The Problem of Consciousness
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the problem of consciousness IT IS NOW BEING EXPLORED THROUGH THE VISUAL SYSTEM— REQUIRING A CLOSE COLLABORATION AMONG PSYCHOLOGISTS, NEUROSCIENTISTS AND THEORISTS BY FRANCIS CRICK AND CHRISTOF KOCH 10 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN COPYRIGHT 2002 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC. he overwhelming question in neurobiology today is We selected the mammalian visual system because humans are the relation between the mind and the brain. Everyone very visual animals and because so much experimental and the- agrees that what we know as mind is closely related to oretical work has already been done on it. certain aspects of the behavior of the brain, not to the It is not easy to grasp exactly what we need to explain, and heart, as Aristotle thought. Its most mysterious aspect it will take many careful experiments before visual conscious- Tis consciousness or awareness, which can take many forms, ness can be described scientifically. We did not attempt to de- from the experience of pain to self-consciousness. In the past fine consciousness itself because of the dangers of premature the mind (or soul) was often regarded, as it was by Descartes, definition. (If this seems like a copout, try defining the word as something immaterial, separate from the brain but interact- “gene”—you will not find it easy.) Yet the experimental evi- ing with it in some way. A few neuroscientists, such as the late dence that already exists provides enough of a glimpse of the Sir John Eccles, have asserted that the soul is distinct from the nature of visual consciousness to guide research. In this arti- body. But most neuroscientists now believe that all aspects of cle, we will attempt to show how this evidence opens the way mind, including its most puzzling attribute—consciousness or to attack this profound and intriguing problem. awareness—are likely to be explainable in a more materialistic way as the behavior of large sets of interacting neurons. As Wil- Describing Visual Consciousness liam James, the father of American psychology, said a century VISUAL THEORISTS AGREE that the problem of visual con- ago, consciousness is not a thing but a process. sciousness is ill posed. The mathematical term “ill posed” Exactly what the process is, however, has yet to be discov- means that additional constraints are needed to solve the prob- ered. For many years after James penned The Principles of Psy- lem. Although the main function of the visual system is to per- chology, consciousness was a taboo concept in American psy- ceive objects and events in the world around us, the informa- chology because of the dominance of the behaviorist move- tion available to our eyes is not sufficient by itself to provide the ment. With the advent of cognitive science in the mid-1950s, brain with its unique interpretation of the visual world. The it became possible once more for psychologists to consider men- brain must use past experience (either its own or that of our dis- tal processes as opposed to merely observing behavior. In spite tant ancestors, which is embedded in our genes) to help inter- of these changes, until recently most cognitive scientists ignored pret the information coming into our eyes. An example would consciousness, as did almost all neuroscientists. The problem be the derivation of the three-dimensional representation of the was felt to be either purely “philosophical” or too elusive to world from the two-dimensional signals falling onto the retinas study experimentally. It would not have been easy for a neu- of our two eyes or even onto one of them. roscientist to get a grant just to study consciousness. Visual theorists would also agree that seeing is a constructive In our opinion, such timidity is ridiculous, so some years process, one in which the brain has to carry out complex activi- ago we began to think about how best to attack the problem ties (sometimes called computations) in order to decide which in- scientifically. How to explain mental events as being caused by terpretation to adopt of the ambiguous visual input. “Compu- the firing of large sets of neurons? Although there are those who tation” implies that the brain acts to form a symbolic represen- believe such an approach is hopeless, we feel it is not produc- tation of the visual world, with a mapping (in the mathematical tive to worry too much over aspects of the problem that can- sense) of certain aspects of that world onto elements in the brain. not be solved scientifically or, more precisely, cannot be solved Ray Jackendoff of Brandeis University postulates, as do solely by using existing scientific ideas. Radically new concepts most cognitive scientists, that the computations carried out by may indeed be needed—recall the modifications of scientific the brain are largely unconscious and that what we become thinking forced on us by quantum mechanics. The only sensi- aware of is the result of these computations. But while the cus- ble approach is to press the experimental attack until we are tomary view is that this awareness occurs at the highest levels confronted with dilemmas that call for new ways of thinking. of the computational system, Jackendoff has proposed an in- There are many possible approaches to the problem of con- termediate-level theory of consciousness. sciousness. Some psychologists feel that any satisfactory theory What we see, Jackendoff suggests, relates to a representation should try to explain as many aspects of consciousness as pos- of surfaces that are directly visible to us, together with their out- sible, including emotion, imagination, dreams, mystical experi- line, orientation, color, texture and movement. In the next stage ences and so on. Although such an all-embracing theory will be this sketch is processed by the brain to produce a three-dimen- necessary in the long run, we thought it wiser to begin with the sional representation. Jackendoff argues that we are not visual- particular aspect of consciousness that is likely to yield most eas- ly aware of this three-dimensional representation. ily. What this aspect may be is a matter of personal judgment. An example may make this process clearer. If you look at a person whose back is turned to you, you can see the back of the VISUAL AWARENESS primarily involves seeing what is directly in front of you, head but not the face. Nevertheless, your brain infers that the per- but it can be influenced by a three-dimensional representation of the object son has a face. We can deduce as much because if that person in view retained by the brain. If you see the back of a person’s head, the brain turned around and had no face, you would be very surprised. infers that there is a face on the front of it. We know this is true because we would be very startled if a mirror revealed that the front was exactly like the The viewer-centered representation that corresponds to the ©1997 C. HERSCOVICI, BRUSSELS/ARTISTS RIGHTS SOCIETY (ARS), NEW YORK back, as in this painting, Reproduction Prohibited (1937), by René Magritte. visible back of the head is what you are vividly aware of. What www.sciam.com Updated from the September 1992 issue 11 COPYRIGHT 2002 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC. your brain infers about the front would of a monkey’s brain and partly from ex- not clear exactly which forms of memory come from some kind of three-dimen- amining the effects of certain types of are involved. Is long-term memory need- sional representation. This does not mean brain damage in humans, that different ed? Some forms of acquired knowledge that information flows only from the sur- aspects of a face—and of the implications are so embedded in the machinery of neur- face representation to the three-dimen- of a face—may be represented in differ- al processing that they are almost certain- sional one; it almost certainly flows in both ent parts of the brain. ly part of the process of becoming aware directions. When you imagine the front of First, there is the representation of a of something. On the other hand, there is the face, what you are aware of is a sur- face as a face: two eyes, a nose, a mouth evidence from studies of brain-damaged face representation generated by informa- and so on. The neurons involved are usu- patients that the ability to lay down new tion from the three-dimensional model. ally not too fussy about the exact size or long-term episodic memories is not essen- It is important to distinguish between position of this face in the visual field, nor tial for consciousness to be experienced. an explicit and an implicit representation. are they very sensitive to small changes in It is difficult to imagine that anyone An explicit representation is something its orientation. In monkeys, there are could be conscious if he or she had no that is symbolized without further pro- neurons that respond best when the face memory whatsoever, even an extremely cessing. An implicit representation con- is turning in a particular direction, while short one, of what had just happened. Vi- What we are aware of at any moment, in one sense or another, is not a simple matter. tains the same information but requires others seem to be more concerned with sual psychologists talk of iconic memory, further processing to make it explicit. the direction in which the eyes are gazing. which lasts for a fraction of a second, and The pattern of colored dots on a televi- Then there are representations of the working memory (such as that used to re- sion screen, for example, contains an im- parts of a face, as separate from those for member a new telephone number) that plicit representation of objects (say, a the face as a whole.