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WITH TACTICAL LOSSES MOUNTING IN SYRIAN BADIA, LIWA’ AL-QUDS EXPANDS RECRUITMENT FLASH REPORT 16 September 2020 Liwa’ al-Quds begins recruiting The recruitment campaign has specifically targeted former fighters affiliated with the fighters in South Damascus Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP - GC) who were Since the area’s reconciliation in May 2018, decommissioned after the end of military South Damascus has slowly become a prime operations in Yarmuk camp in South Damascus recruiting ground for pro-government militias. in 2018. To date, 20 former PFLP-GC fighters On 2 September, local sources reported that have joined Liwa’ al-Quds as a result of the Liwa’ al-Quds, a nominally Palestinian force recent recruitment drive.1 Recruitment is formed in Aleppo in 2013, had started recruiting reportedly being led by Maher Al Mo’azen, a young Palestinian-Syrian men from the area to former PFLP-GC-affiliated commander who be sent to Syria’s central Badia desert to fight reportedly has links with Liwa’ al-Quds’ chief ISIS. 1 The fighters are offered a salary ranging from 50,000 – 75,000 SYP ($23–$35) per month as opposed to the PFLP-GC salary, which does not exceed 30,000 SYP ($14) per month. MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS WITH TACTICAL LOSSES MOUNTING IN SYRIAN BADIA, LIWA’ AL-QUDS EXPANDS RECRUITMENT >> 1 commander Mohammad Al Sa’id.2 Recruitment an Aleppo-based version of the National is also reportedly being conducted by the Defense Forces (NDF), Russia became Liwa’ al- Palestinian Democratic Liberation Party, a Quds’ chief patron sometime after the late 2016 mercenary group disguised as a political party offensive that saw government forces retake run by Mazen Chukeir (also known as Abu Jamil). opposition-held Eastern Aleppo.4 Growing influence of Liwa’ al- Although Liwa’ al-Quds has been deployed to a wide range of frontlines since the end of the Quds Aleppo offensive – including to Eastern Ghouta, Yarmuk and Dar’a in 2018 – until now the group Although the number of fighters so far recruited has remained a wholly Aleppo formation, from South Damascus appears to be small, the recruiting from Palestinian and Syrian recruitment by Liwa’ al-Quds suggests the communities in and around Syria’s second city.5 group’s fortunes are again on the rise, both As such, the new recruitment drive in South within Palestinian loyalist circles as well as pro- Damascus marks a notable growth in the group’s government factional networks more broadly. influence and reach. Liwa’ al-Quds was originally formed in late 2013, Russia appears to be investing significant bringing together a loose coalition of resources in the expansion of Liwa’ al-Quds – intelligence-backed armed militias who’d according to local sources, new recruits will be previously been deployed to put down anti- paid three times the amount they earned during government protests in and around Aleppo. Its their time in the PFLP-GC’s ranks. The fact that commander is Muhammad Al Sa’id, a Palestinian Al Sa’id is said to be personally involved in the originally from Neirab camp with pre-war links recruitment drive also suggests this is very much to Air Force Intelligence and the Berri Clan; over a top-down step undertaken with the group’s time, the group’s sources of support and commanders and Russian patrons. legitimacy has changed.3 Although the group initially received Iranian patronage and funding Given Liwa’ al-Quds’ links with leading PFLP-GC due to its role in the Local Defense Forces (LDF), members, not least its acting secretary-general 2 Mo’azen led one of the lijaan sha’abiyeh (popular committees) formed by the PFLP-GC in Yarmuk camp in mid-2012 before later integrating with the NDF sometime after Yarmuk fell to the opposition in December of that year. The popular committees distributed arms to new recruits inside Yarmuk, the first time this occurred in the local area after the outbreak of Syria’s uprising and conflict. 3 Reportedly, these militias initially received weapons and support from Air Force Intelligence and the Berri Clan, a pro-government Sunni tribal grouping and powerful smuggling family based in southern Aleppo that fought alongside the Syrian army early-on in Aleppo. Later, the Syrian government’s backers (Iran and Russia) moved in. The PFLP-GC also oversaw formation of Liwa’ al-Quds, reportedly through its then-deputy, Talal Naji. 4 The run-up to the final offensive on Eastern Aleppo saw Liwa’ al-Quds coordinate more closely with the Russians, for example during campaigns against opposition positions in Handarat towards the Castello Road on the northern outskirts of Aleppo. Several high-ranking Liwa’ al-Quds figures, including Al Sa’id, were later awarded Russian military decorations for their role in the Handarat offensive. Russia has since conducted trainings for Liwa’ al-Quds fighters inside Handarat, while Liwa’ al-Quds is reportedly responsible for granting security permits for Handarat residents to enter the camp. 5 Although Liwa’ al-Quds was formed out of intelligence-backed militias originating from Neirab and Handarat, Aleppo’s two Palestinian camps, the group later recruited Syrian fighters from communities across the city (including the Shia-majority towns of Zahraa and Nubl). Liwa’ al-Quds’ core leadership are mostly from Neirab, a Palestinian camp on the southeastern outskirts of Aleppo adjacent to Aleppo’s airport (which became a highly strategic frontline between the Syrian army and opposition groups between 2012 and 2013). MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS WITH TACTICAL LOSSES MOUNTING IN SYRIAN BADIA, LIWA’ AL-QUDS EXPANDS RECRUITMENT >> 2 Talal Naji,6 it is likely that the recruitment in backed military formations to fend for South Damascus is taking place with prior themselves. Additionally, groups including agreement from the PFLP-GC (with probable Kataeb Hezbollah Al Nujaba, Liwaa Al Russian mediation). Within the frame of Fatimiyoun, Liwaa Abu Fadel Al Abbas, and Palestinian factional politics, the use of Liwa’ al- Syrian Hezbollah partially withdrew their forces Quds to absorb fighters from a more established on later dates. Palestinian faction (formed in the late 1960s) is an interesting development with little relative The disengagements have resulted in Russian precedent during the course of the Syrian forces incurring tactical losses: On 18 August, two Russian military advisers and seven NDF conflict – however, it is more noteworthy that an ostensibly Aleppo-based faction is now actively fighters were killed when explosive devices recruiting in Damascus. While Liwa’ al-Quds has detonated in the southeastern desert of Deir-ez- been deployed across the country since 2016, it Zor near the Al-Taim oil field. On 24 August, NDF is relatively rare for Palestinian factions to commander Khaled al-Shahada was killed by a actually recruit outside of their traditional landmine during a military operation. The spheres of influence (which would ordinarily be mounting losses have reportedly resulted in the done through pre-existing networks in the form defection of 28 NDF fighters from Al Al- of established Palestinian factions such as the Mayadeen towards self-administration-held PFLP-GC or Fatah al-Intifada).7 This points to areas of Deir-ez-Zor; the defectors then Liwa’ al-Quds growing influence around Syria, surrendered themselves to the US-backed and its efficacy for the Russians in different Syrian Democratic Forces. active theatres around the country. Local sources have reported that Russian- backed NDF and Liwa’ al-Quds are demoralized Russian-backed forces incur as a result of heavy losses, their disadvantage in tactical losses in Syrian Badia terms of knowledge of the terrain vis-a-vis ISIS, lack of necessary resources to conduct the campaign against ISIS campaign effectively, difficulty in cutting ISIS supply lines, and difficulty in stopping ISIS fighter Pro-Iranian militias engaged in combat with ISIS movement between governorates and across in the Syrian Badia desert, such as the Islamic the Syrian and Iraqi border. The Russians have Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Popular thus seemingly resorted to four primary Mobilization Units, reportedly withdrew from the battlefield on 14 August, leaving Russian- 6 Naji has temporarily replaced the PFLP-GC’s longstanding secretary-general, Ahmad Jibril, after Jibril reportedly contracted COVID-19 earlier this year. His health condition is currently unknown. 7 Arguably, the only other example is the Free Palestine Movement, led by Yasser Qashlaq, a Palestinian political movement with its own armed wing (led by Sa’ad Abdel Aal). The group likely received some Hezbollah support on Yarmuk frontlines after 2012, and Abdel Aal has met with Iranian officials. The militia has since deployed to other pro-government frontlines (for example in the northwest), although it has remained very much a product of its Damascene roots, specifically in Yarmuk camp, and does not appear to have recruited outside Damascus. MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS WITH TACTICAL LOSSES MOUNTING IN SYRIAN BADIA, LIWA’ AL-QUDS EXPANDS RECRUITMENT >> 3 strategies in order to increase the resilience of (iv) Russia has seemingly brought Syrian their forces: government forces into the fight: On 11 September, local sources reported on the (i) Local sources have stated that Russian- deployment of Syrian Arab Army’s 17th backed forces have dug trenches and Division bringing in armored personnel erected defensive positions in Al- carriers, light and heavy artillery from the Mayadeen facing potential ISIS attack northern Ar-Raqqa countryside to routes from the Syrian Badia. Masrab (Tabni subdistrict) and (ii) Russia seems to be expanding Shmeitiyeh township (Tabni subdistrict) recruitment through its proxy formations in Deir-ez-Zor under Russian supervision, already involved in the ISIS campaign, in with the stated aim of joining the fight addition to asking proxy forces based in against ISIS.

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