Sample Chapter

Contents

List of Illustrative Material ix Preface to the Second Edition x List of Abbreviations xv

1 Introduction: CSDP – A ‘Work in Progress’ 1 Security and Defence Policy: A Special Work in Progress 2 The Saint-Malo Revolution 7 Controversial Origins 14 Misleading Allegations 15 The Fundamental Drivers behind CSDP 21 Public Policy and Public Opinion 25 The Basic Structure of the Book 26

2 Decision-Making: The Political and Institutional Framework 33 The Pre-Saint-Malo Framework 35 The Post-Saint-Malo Institutions 40 The Post-Lisbon Institutions 49 Conclusion 67

3 The Instruments of Intervention: Generating Military and Civilian Capacity 70 Transforming EU Military Capabilities 73 From Headline Goal 2010 to Pooling, Sharing and Specialization? 83 The European Defence Agency 91 The Contentious Issue of Operational Headquarters 96 Civilian Crisis Management: The Continuation of Politics by Other Means? 97 Conclusion 107

4 Selling it to Uncle Sam: CSDP and Transatlantic Relations 109 US Reactions to CSDP 110 European Approaches to the NATO–CSDP Realtionship 117 The CSDP–NATO Relationship: Zero or Positive Sum? 129 CSDP and NATO after Libya and Afghanistan 137 Conclusion 141

vii

5 The EU as an Overseas Crisis Management Actor 144 CSDP Military Operations 154 Non-Military Missions 168 Monitoring and Assistance Missions 174 Rule of Law Missions 177 Border Assistance Missions 180 Scholarly Analyses 182 Conclusion 187

6 Empirical Reality and Academic Theory 190 Applying Theory to CSDP 192 Substantive Theories 193 Methodological Approaches 205 Alternative Theoretical/Methodological Approaches 211 Conclusion 214

7 Conclusion: The Major Challenges Ahead 216 A Grand Strategy for CSDP 217 Forging an EU Strategic Culture 233 Concluding Thoughts: The Challenges Ahead 242

Bibliography 247 Index 291

Chapter 1 Introduction: CSDP – A ‘Work in Progress’

The notion of a ‘work in progress’ is particularly appropriate for Europe’s efforts to emerge as a security actor. The phrase was used by James Joyce as the working title of his novel, serialized over 20 years and eventually published in 1939 as Finnegan’s Wake. In it, he insisted on the interplay between the conscious and the unconscious in his unprecedented attempt to break with literary tradition and to create an entirely new literary paradigm, appropriate for the twentieth century. Unconsciously, or semi- consciously, Europeans are moving towards a new security paradigm. They have not yet achieved full consciousness of where they are trying to go or what they are seeking to achieve. They have been conscious since the immediate aftermath of the Second World War that the guarantee of their collective security hangs in an uncomfortable balance between dependence and autonomy, between the hand of fate and freedom of manoeuvre. Between 1949 and 1989, dependence and fate held Europe’s security hostage to the imponderables of the American nuclear umbrella in a standoff with the Soviet Union based on ‘mutual assured destruction’. ‘Defence’ was an existential zero-sum game. There was little space for autonomy or freedom of manoeuvre. At the same time, unconsciously, Europeans have sought, in a variety of ways, to create a new practice in international relations, to break with a murderous past which dictated the course of war and peace in depressingly stark realist terms ever since Thucydides first noted that ‘the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must’. Europeans have long sought, often only semi- consciously or experimentally, to transcend the zero-sum logic of ‘defence’ and to embrace ‘security’ as a positive-sum game (I cannot feel secure so long as my neighbour feels insecure). Charles de Gaulle, the very incarnation of France’s resistance against the German occupation, embraced Franco-German reconciliation as the surest way of breaking the vicious circle of war and revenge. This was an unparalleled act of states- manship. The entire story of European integration is one of inchoate and experimental efforts to transcend the Westphalian iron-law of sovereignty (see Box 1.1). For the first time in human history, a number of sovereign states elected to gamble on the semi-conscious proposition that the whole would prove to be preferable to the sum of the parts. The EU is still fully engaged in that original ‘work in progress’.

2 Security and Defence Policy in the European Union

Box 1.1 The Westphalian System

The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) ended the Thirty Years War, and posits four basic principles:

1. the principle of the sovereignty of nation-states and the associated fundamental right of political self-determination; 2. the principle of (legal) equality between nation-states; 3. the principle of internationally binding treaties between states; 4. the principle of non-intervention of one state in the internal affairs of other states.

For these reasons, the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) is crucial in the history of international relations. It formed the basis for the modern international system of sovereign nation-states. It marked the beginning of an international community of law between states of equal legal standing, guaran- teeing each other their independence and the right of their peoples to political self-determination.

For over 40 years (1957–99), the European Union remained an essen- tially ‘civilian’ actor. By this expression, scholars have indicated the Union’s focus on the core policy areas of trade and economics, its existence as an institutions-driven project rooted in international law, and its total absence from the arena of military ambition or coercive diplomacy (Whitman 1998; Manners 2005; Telo 2007). These features lay at the heart of the original EU work in progress. To the extent to which the member states attempted, from the 1970s onwards, to coordinate their foreign policy preferences and maximize their coherence, this was essen- tially done through the relatively informal channels of European Political Cooperation (EPC – Nuttall 1992) in which consensus-seeking and lowest common denominator decision-making were the order of the day. EPC, it should be stressed, took place entirely outside the formal institutions of the EU and never ventured into the world of security and defence. The latter, throughout the Cold War, was considered to be the exclusive domain of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On this, there was simply no discussion.

Security and Defence Policy: A Special Work in Progress

The security and defence dimension of European integration has recently emerged alongside and within the broader EU story as a somewhat separate work in progress, once again mixing the conscious and the unconscious. Its main chapters have been written since the fall of the Berlin

Introduction: CSDP – A ‘Work in Progress’ 3

Wall, but its earliest manifestations predate 1989. In one of the first published studies of what eventually became CSDP, I noted that: ‘the story of European integration began with defence’ (Howorth 2000: 1). This story chronicles the European Union’s constantly frustrated attempts to forge a coordinated defence capacity, beginning with the negotiation of the Franco-British Treaty of Dunkirk (1947), via tentative plans for a Western Union (1947–8), through the Brussels Treaty (1948), the European Defence Community (EDC 1950–4), the Fouchet Plan (1962), the relaunch of the Western European Union (WEU 1973). All these early efforts were couched within the stark context of the Cold War and constituted largely hypothetical – and ultimately unworkable – alter- natives to outright dependence on the USA (Howorth and Menon 1997; Duke 2000; Andréani et al. 2001; Cogan 2001; Quinlan 2001; Duke 2002; Hunter 2002; Salmon and Shepherd 2003; Bonnén 2003; Dumoulin et al. 2003; Mérand 2008). That Europe should have sought to maximize its own inherent security and defence capabilities seems logical enough. Why then did all the above attempts fail? At this point, suffice it to say that the most significant factor which stymied these early efforts was the contradiction between the respective positions of France and the UK. For 50 years (1947–97), Britain and France effectively stalemated any prospect of serious European cooperation on security issues by their contradictory inter- pretations of the likely impact in Washington of the advent of serious European military muscle. Elsewhere, I have called this the Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma (Howorth 2005b). London tended to fear that if Europe demonstrated genuine ability to take care of itself militarily, the US would revert to isolationism. The British fears were exacerbated by a belief in London that the Europeans on their own would never be able to forge a credible autonomous defence (Croft et al. 2001). Paris, on the other hand, expressed confidence that the US would take even more seriously allies who took themselves seriously. Both approaches were based on speculation and on normative aspirations rather than on hard strategic analysis. Yet as long as France and Britain, Europe’s only two serious military powers, remained at loggerheads over the resolution of the Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma, impasse reigned. At the height of the Cold War, the security and defence dimension of the work in progress failed even to get off the ground. However, the 1980s began to see the emergence of a trans-European self-awareness – positing an alternative to the harsh dichotomies of the superpower nuclear stand-off. Change came, crucially, from the UK. Even a man as solidly anchored in the Atlanticist tradition as the then British foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, reacted negatively to American unilateral sabre-rattling during the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) crisis of 1980–4 (Nuti 2008), and raised eyebrows within the international relations community by proposing the establishment of

4 Security and Defence Policy in the European Union

Box 1.2 The Western European Union

The Western European Union arose from the Treaty of Brussels in 1948 as a body designed to coordinate the defence policies of the five signatory countries (UK, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg). It was effectively superseded by NATO in 1949 as a significant defence organization, but was relaunched when Germany and Italy joined NATO in 1955 as an oversight organization to monitor compliance (especially German) with the terms of the Treaty. It became an organization grouping members of the EU which were also NATO members, but remained relatively dormant until it was ‘re-activated’ in the 1980s (Deighton 1997). Most of its activ- ities were effectively phased out in 1999 and transferred to the EU. It passed into history in June 2011. a distinctive European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance (Howe 1984–5). Three years later, at The Hague, the recently ‘revitalized’ Western European Union (WEU – see Box 1.2) stated in a landmark policy document that European integration would never be complete until it had been ‘extended to the fields of security and defence’ (WEU 1988). Meanwhile, Europe’s peoples had begun manifesting a desire to move beyond the Cold War (Thompson 1982) and to bring about transcontinental reconciliation from below (Kaldor 1991). These pre- 1989 manifestations of European awakening all delivered the same basic message: Europe was beginning to assert its intention to assume greater control over its own security fate (Howorth 1986/7). Actors may not have been conscious of the precise outlines of the final destination, but they were increasingly certain that they wished to make the trip. In the years prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the work in progress finally began to emerge. From the very outset, the challenge proved to be huge. The Berlin Wall fell on 9 November 1989. The prospect of German unification and its potential implications instantly constituted another huge conscious/ unconscious element in the EU’s overall work in progress. Within months, the Union was announcing a new project: a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Holland 1997; Regelsberger et al. 1997; Sjursen and Peterson 1998). This was the price demanded of France by Germany for acquiescing in the parallel – largely French-driven – project for a single currency and a European Central Bank. What it implied was that, whereas previously France had dominated European politics and Germany had called the economic and monetary shots, henceforth there was to be greater joint European leadership over both policy areas. For a brief moment, some believed in the advent of a consensual ‘new world order’ (Bush and Scowcroft 1998), or even in the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama 1992). The talk was of peace dividends and the worldwide

Introduction: CSDP – A ‘Work in Progress’ 5 triumph of liberal democracy. Such sentiments sat well with the new paradigm in international relations which the European integration story had always sought to epitomize: multilateralism and the rule of law. But the ideal of the new world order was not to last. Within nine months of the fall of the Berlin Wall, Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait, provok- ing the first major interstate military confrontation since the end of the Vietnam War. In late 1990, a coalition force of some 550,000 troops from 30 countries mustered in Saudi Arabia to drive the Iraqi President out of Kuwait. The 1991 Gulf War confronted EU member states with a triple challenge. First, since the CFSP was barely even in gestation, there was simply no prospect of devising a common EU approach. Secondly, therefore, each member state had to decide for itself whether to join the US-led coalition or to stand on the sidelines. This produced predictable internal divisions: nine member states participated in the coalition (Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK) although only the UK, France and Italy provided combat forces. Germany, Ireland and Luxembourg did not take part, although Germany contributed cash. Third, those that joined the war had to face up to the reality of their own military inadequacy. All European militaries, with the partial exception of the UK, realized, in February–March 1991, just how dependent they were on US military technology, and how ineffective and indeed inappropriate their own armed forces were for the type of post-Cold War ‘crisis management’ epitomized by the coalition against Saddam Hussein. The EU’s task of emerging as a security actor was already proving to be daunting. There was worse to come. The CFSP was set in motion at the Maastricht European Council in December 1991 at precisely the moment when Yugoslavia was breaking apart. What soon became known as the ‘Wars of Yugoslav Succession’ (1991–9) constituted the first direct security challenge facing the infant EU in the post-Cold War world. War (both interstate and civil), accompanied by concentration camps, ethnic cleansing and civilian massacres, had once again reared their heads in a continent convinced it had transcended such barbarity. The violence which engulfed former Yugoslavia was a wake-up call for the whole of Europe. War, it seemed, far from disappearing with the fall of the Berlin Wall, was as present as ever in a world where ethnic tensions, border disputes and strategic rivalries had, from 1949 to 1989, merely been suspended in the permafrost of superpower confrontation. The EU, far from being able to assume the challenge of containing this new threat – as many assumed it could and should – proved, on the contrary, to be incapable of action. Yet former Yugoslavia was not just another ‘far- away country of which we know nothing’, to adapt Neville Chamberlain’s 1938 phrase about Czechoslovakia. It lay inside the very boundaries of the European Union, bordered to the South by Greece, to

6 Security and Defence Policy in the European Union the north by Austria and to the West by Italy. But European military forces were poorly configured to intercede or to project power even as far as the Balkans. They had been designed to stop Soviet divisions on the North European plain. The United States possessed power projection of the requisite type, but a variety of US presidents echoed the view expressed by Secretary of State James Baker: ‘we don’t have a dog in that fight’ (Baker 1995). Out of this Balkan dilemma was born the first serious post-Cold War chapter in the EU’s security work in progress. It was called the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and it was intended to allow European forces, in crisis situations of little or no interest to the US, to borrow American military assets via NATO. What ESDI implied was that the EU would seek to organize its security arrangements entirely within the NATO framework, based on European-only forces, a European-only command chain, and complex arrangements for borrowing essential assets from the Alliance (in effect, from the US). The buzz-word for this arrangement was ‘separable but not separate’, a formula which consciously eschewed any suggestion of autonomy – the cardinal feature of what later became CSDP (Bensahel 1999). The object of the ESDI exercise was to provide for circumstances – of which the Bosnian war in the early 1990s was a prime example – where the EU needed to (and wished to) deploy military force, but in which the US did not wish to be directly involved. It was a reasonably sensible idea, but it did not work in practice. There were two principal reasons for this. The first was that the formal arrangements under which the EU might be able to borrow crucial military assets from NATO, and presumably to return them, were felt to be unsatisfactory for both parties. The second reason was that the identification of the WEU as the pivotal structure at the heart of such arrangements was an understandable but ultimately misguided choice. It was understandable in that the WEU was the only existing security structure which acted as an interface between the EU and NATO. But it was misguided in that the WEU was too weak politically, too insignificant militarily and too unwieldy insti- tutionally to be able to carry out the major responsibilities which were being thrust upon it (Howorth and Keeler 2003). The ESDI project reached its high point at a joint meeting of NATO defence ministers in Berlin in June 1996, at which the broad outlines of the procedures for allowing EU access to NATO assets were first discussed. Thereafter, seemingly interminable allied negotiations around the fine print became known as ‘Berlin Plus’ and were revisited after the creation of CSDP in the 2000s (see p. 78). One other idea was floated in the late 1990s to try to get round the unfortunate problem, which ESDI did nothing to resolve, that the EU, despite its embryonic CFSP, simply had no institutional mechanisms to take political decisions on security or defence policy and precious little usable military equipment. A proposal was formulated, initially by

Introduction: CSDP – A ‘Work in Progress’ 7

France and Germany but eventually sponsored by eight other nations, which foresaw the integration of the WEU into the EU (EU-WEU 1997). This was intended to short-circuit the political incapacity of the WEU to handle broader defence policy issues, but it ultimately proved a half- measure, designed partly to get around the UK’s continued opposition to any suggestion that the EU itself should take on a security and defence remit. The EU-WEU merger plan was tabled at the Amsterdam European Council in June 1997. One of Tony Blair’s first political acts was to use the UK veto to kill it off. But Blair was acting on briefings prepared for the outgoing Conservative government of John Major, his New Labour government not yet having found the time to address security or defence policy. When it did get around to thinking about these issues, as we shall see, major change was about to happen. Meanwhile, storm clouds were mustering around the EU’s entire periphery, from the Maghreb to Kosovo, from the Caucasus to the Baltic. The US was preoccupied elsewhere. Europe, ultimately, had little choice but to assume responsibility for the stabilization of its hinterland.

The Saint-Malo Revolution

Around three o’clock in the morning on Friday 4 December 1998, officials of the French and British governments slipped under the bedroom doors of President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Tony Blair, both fast asleep in the French seaside town of Saint-Malo, a document which was to revolutionize both the theory and the practice of European security and defence and to give a considerable boost to the work in progress (Whitman 1999; Shearer 2000; Author’s interviews London and Paris 2000). The document had been written from scratch during the late after- noon and evening of 3 December by the Political Directors of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the French Quai d’Orsay, respectively Emyr Jones Parry and Gérard Erreira. The Saint-Malo Declaration (Box 1.3), as the text was to be known, initiated a new political process and a substantial new policy area for the European Union. The shift in UK policy was the most significant. Tony Blair jettisoned almost five decades of British opposition to the EU’s acquiring political capacity to develop a security and defence policy. The Saint-Malo Declaration broke three crucial logjams with respect to EU security. First, it stated that the European Union should have ‘the capacity for autonomous action’ in security and defence matters. This was an unprecedented and crucial breakthrough asserting the EU’s intention – and indeed right – to formulate policy independently of the US. The expectation at the time was that whatever policy might evolve would prove compatible with US preferences, but the assertion of autonomy constituted a powerful statement of principle. It removed the blockage

8 Security and Defence Policy in the European Union

Box 1.3 The Saint-Malo Declaration

British–French Summit St-Malo, 3–4 December 1998

JOINT DECLARATION

The Heads of State and Government of France and the United Kingdom are agreed that:

1. The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for action by the Union. It will be important to achieve full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP. This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP. The Council must be able to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of activity set out in Title V of the Treaty of European Union. 2. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. In pursuing our objective, the collective defence commitments to which member states subscribe (set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty) must be maintained. In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, → which, for decades, had prevented the EU from embarking on security and defence as a policy area and therefore from evolving and maturing as a policy actor. Secondly, the Declaration stated that the EU ‘must be given appropriate structures’ to take decisions and implement them. This was a call for new institutions which would allow the EU, for the first time ever, to make policy in the field of security and defence. Thirdly, it called for ‘credible military forces’ and ‘the means to decide to use them’ – potentially a major revolution in the Union’s military affairs. This new approach was rapidly named the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) and officials went to great lengths to differenti- ate it from ESDI, stressing the novelty of both political decision-making and autonomy – the latter applying both to politics and to military capacity. At this stage, CESDP was as much an aspiration as a reality, once again part of that work in progress which sought to move from the ‘unconscious’ (nobody in 1998–9 really had much idea how the project would work out in practice) to the ‘conscious’ (some kind of operational

Introduction: CSDP – A ‘Work in Progress’ 9

→ while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members. Europeans will operate within the institutional framework of the European Union (European Council, General Affairs Council, and meetings of Defence Ministers). The reinforcement of European solidarity must take into account the various positions of European states. The different situations of countries in relation to NATO must be respected. 3. In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO’s European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework). 4. Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology. 5. We are determined to unite in our efforts to enable the European Union to give concrete expression to these objectives.

Source: Rutten (2001: 8–9).

reality if not a definitive end-state). Within the course of its first year of existence, CESDP underwent an acronymic abbreviation. The word ‘Common’ was discreetly dropped – not as a political statement, but simply because the initial acronym was considered too long and unwieldy – and the project became know for the next decade as the European Security and Defence Policy. ESDP had the further quality of chiming with CFSP. The work in progress seemed to be coming along nicely. This book will chart in some detail the progress of that work throughout the decade between the important European Council meetings in Cologne (June 1999) and Helsinki (December 1999) – when some programmatic flesh was put on the bones of the Saint-Malo Declaration – and the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. During those years, real progress was made both in embedding institutions appropriate to decision-making and in cataloguing requirements for military and civilian deployments. Lisbon marks the next major chapter in our

10 Security and Defence Policy in the European Union work in progress in that it was assumed to constitute the final stage of institutional adjustment (the creation of the two key posts of High- Representative/Vice President of the Commission (HR-VP); Council President; and of the European External Action Service – EEAS: see pp. 62ff) as well as offering concrete measures designed to boost military capacity. At the same time, the acronym was changed once again, this time with the word ‘Common’ slipping back in and the word ‘European’ being removed as superfluous. From December 2009, the project has been called the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Thus, at different moments over a period of fifteen years, the same basic project has changed its name from ESDI to CESDP to ESDP to CSDP. For the sake of simplicity, I shall refer throughout the book to CSDP (except when stressing its difference with ESDI or quoting others). Considerable thought was devoted, towards the end of the 2000s, to defining the requirements for CSDP to become a consequential project in the international arena (Vasconcelos 2009; Grevi et al. 2009). Two main axes emerged. On the one hand, it was argued that far greater efforts were required in the area of military capacity (European Council 2008; Witney 2008; Giegerich & Nicoll 2008; Giegerich 2010; Biscop et al. 2011). On the other hand, it was felt that the EU needed to move beyond a reactive approach to its strategic environment and develop proactive strategic vision (European Council 2008a; Biscop et al. 2009; Howorth 2010). However, in the few years since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, little progress has been made in either of these areas. This book will end with CSDP still very much ‘in progress’ in that, at the time of writing (autumn 2013), the fruits of Lisbon were proving difficult to discern. The performance of the two top post-holders, particularly that of the HR-VP, was generally considered to have been less than stellar (Howorth 2011), the EEAS had yet to make its mark and the EU, despite 20 years of preparation after the Balkan fiasco of 1991, had once again proved incapable of action in the crisis over Libya. Some analysts began to feel that the work in progress was already over (Armellini 2011). The 2011 Libyan imbroglio offered yet another reminder that any hypothetical EU foreign and security policy (CFSP and/or CSDP) neither challenges nor supplants whatever national foreign and security policies the member states might continue to favour. That said, one has to ask how many of the 28 member states can be considered to possess distinctive national foreign and security policies whose reach extends much beyond their own immediate borders. Only a minority wield significant influence beyond that range. France and the UK have global interests and outreach; Portugal and Spain exercise a measure of impact in Latin America and parts of Africa; Germany has special relations with Eastern Europe, with Russia, and increasingly with the emerging powers Brazil, India and China. For most of the smaller member states, however, it is no secret that their diplomatic clout – hardly impressive on its own – can be

Index

A-400M transport aircraft, 82, 87 Atlanticism/Atlanticists, 3, 16, 18, 29, 30, Abbas, President Mahmoud, 173, 180 94, 109, 110, 118–20, 234, 239 Abkhazia, 177 atomic era, see nuclear weapons Aceh, see CSDP overseas missions Australia, 72, 217 Aegean Sea, 131 Austria, 6, 12, 13, 65, 76, 77, 85, 86, 91, Afghanistan, xi, 11, 12, 71, 95, 104, 105, 113, 120, 121, 160, 185, 224, 237, 107, 117, 119, 123, 124, 126, 132, 240 134–41, 144, 146, 147–9, 159, 160, autonomy, see CSDP 165, 168, 171, 173, 174, 183–7, 217, Aung San Suu Khi, 229 219, 221, 244 Aznar, José-Maria, 124 Africa, xii, 10, 11, 63, 96, 97, 103, 137, 144–7, 155–6, 160–3, 167, 168, 172, Bailes, Alyson, 227 175–6, 187, 188, 189, 216, 219, 225, Baker, James, 6 245 Bakoyannis, Dora, 58 African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), 125, balancing (against US), x, 15, 19–21, 54, 149, 153, 175–6 115, 125, 186, 193–5, 199 African Union, 164, 168, 175, 176 soft-balancing, 20, 194 Ahtisaari, Martti, 174 Balfour, Rosa, xiv, 64–7 air-to-air refuelling, 80, 83, 95 Balkans, xi, 6, 10, 11, 17, 23, 29, 50, 71, 76, aircraft carrier, 81, 82, 89 110, 122, 130, 136, 137, 145–50, Albania, 13, 155, 230 157, 158, 161, 169, 171, 178, 182, Albright, Madeleine, 20–1, 109, 111–14, 185, 187, 218 136 Western, 71, 103, 147, 149, 158, 171, Alema, Massimo d’, 58 187 Algeria, 202 Baltic/Baltic states, 7, 87, 90, 121, 239, 244 Alliances (military), 14, 90, 112, 115 Bamako, 167, 168 allies, xi, 3, 20, 32, 33, 72, 90, 109, 111–14, Banda Aceh, 174 126, 127, 134, 196, 229, 234 bandwagoning, 199 Al-Qaeda, 132, 146, 167, 190, 198, 219, Barnett, Thomas, 222 245 Barnier, Michel, 60 in the Islamic Maghreb, 167 Barroso, José Manuel, 57, 60, 61, 62 AMISOM, see Somalia Bàtora, Josef, 93–94 Amsterdam, Treaty of (1997), 7, 8, 36, 39, Battle groups, 81, 83–4, 90, 119, 182 121 behaviourism, 214 Anna, Kofi, 155 Belgium, 4, 5, 13, 20, 26, 28, 53, 75, 76, 77, Aquinas, Thomas, 23 82, 84, 85, 86, 124, 160, 172, 185, Arab Spring, xi, 12, 30, 60, 146, 216, 219, 224, 228, 240 230, 245 Berenskoetter, Felix, 122–3 arms control, 217 Berlin Plus (arrangements), 6, 76–8, 96, 119, Arnould Claude France, xiv, 92, 95 131–2, 135, 155, 157, 164 Art, Robert, xiv, 20–1 ‘reverse Berlin Plus’, 135 ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Berlin Wall (fall of), 4, 5, 22, 111, 190, 194, Nations), 164, 174, 175 243 Ashdown, Paddy, 169, 170, 171 Biehl, Heiko, 237–40 Ashton, Catherine, xi, xii, 25, 38, 50, 55, bipolarity, 217, 243 57–67, 96, 138 Bildt, Carl, 58 Asia, xi, 63, 72, 85, 107, 109, 111, 113, Biscop, Sven, xiv, 88 129, 134, 139, 147, 148, 187, 219, Black Sea, 244 225, 226, 243 Blair, Tony, 7–9, 16, 19, 22–3, 55, 59, 78, Assad, Bashar al-, 245 96, 98, 112, 114, 118, 200, 213, Asseburg, Muriel, 184–5 230 Atlantic Alliance, see NATO Boin, Arje, 187

291

292 Index

Bolton, John, 116 139–41, 165, 189, 193, 195, 198, border assistance missions, see CSDP 213, 217, 226, 235, 244 overseas missions Combat Search and Rescue, 80 Bosnia-Herzegovina, xi, 6, 19, 22, 23, 105, Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), 28, 76 121, 123, 126, 130–3, 135, 136, 145, Command and Control (arrangements), 76, 148–9, 157, 168–70, 185, 213 90, 100, 112, 155, 164 Bosnian War, 6, 19, 123, 126, 169 Commissioner for External Relations, see EU Brantner, Franziska, 61 Commission Brazil, xi, 10, 72, 85, 217 Committee for Civilian Crisis Management Britain (Great), see United Kingdom (CIVCOM), 40, 48–9, 101, 102, 203 Brok, Elmar, 62 Committee of Permanent Representatives Brown, Gordon, 59, 160 (COREPER), 37, 43, 69, 203 Brussels, Treaty of (1948), 3, 4, 8, 41, Common Agricultural Policy, 227, 235 Brusselsization, 51, 69 Common Foreign and Security Policy Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 116 (CFSP), 4, 5, 8–11, 14, 36–40, 49–51, Bulgaria, 13, 77, 86, 240 56, 63, 65, 69, 97–8, 106, 108, 178, Bunia (DRC), 155–6, 183 203–6, 214, 227, 243, 246 burden-sharing, 110, 136, 137, 260, 262, Common Security and Defence Policy 268, 273 (CSDP) Bush, President George H.W., 20, 22, 29, autonomy (EU ambitions for), 1, 6–8, 22, 109, 29, 33, 46, 75, 108, 111, 120, 126, Bush, President George W., 11, 20, 29, 109, 131, 133, 167, 188, 244 110–14, 117, 122, 125, 127, 176 capabilities gap, 75, 76, 87 civil–military planning cell (CMPC), 96, Cameron, David, 17, 119, 138, 139 106, 175 Canada, 72, 169, 172 decision shaping/making, 37, 44–7, 57, Cato Institute (Washington, DC), 115 68, 126, 131, 203, 204, 208, 231 Caucasus, xi, 7, 103, 130, 147, 187, 218, funding arrangements, 98, 99, 105, 106, 225, 244 176 Central and Eastern European (states), 12, institutions of, 33–69 19, 25, 30, 76, 119, 120, 136, 236 military capabilities/capacity, 3, 9, 12, Central European Defence Cooperation 28, 33, 70–108, 113–14, 132, 196, (CEDC), 91 198 Chad, 47, 84, 96, 124, 146–51, 160–3, 164, military exercises, 74, 93, 98, 140 166, 175, 176, 182, 186 Common Security and Defence Policy Chamberlain, Neville, 5 (CSDP) overseas missions, x, 31, 70, Chatham House (Royal Institute of 84, 104, 135, 144–89, 227 International Affairs), xiv, 18, 65 border control and monitoring missions, Checkel, Jeffrey, 204 174–7, 180–2; Aceh Monitoring China, xi, 10, 61, 72, 85, 162, 197, 217, Mission, 147–50, 174–6, 187; 219, 220, 226, 228 EUBAM Libya, 148–53, 181–2; Chirac, Jacques, 7, 19, 98, 126, 213 EUBAM Rafah, 148–53, 180–1; Cimbalo, Jeffrey, 116 EUMM Georgia, 148–53, 176–7; civilian actor (EU as), x, 2, 15, 98, 108, 142, Moldova/Ukraine border mission, 144–7, 184–6, 200, 206–7 144, 148–50, 181 Civilian Crisis Management (CCM), 71, military missions and military assistance 97–107 missions, 154–68; AMIS, 149, 153, Civil–Military Planning Cell (CMPC), see 162, 163, 175–6; Artemis, 149–51, CSDP 155–9, 163, 164, 166, 183; Atalanta, Clinton, President Bill, 19, 20, 29, 109, 111, 30, 47, 148–51, 162–3, 164, 183, 113–14, 126 189; Concordia, 148–51, 154–5, 163, Clusters (defence cooperation), xii, 88, 164, 166, 171; EUFOR–Althea, 105, 89–91, 108, 238 133, 145, 148–51, 158, 164, 166, coalitions of the willing, 140, 196 171, 186; EUFOR–Chad/CAR, 47, coercive power, 2, 196, 199 124, 151, 160–1, 163–6, 182, 186; coherence (of policy), 2, 38, 43, 51, 56, 61, EUFOR–RD Congo, 148–50, 67–9, 101, 103, 111, 126, 161, 165, 158–60, 164; EUSEC–RD Congo, 171, 213, 216, 224, 227 148–50, 159, 172; EUTM–Mali, Cold War, 2–6, 19, 20–2, 24, 26, 28, 30, 51, 148–51, 167–8; EUTM–Somalia, 70, 73–5, 107, 109–11, 116, 122–6, 148–51, 163

Index 293

police missions, 168–74; EUPAT, Diego Garcia, 227 148–51, 171–2; EUPM (BiH), 101, Dijkstra, Hylke, 206–7 148–51, 158, 168–71; EUPOL discourse, discursive institutionalism, 25, Afghanistan, 148–52, 173–4, 186; 196, 208–11, 221, 238 EUPOL COPPS, 148–53, 173; ‘discrimination’, 112, 158, 171 EUPOL–Kinshasa, 148–53, 168, DRC, see Congo 172–3, 244; EUPOL RD Congo, Dunkirk, Treaty of (1947), 3 148–51, 172; Proxima, 149–51, 154, ‘duplication’, 9, 20, 85, 87, 96, 112, 114, 171–2 141, 224 rule of law missions, 177–80; EU–JUST ‘constructive duplication’, 112 Lex Iraq, 178; EU-JUST Lex Kosovo, Dyson, Tom, 195–6 49, 103, 148–53, 178–9, 186; EU- JUST Themis, 177–8 East Timor, 23, 144 complex interdependence, 120, 200, 217, Eastern Europe, xi, 10, 12, 19, 25, 30, 76, 221 119, 120, 131, 136, 144, 176, 236 comprehensive security/approach, 29, 70, Edwards, Geoffrey, xiv, 236 101, 103, 104, 105–8, 159, 161, 183, Egypt, xi, 55, 67, 148, 180, 182 185, 199, 201, 218, 222, 246 Ekengren, Magnus, 187 conflict myopia, 197 Engberg, Katarina, 163–6 conflict prevention, 38, 80, 99, 101, 102, Erreira, Gérard, 7 187, 218, 245 Estonia, 13, 76–7, 85–6, 90 Congo, Democratic Republic of, 46, 122, ‘Euro-Army’ (European army), 15, 17–18, 124, 144, 148–52, 155, 158–60, 166, 25, 246 168, 171–2, 228 European Commission, 10, 38, 39, 45, conscription, 75–6, 235 51–69, 95, 98, 99, 100–5, 138, 171, Constitutional Treaty, x, 40, 41, 50, 57, 59, 174, 176, 202, 206, 207, 228, 232, 80, 91, 117, 174 235 constructivism, 31, 32, 35, 195–7, 205, 208, European Council (see also Presidency of the 209–12 European Council), xii, 5, 7 8, 9, 10, Convention on the Future of Europe (2003), 14, 28, 31, 36–40, 42, 47–8, 52–62, 12, 40, 57, 59 64–9, 70, 79, 81–2, 91, 97–100, 103, Cooper, Robert, xiv, 14, 235 106, 113, 128, 138, 145, 158, 162–3, COPS, see Political and Security Committee 167, 171–3, 176, 185, 202–6, 217, Cornish, Paul, 236 222–3, 233 Council of Defence Ministers, xii, 9, 28, 61, European Council on Foreign Relations 82, 88, 92, 233 (ECFR), 185, 224, 234 criminal justice system, 152, 173, 177, 178 European Council General Secretariat, 29, criminality/organized crime, 38, 102, 107, 37, 43, 45, 48, 51, 62, 63–9, 99–102, 154, 158, 169, 170–1,181, 218 106, 168, 203 206, 207 Croatia, 13, 23, 77, 84, 86, 91, 169 European Defence Agency (EDA), xii, 21, Cross, Mai’a, 46–9, 203 26, 81–2, 87–8, 91–95, 203, 205 Cyprus, 13, 26, 76, 77, 86, 131–2, 187, 240 European defence industry, 9, 24, 92–5, 112, Czech Republic, 5, 13, 41, 77, 86, 87, 88, 162, 242 90, 91 224, 240 European External Action Service (EEAS), 9, 10, 26, 38, 56, 61, 62–6, 67, 69, Darfur, 147, 149, 153, 160, 161, 168, 146–9, 230, 231, 232–3 175–6 European Global Strategy, xii, 224–5 Dayton agreement (1995), 151, 157, 168, European identity, x, 17, 50, 77, 209, 234, 170 235–7 Déby, Idriss, 161 European Neighbourhood Policy, xi, 11, 61, ‘decoupling’, 20, 112 98, 107, 141, 177, 188, 218, 224 defence budgets/spending, 11, 28, 47, 75, European Parliament, 38, 52, 61, 62, 66, 97, 85, 98, 107 125, 182, 227, 228, 238 De Gaulle, General Charles, 1, 74, 125, 126, European Political Cooperation (EPC), 2, 233 36 De Hoop Scheffer, Jaap, 58 European Security and Defence College democracy (promotion of), 5, 76, 161, 178, (ESDC), 64, 82 187, 224, 227, 228 European Security and Defence Identity Denmark, 5, 13, 26, 30, 76, 77, 84, 86, 90, (ESDI), 6, 8, 10, 12, 18, 26, 70, 75–8, 95, 117, 118, 154, 185, 237 79, 111, 113, 114

294 Index

European Security Strategy (ESS document, 194–8, 212, 217, 220, 224, 231–4, 2003), x, 101, 102, 107, 144, 147, 237, 239–40 169, 175, 217–20, 229, 236 Ghent Framework, xii, 28, 87, 88 Report on the Implementation of the ESS Giegerich, Bastien, 122–3, 237, 238 (2008), 219 Ginsberg, Roy, xiv, 166, 182–4 European Union Institute for Security global public goods, 218 Studies, 129, 206, 249–63 globalization, 136, 218, 235 European Union Military Committee Gnesotto, Nicole, xiv, 236 (EUMC), 40, 47, 48, 203 Gordon, Philip, 113 European Union Military Staff (EUMS), 40, Gowan, Richard, 185–6 48, 106, 231 Grand Strategy, 31, 149, 195, 217–33 existential security/threat, 1, 17, 18, 30, 85, Greece, 5, 13, 72, 76, 77, 82, 6, 96, 131, 129, 138, 140, 141, 235, 244 137, 224, 239, 240 expeditionary warfare, 89, 239 Grevi, Giovanni, xiv, 179 extraordinary rendition, 227 Gross, Eva, xiv, 187 Guillaud, Edouard, 138 Fabius, Laurent, 128 Gulf of Aden, 148, 162 federalism, 18, 25, 216 Gulf War (1990–91), 5, 74, 122, 123, 126 Finland, 8, 12, 13, 26, 76, 77, 86, 90, 113, Guttenberg, Karl-Theodore zu, 87 117, 120, 160, 174, 185, 224, 240 Fischer, Joschka, 58 Habré, Hissène, 161 flexibility, 197, 207, 240, 241 Hague, William, 97 Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), 36, 53, 56, Hamas, 173, 180 61, 63, 97, 138 Headline Goal 1999 (Helsinki), 28, 79, 80, Foreign Policy Analysis, 213 99, 145 Fouchet Plan, 3 Headline Goal 2010, 28, 81, 83 Fox, Liam, 17, 119 Headline Goal 2008 (Civilian), 83, 102–3, France, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 11, 13, 175 18–19, 20, 24, 25, 28, 35, 36, 39, 41, Headline Goal Task Force, 79, 42–3, 47, 52, 54, 60, 72, 74–6, Headquarters (military – OHQ), 66, 80, 81, 81–97, 117, 120, 124–8, 137–9, 141, 83, 96–7, 141, 160, 162, 181, 232 155–61, 167, 172–6, 185–6, 195, Headquarters (civil military), 106 197–8, 212, 217, 219, 220, 223–6, hegemony/hegemonic power, 20, 22, 25, 29, 228, 231–3, 237–40 108, 116 Defence White Paper (2013), 88, 222 Helsinki Final Act (1975), 218 Opération Serval (Mali 2013), 139, 157, High Representative, x, xi, xii, 10, 26, 38, 231 41–2, 47, 48, 51, 55–9, 62, 92, 97, Franco-British (relations), 15, 79, 89, 139, 130, 138, 146, 158, 170 145, 155, 198, 233 historical institutionalism, 34, 35, 206–8 Franco-British Treaty (2010), 28, 89–90 Hoffmann, Stanley, xiv, 197, 200, 226 Free Aceh Movement (GAM), 174 Hofmann, Stephanie, 207 Freedman, Lawrence, 198–9 Holbrooke, Richard, 126 FYROM, see Macedonia Hollande, François, 125, 127 Hughes, James, 187 Gabon, 158–9 Hulsman, John, 116 Gaddafi, Muammar, 137, 167, 182 human security, 129, 218, 229, 241 Gaddis, John, 220 human rights, 22, 38, 98, 101, 102, 129, Ganashia, Jean-Philippe, 160 158, 167, 171, 173, 174, 218, 222, Gates, Robert, xi, 12, 138, 139, 142 224, 227, 228–9, 235 Gaullism, 19, 126 humanitarian assistance/intervention, 22, Gaza, 148, 153, 180–1, 184, 185 25, 56, 61, 75, 79, 80, 83, 98, 99, General Affairs Council (GAC), 37, 64–5, 102, 107, 150, 155, 160, 161, 162, 68, 72, 76, 88 165, 167, 175, 178, 182, 230, 235, General Affairs and External Relations 237 Council (GAERC), 36, 37, 43 Hungary, 13, 53, 77, 86, 90, 91, 234, 240 Georgia, 12, 144, 147, 148–53, 176–7, 183, Hunter, Robert, xiv, 20 213, 219 Hutton, John, 60 Germany, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 20, 25, 26, 52, 54, Hyde-Price, Adrian, xiii, 193–5, 197 72, 75, 76, 77, 81–91, 96, 97, 108, 118–19, 122–7, 138, 158–60, 185–6, Iceland, 13, 90, 169

Index 295 ideas (role of), 34, 35, 46, 64, 66, 208, Keohane, Robert, 221 209–11, 219, 225, 232, 238 Kirchner, Emil, 211 identity (European), see European identity Kissinger, Henry, 39, 52, 125 Ikenberry, John, 226 Klein, Nadia, 187 immigration, 163, 169, 227, 246 Konstadinides, Theodore, 195–6 India, xi, 10, 11, 72, 85, 162, 217, 219, 220 Korea, South, 72, 85, 162 Indonesia, 46, 144, 149, 153, 174, 175, 217, Korea, North, 12 220 Korski, Daniel, 185–6 inductive analysis, 191, 214, Kosovo, xi, 7, 11, 19, 22, 23, 30, 39, 49, 70, institution-building, 33, 34, 170, 206 80–3, 103, 121, 123, 126, 132, institutionalism, 205–8 135–6, 145, 147–53, 177–80, 183, Instrument for Stability, 38, 98 186, 206, 230, 234, 244 intelligence, 9, 76, 82, 126, 132, 172, 231 KFOR, 121, 179 inter-agency tensions, 45, 93, 94, 105, 213 Kouchner, Bernard, 58 intergovernmental, 8, 18, 26, 36, 38, 40, 44, Krahmann, Elke, 211 48, 49, 61, 68, 92–6, 165, 167, 193, Kratochwil, Friedrich, 210–11 194, 200–5, 214, 242 Kupchan, Charles, 115, 226 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) crisis, 3 Kurdistan, 22 International Criminal Court (ICC), 176 Kurowska, Xymena, 210–11 International Crisis Group (ICG), 155, 156, Kuwait, 5 161, 169 Kyoto protocol, 227 international law, 2, 50, 126, 129, 197, 196, 218, 221, 229, 235 La Guardia, Anton, 67 interoperability, 81, 82 95, 100 Laeken Declaration (2001), 40, 101, 145, intersubjectivity, 204 Latvia, 13, 58, 77, 86, 119, 240 intervention (military), 2, 19, 22, 23, Le Drian, Jean-Yves, 128 70–107, 121–3, 126, 137, 138, 156, Leakey, General David, xiv, 104, 106, 157, 164–5, 173, 175, 176, 187, 189, 211, 158 218, 227, 229–30, 235, 245 leadership, 4, 22, 25, 51, 52, 57, 61, 64–7, Iran, 12, 72, 162, 197 80, 111, 122, 134, 139, 140, 142, Iraq, xi, xii, 5, 11, 17, 20, 71, 72, 96, 101, 160, 206, 213, 221, 233 105, 107, 109, 110, 116–19, 121, ‘leading from behind’, see United States 123–7, 132, 134, 136, 138, 144–52, League of Democracies, 140 155, 159, 160, 177–8, 186, 195, 197, Lebanon, 11, 163, 164 198, 204, 217, 221, 230, 236, 244 legal personality (of the EU), 50–1 Ireland, 5, 12, 13, 49, 58, 75, 77, 85, 86, legitimacy, 12, 35, 68, 161, 218, 230, 113, 117, 120, 121, 154, 160, 185, 236 187, 224, 237, 238, 240 Lewis, Jeffrey, 204 IRSEM (Strategic Research Institute), 223 liberal intergovernmentalism, 200–4 Islam, 138, 146, 167, 182, 188, 225, 226 liberalism, 199–203 Israel, xi, 11, 72, 95, 180–1 Libya, xi, xii, 10, 17, 29, 84, 97, 110, 117, Italy, xii, 4, 5, 6, 13, 72, 76, 77, 82, 84–6, 124, 125, 128, 137–42, 147, 148–53, 96, 97, 108, 137, 172, 185, 195–8, 161, 163, 164, 167, 181–2, 206, 223, 224, 231, 233, 239, 240 244–5 Ituri province (DRC), 155, 156 Lindley-French, Julian, 197–8 Lisbon Treaty, 9, 10, 12, 26, 28, 36, 38, 41, Jackson, General Sir Mike, 175 43, 49–62, 80, 121, 146, 150, 203, Janjaweed (Sudan militia), 161, 175 222 Japan, 72, 85, 162 Lithuania, 13, 77, 86, 119,120, 240 Jones Parry, Emyr, 7 logistics, 76, 83, 95, 102, 112, 155, 156 Jonge Oudraat, Chantal de, 16 Lugar, Richard, 140 Joyce, James, 1 Luxembourg, 4, 5, 13, 20, 23, 26, 74, 75, judges, 28, 71, 100, 102, 104 124, 154, 224 Juncos, Ana, 44–5, 187 just war theory, 229 Maastricht European Council (1991), 5, 36, Justice and Equality Movement (Sudan), 175 50, 203 Justus Lipsius (building), 48 Macedonia (FYROM), 84, 135, 154–5, 171, 183 Kempin, Ronja, 184–5 Madrid, terrorist attacks (2004), 125 Kennedy, Paul, 220 Maghreb, xi, 7, 146, 167

296 Index

Mali, xi, 84, 97, 128, 139–42, 146, 147–53, Military Committee, 19 157, 167–8, 231 NATO Response Force (NRF), 123, 136, Malta, 13, 75, 77, 84, 86, 132, 137, 224, 137 240 North Atlantic Council, 130, 131 Mandelson, Peter, 58, 60 Partnership for Peace, 132 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Prague Summit (2002), 136, 140 Aircraft (MPRA), 162 ‘right of first refusal’, 113, 136 Matlary, Janne Haaland, 212, 240 Rome summit (1991), 111 Mattelaer, Alexander, 13, 164–6 SACEUR, 78, 130 McCain, John, 140 ‘separable but not separate’ forces, 6, 76, Mearsheimer, John, 193 113 Médecins sans Frontières, 156 Strategic Concept, 30, 74, 111, 135, 136, Mediterranean (security), 11, 55, 218, 225 137, 198, 222 Menon, Anand, xiv, 21, 207–8, 213, 225, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 241 Europe (SHAPE), 96, 136, 139, 155 Mérand, Frédéric, xiv, 201, 212 Washington summit (1999), 88 Merkel, Angela, 18, 54, 60, 123 neighbourhood, see European Messervy-Whiting, General Graham, 147 Neighbourhood Policy Meyer, Christoph, xiv, 210, 237 neo-functionalism, 201 Middle East, xi, 4, 11, 63, 67, 71, 85, 103, Netherlands, 5, 13, 26, 30, 41, 72, 75–7, 81, 129, 130, 138, 147, 187, 219, 243, 85–8, 118, 120, 124, 160, 172, 174, 245 185, 195, 224, 231, 239–40 milieu goals, 195, 226 network-centric warfare, 80 Missiroli, Antonio, xiv neutrals, neutrality, 12, 32, 49, 91, 113, Miliband, David, 60 120–2, 161, 170, 234, 238 military capacity, see CSDP New Labour, 7, 16, 118 Ministry of Defence (MOD), 79, 163, 224, ‘new world order’, 4, 5, 22, 28, 110, 123, 233 129, 217, 225, 226, 243 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 37, New York, 11, 190 41–5, 64 New Zealand, 85, missile defence, 11, 74, 80 NH-90 helicopter, 90 Mitterrand, François, 19, 126 Nice, Treaty of (2000), 26, 36, 40, 41, 50, Moldova, 144, 148–53, 181 55, 56, 120 Moravcsik, Andrew, 200, 216 Nigeria, 176 Mugabe, Robert, 228 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Muller-Brandeck-Boquet, Gisela, 39 106, 156, 211 multiculturalism, 235 non-nuclear states, 3, 12, 89, 125, 219, 234 multilateralism, 5, 107, 126, 147, 176 non-state actors, 129, 184 multi-polarity, 194 Nordic Defence Cooperation Munich Security Conference, 55, 117, 135 (NORDEFCO), 90 mutual assured destruction, 1 Norheim-Martinsen, Per Martin, 183–4, 212 normative approaches, 3, 15, 22, 23, 25, 98, Nash, Patrick, 160, 161 123, 133, 134, 184, 186, 194, 209, nation-building, 29, 63, 64, 81, 104, 105, 218, 228, 235, 243, 246 107, 165, 177, 199, 205 North Korea, 12 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Norway, 13, 16, 20, 30, 72, 77, 84–6, 90, Organization), 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, 12, 112, 118, 131, 169 13–15, 18–19, 22, 26, 29, 30, 33, 36, Nowak, Agnieszka, xiv, 201 38–9, 42–43, 47, 53, 58, 59, 72, 73, nuclear, biological and chemical defences, 80 74–83, 85, 87, 89–91, 96, 105, nuclear deterrence, 126, 141 109–43, 154–7, 160, 162, 163, 164, nuclear weapons, 38, 73, 74, 126, 217, 219, 165, 167, 171, 176, 178, 179, 182, 234 187, 188, 196, 207, 219, 229, 230, Nye, Joseph, 221 232, 236, 238, 239, 240, 244 AF-South (crisis), 167 Obama, Barack, xi, 29, 30, 52, 53, 109 113, Allied Command Transformation, 127 129, 138–9, 219, 243 Deputy Supreme Commander Europe Odessa, 181 (DSACEUR), 78, 130 Ojanen, Hanna, xiv, 27, 201, 214 enlargement, 136, 137 operational planning, 48, 83, 92, 96, 106, flexible response, 110 136, 139, 155, 165, 224, 231, 232

Index 297

OHQ (European), 66, 96–7, 141, 162, pre-emptive warfare, 11, 123, 147 232 Presidency of the European Union (see also opt-outs, 44, 90, 95, 96, 117, 121, 158, 195, European Union), 28, 37, 41, 42–4, 197, 214 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 81, 82, 87, 97–9, Organization for Security and Cooperation 120, 160, 174, 213, 243 in Europe (OSCE), 100, 101 121, Presidency of the Council (see also Van 123, 168, 171, 181 Rompuy), 10, 26, 51, 52–5, 232 Osland, Kari, 169 proliferation (weapons), 38, 107, 217 Ossetia, South, 177 Putin, Vladimir, xi O’Sullivan, David, 62 Quadrennial Defence Review (USA), 11, Palestine, 147, 152, 168, 171, 173 232 Papandreou, George, 58 Quai d’Orsay, 7, 42 Parry, Emyr Jones, 7 qualified majority voting (in EU), 36 Patten, Chris, 57, 58 partnership, xi, 98, 110, 111, 115, 117, 128, Rafah crossing (see also CSDP overseas 132, 134, 137, 159, 225, 232 missions), 148, 150, 153, 180–1 ‘peace dividend’, 4, 28, 75 rational choice, 44, 199–209 peace-keeping, 13, 19, 70, 73, 75, 79, 80, rationalism, 205, 207 122, 156, 166, 170, 185 Reagan, Ronald, 29, 213 peace-making, 75, 79, 80 realism, neo-realism, structural realism, 31, peace-support operations/capabilities, 102, 193–7, 246 121, 147, 157 referendum, 76, 119, 120, 124 Peen Rodt, Annemarie, 165–7 Reflexion Group on the Future of the EU, penitentiary officers, 28, 100, 104, 178 222–23, 230 Penksa, Susan, 166, 182–4 Rehn, Olli, 58 permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), Republika Srpska, 158, 170 28, 143 research and technology, 87, 93, 93 Perruche, General Jean-Paul, xiv Reynolds, Christopher, 44–5 Petersberg Tasks, 75, 79, 80, 121, 145 Rhinard, Mark, 187 Pohl, Benjamin, 186, 197 risk management, 13, 129 Poidevin, Estelle, 39 Risse, Thomas, xiii, 201–2 Poland, xii, 13, 72, 76–7, 85, 86, 90, 91, 97, Robertson, Lord, George, 33, 34, 67, 155 108, 110, 117, 119–20, 124, 138, Robinson, Mary, 58 160, 195, 223, 224, 233, 237, 239, Rodman, Peter, 116 240 Romania, 13, 77, 86, 160, 185, 240 police forces (see also CSDP police missions), Rompuy, Herman Van, see Van Rompuy 13, 28, 71, 83, 98–102, 104, 144, RPAS (drones), see UAVs 145, 148–55, 157–60, 168–73, 176, Ruger, Carolin, 39 178–9, 184–5, 244 rule of law, 5, 30, 83, 99, 100, 102, 103, Policy Unit, 39 144, 146, 149, 150, 158, 173, 177–9, Political Committee (PoCo), 37, 41, 51 186–9, 196, 224 Political Directors, 7, rule of law missions, see CSDP overseas Political and Security Committee (COPS), missions xiii, 37, 40, 41–7, 51, 69, 130, 131, Rumsfeld, Donald, 30, 107, 109 203, 231 Russia, xi, 10, 67, 72, 76, 85, 91,160, 162, Nicolaidis Group, 43 169, 176–7, 179, 181, 197, 217, 219, permanent representatives (ambassadors) 225, 228 to, 37, 42, 43 Russo-Georgian War (2008), 213 Politico-Military Working Party, 43 Rynning, Sten, 194–7 pooling and sharing, xii, 28, 83–91, 95, 128, 201 Saakashvili, Mikheil, 177 Poos, Jacques, 23, 74 Saddam Hussein, 5 Popowski, Maciej, 63 Sahel, xi, 140, 145–6, 148, 150–3, 219, 225, Portugal, 5, 10, 13, 77, 86, 91, 118, 120, 245 172, 224, 240 Saint-Malo (Franco-British summit, Posen, Barry, xiv, 115 December 1998), 7–15, 16, 20, 22, post-conflict reconstruction, 165, 169 24, 26 33, 34–40, 41, 47, 48, 69, 78, power transition, 219–20, 226–8 80, 98, 108, 109, 112–13, 118, 145, precision-guided munitions (PGMs), 81 200, 208, 213, 236

298 Index

Saint-Malo Declaration, 7, 8–9, 15, 16, 24, Strickmann, Eva, 210 33, 78, 80, 109, 111–12 structural realism, see realism/ neo-realism Saudi Arabia, 5, 72, 74, 85 structured cooperation, 143, 194 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 19, 54, 60, 117, 127, 138, Sudan, 146–53, 161, 175–6, 182 139, 176, 213 supranational(ism), 2, 14, 36, 38, 48, 49, 57, Schilde, Kaija, 95 68, 69, 92, 94, 202–5, 214, 241 Schmid, Helga, 62 Sweden, xii, 12, 13, 26, 76, 77, 86, 90, 113, Schmidt, Peter, 241 120, 121, 155, 156, 160, 163, 174, Schmidt, Vivien, xiv, 208 185, 195, 223, 224, 231, 234, Schroeder, Gerhard, 123, 135 237–40 security culture, 25, 31, 122, 183, 210, Switzerland, 158, 160, 169 233–42 Syria, xi, 11, 67, 128, 219, 245, 256, 257 security sector reform, 71, 82, 83, 101, 159, systemic pressures, 194, 195, 197, 198 169, 182, 187, 188 Selbstverzwergung, 52 Taiwan, 72 Serbia, xi, 23, 81, 149, 170, 178, 179, 230 Talbott, Strobe, 18, 113 Slovakia, 13, 77, 86, 90, 91, 119, 240 territorial defence, 17, 73, 121, 222, 234, Sloan, Stanley, 111 239, 244 Slovenia, 13, 23, 26, 77, 86, 91, 160, 224, terrorism, 11, 38, 81, 105, 107, 132, 146, 240, 241 180, 190, 196, 197, 218 smart power, 200–1 Tervuren, 96 Smith, Michael, E, 206 Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence, 80 smuggling, 158, 181 threat perception, 91, 218, 237 socialization, 35, 44, 45, 49, 204–10, 237 threats, 13, 17, 18, 20, 22, 28, 38, 81, 83, sociological institutionalism, 34, 35, 44, 47, 85, 91, 99, 104, 105, 107, 115, 128, 192, 206–9 129, 140, 144, 162, 197, 198, 211, soft power, 20, 71, 117, 183, 194, 200–2, 218, 222, 224, 225, 229, 232, 235, 227 237, 246 Solana, Javier ( High Representative for Thucydides, 1 CFSP), x, xiv, 38–40, 42, 57, 59, 71, ‘tilt to Asia’, see United States 99, 124, 155, 157, 158, 161, 219, Timor, East, 23, 144 228 Toje, Asle, 208, 241 Somalia, 22, 30, 145, 147–53, 162–3, Transatlantic relations, xii, 12, 29, 30, 167–8, 185 109–43, 198, 211 AMISOM, 153, 162, 163 Transnistria, 181 Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF), treaty/treaties see under name of treaty 167 Trybus, Martin, 92–3 South Africa, xii, 155, 217 Tuaregs, 167 sovereignty, 1, 2, 15, 23, 50, 87, 88, 91, 94, Turkey, 13, 20, 30, 72, 76, 77, 84, 86, 112, 142, 191, 193, 201, 214, 229, 231, 119, 130–3, 138, 157, 158, 162, 169, 242 172, 237, 240 space capabilities, 80, 82, 93 Spain, xii, 5, 10, 13, 26, 53, 72, 75–7, 81, Uganda, 155, 163, 167 84–86, 91, 97, 124, 160, 196, 223, Ukraine, 144, 148, 150, 153, 169, 181–2 224, 231, 233, 237, 238, 239, 240 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Special Operations forces, 80, 82, 100, 155 29, 30, 125, 150, 153 Sperling, James, 211 United Kingdom, 3, 8, 16, 60, 73, 75, 89, spillover, 201–2, 244 118, 119, 208, 231, 240 Stabilization and Association Agreement, Strategic Defence Review (1998), 73 155, 157 United Nations, 12, 13, 22, 105, 107, 116, Steinmeier, Frank-Walter, 58 147, 158, 164, 168, 179, 185, 188, Stelzenmuller, Constanze, 216 228, 229, 236, 242 strategic planning/thinking, 9, 48, 80, 88, Chapter VII mission, 155, 158 105, 232 MINURCAT, 162 strategic culture, 89, 105, 122, 183, 197, MONUC, UN mission in Congo, 151, 199, 210, 217, 218, 233–42 155, 158 strategic lift, 76, 80, 81, 82, 83, 135, 155, World Food Programme, 162 176 UNMIK, 179 strategic vision, 10, 31, 59, 62, 65, 80, 105, United States, x, xi, xiv, 3, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 130, 216, 222, 223, 226, 233, 243 19, 20, 24, 25, 61, 68, 72, 73, 75, 76,

Index 299

108, 109–43, 144, 164, 168, 179, Warsaw Pact, 19, 73 188, 191, 198, 199, 218, 225 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 38, disengagement from Europe, 22, 129, 73, 107, 218 190, 194 Weimar (Five), xii, 91, 97, 233 ‘leading from behind’, 139 Weiss, Moritz, 212–13 ’tilt to Asia’, xi, 109, 111, 119, 134, 139, Western European Union (WEU), 3, 4, 5–6, 225, 226, 243 7, 9, 26, 36, 75–8, 103, 121–3, 130, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), 89, 95 207–8 Westphalian system, 1, 2, 22, 23, 129, 193, Valasek, Tomas, 89 217, 225, 229, 242 values competititon, 228 White Paper (European), xii, 222, 223 Van Daele, Frans, 52 Whitman, Richard, xiii, 186 Van Rompuy, Herman, 26, 51–5, 223, 242 Witney, Nick, xiv, 92, 94, 224 Védrine, Hubert, 110, 125, 127–8, 141 Wolfers, Arnold, 226 Verhofstadt, Guy, 62 Wolff, Stefan, 186 Vershbow, Alexander, 33 Vietnam, 5, 221, 244 Yom Kippur War, 110 Vike-Freiberga, Vaira, 58 Youngs, Richard, 228 Villepin, Dominique de, 19, 230 Vimont, Pierre, 63 Zaborowski, Marcin, 134 Visegrad (countries), xii, 90 Zapatero, José Luis Rodrigo, 53, 125 Zyla, Benjamin, 241 Walt, Stephen, xiv, 20–1