Understanding the Russian Withdrawal from Syria

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Understanding the Russian Withdrawal from Syria Fariza Dzorthova FOKUS | 3/2016 Understanding the Russian withdrawal from Syria During the last half-year Syria has gone participated in the west-led occupations in than 2000 Russian fighters, including 17 through fast and violent alterations both the Middle East in the similar vein as with field commanders have been eliminated on the battlefield and in the political con- the Syrian case, and it has even expressed during the Russian military operations in text. In tandem with Iranian and Hezbollah sympathy towards all forms of resistance Syria2. militia on the ground, Russia carried out to occupations. Interestingly, the USSR ge- massive military operations across Syria, nerally had a low profile during the insur- Regaining territory turning the course of events in favor of the rection of 1982 in Syria, led by a political exhausted Syrian regime. This strategy to Islam organization formed in 1920s – the With Russian intervention aiming to rescue capture territory was carried out in anti- Muslim Brotherhood - against the Hafez Assad, who was losing more and more cipation of the fact that negotiations are al-Assad’s regime. Considering the USSR’s territory to the rebels, the spirits of the under way, desiring to draw the broad out- pressure that Russian Muslims were under Syrian army rose at once and it was able to lines of a political settlement. Unexpected- during the Soviet time, Russia’s reluctance move forward in several fronts. Most of the ly, Putin has ordered a partial withdrawal can be impugned. Large profits from the 910 km Syrian-Turkish border that crosses of Russian forces from Syria starting March weapons sales to Syrian authorities (by the East of the Euphrates - an important 15, the day the negotiations start in Genè- then more than 60% of the Syrian GDP was trade corridor between the countries ve, stating that the objectives that have spent on arms under the pretext of libera- to date - is controlled by the Kurdistan been set, are generally accomplished. But tion of Palestine)1 and Russia’s occupation Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is the fact remains - the Islamic State (IS) - with its own internal issues, give some propped up by both Russia and the US. the original declared objective for Russian explanations. Nevertheless, since the fall Only a 160 km stretch, which lies on the intervention - is still having a considerable of the USSR, the Russian government has West Bank of the Euphrates, is not under part of Syria under its control, and in the been claiming that the Middle East is close control by the Kurdish forces. Considering statement about the end of operation in to its neighborhood, so the border defense that the opposition, Assad’s regime, and Syria the IS has not been even mentioned. has become Moscow’s primary concern. the Islamic State, the latter of which has Whether Russia has fulfilled its tasks in Sy- Besides, the US strategy in the region is under its control a 98 km Jarabulus-Azaz ria or simply retreated, convinced that it is a threat and incompetent in Putin’s view, linkage along with a 13 km road stretching impossible, is today a subject to controver- as well as dangerous, because it provokes from Azaz to Afrin, are eager to control the sy. But a closer look at the events in Syria wars in the Gulf States, resulting in Russia Syrian-Turkish frontier, this is a dramatic and Russia’s policy both toward it, as well losing friendly regimes, such as the Libyan achievement. The rest of the borderland as Russia’s domestic issues, could help to one. that lies across the Mediterranean and understand what the Russian calculations the province of the Hatay within Turkey, is might mean. Specifically the fight against the IS, decla- controlled by the Syrian-Kurdish People’s red by Russia when intervening in Syria, Defense Units (YPG).3 The pretext for the Russian military cam- was unrealizable by the current Russian paign in Syria military means. It is an elusive goal, which The high priority target of Russian forces requires a huge military coalition, hund- was the so called Azaz-Aleppo Corridor - a There are goals that are declared within reds of thousands of troops, a large-scale lifeline to the opposition-held areas in the framework of propaganda and there operation, and not just 50 small aircraft northern Aleppo - and is, in fact, coordina- are goals that are set within the actual mili- and helicopters applied for pinpoint ted with the US, which is employing the tary and political operations, for instance, strikes. And in fact, the Russian president’s Kurdish forces as a proxy to hold the IS the fight against international terrorism, speech at the UN General Assembly calling within the Syrian boundaries before its fi- which is a global strategic goal of the same for common anti-terror efforts faced a mu- nal strike to completely destroy the group. order as the struggle for democracy. But all ted reaction. Although, within this global Russian air strikes forced people to move of this is a common declaration, covering objective, there was another small goal, to the Shia-dominated towns supporting specific interests - a constant (which is which is considered as achieved by the the regime, Nubl and Zahraa. With this impossible without military support) pres- Russian Defense Minister: the destruction move, Russia together with its allies, put ence in the strategically important region. of the militants, who sympathize with the the towns back under the control of the terrorist underground in Russia. As Presi- regime and cut off the opposition’s supply The interference in the Syrian conflict dent Vladimir Putin said: ‘it is better if we route Azaz-Aleppo. The opposition-held is the first time Russia is at war beyond will fight with them there, than in Russia’. part of Aleppo was now besieged by three its borders since its crushing defeat in According to the Russian Defense Ministry fighting forces: the regime forces from Afghanistan. Previously, Russia has never data, by the time of the withdrawal, more the southern and the northern sides, the 1 Understanding the Russian withdrawal from Syria FOKUS | 3/2016 IS from the north and the east, and the three regions: surrounding Latakia, in the it would only last for a several months and Kurdish fighters from the western side.4 northern parts of the Aleppo governorate, that it would not become a second Afgha- and in the governorate of Deraa, all of nistan with a Libyan fate. Vladimir Putin in Simultaneously, Russia’s air strikes allowed which are free of the IS and other radical the past two years, has mainly been enga- the PYD to advance on the road that ties groups. The Russian intervention revived ged in foreign policy and the engagement the Aleppo city to the Azaz town. By the the ‘regime-vs-extremism’ contrast in fact, is regarded as successful for Russia in ge- first week of February, the Kurds, inclu- which allowed Russia to tackle whiche- neral. The isolation gets excited, because ding the YPG and a group calling itself ver group it considered. All told, Russian you can play on the contradictions of its ‘Revolu tionary Army’ forces seized two Defense Minister reported that the Russian participants. The military operation in Syria more towns to the north of the Nubul and Air Force helped the regime to regain 10 was exactly such a project. On one hand, Zahraa - Al Khirbeh and al-Ziara, as well 000 km of the Syrian territory with 400 it is a continuation of the policy of foreign as the airfield at Minaq, located less than settlements7. The main goals of Russian wars as an agenda set by Russia, which the 7 km away from Azaz.5 These forces will military offensive - to save its ally’s regime international community has to respond likely continue to advance northward to- and regroup its military force - have been to. On the other hand, it is an attempt to ward the Turkish border, thereby making it achieved. By its withdrawal, Russia is likely get out of political isolation, and it has easier for the regime forces to consoli date demonstrating the end of the unconditio- been successful, but it seems that only in their positions in and around of Aleppo. nal support to Assad, aiming to pressure the framework of the Syrian project. The Under such circumstances, the regime is him to take a more serious stance towards meetings after the Russian direct involve- able to create a buffer between its gained the opposition in the UN-hosted negotia- ment in the Syrian conflict have been long territory and any anti-regime forces based tions. Assad himself was informed about and substantial. Russia has once again in Aleppo area. The Russian military offen- the decision the same day when it was become a part of the ‘international board’ sive launched from the southwest of Alep- actually announced. While Assad insisted of directors dealing with conflict resolu- po and focused on the Idlib governorate, on the war with a ‘victorious end’ regaining tions, but, in fact, the sanctions remained. allowed the regime and its allies to encircle all of Syria, Russian diplomats have made So the question of new Russian projects is the opposition forces based in Aleppo, and it clear that the solution of the conflict lies still open. to release its supporters within the Idlib only in a diplomatic solution. This pushes governorate. Any prospective ground of- Assad to concentrate on a single point of Parallel goals fensive against the IS would have to collide the negotiations under the UN aegis to with the regime or its allies.
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