GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 2015 Berkshire's Disintermediation: Buffett's New Managerial Model Lawrence A. Cunningham George Washington University Law School,
[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Cunningham, Lawrence A., Berkshire's Disintermediation: Buffett's New Managerial Model (2015). Appearing in volume 50 of the Wake Forest Law Review (2015); GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2015-16; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2015-16. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ abstract=2602825 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. BERKSHIRE’S DISINTERMEDIATION: BUFFETT’S NEW MANAGERIAL MODEL Lawrence A. Cunningham Abstract Berkshire Hathaway, among history’s largest and most successful corporations, shuns middlemen; its chairman, the legendary investor Warren Buffett, excoriates financial intermediaries. The acquisitive conglomerate rarely borrows money, retains brokers, or hires consultants. Its governance is lean, using an advisory board and bucking all forms of corporate bureaucracy. Berkshire’s shareholders also minimize the roles of intermediaries like stockbrokers and stock exchanges by trading little and holding for lengthy periods. By exploring Berkshire’s antipathy to intermediation, this article supports the view that public policy ought to make considerable room for companies to define their own internal business practices and that more companies ought to consider emulating aspects of Berkshire’s disintermediation.