Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?
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The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism
Handout 8 The Knowledge Argument against Physicalism 1. Some Terminology Physicalism – all information is physical information (Another possible formulation: all facts are physical facts) Physical information - The information given by science (note: Jackson doesn’t regard this as a definition, since it’s somewhat vague) A Qualia Freak – Someone who thinks that there are features of bodily sensations and perceptual experiences that no amount of physical information includes. These features are called “qualia”: the hurtfulness of pain, the itchiniess of itches, how it feels to be jealous, taste a lemon, etc. 2. The Knowledge Argument for Qualia Fred – Fred can make all the color discriminations we make plus more. Show him a batch of ripe tomatoes and he’ll sort them into two piles which he says are as different to him in terms of color appearance as yellow is from blue. He calls these calls “red1” and “red2.” 1. We can gain all the physical information about Fred that we like and we still won’t know certain information about Fred: what kind of experience Fred has when he says red1 and red2. 2. Not all information is physical information (This can be dramatized by imagining that Fred donates his body to science and they are able to transplant his optical system into somebody else. After the operation this person will know more about Fred than was known before). Mary – Mary is a brilliant scientist who has spent her whole life in a black and white room. She is an expert on color vision and neurophysiology and knows all the physical information one could possibly know about color vision. -
Koch AAAS Updated
Consciousness and Intelligence Dr. Christof Koch Allen Institute for Brain Science Seattle, USA Cartesian Certainty As a radical skeptic, the only certainty Rene Descartes had Je pense, donc je suis translated later on as Cogito, ergo sum. or, in modern language, I am conscious, therefore I am Rene Descartes (1637) Intelligence and Consciousness • Intelligence - the ability to understand new ideas, to adapt to new environments, to learn from experience, to think abstractly, to plan and to reason • It can be decomposed into crystalline and fluid intelligence and can be measured (IQ, g-factor) • Consciousness - the ability to experience something, to see, hear, feel angry, or explicitly recall an event • Many animals besides humans experience the sights and sounds of the world Lilac Chaser What do we know about Consciousness? • Consciousness is associated with some complex, adaptive, biological networks (not immune system nor enteric nervous system) • Consciousness does not require behavior • Consciousness can be dissociated from emotion, selective attention, long-term memory and language • Self-consciousness is one of many aspects of consciousness, highly developed in adult neuro-typical humans, less so in infants, certain patients and non-human animals Many Zombie Behaviors Many - if not most - behaviors occur in the absence of conscious sensations, or consciousness occurs after the fact: • Over-trained routines - shaving, dressing, tennis, video games, keyboard typing, driving, rock-climbing, dancing • Reaching and grabbing, posture adjustments • Generating and understanding speech • Eye-movement control • High-level decision making (e.g. choice blindness, dissociations) Neuronal Correlates of Consciousness (NCC) Search for the minimal neuronal mechanisms jointly sufficient for any one conscious perception, the NCC. -
© 2017 Luis H. Favela, Ph.D. 1 University of Central Florida PHI
1 University of Central Florida PHI 3320: Philosophy of Mind Fall 2017, Syllabus, v. 08222017 Course Information ¨ Title: Philosophy of Mind ¨ Course number: PHI 3320 ¨ Credit hours: 3.0 ¨ Term: Fall semester 2017 ¨ Mode: Web Instructor Information ¨ Name: Luis Favela, Ph.D. (Please refer to me as “Dr. Favela” or “Professor Favela.”) ¨ Email: [email protected] ¨ Website: http://philosophy.cah.ucf.edu/staff.php?id=1017 ¨ Office location: PSY 0245 ¨ Office hours: Tuesday and Thursday 1:30 – 3:00 pm Course Description ¨ Catalogue description: Recent and contemporary attempts to understand the relation of mind to body, the relation of consciousness to personhood, and the relation of psychology to neurobiology. ¨ Detailed description: This course introduces some of the main arguments, concepts, and theories in the philosophy of mind. Some of the questions addressed in the philosophy of mind include: “What are minds made of,” “How does the mind relate to the brain,” and “what is consciousness?” Answers to these questions have consequences for a wide range of other disciplines, including computer science, ethics, neuroscience, and theology. The first part of the course covers the main philosophical views concerning mind, such as dualism, behaviorism, identity theory, functionalism, and eliminativism. The second part of the course focuses on consciousness, and questions such as: “Does ‘consciousness’ exist,” “Is consciousness physical,” and “Can there be a science of consciousness?” Student Learning Outcomes ¨ Students will be able to describe the main philosophical views concerning the mind. § Students will be able to reconstruct the arguments underlying the main philosophical views concerning the mind. § Students will be able to articulate their positions concerning whether or not they agree with the conclusions of the arguments behind the main philosophical views concerning the mind. -
Russellian Panpsychism: Do We Need It and Is It Enough?
Russellian Panpsychism: Do We Need It and Is It Enough? By Damian Aleksiev Submitted to Central European University Department of Philosophy In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy Supervisor: Philip Goff CEU eTD Collection May 2016 Abstract The main aim of this thesis is to clarify the ontological status of phenomenal experience. In order to do this, I first examine how pure physicalism explains phenomenality. Pure physicalism relies on the structural and causal vocabulary of physics, and is compatible with the causal closure of the physical. Nonetheless, I argue that pure physicalism is false since it cannot account for our intuitive understating of phenomenal experience as something beyond-structural. I supplement these intuitions, first with the knowledge and conceivability arguments, and second with my own argument for the transparency of phenomenal concepts called the argument from solipsism. Then, I investigate Russellian panpsychism as a promising alternative to pure physicalism that attempts to solve its problems without any drawbacks. Russellian panpsychism places phenomenal experience at the fundamental ontological level, and at the same time remains compatible with the causal closure of the physical. Finally, I argue against Russellian panpsychism based on the combination problem, as well as my own: reverse conceivability argument, and combination problem for value. The conclusion of this enquiry is that neither pure physicalism nor Russellian panpsychism can provide a satisfactory account of phenomenal experience. CEU eTD Collection I Acknowledgments I would like to thank my supervisor Philip Goff for his continual support and willingness to discuss my ideas during the entire academic year. -
The Causal Efficacy of Consciousness
entropy Article The Causal Efficacy of Consciousness Matthew Owen 1,2 1 Yakima Valley College, Yakima, WA 98902, USA; [email protected] 2 Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan Medical School, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA Received: 10 June 2020; Accepted: 17 July 2020; Published: 28 July 2020 Abstract: Mental causation is vitally important to the integrated information theory (IIT), which says consciousness exists since it is causally efficacious. While it might not be directly apparent, metaphysical commitments have consequential entailments concerning the causal efficacy of consciousness. Commitments regarding the ontology of consciousness and the nature of causation determine which problem(s) a view of consciousness faces with respect to mental causation. Analysis of mental causation in contemporary philosophy of mind has brought several problems to the fore: the alleged lack of psychophysical laws, the causal exclusion problem, and the causal pairing problem. This article surveys the threat each problem poses to IIT based on the different metaphysical commitments IIT theorists might make. Distinctions are made between what I call reductive IIT, non-reductive IIT, and non-physicalist IIT, each of which make differing metaphysical commitments regarding the ontology of consciousness and nature of causation. Subsequently, each problem pertaining to mental causation is presented and its threat, or lack thereof, to each version of IIT is considered. While the lack of psychophysical laws appears unthreatening for all versions, reductive IIT and non-reductive IIT are seriously threatened by the exclusion problem, and it is difficult to see how they could overcome it while maintaining a commitment to the causal closure principle. -
Great Philosophers 2 Lucretius
What is the relationship between the mind and the brain? Ben White 05.02.2019 What distinguishes the mental from the non- mental? Mental Non-mental • Consciousness • Mass • Belief • Charge • Desire • Shape • Thought • Size • Memory • Solidity • Sensation • Velocity • Perception • Location • Emotion • Density • Imagination • Weight • Rationality • Physical/Chemical composition What distinguishes the mental from the non- mental? The members of the class of mental phenomena thus seem like a very mixed bag… What, if anything, qualifies them for membership in this class? Philosophers have frequently identified two characteristics that seem distinctive of mentality, in that all (and only) mental phenomena exemplify at least one of these two features: • Intentionality • Phenomenal consciousness Intentionality Some mental states, e.g. thoughts, beliefs, desires, and perceptions, have a certain “aboutness” in that they represent or are directed towards certain things beyond themselves. Intentionality Such mental states are said to possess intentionality and are often referred to as intentional states. Note that many activities presuppose the possession of certain intentional states: e.g. hunting, worshiping, speaking. Intentionality Mental Non-mental • Consciousness • Mass • Belief • Charge • Desire • Shape • Thought • Size • Memory • Solidity • Sensation • Velocity • Perception • Location • Emotion • Density • Imagination • Weight • Rationality • Physical/Chemical composition Phenomenal Consciousness Some mental states have certain experiential qualities such that there is something it is like for us to be in them. • the experience of yellow • the sensation of pain • the feeling of a sore muscle • the sound of a trumpet • the smell of rotten eggs • the taste of cantaloupe Phenomenal Consciousness Such states are said to be phenomenally conscious or to have a certain phenomenal character. -
PHI 575-Jackson
Philosophy 575 Prof. Clare Batty Qualia Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia” Physicalism: all the facts about the world are physical facts. 1. The Knowledge Argument Jackson argues that physicalism is false. The story: “Mary is a brilliant scientist…forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white monitor.” She “specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on.” “What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a color television monitor?” “Will she learn anything or not?” Jackson: “yes”. “It just seems obvious that she will learn something about the world and our experience of it…But she had all the physical information. Ergo…Physicalism is false” The Knowledge Argument: 1. Imprisoned Mary knows all the physical facts. 2. If physicalism is true, Mary (before her release) knows all the facts. (from 1 + physicalism) 3. After her release, Mary learns something–something she couldn’t have known while imprisoned. 4. If Mary learns something, she learns a fact. 5. So, Mary learns a fact. (from 3, 4) 6. So, physicalism is false. (from 2, 5) Further conclusion: 7. Our experiences have “qualia”. Qualia are “certain [nonphysical] features of bodily sensations [and] perceptual experiences...the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches [etc.]” 2. The Modal Argument (The Zombie Argument) 1. It is possible that there be zombies. -
The Elusive Origins of Consciousness: a Philosophical Argument for Panpsychism Over Competing Metaphysical Theories of Mind
Trinity College Trinity College Digital Repository Trinity Publications (Newspapers, Yearbooks, The Trinity Papers (2011 - present) Catalogs, etc.) 2019 The Elusive Origins of Consciousness: A Philosophical Argument for Panpsychism over Competing Metaphysical Theories of Mind Tommy Tobias Aahlberg Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/trinitypapers Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Aahlberg, Tommy Tobias, "The Elusive Origins of Consciousness: A Philosophical Argument for Panpsychism over Competing Metaphysical Theories of Mind". The Trinity Papers (2011 - present) (2019). Trinity College Digital Repository, Hartford, CT. https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/trinitypapers/79 The Elusive Origins of Consciousness: A Philosophical Argument for Panpsychism over Competing Metaphysical Theories of Mind Tommy Tobias Aahlberg Introduction Underpinning everything that constitutes our perceived reality is consciousness. The fact that there is something that it is like to be us is at the foundation of everything we consequently come to care about in our lives. Every observation, sensation, thought, and emotion is predicated on the phenomenon that there is something that it is like to observe, sense, think, and feel. The awareness and experience of a world is the essential factor that separates our universe from any conceivable zombie universe where nothing is observed, sensed, thought, or felt. Necessarily, we filter every single moment through our consciousness. If consciousness did not exist there would be no groundwork for meaning as it would hold no basis in any conceivable creature’s awareness, and therefore such a universe would be meaningless. Despite, or perhaps due to, its fundamental nature and important implications – consciousness is poorly understood by contemporary science and philosophy alike, at least in the theoretical sense of understanding. -
Empfindungsfähigkeit Und Moralischer Status Eine Kritik Der Pathozentrischen Ethik
Empfindungsfähigkeit und moralischer Status Eine Kritik der pathozentrischen Ethik Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophie im Fachbereich A Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften der Bergischen Universität Wuppertal vorgelegt von Erasmus Scheuer aus Düsseldorf Wuppertal, im Januar 2018 Die Dissertation kann wie folgt zitiert werden: urn:nbn:de:hbz:468-20180503-133904-3 [http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn=urn%3Anbn%3Ade%3Ahbz% 3A468-20180503-133904-3] alles bleibt wie es ist Geheimnis in einem Geheimnis Muster in einem Muster (Norbert Scheuer – Nichts) Meinen Eltern, Elvira und Norbert Scheuer Vorwort Der Pathozentrismus betrachtet die Leidens- oder Empfindungsfähigkeit aller, auch nichtmenschlicher Spezies als zentrales moralisches Kriterium. Diese Arbeit hat die pathozentrische Position zum Gegenstand und bewegt sich bewusst zwischen Kritik und Verteidigung eines solchen Ansatzes. Einerseits liegen die Schwächen des Pa- thozentrismus m.E. mehr oder weniger offen zu Tage, da die Kluft zwischen Empfin- dungen des Menschen und den Empfindungen anderer Spezies nur schwer inner- halb eines naturwissenschaftlich-physikalistischen Weltbildes überbrückbar erscheint. Andererseits vertrete ich als Verfasser dieser Arbeit die Ansicht, dass eine Erweiterung der Moralobjekte über die Menschen hinaus erfolgen muss, dass das Leiden anderer Kreaturen Teil einer jeden ethischen Betrachtung sein sollte. Der Pa- thozentrismus vertritt mit seinem Kriterium der Leidens- bzw. Empfindungsfähigkeit eine ethische Position, die vom Ansatz her eine Erweiterung der Moralobjekte an- strebt. Aus diesem Grund liegt meine Sympathie beim Pathozentristen. Infolgedes- sen versucht diese Arbeit, einerseits die Kritik am Pathozentrismus aufzuzeigen, an- dererseits dem Pathozentristen auch Argumente an die Hand zu geben, die es ihm erlauben, seine Position zu verteidigen. Der Pathozentrist hat nach meiner Ansicht zwei schwerwiegende und grundlegende Probleme, wenn er seine Ethik innerhalb eines tendenziell physikalistischen Weltbildes zu verteidigen sucht. -
1 the Many-Worlds Theory of Consciousness Christian List* Abstract: This Paper Sketches a New and Somewhat Heterodox Metaphysica
1 The many-worlds theory of consciousness Christian List* Discussion paper, this version posted 2 March 2021 Abstract: This paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many-worlds theory”. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects’ experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different “first-personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct “first- personal realizers” of a shared “third-personal world”, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects’ first-personally centred worlds are all real, though only one of them is present for each subject. The theory offers a novel way of capturing the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience without lapsing into solipsism. The paper also looks at some scientific theories of consciousness, such as integrated information theory, through the proposed lens and reconsiders the hard problem of consciousness. 1. Introduction The aim of this paper is to sketch a somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many-worlds theory”. The theory seeks to give an account of how consciousness, in the sense of subjective experience, fits into the world and how it relates to other, non-subjective features. To capture the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience, the theory drops the common assumption that all conscious experiences – yours, mine, and those of everyone else – are features of one and the same world and postulates instead that different conscious subjects are associated with different “first-personally centred worlds”. -
Robot Rights Conscious Machines: Defining Questions
Conscious robots may merit legal protections. Developing machine capacities such as artificial intelligence (AI) and robots for human-robot interaction is of extreme technological value, but it raises moral and ethical questions. For example, one of the major sectors in robotics is the develop- ment of sexual robots (1). Although some researchers consider this phenomenon a gateway to the future acceptance of human- robot interactions, others see a danger for human society as robots modify the social LETTERS representation of human behaviors (2, 3). The robotics field must wrestle with these questions: Is it ethical to create and con- tinue to use robots with consciousness in Edited by Jennifer Sills global projection of winning representa- the way we use robots that were originally tions and have metacognitive capacity, designed for our needs? Do robots deserve Downloaded from such as confidence estimates. If these types to be protected? This debate could challenge Conscious machines: of processes were strongly indicative of the limits of human morality and polarize consciousness, we would have to admit society’s views on whether conscious robots Defining questions that some machines are already conscious. are objects or living entities (4–6). In their Review “What is consciousness, We agree with Dehaene et al. that to As we approach an era when conscious and could machines have it?” (27 October address the question of machine conscious- robots become part of daily life, it is http://science.sciencemag.org/ 2017, p. 486), S. Dehaene et al. argue that ness, we must start with a theory of human important to start thinking about the cur- the science of consciousness indicates that consciousness. -
FCMC Program Master DOC Final
The Francis Crick Memorial Conference Consciousness in Human and Non‐Human Animals Wolfson Hall, Churchill College Cambridge, United Kingdom "It is essenƟal to understand our Crick Memorial Conference: num Sponsor of the Francis Ɵ brains in some detail if we are to assess correctly our place in this Proud Pla Proud vast and compli- cated universe we see all around us." - Francis Crick All Bordering Photos Courtesy Google Images The Francis Crick Memorial Conference Francis Crick (1916‐2004) Thank you to all of our sponsors for your support in making the Francis Crick Memorial Conference a success and for helping us to fuel this unprecedented discussion on data‐driven perspectives on the neural correlates of consciousness. Sponsored by: The Francis Crick Memorial Conference The Francis Crick Memorial Conference Schedule of Events Schedule of Events 7:45 Check‐in / Complimentary 13:00 Complimentary Lunch Breakfast 14:00 Diana Reiss, Ph.D. Mirror Self‐recognition: A Case of 8:30 Christof Koch, Ph.D. Studying the Murine Mind Hunter College and Cognitive Convergence in Humans Allen Institute for Brain Science, City University of New York and other Animals Caltech 14:30 Franz X. Vollenweider, MD Neuronal Correlates of Psychedelic 9:00 Invited Lecture: Consciousness: A Pharmacological University of Zü rich School of Drug‐Induced Imagery in Humans Baltazar Gomez‐Mancilla, Perspective Medicine, Heffter Research Centre MD Ph.D. Novartis Institute of 15:00 Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Ph.D. Visual Consciousness Tracked with Biomedical Research RIKEN, ATR, Japan, Caltech, Direct Intracranial Recording from 9:30 Ryan Remedios, Ph.D.* The Claustrum and the Orchestra of Monash University Early Visual Cortices in Humans CalTech Cognitive Control Nikos K.