EPC WORKING PAPER N° 11

ESDP: The State of Play

Fraser Cameron Gerrard Quille

September 2004

In strategic partnership with the King Baudouin Foundation

With the support of the THE FUTURE OF CFSP 32 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 16 SO207/04, PressRelease,Javier SolanaannouncedtheappointmentofChiefExecutive anddeputy 15 On theestablishmentandlegalbasisof Agency seeQuille,G.andManca,D., “The European 14 ‘Draft CouncilJoint Action ontheestablishmentofaEuropeanDefence Agency (EDA)’, No.10450/04, ttp://www 13 For the5February 2003Le Touquet Summitsee: 12 Ibid. 11 CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,ESDPPresidency Report,Brussels15June 2004.seeannex1‘Headline Clarke, M.,Garden, 10 T., &Quille,G.,“Achieving theHelsinkiHeadlineGoal,” CentreforDefenceStudies, 8 Quille, G.,“Makingmultilateralism matter; 8 The EUSecurityStrategy,” ESR,ISISEurope 9 The SolanaPaper usesthefigure 2004. at: www drawing uponNATO figureswhich are indollars). drawing onSIPRIandIISS,which may beduetoexchange rate differences (usuallyoccurringwhen 2003 LondonSummitsee:www Chief Executive oftheEuropeanDefence Agency, Brussels30July 2004. Review Armaments Agency:Security A European VirtualReality”, Brussels, 11June 2004. http://www a UK‘Non-Paper’ focusingonimplementationentitled‘The roadto2010.’ ‘Towards a2010HeadlineGoal.’ This was furtherelaborated by anItalianpresidency Paper andagainby Goal 2010.’ The 2010HeadlineGoalprocesswas firstintroducedinaFrench ‘Non-paper’entitled King’s CollegeLondon,November 2001. .iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf .isis-europe.org .diplomatie.gouv ; CameronF., “EuropasneueSicherheitstrategie,” InternationaleP .fr/actu/bulletin.gb.asp?liste=20030205.gb.html .fco.go € 160 billion,slightlydifferentfigurescanbecalculatedfromthefigure v .uk/F iles/kfile/ UKF r ance_DefenceDeclar No. 20,ISISEurope,January 2004. and forthe24November ation,0.pdf , No.18July 2003, olitik , Spring EPC WORKING PAPER

EPC Working Papers cover the extended discussion of contemporary themes. They are normally written by in-house analysts, although outside experts may also be invited to produce papers. Working Papers are policy oriented and generally contain an executive summary and key recommendations. The papers represent the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the EPC.

September 2004

Fraser Cameron Gerrard Quille

THE FUTURE OF CFSP 3 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 Gerrard Quille Fr 26 About the Authors: 25 21 17 7 Conclusion 29 15 7. EU-NATO 11 6. The TransatlanticFramework 5. The RoleoftheCommission 4. The EuropeanDefence Agency 3. The Multilateral Dimension:EU-UNCooperation 2. Improving Capabilities: The HeadlineGoal2010 1. The Development ofESDP Introduction 6 aser Cameron is Acting Executive DirectorofISISEurope. is DirectorofStudiesattheEPC. T able ofContents & Research andDevelopment Qualified Majority Voting PrecisionGuidanceMunitions Prague CapabilitiesCommitment NATO ResponseForce LetterofIntent(Framework Agreement) R&D Integrated Police Unit QMV Headquarters PGM PCC OCC HelsinkiHeadlineGoal HeadlineGoal2010 NRF GroupofPersonalities LoI GrossDomesticProduct IPU HQ General Affairs andExternalRelationsCouncil EUPolice Mission HG2010 EUMilitaryCommittee HHG EUMilitary Staff EuropeanSecurityStrategy GoP GDP EuropeanSecurityResearch Programme GAERC EuropeanSecurityandDefence Policy EUPM EuropeanRapidResponse Force EUMC EuropeanDefence Agency EUMS European Capability Action Plan ESS Centre EuropeanAirlift ESRP European Airlift CoordinationCentre ESDP Defence Test andEvaluation Base ERRF Defence Technological andIndustrialBase EDA DefenceCapabilityInitiative ECAP EAC DeputySupreme Allied Commander Europe Commercial oftheshelf TechnologiesEACC CrisisManagementOperation DTEB CommonForeign andSecurity Policy DTIB DSACEUR CapabilityDevelopment Mechanism CapabilityFunctional Areas/Capability Development Areas DCI ChemicalBiologicalRadiologicalandNuclear COTS CMO CFSP CFA/CDA CDM CBRN 3Command,ControlandCommunications CommandandControl Agency Establishment Team C C3 C2 AET List of Acronyms 4 S Command,Control,Communications,Computers, ISR AR Organisation ConjointedeCoopération en matièred’Armement Intelligence, Surveillance andReconnaissance

4 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 5 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 M Weapons ofMassDestruction Stabilisation Force UN DepartmentofPeacekeeping Operations Western European Armaments Group/Organisation SuppressionofEnemy Air Defence WMD StandByHighReadinessBrigade Revolution inMilitary Affairs WEAG/WEAO Research and Technology UN DPKO SFOR SHIRBRIG SEAD RMA R&T future oftheEU and limitedprospectsforadditional financingbeingavailable forESDP. It recognisesthat thesenewchallenges areoccurringinaperiod ofuncertaintyaboutthe mandate ofthe EDA andassesses theprospectsforincreased R&Dinthedefencefield. considers thechanges inthenewConstitutional Treaty affectingESDP, examinesthe T faster down thepathofdefencesharingthan was possible inpastyears. ahead. Yet thebudgetarypressuresfacingallMemberStates may pushthemfurtherand in managingdefencepolicies, budgetsandbureaucracies thereisamassive task Looked atfromtheperspective ofthepastfiftyyears oftheMemberStates’experience development, research, acquisitionandarmaments(EuropeanDefence Agency -EDA). step forward by establishinganew Agency inthefieldofdefencecapability, promote “defencetransformation.” The Unionhasnow takenapotentially important T that arerelevant fortoday’s securitychallenges asmappedoutintheESS. on resources fromEuropeancoffersandaninabilitytoprovide forces andequipment capacity inthewrongtypesofforces andequipment. This hasledtoasignificantdrain under-developed capabilities;militarycrisismanagementsuffersfromamassive over- capabilities sufferfromalack ofpoliticalwilltodevelop hithertonon-existent or civilian and militarycrisismanagement.Butwhilst civilian crisismanagement underpin theEU’s securitypolicy aspirations. This appliesequallytocapabilitiesfor A keyelementinthisagendawillbefocusingonthenecessarycapabilitiesto demonstrates anewmoodintheEUtodevelop itscrisismanagementcapabilities. P Bosnia fromNATO, which willbenamedoperation Althea (andincludeanIntegrated mission inGeorgia.Laterthisyear theEUwillbetakingover theSFORmissionin the Balkans(EUPMandProxima)isabouttoembarkonitsfirstESDPruleoflaw research capacity inthesecurityfield. The Unionisactive intwo policemissionsin European CommissionhasalsoproducedanumberofproposalstoenhanceEurope’s Defence Agency, theSolidarityClauseandanexpansionofPetersberg Tasks. The begun toliftkeydefenceprovisions forimmediateadoptionsuch astheEuropean full ratification ofthenewConstitutionby the25,MemberStateshave already “permanent structuredcooperation” indefence.Ratherthanwaiting fortheeventual the EUagreedanewconstitutionaltreatythatcontainsfar-reaching proposalsfor EU SecurityStrategy (ESS),agreedlastDecemberby theEuropeanCouncil.InJune and defence. The EUismoving toimplementtheproposalscontainedinSolana States recognisetheneedtoimprove theEU’s proceduresandcapabilitiesforsecurity the disarray andshock oftheIraq war thereareencouraging signsthattheMember T Introduction his paperbrieflyreviewsthemain developments inESDPandassessestheESS.It he EUmustnow seektodevelop aEuropeanstrategic cultureandsimultaneously olice Unit). he EuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy (ESDP)isbeginningtomove forward. After 1 In comparisontorecentyears thisisanambitiousagendaand 2

6 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 7 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 In thepastfive years EuropeanCouncilmeetingshave developed ESDPfurther: decide tousethem,andareadinessdoso,inorderrespondinternationalcrises.” capacity forautonomousaction,backed upby crediblemilitaryforces, themeansto on EUdefenceeffortswithadeclaration statingthattheEUshoulddevelop “…the position. At St.MaloinDecember1998LondonandParis initiatedanewbi-lateral push Th that NATO remainedthekeypillarfordefenceandsecuritypolicy. dependence ontheUSthroughNATO, whilst theUKledcampofthoseconvinced European defencepolicy tostrengthenEuropeanautonomy andbreakfreeoftheir defence campswereledby France andtheUK;formersaw thepotentialfora did notamountto“theframing ofacommondefencepolicy.” The two mainEuropean tasks ofcombatforces incrisismanagement,includingpeacemaking”)which clearly P 1997 Amsterdam Treaty agreedonaHighRepresentative forCFSPandintroduced the a commondefencepolicy,” which could“intimeleadtoacommon defence.” The 1992 thatestablishedtheCFSPalsoforesaw “theeventual framing of agree plansforasinglecurrency andacommonforeignsecuritypolicy (CFSP). The States oftheEUalsoseizedopportunity, somemoreenthusiasticallythanothers,to now hadtheopportunitytojoinprosperouswesternhalfofEurope. The Member (EU). The statesthatwereunderSoviet dominationforhalfacentury T 1. The Development ofESDP etersberg Tasks (including“humanitarianandrescuetasks,peacekeeping he endoftheCold War openeduptheprospectofbothwideninganddeepening e electionofanewLabourBritishgovernment in1997ledtoachange intheUK • on capabilitieswidelyregardedaslacking inEuropeaninventories and on financingmilitarycrisismanagement operations attheSevilleEuropean • • on decision-makinginordertobeableoversee acrisismanagement • on operational objectives inDecember1999,withitsHelsinki Headline develop thecapabilitiesneeded fortheU multinationally, inordertoimprove existingresources andprogressively investments, developments andcoordination measures,bothnationally and (ECAP). This calledonMemberStatesto“mobilisevoluntarily allefforts, on 15December2001which approved theEuropeanCapability Action Plan essential forcrisismanagement operations withtheLaekenEuropeanCouncil Council inJune 2002,and Committee, MilitaryCommitteeandEUStaff; introduction ofthepermanentstructuresPolitical andSecurity operation attheNiceEuropeanCouncilinDecember2000,andwith the to 50,000-60,000personscapableofthefullrange ofPetersberg Tasks.”; deploy within60days andsustainforatleast1year militaryforces ofup v Goal (HHG)where theMemberStatesagreedthatin“cooperating oluntarily inEU-ledoperations, MemberStatesmustbeableby 2003,to nion’s crisis-management actions.” 4 3 then adoptedinarevisedformattheDecember2003EuropeanCouncilBrussels. w T global actorandhow itseesitsevolving securityinstrumentsmeetingthatvision. Representative forCFSP, amandatetoaddresstheissueofwhere theUnionstandsasa its emphasison“pre-emptive strikes.” The MemberStatesgave Javier Solana,theHigh and partlyaresponsetotheassertive USnationalsecuritystrategy ofSeptember2002with T T (Concordia below). Finally, theUnionbeganitsfirstactualmilitaryoperations underESDP T instruments tomeetcontemporary security challenges: T concerns butthatdonotamounttoaEuropeanendorsement of USmethods. Strategy. Thus, itmay bereadasidentifyingsecurityprioritieswhich meetcurrentUS generally acknowledged tomaketheESSstandapartfromUSNationalSecurity along withanemphasisupon“preventive engagement”rather than“pre-emption,” are drawing uponcommunityinstrumentsandregionaldialogue. These characteristics, EU synergiesandby addressingrootcausessuch aspoverty andweakgovernance by other words, by supportingtheUNsystem,strengtheningnationalresponsesthrough international terrorism)shouldbeaddressedthrough“effective multilateralism.” In weakness. The ESSstressesthatpriority securityobjectives (WMD proliferation and power. Indeed,theUnion’s lack ofmilitarycapabilityishighlightedasamajor force asalastresort).IthasnoillusionsregardingtheweaknessofEUmilitary and regionalorganisations)theruleoflaw (upholdingtheprincipleofuse priorities inaframework thatemphasizesmultilateral institutions(specificallytheUN T he EuropeanSecurityStrategy (ESS)was partlyaresponsetotheUnion’s disarray over Iraq he ESSproducedinadocumentwiththesubtitle“ he ESSclearlystatesthattheEUanditsMemberStateswilltackle theirsecurity he BerlinPlusarrangements withNATO werealsoanimportantstepforward (see he ESSsuggeststhattheEUhasthreekeystrategic objectives inapplyingitsexternal he European Security Strategy as firstproposedadraft atthe Thessaloniki EuropeanCouncilinJune 2003and • seekingeffective countermeasurestonewand old threats. • supporting theemergenceofastable andequitableinternationalorder, • extendingthezoneofsecurity onEurope’s periphery; particularly aneffective multilateral system; 5 and Artemis 6 ) in April andJune 2003. A SecureEuropeinaBetter World,” 8 7

8 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 9 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 considerable defencespending.MemberStatesmustmakebetteruseofthe T strategy withwhich theUScanengage. Member Statestoturntheirrhetoriconmultilateralism intoa“resultsoriented” multilateralism isnotsimplyaknee-jerkresponsetotheUSbutclearchallenge to position intheUNSecurityCouncilover theIraq crisis.Solana’s useoftheterm in supportoftheBiologicaland Toxin Weapons Convention ortoarrive atacommon effective actionasdemonstrated by thefailureofUniontomeaningfullymobilize as anEUcommitmenttomultilateralism hasnotalways beenconducive tocommon, It was a brave move forSolanatoputsuch emphasisonmultilateralism, especially this way, theEUcanengagein systematicpoliticalengagementof“prevention.” is notalways appropriatebutmightformoneelementofacombinedresponse.In acknowledging that inactionisnotanoption;understandingthatamilitaryresponse elements; recognizingthatthefirstlineofdefenceliesbeyond EUfrontiers; Whether appliedtoneworoldthreats,thesecountermeasureshave certaincommon document emphasisesthatthisneedsthe Fr missions onbehalfoftheEU. Inblunttermsthisacknowledges thatBritainand w allow thoseMemberStateswhose militarycapabilitiesfulfilhighercriteriaand of anewform“permanentstructuredcooperation” withinthe Unionthatwould unanimously, sodecides.” The mostimportant change, however, isintheacceptance and thiscouldleadtoacommondefence“when theEuropean Council, acting remains thecommitmentto“theprogressive framing ofacommondefencepolicy” this area,morethanothers,someMemberStatesareequal thanothers. There T Proposals intheEuropean Constitutional Treaty capability weaknessestoremedy inordertomakethatpolicy areality. European SecurityStrategy andthenhighlightingthekeycivilian andmilitary (see below). The ESSthereforecomesfullcircle by outliningtherationale fora capacity, which inturn willreinforce effortstoestablishaEuropeanDefence Agency thinking onhow toreduceduplication,sharetasksandcreatemoremultinational European armedforces billion devoted annuallytodefence(theUSspendsaroundbillioneuros340). he ESSagainstressesthatEuropeansgenerate inadequatecapabilityfromtheir he articlescovering defenceintheConstitutional Treaty provide recognitionthatin hich have made morebindingcommitmentstooneanotherinthisarea carryout ance bringrather moremilitaryassetstothe tablethanMaltaorCyprus. . In turnthisrequiresandwillinspiregreatersystematic transformation and modernization € 9 160 The of underline thebasic solidaritybetweenMember States. political gesture thananattempttocreate EUdefencealliance.Butit serves to obligation ofaid andassistanceby allmeansintheir power….” This ismorea armed aggressiononitsterritory, theotherMemberStatesshallhave towards itan commitments ofNATO MembersStatesthat“ifaMemberStateisthe victim of Another change isthemutualsolidarity clausewhich, while acknowledging the be very reluctanttobreakfromthetraditional principle ofunanimityindefencematters. permanent structuredcooperation butexperiencesuggeststhatMember Stateswould T of MemberStates’contributionswithregardtocapabilities. Article IIIreferstotheEDA andstatesthatitshallcontributetotheregular assessment permanent structuredcooperation shall: Article IIstatesthattoachieve theseobjectives MemberStatesparticipatingin to any Member State: Article IoftheProtocolstatesthatpermanentstructuredcooperation shallbeopen here arecomplicatedproposalsfortheuseofQMVintaking decisionsunder • take part,where appropriate,inthedevelopment ofmajorjointor • work togethertomakegoodtheshortfallsperceived intheframework of • take concretemeasures toenhancetheavailability, interoperability, • • • • that undertakestoproceedmoreintensively toward developing, its European equipmentprogrammes intheframework ofthe Agency. the “CapabilityDevelopment Mechanism;” possibly reviewingtheirnationaldecision-makingprocedures; common objectives regardingthecommitmentofforces, including flexibility anddeployability oftheirforces, inparticularby identifying by and, where appropriate,specialisingtheirdefencemeansandcapabilities, particularly by harmonisingtheidentificationoftheirmilitaryneeds,by pooling bring theirdefenceapparatus intolinewitheach otherasfarpossible, responsibilities; in thelightofsecurityenvironment andoftheUnion’s international expenditure ondefenceequipment,andregularlyreviewtheseobjectives cooperate toachieve approved objectives concerningthelevel of the missionsplanned…withsupportelementsincludingtransport andlogistics. that hasthecapacitytosupplyby 2007atthelatesttargetedcombatunitsfor European equipmentprogrammes, andintheEDA, and participation,where appropriate,inmultinationalforces, inthemain defence capacitiesthroughthedevelopment ofitsnationalcontributions

encouraging cooperation inthefieldsoftraining andlogistics; 10 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 11 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 as “BerlinPlus,” forinter-institutional exchanges. sufficiently tohave joint meetings,even afteragreeingsecurity arrangements, known focussing on almost identicalcapability shortfalls butcouldnotcoordinate in thecommonkeycapability enablers.Even worse, thetwo organisationswere of politicalwillfromMember Statestocommitresources tomakeuptheshortfalls in 2003)bothprocessesbegan tosufferthesamefateoforiginalDCI,i.e.alack Prague CapabilityCommitments(with8key capabilityareaslaunched attheSummit shortfalls. DespiteNATO adoptingasimilarnarrower focussedprocessunderthe (DCI) atits Washington SummitinMarch 1999, which hadalready identified58key Pre-dating thisEUinitiative NATO hadlaunched theDefenceCapabilities Initiative concept. long beenarguedthatthePetersberg Tasks have becomeanunhelpfullyempty envisage andunderwhat circumstances force shouldbeused.Furthermore,ithas T 2. Improving Capabilities: The HeadlineGoal2010 critical areasthatcanbegroupedasfollows: A numberofECAP working groupsweresetuptoexamineshortfallsin anumberof were available atany onetime. planner would notbeabletostatewithany confidencewhich oftheactualtroops (including helicopters).Othercommitmentsweresocomplicatedthataforce absence ofcommitmentinotherareassuch asstrategic airliftandtacticaltransport such as soldiers(over 100,000) combataircraft (over 400)andships(100) andan Initial Helsinkicommitmentshadledtoasurplusofinsomeareas Catalogue, theHeadlineForce CatalogueandtheHeadlineProgressCatalogue. need tobeaddressedfollowing areviewunderthreecategories;theHeadlineGoal at keymomentsinany conflictcycle. Itrecognised thatexistingshortfallsstill responses andthedeployment ofeffective capabilitieswilloftenplay acrucialrole Accordingly, theEUiswellplacedtoprovide aframework forcivilian andmilitary c T for theEUaccordingtoatimeframe of2010. States endorsedaplantodefineby June 2004thepresentlyopaquePetersberg Tasks hallenges aremultifacetedandrequirebothcivilian andmilitaryresponses. here hasbeenlittlediscussionletaloneconsensusonwhat level offorce Europeans he new2010HeadlineGoalstatesunequivocally thattoday’s securitythreatsand 10 • C • Survivability ofForce andInfrastructure (includingrescue helicopters) • Effective engagement (includingprecisionweapons) • Sustainability andLogistics(includingair-to-air refuelling) • Strategic andtacticallift T his was finally recognisedintheESSandNovember 2003Member 4 ISR (includingcommunications,satellites,andsurveillance) European CouncilinJune 2004, recognised shortfalls. The new2010HeadlineGoalwas adoptedattheBrussels across thefullrange ofPetersberg taskswas stilllimitedandconstrained by T Although theHelsinkiHeadlineGoalsweredeclaredformallymetin2003, Europe. w process slowed down inlate2002/2003andhadnotprevented theconsiderable most analystsagreethatdespiteECAP effortsthedefencecapabilitygeneration assets, troopsandresources areactuallyavailable orreally operational. Furthermore, limitations. MemberStateswerenotrequiredtoprovide guarantees regardingwhat cataloguing process,analysingEuropeancapabilitiesandcommitments,hadits Commitments processandfortheNATO ResponseForce (NRF). The EU’s commitments, afeaturethatNATO alsoadoptedunderthePrague Capability A keyfeatureoftheoriginalHHGwas thevoluntary natureofMemberStates’ invasion include anything fromproviding personal securitytoUNinspectorsfullscale ambiguity isaddedwithreference to“jointdisarmamentoperations,” which could level ofconcurrency andsustainabilitytheUnionused initsplanning.Further w them) nordoesitclarifyambiguities inthefirstHeadlineGoalsuch aswhether there Goal 2010doesnotdefinemorepreciselythePetersberg Tasks (indeeditaddsto T also appliesto references toissuesthatarecritically importanttodefence planning generation models,with such statementsas“several concurrentoperations.” The same critical forproviding theEUMS withrealisticparameters forpolicy planningandforce levels ofengagement.” concurrent operations thussustainingseveral operations simultaneouslyatdifferent can avoid thatasituationdeteriorates. The EUmustretaintheabilitytoconduct reform. The EUmustbeabletoactbefore acrisisoccursandpreventive engagement operations, thesupportforthirdcountriesincombatingterrorismandsecurity sector peacemaking. As indicatedby theESSthismightalso includejointdisarmament tasks, peace-keepingtasksofcombatforces incrisismanagement, including covered by the Treaty ontheEuropeanUnion. This includeshumanitarianandrescue a fullycoherentapproach tothewhole spectrumofcrisismanagementoperations themselves tobeableby 2010torespondwithrapid anddecisive actionapplying existing shortfallsstillneedtobeaddressed,MemberStateshave decidedtocommit “Building ontheHelsinkiHeadlineandcapabilitygoalsrecognisingthat he EuropeanCouncilstatementleftsomequestionsunanswered. The newHeadline hessaloniki EuropeanCouncilacknowledged thattheEUoperational capability as anagreedcapatthehighend ofmilitaryintervention fortheEUorwhat precise aste ofresources spentoninefficientgeneration ofmilitarycapacitythroughout à la Iraq. There isalso ambiguityonconcurrency andsustainability, both 12 11 and itsessencecapturedinthestatement: 12 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 13 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 certain scenarios. purposes andinnovatively asthebasis forcategorisingcapabilities totaskswithin actual defencetools. The catalogueprocesswillremaininplace foranalytical role inproviding mechanisms fordefencetransformation aswell asreferringto such asBattleGroups,interoperability, deployability andsustainabilityplay acritical T Battle Groups have greatersuccessinachieving the2010goalsthanprevioustargets. groups toprojectbutitremainsbeseenwhether theMember Stateswill T process forachieving theseobjectives withsomespecificmilestones: P of theMemberStateseffortsandwillbedriving factorsofthisgoal2010.” such as“Interoperability butalsodeployability andsustainabilitywillbeatthecore he newHeadlineGoal(2010) isaprocessandthemilestoneskeyconcepts hese areambitiousbutnotunrealistictargets. The EUhasnow moved from working erhaps inanticipationofsuch criticismsthenewHeadlineGoal2010outlinesa • to develop quantitative benchmarks andcriteriafornationalforces • to improve thecommunicationsatalllevels ofEUoperations by • toacquiretheavailability ofanaircraft carrierwithitsassociatedair wing • to completeby 2007theestablishmentofBattleGroupsincluding • to implementby 2005thecreationofanEUstrategic liftjointcoordination • • to establishthe Agency inthefieldofdefencecapabilitydevelopment, • to establishduringthe second halfof2004acivil-military cellwithinthe of multinationaltraining. declared totheHeadlineGoalinfieldofdeployability andinthefield 2010; communications equipmentandassets(bothterrestrial space)by developing appropriatecompatibilityandnetwork linkageofall and escortby 2008; assets; identification ofappropriatestrategic lift,sustainabilityanddebarkation develop (betweensomeMemberStates)aEuropean Airlift commandby 2010; to transform (inparticularforairlift)theEACC intotheEAC by 2004andto lift (air, landandsea); as asteptowards achieving fullcapacityandefficiency by 2010instrategic capability shortfalls; 2004. The agency’s work willincludeongoingeffortstoachieve (theECAP) research, acquisition andarmaments(EuropeanDefence Agency) during the needariseforcertainoperations; EUMS aswellthecapacitytorapidly set-upanoperation centreshould unlike airliftand pre-positioningofkeycapabilities andforces. of power-projection forESDP, even ifithasaslower capabilityin force projection, their navies. Having accesstoanaircraft carrier would provide an importantsymbol wing andescortby 2008”astheonly statesalongwithItalyaircraft carriersin commitment “toacquiretheavailability ofanaircraft carrierwithitsassociatedair and theUK,remaincommitted tothenewHeadlineGoalandhave endorsed the T with liaisoninterviews). a DefencePlanningQuestionnairesuch asNATO useswhich mightbefollowed up planning processes(thiswillmostlylikelytaketheshapeof aselfassessmentusing “catalogues” butalsoverified andvetted inordertosubstantiallyimprove assignedtotheUnionthatarenotonlycommittedand counted in developed” thiswould potentiallyaddaqualitative andquantitative breakthroughin joint packages willrequiretobedeveloped.” Whilst only “remainingtobe packages isthereferenceto“Proceduresassessandcertifythese highreadiness incomplete intheHeadlineGoal. Another majoradditiontothedetailonforce w addition totheBattleGroupconceptprovides acriticalpointofdepartureforfurther or aspartofalargeroperation enablingfollow-on phases. This follow-on phase force packages athighreadiness asaresponsetocrisiseitherstand-aloneforce comprehensive concept ofintervention whereby the EUhastheabilitytodeploy moderately describedas“minimumforce packages” by linkingthemtoamore further initsspecificreferencestothe“BattleGroupsconcept”althoughalsomore generation shouldberecalibrated. However, theHeadlineGoaltakesthisastep that eithertheBattleGroup’s periodofdeployment ortheUN’s processofforce process (themostlikelysource offollow onforces) is6months. This seemstoimply Group isdeployable andsustainablefor120days but the UNforce generation T also becompatiblewiththeNATO ResponseForce (NRF). peacekeeping forces, ideallyprovided by theUNorMemberStates. They should jungle, etc). As such, theyshouldpreparethegroundforlarger, moretraditional to conductcombatmissionsinanextremelyhostileenvironment (mountains,desert, distant crisesareas(i.e.failingstates),under, butnotexclusively, aUNmandate,and F by within 15days noticeand sustainableforatleast30days (extendableto120days support aswelldeployability andsustainabilityassets. These shouldbeavailable battalion –sizeformation(1,500soldierseach) –includingallcombatandservice pursuing theHeadlineGoal2010. A BattleGroupconsistsofhighlytrained, or instancetheBattleGroupconceptisseenasakey“mobilising”elementin he two mostimportantMemberStatesintermsofdeployable militaryforce, France he BattleGroupconceptleaves open thequestionoffollow onforces. The Battle ork toaidforce planningforEUcrisismanagement,butasyet hasbeenleft

rotation). They shouldbeflexibleenoughtopromptlyundertakeoperations in 14 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 15 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 Model inparticular raises somevery interestingnewissues.References tothefact Fr might play insupportingcrisismanagement operations isconsistentwiththeESS and Furthermore, whilst thedevelopment ofadialoguewith theUNonroleEU ongoing effortstoimplementthe EU-UNJoint Declaration. Bridging ModelandtheStand By Model)willbedeveloped furtherinthecontextof Presidency reportsays thatthesethreeissues(theclearinghouseprocess, the should theywish,usethe process toco-ordinatenationalcontributions. The they submitinformationonthecapabilitieshave committedtotheUNand commitments totheUNandmay usetheEUina“clearinghouseprocess”whereby Member Stateswillalsobeabletocontinuelong-standingbi-lateral ormultinational development oftheBattleGroupconcept. “could carryconsiderable associatedrisk”andwillbeanalysedfurther underthe w Readiness Brigades(SHIRBRIG). The Presidency report says thatthistypeofmodel development ofsuch amodelwiththeDanish-basedmultinationalStandBy High EU insupportofaUNoperation. Europeanexperiencealso existsinthe Secretariat asan“over thehorizonreserve” oran“extraction force” provided by the T replacement andsmoothtransition. successful useofsuch aforce isclosecoordinationwiththeUNforaquick a rapid deployment forashortduration withaclearend-state. The keytothe to mountanewoperation orreorganiseanexistingone.Such anoperation requires operation whereby theEUintervenes forashortperiodinordertoallow theUNtime T as acomponentwithinlargerUNmission(amodularapproach). operation inanswer toarequestfromtheUN”eitherwith“standaloneforce” or analysis isbeingconductedontwo specificmodelstomeettheobjective of“anEU cooperation onfuturecrisismanagementscenarioswillincrease.Currently, further learning curve forEU-UNrelationsincrisismanagement.Itislikelythat management operations. Operation Artemis launched inJune 2003provided arapid framework totakeforward substantial cooperation inEU-UNmilitarycrisis elements ofimplementationtheEU-UNJoint Declaration” provides anambitious under theheading“EU-UNco-operation inMilitaryCrisisManagementOperations: UN’s force generation processaretouched upon. Annexe IIentitled“EUUN”and links betweentheEUBattleGroup’s intervention period(upto120days) andthe In anannextothe“ESDPIrishPresidency Report”ofJune 2004someofthemissing 3. The Multilateral Dimension:EU-UNCooperation he secondmodel,known asthe“StandByModel”hasbeendescribedby theUN he firstmodel,known asthe“BridgingModel”reflectsanoperation Artemis type ould require“complicatedcoordination”withtheUN,“immediate reaction”and anco-British visions ontheroleofEUmilitary capabilities, 13 the StandBy comprehensive approach totheplanningofmilitaryand civilian EUinterventions. gap” known asthe“civil-military divide” andensure anintegrated and evidence thattheproposedcellwillberobustenoughtobridge thecrucial“security deployed incomplexconflictsandpeace-buildingprocesses,butthereis little provides theobvious locationfordiscussionsrelatingtohow BattleGroupsmightbe and militaryoperations, oraspartoftheEDA’s remit. The civil-military planningcell w realistic categorisationofcapabilitiesfortasks.Itremainstobe seen,however, ifthis co-operation withandtransition tocivilian operations. This inturnwillfacilitate to promotereadiness,sustainability, concurrency andfollow-on forces, aswell (EUMS) willalsoneedtodevelop theconceptthroughrealisticscenario-based work Groups atthecommitmentsconferencetobeheldthisautumn. The EUMilitaryStaff concept willbeinseeingwhich countriesoffertoprovide orcreatenewBattle a toolforproducingnewones. A keybenchmark formeasuringthevalue ofthe also usefullybemobilisednotjustforre-arranging existingcapabilitiesbutrather as Likewise, whilst theBattleGroupisdeveloped fromconcepttoactualforce itcan w Planning Centrecouldusefullytakeupthelesscontroversial roleoffosteringgood and operational facility. Inthemeantimefurtherdevelopment oftheOperational EU-UN militarycrisismanagementframework would alsorequireanEUplanning calls fortherealisationofanEUPlanningCell. The moredemandingaspectsofthe Cell) adoptedattheDecember2004EuropeanCouncil. The HeadlineGoalclearly F Fo immediate reaction. The voluntary trust-basedcommitmentsoftheRapidReaction w remains tobeseen. This ismoredemandingthanthe Artemis modelbecausethe EU being pre-assignedtotheEUinorderforitmeetEU’s decision-makingprocess w risk” implyaneedforvery rapidly deployable androbuststandingforce, but “immediate reaction”andreferencesthatit“couldcarryconsiderable associated that theStandByModelrequirementsfor“complicatedcoordination”withUN, inally thislinkstotheroleofEU’s Operational PlanningCentre(and hether thiscanbedeveloped andoperational for“immediatereaction”withoutit orking relationswiththeUNDepartmentforPeacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). ork takesplacewithintheEUMilitaryStaff,innewplanning cellforcivilian ould bepoliticallycommittingtotheUNthatithastheseforces ready for r ce would notmeetthisrequirement. 16 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 17 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 established. defence capabilitiesdevelopment, research, acquisitionandarmaments”would be T proposal intheEuropeanConvention andendorsedinthedraft constitutionaltreaty. the EuropeanDefence Agency (EDA) underaJoint Action oftheEUfollowing a a newwillingnesstopromoteclosercooperation. This hasledtotheestablishmentof shrinking defencebudgetsandwiththecostofnewweaponryrisingtherehasbeen and withemployment considerations trumpingeconomicefficiency. Butinanera of procurement inEurope. These effortshave oftenfailedduetothelack ofpoliticalwill T 4. The Intent (Framework Agreement) process. d’Armement) orby the Agency onthebasis of theirexperienceandtheLetter Organisation) and/orOCCAR (OrganisationConjointedeCoopération enmatière WEAG/WEAO (Western European Armament Group/Western European Armament procurement throughco-operation programmes tobemanagedby the requirements ofESDPcapabilities, andwillpromotecost-effective andefficient T During 2004Ministersagreedthatthe Agency shouldbetaskedwith: here have beenmany effortsover theyears toinject moreefficiency into defence he CouncildecidedinNovember 2003thatduring2004an“Agency inthefieldof he Agency willalsoidentify multilateral solutionsforpresentandfuture • pursuing collaborative activities tomakeupshortfalls,anddefining • promotingtheharmonisationofmilitaryrequirements; • encouraging MemberStatestomeettheircapabilitycommitmentsinthe • continuing towork withNATO throughtheCapabilityDevelopment identifying futuredefencecapabilityrequirements,bothinquantitative and • and creatingacompetitive• Europeandefenceequipmentmarketaswell • strengtheningtheEuropeanindustrialandtechnological base; • promotingandenhancingEuropeanarmamentsco-operation; • developing defencecapabilitiesinthefieldofcrisis-management; financial prioritiesforcapabilitydevelopment andacquisition. ECAP process; Mechanism (CDM); qualitative terms(forces, equipments,interoperability andtraining); future defenceandsecuritycapabilities. appropriate, research aimedatleadershipinstrategic technologies for promoting, inliaisonwiththeCommunity’s research activities where 15 It would have fourkeyroles: 14 Defence IndustrialandMarket Directorate. ov hierarchy supportedby aDeputyChiefExecutive, HilmarLinnenkamp,who will Nick Whitney has beenappointedastheChiefExecutive sittingatthetopof armaments andindustrialperspectives intheoverall contextofstrengtheningESDP. especially thechallenges ofintegrating capabilitydevelopment, research, T Structure Europe. within which decisionscanbemadeonresearch andcapabilityinvestment in look beyond 2010. This willprovide amorerobustand policy relevant framework culture. Importantlythereportnotesthat Agency’s analytical horizonmustalso and reducefragmentation by fosteringthedevelopment ofaEuropeanstrategic making baseduponfutureESDPneedsalsoreinforces effortstoimprove coherence future ESDPcapabilityrequirements. The latterstrategic framework fordecision- and b)provide longertermstrategic directionasthebasisformakingdecisionsabout and remedy fragmentation intheEuropeandefencecapabilitygeneration process T Functions estimate for2004and2005atimetableroadmapimplementation. to theprioritiesofearlyactivities, theproposedorganisationchapter, abudget Steering Board;andDecision Taking. Italsoincludesfourtechnical annexesreferring agency’s way ofworking; theagency’s size,structure,costandambition;theagency’s T Member Statesintheircollective efforttostrengthentheESDP.” The Establishment of the Agency, andstatingclearlythat“theagency’s raison d’êtreistosupportthe comprehensive and detaileddocumentoutliningthefutureshapeandkeyfunctions T equipment. means thatmostMemberStatesareconsumersrather thanproducersofdefence Germany, Italy, SwedenandSpain)have significantdefenceindustrialsectors. This Although allMemberStatesmay jointheEDA onlyasmallnumber(France, theUK, directorates inthechain ofcommandand work on individual programme areas. directorates throughitsrole intheIntegrated Project Teams thatsitunderneaththe Development isalsoincluded,which mainstreamsitsactivities in theother eam’s reportisorganisedaroundfive chapters: theagency’s PurposeandRole;the he Agency hasbeenstructuredaccordingtothefunctions tobedelivered, he functionsaredesignedtotackle two broadproblemsa)toimprove coherence he Establishment Team, underitsDirectorNick Witney, hasproduceda ersee thefunctionalDirectorate forR&T, the Armaments Directorate andthe 16 A fourthDirectorate forCapability 18 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 19 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 meet atleast twice ayear, perhaps back-to-back withtheGeneral Affairs and T on ratification ofthe Treaty ontheConstitution. Agency willincludetherequirementofhaving aformalreviewafterthreeyears or as thedemiseof WEAG/WEAO. Nevertheless theJoint Action establishing the size andbudgetofthe Agency willbekeptunderreviewandrespondtosuch things study ofprogrammes inthearmouredfightingvehicle sector. The scopeofactivities, late 2004inkeyareassuch asinteroperability ofcommunicationsforC2orareview T leverage resources andfocusonhigh-value targets. approach thatisoutward-looking andengagedwiththestakeholdersinorder to costs). The reportsays thatkeepingtheteamsmallandhungry willencourage an of 25millioneurosfor2005(including10 non-recurringsetup (including expertssecondedfromnationaladministrations) andwillhave abudget that the Agency’s corestaffinthefourdirectorates will initially buildupto80 Groups andtheCommission’s Preparatory Action. Nevertheless, thereportenvisages context ofongoingdevelopments undertheHeadlineGoal2010,ECAP Project It willtaketimetogettheagency upandrunningatfullspeedthiswillbeinthe Budget, Staffing,Priorities special Consultative Committee,althoughitwould have nodecision-makingpower. relations andstatessuch as Turkey andNorway mightbeearlycandidatesfora institutions. For Non-EUNATO MemberStatestransparency willhelpmaintain T collaborative armamentsproject andrestructuringoftherelevant industrialsector.” intersecting agendas–forexample,theinterconnection betweenamajor approach shouldbeadoptedbecauseit“shouldalsohelpidentifysynergiesbetween crucial toachieving capabilityneeds. The reportgoesontoarguethatthis“matrix” DTIB/EDEM experts. The reportarguesthatincludingsuch groupswithintheCFAs is Industrial Base(DTIB)drawing uponstrategies developed by Agency and on thevertical axisareinitiatives forstrengtheningtheDefence Technological and Integrated Project Teams alongwithotherkeystakeholders(i.e.industry).Included Protect andSustain).Representatives fromallrelevant Directorates willwork in been usedtocategorisekeycapabilityshortfalls(Command,Inform,Operate, (CFAs) such asthose basedonthekeyenablingareasofcrisismanagementthathave requirements. The reportsuggeststhatanumberofCapabilityFunctional Areas Goal shortfalls,the2010Headlineandbeyond tolookatfuturecapability matrix. Includedinthehorizontalaxisofmatrixiswork ontheHeadline T he HighRepresentative forCFSP will chair theSteeringBoardwhich willlikely he reportrecommendsthatthe Agency alsoprioritisesomeearly pilotprojectsin he Agency willbetaskedtomaintainrelationshipswithexistingco-operative he managementofthe Agency’s work programme isdescribedasbasedupona Te Evaluation Base(DTEB),andlaunch studiesincludingonCommercial offtheshelf programmes, assumeresponsibility(from WEAG Panel II)forDefence Test and T Armaments Member Statestosetgoalsforgreatermultilateral collaborative R&Tprojects. Action andEuropeanSecurityResearch Programme (ESRP),andwork withthe Agency, work withtheCommissiontoensurecomplementarityitsPreparatory T R&T technologies withtheaimofidentifyingoptionsonhow tomove forward. environment. A specificprovision isalsoenvisaged forwork onspace-based long termvisiononthefutureofESDPrequirementsbasedstrategic It isforeseenthatthe Agency willassumeoversight ofECAP andbeginwork ona Capabilities number ofpriorities: T W decision makingwillbeaccordingtoQMV. mission andfunctions.Ministerswillseektoachieve consensusondecisionsbut the Agency’s externalrelations,andc)thesubstanceofissuesrelatingto Agency’s decisions inthethreeareasofa)how the Agency conductsitsbusinessinternally, b) NA is reserved onlyforMinisters)andthiswillalsoapplytotheSecretaryGeneral of Commission willberepresentedintheSteeringBoardbutnothave avote (this External RelationsCouncil(GAERC),atthelevel ofDefenceMinisters. The with theLoIstates. w on EuropeanCapacitiesofthe DefenceIndustrialBasefollowing theCommission’s up theGreenPaper (due inautumn2004)ondefenceprocurement,launch studies T Defence IndustryandMarket he Agency willdevelop proceduresforbringingEuropeandefenceR&T withinthe he intentionistostaffthe Agency by theendof2004andthenconcentrate ona he Agency willjointlyidentifywiththeEuropean Commissionthework tofollow he Agency willbeginwork onidentifyingbestpractice for collaborative ork onMonitoring DefenceIndustry, and promoteselectletterofintent (LoI)rules ork Programme c TO hnologies (COTS). , when itisdeemed appropriateforhimtoattend. The SteeringBoardwilltake 17 20 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 21 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 research. Inpursuitofthisactionitconcludedby listingthevarious activities intrain: transfers, competition,procurementrules,exportcontrolofdual-use goodsand action standardisation,monitoringofdefence-relatedindustries, intra-community an EUDefenceEquipmentPolicy,” theCommissionidentifiedseven priorityareasof Commission inpromotingprocurement,securityresearch andcross-pillarcooperation. as opposedtothecurrentbottom-upapproach. There isalsoanimportantroleforthe strong staffshouldprovide somemuch neededfreshimpetusandtop-down orientation and undertheresponsibilityofHighRepresentative anddefenceministers. The 80- T Assessment the future. w European defenceandsecurityresearch industryandtheirpatternsofprocurement the Commissioninthisareawillhave amajorimpactontheinvestment strategies of Commission.” This isamajorunderstatementasthevast andfastdeveloping roleof require, andofferbeneficialpotentialfor, afruitfulpartnershipbetween Agency and Research and Technology, marketregulationanddefenceindustrialpolicy issues 21 Report2003). usually withthesupportofapowerful groupofinterestedexternalexperts (e.g.STAR aspects ofthestateplay ofthedefencemarketandindustrialpolicy, In recentyears theCommissionhasbeendeeplyinvolved inexaminingdifferent 5. The RoleoftheCommission NA Member States,Councilbodies,OCCAR, LoI-states, WEAG/WEAO andnon-EU T w he importanceoftheEDA isthatitbringsalldefencedevelopment issuesunderoneroof he Commissionwillbeoneofthekeystakeholdersin Agency (alongwiththe hich in turn willaffectthetechnologies andcapabilitiesthatwillbeproducedin ork ofthe Agency. TO • initiate areflectionondefence procurementatnationaland EUlevels. • continue itsreflectionontheapplicationofcompetitionrulesin the launch• animpactassessmentstudy in2003asthebasis,ifappropriate,for • monitordefence-relatedindustries; • provide financialassistanceforaEuropeanStandardisationHandbookto especially inhelping todefinethescopeof Article 296,theCommission Specifically, itstated“Given theimportantCourtJudgement inrecent years, defence sectorinrespectofthe provisions ofarticle296(ECT); intra-Community transfer ofdefenceequipment; elaborating attheendof2004necessary legalinstrumenttofacilitate be ready in2004;

States, andNATO throughtheCDM)andassuch itis“fullyassociated”tothe 19 In aCommunicationdated11March 2003andentitled“Towards 18 T he preparatory reportstatedthat“The Commission’s work on F recent breakthrough. The Preparatory Action forSecurityResearch commencesin Of these,efforttoestablishasecurity/defenceresearch programme hasmadea support fromEuropeansecurityresearch stakeholders. activities (e.g.technology road-mappingetc)closedinJune 2004,receiving astrong of freedom,security andjustice.” foreign, security anddefencepolicy objectives anditsambition toconstructanarea and prioritiesof aEuropeanSecurityResearch Programme inlinewiththeEU’s (GoP) was setup.Itwas tasked“withtheprimarymission ...toproposeprinciples industrial potentialinthefield ofthesecurityresearch,” a“GroupofPersonalities” “Implementation ofthePreparatory Action ontheEnhancementofEuropean F Research programme: GoPreport research results;andtolookforopportunitiesco-fundedjointventures.” are ascomplementarypossible;toprovide where possibleformutualuseof it “makessensetoensurethatCommission-fundedanddefence-funded programmes is notlostonthe AET, which statesthatwhilst competencesmustbeacknowledged are connectedwiththeproductionofortrade inarms,munitionsandwar material”) considers necessaryfortheprotectionofessentialinterests ofitssecuritywhich to article296(1) TEC (thatstates“any Member Statemay takesuch measures asit T capability prioritiesidentifiedby the Agency. the two willposechallenges forcoherenceinrelatingitswork directlytothedefence w priority areasandco-ordinationmechanisms. The Commission’s securityfocused “Group ofexperts”willbeassembledtofurtherhelpadvise theCommissionon and Development fundingtothesecurity/defencesector. Intheautumnof2004,a Preparatory Action theCommissionispreparingtoopenupCommunityResearch ebruary 2004;itsfirstcallforproposalsresearch projectsandsupporting ollowing theEuropeanCommission DecisionofFebruary 32004onthe he importanceoftheCommissioninresearch, marketregulationandrelationship ork runsinparallel tothe Agency’s work andthepillarlegaldivisions between • pursue work onapossibleEUDefenceEquipmentFramework• overseen by launch aPreparatory • Action foradvanced research inthesecurityfield(see • raise, intheappropriateCouncilworking groups,theissueof Defence Agency. an Agency (or Agencies). This hasbeentakenover by thenewEuropean below); Commission’s involvement inexportcontrolregimes; stakeholders; P implications ofthesejudgements.Inparallel, itwillwork onaGreen will issueanInterpretive Communicationby theendof2003on aper, which mightbeissuedin2004asabasisfordiscussionwith 21 T he GoPwas co-chaired by European 20 W ith thishighlyscrutinised 22 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 23 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 “Revolution inMilitary Affairs” and practically “network-enabled warfare.” have fed back intothemilitarydevelopments andusheredinthenewconceptof inventions, althoughtheyhave flourishedundercivilian enterprises,which inturn areas.” The GoPgives the example ofthe“internetandGPS”beingmilitary same technological baseandthereis a growing cross-fertilisation betweenthetwo between civil anddefenceapplications becausethey“increasinglydraw fromthe but securitywithoutthesupportoftechnology isimpossible.” Itnotestheconnection Europe” beginswithaboldstatement:“Technology itselfcannotguarantee security, T appropriate fundingandanoptimaluseofresources.” strengths. This requiresstate-of-the-artindustries, astrongknowledge infrastructure, abroad. To achieve theseobjectives, Europemusttakeadvantage ofitstechnological resources forpeacekeeping,humanitarianaidandinstitutionbuilding activities build upthecapabilitytoprotectcitizensathomeaswell as todeploy significant trans-national natureofcurrentthreats.Butitstatesclearlythat“Europe must rapidly police andjudiciaryacross25MemberStates)thecomplexity ofdealingwith coordinationintheEUbetween agencies(such as environment andtheproblemof Department ofHomelandSecurity.” The chapter acknowledges thevery differentEU record-breaking investments indefenceandsecurity, andtheestablishmentofa security environment where ithas“ledtotheadoptionofanewsecurityconcept, T malevolently. developments makeiteasierfortechnological advancements to beused natural diffusionoftechnological know-how resulting fromscientificandindustrial other fieldsincreasesthevulnerability ofmodernsocieties. At thesametime, dependence oninterconnected infrastructures intransport, energy, informationand research. Itsuggests thatsuch research mustbe defined broadlyasthegrowing security ambitionstheUnionshouldbeinvesting considerably moreinsecurity T 3% spendingonR&DofallCommunityresearch spending. w € security andassuch shouldrequiresubstantialappropriateresources tothetuneof Its keyconclusionwas thatsecurityresearch isanessentialpillaroffutureEuropean T four DirectorsofResearch Institutes,andtwo MinistryofDefenceofficials. industry ChairmenandChiefExecutives, fourmembersoftheEuropeanParliament, Commissioner’s PhilippeBusquinandErkkiLiikanenincludedeightsecurity he secondchapter “Research and Technology –“force enablers”forasecure he chapter thenturnstoacomparisonwiththeUSresponsepost-9/11 he firstchapter ofthereportarguesthatinlightEU’s political,economicand he productofthegroup’s work was areportentitled“ 1 billion(reaching upto1.8billion)peryear. Whilst meetingEUsecurityneedsit ould alsohelptheEUmeetLisboneconomiccriteriaandBarcelona targetof Research foraSecure Europe.” increased spendingoncivil andmilitary securityresearch withaparticularfocuson: T To achieving cost-effective solutions.” exacerbate thelack ofpublicresearch fundingandpresentmajorobstaclesto Member Statesandthelack ofcoordinationbetweennationalandEuropeanefforts security research at theEuropeanlevel, thelimitedcooperation betweenthe between defenceandcivil research funding,theabsenceofspecificframeworks for increases costsandleadstoinefficiencies.Itgoesonnotethat“thedividing line w But thereportiscriticaloffragmented natureofthedefenceindustrialsector only enhancesecuritybutalsocontributetoEUproductivity andgrowth.” and telecommunication. Targeted research investment intheseareaswillthereforenot that “Europehasworld-class industrialexpertiseinpharmaceuticals,bio-technology specialises inthedefence,aeronautic,spaceandprofessionalelectronics,” italsonotes segment ofthatindustrialbaseby statingthat“asignificantpartofthisindustrialbase institutes andstrongindustrialbase. Although thereportchooses tofocusuponone technological requirementsinrespondingtosecurity, duetoitshighqualityresearch c excellence inresearch isaprerequisitefortheabilitytotackle thenewsecurity T hallenges.” ItsuggeststhatEuropeisinagoodpositiontorespondthe his chapter alsostatesthat“intoday’s technology-driven andknowledge-based world, he thirdchapter “Towards aEuropeanSecurityResearch Programme” callsfor hich means thattheabsenceofasinglecustomerwithsetrequirements

ove • for the EUmissions’outsidethe Unionforpeacekeeping, conflict • theprotectionofMemberState territory, sovereignty, domesticpopulation 7. Creating institutionalarrangements thatarebothefficientandflexible 6. Providing specific legalconditionsandfundinginstrumentsforsecurity- Full exploitationofpotentialsynergiesbetweendefence,securityand civil 5. 4. Sufficientfunding; Systematic analysisofsecurity-related capabilityneeds,fromcivil security 3. 2. Effective coordinationbetweennationalandEuropeanefforts; 1. Involvement ofallMember States; principles ofthe UnitedNationsCharter. prevention andstrengthening internationalsecurityinaccordance withthe and criticalinfrastructure againsttransnational threats, and to involve otherpartnerswithmutualbenefits. enough tocombinetheeffortsofMemberStatesandCommunity, and related research attheEUlevel; research; to defence; r come thislack ofcoherencethereportprovides seven recommendations: 24 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 25 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 forces. frameworks toward creatingbothuseable andlargernumbersofdeployable armed the pressureismountingin both theEUandNATO tomove beyond policy afford, tofundamentallyundermine theirshareddesiretoachieve thisbalance,but their securityobjectives. NeithertheUSnorEuropeans seemready, nor canthey them toprojecttheirforces inatimelymanner, ifnecessarywithpartnerstomeet for Europeanstoinvest inkeyenablingandinteroperability capabilities topermit threats andchallenges (acritiqueoftheRevolution inMilitary Affairs Debate)and restraining itstendenciestoseektechnological-solutions tointernationalsecurity (and perhapseven lesssoafterIraq). The balanceisneeded bothfortheUSin and technologies thatwillmakeco-operation withkeyEuropeanpartnersimpossible and asyet theUShasshown nosignsofwanting tocompletelycreateforce postures internationally withtheUSandothers. The politicalconcernisalongstandingone European defencemarketisnecessaryifEuropetobeable tosurvive andcompete defence-industrial concernsfromkeyareaswithinEurope’s defenceindustrythata capabilities willleave Europeansbehindasmarginalsecuritypartnersandb) political concernsinEuropethatUStechnological applicationstodefence T 6. The TransatlanticFramework increase inspendingcouldleadtoreducedoverall costs. homeland securityisimportantforpoliticiansandasthereportpointsout,an the majornetcontributorstoincreaseEU’s budgetandcompetingpriorities.But increased budgetforsecurityR&D. This willbevery difficultgiven thereluctanceof T report. the reportalthoughmilitarydimensionisrather neglectedinthebulkof and theUnion. The importanceofdefencecapabilitiesisraised toward theendof security asapriorityandcallsforincreasedcoordinationbetweentheMemberStates including thosesetoutintheESS.Itemphasisesneedtofocusuponinternal globalised world, andwhere therearenewopportunitiesbutalsodangers internal-external boundariesareblurred,inwhich Europeisaglobalactorin security/defence research onthebasisofaholisticunderstandingsecurity, where T GDP investment inResearch, assetatLisbon andBarcelona. contribution thisbudgetwould makeinhelpingtheEUachieve itstargetfora3%of progressively increase itfurther, ifappropriate.” A clearlinkismadeinthe T he transatlantic framework forsuch discussionsoftencomesintwo formsa) here remainstheproblemofsecuringsupportfromMemberStatesforan he minimumrecommendedbudgetis1billioneuros“withthepossibilityto he reportmakesapowerful caseforEuropeanCommissionspendingon account when consideringthefutureofEuropeandefencemarket. otherwise inEU-USeconomicandmarketrelationsshouldbealsotakeninto realisation oftheinterdependence Transatlantic marketandprogressor narrower concernsofsomethatseeklabelssuch as“strategic industry.” Likewisea ESDP tobestrengthenedandrespondsecuritypolicy objectives, rather thanthe Commission isenteringneedstotreadcarefullyamongthesedifferentconcernsfor American defenceprocurementcontracts. The defence-industriallandscapethatthe defence companiesandUSreluctancetoallow Europeanfirmstocompetefor existence. Itisfurthercomplicatedby theinternationalisednatureofsomelarger w international competition,othersdonotandworry thatsuch aEuropeanmarket the industryconsiderthataEuropeanmarketwould offerthemafirmbasisfor T difficulties in achieving securityarrangements tosupportan inter-institutional A keyobstacle for developing EU-NATO relationsataworking level hadbeenthe defence procurement. considering oneoftheEDA’s mandatesisto tackle fragmentation in European C3 Agency. Itwillbeinterestingto seehow the EDA-NATO relationshipevolves maintenance andsupplyagency, theresearch andtechnology agency andtheNATO a seriesof Agencies includingNATO Standardisation Agency, theNATO Investment Division, intheSecurityInvestment Directorate atNATO HQ, aswell experience todraw uponintheprocurementsphereincludingDefence w W Prague CapabilitiesCommitmentidentifiedeightspecificcapabilitypackages: defence transformation process,itisstillstrugglingtomeetcommitments. The Although NATO hasalongertradition ofdealingwiththecapabilitygeneration and 7. EU-NATO he defenceindustrialconcernisequallycomplexbecausewhilst somesectorsof ould endtheirprivileged relationshipswithnationalgovernments thatensuretheir orking much morecloselyonacommoncapabilityagenda.NATO alsohas ith somuch overlap, itremainsunsatisfactorythattheEUandNATO arenot • Increasedeployable combatservicesupportby 2005. • Reductioninair-to-air refuellingby 2005; • Reductioninoutsizedairliftby 2004; • ReductioninSEADshortfallby 2005/additionalsupportjamming; • IncreaseofPGMsby 2005; • Deployable andsecureC3foralldeployable HQ; Alliance ground surveillance• systemdesigndeveloped by theendof2004; • Chemical, biological,radiological andnuclear(CBRN)defenceforall deployable forces; 26 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 27 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 engaged.” The original‘BerlinPlus’comprisedfourprinciplesthatincluded: arrangements would cover “…operations inwhich the Alliance asawhole isnot European SecurityandDefencePolicy. The Washington communiquésaidthese provision was extended forEU-ledCrisisManagementOperations underthe bid toboostEuropeandefencewithinNATO. At the1999 Washington Summitthis foreign ministersagreedtomakeNATO assetsavailable to WEU-led operations ina NA Plus’ hasbecomeatermthatsymbolisesallisgoodandbadaboutrecentEU- relationship, which has cometobeknown as‘BerlinPlus’forshorthand. that was necessaryto formalise thisrelationshiparrived withthe12 March 2003 manner inwhich NATO makesavailable itsassets. The finalinstitutional agreement and NATO thatenablethem toexchange informationsecurelyandto establish the ‘Berlin Plus’isalso,therefore, a seriesofinstitutionalarrangements betweentheEU provide for: concluded onthemarginsofBrusselsCouncil. Those agreementsspecifically Adeal,originally, brokeredby theUKand series ofEU-NATO agreements. T formalising thisagreementduetoblocking manoeuvresby, alternatively, Greeceand Between 1999andDecember2002,theEUNATO wereprevented from urkey. Eventually agreementwas reached inDecember2002which ledtoafurther TO • adaptation oftheNATO defenceplanningsystem toincorporate the • NATO EuropeancommandoptionsforEU-ledoperations, including • availability totheEuropeanUnionofNATO capabilities andcommon • assuredEUaccesstoNATO operational planning; • • EU-NATO consultation arrangements inthecontextofanEU-ledCMO terms ofReferenceforDSACEUR• andtheEuropeanCommandOptionsfor procedures forRelease,Monitoring,ReturnandRecallofNATO• Assets and • availability ofNATO assetsandcapabilitiesforEU-ledCMO • • aNATO-EU Security Agreement; av Commander, Europe(DSACEUR); and developing theEuropeanroleofNATO’s DeputySupreme Allied assets; Requirements. arrangements forcoherentand mutuallyreinforcing Capability making useofNATO assetsandcapabilities; NATO; Capabilities (known asthe“ModelContract”); Management Operations (CMO); assured Access toNATO planningcapabilitiesforEU-ledCrisis

relations. Itsoriginsrefertothe1996NATO MinisterialinBerlin,where ailability offorces forEUoperations. technology trap andthetechnology gapinordertohave abalancedpolicy. properly integrated. Onecannotdominate theotherbutthereisaneedtoavoid the management capabilitiesonemustaskthequestionwhether thesetwo processesare technologies ofthefutureavailable tobeintegrated intodefenceorcrisis Commission issimultaneouslyfundingresearch inareasthatwillproduce inform decisionmakersonkey“defencecapability”choices forthefuture andthe Considering thattheagency islookingtothefutureinitsanalysisbeyond 2010to the ESSasmainreferencepointfortheirobjectives insupportofsecuritypolicy. W Assessment w Agency andtheCommission’s GreenpaperonprocurementandPreparatory Action v the capabilitydevelopment processandinturndeveloping relationsbetweenthe and regionally. This couldatleastturntogreaterinter-institutional co-ordinationon real capabilitiesthatcanmakethemkeysecuritypartnersatalllevels internationally develop therightframework forEuropeanstotransform theirdefencestoproduce SFOR to ALTHEA), asitorientstowards Afghanistan andtheMiddleEast,buttohelp not justtosupportNATO’s extraction fromthelegacy operations intheBalkans(from Nevertheless, onecannothelpobservingthat‘BerlinPlus’couldbebettermobilised accepted withsilentapproval fromtheUSonbasisofUKreassurances. of Tevuren. After someconsiderable diplomaticwrangling, theideawas finally for anindependentEUoperational headquarterstobesetupintheBrusselssuburb Iraq war when France, Germany, Belgiumand Luxembourgtookthestepofcalling determination tokeepESDPweddedNATO. These tensionsincreasedduringthe desire tohave afullyautonomous ESDPandthose,ledby theUK,witha T assets andplanningresources. the EUtolaunch Operation Concordiaon31March 2003which requiredNATO Representative and NATO’s SecretaryGeneral dated17March 2003-justintimefor Agreement” which consistedofanexchange oflettersbetweentheEU’s High ‘Berlin Pluspackage’ couldthenbetiedtogetherwiththeso-called“Framework “EU-NATO Agreement onSecurityofInformation”(including18articles). The whole arious NATO agenciesworking oncapabilityanddefenceinvestment andthenew here haslongbeenanunderlyingtensionbetweenthose,ledby France, holdinga ork. ithin theEUbothhighlevel reportandthepreparingEDA draw upon 28 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 29 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 and thework mustbe“mainstreamed” beyond theDefenceCapability Directorate being developed intheEuropean Defence Agency butthere isnoroomforhesitancy environment; sofarsuch anapproach hasbeenincorporated into earlyconcepts strategic objectives, civil-military needsandrespondtoachanging security framework forassessingcapabilitiesandarmaments policy mustbebased upon disconnected atatimeofchanging institutional andlegalcompetencies. Any new ignore thisinitsbidtodevelop mechanisms andprocesses,which appear on adiscussionaboutstrategic interestsand securityrequirements. The EUmust not capability needsbasednotonly ondefenceindustrialpolicy, butalsoincreasingly national level hasdeveloped asophisticatedapproach ofdiscussingmilitary more fromtheUnionbasedupon“mythical efficientprocurement.” However, the has beenadifficultprocessatthenationallevel anditwould beunfairto expect effective securitypolicy supportedby appropriatedefencepolicy andcapabilities budget/technology/industry trap alone.Cooperation isessential.Butthepursuitof in securityresearch andprocurement.NoMemberStateiscapableoftackling the equipment. There isalsorecognition ofthebenefitstobegainedfromsharingcosts that toomuch moneyisbeingwasted onconscriptarmiesandout-of-date the institutions,may begettingseriousaboutdefence. There isa broadrecognition T unstable regionsandendupfuellingconflicts. to propupthedefenceindustrialsectorandover-supply ofexportsaredumpedon for awasteful common agricultural policy-for-defence –where EUsubsidiesareused Furthermore, ifthiscross-pillaraspectisnotaddresseditmighteven pave theway making realEU-UNambitionsfor“Bridgingforces” oreven “StandByforces.” av planners canmove forward andprovide credibleanalysis onthetypesofcapabilities up itsinternationalresponsibilitiesmappedoutintheESS. This istheonlyway force aspect forthenewdebateinunderstandinghow crediblytheEUisplanningtotake meet theneedforconcurrent,sustainable,andprojectableforces. This isacritical Member States’commitmentstoproviding sufficienttroopsandcapabilitiesthatcan make progressonitskeybenchmarks notleastdeveloping scenariosthattest now needstotakeitsgeneral statementsunderthenewHeadlineGoal2010and the demandsofbeingaglobalstrategic actorwithacommondefencepolicy, theEU approaches, such asMemberStateengagementatthenationallevel. Inadaptingto strategic actorandwhat it needsfromanESDP, willcomplementpresentbottom-up process. EngaginginabroaderdebateabouttheroleandfutureofEUas Europe’s futurecapabilityneedsinordertoinfluencethecurrentprocurement term analyticalperspective iscritical. We needtoasktherightquestionsabout security andcapabilitiesisthepointofanalysisfortwo ventures thenalonger- It willbeamajorchallenge toachieve bothbettercoordinationandcoherence.If Conclusion here aresomepositive signsthatatlasttheMemberStatesofEU,prodded by ailable fordifferentcrises,which inturncanprovide arealisticstartingpointfor Europe totakeupitsstatedinternational responsibilitiesandstrategic role. missed opportunitytofacilitate thedevelopment ofESDPinthefutureandfor strands ofEuropeandefenceandsecurity capabilitieswillrepresentasignificant the securityfieldisofcritical importance. Failure toachieve synergiesinthesetwo Commission’s investment thatwillshapethetypes oftechnology beingdeveloped in analysis ofcapabilityrequirementsfortoday, 2010andbeyond andthe unclear intheESS.Notleastrelationshipbetween Agency’s strategic vision, integrating thedifferentpolicy instrumentsandproviding clarityonconceptsleft institutions stillhave alongway togoinrefiningtheinstitutionalarchitecture, a securitystrategy andlaunched two militaryoperations, MemberStatesandtheEU But althoughexpectationsarerising,andeven iftheEuropeanCouncil has adopted Europe inthenextfewyears shouldalsobeaspurtocloserEuropeancooperation. defence White Paperdefence White to improve deployability andmobility. Proposals have beenmadeforaEuropean struggle toputmorethan150,000intothefieldatany onetime. There isaclearneed Member StatesoftheUnionhave over 1.2millionmenand women in uniformbut Defence transformation willbeakeyelement. The figuresarewellknown. The hitherto beenabsent. profound step-change inthelevel andintensityofdebateattheEUlevel thathas satisfying ahungrydefenceindustry? This questionmay provide theimpetusfora framework thatprovides forthegeneration ofdefencecapabilitiesaswell materials andweaponsofmassdestruction,theneedtodevelop astrategic immediate securitypressures,duetoconcernsover terrorismandtheproliferation of European Defence Agency withatiny budgetofferthis.How cantheEUcombine of theannouncementsa2010framework fortheBattleGroupsandaskeletal It remainstobeseenwhether thenewframework emergingduring2004intheform national defenceplanningandmanagement. opportunity tolearnfromtheexperiencesandlessonsofatleastfiftyyears of with shorttermandlongdefencetransformation needswillmarkamissed up strategic analysis(security, political,military, conflictaswelltechnological) European SecurityResearch Programme. The failuretorealisetheopportunitylink Agency andtheCommissionindeedinCommission’s own work tosetupa Directorates. Such mainstreaming mustalsobeextendedtodiscussionsbetweenthe and underpinallshorttermlongwork programmes ofthe Agency’s the newsecuritythreats. c W hange inapproach. PublicopinionalsoexpectstheEUtoacttogether intackling ith thenewConstitutional Treaty andtheESS,groundhasbeenpreparedfora 22 and anEUdefencestrategy. 24 T he decisionby theUStowithdraw 70,000troopsfrom 23 Both makeeminentsense. 30 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 31 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 16 SO207/04, PressRelease,Javier SolanaannouncedtheappointmentofChiefExecutive anddeputy 15 On theestablishment andlegalbasisofthe Agency seeQuille, G.andManca,D., “The European 14 ‘Draft CouncilJoint Action ontheestablishmentofaEuropeanDefence Agency (EDA)’, No.10450/04, 13 For the5February 2003Le Touquet Summitsee: 12 Ibid. 11 CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,ESDPPresidency Report,Brussels15June 2004.seeannex1‘Headline Clarke, M.,Garden, 10 T., &Quille,G.,“Achieving theHelsinkiHeadlineGoal,” CentreforDefenceStudies, 3 For3 areviewofthedefencepolicy andeconomicsoftheevolution ofESDPsinceSt.Malosee: Quille,G. 8 Quille, G.,“Makingmultilateralism matter; 8 The EUSecurityStrategy,” ESR,ISISEurope Solana, J.,‘EuropeanSecurityStrategy: 7 A SecureEuropeinaBetter World,’ December 2003,ISS-EU,Paris 6 The EuropeanUnion(EU)launched aMilitaryOperation intheDemocratic RepublicofCongo(DRC)in 5 The EuropeanUnionlaunched amilitaryoperation (Concordia)intheformer Yugoslav Republicof For2 areviewofthewiderpoliticalandeconomicbackground seeCameron F. (ed),T 1 2004/570/CFSP, CouncilJoint Action ontheEuropeanUnionmilitaryoperation inBosniaand 4 http://www 9 The SolanaPaper usesthefigure Fo & Mawdsley, J.“The EUSecurityStrategy: A newframework forESDPandequippingtheRapidReaction Nice, Europeandefence:coredocuments”,ChaillotP at: http://www the stabilizationofsecurityconditionsandimprovement ofthehumanitariansituationinBunia. ordination withtheUnitedNationsMissioninDRC(MONUC).Itwas aimed,inter alia, atcontributingto J of the August 2001OhridFramework Agreement. fYROM government, was tocontributefurtherastablesecureenvironment toallow theimplementation Macedonia (fYROM)on31March 2003. The core aimoftheoperation ,attheexplicitrequestof Herzegovina, 12July 2004,intheOfficialJournal oftheEuropeanUnion,L252/10,28July 2004. Integr 2004. at: www drawing uponNATO figureswhich areindollars). drawing onSIPRIandIISS,which may beduetoexchange rate differences (usuallyoccurringwhen 2003 LondonSummitsee:www Chief Executive ofthe EuropeanDefence Agency, Brussels30July 2004. Review Armaments Agency:Security A European VirtualReality”, Brussels, 11June 2004. http://www a UK‘Non-Paper’ focusingonimplementation entitled‘The roadto2010.’ ‘Towards a2010Headline Goal.’ This was furtherelaborated by anItalianpresidency Paper andagainby Goal 2010.’ The 2010HeadlineGoalprocesswas firstintroducedinaFrench ‘Non-paper’ entitled King’s CollegeLondon,November 2001. une 2003. The operation was code-named ARTEMIS. The Europeanmilitaryforce worked incloseco- r ce,” ISISReport ation andEnlargement .isis-europe.org .eurunion.org/legislat/Defense/LaekenESDP .diplomatie.gouv .iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf , December2003atwww ; CameronF., “EuropasneueSicherheitstrategie,” InternationaleP .fr/actu/bulletin.gb.asp?liste=20030205.gb.html (Routledge: 2004). .fco.go € 160 billion,slightlydifferentfigurescanbecalculatedfromthefigure v .uk/F .isis-europe.org iles/kfile/ UKF .pdf apers r . Seealso,From Rutten,M.“From St.Maloto , ISS,No.47May 2001. ance_DefenceDeclar No. 20,ISISEurope,January 2004. and forthe24November ation,0.pdf he FutureofEurope; , No.18July 2003, olitik , Spring 20 See theCommission’s newlyestablishedwebsitededicatedtotheissueofsecurityresearch withkey 19 See theCommission’s responseinitsCommunication,entitled“A coherentframework foraerospace-a Fully associatedmeaninginparticularwithaviewtoexchange18 information,assessments,andadvice, as Ibid. 2. 17 The Joint Action includes:‘The SteeringBoardshalltakedecisionsby qualifiedmajority. The votes 24 seethelastfive years ofEurobarometerpolls. 23 BertelsmannFoundation, Venusberg Report,May 2004&Quille,Mawdsley, op cit. 22 EUISSreportofMay 2004. 21 Research foraSecureEurope.EuropeanCommission.CommissionDecision(2004/213/EC), February 3 policy documents:http://europa.eu.int/comm/resear response totheSTAR 21Report,” October 2003. missions. appropriate, onmatterswhere activities andstrategies oftheCommissionhave abearingonthe Agency’s participating MemberStatesshalltakepartinthevote.’ least two-thirds ofthevotes oftheparticipatingMemberStates.Onlyrepresentatives ofthe European Union.Decisionstobeadoptedby theSteeringBoardby qualifiedmajorityshallrequireat of theparticipatingMemberStatesshallbeweightedinaccordancewith Article 23(2)ofthe Treaty on shall beappointedby adecisionoftheCommissionauthorisingofficerbasedoncallforapplications.” evaluation; andmonitoringofactivities includingtheoverall outcomeofthePreparatory Action. Experts independent expertstoassistinthedevelopment oftheEuropeanSecurityResearch Programme; proposal included thefollowing statementthatprovides thegroundforGoP:“The Commissionmay appoint potential inthefieldofsecurityresearch,’ OfficialJournal, L67/18(-22),5February 2004. The Decision 2004 ‘OntheImplementationofPreparatory Action ontheEnhancementof Europeanindustrial c h/security/news/article_682_en.html 32 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 32 The Future of CFSP - September 2004 16 SO207/04, PressRelease,Javier SolanaannouncedtheappointmentofChiefExecutive anddeputy 15 On theestablishmentandlegalbasisof Agency seeQuille,G.andManca,D., “The European 14 ‘Draft CouncilJoint Action ontheestablishmentofaEuropeanDefence Agency (EDA)’, No.10450/04, ttp://www 13 For the5February 2003Le Touquet Summitsee: 12 Ibid. 11 CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,ESDPPresidency Report,Brussels15June 2004.seeannex1‘Headline Clarke, M.,Garden, 10 T., &Quille,G.,“Achieving theHelsinkiHeadlineGoal,” CentreforDefenceStudies, 8 Quille, G.,“Makingmultilateralism matter; 8 The EUSecurityStrategy,” ESR,ISISEurope 9 The SolanaPaper usesthefigure 2004. at: www drawing uponNATO figureswhich are indollars). drawing onSIPRIandIISS,which may beduetoexchange rate differences (usuallyoccurringwhen 2003 LondonSummitsee:www Chief Executive oftheEuropeanDefence Agency, Brussels30July 2004. Review Armaments Agency:Security A European VirtualReality”, Brussels, 11June 2004. http://www a UK‘Non-Paper’ focusingonimplementationentitled‘The roadto2010.’ ‘Towards a2010HeadlineGoal.’ This was furtherelaborated by anItalianpresidency Paper andagainby Goal 2010.’ The 2010HeadlineGoalprocesswas firstintroducedinaFrench ‘Non-paper’entitled King’s CollegeLondon,November 2001. .iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf .isis-europe.org .diplomatie.gouv ; CameronF., “EuropasneueSicherheitstrategie,” InternationaleP .fr/actu/bulletin.gb.asp?liste=20030205.gb.html .fco.go € 160 billion,slightlydifferentfigurescanbecalculatedfromthefigure v .uk/F iles/kfile/ UKF r ance_DefenceDeclar No. 20,ISISEurope,January 2004. and forthe24November ation,0.pdf , No.18July 2003, olitik , Spring Mission Statement

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