferior African American population, and to prevent sexual assault on white women. Additionally, even many of those white citizens opposed to racial violence in general, took a different view when confronted with the myth of the unchecked black male. Local institutions such as newspapers and churches often turned a blind eye to mob violence in their own communities.30 Due to the political implications of the existence of factions condemning and condoning lynching, elected officials often found themselves pulled in opposing directions. The double lynching of A. C. Williams also drew the attention of nationally syndicated newspaper columnist Westbrook Pegler.31 Something of a firebrand on a variety of topics, in his column on the Quincy murder Pegler portrayed the entire state of Florida as backward and corrupt. After sketching events surrounding Williams‘ killing, Pegler went on to impugn the history and character of the entire state. Writing with a pen dipped in venom, Pegler asserted,

The section of the country in which this horror occurred is in the social and intellectual slum which, according to the hearsay historians of Florida, was populated by low whites who fled from other southern states, notably Georgia and

29 L. Wishwell to ―Dear Sir,‖ 14 May 1941. Holland Papers, FSA, Box 72, FF Lynching 1941.

30 Arthur F. Raper, The Tragedy of Lynching. (New York: Negro Universities Press, reprint edition, 1969), 18-24.

31 A nationally syndicated columnist, Pegler had been awarded a Pulitzer Prize in 1941 for exposing the involvement of racketeers in motion picture and entertainment industry unions. Pegler wrote an extremely controversial 1933 column defending the San Jose, California, lynching of two confessed murderers as an ―act of civic virtue.‖ Pegler frequently criticized Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt in his columns. One of Pegler‘s biographers described the columnist‘s work as muckraking with an edge of harshness and savagery. Finis Farr, Fair Enough: The Life of Westbrook Pegler. (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House Publishers, 1975), 105, 106-108, 151-152, 158, 207-209. 272

Alabama, to escape service in the Civil [W]ar, and the white population is distinguished from the negroes only in the matter of complexion and other racial characteristics…. Florida is an adolescent, irresponsible and, thus far, incorrigible state whose most respected political and civic leaders in the urban areas have frankly insisted that it is necessary, in the interests of progress and prosperity, to connive at crime and build on vice and official corruption…. It is not to scold the people or the state that such observations are made, but rather to indicate how it can be that white men, claiming to be members of a superior breed, can so degrade themselves and embarrass the race in which they hold technical membership in an effort to impress their superiority on their negro neighbors. Ignorance and brutality die hard and slowly in certain strains of Florida Caucasians and resist such refinements as electric signs, the radio, plumbing and paving, even on the luxury coast of the Atlantic…. Civilization can‘t be hurried in the and backwoods, on either the whites or the negroes. Each degrades the other, but the white man has moments when he can really show the negro a very recognizable stump of the tail by which his not so remote ancestors swung from the tangled vines among the stunted trees.32

In this one column, Pegler labeled Florida‘s pioneer settlers as craven cowards, challenged the honor of the state‘s political and civic leaders, and denied the foundation of the white supremacy system. Pegler‘s diatribe drew a number of responses, most of them red hot reprisals from the press and officeholders. In provoking such a convulsive reaction, Pegler‘s column vied with the actual crime as the focus of attention in the state. ASWPL director Jesse Daniel Ames contacted Pegler immediately after seeing his column in the Atlanta Constitution. In what may have been a rare expression of support from a southerner, Ames wrote,

I concur heartily in all that you say except that I cannot believe in the hopelessness of that part of the South. Nothing is hopeless except as people see it that way.33

Ames comments reflected the progressive‘s faith in the potential for achieving meaningful change through education, publicity, and persuasion. Not surprisingly, Florida newspapers stepped forward to defend the state and criticize Pegler‘s column. A Tampa Tribune editorial took issue with what it described as Pegler‘s

32 Tampa Tribune, 19 May 1941.

33 Ames to Pegler, 19 May 1941. ASWPL Papers, Reel 2, Frame 1601 no. 26.

273 attempt to apply an ―exaggerated and vindictive smear‖ to the entire state for the lynching in Quincy. The Tribune editor deftly sidestepped the question of whether Pegler‘s charges applied to Quincy or any other area of Florida and focused on the injustice of maligning the entire state because of an outrage in one community.34 An editorial in the Tallahassee Daily Democrat, published in adjoining Leon county, not only vilified Pegler, it denied that a lynching took place and equated the column on the Williams murder with the ―smear propaganda of Herr Goebbels.‖ Describing the offending editorial as a ―verbal lynching bee directed at the beautiful, orderly, cultured community of Quincy,‖ the Democrat editor declared Pegler to be a benighted and corrupt individual. Asserting that ―an informal, extra-legal and often misdirected attempt to apprehend and punish criminals, carried out by a large section of a community‖ constituted the definition of lynching, the Democrat denied that a lynching occurred because Williams had been ―shot to death by four men ….‖ Therefore, according to the Democrat, the Quincy murder had ―all the outward aspects of a private vengeance slaying. It was not lynching.‖ Furthermore, following the Democrat’s convoluted reasoning, ―the community of Quincy can be held no more responsible for the crime than for a robbery committed there.‖35 A column in the Pensacola Journal observed ―Westbrook Pegler…has stepped into a hornet‘s nest in Florida,‖ with ―his unwarranted and below-the-belt attack on Northwest Florida in particular and all Florida in general….‖ The editorial continued,

As far as Pegler‘s statements concerning the recent lynching … are concerned, we have no complaint. We never had condoned lynching or the taking of the law into their own hands by a mob, band or small group of relatives or friends of the victim.‖

Regarding the assault on the good name of Florida, ―we cannot condone Pegler for his vicious and unfounded attack upon … all of Florida because of the lawlessness of a few.‖36 These editorial reactions betrayed sensitivity to criticism perhaps borne of a feeling of inferiority and remorse over the state‘s record of racial violence.

34 Tampa Tribune, 20 May 1941.

35 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 20 May 1941.

36 Pensacola Journal, 23 May 1941, in ASWPL Papers, Reel 2, Frame 1608 no. 26.

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The most vituperative response to Pegler‘s column on the Quincy lynching came from the upper chamber of the Florida legislature. The lynching occurred during the initial weeks of the 1941 legislative session, forcing Holland to juggle his administration‘s response to the murder, management of his legislative program, and the other demands of office. State Senator Amos Lewis of Marianna, situated in Jackson county, the locale of the infamous 1934 lynching of Claude Neal, rose to Florida‘s defense. Speaking from both prepared remarks and extemporaneously, Lewis declared,

Four or five persons acting incognito and of their own and not as the emissaries of the whole people of the beautiful and charming City of Quincy, became outraged when a little 12-year old white girl was ravished by a brutal, 22- year old bestial negro, and saw fit to assassinate (not lynch) the perpetrator of this heinous crime. As a result of this regrettable occurrence (the Quincy affair) a certain soul-sick, mud-wallowing, gutter-scum columnist … with vicious and vitriolic pen has maliciously insulted the good people of North and West Florida, and all Florida and particularly the citizens of the fair city of Quincy. The alley-bat news sniper, among other things charges that North and West Florida was settled by people who were renegades … and deserters of the cause of the confederacy. He charges that the citizenry are illiterate and no better than the rapist. …I resent with every particle of vigor that in me lies, this vile, cheap, unjustified, scurrilous, and scandalous attack upon us, and I sincerely hope that this vicious, uncouth, uncultured blasphemer of all that is good and noble in America will live to drink the dregs of the shame that must be his inevitable reward for his earthly existence.

A packed gallery repeatedly interrupted Lewis‘ remarks with applause. Sen. Pat Whitaker of Tampa charged Pegler with attempting to destroy national unity by undermining confidence in the wellbeing of the thousands of military personnel training in the state. The senate adopted a motion by Senator LeRoy Collins of Tallahassee to publish Lewis‘ written remarks in the Senate Journal.37 Pegler‘s editorial sparked a greater legislative reaction than the Williams murder itself. This seeming disinterest among lawmakers to the actual crime reflected several tendencies regarding lynching – the political impotence of African Americans resulted in neglect and indifference among officials, the erroneous conviction that extralegal violence constituted the last defense against black miscreants, a white reluctance to discuss lynching spawned by guilt

37 Senate Journal, 753-755; Florida Times-Union, 28 May 1941.

275 and fear, and the inadequacy and weakness of local and state governments.38 The preference for rhetorical rather than substantial action on the part of the legislature reflected the inherent political, social, and practical barriers to the eradication of racial violence. Sen. Lewis‘ response to the Pegler editorial prompted Jane Havens, Florida chairman of the ASWPL, to write the senator regarding the organization‘s anti-lynching program. Havens reminded Lewis that her organization was ―an association of southern white women banded together to educate against the crime of lynching.‖ Regarding the murder of A. C. Williams, Havens counseled Lewis, ―those peace officers responsible for law and order who have permitted this to take place should be removed from office for the protection of people who reside in that area.‖ Furthermore, Havens admonished the senator,

In a time of the world‘s history when lawlessness and injustice are flagrant, we of the United States must uphold our law and order in our states. No matter what the crime the negro committed, his lynching in Gadsden County was not justice, law, or order. And until we in Florida uphold these we must expect adverse comments from the citizens of other states which do not permit lynchings … to occur.39

Havens, although too readily accepting of Williams‘ guilt, reproached Lewis for not taking action against the Gadsden county officials who failed to provide adequate protection for their prisoner. Additionally, writing in a tone she might have used with a capricious child, Havens advised Lewis a state that allowed lynchings to occur must expect criticism from citizens of states that did not. Despite being phrased in respectful terms, Havens‘ message to Sen. Lewis constituted a rebuke for his failure to take substantial action against the murderers of A. C. Williams and lynching in general. Not one to accept correction without protest, Lewis‘ response demonstrated his adherence to the primary rationale for lynching. Lewis wrote,

Replying, I will state that I was glad to learn that you are a member of that great Association of Southern Women to Prevent Lynching. This is to advise you that I am a member of that other Association of Southern Gentlemen to Prevent Raping. I do not see any reason why we should have any differences.40

38 Raper, 14, 16; Tindall 170-172.

39 Havens to Senator Lewis, 28 May 1941. ASWPL Papers, Reel 2, Frame 1644-1645 no. 26.

40 Sen. Amos Lewis to Mrs. Henry Havens, 2 June 1941. ASWPL Papers, Reel 5, 1671 no. 99. For her part, Jessie Daniel Ames apparently regarded the views of Lewis and others who shared his beliefs as amusing and absurd. After reading Lewis‘ message, Ames wrote to Havens, ―The letter from Senator Lewis is priceless. I am having it 276

Senator Lewis‘ rejoinder epitomized resistance to the efforts of those organizations, such as the ASWPL, dedicated to the eradication of lynching and other forms of institutionalized racism. While the Pegler row played itself out, state officials continued their investigation into the lynching of A. C. Williams. State Attorney Orion C. Parker, Jr. oversaw a preliminary investigation into the initial abduction on 12 May 1941. At about the same time, Governor Spessard L. Holland ordered special investigator Maurice H. Tripp to conduct an inquiry and report back to him. Additionally, Holland interviewed Gadsden county Sheriff Luten regarding the incident. Following the discovery of the body of A. C. Williams, State Attorney Parker held a coroner‘s inquest in Quincy on 13 May 1941. Despite multiple investigations and the accompanying reports, no evidence fixing the identities of those individuals responsible for the abductions and murder of A. C. Williams emerged. Governor Holland continued to hope for the discovery of additional evidence and the case file remained open.41 In the weeks and months following the Quincy incident, the ASWPL continued to monitor the investigation. In the absence of discernable progress, the organization attempted to encourage officials to take action. Executive Director Ames wrote Florida Chairman Havens suggesting that she contact Governor Holland. Recognizing Holland also experienced countervailing pressures to do nothing about the lynching, Ames observed,

I know you are doing everything that can be done to force the Governor‘s hand and I hope … not only for the sake of Florida but for the sake of our country in this international tragedy that the Governor will come clean on this and will rise superior to politics.42

Acting on Ames‘ advice, Havens contacted Governor Holland, reminding him,

I wrote to you on May fourteenth asking for your cooperation, and so far have not had a reply. I feel sure that the reason for this that you are giving this matter your serious consideration. However, I do feel that the time has come when you as the

copied to put in my file with Mrs. Andrews‘ dossier. You know she is the woman here that organized the Association for the Preservation of the White Race with the motto that all future Americans be sired by white men.‖ Ames to ―My dear Jane,‖ 11 July 1941. ASWPL Papers, Reel 5, 1668 no. 99.

41 U.S. Attorney George Earl Hoffman to Rotman, 14 July 1942. Holland Papers, FSA, Box 72, FF Lynching 1942.

42 Ames to Havens, 26 May 1941. ASWPL Papers, Reel 5, Frame 1667 no. 99.

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Governor of our fair state must voice your opinion and stand on this question…. Hence I appeal to you again as a southern Christian gentleman to take a stand in this matter so that right may prevail in our fair state in a world where so much wrong and injustice is reigning.43

While awaiting a reply from Governor Holland, Havens received an update from ASWPL Vice Chairman Mary S. Williams of Tallahassee. Regarding the state investigation, Williams wrote, I have this morning talked with the Governor‘s secretary, Mr. [Ralph] Davis, about the investigation of the lynching. He says the State‘s Attorney, Mr. Parker, has reported to the Governor but that the investigation is not yet complete and that the Governor is not ready to make any statements about the matter. As soon as the rush of legislative matters permits he will go into the matter further and will make reply to your inquiry. He assured me the matter has not been tabled but will be given adequate attention as soon as possible.44

Havens subsequently received an apologetic response from Governor Holland. Professing his regret at the delay in responding to her, the governor attributed the lapse to ―the unusual strain I am undergoing during this session of the Legislature.‖ On lynching in general and the Williams incident in particular, Holland wrote,

I am in accord with your statements regarding the subject of lynching. Promiscuous lynching in our Southern states in years gone by has occasioned the criticism that we receive from time to time. You may be assured that during my administration I am going to assist in every way to prevent such crime in our state. A thorough investigation is being made at this time of the recent unfortunate incident at Quincy and this matter would have been consummated by this time except for the fact that I have been tied up almost constantly with the Legislature.

Holland encouraged Havens to ―continue to correspond and bring to this office any thoughts you may have along this line.‖45 In addition to corresponding with members of her organization and state officials, Havens traveled to Tallahassee to follow-up on the Quincy investigation in person. Following her journey, Havens reported to Executive Secretary Ames,

I was in Tallahassee on the 13th [of June] and had a most interesting talk with Governor Hollands [sic] Executive Secretary in regards to the Quincy affair. I

43 Havens to Holland, 28 May 1941. ASWPL Papers, Reel 2, 1646-1647 no. 26.

44 Mary S. Williams to Mrs. Haven (sic), 30 May 1941. ASWPL Papers, Reel 2, 1635 no. 26.

45 Governor Holland to Havens, 31 May 1941. ASWPL Papers, Reel 2, 1634 no. 26.

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firmly believe that they are going to straighten out the whole thing. They feel the same as we do that Sheriff Luten was careless.46

After roughly six weeks of monitoring the state investigation of the Williams lynching, and despite the absence of arrests or suspensions, Havens apparently maintained confidence in the Holland administration. An investigation of the Williams lynching by the United States Department of Justice attributed the double kidnapping to ineptitude on the part of the Gadsden county sheriff. In his report on the investigation, U.S. Attorney George Earl Hoffman blamed the initial abduction on sloppy procedures at the Gadsden county jail. Because the town of Quincy did not have a municipal jail, the municipal police department lodged prisoners in the county jail under an agreement between Gadsden county and the city. In operating the jail, Sheriff Luten allowed members of the Quincy police department to carry individual keys to the jail. Hoffman noted,

that was the situation when the four men in an automobile came along side of the city policeman at Quincy and took him over to the county jail where he opened the doors and the masked men took the negro from his cell.

Additionally, Hoffman faulted the Sheriff for failing to station adequate guards at the jail. As a result of the conditions at the jail, the Federal Bureau of Prisons had earlier barred the Department of Justice from using the Gadsden county facility to house federal prisoners ―because of the loose and careless way in which the mail [sic] was operated.‖47 In allowing individual police officers to carry keys to the jail and neglecting to adequately guard the prisoner, Sheriff Luten‘s management of the jail made it easier for the lynchers to take A. C. Williams. Furthermore, Hoffman censured Luten for his inexplicable failure to assign an armed guard to the ambulance transporting Williams to the hospital in Tallahassee. Hoffman wrote,

The failure of the sheriff to take the necessary precaution to protect this negro from further violence merits criticism and any feeling on his part that the wrath of this small group of men had been spent, would hardly be an excuse. The situation was one that really justified and required an armed guard and protective custody in its best sense. The sheriff‘s failure to do this is perhaps directly responsible for the second episode in this unfortunate affair.48

46 Havens to Ames, 30 June 1941. ASWPL Papers, Reel 5, 1676 no 99.

47 U.S. Attorney George Earl Hoffman to Rotman, 14 July 1942. Holland Papers, FSA.

48 Ibid.

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While disparaging Sheriff Luten‘s performance, Hoffman stopped short of suggesting collusion with the murderers or his removal. Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge‘s reply to Hoffman summarized the Department of Justice‘s appraisal of Sheriff Luten‘s role in the lynching. Berge wrote,

As you note, the behavior of the law enforcement officials in Quincy, Florida, may be subject to criticism on the basis of ineptitude and negligence, but it does not appear that any willful or intentional refusal to protect A. C. Williams was involved. The fact that the sheriff notified the judge of the second judicial circuit after the first seizure of Williams indicates that he was acting in good faith and was seeking to make proper arrangements for the custody of his prisoner. The Department is satisfied from your able report that criminal proceedings against the police authorities of Quincy are not warranted.49

In the view of the U.S. Department of Justice, Sheriff Luten failed to provide adequate protection for Williams, but the sheriff‘s negligence did not justify criminal charges. Inquiries into the Williams lynching by state officials came to a similar conclusion regarding Sheriff Luten‘s role in the incident. Governor Holland reported on the state‘s attempts to determine the sheriff‘s culpability in the abductions and the identities of the kidnappers in a letter to the ASWPL‘s Jane Havens. Regarding efforts to find Williams‘ murderers, Holland wrote,

I am sorry to say that though we have had three separate investigations made of the affair, we have not yet been able to get to the bottom of the matter. For your own personal information, I beg to advise that we have had undercover investigators in the Quincy community on several occasions for considerable periods of time, but they have been unable to find out anything of importance or anything linking any known persons to the crime.

In reference to the conduct of Sheriff Luten, the governor noted,

The reports following each of the three investigations and the private reports made to me by investigators and by several of the good citizens of Quincy and of Gadsden County, whose help I have asked in the matter, have all indicated that there was no active or passive participation in the matter on the part of the Shierff, but that the root of the trouble seems to have been in the careless custom of many years under which no jailer resided at the jail and under which many keys to the

49 Wendell Berge to George Earl Hoffman, 23 July 1942. Holland Papers, FSA, Box 72, FF Lynching, 1942.

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jail were held by the several county and city officials who placed prisoners there from time to time.

Despite being stymied thus far, Holland refused to declare the case at an end. ―The investigations will continue, and we shall hope that eventually we can discover and announce the actual facts lying behind the terrible occurrence,‖ he promised.50 A lack of evidence ultimately frustrated the state‘s attempts to punish those responsible for the abductions and murder of A. C. Williams. Despite the timely response by State Attorney Orion C. Parker and the subsequent investigations, law enforcement officials could not pry the secret of Williams‘ killers from the small north Florida community. Once again southern custom and tradition prevailed over lawful authority and justice. While the state could not identify and punish the actual murderers of A. C. Williams, the possibility of action against the man whose negligence facilitated the crime remained. Confronted with Sheriff Luten‘s poor performance and a torrent of mail and telegrams demanding action, Governor Holland must have weighed suspending him from office. An awareness of the constitutional and political considerations likely shaped Holland‘s deliberations. Under the state constitution and judicial precedent, the governor could suspend officials for ―malfeasance, neglect of duty, misfeasance, commission of a felony, drunkenness, and incompetence.‖51 However, the state senate reexamined all gubernatorial suspensions. The senate met in closed session to review suspensions and rule on removal or reinstatement. While the state senate‘s process for reviewing gubernatorial suspensions had all the outward appearances of a deliberative proceeding, in actuality, senatorial custom left the final decision to the senator in whose district the suspended official served.52 Therefore, as a result of senatorial courtesy, political and personal considerations potentially influenced these decisions as much as the facts. Given the obvious sensitivity to criticism among those members of the senate from the northern region of the state, Holland could not assume confirmation of Luten‘s suspension. Additionally, the timing of the Williams incident, coming during the new governor‘s first legislative session, the ambitious nature of Holland‘s legislative program, and the

50 Holland to Havens, 9 October 1941. Holland Papers, FSA, Box 72, FF Lynching, 1941.

51 Colburn and Scher, 140.

52 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 19 May 1941.

281 disproportionate influence of north Florida senators made any action against Sheriff Luten politically risky for the governor. In deciding not to suspend, Holland probably decided that the political perils outweighed the uncertain benefits of removing Luten. The second lynching of an African American to occur during the Holland administration took place in the rural north Florida community of Marianna during the early morning hours of 16 June 1943. Shortly after midnight, four masked men took thirty-one year old Cellos Harrison from the Jackson county jail, where he awaited retrial on a charge of murdering a white man. The men gained entry to the jail through the ruse of calling to night jailer Tom Belcher, ―Uncle Tom we have a drunk for you, open up.‖53 After unlocking the jail door, four masked men, one holding a pistol, confronted Belcher. The men held Belcher at gunpoint while they removed the prisoner from his cell and left the jail. Law enforcement officers discovered Harrison‘s lifeless body around daylight in a roadside ditch about five miles south of Marianna.54 Local and state officials responded quickly to the abduction and murder of Harrison. After learning of the kidnapping, the governor‘s office ordered Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) Lieutenant Reid Clifton and three FHP patrolmen to Marianna to search for Harrison.55 Following the discovery of Harrison‘s battered body, County Attorney Hays Lewis, Jr. (brother of State Senator Amos Lewis) and State Attorney L. D. McRae impaneled a coroner‘s jury and conducted an inquest into the incident.56 Direct questioning of night jailer Belcher, jailer Lewis Rogers, and inmates of the jail failed to discover sufficient information to identify Harrison‘s abductors.57 Given the lack of revelatory testimony or physical evidence, the coroner‘s jury determined Harrison ―came to his death from wounds inflicted by a blunt or sharp instrument in the hands of an unknown person or persons.‖58 Once again a mob had taken the law into its hands.

53 Lieutenant Reid Clifton report on the death of Cellos Harrison, 21 June 1943. Holland Papers, FSA. Box 72, FF Lynching, 1943.

54 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 16 June 1943; St. Petersburg Times, 17 June 1943.

55 Clifton report on the death of Cellos Harrison. Holland Papers, FSA.

56 L. D. McRae report on lynching of Cellos Harrison, 23 June 1943. Holland Papers, FSA. Box 72, FF Lynching, 1943.

57 Report of Coroner‘s Inquest into the Death of Cellos Harrison, 16 June 1943. Box 72, FF Lynching, 1943.

58 St. Petersburg Times, 17 June 1943. 282

The circumstances surrounding the lynching suggested members of the community acted to ensure Harrison received the sentence they no longer believed the courts would provide. Harrison had been twice convicted of beating white filling station operator Johnnie Mayo to death with a hammer during a 1940 attempted robbery. The state supreme court twice reversed Harrison‘s convictions and ordered his release from custody.59 In overturning Harrison‘s second murder conviction, the supreme court nullified a signed confession obtained through ―influences calculated to delude the mind of the ignorant negro of its far-reaching consequences.‖ A Jackson county grand jury again indicted Harrison in the spring of 1943 and county authorities took him into custody awaiting retrial.60 At this point, three years after the murder of Johnnie Mayo, the prosecution of Harrison encompassed multiple indictments, convictions, death sentences, and reprieves. In kidnapping and murdering Harrison, in a manner that mimicked the killing of Mayo, the lynchers exchanged mob rule for the rule of law. Identification and prosecution of a lynch mob in Florida constituted a difficult undertaking under any conditions, but given the circumstances surrounding the Harrison murder the task became even more onerous. The convoluted legal proceedings and reversals of convictions, seemingly on technicalities, engendered frustration among many of Jackson county‘s white residents and feelings of sympathy with the actions of the lynchers.61 Additionally, a promise to find the murderer of Johnnie Mayo made by Sheriff W. Barkley Gause, then a candidate for sheriff, in the days following the initial crime,62 and his involvement in building the case against Harrison,63 raised valid questions regarding the sheriff‘s commitment to apprehending the lynchers. The ease with which Harrison‘s abductors gained access to the jail looked suspicious to outside observers. The reported inactivity of local law enforcement officers

59 For the transcripts of Cellos Harrison‘s appeals before the Florida Supreme Court see, Cellos Harrison v. State of Florida, Florida Supreme Court case nos. 15.518 and 16.147.

60 (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 16 June 1943; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 16 June 1943; St. Petersburg Times, 17 June 1943. For a detailed narrative of legal proceedings, see Tameka Bradley Hobbs, ―‗Hitler is Here‘: Lynching in Florida During the Era of World War II,‖ 99-105.

61 Hobbs, 105.

62 FBI Investigation, 19 August 1943. Department of Justice, National Archives, RG 60, cited in Hobbs, 92.

63 Testimony of Cellos Harrison, State of Florida v. Harrison, (1941), cited in Hobbs, 95.

283 following Harrison‘s abduction fostered doubts about their interest in capturing the kidnappers.64 Furthermore, widespread connections of friendship and sympathy with the large, extended family of Johnnie Mayo decreased the likelihood of cooperation with the investigation from within the community. In addition to these factors, the memories and experiences of the infamous 1934 Jackson county lynching of Claude Neal undoubtedly discouraged residents, both black and white, from providing information vital to the investigation of Harrison‘s murder. In light of these elements, it was not surprising that State Attorney L. D. McRae conveyed a sense of pessimism in a letter to the governor‘s office, observing,

From what information or evidence could be produced before the Inquest which was conducted on the morning following the lynching by the County Attorney, Hays Lewis, in my opinion it will be a difficult matter [to] find out who were the actual participants in the affair.65

The Tampa Morning Tribune expressed an even higher degree of cynicism regarding the chances of apprehending those responsible for the lynching. The editor wrote with obvious resignation,

It is customary for the press to urge in these cases that the authorities exert every effort to catch and punish the perpetrators – but that‘s wasted ink and paper, because it‘s never done.66

Given the public frustration with the legal proceedings and sentiment against the victim, the heavy investment by law enforcement in prosecuting Harrison, and the community‘s history of racial violence, the likelihood of discovering evidence leading to the identities of the mob members appeared insignificant. The federal Department of Justice took the lead in the ensuing investigation of the lynching of Cellos Harrison. This may have come about because state officials recognized the formidable obstacles to an effective investigation and the need for investigative personnel unknown to members of the community. State Attorney L. D. McRae advised the governor‘s office, ―In my opinion, this case should be investigated by a Special Investigator, and his assignment should be kept from the public.‖ McRae further recommended the inquiry begin,

64 FBI Investigation, cited in Hobbs, 123-124.

65 L. D. McRae to Ralph Davis, 21 June 1943. Holland Papers, FSA. Box 72, FF Lynching, 1943.

66 Tampa Morning Tribune, 18 June 1943, in Holland Papers, FSA. Box 72, FF Lynching, 1943.

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immediately after the Grand Jury finishes their investigation, in the event they should fail to indict any one, I believe he would most likely get a start. It will be then that people will begin to talk, feeling that it is all over.67

Furthermore, coming on the heels of race riots in Los Angeles, California, and Beaumont, Texas,68 the Marianna lynching undoubtedly drew the attention of federal officials mindful of the threat of racial violence to the war effort. The U.S. Department of Justice moved quickly to investigate the abduction and murder of Cellos Harrison. At the request of Attorney General Francis Biddle, Assistant U.S. Attorney General Wendell Berge requested George Earl Hoffman, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Florida to investigate and report.69 In July 1943, a team of agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation began what would become a nine month inquiry into the Marianna incident. Despite the expenditure of hundreds of hours and approximately sixty interviews, the team of six FBI agents failed to uncover sufficient evidence to identify those responsible for the abduction and murder of Cellos Harrison. Federal authorities terminated the inquiry and closed the case in July 1944.70 In addition to affirming the already well-documented propensity of southern communities to resort to racial violence, the two lynchings in Florida during the Holland administration71 revealed the complexities of bringing these terrorists to justice. The national record of indictments and convictions for lynching further illustrated the difficulty of punishing perpetrators of mob violence. The Tuskegee Institute reported fourteen lynchings and five prosecutions in the U.S. between 1941 and 1944. In 1941, a jury sentenced four men to prison for the lynching of a black man in Gaston, North Carolina. During 1942, a Roxboro, North Carolina, jury convicted five men of trying to lynch an African American youth jailed on charges

67 McRae to Davis, Holland Papers, FSA.

68 David M. Kennedy, Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 770.

69 Wendell Berge to George Earl Hoffman, 17 June 1943. DOJ Files. Cited in Hobbs, 114.

70 Hobbs, 115-116, 126-127.

71 Fifteen-year-old Willie James Howard drowned in the Suwannee River near Live Oak, Florida, under very suspicious circumstances on 2 January 1944. The legal department of the NAACP determined Howard‘s death did not constitute a lynching. Miss Randolph to Mr. Marshall, 29 March 1944. Papers of the NAACP, Part 7, Series A, Reel 25, Frame 663.

285 of attempted rape. In 1943, a federal court in Albany, Georgia, convicted and sentenced a county sheriff, deputy sheriff and a former officer for violating civil liberties statutes in an abduction and lynching. However, not all prosecutions resulted in the punishment of those charged. During 1943, four men tried for lynching a black soldier in Illinois received a verdict of ―justifiable homicide.‖ Five Hattiesburg, Mississippi, men escaped conviction in federal court for a 1942 lynching – two as the result of a motion asserting insufficient evidence and the remaining three on acquittal. Out of the five lynching prosecutions, three resulted in convictions and sentences including fines and incarceration.72 Authorities rarely identified and punished those responsible for racial violence. An array of factors impeded the processes of bringing members of lynch mobs to justice. Southerners frequently rationalized incidents as either inevitable manifestations of irrational violence or justifiable retribution. Law enforcement officers neglected their duty to prevent lynchings for numerous reasons – officers shared the fear and bigotry of the community, elected officials recognized that white mobs voted and the African American community did not, and dereliction of duty rarely resulted in punishment. The threat of sanctions from state or local authorities held little fear for local officials because of the great degree of autonomy enjoyed by county officials in the South. Local voters and community elites held greater influence over county officials than either state or federal authorities. 73 Additionally, in his groundbreaking study of lynching, Arthur F. Raper attributed the ineffectiveness of judicial proceedings against mobs to,

Divided responsibility between peace officers, judges, and grand and trial juries; the indifference of some court officials; the widespread feeling that white women should be shielded from court testimony; the disinclination of local jurymen to indict and convict their neighbors, and promises made the mob by officers and leading citizens in order to prevent further outbreaks.74

Following a lynching, formidable obstacles frequently thwarted attempts to identify, apprehend, and prosecute the responsible individuals. Given the numerous impediments to prevention,

72 Guzman, 309-310.

73 Hall, 217, 224, 226.

74 Raper, 18.

286 investigation, and punishment, it was not surprising that so few prosecutions and convictions occurred. While the lynch mob achieved its bloody work without punishment in far too many instances, on some occasions determined and resourceful officials managed to protect the intended victim. These examples of extraordinary vigilance were partly attributable to the efforts of the NAACP, the CIC, and the ASWPL to publicize lynchings and shame the communities and states in which they occurred.75 Those occasions when officials frustrated the mob revealed another facet of the governmental response to lynching. State and local officials ―out-thought and outmaneuvered mobs‖76 through a variety of means. Authorities saved intended victims‘ lives by augmenting jail guards, removing the threatened individual to distant or more secure prisons, employing the National Guard or militia, and using force or persuasion to scatter mobs. Without the diligence and resourcefulness of some officials, the bloody roster of lynchings would have been even longer.77 The NAACP and ASWPL recorded reports of prevented lynchings and encouraged authorities to take necessary measures to save lives.78 Between 1916 and 1929, vigilante authorities and individuals averted five-hundred-sixty-nine attempted lynchings, mostly in the South. Another eighty-nine lynchings were prevented between January 1930 and October 1931.79 In spite of careful record keeping and verification, numerous averted lynchings went unreported and unrecorded in the lynching tallies due to the furtive nature of the attempted crime.80 Based upon records of the ASWPL, authorities and individuals in Florida foiled the lynch mob on at least thirteen occasions from 1932 through 1940. During this period, resourcefulness and quick action preserved the lives of twenty-four people – twenty-one African American men, two African American women, and one white woman – pursued for alleged offenses including

75 Guzman, 309.

76 Ibid.

77 In some instances officials or individuals made promises of quick trials, guilty verdicts, and speedy execution to persuade lynch mobs to disperse. In describing this phenomena, Arthur F. Raper observed, ―A ‗legal lynching‘ is little, if any, improvement over an extra-legal lynching.‖ Guzman, 309; Raper, 15, 32-33.

78 ASWPL members backed sheriffs who prevented lynching with their votes. Dowd Hall, 173.

79 Raper, 32.

80 Guzman, 309. For more on inaccuracies in the lynching inventory, see Tolnay and Beck, 256-67.

287 killing law enforcement officers, rape, kidnapping, and suspicion of theft. The means employed to thwart the lynchers‘ bloody intentions included removal to a more secure jail or prison (five instances), increased guard (three occasions), deployment of the National Guard (once), law enforcement‘s refusal to cooperate with the mob (once), and escape (once).81 The majority of these incidents occurred in communities located in north Florida (six), followed by the central (four) and southern region (one).82 The episodes took place more frequently in the early and middle years of the eight year span, with two each in 1932, 1934, 1935, and 1936; three in 1937; and one each in 1939 and 1940.83 This data suggests that in the years immediately preceding the Holland administration preventions occurred with greater frequency in the northern region, African American males comprised the majority of the intended victims, and preemptive action by law enforcement, in particular removal to a more secure location and augmenting guards, proved effective in circumventing lynchings. The alleged or suspected crime apparently made little difference in authorities‘ willingness or ability to shield individuals from mob violence, as demonstrated by protection of black men accused of killing law officers in 1932 and 1940, and protection of accused rapists throughout the period.84 In several instances during the Holland administration authorities took precautionary measures to prevent racial violence. In August 1941, Leon County Sheriff Frank Stoutamire arrested two African American males – George Newsome and Ocie Juggar – for the murder of a white female merchant in the rural north Florida community of Needmore, in Columbia county. Sheriff Stoutamire promptly transferred Newsome and Juggar to the state prison at Raiford.85 Following the killing of Walton County Sheriff Bob Gatlin, in November, 1942, Governor Holland assigned Florida Highway Patrol Director J. J. Gilliam to head the search for Alfred Snipes, a thirty-nine year old black man wanted for the crime. Holland called in the highway

81 ASWPL records do not list the means of prevention for two attempted lynchings in 1937. ASWPL Papers, Reel 3, F 1303, no. 49.

82 ASWPL records do not provide locations for two averted lynchings in 1932. ASWPL Papers, Reel 3, F 0934, no. 49. The prevented lynchings occurred in the following counties: in the northern region – Duval (2), Franklin (1), Jackson (1), Leon (1), and Washington (1); central region – Levy (1), Manatee (1), Orange (1), and Osceola (1); southern region – Broward (1).

83 ASWPL Papers, Reel 3, F 0934, no. 49ff.

84 ASWPL Papers, Reel F 0934, no. 49, F 1489, no. 49.

85 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 31 August 1941.

288 patrol because the incident which killed Sheriff Gatlin also severely injured Walton‘s only other officer, Deputy Curtis Miller, leaving the county without legally authorized law enforcement. Gilliam and ten Florida Highway Patrol officers led posses scouring the area for Snipes. As an additional safeguard against potential mob violence, Holland assigned fifty members of the Florida Defense Force to Defuniak Springs. Authorities eventually captured Snipes and took him to Raiford ―although there was no evidence that mob violence in Walton county was likely.‖86 In February, 1944, authorities arrested seventeen-year-old African American male Johnnie Byrd and transferred him to Raiford after he allegedly attempted to sexually assault a white woman near the Tallahassee railroad station.87 Jackson County Sheriff Barkley Gause, assisted by state highway patrolmen, arrested seventeen-year old African American Willie C. Morgan for raping a black woman and beating a white woman near Marianna in April 1944. Authorities immediately transferred Morgan to ―an undisclosed jail‖ for his safety.88 In each of these instances local or state authorities took precautionary measures to guard against outbreaks of mob violence. These preventive actions included relocation to a more secure prison and augmentation of local law enforcement with the state highway patrol and the Florida Defense Force.89 During the summer of 1944, a brutal attack on a young white woman, the daughter of a prominent local family and wife of a service man, on the back roads of Gadsden county brought a band of vigilantes to the threshold of conflict with state authorities. Furthermore, the proceedings against the alleged assailants revealed how an atmosphere of violence resulted in pressure on the legal system to quickly convict and punish the accused – a phenomena commonly known as a ―legal lynching.‖ This tragedy began with the multiple rape and attempted murder of a twenty-two year old employee of the State Hospital for the Insane at Chattahoochee on the evening of 29 July 1944. On that dark and rainy evening the attackers

86 St. Petersburg Times, 14, 15 November 1942.

87 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 23, 24, 28 February 1944.

88 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 9 April 1944.

89 Information on specific instances of prevented lynchings became scarce after the ASWPL voluntarily dissolved during 1942. The annual lynching inventories reported in the Papers of the NAACP provide cumulative totals, rather than reports of distinct incidents by state. The above overview relied on newspaper accounts and sought to identify both instances of prevented lynchings and extraordinary measures to avert racial violence.

289 used their Ford automobile to force the victim‘s car from the highway between Quincy and Chattahoochee, assaulted her, and then shot her twice in the head.90 The shooting inflicted only superficial wounds and the victim walked to a farmhouse to request help. After hearing a highway patrol radio bulletin describing the assailants, an officer of the Florida Highway Patrol arrested three African American males – James Williams, 26; Fred Lane, 20; and James Davis, 16;91 – in Live Oak driving a car stolen in Chattahoochee. Authorities immediately transferred the trio to the state prison at Raiford.92 Investigators quickly identified Williams, Lane, and Davis as suspects in the case. State Attorney Orion C. Parker, Jr. and Gadsden County Sheriff Otho Edwards traveled to the state prison to question the men in connection with the assault and murder attempt. Following interviews with the suspects, State Attorney Parker announced that James Williams made a detailed confession, and James Davis and Fred Lane made ―damaging admissions.‖ Based upon this information, Parker said the state intended to prefer charges of rape against the prisoners.93 On the eve of a special session of the circuit court grand jury called to consider indictments against the three suspects, Governor Holland pledged adequate protection for the prisoners. He promised, should the three men be charged, legal proceedings would take place ―under such conditions as to assure a peaceful and fair trial and the absence of any incident that would be regrettable.‖ Furthermore, Holland said that he had,

been assured by many leading citizens of Gadsden county that they think the sentiment there is to insist upon an early and fair trial and rendering of prompt justice and they are discouraging resort to anything other than proper judicial methods.

Despite these assurances, however, the governor avoided unnecessarily testing the forbearance of Gadsden‘s white citizenry. Authorities declined to return the prisoners to the county for the grand jury hearing, keeping them in the state prison in Raiford for their own safety.94

90 Lane et al v. State, Florida Supreme Court (1944), ―Minutes of the Circuit Court, Special Term, 1944,‖ 49.

91 The ages of the defendants varied in initial newspaper reports. The information used here came from accounts of their trial in Gainesville. (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 31 August 1944.

92 Florida Times-Union, 31 July 1944; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 31 July, 23 August 1944.

93 Ibid.

94 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 9 August 1944. 290

The grand jury met in Quincy on Thursday, 10 August, to consider the case against Williams, Lane, and Davis. The jury returned indictments for rape before a packed courtroom that afternoon. Circuit Judge W. May Walker appointed attorneys to defend the men and scheduled the trial for 24 August in Quincy.95 State authorities took extra precautions to prevent attempts to harm the three defendants prior to their scheduled court appearance. In advance of the trial, Governor Holland called up two hundred members of the Florida Defense Force and augmented the existing contingent of State Highway Patrol officers with additional patrolmen.96 Taking no chances with the safety of the three prisoners, state authorities played a prominent role in securing the Gadsden county courthouse. On the morning designated for the trial, sixty highway patrolmen guarded the courthouse, officers searched individuals seeking admission to the building, and machine guns defended the approaches to the courthouse square. In the midst of these security precautions few spectators gathered near the town square, but those who did could purchase photos of the individual defendants from hawkers for a dime each.97 Meanwhile, authorities transferred the three defendants from Raiford to the Leon county jail immediately prior to their court date in Gadsden county. State defense force troops guarded the Leon county jail as well.98 The deployment of the contingent of highway patrol officers and defense force personnel reflected both the Holland administration‘s appraisal of the danger to the prisoners and its resolve to protect Williams, Lane, and Davis during their trial. An attempt to seize the defendants from state custody confirmed the administration‘s wisdom in employing such extensive security. During the night before the trial‘s scheduled commencement, a large group of armed men brazenly seized a highway patrol cruiser and its occupants traveling from Tallahassee to Quincy. A highway patrol officer, on condition of anonymity, provided the following account of that night‘s events:

We were sent to Quincy to maintain law and order. About midway between the two cities we were stopped by a road blockade, formed by cars parked across the

95 St. Petersburg Times, 11 August 1944; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 11 August 1944.

96 Florida Times-Union, 24 August 1944.

97 (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 24 August 1944.

98 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 24 August 1944.

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highway. There must have been a hundred or more men, most of them armed, standing at the side of the road. They asked us to get out. Then they searched our car to make sure we didn‘t have the negroes with us. At first, the crowd was pretty hostile but finally they became friendly. We were told that the people of Gadsden county intended to settle the rape case ‗in their own way‘ and that we were to stay right there.99

Highway Patrol Lieutenant Olin Hill later reported that patrol headquarters dispatched a second car after losing radio contact with the first cruiser. The mob detained the second patrol vehicle. An officer traveling in a third patrol car attained the release of the two captive cruisers and their occupants. 100 An eyewitness reported that other than removing license plates from their vehicles, the mob made no attempt to hide their identities with masks or other disguises.101 The seizure of the highway patrol cars and approximately a dozen officers alerted authorities guarding the defendants in Tallahassee to the extreme dangers in transporting the prisoners to Quincy. The inability of authorities to safely deliver the prisoners to the court house initially delayed and then aborted the trial scheduled for Quincy. The mob‘s well orchestrated attempt to capture the prisoners caused state authorities to cancel plans to try the three men in Quincy. Following the failure of the defendants to appear in court, State Attorney Orion C. Parker, Jr. requested a change of venue from Gadsden county. The state attorney informed Judge W. May Walker that ―great bloodshed and loss of life might result‖ if the trial took place in Quincy. Witnesses testified in support of Parker‘s motion for a change in the site of the trial. Gadsden county resident B. Otinger told the court he had been, ―informed that every road into Gadsden county has been blocked by crowds of [fifty] to [two hundred] men who are armed.‖ After hearing testimony in support of Parker‘s motion for a change of venue, Judge Walker ordered the transfer of the trial from Quincy to Gainesville, a distance of approximately one-hundred-fifty miles.102 In addition to forcing the relocation of the trial, the attempt to wrest the prisoners from state custody also demonstrated both the determined intention and the resources to challenge state authority to exact extralegal retribution.

99 (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 26 August 1944.

100 St. Petersburg Times, 25 August 1944.

101 (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 26 August 1944.

102 St. Petersburg Times, 25 August 1944.

292

Up to the attempt to seize the prisoners the state had asserted its authority and demonstrated a commitment to trying the defendants in Quincy despite the inherent risks arising from the community‘s history of racial violence and the certainty of inflamed public sentiment. Following the capture and detention of the state highway patrol cruisers, dubbed the ―Gadsden incident‖ by the Evening Independent of St. Petersburg,103 state officials altered course. In his comments following the failed trial attempt, Governor Holland said the event indicated ―a very carefully laid plan‖ to take the defendants from custody.104 The governor reported that the officers in command of the state guard forces ―were of the feeling that they could force their way‖ through the road blocks between Tallahassee and Quincy ―but to do so would result in an armed clash and heavy bloodshed.‖ Furthermore, Holland said a conflict between the state guard and armed civilians would be pointless because it was now obvious that the accused men could not receive a fair trial in Quincy.105 Regarding the potential for state action against the blockaders, Holland said ―As far as I know, none of the men in the blockade party was known. If any of them are known, of course they will be prosecuted.‖106 The improbable claim that authorities could not identify a single member of a mob reportedly numbering one hundred or more people indicated official reluctance to confront an inflamed community bent on violent retribution. In the face of an armed challenge from a segment of the community in Gadsden county, the Holland administration did not force the issue, deciding to relocate the trial in hopes of avoiding bloodshed and finding a less biased environment in another area of the state. In its report on the incident, the St. Petersburg Evening Independent portrayed the affair as an uprising led by some of the county‘s prominent citizens. Furthermore, the paper questioned the decision to move the trial and forecast a political backlash against state officials. Writing under a Tallahassee dateline, staff writer Howard Hartley predicted,

How armed posses of Gadsden county citizens, including some of the most prominent business and professional men of Quincy held captive two squad cars loaded with state highway patrolmen and blocked Florida‘s state government‘s move to bring three negro rapists to trial in the judicial circuit in which the crime

103 (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 26 August 1944.

104 St. Petersburg Times, 25 August 1944.

105 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 27 August 1944.

106 St. Petersburg Times, 25 August 1944.

293

was committed, was revealed here last night … as Tallahassee seethed with reports that the now celebrated ‗Gadsden incident‘ will cast a shadow across the political futures of some state officials involved in the case…. The big question here and throughout Florida is whether the state government acted wisely or unwisely in taking the trial to another circuit because the enraged citizenry of a community threatened to take the law into their own hands. Never in recent history has a case stirred north and west Florida more deeply than the ‗capture‘ of a dozen state patrolmen and the dramatic defiance of the courts and the law that was unfolded Thursday afternoon on a highway between Tallahassee and Quincy.107

While emphasizing the sensational nature of the episode and promoting the perception that the mob bullied state officials, Hartley‘s story ignored the likely consequences of stubbornly trying the defendants in Gadsden county – bloodshed and a hopelessly biased trial. Other newspapers lauded officials for frustrating the lynch mob and adhering to legal principles. The Lakeland (Florida) Ledger proclaimed,

Thanks to careful maneuvering on the part of Governor Holland, county officers, state highway patrolmen and others, Florida apparently has been able to avoid three more lynchings. A mob formed in the Quincy area to seize three negroes charged with having violated a white woman. Aware that feeling was running high, officers took precautions well in advance. So tense was the situation yesterday that a decision was reached to call off the trial in Quincy and try the accused later in Gainesville….108

Cognizant of strong sentiment against the accused, the editor of the Tampa Times noted,

With his usual calm and fair attitude Governor Holland ably handled the delicate situation surrounding the trial at Quincy …. The governor knows lynchings are contrary to the principles for which this nation stands, and he took every precaution to try to give the negroes a fair trial …. Now the governor and the judge in the case … have decided wisely to move the trial to Gainesville in an attempt to avoid bloodshed. Fair-minded people are counting on the governor to continue his vigilance against possible lynchings and feel sure that he will do his utmost to assure that law and order and due processes continue to prevail.109

107 (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 26 August 1944.

108 Lakeland Ledger editorial reprinted in Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 27 August 1944.

109 Tampa Times editorial reprinted in Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 27 August 1944.

294

Unlike the Evening Independent coverage, these journals praised authorities for averting what almost certainly would have been a multiple lynching and their commitment to pursuing the legal processes. For the most part, the Holland administration‘s response to the attempted abduction of Davis, Lane, and Williams constituted a commendable interlude in an otherwise tragic episode. Authorities demonstrated uncommon diligence and competence in the steps taken to protect the defendants in advance of the abduction attempt. Whether the result of superior strategy or good fortune, the discovery of the road blocks between Tallahassee and Quincy saved the accused and prevented yet another bloody incident of racial violence. Authorities acted wisely in declining to force the trial in Quincy; to do otherwise would have invited further, possibly more violent, attempts on the prisoners and constituted a mockery of the judicial process. However, the failure of authorities to arrest and prosecute members of the conspiracy attempting to usurp legal authority constituted a disappointing concession to the power of the mob. In taking extraordinary steps to preserve Davis, Lane, and Williams for trial while failing to act against their would-be executioners authorities attempted to conclude the case through the judicial process without further antagonizing residents of Gadsden county. Despite the delay and change of venue, the Gainesville trial of Davis, Lane, and Williams bore a more than passing resemblance to the proceedings attempted in Quincy. In an effort to promote continuity and expedite proceedings, Governor Holland transferred Circuit Judge W. May Walker and State Attorney Orion C. Parker, Jr. to the Alachua County Circuit Court.110 In announcing the transfer of Judge Walker and State Attorney Parker, the governor declared his intention to get,

this case disposed of as speedily and decently as we can in a fair and unbothered way. They are going to be protected over there (in Gainesville) just as fully as the court requests, and by as many State Militiamen as heads of the State Guard consider necessary.111

Additionally, authorities continued to hold the three defendants at the state prison in Raiford for their protection. Forced to move the trial due to the imminent threat of violence, state officials continued to pursue a legal resolution to the case.

110 Lane et al, 78-79.

111 Florida Times-Union, 27 August 1944.

295

After relocating to Gainesville, authorities set about the preparing for the trial. Judge Walker drew eighty-five names from a pool of potential jurors. According to Alachua County Sheriff J. P. Ramsey, the pool of jurors used for the jury panel contained the names of several black Alachua citizens. Sheriff Ramsey could not immediately confirm whether any African Americans had been summoned for jury service in the case. Because the defendants faced charges of rape, a capital offense in Florida at that time, they faced execution in the state‘s electric chair. As the preliminaries neared completion, Judge Walker set the trial date for Thursday, 31 August, at nine a.m.112 After delay and relocation, the intensely anticipated trial would finally begin. For all the time, precautions, and resources invested, the trial turned out to be a brief and unsettling episode. Authorities delivered the defendants from Raiford to Gainesville in an armored vehicle to prevent further attempts to abduct or harm them. Press accounts estimated three hundred guardsmen and state troopers provided security for the thirty-eight mile journey to Gainesville. No attempts to interfere with the transfer of the prisoners occurred. State militia and highway patrol officers armed with shotguns and ―tommy guns‖ stood guard outside the courthouse and inside the court room. In the opening moments of the trial, the three accused men – James Walker, James Davis, and Freddie Lane – pled guilty to the charges of rape. Judge Walker accepted the pleas and dismissed the prospective jurors.113 In the next phase of the proceedings, Walker heard testimony from the victim and the three men prior to deciding whether to impose sentences of life in prison or the death penalty. Prior to the young woman‘s testimony, State Attorney Parker announced, ―I think it would be appropriate that all idle ears and curious eyes should be restricted or taken from the court room.‖ After Judge Walker cleared the courtroom of everyone but court officials, the victim identified the defendants as her assailants.114 Each of the three defendants, taking the witness stand at their own request, admitted to assaulting the young woman and made statements implicating the other two men. Both Williams and Lane attributed the shooting to Davis.115 After hearing testimony, Circuit

112 Florida Times-Union, 31 August 1944.

113 Lane et al v. State, ―Minutes of Circuit Court, Special Term, 1944,‖ 42-44.

114 Ibid, 50.

115 Ibid, 62-74.

296

Judge W. May Walker imposed the maximum sentence – death by electrocution at the state prison near Starke.116 Responding to a plea for ―mercy‖ from James Williams, Judge Walker, a veteran of twelve years on the bench,117 said,

I think this is one of the most horrible, most gruesome, most unthinkable crimes this court ever heard of. This case is absolutely destitute of any foundation for mercy. Mercy would be repugnant to any theory of justice.118

Many white Floridians undoubtedly experienced similar sentiments to those expressed by Judge Walker. When Colonel E. D. Vestal, commander of the militia detachment, in announcing the verdict said ―they will be electrocuted,‖ a cheer went up from a gathering of about three hundred spectators near the courthouse. The entire trial took only about two hours. At the conclusion of proceedings authorities placed the prisoners in an armored vehicle guarded by a cordon of state guardsmen and highway patrol officers for the return trip to Raiford.119 Davis, Lane, and Williams faced death again, this time at the hands of state authorities. With the trial completed and sentence passed, some Floridians breathed a sigh of relief and congratulated their state for its handling of an extremely volatile case. The St. Petersburg Times proclaimed,

The whole state is in debt to Governor Holland for the firm way he has handled the case of the three confessed negro rapists from Gadsden county…. Law and order has prevailed over lynch rule. To do this the governor had to take the precaution to call out [three hundred] guardsmen and state patrolmen, use Army trucks to carry the accused, and change the trial from Quincy to Gainesville – but Florida is not smeared and humiliated with a lynching. A strong governor has demonstrated that democratic law and order can prevail even when emotions and animosities have been inflamed by one of the most brutal rape cases in recent history. Again Florida is proving its leadership in the New South…. Florida has set a powerful example that will command respect throughout the rest of the United States.

116 Lane et al, 75; Florida Times-Union, 1 September 1944; (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 31 August 1944.

117 ―Biographical/ Historical Note‖ in W. May Walker Papers, Special Collections, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida.

118 (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 31 August 1944.

119 Florida Times-Union, 1 September 1944; (St. Petersburg) Evening Independent, 31 August 1944.

297

While the Times editorialist erred in giving sole credit to Governor Holland rather than recognizing all those involved, the accomplishment merited praise. Merely taking a case of this notoriety to trial in Florida constituted a noteworthy achievement. A series of factors militated against the state‘s efforts to pursue the case through the legal processes. First, the extremely provocative nature of the crimes attributed to the accused, and their race, particularly incited the traditionalist segment of the populace and increased the potential for extralegal measures. Second, the assault occurred in the region of Florida most likely to resort to racial violence for enforcement of community mores. Third, the extraordinary measures on the part of the state, just over ten years after the infamous torture and murder of Claude Neal in nearby Jackson county, contrasted sharply with the inaction of prior administrations. In determining to try the accused, and then carrying out this intention, state authorities departed from the traditional passive attitude toward potential mob activity. While authorities had kept the Gadsden trio from falling under the savage authority of Judge Lynch, questions existed about the fairness of the conditions under which the state tried them. As the State of Florida prepared to execute the three convicted men during the week of 18 September,120 a flood of appeals to stay or commute sentence came to the governor‘s office from officers of African American organizations, labor, lawyers, ministers, and private citizens. Renowned educator and president of the National Council of Negro Women Mary McLeod Bethune wired Governor Holland, ―Urgently request you grant stay of execution three negro boys sentenced at Gainesville, pending taking of appeal through courts.‖121 George Marshall,122 chairman of the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties, urged Holland to stay the executions to allow for appeal and further inquiry. Marshall‘s message read,

Conviction in a closed courtroom surrounded by armed militia and a mob of would-be lynchers constitutes a denial of due process of law. A trial conducted under these pressures, following a week in which armed mobs of lynchers roamed the highways hunting for these boys, is a travesty of justice. We urge that in addition to staying the execution and a thorough investigation of the case you

120 Florida Times-Union, 8 September 1944.

121 Mary McLeod Bethune to Gov. Spessard Holland, 17 September 1944. Holland Papers, FSA, Box 42, FF ―Gadsden County Rape Case.‖

122 Marshall was a civil rights activist and conservationist from New York. New York Times, 18 June 2000.

298

investigate and bring to trial the would-be lynchers who attempted to obstruct justice.123

In his reply to Marshall, Holland said because the convicted men had committed

The most heinous in many years … the only appropriate punishment was meted out by the trial judge and such punishment would have followed regardless of color of defendants…. I feel certain that the good people of this State both white and colored are equally of the opinion that the death penalty should be inflicted as rapidly as the law permits …. I am sure that any attempt to delay the orderly procedure outlined … would be a distinct disservice to citizens of both races and would operate to impose further obstacles in the way of future orderly procedure in such cases.

The governor specifically refuted Marshall‘s claims of a closed courtroom and denial of due process, noting that the public and press had access to the trial, and able counsel represented the defendants.124 After earlier contending with the lynch mob, state officials found themselves in a vastly different fight with rights activists. An appeal of the defendants‘ death sentence blocked the State‘s efforts to bring quick closure to the case and revealed officials‘ fears over the potential for further racial violence. Bradford G. Williams, Lakeland attorney, filed a notice of appeal to the state supreme court on 13 September, resulting in an automatic stay of execution.125 J. Tom Watson asked the supreme court to reject the appeal because it served ―no purpose other than to obstruct justice.‖ State Attorney Orion C. Parker, Jr., joining in the motion to dismiss, warned the court, ―If this case isn‘t decided promptly there won‘t be any more trials for crimes of this nature in the future.‖ Watson and Parker claimed the appeal resulted from interference by ―northern money,‖ communists, and Congress of Industrial Organizations labor activists.126 The appeal requested the court to review the lower court‘s acceptance of the defendants‘ guilty pleas, the severity of sentence in view of sixteen year old James Davis‘s youth, and the actions of the

123 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 5 September 1944.

124 Florida Times-Union, 8 September 1944.

125 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 14 September 1944.

126 Florida Times-Union, 19 September 1944.

299 court-appointed defense counsel. In a separate petition, Bradford requested the court‘s permission to withdraw as counsel for the convicted men.127 On the day of the supreme court hearing on the appeal the defendants‘ counsel of record, Bradford G. Williams, failed to appear, leaving a female employee of a Tampa shipyard as the sole representative to speak on condemned men‘s behalf. Mrs. Mary Kogge, representing the Florida Committee for Preservation of Legal Rights, recalling the transfer of the trial from Quincy to Gainesville because of threat of violence, advised the court,

It seems to us that elementary observance of the constitutional requirements and fundamental principles demanded that the hearings be delayed until the ‗prejudicial air‘ had been clarified.

Justice Glenn Terrell, noting the unusual circumstances of the appeal hearing, said he could remember no other instance during his twenty-one years on the court when a layperson not a participant in the case made a similar statement. The State, represented by Assistant Attorney General John C. Wynn and State Attorney Orion C. Parker, Jr., described the appeal as frivolous and asserted the trial record revealed no court error.128 On 28 September the Florida Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. In a unanimous decision, the seven justices agreed due processes had been observed and no ground for appeal appeared in the court record. Furthermore, Chief Justice Rivers Buford announced the opinion cleared all obstacles to the issuance of warrants of execution by the governor.129 Following the court ruling, Governor Holland issued a second set of execution warrants for Davis, Lane, and Williams, ordering the completion of sentences during the week of 9 October.130 The state put the three men to death consecutively beginning at 9:01 a.m. on Monday, 9 October. The father of the victim attended the executions. The electrocution of sixteen year old James Davis marked the first time Florida imposed such a sentence on one so young.131

127 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, 24 September 1944.

128 Florida Times-Union, 26 September 1944.

129 Daytona Beach Morning Journal, 29 September 1944.

130 Florida Times-Union, 1 October 1944.

131 Florida Times Union, 10 October 1944.

300

The Gadsden county rape case demonstrated the capabilities and limitations of the Holland administration in addressing racial violence. Authorities demonstrated their ability to thwart the lynch mob through diligence and well-considered action. Setting aside the shadow of racial bigotry upon the proceedings, according the defendants access to trial and appeal constituted a departure from the southern custom of summary judgment in crimes of this nature. At the same time, pervasive racial prejudice and the emotionally explosive crime unquestionably influenced the trial. Furthermore, the failure of officials to effectively investigate and prosecute members of the mob attempting to preempt the legal process clearly showed the limits of the state‘s willingness and ability to confront entrenched tradition. Given the state‘s historic racial attitudes and the incendiary character of the crime, the fact the case made it through the legal system constituted a notable event. Considered in context of place and time, and in comparison with the tenures of Florida‘s other chief executives, the Holland administration achieved a mixed record in relation to lynch violence. Two men suffered agonizing deaths and the state faced embarrassment and ridicule as a result of racial terrorism during Governor Holland‘s term. Compounding the disgrace, state officials foundered in attempts to punish the parties committing these atrocities. However, following the earlier incidents, local and state officials became more effective in efforts to frustrate lynch violence, culminating in the Gadsden county case. In the latter months of his tenure, Holland appeared to make good on his earlier pledge to Jane Havens, Florida chair of the ASWPL, following the murder of A. C. Williams, ―You may be assured that during my administration I am going to assist in every way to prevent such crime in our state.‖132 Chastened by the initial incidents, Florida officials became more effective in averting racial violence. During the first half of the twentieth century, the relationship between racial attitudes and gubernatorial politics in Florida was complex and mutually reinforcing. The state‘s regional heritage and frontier characteristics resulted in an environment distinguished by steadfast adherence to traditional southern racial attitudes. Most of the state‘s chief executives came from rural areas in Florida or other southern states, and shared these racial views. Additionally, the advocacy of nontraditional racial attitudes carried a political price - racial liberals did not achieve

132 Holland to Havens, 31 May 1941. ASWPL Papers, Reel 2, 1634 no. 26.

301 high office in Florida at that time. As a result, in the words of David R. Colburn and David K. Scher, ―While some governors … decried lynchings and others such as Spessard Holland took steps to prevent them, they all supported racist attitudes and permitted the existence of a climate of opinion that allowed such acts to take place.‖133 As southerners governing a southern state, these men shared, in varying degrees, the prevailing racial prejudices of their times.

133 Colburn and Scher, 223, 236. 302

CONCLUSION

Not surprisingly, World War II exerted a powerful influence over nearly every aspect of life and politics in Florida during the administration of Governor Spessard L. Holland. From the 1940 election campaign, through the 1941 and 1943 legislative sessions, the war shaped events both directly and indirectly. In one area, the longstanding subordination of African Americans, the state‘s traditional mores appeared largely unaltered. The maelstrom of war engulfing swathes of Europe, Asia, and Africa, also brought new challenges and demands to Florida. The 1940 gubernatorial race began as yet another in a line of highly amorphous contests before becoming a referendum on leadership style under the influence of the intensifying war in Europe. Featuring eleven candidates and a general emphasis on personality over policy, the first primary contest conformed to the ―lottery‖ phenomena described by V. O. Key and others. The second primary campaign, however, occurring nearly simultaneously with the German invasion of France and the Low Countries, was profoundly influenced by the war. Competing with and often overshadowed by the more dramatic and momentous news from Europe, the aggressive rhetoric used by Francis P. Whitehair in an attempt to make up ground on first primary winner Holland had less effect than it otherwise might have in peacetime. Additionally, the taint of bossism and a preference for executive power associated with Whitehair too closely resembled the despotic tendencies of certain European and Asian leaders for many Florida voters. Senator Holland, on the other hand, appeared to embody the democratic qualities prized by the electorate. As the European war spread and intensified, the campaign became a referendum on wartime leadership. During the 1941 legislature, the war influenced the new governor‘s program and its progress, as well as the composition of the legislature itself. The potential for U.S. involvement in the European conflict increased the necessity of bringing order to the state‘s financial system. To that end, Governor Holland pursued an ambitious program of fiscal reform, increased welfare funding, and debt refunding during his first legislative session. The success of Holland‘s legislative agenda came about in part from an increased sense of unity caused by the possibility of war and also because of the tractability of an unusually high number of first time legislators

303 serving in place of more experienced predecessors called to military service. Looking to an uncertain future, the executive and lawmakers worked together to produce an unusually harmonious and productive legislative session. America‘s entry into World War II resulted in manifold challenges and opportunities for the residents of Florida and their leaders. The German U-boat offensive off Florida‘s coasts brought the lethal reality of warfare home to residents in all too dramatic fashion. While observing the carnage at sea, Floridians began to experience a series of fuel conservation restrictions that would severely threaten the fiscal security of individuals and governments. At the same time, the war brought an unprecedented influx of population and funds related to the construction and staffing of military installations across the state. Florida‘s defense buildup strained the state‘s housing, recreation, education, and health resources as it brought increased prosperity to the state‘s agricultural and construction sectors. Throughout this period of upheaval the state‘s political leaders strove to reconcile the needs of the state with the demands of a nation at war. Governor Holland enjoyed a high degree of success in his second legislative session at least partially as result of wartime conditions. Federal restrictions on gasoline resulted in severe reductions in state revenues from the gasoline tax and other sources. This shortfall of revenue and the potential for additional restrictions prompted the governor and legislature to buttress the state‘s financial system through increased economy and a new tax on cigarettes. In addition to these measures, the Holland administration pursued further revision of the tax system and preserved vital funds for the state‘s postwar future. Holland enjoyed unprecedented success in his second legislative session due in part to an unusual degree of influence born of patronage and appointment power. The Holland administration retained his influence well into his term in part because of high turnover among holders of patronage and appointed positions due to military service and opportunities for lucrative defense work. This situation allowed Governor Holland to retain a high degree of influence well beyond the point when his predecessors had exhausted the same capacity. The war bolstered Holland‘s ability to retain political influence and partially accounted for the unusual success of his program in the 1943 legislature. While World War II brought rapid alterations throughout Florida, traditional Southern racial mores appeared nearly impervious to change. The Holland administration displayed a notable ability to recognize and respond to serious problems afflicting the state with the

304 exception of racial violence. Only after the deaths of two Floridians – A. C. Williams and Cellos Harrison – did the Holland administration recognize and accept the necessity of state action to prevent lynching. To the credit of officials across the state, reported instances of prevented lynchings increased during the latter months of the Holland administration. Furthermore, state authorities acted to thwart an apparent conspiracy to murder three African American males charged with assaulting a white female in Gadsden county. In taking extraordinary measures to bring the defendants to trial, the state took a significant step in its passage from mob rule to the rule of law. World War II and Florida‘s traditional politics each played crucial roles in the election and administration of Governor Spessard L. Holland. The war brought the challenges of reconciling the needs of the state‘s residents to the demands of war. Florida‘s political leaders faced the daunting task of balancing both.

305

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Jon S. Evans

Jon S. Evans has a B.S. degree in Fine Arts, and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in History, all from Florida State University in Tallahassee, Florida. He published ―The Origins of Tallahassee‘s Racial Disturbance Plan: Segregation, Racial Tensions, and Violence During World War II‖ in Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 79, No. 3.

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