Fariza Dzorthova

FOKUS | 3/2016

Understanding the Russian withdrawal from

During the last half-year Syria has gone participated in the west-led occupations in than 2000 Russian fighters, including 17 through fast and violent alterations both the Middle East in the similar vein as with field commanders have been eliminated on the battlefield and in the political con- the Syrian case, and it has even expressed during the Russian military operations in text. In tandem with Iranian and sympathy towards all forms of resistance Syria2. militia on the ground, Russia carried out to occupations. Interestingly, the USSR ge- massive military operations across Syria, nerally had a low profile during the insur- Regaining territory turning the course of events in favor of the rection of 1982 in Syria, led by a political exhausted Syrian regime. This strategy to Islam organization formed in 1920s – the With Russian intervention aiming to rescue capture territory was carried out in anti- Muslim Brotherhood - against the Hafez Assad, who was losing more and more cipation of the fact that negotiations are al-Assad’s regime. Considering the USSR’s territory to the rebels, the spirits of the under way, desiring to draw the broad out- pressure that Russian Muslims were under rose at once and it was able to lines of a political settlement. Unexpected- during the Soviet time, Russia’s reluctance move forward in several fronts. Most of the ly, Putin has ordered a partial withdrawal can be impugned. Large profits from the 910 km Syrian-Turkish border that crosses of Russian forces from Syria starting March weapons sales to Syrian authorities (by the East of the Euphrates - an important 15, the day the negotiations start in Genè- then more than 60% of the Syrian GDP was trade corridor between the countries ve, stating that the objectives that have spent on arms under the pretext of libera- to date - is controlled by the Kurdistan been set, are generally accomplished. But tion of Palestine)1 and Russia’s occupation Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is the fact remains - the Islamic State (IS) - with its own internal issues, give some propped up by both Russia and the US. the original declared objective for Russian explanations. Nevertheless, since the fall Only a 160 km stretch, which lies on the intervention - is still having a considerable of the USSR, the Russian government has West Bank of the Euphrates, is not under part of Syria under its control, and in the been claiming that the Middle East is close control by the Kurdish forces. Considering statement about the end of operation in to its neighborhood, so the border defense that the opposition, Assad’s regime, and Syria the IS has not been even mentioned. has become Moscow’s primary concern. the Islamic State, the latter of which has Whether Russia has fulfilled its tasks in Sy- Besides, the US strategy in the region is under its control a 98 km - ria or simply retreated, convinced that it is a threat and incompetent in Putin’s view, linkage along with a 13 km road stretching impossible, is today a subject to controver- as well as dangerous, because it provokes from Azaz to Afrin, are eager to control the sy. But a closer look at the events in Syria wars in the Gulf States, resulting in Russia Syrian-Turkish frontier, this is a dramatic and Russia’s policy both toward it, as well losing friendly regimes, such as the Libyan achievement. The rest of the borderland as Russia’s domestic issues, could help to one. that lies across the Mediterranean and understand what the Russian calculations the province of the Hatay within Turkey, is might mean. Specifically the fight against the IS, decla- controlled by the Syrian-Kurdish People’s red by Russia when intervening in Syria, Defense Units (YPG).3 The pretext for the Russian military cam- was unrealizable by the current Russian paign in Syria military means. It is an elusive goal, which The high priority target of Russian forces requires a huge military coalition, hund- was the so called Azaz- Corridor - a There are goals that are declared within reds of thousands of troops, a large-scale lifeline to the opposition-held areas in the framework of propaganda and there operation, and not just 50 small aircraft northern Aleppo - and is, in fact, coordina- are goals that are set within the actual mili- and helicopters applied for pinpoint ted with the US, which is employing the tary and political operations, for instance, strikes. And in fact, the Russian president’s Kurdish forces as a proxy to hold the IS the fight against international terrorism, speech at the UN General Assembly calling within the Syrian boundaries before its fi- which is a global strategic goal of the same for common anti-terror efforts faced a mu- nal strike to completely destroy the group. order as the struggle for democracy. But all ted reaction. Although, within this global Russian air strikes forced people to move of this is a common declaration, covering objective, there was another small goal, to the Shia-dominated towns supporting specific interests - a constant (which is which is considered as achieved by the the regime, Nubl and Zahraa. With this impossible without military support) pres­ Russian Defense Minister: the destruction move, Russia together with its allies, put ence in the strategically important region. of the militants, who sympathize with the the towns back under the control of the terrorist underground in Russia. As Presi- regime and cut off the opposition’s supply The interference in the Syrian conflict dent Vladimir Putin said: ‘it is better if we route Azaz-Aleppo. The opposition-held is the first time Russia is at war beyond will fight with them there, than in Russia’. part of Aleppo was now besieged by three its borders since its crushing defeat in According to the Russian Defense Ministry fighting forces: the regime forces from Afghanistan. Previously, Russia has never data, by the time of the withdrawal, more the southern and the northern sides, the

1 Understanding the Russian withdrawal from Syria

FOKUS | 3/2016

IS from the north and the east, and the three regions: surrounding , in the it would only last for a several months and Kurdish fighters from the western side.4 northern parts of the , that it would not become a second Afgha- and in the governorate of Deraa, all of nistan with a Libyan fate. Vladimir Putin in Simultaneously, Russia’s air strikes allowed which are free of the IS and other radical the past two years, has mainly been enga- the PYD to advance on the road that ties groups. The Russian intervention revived ged in foreign policy and the engagement the Aleppo city to the Azaz town. By the the ‘regime-vs-extremism’ contrast in fact, is regarded as successful for Russia in ge- first week of February, the Kurds, inclu- which allowed Russia to tackle whiche- neral. The isolation gets excited, because ding the YPG and a group calling itself ver group it considered. All told, Russian you can play on the contradictions of its ‘Revolu­tionary Army’ forces seized two Defense Minister reported that the Russian participants. The military operation in Syria more towns to the north of the Nubul and Air Force helped the regime to regain 10 was exactly such a project. On one hand, Zahraa - Al Khirbeh and al-Ziara, as well 000 km of the Syrian territory with 400 it is a continuation of the policy of foreign as the airfield at Minaq, located less than settlements7. The main goals of Russian wars as an agenda set by Russia, which the 7 km away from Azaz.5 These forces will military offensive - to save its ally’s regime international community has to respond likely continue to advance northward to- and regroup its military force - have been to. On the other hand, it is an attempt to ward the Turkish border, thereby making it achieved. By its withdrawal, Russia is likely get out of political isolation, and it has easier for the regime forces to consoli­date demonstrating the end of the unconditio- been successful, but it seems that only in their positions in and around of Aleppo. nal support to Assad, aiming to pressure the framework of the Syrian project. The Under such circumstances, the regime is him to take a more serious stance towards meetings after the Russian direct involve- able to create a buffer between its gained the opposition in the UN-hosted negotia- ment in the Syrian conflict have been long territory and any anti-regime forces based tions. Assad himself was informed about and substantial. Russia has once again in Aleppo area. The Russian military offen- the decision the same day when it was become a part of the ‘international board’ sive launched from the southwest of Alep- actually announced. While Assad insisted of directors dealing with conflict resolu- po and focused on the governorate, on the war with a ‘victorious end’ regaining tions, but, in fact, the sanctions remained. allowed the regime and its allies to encircle all of Syria, Russian diplomats have made So the question of new Russian projects is the opposition forces based in Aleppo, and it clear that the solution of the conflict lies still open. to release its supporters within the Idlib only in a diplomatic solution. This pushes governorate. Any prospective ground of- Assad to concentrate on a single point of Parallel goals fensive against the IS would have to collide the negotiations under the UN aegis to with the regime or its allies. Considering consolidate his control over the territories Whatever the main reason for the Russian the advance of the Kurds, backed by both he was helped to regain, and gives him an intervention, the main achievements are the US and Russia, towards the Turkish bor- opportunity to look more independent, of various kinds. As every other war in the der, which could be a casus belli for Turkey than just a client of Russia. However, the Middle East, the Syrian war has its eco- due to the threat to its territorial integrity, population in these areas is persuasively nomic background. Arab Spring created the decision of Russia to pull out could opposing to the regime, just like it was in opportunities for Moscow. What Russia also mean a cautious disincentive of the the beginning of the uprisings. does have to offer is arms and energy. In possible direct confrontation with one of the light of Russia’s support to its allies the key players in the conflict. The battles Russia’s primary goal and victories in Syria, the regional states in the south, in Deraa governorate, was no began to look at Moscow for the prospect less vital and was conducted in order to Although the withdrawal announcement of military sales. According to SIPRI data, secure the Nusaib governorate that shares came as a surprise, there is a considerable Russia accounted for 25% of global arms borders with Jordan. With the help of reason to assume that the timing has been exports in the recent five-year period, of Russian air strikes, the regime forces have accurately chosen for it: during the truce which a considerable part is exported also retaken the border town of Sheikh came into effect on February 27. In Putin’s to the Middle East states.8 There is an Maskin, and the town of Athman, which own words ‘most of the goals in Syria have opinion among western experts, such as likely creates conditions for the regime been accomplished’ - some of them have Michael Kofman and Stephan Blank that to reopen the international road that ties nothing to do with Syria itself. A more im- Russia might be thinking of establishing a to Amman6. portant goal for Russia surely was its place coalition of states that are pro-Russian and in world diplomacy. After the sanctions anti-American, and among Iran, Iraq and The primary concern of the Russian mili- over Ukraine crisis, the year 2015 began for Syria. The instrument to employ here is tary offensive would seem to be to defeat Russia with a complete isolation, and the energy and arms deals. the moderate Syrian opposition and by recent oil price decline as well as the cur- that to coerce Syrian and international rency crisis made the situation only worse. Furthermore, Moscow’s interest in the re- forces into accepting Moscow’s terms Russia could not afford a full or a long- gion is partly due to its remarkable oil and during peace talks. Russian air strikes term intervention due to the logistical natural gas reserve concentrations. Russia have been concentrated specifically in obstacles and costs. Putin himself said that is a country with a worldwide reputation as

2 Understanding the Russian withdrawal from Syria

FOKUS | 3/2016

a gas and oil supplier, which is an important Taking advantage of the IS threat of low oil prices and sanctions can be instrument in making foreign policy. Now the failure of the Russian government to Russia has a potential to access Syrian fields Alongside with securing its small port in develop and modernize the economy - is with the prospects that Russia may be able waters, which now may become a not the only factor that Russia cares about. to control oil and gas transportations. Syri- naval base, military and air base in Latakia The North Caucasus and Central Asia an authorities, in their turn, have expressed and adjustment of its client network, using regions have often been considered by their hope that Russian companies will the IS threat, Russia has also intensified Russian and foreign experts as vulnerable develop the country’s offshore oil and gas militarization of the Central Asian states, regions in estimation of the scope of the deposits which have enormous potential. Black and Caspian Sea regions. Crimea is threat that IS poses to the Russia’s national Banayas city of Tartus is one of the oil- also turning into a military bridgehead. In security. The security forces of the Central richest reservations in the Mediterranean the Caucasus region, Dagestan and Arme- Asian republics - a very relative concept area and there are already a number of nia are being transformed into border are- as they cannot cope by themselves with bilateral contracts between the countries, as under special control11. This might be re- a powerful invasion the IS escalation. The with the first phase worth $88 million.9 garded as Putin’s nostalgia for the bygone Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which former Soviet republics. Nevertheless, with is an affiliate of the IS is an extremely There are already considerations regarding this move he has killed several birds with serious and underrated threat as well. And the ‘Revived Syria’ project. When the war one stone, namely - a military fortification to throw these states to their fate - is not ends and Syria walks out of the conflict, on the borders to Russia, further depen- an option for Russia. Because then, it will the one who will invest in the rebuilding dence on Russia of economically unstable have to fight against extremism directly process, will become a share participant and vulnerable Central Asian countries due on the perimeter of Russian borders. As in the project. Preferences will be given to the IS escalation, as well as what is visible for the North Caucasus, indeed, Russia has Russian companies’ contributions. Thus, with the naked eye: the position of these never been able to completely eliminate Russia wins an ally, a state in which it can military objects surrounding Turkey. The jihadists in the region, though it has been make payback investments. But if Syria is reassessment of the Russian-Turkey rela- acting brutally and overcommitting its divided into parts, it would be regarded tions does not seem as following Turkey’s internal forces and relying on Chechnya’s as a defeat for Putin, both global and at downing of a Russian jet over Syria. The president Kadyrov. For Moscow it is now of home, the latter being more important. geographic location of Turkey ensures that a vital importance, bearing in mind Central The disunited territorial integrity of Syria in Ankara can have a much greater impact Asia, to focus on ensuring the success of the aftermath of the conflict, which is the on national interests of Russia regarding its Syrian operations, as it believes that if worst case scenario, could jeopardize the the former Soviet areas - Ukraine, the opposition in Syria led to the IS rise and internal order of the Russian Federation. Caucasus and Central Asia. Ankara is, at power acquisition there, it can reach and This is why Russian leadership is concer- the same time, improving its relations with destabilize southern and northern parts ned with the territorial integrity of Syria. Kiev even in terms of military exercises. of Russia along with its neighborhood in But Russia should be careful what it wishes Turkey’s mobilization and ground opera- Central Asia. Expressing concerns that the for, because Israel can create obstacles tions against Kurdish militias in Syria could domestic security could be undermined if on the way of Syria’s rebuilding, while it easily lead to the direct confrontation experienced Russian fighters from a trans- is eager to gain control over the Golan with Russian forces, in which the US could national network would return back home, Heights border, which could be possible in repeat its experience with Argentina in Russian authorities managed to generate case of a separated Syria. In 2006 Israel ex- times of General Galtieri12, namely - leaving a permanent state of emergency framing pressed its worries regarding that Russian Erdogan alone with Russia. Russian au- its support to the Syrian government as arms sold to Syria end up in the hands of thorities seem to take into account Saudi national security interests. In this regard, it Hezbollah. Since then, Moscow has been Arabia’s growing cooperation with Turkey, seems that president Putin’s attitude regar- cautious to act in the Middle East with which might also prove Russia’s decision to ding outside interventions, which in his respect to Israel’s interests. For instance, withdraw from Syria in order to minimize mind in the future could serve as a pretext when Putin was quite serious in selling one of the irritants in the Russian-Saudi for the international community to inter- S-300 missile systems to Syria back in 2013, relationship. Thus, to strengthen and vene in Russia, which has a poor democra- and after Israel raised concerns that such demonstrate Russia’s military potential and tic experience, reflects concerns about the a system would allow Syrian government intelligence is not a less important goal of country’s domestic affairs and sovereignty, to cover all of Israel, Moscow suspended the Russian involvement in Syria. which Putin was likely defending in Syria. the deal. In turn, there is a Russian-Israeli Hereby, Russia sends a clear message to cooperation conducting a joint aerial However, critics have a more skeptical the West and its coalition that no outside reconnaissance of Syrian air space. The view - ‘Russia can only sustain its policy state has the right to decide internal affairs control over the enemy’s air space has long toward Syria as long as conditions in of another one. been a center of security strategy doctrine Russia allow it to do so’. The question that of Israel.10 has been discussed in terms of the impact

3 Understanding the Russian withdrawal from Syria

FOKUS | 3/2016

Conclusion if the conflict prospers, then Russia is not among the instigators. In this regard, the During its military campaign in Syria, timing for withdrawal seems to be well Russia has achieved quite a lot. It under- measured. Indeed, Moscow never clearly mined the Syrian opposition, stabilized stated its goals in the Middle East, but one the Assad’s regime and produced a peace thing is clear - as long as there is a Russian process on more favorable conditions for presence in Syria, Moscow has its desired Assad. All of it does not look very promis­ leverage of influence at the diplomatic ing since the people of Syria, even those table, something that it has been trying who initially were supporting the regime, long to achieve and, from now on, will now seem to be deeply frustrated in and obviously do anything to retain. opposing, which matters as peace talks are taking place. In parallel Russia has mana- Fariza Dzorthova is ERASMUS intern ged to fulfil its own goals in the areas of its at the AIES. national interest. Changing the counters of the five-year-old war and its surrounding Sources geopolitics, Russia has coped to break out from the international isolation as a result 1. Vox.com [putin-syria-russia-withdraw] 14-03-2016 caused by the Ukraine crisis. One can 2. Carnegie.ru [well-timed-retreat-russia-pulls-back-from-syria] 15-03-2016 speculate that the hasty withdrawal is risky 3. CSIS.org [russian-military-forum-russia-middle-east] 25-09- for Russia as it could be excluded from the 2015 desired partnership, while others are keep­ 4. Komsomolskayapravda.ru [pochemu-rossia-srajaetsya-za- ing their forces on the ground, but the siriyu] 12-02-2016 5. Theguardian.com [the-guardian-view-on-syria-the-people- country still retains a considerable part of return-to-the-streets-against-assad] 10-03-2016 its forces and air defense systems in Syria, which should not be overlooked. Putin’s Notes announcement to deploy Russian forces from Syria does surely not mean the end of 1) Informnapalm.org [Sirijskaya-aktivistka-rossiya-vedet-sebya- kak-varvar-ubijtsa-vorvavshijsya-v-drevnyuyu-ctranu-drevnih- the conflict, as some predicted, not even traditsij] lesser airstrikes, because the main Russian 2) BBC.com [Syria-conflict-Russia‘s-Putin-orders-‘main part‘-of- forces-out] air defense system S-400 along with other 3) Doha Institute.org [Russian Military Strategy across Syria, smaller systems still remain in Syria and Negotiating Tactics in Geneva] airstrikes are continuing at about the same 4) Ibid. 5) Ibid. rate as before. Besides, orders were made 6) Doha Institute.org [Turkey’s Difficult Choices in Syria] to defend Russian military bases in Syria 7) BBC.com [Syria conflict: Russia‘s Putin orders ‚main part‘ of forces out] from land, air and sea and continue to 8) Sipri.org [Asia-and-the-Middle-East-lead-rise-in-arms- operate on the regular basis, which implies imports-the-United-States-and-Russia-remain-largest-arms exporters-says-SIPRI] that some decent amount of soldiers will 9) RT.com [Damascus-wants-Russia-to-develop-Syrian-oil] be kept in Syria. So, the ‘partial’ withdra- 10) Globalresearch.ca[russias-s-300-surface-to-air-missile-alrea- wal would rather imply some political dy-deployed-and-functional-in-syria-the-ordnance-bothering- the-allies] moves rather than military. By declaring 11) SIPRI.org [middle-east-conflict-risks-overspill-into-caucasus] a pullout in times of relative truce and 12) Poistine.org [peremirie-v-sirii-iran-i-hizbulla-uhodyat- turciya-likuet] © Austria Institut für Europa- current negotiations, Russia, firstly, seeks und Sicherheitspolitik, 2016 not to lose the hard paved way back to the table where global affairs are discussed, Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Nachdruck oder ver­ gleich­bare Verwendungen von Arbeiten des because if the peace negotiations lead to Austria Instituts für Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik a permanent peace, then Russia will be (AIES) sind auch in Auszügen nur mit vorheriger in a more favorable position, if not, then Genehmigung gestattet. Die im AIES-Fokus veröffentlichten Beiträge geben ausschließlich die it would mean that the whole idea of the Meinung der jeweiligen Autorinnen und Autoren invasion in Syria was a wrong decision, and wieder.

Russia could be facing a discretization of Dr. Langweg 3, 2410 Hainburg/Donau its own regime. Secondly, by having less Tel. +43 (1) 3583080 forces in Syria, Russia ensures itself against E-Mail: [email protected] Website: www.aies.at unpredicted clashes with the Saudi- Turkish players on the Syrian ground, and Layout: Medienbüro Meyer

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