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ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMIC SCIENCES COLLOQUIUM SCIENCES PAPER Here we provide an empirical test of a “blue paradox”—that is, whether anticipation of a marine reserve catalyzes a race-to- fish that undermines the intended conservation objectives. Until recently, data limitations would have made conducting such a test virtually impossible. One needs fishing effort data at a sufficiently high temporal frequency (and covering a long enough time horizon before the marine reserve implementation) to capture anticipatory effects. Moreover, the data must be of sufficiently high spatial resolution such that fishing effort is observed both over the potential marine reserve itself and over an appropri- ate counterfactual control region. There are two reasons that this latter requirement is especially important for causally esti- mating how conservation outcomes are affected by preemptive fishing behavior. First, in most fisheries (including PIPA), fish stocks are not directly observed. Second, depending on where a fishery lies in its transitional dynamics (e.g., if it is out of steady state), an increase in fishing effort can coincide with higher or Fig. 1. MPA expansion over time, including no-take marine reserves and lower stock levels. These two facts imply that simply observing other types of MPAs (1900–2017). The figure shows the cumulative quantity an increase in PIPA fishing effort levels alone would not pro- and coverage of MPAs at a global level. Source: Ref. 10. vide a sufficient basis for concluding that fish stocks are also falling there. The detection of a blue paradox therefore requires a research design that can identify an exogenous increase in hinges on the idea that fishing pressure inside the marine reserve fishing effort relative to what would have occurred without the will be reduced to zero upon implementation. Evidence from announcement; only then can we conclude that the increase in some of the world’s largest marine reserves appears to confirm fishing effort led to a reduction in the fish stock. In our setting, this necessary condition. this is best achieved by establishing a control region with stock For example, consider the Phoenix Islands Protected Area dynamics mirroring that of PIPA before the policy announce- (PIPA), a 408,459 km2 swath of central Pacific ocean roughly the ment or the onset of any preemptive harvesting. The control size of California (Fig. 2), which is the focus of this study. As part region therefore serves as a plausible counterfactual of how fish- of the island nation of Kiribati’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), ing effort and fish stocks would have evolved in the absence PIPA is perhaps the most well-studied and celebrated marine of the impending marine reserve. A blue paradox can then be reserve in the world (11–17). Before receiving full protected sta- said to have occurred if PIPA fishing effort increased relative tus, PIPA existed as a lesser form of MPA that prohibited fishing to that of the control area during the lead-up to policy imple- activity in only a small fraction of its waters. This management mentation. We discuss this so-called difference-in-differences status proved to be a matter of some confusion and contro- research design—also referred to as a before-after-control- versy within the international conservation community (18, 19). impact approach—and our selection of a control area in greater However, following a period of increasing political pressure and detail below. funding provisions, PIPA was finally closed to all commercial Fishing effort data with the necessary temporal and spatial fishing activity on January 1, 2015—thus establishing its new des- resolutions were recently made available through the Global ignation as an official no-take marine reserve. The impact was Fishing Watch (GFW) initiative (12), which provides satellite- dramatic. Fishing activity within PIPA swiftly collapsed to zero derived estimates of global fishing effort in unprecedented detail. after the reserve was implemented (11, 12). More broadly, our use of GFW data enables statistical analysis at Even when marine reserves like PIPA are ultimately imple- temporal and spatial resolutions significantly exceeding that of mented, the path toward designating protected status is almost all previous empirical studies on terrestrial preemptive resource always long and arduous. It typically involves public meetings, extraction. The novelty of these data therefore allows not only scientific studies, expert testimony, fisher rebuttal, and blue- detection of a blue paradox but also richer statistical analy- ribbon panels. Successful implementation is thus the product of ses than previously possible in the broader study of preemptive months or even years of policy deliberation and planning. While resource extraction. this process promotes transparency and stakeholder engage- ment, it also serves as a palpable signal to existing resource extractors that the area may be closed to fishing in the future. This policy telegraph opens up the possibility for a paradox- ical race-to-harvest well before the marine reserve is actually 0 1000 2000km enforced. Whether the anticipation of a possible future closure alters incentives to extract fish in the short run is an issue that has received almost no attention in the popular or scientific litera- ture. On the one hand, one may expect that anticipation of a future marine reserve triggers a race to fish, just like the race to purchase guns or to convert endangered species habitat. On the other hand, in an open access setting, we might expect fishing effort to already have been applied to the point of zero profit, suggesting that still further application of effort would not be PIPA Kiribati control Phoenix Islands (Non−PIPA) undertaken. Yet if marine reserve anticipation does trigger a race to fish, this could be a potentially serious cause for con- Fig. 2. Map of the Kiribati EEZ. The shaded areas denote the treatment cern. After all, the primary purpose of most marine reserves is to region PIPA (red), a control region made up of the Line and Gilbert Islands rebuild fish stocks and replenish the local ecosystem by reducing (blue), and the remaining part of the Phoenix Islands not used as part of the fishing pressure. control region (gray).

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ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMIC SCIENCES COLLOQUIUM SCIENCES PAPER have been fishing there longest, know these waters better than Current F F MSY their competitors, and coordinate among each other to maintain the status quo. Supporting evidence for this idea can be gleaned by looking at the relative contributions to total PIPA fishing effort—aggregated at the fleet level—before and during the preemptive harvesting phase. We find that any post-September 2013 increase in fishing effort tends to be proportional to a SI Appendix F F MSY fleet’s existing footprint in PIPA ( , Figs. S5 and S6). Moreover, this result is robust to defining a fleet at both the 3 country and owner (i.e., company) level. Taking the country- level fleet aggregation as an example, South Korean vessels dominated fishing effort within PIPA in both the “before” and 2 “during” periods. Such a proportional response is at least con- F F MSY after reserve announcement sistent with a possible “spatial knowledge” equilibrium, in which particular vessels were able to dominate fishing activity within PIPA, securing themselves a kind of de facto property right in 1 the process. Fully determining the precise causal chain underlying the 2014 surge in PIPA fishing activity—the role of quasi-property rights 0 and other factors—is a subject for future research. While the evidence presented in this paper strongly supports a blue para- dox event, our larger goal is to generate a discussion about the role of information and incentives in the anticipation of future conservation policies. If the evidence presented here about pre- emptive overfishing in prospective marine reserves and other Fig. 5. Current global fishing pressure by FAO MFA (Top) and expected fishing pressure during a preemptive mining phase following the announce- MPAs holds generally, then it would have important implica- ment of no-take marine reserve expansions to achieve the IUCN 2030 target tions not only for their biological and ecological efficacy, but also of 30% coverage (Bottom). for the methods that scientists use to establish this efficacy in the first place. On the biological and ecological side, we have shown that a blue paradox could lead to a significantly impov- marine reserve trigger a surge in fishing activity if that region erished starting point for the affected reserves. It could even is already being fished at an effort rate that returns zero lead to a long-term decline in abundance if, say, the surge in profit? fishing activity pushes fish stocks below some minimum popu- We speculate that there are at least three reasons why the lation threshold. On the scientific measurement side, the threat standard economic intuition of open-access fisheries might not of a blue paradox calls into question monitoring approaches hold in the case of marine reserves like PIPA and would there- that rely on direct comparisons of fish abundance. For example, fore give rise to a blue paradox. The first is that the zero profit preemptive fishing would affect the interpretation of compar- condition for open access resources holds only in steady state. If isons of abundance before versus after policy implementation, or the resource is out of steady state, for example as it is in the pro- inside versus outside the newly-established reserve. Such simple cess of being fished down, the announcement of a new closure approaches are not robust to an endogenous change in fish- could trigger changes in the pace of entry, consistent with a blue ing effort—a la the blue paradox—and would almost certainly paradox. The second explanation is that an area earmarked for be biased as a result. Concerns about this potential bias take protected status could already have some kind of formal access on a greater significance in light of an ongoing debate about rights associated with it. Indeed, PIPA is located within Kirbati’s the true conservation efficacy of marine reserves and MPAs. EEZ, which has a well-described set of rules governing extraction Indeed, the empirical evidence in their favor remains worryingly from its waters. This may have conferred additional privileges for equivocal, despite their increasing popularity and the impres- a select group of fishers by restricting access to outsiders before sive growth in total MPA coverage (20–22, 32, 33). It may well the enforcement of the no-take rule. A fishery may be similarly be that the puzzling prevalence of so-called “paper parks” has subject to the restrictions imposed on it by international agree- as much to do with scientists mistakenly picking up on a blue ments between countries. For example, purse seine fishing in the paradox effect, as it does with the inability of local authori- Western and Central Pacific is regulated by the Nauru Agree- ties to police enforcement. Importantly, we also demonstrate ment (30), which specifies total allowable fishing effort in the with PIPA that size is not a sufficient bulwark against a blue form of an annual Vessel Day Scheme (VDS). As a signatory paradox. This too pushes back against conventional wisdom in country, Kiribati is allowed to sell off its quota of vessel days to conservation circles, where the move toward increasingly large fishers. It is also allowed to trade vessel days with other member marine reserves is underscored by scientific arguments that sug- nations in the event of a quota shortage or glut. However, total gest conversation efficacy is increasing in marine reserve size purse seine fishing within its waters (including PIPA) remains (e.g., ref. 20). bound by the VDS and would thus have conferred some form of Taking a step back, these results contribute to the growing property rights to eligible vessels. That said, the VDS program appreciation by policy makers and scientists to proceed cau- in Kiribati did not include the sizable longline fleet during the tiously when environmental policies and economic incentives are study period; though Kirbati began using a longline catch quota misaligned. In the specific case of marine reserves at least, we management system in 2017 (31). This implies that there were suggest a need to reduce the duration of policy design periods. partial property rights over the resource during the study period. We end on a hopeful note, recognizing that the evidence pre- The third reason that the standard open access model might not sented herein would have been impossible only a few years ago apply is that fishers naturally secure quasi-property rights for due to data limitations. Thanks to the advent of incredibly rich themselves through a process of specialization and spatial knowl- satellite data provided by the likes of GFW, we now have the edge. Certain vessels or fleets may hold virtual monopoly power means to address previously unanswered questions and improve in patches of the ocean simply by virtue of the fact that they management of our natural resources accordingly.

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Data Methods and Materials ecmr oe.MdlM in M2 Model model. benchmark .InsR oak ,Tcihr 19)Tkns opnainadednee species endangered and compensation Takings, (1998) J Tschirhart S, Polasky R, Innes conservation preemptive 9. and incentives, perverse approach. Thresholds, (2017) side J supply Wu C, A Langpap on warming: global 8. policy against species policies Endangered Public hurts: (2008) HW truth Sinn the When 7. (1998) of H cost abatement Doremus marginal S, and the Polasky forecast security to 6. rule water permit free Agricultural a Using (2011) (2017) KC M Meng Mezzatesta 5. endanger- N, Act Brozovic Species DA, Endangered Newburn the 4. Is (2006) DE Osgood M, Hook Margolis Sandy JA, on Group List Freedom 3. rifle-maker for the up Profits from (2013) Evidence S deaths: Foley accidental E, and Crooks Firearms 2. (2017) R McKnight PB, Levine 1. urn P oeaeetmtsb A F eecluae yover- by calculated were MFA FAO by estimates coverage MPA Current sam- 2012–2016 same the over data (SST) temperature surface sea Daily ut9 2018. Au- 9, gust Accessed www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/516/ at Available Kiribati+votes+to+ban+fishing+in+massive+marine+protected+area. Agency. News Seychelles 2018. 9, August Accessed grounds/. blog/celebrate-kiribati-changes-its-tuna-and-protects-one-of-worlds-largest-fishing- grounds. fishing largest 2018. 9, Aug Accessed www.ipsnews.net/2014/05/kiribati-bans-fishing-crucial-marine- sanctuary/. at Available Agency. 2018. 9, August Accessed www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/05/mega-marine-reserve-going-limits-fishers. at 04sp2/aakoaawrd-ags-ca-eev-aic cesdAgs 9, 2018. August Accessed 2014/sep/25/barack-obama-worlds-largest-ocean-reserve-pacific. Pacific. the 904–908. uut9 2018. 9, August Planet Protected lands. private on protection species. endangered of Finance Public Tax information. imperfect with land private policy. climate proposed species. endangered for flows instream at Available MA). Cambridge, 2018. Research, 9, Economic August of Accessed http://www.nber.org/papers/w12777. Bureau (National species? ing 2018. 9, August Accessed 6407-11e3-b70d-00144feabdc0. anniversary. shooting. school Hook Sandy the of aftermath i b f steKrbt oto ein i.3, Fig. region. control Kiribati the is (t f i GE 3) h S aaaeosre tagiddsailresolution spatial gridded a at observed are data SST The (35). (GEE) dsaqartci einseicsasraetmeauet the to temperature sea-surface region-specific in quadratic a adds ih6kos siae eaaeyfrteprosbfr n after and before periods the for separately estimated knots, 6 with ) (t uigdate during and ) h Guardian The vial thttps://www.ft.com/content/9fb20eea- at Available Times. 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Available Science. ogeEarth Google i IAppendix, SI sPP and PIPA is Science 2 lo 5 allow , y it for , 359: [1] Int 9 aaC(03 oehn’ fishy. Something’s (2013) C Pala 19. claims. protection marine President’s Kiribati undercuts Fishing (2013) C Pala 18. 5 oeikN ta.(07 ogeErhEgn:Paeaysaegopta nlssfor analysis geospatial Planetary-scale Engine: surface Earth Google sea (2017) for al. et analyses N, high-resolution-blended Gorelick global Daily 35. A (2007) reserves: al. marine et no-take RW, within Reynolds effects Biological 34. areas. (2009) protected al. marine of et network SE, global Lester the and 33. reefs Coral (2006) al. Available et 10(3). C, News Mora Industry and Trade 32. FFFA (2017) L Campling M, McCoy E, Havice ocean 31. Pacific Central and Western the in management Rights-based (2013) E Havice 30. pro- (2014) FAO marine 29. Increasing (2017) Nature of management Conservation contrasting under for prospects Union heteroskedas- fishery International Global semi-definite, 28. (2016) positive al. et simple, C, Costello A 27. (1987) KD West WK, Newey 26. (2001) F Harrell 25. Central and Western the in fisheries tuna of Overview (2012) P Terawasi Phoenix P, the Williams of maintenance 24. and management, Establishment, (2014) al. et R, Rotjan work. 23. areas protected marine Making Conservation: protected (2014) marine on BS depend outcomes Halpern conservation 21. Global (2014) al. et GJ, Edgar 20. 2 ilD,e l 21)Cpct hrflshne h efrac fmrn protected marine of performance the hinder shortfalls Capacity (2017) al. et DA, Gill 22. udn rmteWitFudto n ogei rtflyacknowledged. gratefully is public. Google the and Foundation to Waitt available the from data Funding fishing satellite-based high-resolution making ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. overfishing an to into globally move would fisheries scenario. that individual Similarly, fisheries (F all 0%. of situation for of number fraction done the expansion also determine an were assumed calculations we exceed- already these target), with coverage (which, 30% global area with the area Antarctic will only ing Pacific MFA the the FAO is For coverage, each here. no-take MPA 39.5% given for yet than fraction not higher are expansion even MPAs PIPAbe necessary current the inside the many of reserves, observed since by fraction marine pressure that fraction a highlight fishing expansion We increasing in this (+130%). then increase to and equivalent determined pressure empirically coverage, between fishing difference MPA current the current determining the the first by cal- and are area 30% coverage fishing of reserve each announcement marine for 30% an culated to following expansion estimates reserve estimates status marine fisheries pressure no-take of fishing database (F global Expected a pressure from (27). fishing area the of in caught mean eries catch-weighted a using classification regression logistic benchmark our procedure. than rather in effort, M2 fishing Model month. given a S4 in with M2 in correlation and serial M3 M1 trary Model Models respectively. heteroscedas- (26). windows, and window time S3 correlation 60-d Fig. serial a Appendix, to within robust SI form be arbitrary to of errors ticity allows 3 Fig. effects. in fixed month adding by urn sigpesr siae o ahFOMAwr calculated were MFA FAO each for estimates pressure fishing Current journal/index.php/eij/article/somethings 2018. 9, August Accessed marine-protection-claims/. www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/fishing-undercuts-kiribati-presidents- at Available Agency. everyone. temperature. synthesis. 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(Western Federated Report State, conditions Pohnpei Kolonia, economic Commission, eries including Ocean, Pacific area. protected islands features. key five with areas ra globally. areas 506:167–168. ssa lentv erlntcasfiainpoeuefrdetermining for procedure classification net neural alternative an uses 42:259–267. 312:1750–1751. rcNt cdSiUSA Sci Acad Natl Proc a clPo Ser Prog Ecol Mar /F eoeSn Environ Sens Remote A ttsia ra o ihr Purposes Fishery for Areas Statistical FAO MSY Clim J Nature ersinMdln taeis ihApiain oLna Models, Linear to Applications With Strategies: Modeling Regression > 20:5473–5496. )udramrn eev xaso announcement expansion reserve marine a under 1) lo rirr eilcreainars 5 n 90-d and 15- across correlation serial arbitrary allow 543:665–669. d a Biol Mar Adv h uhr hn hi olbrtr tGWfor GFW at collaborators their thank authors The 384:33–46. Nature 202:18–27. 113:5125–5129.  it vial twww.earthisland.org/ at Available J. Isl Earth 506:216–220. 69:289–324. sa ro em h ecmr model benchmark The term. error an is sy.Acse uut9 2018. 9, August Accessed fishy/. i.S3 Fig. Appendix, SI NSLts Articles Latest PNAS Srne,NwYork). New (Springer, FOFseisadAquacul- and Fisheries (FAO /F Econometrica MSY Fig. Appendix, SI rmalfish- all from ) lo arbi- allow esand News | P News IPS 55:703– Nature f7 of 7 Mar

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