Primaries: a Dress Rehearsal for the Election? Analyzing the Conservative Party of Canada's 2016-2017 Leadership Primary

Primaries: a Dress Rehearsal for the Election? Analyzing the Conservative Party of Canada's 2016-2017 leadership primary

Mémoire

Audrey Brennan

Maîtrise en science politique - avec mémoire Maître ès arts (M.A.)

Québec, Canada

Primaries: a Dress Rehearsal for the Election? Analyzing the Conservative Party of Canada’s 2016-2017 leadership primary

Mémoire

Audrey Elizabeth Brennan

Sous la direction de:

Marc André Bodet Résumé

Primaire: une répétition générale pour l’élection? La sélection des chefs de partis de façon dé- centralisée étant un phénomène récent au Canada, en quoi cette nouvelle formule de sélection se distingue d’une campagne électorale? Ce projet est une étude d’un cas actuel soit, la course à la cheﬀerie du Parti conservateur du Canada. À l’aide d’une analyse de contenu médiatique, de données issues des réseaux sociaux et d’entretiens semi-dirigés, nous tentons de répondre à la question suivante: Comment est-ce que les règles de la course à la direction 2016-2017 du Parti conservateur du Canada inﬂuencent-elles la perspective électorale du parti. La loi d’airain de Mi- chels (1915c) suggère qu’en raison du manque d’intérêt des électeurs, les partis centralisent leurs organisations de plus en plus complexes autour des chefs de partis politiques. Trois composantes conduisent à l’oligarchisation des partis politiques dans les démocraties: la psychologie des can- didats; le besoin d’organisation; et la psychologie des masses (Michels, 1915c, 516). Ce projet met à jour et teste la loi de d’airain.

La campagne à la cheﬀerie du Parti conservateur du Canada n’est pas une répétition générale pour les élections. Celle-ci est une audition. Il s’agit de choisir qui seront les principaux acteurs de l’élection, aucune répétition générale nécessaire. Il s’agit de préparer la mise en scène, d’écrire le scénario et de choisir qui sera le metteur en scène lors de la répétition générale. Celle-ci débutera réellement lor du congrès du parti qui aura lieu à l’été 2018. Une année après la sélection du nouveau chef.

iii Abstract

Primaries: A Dress Rehearsal for the General Election? Since the selection of party leaders in a decentralized manner is a recent phenomenon in Canada, how is this new selection procedure diﬀerent from an election campaign? This project is a study of a current case, the leadership selection of the Conservative Party of Canada. The research question is: How do the rules of the Conservative Party of Canada’s 2016-2017 leadership race inﬂuence the electoral prospect of the party? It is answered using an analysis of media content, data from social networks, and semi- structured interviews. Michels’ (1915c) Iron Law of Oligarchy suggests that due to the lack of interests of voters, parties have centered their increasingly complex organizations around leaders. Three components lead to the oligarchization of political parties in democracies: the psychology of candidates; the need for organization; and the psychology of the masses (Michels, 1915c, 516). This project updates and tests the Iron Law.

The Conservative Party of Canada’s leadership campaign is not a dress rehearsal for the general election. This leadership primary is more like an audition. It is about choosing who will be the key players at the election, no dress rehearsal needed. It is about setting the scene, writing the plot and choosing who will lead the party at the dress rehearsal. Which will really begin during the policy convention that follows the leadership selection in the summer of 2018.

iv Contents

Résumé iii

Abstract iv

Contents v

List of Tables vii

List of Figures viii

Acknowledgments xii

Introduction 1

1 Literature Review4 1.1 Decentralization of leadership selection...... 5 1.1.1 Changing patterns of political participation...... 5 1.1.2 The importance of party leaders...... 7 1.2 How are leaders chosen? ...... 7 1.3 The rules governing primaries...... 10 1.4 Why choose a primary? ...... 11 1.5 Michels’ Iron Law...... 13 1.6 Conclusion...... 15

2 Theoretical Framework 17 2.1 Modernizing Michels’ Theory ...... 17 2.2 The case study...... 20 2.3 Conclusion...... 23

3 Research Question and hypotheses 24 3.1 Research Question...... 24 3.2 Hypotheses...... 24 3.3 Conclusion...... 25

4 Methodology and Data 26 4.1 The inﬂuence of rules on individual campaigns...... 26 4.2 Inﬂuence of rules on candidacies...... 29 4.3 Media coverage of the campaign ...... 30 4.4 Conclusion...... 31

v 5 Setting the Scene: Primary rules and candidacies 33 5.1 Candidacy rules in the leadership primary ...... 33 5.2 Conclusion...... 38

6 Open-House: Eﬀect of rules on candidates’ campaigns 40 6.1 Introduction...... 40 6.2 Conservative Party Rules and their Inﬂuence...... 41 6.3 Target Audience...... 43 6.4 Campaign messaging during the leadership primary...... 46 6.4.1 Message transmission strategies...... 46 6.5 Conclusion...... 53

7 All the World’s a Stage: Newspaper coverage of the campaign 55 7.1 Behind the Scenes: Perspectives on the news...... 55 7.2 Center Stage: Type of Coverage ...... 61 7.3 Conclusion...... 65

Conclusion 66

A Media Analysis Code-book 72

B Interview Questions 75

C Latent Dirichlet Allocation Topic Modeling: Results and robustness tests 76 C.1 Chris Alexander...... 76 C.2 Maxime Bernier...... 79 C.3 Steven Blaney ...... 81 C.4 Michael Chong ...... 83 C.5 Kellie Leitch ...... 85 C.6 Pierre Lemieux ...... 87 C.7 Deepak Obhrai ...... 89 C.8 Kevin O’Leary...... 91 C.9 Erin O’Toole...... 93 C.10 Rick Peterson ...... 95 C.11 Lisa Raitt ...... 97 C.12 Andrew Saxton ...... 99 C.13 Andrew Scheer ...... 101 C.14 Brad Trost...... 103

References 105

vi List of Tables

1.1 Typology of primary election methods...... 8

2.1 The evolution of leadership selection change methods in Canada...... 21

4.1 Summary of Methodology...... 27 4.2 Topic Models...... 28 4.3 Search protocol: Factiva and Eurekka c.c...... 30

5.1 Candidacy Rules Time-line...... 35

6.1 Salient topics...... 50 6.2 Salient topics (cont’d) ...... 51 6.3 Salient topics (cont’d) ...... 52

C.1 Chris Alexander Topic Summary...... 77 C.2 Maxime Bernier Topic Summary...... 80 C.3 Steven Blaney Topic Summary...... 82 C.4 Michael Chong Topic Summary...... 84 C.5 Kellie Leitch Topic Summary...... 86 C.6 Pierre Lemieux Topic Summary ...... 88 C.7 Deepak Obhrai Topic Summary...... 90 C.8 Kevin O’leary Topic Summary ...... 92 C.9 Erin O’Toole Topic Summary** ...... 94 C.10 Rick Peterson Topic Summary...... 96 C.11 Lisa Raitt Topic Summary...... 98 C.12 Andrew Saxton Topic Summary ...... 100 C.13 Andrew Scheer Topic Summary ...... 102 C.14 Brad Trost Topic Summary ...... 104

vii List of Figures

1.1 Party aﬃliation: the multi-speed model...... 6

2.1 Schema of Oligarchy...... 18

4.1 Tweeting Frequency by Candidate...... 29

7.1 Coverage by language ...... 58 7.2 Candidate Mention Frequency...... 60 7.3 Personality vs. Policy Coverage...... 62 7.4 Personality vs. Policy: Candidates Types...... 63 7.5 Personality vs. Policy: All Candidates...... 64 7.6 Oligarchy in the Canadian Context ...... 68

C.1 Chris Alexander Perplexity ...... 76 C.2 Chris Alexander Topics...... 77 C.3 Chris Alexander Topic Spread ...... 78 C.4 Maxime Bernier Perplexity ...... 79 C.5 Maxime Bernier Topics...... 79 C.6 Maxime Bernier Topic Spread ...... 80 C.7 Steven Blaney Perplexity...... 81 C.8 Steven Blaney Topics...... 81 C.9 Steven Blaney Topic Spread...... 82 C.10 Michael Chong Perplexity...... 83 C.11 Michael Chong Topics...... 83 C.12 Michael Chong Topic Spread...... 84 C.13 Kellie Leitch Perplexity...... 85 C.14 Kellie Leitch Topics...... 85 C.15 Kellie Leitch Topic Spread...... 86 C.16 Pierre Lemieux Perplexity...... 87 C.17 Pierre Lemieux Topics...... 87 C.18 Pierre Lemieux Topic Spread...... 88 C.19 Deepak Obhrai Perplexity...... 89 C.20 Deepak Obhrai Topics...... 89 C.21 Deepak Obhrai Topic Spread...... 90 C.22 Kevin O’Leary Perplexity...... 91 C.23 Kevin O’Leary Topics...... 91 C.24 Kevin O’Leary Spread...... 92 C.25 Erin O’Toole Perplexity...... 93

viii C.26 Erin O’Toole Topics...... 93 C.27 Erin O’Toole Topic Spread...... 94 C.28 Rick Peterson Perplexity...... 95 C.29 Rick Peterson Topics...... 95 C.30 Rick Peterson Topic Spread...... 96 C.31 Lisa Raitt Perplexity...... 97 C.32 Lisa Raitt Topics...... 97 C.33 Lisa Raitt Topic Spread...... 98 C.34 Andrew Saxton Perplexity...... 99 C.35 Andrew Saxton Topics...... 99 C.36 Andrew Saxton Topic Spread...... 100 C.37 Andrew Scheer Perplexity...... 101 C.38 Andrew Scheer Topics ...... 101 C.39 Andrew Scheer Topic Spread...... 102 C.40 Brad Trost Perplexity...... 103 C.41 Brad Trost Topics ...... 103 C.42 Brad Trost Topic Spread...... 104

ix Pour mes grand-mères. Ceci est le fruit de vos plus beaux legs: le rêve et la persévérence.

x Une pièce de théâtre, c’est quelqu’un. C’est une voix qui parle, c’est un esprit qui éclaire, c’est une conscience qui avertit.

Victor Hugo.

xi Remerciements

Je dois beaucoup au soutien de mon directeur, Marc André Bodet. Son enthousiasme, son éthique de travail et sa rigueur scientiﬁque ont contribué à la réalisation de ce projet de recherche. Merci de répondre à chaque question, de lire chaque mot et pour chaque référence de François Pérusse. Je suis seulement désolé que je ne catch toujours pas ces dernières.

Je suis également redevable aux membres de mon jury pour leurs précieux commentaires, Eric Montigny et François Gélineau. Je suis choyé d’avoir bénéﬁcié de vos conseils au cours des deux dernières années. Ils ont également fourni un environnement de travail dynamique et accueillant à la Chaire de recherche sur la démocratie et les institutions parlementaires.

Ce mémoire a été rendu possible en partie grâce au Social Network Harvester(ASPIRA). Un outil essentiel fourni par le Groupe de recherche en communication politique (GRCP). Je suis égale- ment redevable à la Chaire de recherche sur la démocratie et les institutions parlementaires et au soutien ﬁnancier du Centre pour l’ Étude de la citoyenneté démocratique. Aux praticiens in- terviewés pour ce projet, j’exprime la plus grande gratitude pour votre enthousiasme et vos con- naissances du monde de la démocratie intrapartisane. La participation de militants politiques à des projets comme celui-ci est cruciale pour que les chercheurs reﬂètent la réalité du système partisan. De plus, la patience de Samuel Cloutier dans la mise en place d’ASPIRA était essentielle pour une grande partie de mes analyses. Un immense merci à vous tous!

Au cours des deux dernières années, j’ai eu la chance d’être entouré par de merveilleux collègues. Je voudrais surtout les remercier pour les distractions indispensables, sans quoi je ne m’en serais pas sortie vivante. Charles Tessier, Evelyne Brie, Sabrina Bourgeois, Justin Savoie, Mickael Tem- porão, Corentin Vande Kerckhove et Gabriel Coulombe ont créé un environnement de travail accueillant et productif à la Chaire. Joanie Bouchard, Katryne Villeneuve-Siconnelly, Benoît Béchard, Catherine Ouelette et Dominic Duval m’ont aidé à survivre dans la jungle qui est la rédaction d’un mémoire. Finalement, dans une série d’événements malheureux au cours du dernier mois d’écriture, j’ai eu la chance d’avoir Francesco Pascu et Alessandra Bonci qui ont tout fait pour m’aider à terminer à temps. Grazie mille!

To Sterling Thorne Perkins, "Let us learn to show our friendship for a man when he is alive and not after he is dead" (F.Scott Fitzgerald). Your kindness, enthusiasm, and contagious good mood are

xii some of the many reasons I am fortunate to call you my friend.

Je suis également reconnaissante à ma famille pour leur soutien constant, tant lors de mes études que lors de mes autres folies. Paul-André Brennan et Christiane Fortin, merci pour tous vos en- couragements! Dobby et Boogy, sans vous deux j’aurais surement terminé plus tôt. Pour cela je vous en remercie.

Chères grand-mères, ce mémoire vous est dédié. Denise Brennan, Grand-maman, vous avez toujours su persévérer. Je vous remercie de cet exemple de femme forte. Georgette Fréchette, depuis mon tout jeune âge tu me disais toujours d’écrire toutes mes idées. Un jour j’accomplirai une ou plusieurs de celles-ci. Voici l’une d’elles. Grand-m’an, laisse-moi te raconter ça...

xiii Introduction

To immediately address the elephant in the proverbial room, the least predictable entrance in politics is that of Donald Trump. Indeed, due to a primary Trump was able to go from reality-TV businessman to President. In Canada primaries are diﬀerent. Primaries are closed. This means that only party members get to choose the leader. This is a fairly recent practice on the part of political parties (Cross and Pilet, 2015). Primaries are a reaction to changing political participation (Scarrow, 2014), whereby parties attempt to maintain their status as membership organizations. In 2013, the Liberal Party of Canada allowed party supporters and members to choose the leader (Montigny and Tessier, 2017). To be a supporter, all one had to do was to create an account on the party’s website without paying any fees. Political parties have reached a critical juncture, where their very organization is changing. Increasingly they create incentives, such as the right to choose leaders, for individuals to join their organization (Gauja, 2017).

For the Liberal Party of Canada, the 2013 leadership primary saw Justin Trudeau selected as party leader. Following the 2015 general election, both the New Democrats and Conservatives began the process of selecting their leader. This also concurs with what scholars have proposed. That, generally, an electoral setback will lead a political party, to undertake the process of leadership change (Leduc, 2001; Goldstein, 2002). Scholars have also argued that primaries look like a general election (Weller, 1994; Kenig, 2009b).

Regardless of the external effects of leadership primaries, scholars have yet to look at the consequences of the new rules on the party (Scarrow, 2014). Indeed, studies have looked at who the leaders are and what are the influence of different selection rules on the results (Cross and Blais, 2012; Pilet and Cross, 2014; Cross and Pilet, 2015). It is necessary then to look at the mechanism of leadership selection in more detail. It is necessary to answer the following question: how do the rules influence the electoral prospects of the party?

The objective of this M.A. thesis is to look at how decentralized leadership selection rules aﬀect the dynamics internal and external to the party. By doing so, it will be possible to infer some the potential electoral consequences of intra-party democracy on electoral viability. This is done by using the Conservative Party of Canada’s leadership change procedure that followed the 2015 election.

1 Results

Crotty et al.(1999) propose that the wining candidate’s message will be the one that the party will use at the next election. Consequently, a leadership primary would be a dress rehearsal for a general election in that regard. In addition, because it is technically easier to adhere to the party or become a candidate, we should see party outsiders participate in the process (candidates and members). Furthermore, the media should also be emphasizing candidates’ personalities as opposed to their policies, as they would during an election (Trimble, 2007). Although, we do see some of these tendencies these assumptions are much more nuanced.

Firstly, the message used by the wining candidate may have more weight than his or her competi- tors. However, because the Conservatives have a policy convention scheduled one year after the leader was selected, then whether or not this message will stay with the party remains to be seen. The message the party’sbureaucracy is sending with its rules though, is that it wanted candidates to campaign to Canada more broadly. Indeed, the 100 points per riding encouraged many candidates to have national campaigns. In addition, to have a successful campaign, candidates had to renew and recruit party members. There are two main reasons for this. The ﬁrst is to recruit their own leadership voters and the second is the renew the party’s membership more generally. The ﬁrst reason is evident. It should be added, moreover, that this encouraged candidates who wanted to add a policy to the party’s agenda to recruit niche members, such as social conservatives.

Secondly, because of the nature of candidacies, the policy versus personality dimension of news coverage does not apply to every candidate. Indeed, some candidates received more policy whilst others’ personalities were emphasized. However, the top two scoring candidates on the ﬁrst ballot received more or less equal personality and policy coverage. Which leads us to conclude that the dress rehearsal aspect of the primary only applies to the media. That the primary of the Con- servative Party of Canada is in fact more of an audition than a dress rehearsal.

Outline

The ﬁrst chapter of this thesis provides an overview of the literature surrounding leadership selection. It includes scholarship on party politics, political communication, and party membership. The second chapter outlines the theoretical framework that guides this project. Robert Michels’ Iron Law of Oligarchy is updated to reﬂect the reality of modern political parties. It leads to Chap- ter3, where the research question and hypotheses are listed. The methodology and data used to answer the research question are discussed in Chapter4. We propose the integration of semi- structured interviews, newspaper coverage, and candidates’ tweets. Interviews were completed with candidates, national organizers, local organizers, and Members of parliament.

There are many reasons which encouraged candidates to participate in the primary. There are

2 also many challenges which they have faced during the campaign. The influence of the rules on candidates are discussed in Chapter5. We see, that why a candidate ran, also influenced their campaign strategies. In Chapter6, it is shown using tweets and interviews how the rules encouraged national campaigns. Interestingly, these dynamics are not quite reflected in the newspaper coverage of the primary. These results are in Chapter7. The final chapter discusses the implications of these results for the party. It also highlights the scientific contribution of this project, its limitations, and concludes with proposals for future research projects.

3 Chapter 1

Literature Review

Since the early twentieth century leadership selection procedures have been gradually decentralized to give a vote to political party members. Because of that, scholars have concluded that political party membership has become permeable to broader segments of the electorate (Leduc, 2001; Pilet and Cross, 2014; Goldstein, 2002; Cross and Crysler, 2011). In addition, there are few in-depth studies of the eﬀects of these processes (Cross and Pilet, 2015) and their broader consequences on the party and its membership (Scarrow, 2014). Lemieux(2005) suggests that political parties should be studied as a system per se as opposed to simply being part of a system. It allows the researcher to get a better grasp of the dynamic components surrounding elections. Political parties can be studied on three levels: internal organization, electoral support, and governing approach (Lemieux, 2005).

This chapter answers a series of questions on leadership selection using Lemieux as a guide to view the political party as a system. Because the subject of study is leadership selection, the focus is on aspects of internal organization and electoral support. What explains the decentralization of leadership selection? How are leaders chosen? What are the rules governing these processes? Parties have evolved into complex organizations over time due to changing patterns of political participation. This is impacted by the changing internal organization of political parties and the advancement of communication technologies. This suggests that evolution is cyclical. Parties have found that including leadership primaries in their internal organization repertoire is a good way of rallying non-traditional party supporters to participate in a seemingly traditional organization. Thus, primaries should create a centripetal force for party membership. Furthermore, the chapter shows by discussing Robert Michels’ Iron Law of Oligarchy that, in theory, leadership primaries may be a democratic contradiction. This is because the party has to manage the aftermath of the primary.

4 1.1 Decentralization of leadership selection

This section shows that because of the dynamic nature of participation, political parties have concentrated their campaigns around their leaders. This has led to the increasing pressure from below to decentralize decision-making processes in political parties.

1.1.1 Changing patterns of political participation

According to scholars, party members are either older and resourceful men or university stu- dents who were socialized to participate in politics by a family member (Cross and Young, 2008). Younger members may have also joined speciﬁcally to participate in a leadership race underway and will not necessarily support the party or the candidate later on. These are the conclusions of Cross and Young, who use data from surveys submitted directly to political party members or to members of their university campus clubs (2002a, 2002b, and 2008). Even the limits of their results are telling. Their respondent pool not only reﬂect the reality of certain party members, but in fact shows who traditionally participates in party politics (i.e. educated or older citizens). In sum, their studies conclude that party membership is declining and those who are members are not representative of the electorate. Researchers have emphasized the decline of traditional membership since the sixties (Scarrow, 2014, 69-97). However, party politics is not yet obsolete and there is still a demand for direct access to the political process (van Biezen and Poguntke, 2014, 215), at least to some extent. Which is why parties have introduced primaries and citizen consultations (Gauja, 2017, 186).

New forms of membership and electronic involvement of citizens also has its effects on the internal workings of political parties (Scarrow, 2014). Hence instead of focusing on decline, let us focus on change. The discussion should not revolve around how non-traditional involvement is broken hence it requires fixing. Rather it should be about how these new forms of participation affect the internal structures of political parties. "Although they are as yet unlikely to offer a viable substitute to traditional party politics, they may come to complement the conventional vertical and hierarchical modes of politics within an increasingly horizontalized society." (van Biezen and Poguntke, 2014, 215; see also Lawson, 2007). If mass membership parties are an ideal model, then the evolution of participation is detrimental for political parties. It is damaging to maintain such an idyllic vision because of changes in types of membership (van Biezen and Pic- cio, 2013; Gauja, 2017). In that regard, party changes are understood as what they are: adaptation to a political and societal landscape in constant evolution.

Because they attempt to appeal to the larger electorate, parties are focused on winning elections as opposed to keeping their partisans satisﬁed (van Biezen and Poguntke, 2014, 205; Lemieux, 2005, 97). This can create internal tensions. Consider Figure 1.1 which illustrates a modern dynamic between political parties and citizens. It shows that there is no clear conceptualization of political party support. Thus, political parties actually have a large partisan base in spite of the

5 Figure 1.1 – Party aﬃliation: the multi-speed model

Source: Scarrow(2014)

decrease in traditional membership adherence. Followers, cyber-members, and activists are all technically non-members, yet they can still contribute to a political party’s activities (Mair and van Biezen, 2001). The multi-speed model shows that the relationship between voters and political parties is dynamic and multifaceted, and that you do not need to be a member in order to actively contribute to a given party. However, if parties embrace this reality, then they will need to establish a bureaucracy.1 Which is why it is important to understand the mechanism behind political party aﬃliation as opposed to just the intensity of that relationship (Miller, 2009).

To prepare for an election campaign parties canvas voter for their information either by phone or door to door. Volunteers compile voting intentions and other details which give parties a better idea of how they will fare on election day. Sometimes, these volunteers are simply party supporters as opposed to members (Mair and van Biezen, 2001). Canvassing can also outline what needs to be done to rectify a troublesome situation (i.e. if a party needs more to win an election)(Nielsen, 2012). How do they know which door to knock on when citizens are no longer available through traditional means? Fewer are purchasing memberships or donating to a political party. Opportu- nities must be created to collect data on supporters. The multi-speed model shows that parties have access to more information than some scholars give them credit for. For example, a party can solicit cyber-members for support. However, the true task is reeling the supporters back-in

1More on this in section 1.5

6 into traditional roles when needed.

1.1.2 The importance of party leaders

The leader is responsible for representing and personalizing an ideology and, in turn, personalizing the core message of the political party (Miller, 2009; Kam, 2009). It facilitates the establishment of party aﬃliation among less attentive voters (Miller, 2009).

Leaders of political parties are the central ﬁgures in contemporary parliamentary democracies. We come to this conclusion by virtue of the observations that parties operate at the center of politics and that their leaders exercise considerable authority over both party and governmental activity. (Cross and Blais, 2012, 1)

However, the increasing attention given to leaders leads to the dedemocratization of political parties (Lawson, 2007). Which leads to the increasing presence of highly charismatic candidates that can spin controversial issues and generate support for said issues (McAllister, 1996). It is thus a self-reinforcing trend. Leaders are charismatic due to their exemplary character or heroic virtues, which legitimizes their exercise of power (Weber, 1921). Consequently, the media coverage of campaigns becomes more focused on the leader, as opposed to the party. Additionally, even if the leader does not have that much power, parties (and media) will feel like they need to person- alize the campaign around said political leaders. This process is part of the presidentialization of politics (Webb and Poguntke, 2005). Centralizing communications around a leader has been a solution to changing trends in political participation. To the point where communication strategies that are used to prepare a party to campaign at an election stays with its key players into power; and it sometimes become diﬃcult to distinguish between the government’s communications and the party’s message (Marland, 2016).

Scholars have proposed that the reason for choosing a decentralized method is to solicit support from outside the party’s traditional base (McAllister, 1996, 290). Which now makes decentralized leadership selection one of the key activities of political parties (Cross and Crysler, 2011). It gives members the opportunity to vote on policy design and to vote in a leadership primary (Cross and Pilet, 2015). Thereby, leadership selection may be the only real impact which the rank-and- ﬁle has on their party (Cross and Crysler, 2011). In addition, members get more say in the party through a primary because of the centralization of power around the leader.

1.2 How are leaders chosen?

Kenig et al.(2015) are critical of the literature on leadership selection because although there is no shortage of scholarship on the question, no one had yet offered a standardized typology for the different types of procedures. They thus propose a typology of seven leadership selection processes which are defined based on who can participate. This typology is similar to Leduc

7 (2001)’s. Leadership selection is a decentralized process if the selectorate is either the electorate, party supporters, or all party members (see also Cross et al., 2016, 25). There are two types of primaries: pure primaries and mixed primaries. Table 1.1 shows the typology of primary selection types. Candidate selection also falls under the umbrella term of primary. Herein, however, it strictly refers to leadership selection. Finally, when party delegates, the parliamentary party group, party elite, or the incumbent leader select the replacement, it is not a primary, but rather, a replacement through elite channels.

Table 1.1 – Typology of primary election methods

Type Subtype Selectorate Pure Primaries Open primary All voters are eligible to vote Semi-open primary Supporters and party members Closed primary Party members only Complex primary Selection through some combination of the above Mixed Primaries Weighted primary Combination of primary and non- primary zone selectorates in a single state. Primary zone selectorates have at least 50% of the vote Multi-stage primary Combination of a primary selectorate and a non-primary selectorate in a multi-staged process

Source: (Kenig et al., 2015, 153)

A primary by its rules alone is not necessarily more democratic than any other method (Cross and Blais, 2012; Bashevkin, 2010; Kenig, 2007; Pilet and Cross, 2014), although it might appear like it. In fact, selection through elite channels is more competitive (Kenig, 2007). Selection in exclusive selectorate is probably more oligarchic, less transparent and less accessible to fresh and young forces; but it is often more competitive and more economic. Furthermore, the selectors tend to know the candidates’ skills and personalities quite well and therefore exercise better judgment in the selection process (Kenig, 2007, 87).

Building a base that reflects the reality of the whole electorate was a principal motivation the ini- tial expansion of the selectorate (Courtney, 1995, 274-75). Yet few parties have actually adopted open primaries (Montigny and Tessier, 2017). Most have adopted a variant of the primary for leadership selection with the exception of Australia, New-Zealand, and Ireland’sFianna Fáil party (Pilet and Cross, 2014; Meyer and Odom, 2016; Cross et al., 2016). Australian parties prefer to have the flexibility to change their leaders at will and have thus maintained the traditional appointment of the leader by elected Members of Parliament. (Pilet and Cross, 2014, 194). With regards to the case of New-Zealand it is quite possible that their electoral system also influences the choice of leadership selection method.

8 The selectorate changes not only who decides to become a candidate, but also who has an incentive to engage in the process (Meyer and Odom, 2016). This is especially true because of the new ways in which citizens engage with political parties. Primaries have been considered as a principle-agent relationship. This puts into question the values of the new leader, because principals have a goal (leadership ascension) and will recruit agents to attain said goal (Quinn, 2004). Notwithstanding the new democratic selection methods voters will choose the unifying candidate (Quinn, 2004). Candidates who plan their leadership bid earlier in their career will have begun to assemble their campaign teams long before a primary has been announced and tend to fare better during the campaign (Cross and Pilet, 2015, 169). Consequently, who chooses the leader is not the only thing creating inequalities during the campaign. Who a candidate is can limit their chance of being a leader.

The use of primaries suggests that parties adapt their internal organization in order to change their electoral support. Broader electoral support implies that candidates have to organize stronger campaigns. Primaries will also be subjected to more media attention which can give a positive image boost to the party (Cross and Pilet, 2015, 171). On the other hand, there is a possibility that the coverage is of candidate’s personality as opposed to being focused on the proposed public policies (Pilet and Cross, 2014, 187). Consequently, primaries may reinforce the personalization of politics outlined in a prior section of this chapter. Therefore, reinforcing leadership centered instead of policy centered communications. The more inclusive the voter base the more resources candidates will need to organize their campaign. These resources include ﬁnancial support, volunteers, campaign staﬀ, and communication tools. Meaning that if a leadership candidate aspires to become leader, then she or he will have to organize a large campaign team. This unavoidably leads to an important role played by the media and money (Stewart and Archer, 2000, 6), because nowadays campaigns are increasingly professionalized.

The number of candidates is also important (Kenig, 2009b). An open primary increases the number of candidates, which affects competitiveness and the way journalists cover the process. A wider selectorate creates an early favorite in the polls (Bashevkin, 2010; Kenig, 2009b) leading to horserace news reports. Indeed, Trimble(2007), who studied the Globe and Mail’s coverage of candidates in three Conservative Party of Canada primaries, suggests that the competitiveness affects the way in which the news will be reported. Stronger candidates attract more attention. Conversely, the other candidates obtain less. Thus, the leadership primary also strengthens the leader effects which are already apparent in political communications. Decentralized decision- making inevitably can lead to the erosion of ideology in exchange for electoral support (Cross et al., 2016; Cross and Katz, 2013).

Leadership candidates and their entourage want to win elections whilst members have will more speciﬁc policy goals (Cross and Katz, 2013).2 Because parties streamline their message, they contribute to the decline of traditional membership. Elite selection is inexpensive and more com-

2See also Quéniart and Jacques(2001)

9 petitive. It facilitates the choice of a qualiﬁed candidate because the elite selectorate is better aware of candidates’ capabilities (Kenig, 2007, 87).3 Which might explain why New Zealand, Aus- tralia, and Ireland’sFianna Fáil party, have yet to decentralize their leadership selection processes (Meyer and Odom, 2016).

1.3 The rules governing primaries

The rules governing primaries are twofold. Firstly, they are the party rules that outline the actual voting procedure. These determine who can be a candidate and who can participate in the selection process as well as the campaigning rules for candidates. Secondly, there are electoral rules that are external to political parties. They vary from ﬁnance laws to standardized primary laws which all political parties must abide by.

Parties are cautious when choosing their rules because their organization’sunity is at stake (Quinn, 2010; Weller, 1994; Cross, 2016; Pilet and Cross, 2014; Putnam, 1976). For example, when estab- lishing the primary rules parties choose between;

[e]quality of members versus equality of ridings—it was a classic clash of principals in which each side advocated a principle advancing its own interests. The equal- member model treats all members equally, which is the norm in a democracy. How- ever, it also encourages the party to remain bottled up in areas of current geographic strength rather than expanding into areas of weakness. (Flanagan, 2009, 99-100)

The selection rules, such as points per riding, give candidates an incentive to campaign on national questions. The points per riding reinforces the current trend of the centralization of political power and the decentralization of the choice of said political power. National questions are rarely national in scope, and this makes them impossible to implement once a party is elected (Schattschneider, 1960). Which may also lead to voter disenchantment.

Parties reinforce increasingly stricter primary rules because some individuals might just purchase a membership to vote for the leader (Cross and Katz, 2013).4 Also, as mentioned earlier leadership primaries may be the only time when members (new and experienced) actively participate in a political party’s activities. Due to the higher number of participants, parties require that candidates pay a fee to fund the administrative process and to deter non-competitive candidates from participating (Carty and Blake, 1999; Cross and Blais, 2012; Cross et al., 2016). Indeed, should candidates with no chance of appealing to the party’s support base run, it could potentially harm their chances at the next election. Spending limits, participation fees, minimum bank account balances have also been imposed on candidates in the past (Cross and Crysler, 2011). Additionally, the process is monitored by the party to assure that all participants abide by the

3More on this in a subsequent section 4See also Subsection 1.1.1

10 rules (Courtney, 1995; Flanagan, 2009; Jeffrey, 2010; Stewart, 1997). Nonetheless it is difficult to reprimand rule breakers (Cross et al., 2016). Admitting that the rules were broken might have a negative effect on the party.

Whether parties should be subjected to external rules is a bone of contention (see Cross, 2016; Gauja, 2016, 2017; van Biezen and Piccio, 2013), which falls outside the scope of this research project. But, in Federalist 10 Madison explains how factions—parties—emerge. He also suggests how they can be managed. He notes that parties should be overseen by a neutral organization. The principal reason behind his argument is that a party could acquire enough support to dom- inate all aspects of the Government of the United States (Hamilton et al., 1911). The conclusion is that the faction cannot be stopped, it can only be slowed down (Hamilton et al., 1911).

Currently, Britain, Canada, and Australia only regulate the external aspects of parties, and Ger- many and the United States have internal and external regulations (Johns, 1999). Primaries could beneﬁt from state funding to alleviate the burdens imposed both on the candidates and the party more generally (Cross and Crysler, 2011). If primaries are state funded, then, political science scholars and citizens need to have a discussion on the need or the value of state regulation. For example, these rules could create incentives for all parties to diversify their candidates or force all parties to use the same primary method. It would level the playing ﬁeld (Pruysers and Cross, 2016). Thereby increasing the representativeness of parties more generally and allowing new candidates to bring more citizen voices at the forefront of political debates (Gauja, 2013).

1.4 Why choose a primary?

The rise of internal party factions during leadership selection (Carty and Cross, 2006; Pilet and Cross, 2014), creates regional, values-based, and other types of tension within a party. Here again primaries force parties to balance their organizational needs with their need for electoral support (Lemieux, 2005). Decentralizing leadership selection has led to the erosion of the ideological nature of political parties; and, the decreasing expectations that the rank-and-ﬁle and citizens have of parties (Ware, 2002). The fact of the matter is that decentralization leads to personalization (Cross et al., 2016). Hence if parties only focus their message around leaders as opposed to policies, then it may seem like they have weakening ideals.

Furthermore, primaries provide participants with an opportunity to become members; and generate publicity for the candidates outside their respective constituencies, which can add to the good image of the political party (Alexandre-Collier, 2016; Cross et al., 2016). This process can show who is apt for cabinet positions. In the past many leadership candidates which were not elected as leader, were later appointed to cabinet (Carty, 1989). Canadian examples of this are: Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin (Jeﬀrey, 2010; Carty, 2015), and Peter MacKay (Flanagan, 2009). Also, because primaries inevitably have many candidates, then there will be many runner-ups available for other top positions within the party. Hence, losing a leadership bid can also mean pro-

11 fessional advancement or exposure for a subsequent campaign (Carty, 1989).

Advocates of universal suffrage, argue that primaries add value and purpose to party members (Courtney, 1995, 241). It creates incentives to join a political party. Nonetheless, these voters are not more interested in the political process (Ostrogorski, 1903, 463). Therefore, some party members will remain passive despite having purchased a membership, as was demonstrated in the first section of this chapter. So why give them decision-making power? Because a leadership race is a good way to get donations (Pilet and Cross, 2014, 174). Indeed, Montigny and Tessier (2017) show that the sources of party revenue are volatile, hence parties have gotten creative in order to support increasingly complex structures. Primary candidates bring in money both with individual donations to their respective campaigns as well as revenue directly for the party with membership renewals and adherence (Noel, 2011; Cross and Katz, 2013). Recruitment also builds candidates’ supporter base for the primary (Flanagan, 2009; Jeffrey, 2010). Therefore, if a member technically votes for the candidate whom they purchased a membership from, then candidates have an incentive to recruit and renew as many members as they possibly can. The potential downside of this practice, is that the membership is constructed by the leadership candidates’ supporters (Cross et al., 2016). If a polarizing candidate can garner support, then the party will have to take into consideration how to keep these new supporters involved in the party. At the very least to keep their vote. Crotty et al.(1999) suggest that the winning leadership candidate’s platform will more or less dictate the party’s platform at the next election.

Therefore, the result of a leadership selection can have negative eﬀects on a party. An example is the electoral success of Britain’s Labour Party and the erosion of its internal organization under Tony Blair (Henig and Baston, 2005; Leduc, 2001; Quinn, 2004). Some leaders can even create disturbances in other parties, Tony Blair remains a good example here as well (Costa Lobo, 2008; Henig and Baston, 2005).

As this section shows, parties are adapting their traditional internal structures in exchange for electoral success (Crotty et al., 1999; Cross et al., 2016). At their detriment if we still consider that a mass membership party is an ideal model. Some have suggested that the best way to deter many, if not all issues, of primaries is by increasing their competitiveness (Bashevkin, 2010). The irony is that selection through elite channels has been proven to be more competitive (Kenig, 2007). Ped- ersen and Schumacher(2015) show that the positive effects that parties get from primaries fade as time passes. In addition, leaders chosen with an inclusive selectorate have a shorter tenure than those chosen by an exclusive group (Ennser-Jedenastik et al., 2015). In short, inclusiveness gives no tangible electoral advantages to parties that use them (Pedersen and Schumacher, 2015). What mobilization advantages, then, do these methods give to a party who uses them? For parties who favour exclusive methods, then how do they maintain their supporter base? New leaders are also punished for their electoral setbacks. Indeed, Ennser-Jedenastik et al.(2015) show this by testing the differences in tenure between leaders chosen with an inclusive method as opposed to an exclusive one. They conclude that electoral performance is not what affects tenure. Instead,

12 it is the expectations that intra-party contest participants have of the leader’s electoral performance. Simply put, if a leader is expected to fail and he does, then he is likely to keep his post despite not having provided any electoral gains.

1.5 Michels’ Iron Law

Is the paradoxical relationship between electoral support and internal organization a new phenomenon for political parties? In 1915 Robert Michels was already demonstrating the complex relationship between internal organization and electoral appeal. To be electorally viable a party needs to appeal to the masses outside of its traditional political circles. Thus, the party requires a viable candidate that is articulate, aesthetically pleasing, and intelligent (Michels, 1915b). If a leader does not emerge from the ruling class then she should have other characteristics to compete with the current ruler in an election campaign. Consequently, broadening the appeal legitimizes the ascension to power. Firstly, the support of less politically sophisticated masses is necessary. Secondly, there is the establishment of a larger organizational structure, which also solves two issues. The ﬁrst is the need of a structure to recruit the masses. The second is to manage both the new structure and the new members. Central to this process is the choice of a leader that has a broader appeal, partly due to their charisma and partly because the party loosens its platform.

Therefore,

[i]n view of the perennial incompetence of the masses, we must recognize the exis- tence of two regulative principles: 1. The ideological tendency of democracy towards criticism and control; 2. The eﬀective counter-tendency of democracy towards the creation of parties ever more complex and ever more diﬀerentiated — parties which are increasingly based upon the competence of the few. (Michels, 1915b, 244-45)

The translation of the above quotation from the original German text varies. In the English translation, the word principal is favored, as in "two regulative principals". However, in the French translation, of this same sentence the word loi is used(Michels, 1915a, 267). "In science, a law is a descriptive principle of nature that holds in all circumstances covered by the wording of the law" (Daintith, 2005). Instead Lipset(1952) suggests to see Michels’ thesis as a lawlike generaliza- tion. This is the weight that will be given to Michels’ theory in this literature review. Also, Michels discusses the complexity of a party’s internal organization, which he refers to as a bureaucracy (Hands, 1971). Bureaucracy is the internal hierarchy of a political party. That same internal structure which will later serve to guide a governing party’s operations. Indeed, Marland(2016) has shown that the way parties manage their political communications outside of an electoral context will be replicated once a party is elected to government. According to his research, that was the case with the Conservative Party of Canada prior to the 2015 election (Marland, 2016). Oligarchy is maintained when a party’s internal organization (i.e. intra-party democracy) transcends and

13 persists even when a party is elected to government (Michels, 1915c). Consequently, if we strictly consider political communication tactics, then in this particular example the Conservative Party would be oligarchic. If a party seeks to govern, it will establish an organizational structure to get elected. Lemieux(2005)’s theory, discussed at the start of this chapter, is all the more relevant here. It explains the second principal of Michels’ law. Parties are instituting increasingly complex organizations as a result of other factors such as electoral support. A party’sinternal organization will be adapted to align with the other two components of the party as a system (electoral support and governing approach). Modifying one component inevitably means altering another.

There are four crucial steps that must be completed for a party to attain an oligarchic status. The ﬁrst is the psychology of the masses. In this case the masses are eligible voters. And their psychology are their voting behaviour and political sophistication. The second step has three components: the psychology of candidates; the need for organization; and the need for a strong leader. The psychology of candidates refers to the desired attributes of any given party leader, such as those listed as emanating from the presidentialization of politics. Secondly, the need for organization is the need for bureaucracy. One that organizes membership, fundraising, and other campaign activities. Thirdly, Michels proposes that the masses want to look up to a leader. A person who possesses the psychology of a candidate. The third step is the institution of the bureaucracy that was deemed necessary in step two. Finally, once steps one through three have been fulﬁlled, then a political party reaches step four, which is getting elected, and is deemed an oligarchic organization. At which point, the party in question is organized in the same fashion as the political opponents it once criticized.

Marland(2016)’s study of communications in parties, government agencies, and the legislative branch echoes Michels’ argument on oligarchy and validates the predicament of democracy in the digital age. In addition, political communication, a critical part of a modern party’s internal organization, results from the changes in political participation. Communications have become centralized and so well managed that it becomes diﬃcult to distinguish between the message of government and that of the governing parties. Newly elected parties will have an incentive to maintain the centralization of communications (Marland, 2016). It gives them greater message control. At that point we can say that a political party has completed the process of oligarchization. To uphold democracy, political parties must avoid oligarchic practices within their organizations (Michels, 1915c). Doing so will prevent newly elected leaders from transferring these practices into government. To avoid this predicament, a leader must be democratically elected within their party and then at a general election. However, to ascend to power, parties will decentralize power to acquire mass appeal for their leader. In practice, this encourages oligarchic behaviour because power remains in the hands of a few individuals. Just like the government which said party seeks to govern.

Scholars who have studied Michels have narrowed down his thesis to a three-step process. The ﬁrst is the occurrence of bureaucracy, the second is that it leads to the rise of power, and that the

14 acquisition of power inevitably leads to corruption (Leach, 2005, 313). Simply put oligarchization is the decentralization of the internal structures of a political party so that it can centralize the decision-making power (Lemieux, 2005, 96-107). This beneﬁts the party because it is then better able to operate its other two components (electoral and governmental). Thus, the only real danger to democracy which emanates from a leadership primary rests on whether or not political parties will maintain their strict communication styles once in government.

1.6 Conclusion

At the time of writing this chapter studies of leadership selection processes have been done using information from the biography of a past leader (Fitzgerald et al., 2004; Cross and Blais, 2012); it is the account of a party insider, (see Flanagan, 2009; Jeﬀrey, 2010); or surveys are distributed to party members (Fitzgerald et al., 2004; Stewart and Archer, 2000; Cross and Young, 2008). Com- parative studies are scarce and other than Cross and Pilet(2015), quantitative methods are not favoured in this ﬁeld of research (Cross and Pilet, 2015). Because of the tools used by researchers, studies are usually completed after the event (Bynander and ’t Hart, 2006; Cross and Blais, 2012; Cross and Pilet, 2015; Kenig, 2009a; Pilet and Cross, 2014). Therefore, despite the substantial contribution of these studies, the data sources used are limited by either partisan bias, retrospective bias, or both. Furthermore, whilst primaries are increasingly used internationally, there are only two countries which have been studied in depth: Canada and the United Kingdom (Cross and Pilet, 2015, 5). This explains why the bulk of the examples given in this literature review stem from these cases.

Parties have increased the complexity of their internal organizations in order to meet the expectations of the masses. The changes in party organization and the growing importance of leaders is due to the response to changes in voter participation. Leaders are chosen outside of elite circles which creates a twofold effect. The first is that parties seek to legitimize their internal processes in order to become a viable choice at a subsequent election. The second is that primary selectors are not necessarily more interested in the substance of politics. Rather, they are the same electors but in a different zone of the multi-speed model of political participation (see Figure 1.1).

The only diﬀerence between supporting a party and being a member, is that the latter is only accessible to those who register to participate in the internal decision-making process. The leadership selection rules put in place by the party attempt to assure: party unity; competitiveness; and electoral appeal more generally. The state rules relative to leadership primaries target the aspects external to political parties. Party ﬁnance laws are a good example of this. To better understand why and how primaries have become the preferred method for leadership selection, it is important to consider primaries within the theory of political parties as a system. Therefore, primaries are a means to an end, as well as an end in itself. A leader is chosen whilst a party attempts to broaden its electoral appeal throughout the process.

15 The following chapter outlines the theoretical framework of this thesis by deﬁning key concepts outlined in this literature review.

16 Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework

Media and parties associate messaging with the leader (Pilet and Cross, 2014) therefore the second principal of Michels’ Iron Law holds. Indeed "[t]he effective counter-tendency of democracy towards the creation of parties ever more complex and ever more differentiated — parties which are increasingly based upon the competence of the few." (Michels, 1915b, 244-45). Furthermore, due to parties’ communication tactics it has become difficult to distinguish between the governing party’s communications and that of the government’s (Marland, 2016).

This chapter outlines the key components in the mechanism of a leadership primary. It does so by building onto the principal of oligarchization of political parties and the multi-speed model of political party membership. It will look at how part of the Iron Law affects the campaign dynamics. At the same time, it will be possible to look for ways in which the first principal manifests itself during a leadership primary. By analyzing the process, it will be possible to show heather or not "[t]he ideological tendency of democracy [is actually directed] towards criticism and control" (Michels, 1915b, 245). The final section of this chapter justifies why the Conservative Party of Canada’s 2016-2017 leadership race was chosen as the case study for this research project.

2.1 Modernizing Michels’ Theory

Three fundamental components lead to the oligarchization of political parties in democracies: the psychology of candidates; the need for organization; and the psychology of the masses (Michels, 1915c, 516). In the current political landscape these factors translate to: leader qualities, intra- party democracy, and leader eﬀects, respectively. All three factors lead to the professionalization of leaders and eventually ends with message control.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the mechanism which this research project seeks to test. Figure 2.1 builds on Michels’ thesis using the dynamics outlined in the previous chapter. Scarrow’s (2014) multi- speed model best reﬂects the participation dynamics of today’selectorate which is why it replaces the masses in this model. Assuming that the objective of parties is to rally members back into

17 Figure 2.1 – Schema of Oligarchy

Ideal IPD Candidates

Multi-Speed * Membership Election

Leadership Leader Primary Eﬀects

Election loss

*The election result would be oligarchic if a parties’ practices remain the same as when it was attempting to gain power. traditional arenas of participation. The objective is to create a centripetal force to convert party supporters intro traditional members. Secondly, intra-party democracy and leadership primary, is the actual process through which an opposition party rallies supporters against the current government. In sum the process of oligarchization, is what a non-governing party does to change its leader in an eﬀort to prepare for the next election. Finally, ideal candidates are the individuals whose attributes would make them a viable leader. Thirdly, leader eﬀects are what the masses respond to. This section explains the role and relationship of each component of the studied process.

The first component necessary for the process of oligarchization is the electorate. The previous chapter has shown two things. The first is that according to Michels’ the masses are incompe- tent. To that effect, we can associate incompetence with inattention or the decline in political participation. The second is that the decline in traditional participation does not equate decline actual party support. The complex dynamic between citizens and political parties suggests that campaign dynamic will change. Which is why we have such strong leader effects. Furthermore, who parties campaign to will determine who is an ideal leadership candidate.

The mass party is still considered as an ideal model which parties should strive to resemble (van Biezen and Piccio, 2013), from an organizational perspective. Is it romanticism to still see parties strictly as this type of membership organizations (Gauja, 2017, 183)? The literature review shows evidence of the contrary. Let us, ﬁrst, outline what is meant by intra-party democracy. There are two types: assembly and plebiscitary.

Assembly-based [intra-party democracy] assigns decision-making to meetings, whose

18 participants debate propositions and then take a decision. Plebiscitary [intra-party democracy] separates the stages of debate and decision-making, and places the latter stage in the hands of the mass membership via a ballot. (Poguntke et al., 2016, 671)

In the path leading towards oligarchy a party’s internal organizations will grow to increasingly include administrative affairs that allow more individuals to have a voice in administrative affairs. “Leading parties seem to have moved away from traditional brokerage catch all organizations to become more market oriented, franchise, or ‘boutique’ formations” (Marland and Giasson, 2016, 357). Meaning that parties attempt to give citizens what they want. However, it is difficult to give everyone what they want. And this is the case whether we are referring to party members or citizens more generally. As it was the case with ideal candidates and leader effects, intra-party democracy and primaries are considered together in this research project.

Primaries are the selection methods in which the cumulative weight of inﬂuence and party members, supporters and/or voters is equal or greater than all other more exclusive selectorate(s) combined. (Cross et al., 2016, 25)

A primary is a plebiscitary form of intra-party democracy. The results of a primary can have larger eﬀects on intra-party democracy, such as when individuals strictly adhere to a political party in order to participate in a primary.1 Which is why

[t]he universal ballot is favoured over conventions because it is more accessible to the general population, and as a consequence it is said to be more likely to be representative of a population’s socio-demographic characteristics. (Courtney, 1995, 241)

The result of the interaction between intra-party democracy and primary will determine the party’s inner dynamic. It will be what the will be working with at the next election. In theory the winning candidate’s message will be the one that will be applied during the election campaign (Crotty et al., 1999). Which as we will see in the next chapter, is susceptible to have strong eﬀects on the party.

Leaders may be important because of who their predecessors are. On the other hand, it could also be due to who was allowed to choose the previous leader (Webb and Poguntke, 2005). More- over, because of the way in which media reports campaign events it has been difficult to discern whether the candidates created the effects which this thesis is studying. Consequently, we do not know whether the media creates the image or responds to it. We know based on the previous chapter that parties and electors prefer charismatic leaders. These two factors, however, also affect one another individually. In addition, the extent to which they affect one another is difficult to determine. Thus, these two interdependent components of the process towards oligarchy should be studied together.

1See Subsection 1.1.1

19 The party as a three component system in itself reﬂects what Robert Michels cautioned against a century ago (Lemieux, 2005). A party that changes its internal organization in order to increase its electoral support is an indication of oligarchization. The question of whether or not it criti- cizes and controls (Michels, 1915b, 245) remains to be tested. Whether democracy truly has this tendency would depend on how non-governing political parties rally in between elections in an attempt to form a government. The leader eﬀects and the ideal—desired—candidate are necessary to win an election. It makes parties rethink their internal organizations. Which leads to the third step of the process of oligarchization. What emanates from the result of the relationship between intra-party democracy and a leadership primary should be a message of criticism. Fur- thermore, the chosen leader should be one that stands an actual chance of defeating the current government at a subsequent election.

There are a few factors that can determine whether or not a party aims to ascend to power. The ﬁrst are the rules that the party bureaucracy put into place. These rules should encourage individuals from the multi-speed model of membership2 to participate in the selection process. The second is both who becomes a candidate in this primary and the fact their message should be critical of the governing party. Finally, the last step of the process of oligarchization which is the election campaign and its result. It should be noted that this cannot be tested within the scope of this project. Thus, this research project seeks to determine whether or not the necessary conditions for oligarchization are met, for all the steps leading to the election. Therefore, should

1. intra-party democracy and primaries be more inclusive of new members and; 2. Leadership candidates’ campaigns and the party’s messages during the campaign be critical of the governing party. Or it is not targeting the party’s traditional support base; then, there will be enough evidence to infer that leadership campaign messages are both prepa- ration for an election campaign and potentially for the party’s main message once elected.

In sum, primaries should facilitate the oligarchization of modern political parties. Oligarchy, within the context of this research is actually a means through which parties legitimize the power that can be exercised by the leader (Schattschneider, 1960) and eventually the prime minister. Consider leadership selection using primaries as a very large and expensive focus group. Par- ties are perfecting the product that they intend to sell at the following election (Lees-Marshment, 2011; Marland and Giasson, 2016).

2.2 The case study

The Parti Québécois was the ﬁrst party in Canada to allow its members to participate in leadership selection (Leduc, 2001). Eventually other Canadian provincial and federal parties followed suit. Table 2.1 shows how national parties in Canada have changed their leadership selection methods

2See Figure 1.1

20 over time in order to respond to the changing dynamics of the political system.

Table 2.1 – The evolution of leadership selection change methods in Canada

Time Period1 Cycle2 Party Type3 Selection type4 Pre-Confederation 1st Elite dominated Appointment by small group of elites 1880-1960 2nd Mass Party Advent of selection at convention 1945 - 3rd Catch-All Party Delegates at convention 1970 - 4th Cartel Party Leftist parties begin with Mixed-Primaries 1993 - Transition period Brokerage Parties Contagion of primary-type 2006 -5 5th "Catch-enoughism"6 Further expansion Boutique parties of selectorate

1Column extracted from Katz and Mair(1995) 2Column extracted from Katz and Mair(1995) 3Based on Patten(2011)’s demonstration of the evolution of the Canadian party system 4Courtney(1995)’s typology of the evolution of leadership selection in Canada 5See Patten(2016) for a discussion on the ﬁfth party system 6See Patten(2016)

More and more Canadian political parties decentralize their leadership selection methods to give each party member one vote (Montigny and Tessier, 2017). In 2013 the Liberal Party of Canada even gave supporters part of the vote in the leadership process that elected Justin Trudeau (Mon- tigny and Tessier, 2017). Decentralization was not always the norm. The first leadership convention occurred in 1919 after the death of Wilfrid Laurier prior to the upcoming convention of that same year; the parliamentary party felt that since they were mainly all French Canadians, they could not speak for Canada as a whole, by arbitrarily choosing the new leader of the Liberal Party (Courtney, 1995; Stewart, 1997; Carty, 1989; Meyer and Odom, 2016). They decided to leave the decision to the delegates present at that year’s convention. Courtney(1995) considers this to be the starting point of the first generation of leadership selection through convention. From 1919 until 1993 leadership selection was incrementally decentralized. Finally, after the election that re- defined the landscape of party politics in Canada in 1993, parties were forced to rethink the way in which they chose their political leaders because of the notable acquisition of power by region- alized political parties (Noel, 2011). With modern selection parties focus on mass recruitment to legitimize their choice of leader as well as fund the actual process (Noel, 2011; Crotty et al., 1999).

The previous chapter showed that parties choose leadership selection rules carefully because their organization’s unity is at stake (Quinn, 2010; Weller, 1994; Cross, 2016; Pilet and Cross, 2014; Putnam, 1976). That is the choice the Canadian Alliance3 and the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada4 had when they merged in the early 2000s. To avoid regionalism the now Conservative

3A Western Canadian federal party 4The party that lost its majority government in the 1993 election and only elected to members to parliament

21 Party of Canada uses a one member one vote method.5 The selection rules, such as points per riding, give candidates an incentive to campaign on national questions. In light of the process discussed in this chapter, the evidence shows that Canadian parties are changing their internal organizations as a response to changing patterns of political participation (see Table 2.1). Which is also the case of the Conservative Party of Canada in late 2015 after the resignation of Stephen Harper.

To select their leader the Conservative Party of Canada chose to give every member one vote. And Item 6.1.1 states that:

• a) Each Electoral District is worth 100 points. • b) Candidates are assigned a point total based on his or her percentage of the vote in each Electoral District. • c) To win, a Candidate must obtain a majority of points from across the country. • d) Balloting shall be conducted by Preferential Ballot (single transferable vote).6

Furthermore, according the rules relative to who is eligible to vote in the 2016-2017 leadership selection, established by the Conservative Party of Canada on March 8th 2016:

• Item 2.1.1: To vote in the Election Process a person must be a member in good standing of the Party as of 5:00 pm Eastern Daylight Time (ET) on March 28, 2017 (Cut-oﬀ Time). • Item 2.3.2: An incentive of $5 per membership will be paid to Candidates for memberships submitted before October 28, 2016. To cover the additional costs of processing, a fee of $5 per membership will be charged to Candidates for memberships submitted after Feb 28, 2017.7

There were 345 days between the date the rules were published and the membership recruitment cut-off date. Candidates had almost one year to bring their own members to the party. In that time period, the Conservative Party of Canada more than doubled its membership to 259,010 members and saw a 51% turnout rate for the leadership vote (CBC News, 2017). The question, according to Respondent 158 is whether all of these new members will stay with the party until the 2019 general election. We can conclude then that leadership candidates invested important campaign efforts in membership recruitment. In addition, as per Item 2.3.2 candidates also had a financial incentive to recruit members earlier in the campaign. If candidates recruit members up until one month prior to the membership cut-off date, there was a 5$ per new member which would remain in the hands of the campaign that signed-up said members. Now, we cannot know exactly how many members each candidate signed up and when. That is because parties tend to keep that information private. However, we can deduct how these members were signed-up as

5For a full account of the events surrounding the merger see Flanagan(2009). 6Conservative Party of Canada (2016) 7Conservative Party of Canada (2016) 8Interview in Toronto May 27th 2017

22 well as who they may be.

Although Geddes(1990) cautions scholars about choosing cases based on the dependent variable, she does state that it can "contribute to building and revising theories" (Geddes, 1990, 149). Therefore, the Canadian case is well suited for this exercise. In addition, a single case study allows us to offer an in-depth assessment of a causal mechanism (Fearon, 1991). The theory tested by this research project is Michels’ updated Iron Law (see Figure 2.1). For the purposes of this research project the Conservative Party of Canada’s 2016-2017 leadership primary is studied. At the 2015 Canadian election the then governing Conservative Party went from governing party to the official opposition. After which the leader of the party, Stephen Harper, resigned. Shortly after the party announced that it would launch the official leadership race. Each riding is worth 100 points and every member is given a preferential ballot (Conservative Party of Canada). Based on the previous chapter, there are a few effects which we should expect to see because the party chose these rules.

2.3 Conclusion

This research project is grounded in Robert Michels’ Iron Law of Oligarchy. Scholarship on electoral politics, political participation, and political parties is mobilized. It leads us to the research question and hypotheses outlined shortly.

Four components of the process of oligarchization will be tested using the Conservative Party of Canada’s 2016-2017 leadership primary. Ideal leaders and leader effects will be studied together, because at the outset it is difficult to discern which one affects the other first. Then the rules which the political party will establish for the primary (intra-party democracy) will affect how the candidates will campaign during the primary.

23 Chapter 3

Research Question and hypotheses

This thesis looks at whether Figure 2.1 does reflect the mechanism of a leadership primary. The Conservative Party of Canada’s2016-2017 leadership change process is used as a case study. More specifically, we look at the effects of the rules on candidates’ campaigns.

3.1 Research Question

The research question is the following:

How do the rules of the Conservative Party of Canada’s 2016-2017 leadership race inﬂuence the electoral prospect of the party?

Answering this research question will oﬀer a contribution to the political science scholarship by considering the broader aspects of leadership selection. First it oﬀers an in-depth analysis of the leadership race as it unfolds. Second it will measure the scope of the output of the individual candidates’ campaign messages. It turn it will be possible to infer on extent of the potential effects of the campaign outside of the party. Third, the question will also be able to attest to the candidates’ and the party’s incentives for favouring a leadership primary as opposed to another method. Finally, it will show the consequences of primary rules on internal party dynamics.

3.2 Hypotheses

The research question leads to three hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Primary rules inherently encourages candidates to target an audience broader than that of traditional members.

The ﬁrst hypothesis is founded on the fact that a party’sinternal organization (intra-party democracy) will choose the leadership selection rules in response to leader eﬀects, in an attempt to select the ideal candidate at the end of the process. The candidates aiming to become leader should

24 have had a strong national campaign organization. These candidates’ intentions should also be reﬂected in their campaign messages.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): There will be more heterogeneous candidacies in a closed primary than its other leadership selection processes.

Because parties seek the ideal candidate the rules will be more inclusive. Hence, individuals that would not necessarily be a viable candidate at an election have an incentive to participate. The motivation for participation will vary from actually wanting to lead the party or wanting to advance one’s own career by getting exposure or promoting an agenda. It refers back to the principal-agent relationship outlined in Chapter1.

Hypothesis 3 (H3): The media will focus on candidates’ personalities or character as opposed their platforms.

This hypothesis is the best way to measure leader eﬀects. Because charismatic leaders are increasingly favoured, and get increasingly more attention in the news, then leader eﬀects should be present in the media.

3.3 Conclusion

This research question will show whether Michels’ iron law is valid with regards to a Canadian political party. It will do so by using a content analysis of newspapers’ coverage of the campaign, leadership candidates’ tweets, and semi-structured interviews. The following chapter discusses the methods used to test the hypotheses using these data sources.

25 Chapter 4

Methodology and Data

The data used for this project covers the period from October 20th 2015, the day following the general election and the day the former leader resigned, to June 27th 2017, one month following the leadership vote. The objective is to closely follow the campaign from the resignation of the former leader to the selection of the new one. This project beneﬁts from the participation of key players of the individual leadership campaigns. Fifteen semi-structured interviews were completed with leadership candidates, national organizers, local organizers, as well as Members of parliament that had endorsed a given candidate. Interviews were completed in Quebec City, Ottawa, Toronto, and by phone between April 8th 2017 and May 27th 2017. No interviews were completed after the leadership result was announced in order to avoid retrospective bias.

The objective of the interviews was to discuss the leadership campaign underway. It was thus preferable if respondents were not aware of the result. As such, they would not be trying to explain what were the strong and the weak points of the campaigns which they were working on. Respondents were asked nine questions. Respondents reﬂected on their party’s choice of leadership selection rules, media coverage of the process, their respective campaigns, as well as the broader societal implications of the primary.1 The interviews provide an answer to Hypothesis 2 and also better explain the results obtained for Hypothesis1 and Hypothesis3. Table 4.1 sum- marizes the data and methodology used for this study.

4.1 The inﬂuence of rules on individual campaigns

To measure whether leadership primary rules encourage candidates to campaign outside the party’straditional support circles, two things are considered. The ﬁrst is whether candidates took advantage of the time period they possessed to sign-up and renew party memberships. As well as determining who they aimed to sell these memberships to. Secondly, individual campaign messages are examined using the Twitter accounts of every leadership candidate on the ballot.

1See AppendixB for the interview questions.

26 Table 4.1 – Summary of Methodology

Hypothesis Indicator(s) Data Source(s) Hypothesis1 1) Time used to recruit members 1) Twitter 2) Messaging not along party lines 2) Interview: 2,5,6 3) Membership centered message & 8 Hypothesis2 1) Motivations for running Interview: 2,3,5,7, 2) Limited or not by primary rules & 8 Hypothesis3 Personality: Mentioned as favorite or 1) Interview: 4 reference to 2019 2) Newspapers Policy: Mention of policy

The reason why campaign messages are analyzed using Twitter, is because the message not seen under the media lens. Thus, it is possible to determine how the candidates are framing the campaign, as well, as how they position themselves within this primary more generally. In addition, by using Twitter the candidates would not feel observed by a researcher. Thereby leading them to inadvertently adapt their message when responding. Principally answers to Question 2 and Question 6 allow us to show what type of member was recruited as well as how.

• Question 2: How do you feel about the way in which the party oversees the process of selecting a new leader: campaign rules, fees, voting method? – What is your campaign organization like (field offices, staff etc.)? • Question 6: With regards to membership renewals and recruitment, how is your team approaching it? Are you trying to sell as many cards as possible or is it more of a question of who would normally support the party and more specifically your campaign?

The Groupe de recherche en communication politique’s (2017) Social Network Harvester collected the tweets from the fourteen leadership candidates. Using packages from the Tidyverse (Wickham and Grolemund, 2016) and the quanteda (Benoit, 2018) packages, the collected tweets were converted into word matrices and then analyzed using a Latent Dirichlet allocation model (Blei et al., 2003). Latent Dirichlet allocation is a probabilistic statistical model that measures word distribution using k-means clustering (Blei et al., 2003, 996). The assumption is that these clusters represent latent topics in a given word corpus. In this case, the corpuses are the candidates’ tweets. Because the Latent Dirichlet allocation model is an unsupervised machine learning method it prevents the researcher’s biases from being imposed by predetermining potential communication topics. The limit of this method, is that the researcher infers what the title of this topic is. In other words, a topic is identiﬁed using the word clusters which the topic model extracted. Some topics are more obvious whilst others are not. Nine possible topics are considered. They are outlined in Table 4.2.

A Membership topic is one where the cluster suggests that twitter users should purchase a membership. For example the cluster containing “parti", “support", “last", “join", “liber", “time", “year", “peopl", “famili", and “look" is coded as membership. Policy topics, are clusters that contained

27 Table 4.2 – Topic Models

Topic Possible words Membership join, member, come, support Policy tax, jobs, polici, budget, values, suppli, mana, reformact, carbon, social Endorsement endors Event meet, event, tonight, host, morn, announc, come, join Mention of other 1) Names of other candidates most important word in cluster. candidates or 2) Justin Trudeau & Liberal were coded under “Trudeau" politicians General campaign candidate, leadership, cpcldr, cpchq, vote, leader, support Information relay Hyperlink to other media Unrelated No words related to any other topic Unclear Words related to campaign topics but not distinguishable a reference to any potential policy or related to a platform. For example, a word cluster containing “manag", “suppi", “trump", and “propos" would be a policy oriented message from Maxime Bernier’s leadership campaign. Event topics are about promoting upcoming events where the candidate is present. In addition it can also be about posting pictures from a past event. For example, Deepak Obhrai’s event topic contained the following, in order of importance: “meet", “deepakage", “need", “obhrai", “today", “support", “right", “debat", “conserv", “happi". Mention of other candidates or politicians means that candidates were referring to their opponents in any way, shape, or form. General campaign clusters emanate a type of "vote for me" message. An example of such a message would be: “cdnpoli", “support", “pierr", “thank", “speech", “lemieux", “conserv", “today", “free", “leadership". Finally, Information relay, Unrelated, and Unclear clusters tend to not have words from which we can infer topics to.

Ten topic models were extracted from each candidates’ tweets. More models could have been tested, however due to the diﬀering levels of activity it is preferable to have a smaller number of models to test. Indeed, Figure 4.1 shows the frequency at which candidates were tweeting from October 20th 2015 to May 27th 2017. For example, if we keep Maxime Bernier (@MaximeBernier) and Pierre Lemieux (@CPCLemieux) in the same corpus, Bernier’s account will saturate the data- set, thereby invalidating the result of our analyses. It should be noted, moreover, that the candidate Erin O’Toole has a private Twitter account even as a national leadership candidate. It limits the tweets that could be extracted from his account. Consequently, his tweets were collected through the #cpcldr hashtag. It limits to some extent the inferences which can be made based on the results of the analyses of his account. That is because only the tweets that contained that hashtag could be harvested.

A perplexity score is used to determine how many models to extract and test for each candidate’s account. A perplexity score tells us how well our model predicts the content of the word corpus.

28 Figure 4.1 – Tweeting Frequency by Candidate

Leadership candidate tweets October 20 2015 to June 27 2017

Andrewesaxton AndrewScheer BradTrostCPC calxandr

CPCLemieux deepakobhrai ErinOTooleMP KellieLeitch

kevinolearytv lraitt MaximeBernier MichaelChongMP Quantity

0 2016−01 2016−07 2017−01 2017−07 2016−01 2016−07 2017−01 2017−07 PetersonCapital StevenBlaneyPCC

0 2016−01 2016−07 2017−01 2017−07 2016−01 2016−07 2017−01 2017−07 Date

The models were tested using 2, 5, 10, 25, 50, 100 k-means. In order to be able to compare a candidate’s topics we need to have a higher number of topics, which implies a lower perplexity score. For this analysis, a k-means of 10 was privileged. It is a small number. Indeed, for some accounts, especially the more frequent tweeters, the best scores were obtained if we were to extract 100 models. Whilst with less frequent tweeters, 5 models would have been a better choice. However, with fourteen candidates, and 10 models each we can analyze 140 topic models. Nonetheless, Latent Dirichlet allocation topic modelling has more advantages that disadvantages within this research context. Indeed, because the objective is to see what were the key messages of individual campaigns, a k-mean of 10 is suﬃcient.

4.2 Inﬂuence of rules on candidacies

Hypothesis2 is tested by mobilizing respondents’ answers to interview Questions 2, 3, 5.

• Question 2: How do you feel about the way in which the party oversees the process of selecting a new leader: campaign rules, fees, voting method? – What is your campaign organization like (field offices, staff etc.)? • Question 3: If the leadership change was undertaken in a more restrictive process (convention), would you still be running for leadership?

29 • Question 5: What compromises have you had to make to be part of this process: it can be both practical or ideological. How do you think it is going to aﬀect your campaign?

There were fourteen candidates on the ballot, thirteen which were still in the running by the time the leadership votes were being counted. 2,3 It will also provide an overview of the motivations behind the campaigns. This will be fully explored in Chapter5. It will explain from the point of view of the respondents, why there were so many candidates. Finally, we will also highlight the campaign dynamics which were created due to the rules.

4.3 Media coverage of the campaign

To determine whether the media covered the leadership primary by emphasizing candidates as opposed to their platforms, French and English Canadian newspapers were collected using the Factiva and Eureka c.c. databases. Table 4.3 outlines the search parameters that were used.

Table 4.3 – Search protocol: Factiva and Eurekka c.c. Search category Search Terms All of these words Conservat* leader* Canada At least one of these words Alexander Bernier Blaney Chong Leitch Lemieux Obhrai Peterson Raitt Saxton Scheer O’Leary O’Toole Trost Source Publication: All Publications Author All Authors Company All Companies Subjects All Subjects Economic Sector All Economic Sectors Region Canada Language English French Period 2015-10-20 to 2017-06-27 Exclusions Television show transcripts Duplicates Articles about choosing interim leader Notes Week begins on Monday

In total 2527 articles were collected, of those, 416 are French. Articles are coded on their headline and ﬁrst two paragraphs. The code-book is available in AppendixA. The components accounted for during the coding process are: which candidate was mentioned; was there a poll or mention of a poll; was there mention of policies; was there comparison of candidates to the sitting Prime

2Kevin O’Leary withdrew the day of the Toronto debate on April 26th 2017 3The ballots were mailed-out by the party earlier than expected. And so when Mr. O’Leary quit, his name was already on the ballot. (Respondent 6, interviewed in Quebec City, May 1st 2017.

30 minister, Justin Trudeau. Because we are not interested in the positive/negative coverage, these variables were not considered during the coding process.

Furthermore, Question 4 from the semi-structured interviews will allow us to add nuance to the results of the media analysis. The following three questions will allow us to test Hypothesis3: which candidates received more newspaper mentions; were newspapers more focused on candidates as opposed to policy platforms; and what did respondents think about the coverage of the primary (interview question 4)? This will allow a broader discussion on the potential eﬀects of media’s portrayal of the leadership selection process on politically interested viewers within a context of multi-speed political party membership.4

There are a few limits to this choice of method. The ﬁrst, is that there is a notable diﬀerence in the quantity of French and English newspapers. This limit, as well as the other methodological limits mentioned throughout this chapter, will be addressed in the chapter containing the analysis.

Finally, to facilitate the analysis, the candidates were separated into three tiers, sub-groups based on the results of the ﬁrst round of voting (i.e. members’ ﬁrst choice for leader):

• Tier 1: Andrew Scheer and Maxime Bernier • Tier 2: Erin O’Toole, Brad Trost, Michael Chong, Kellie Leitch, and Pierre Lemieux • Tier 3: Lisa Raitt, Steven Blaney, Chris Alexander, Kevin O’Leary, Rick Peterson, Andrew Saxton and Deepak Obhrai

Tier 1 candidates were the top two on the first ballot getting more than 20% of the votes each. Tier 2 candidates received between 7% and 11% of the votes each, whilst Tier 3 candidates received less than 4% of the votes each. Organizing the candidates as such allows us to distinguish whether there are correlations between media coverage and the final results. This three Tier distinction is also applied in the chapter that analyzes the campaign messages of individual candidates. There are many other ways of separating the candidates: fundraising, membership adherence, endorsements, time in party. However, using the result of the first round of voting is more conservative. It prevents us from putting emphasis on important aspects of the campaign, but that fall outside the parameters of this research project. Some other ways of dividing candidates would also be difficult to measure because of the way in which parties report these numbers. Fundraising and membership are good examples.

4.4 Conclusion

This study would not be possible without the generosity of all interview participants. All of who provided important accounts of the way in which they participated in this leadership change mechanism. In addition, respondents represent all three candidate candidates Tiers. This allows us to go into greater depth. To better explain from an internal point of view the analyses of

4See Figure 1.1.

31 this project. The interview excerpts have been chosen because they best reﬂect a given aspect of the leadership primary. The summary of the method and data used is summarized in Table 4.1.

Finally, by privileging an integration of methods to test the Hypotheses1 to3 the analysis of the campaign output will allow us to infer about the Conservative Party of Canada’s electoral prospects for 2019. Except that the new leader effects do not last that long (less than one year). The internal dynamics of the party for the next election, however, are likely to still see the effects of this leadership race. As we will see in upcoming chapters, candidates had more than one notable influence on the party.

32 Chapter 5

Setting the Scene: Primary rules and candidacies

This chapter begins with a discussion on the rules relative to candidacy as outlined by the Con- servative Party of Canada (2016). After which, the barriers of entry set out by the party and how these rules aﬀected the overall campaign dynamics are shown. This chapter explains the eﬀects of the primary campaign which are discussed in Chapter6. Many respondents’ critique of the rules had to do with the fact that the process was too democratic. Some of these critiques are linked to how the campaign was covered by the media. Therefore, these aspects are not discussed in this chapter but in Chapter7. The democratic nature of the primary allowed party outsiders and candidates who did not necessarily want to be a leader to enter the race. In addition, respondents also thought that there were no incentives to make non-viable candidates leave the race before it was time to vote.

5.1 Candidacy rules in the leadership primary

As per the rules established on March 8th 2016, in order to be a candidate in the Conservative Party of Canada’sleadership election 2016-2017 one had to "have been a member of the Party for at least six (6) months prior to ﬁling his or her application" and had to support "the founding principles of the Party as set out in the Leadership Contestant Questionnaire" as well as provide the "Leg- ible nomination papers with the names, signatures, residential addresses, telephone numbers and Electoral Districts of not less than 300 members of the Party who reside in not less than 30 Electoral Districts and who represent not less than seven diﬀerent provinces/territories".1 Thus, to become a candidate, the applicant had to have solicited members across the country at the outset. Thereby showing, before becoming a candidate, that they appeal to members in more than one province.

1See Conservative Party of Canada (2016)

33 Candidates were required to answer questions about credit reports, criminal records, party aﬃl- iations (municipal, provincial, and federal) in their nomination papers. In addition, the Applica- tion for National Leadership Contestants2 included the following questions:

• Have you carefully and thoughtfully read the Conservative Party of Canada Policy Declara- tion? • Are there any policies or principles with which you disagree? • Are there other principles and policies not mentioned in the Conservative Party Policy Dec- laration that you adhere to and wish to promote? • Have you ever written anything that has been published or widely distributed through the Internet or other means? Without limiting the breadth of this question, this includes aca- demic or professional papers, books or textbooks, newsletters, blogs, internet message boards, newspaper reports, "op-ed" pieces, columns, letters to the editor, magazine articles, short stories, novels or other ﬁction. If so provide a comprehensive list of all such publications and any online user name. • Do you agree not to use the Conservative Party of Canada logo as a Leadership Contestant?

We do not know how candidates were evaluated based on their response to these answers for many reasons. The principal one is that there is a confidentiality agreement included in the application form. These questions suggest that the party’s bureaucracy wanted to know who would be in the running and how they would campaign. Noteworthy is the fact that candidates could not use the party’s official logo. Consequently, the party would be able to distance itself from any misstep from a candidate. Respondent 23 suggests that this leadership race was a time when a party could get creative. That candidates did not have to follow the party line. Which the rules seemingly reflect.

More telling are items in the declaration section4 of the Application for National Leadership Con- testants:

• 2. Do hereby aﬃrm that I accept, and agree to advance, the policies, principles, goals and objectives of the Conservative Party of Canada as set out in the Constitution of the Party, the Conservative Party of Canada Policy Declaration, and elsewhere. • 3.(c) I will not seek the nomination of another political party, or run as an independent candidate, and will not endorse, campaign for or publicly support any opposing candidate or political party, in the next federal election. I further conﬁrm that following the Leadership Election process, when the elected Leader resulting from the process contests the election, I will take no steps, and make no comments whether public or amongst Party personnel or members which could be interpreted or understood to oppose the elected leader in any

2Obtained by email from an oﬃcial of the Conservative Party of Canada on June 8th 2017. Document adopted by Leadership Organization Committee on February 1st 2016 3Interviewed in Quebec City, April 20th 2017 4Pages 42-43

34 way

The point 2 is paradoxical. Indeed, the new leader of the party will have to abide by two diﬀer- ent sets of policy convention documents those of spring 2016, one year preceding the vote, and those of summer 2018 one year following the vote. What scholars should give attention to, is the dynamics within the party at the convention set for August 2018. Will the policies adopted at the convention following the leadership vote create challenges for the new leader? How will runner- ups with a strong membership behind them negotiate policies which the leader may or may not support? With point 3(c) the party assures than all leadership candidates will work to keep the party united by endorsing the leader and by not running in another political party. Thus, if a candidate could not support the new leader, then she or he would be shown the door. The time-line of the leadership change process was highlighted as an issue by respondents. Table 5.1 outlines the key dates for leadership candidates.

Table 5.1 – Candidacy Rules Time-line

Mar. 8 2016 Primary rules announced Nov. 9 2016 Official Debate 1. Dec. 6 2016 Official Debate 2. Dec. 31 2016 Compliance Deposit paid in full Jan. 17 2017 Official Debate 3. Feb. 24 2017 Deadline to submit candidacy Feb. 28 2017 Official Debate 4. Mar. 28 2017 Membership cut-off date Apr. 26 2017 Apr. 26 Official Debate 4. Apr. 28 2017 Mail voting begins Apr. 28 2017 Candidates receive full membership list May 26 2017 Mail voting ends May 27 2017 On-site voting ends May 27 2017 Scheer Elected Leader

All candidacy documents had to be submitted by February 24th 2017 at the latest.5 In addition candidates had to pay a $50,000 non-refundable registration fee and another $50,000 compliance deposit to assure the candidate complies with the rules of the leadership campaign. 6 Finally, all candidates are required to attend all oﬃcial leadership events. Otherwise they will lose part of their compliance deposit. In addition, because intra-party democracy is not subjected to electoral law, how will the party enforce these rules? What if former candidates go against the leader or worst endorse another party? What enforcement can the party use, other than good faith?

5See Conservative Party of Canada (2016) 6ibid

35 Although other chapters show that a long process allows candidates more time to sign-up and renew party memberships. Nonetheless, according to Respondent 1

[t]he one thing that I think we missed the boat on was two things. One, the length of, and timing of the campaign. So it was very long, um, it’ s grueling, we’re experiencing volunteer fatigue and a lot of people weren’t even tuned in for the ﬁrst few months when we were trying to get it oﬀ the ground. 7,8

Indeed, candidates needed to enter the primary early enough to sign-up new members and acquire name recognition when necessary. Yet if the campaigns began too early, as Respondent 1 states, campaign teams get tired. The impact of this phenomenon can also be seen in the media coverage each candidate received over the period of the leadership primary (See Chapter7). The process thus becomes a marathon as opposed to a race. Another problem, is that altogether there was only about 2 weeks when all candidates had the same advantages during the race.9 That two weeks is when all of the candidates had the list of members eligible to vote and before a com- fortable date at which members could mail their ballot. That is the time that candidates had to obtain second and third choice votes. Prior to that, it all depended on when each candidate had fulﬁlled the requirements to access membership lists.

In line with the length of the campaign, many respondents mentioned that they preferred the former convention method. However, as Respondent 1410 states, the primary type rules were part of an agreement between Stephen Harper, then leader of the Canadian Alliance, and Peter MacKay, then leader of the Progressive Conservative Party during the merger of both parties.11 Which did not keep respondents from suggesting that the party go back to using a convention or that it amend the rules of selection. For example:

I prefer the old method. It’s exiting. And you know, you’ve got the signs and... everyone says "who you are you supporting?". And what it does to... is it... because right now, of course, the majority of [Members of Parliament] they’ve... already uh... endorsed a candidate. So they’ve shown their colors. They haven’t shown their second, third, and fourth, and ﬁfth, and sixth picks. [...] I think that... they should. You know? That and supporters should show who they’re supporting next... and... I don’t know... I just think that that’s the way it should be.12

But I have another little problem because the rules allowed Mr. O’Leary to get into the race after the debate in Quebec City in January after a few months that the other candidates worked very hard in the race. Uh, it’s not fair, and... but, the rules allowed

7Respondent 1, interviewed in Quebec City April 8th 2017 8Respondent 6, interviewed in Quebec City May 1st 2017, also thought that the campaign was long 9Respondent 11, interviewed in Toronto May 25th 2017 10Interviewed in Toronto May 27th 2017 11See Flanagan(2009) for details on the merger and the leadership race that followed. 12Respondent 5, Interviewed in Ottawa May 10th 2017

36 that. So, we have to ﬁx... uh improve the rules. Probably the best choice... for a race like this: all candidates must enter before the ﬁrst day of January.13

In addition, respondents thought that the process itself was too democratic or bureaucratic, which leads to its own set of problems. Respondent 2 describes these implications well:

So, yes, uh, I ﬁnd the system fair... insofar as that it protects, it protects us, and it removes the excessive arbitrary pressures, but, uh, it does not create... it does not excite people. It’s too bureaucratic. And it is so democratic that it has become possible for a lot of people to become candidates.14 Without being tested to see how much they can recruit new members, how far they can convince the current party members of their merits. So, I think it’s better than the system we had in the previous party, but we have some way to go to be perfect [muﬄed] to evolve again. 15,16

Respondents 317, 418, 1319, and 720 all echo this perspective. The main reason is that they were uneasy with Kevin O’Leary’s candidacy. In an era where a businessman and former reality television star was elected as President of the United States, it was difficult to separate Mr. O’Leary from the person whom media and candidates were associating him to. In addition, he was a candidate only for a short period of time, entering officially the day following the only French official debate (Eliott, 2017). Which leads to questions about the barriers of entry to the primary, such as whether the deposits and registration fees that totaled $100,000 were sufficient.

According to Cross and Crysler(2011), political parties impose registration fees to fund the process and to prevent non-competitive candidates from becoming a candidate. The ﬁrst aspect was highlighted at the start of this chapter. Indeed, Respondent 5

[thought that] it’sa good thing to have that entrance fee because, otherwise, everyone would run. And just to get PR and... be able to raise their proﬁle. I think that they’re... they should be serious candidate who want to run as a leader. I think that, you know, you dish out that kind of money, then you better be serious. Yeah. So I think it’s important to have an entrance fee. Although others would argue that it keeps people that don’t have the money from being able to participate in democracy[...] But you also have to eliminate the people who are there just to have their name on the ballot. You see it... I’ve seen it in municipal races before, when I think the entrance

13Respondent 7, Interviewed in Quebec City April 22nd 2017 14Emphasis added. 15Respondent 2, interviewed in Quebec City April 20th 2017 16Translated from French 17Interviewed in Quebec City April 20th 2017 18Interviewed by phone May 6th 2017 19Interviewed in Quebec City, May 5th 2017 20Interviewed in Quebec City April 22nd 2017

37 fee is $100,000.21

Evidently, with thirteen candidates eligible to become the leader on the ﬁnal ballot the registration fees were not enough to deter many candidates. On the other hand the fees underestimate the candidates’ motivations. Furthermore, although Respondent 5 is uneasy with candidates who are running in order to get name recognition and promote their agenda, as we will see in Chapter6 some respondents see this practice as a way of giving a voice to supporters who think that the party does not represent them in its actual form. Which is why they chose to support a strong policy candidate by signing-up to be a member of the party. Nonetheless, many respondents thought that candidates would desist from the process at some point during the process. 22 Many respondents proposed that there were no incentives for non-viable candidates to drop out of the race. 23 If a candidate withdrew from the primary and still had debts on their campaign, then they would have diﬃculty convincing their supporters to continue donating to a campaign that no longer was in the running.

I think the price of $100,000 with 50% deposit is expensive but, it’s not too expensive, uh, because we have a lot of candidates with... all the candidates are my friends, but there are some unsupported candidates, and with just uh ... just uh their name and position on some issues. But, uh, without a team across the country like [our team]. So there is a diﬀerence between the ﬁve and six candidates leading the pack, and the others. So now I think a higher price. 24

Indeed, Respondent 825 proposed that no-one thought that there would be fourteen oﬃcial candidates at some point during the primary. That is because anyone who wanted to be leader or put a topic on the agenda of the party became a candidate despite the rules26. To protect the anonymity of respondents we cannot go into much detail as to why each candidate interviewed became a candidate. However, as we will see in the next chapter, we are able to show how candidate types inﬂuenced the campaign dynamics.

5.2 Conclusion

Thus as Meyer and Odom(2016) have proposed, the changing leadership selection rules, changes not only who can vote, but also who can become a candidate. Furthermore, despite the democratic nature of this primary, respondents demonstrate that it does not make the results nor the process more competitive. Which was suggested at the outset (see Kenig, 2007). In addition, all respondents who were candidates said that they would still be in the campaign if the leadership

21Respondent 5, Interviewed in Ottawa May 10th 2017 22Respondent 15, interviewed in Toronto May 27th 2017 23Interviewed in Quebec City April 8th 2017 24Respondent 7, interviewed in Quebec City April 22nd 2017 25Interviewed in Quebec City, April 22nd 2017. 26Respondent 10, interviewed in Quebec City, May 23rd 2017.

38 selection rules were not in the form of a primary. Furthermore, Respondent 6 added, that even if the selection process was at a convention, that the candidates would still have had to run a campaign.27

Two key criticisms emerge in this chapter. The ﬁrst is the length of the campaign. A lengthy campaign is good because you have time to choose to be a candidate. Tobuy a membership to become a candidate if you do not have one already. On the one hand, as will be shown in Chapter6, is that candidates could recruit new members. On the other hand, if a campaign was launched early on, one had to make sure that you had the necessary campaign infrastructure in order to subsist until voting day. The second criticism is the democratic nature of the primary. This is partially due to Kevin O’Leary’s candidacy. However, it is the large quantity of candidates which was an issue. One main reason why this was considered an issue, was due to the limited media coverage some candidates were getting.

27Interviewed in Quebec City, May 1st 2017.

39 Chapter 6

Open-House: Eﬀect of rules on candidates’ campaigns

Open-House Party: a party at which visitors are welcome in your home (Cambridge Dictionary, 2018).

6.1 Introduction

In pop-culture, an open-house party, is a gathering that one can attend provided you know where said party is. It is not exclusive to anyone; hence all party goers are welcome. An Open-House party is a multi-speed1 political party that sees a centripetal movement of the differing types of political party members (Sustainers, Cyber-Members, Followers, Traditional Members, etc.). Given that political parties have become permeable, they are aware of the fact that citizens interact differently with their organizations. In key moments, however, they rely heavily on the traditional view of a political party: a membership organization. Which is why they need to create the centripetal force to bring-in all types of members. The chapter looks at whether leadership selection rules influence the leadership candidates’ campaign objectives, thereby creating the Open-House party.

Selection rules do inﬂuence the candidates’ campaign objectives which are membership recruitment and campaign messaging. Individual campaign teams did not have the same vision of the process. Some candidates campaigned as though the primary was only for traditional Conserva- tive Party supporters or members, whilst others thought that all Canadians were susceptible to participate in this process. In which case they campaigned to all Canadians. This is evidenced both in the messaging and in the national versus regional structure of their respective campaign teams. The key focus of leadership candidates of the Conservative Party of Canada’s leadership candidates was membership. It is the most frequent message extracted from Twitter accounts,

1See Scarrow(2014)

40 coming before event promotion.

6.2 Conservative Party Rules and their Inﬂuence

The vote counting method which the Conservative Party used to determine who is elected as leader is a 100 points per individual riding.2 It is the method that was established during the merger between the Canadian Alliance and the Progressive Conservatives (Flanagan, 2009).3 One respondent suggests that

[a] lot of people have complained about our 100 points system, they are not recogniz- ing that it was put there so that there will be balance across the country, so that one region did not feel alienated from another region. And I can tell you right now, there are people in Alberta saying that “why should my vote be equal to ﬁfty people in New Brunswick?" Ok. But if you want to be a national party that’s what you have to do. Ok. If you want to be a small protest party, then yeah you can do, you can change the rules. And so, yeah, it’s the most critical factor, as to how do you want, do you want to build this party. So this party, has to look beyond 2019. No question to the fact that I’ve been in opposition for 8 years, and the government, no question about it, if you want to be in the government and make changes. But, the fact of the matter is, yes, you aim for 2019, to be uh, you know, to win the government. But you’re not going to win the government, or this thing, if you don’t have a solid foundation to take the party into the next election. No, not going to happen.4,5

The leadership selection rules of 100 points per riding encourage a cross country campaign structure and respondents that were higher in the campaign hierarchy (candidate or national orga- nizer) highlighted this. When asked what their campaign organization was like, respondents told the interviewer that they either used social media because it is efficient and cost-effective. Fur- thermore, larger leadership campaigns had teams in every province. Indeed, some “[...] have fortunately gone through social media meeting young people on university campuses and meeting [Electoral District Associations]", 6 which facilitates their campaign efforts when they have limited resources to effectively campaign across the country.

Other teams whose resources were limited, preferred to focus on some regions. This was the case for Respondent 13:

Well, I would say that we concentrated a lot of our eﬀorts in Quebec. Because 25% of the points are in Quebec, and that’s where [candidate name] is best known. So that

2See Conservative Party of Canada (2016) 3Also conﬁrmed by Respondent 14, interviewed in Toronto May 27th 2017 4Respondent 3, interviewed in Quebec City April 20th 2017 5Respondent 13, interviewed in Quebec City May 5th echoes this statement 6Respondent 3, interviewed in Quebec City April 20th 2017

41 is where we focus our efforts, on selling as many cards as... We also worked on the Ontario side. We also had debates in different provinces. But it’s really in Quebec. The goal is really to have the most first choice in the first round.7 Then after that you pick up second choices and third choices elsewhere. Of course, we concentrated our efforts in Quebec and Ontario.8,9

This can beneﬁt this campaign because these two provinces are the ones with the most weight in the ﬁnal tally. Some teams also focused their attention on ridings with smaller membership rates. This was either by only campaigning to the smaller membership ridings. Or by selling as many memberships as possible in these ridings. The latter tactic gives less weight to individual members.10 It is Respondent 111 that best explains how candidates were using technology and working the smaller ridings to their advantage:

So we’ll do, online petitions on issues, and anything from a carbon tax to ﬁrearms, policy to changing the lyrics of O’ Canada, and when people interact, and they leave their email address and their contact, then we follow up, and try to sell them a membership. So we have a list, with leads for our team. We do try to sell everywhere, but obviously we focus on areas where there were lower membership. Was a better in- vestment because selling ten memberships St-Hyacinth Bagot, is more eﬃcient, than selling 100 memberships in Calgary South-West.

By using this petition technique, Respondent 1 can appeal to members outside of traditional Con- servative circles. They do this to attract supporters from other parties, that would be susceptible to endorse speciﬁc Conservative ideas. Furthermore, Respondent 1, also stated that the campaign for which they worked on, had a national team that recruited new members. Indeed, Re- spondents working on larger and more publicized campaigns all had vast teams. They loosely had the following organization: national campaign chair, provincial campaign chairs, local organizers, volunteers in every province, and often endorsing Members of parliament promoting them within their respective riding. Which goes along with Robert Michels’s (1915c) thesis, that leaders rally the masses to against the sitting government. The petition strategy demonstrates this well, for these are policies that have been proposed by the governing Liberal Party. It allows Conservative candidates to attract other parties’ supporters, that do not support the Conserva- tives, but who may be favourable to their policies.

Because of how they were structuring their campaigns, respondents were also asked how this leadership race differed from a general election. They had differing answers. Some suggested that it was a two phase race. In the first, candidates could recruit as many new members as possible,

7Referring to the preferential ballot 8Respondent 13, interviewed in Quebec City on May 5th 2017 9Translated from French 10Respondent 14, interviewed in Toronto May 27th 2017 11Interviewed in Quebec City, April 8th 2017

42 and the second candidates concentrated their campaign on members.12,13 The two stage process is due to the fact that candidates had from March 8th 2016 to March 28th 2017 to sign up members or renew expired memberships (Conservative Party of Canada, 2016). This twostep campaign and its eﬀects is dealt with in the following two sections. After March 28th 2017, candidates only campaigned to members. It was the time period when all candidates had an equal playing ﬁeld as previously mentioned.

This leadership campaign diﬀers from an election because candidates are only discussing issues that are important to Conservatives.14 Hence their campaign was structured to appeal to Con- servative Party of Canada members and supporters.15 Although respondents put emphasis on the fact that the primary was just for party members, the party doubled its membership over the course of the leadership race.

6.3 Target Audience

Candidates had varying target audiences. One respondent suggested that “[a]t the moment we are not here to convince the entire country, we are here to convince our members and to recruit new members".16,17 Respondent 2, however, was principally trying to sign-up former Progressive Conservative members,18 who may not have renewed their membership during the years when Stephen Harper was leader of the party. In addition, Respondent 1 thought “[that Canadians are] aware of the race. And [...] that they’re probably, aware of a few of the candidates, but [the respondent did not] think that there’s much kinda of depth."19 Consequently, that only the candidates with a strong media presence were the ones that Canadians were aware of. Hence only certain candidates were susceptible to be exposed to an audience outside of the party. Therefore only they are able to sign-up members of all stripes. However, Respondent 2’s perspective on recruitment is telling. Meaning that not every Canadian is susceptible to join-in the Open-House party. And that candidates are trying to bring as many of these potential individuals as they can to the party.

The party gave candidates a membership list that dated all the way back to January 1st 2008 (Con- servative Party of Canada, ). Thereby allowing campaigns to rally former members back-in. Which may be why many campaigns were using the expired membership list to build their voter base.20,21

12Respondent 4, interviewed by phone May 6th 2017 13Respondent 13 interviewed in Quebec City on May 5th 2017 also had this perspective 14Respondent 7 15Respondent 8, interviewed in Quebec city April 22nd 2017 16Respondent 2, interviewed in Quebec City April 20th 2017 17Translated from French 18For a description of the events surrounding the Canadian Alliance and Progressive Conservative merger in the mid-2000s see Flanagan(2009) 19Respondent 1, interviewed in Quebec City April 8th 2017 20Respondent 2, interviewed in Quebec City April 20 21Respondent 7, interviewed in Quebec City on April 22nd 2017

43 However, one respondent was uneasy about the way candidates were campaigning:

You have three or four candidates talking about how they’re going to end supply management. Are you going to put people out of work? Right. What are you going to do? And then you have another candidate say “I’m going to withdraw money from the universities who don’t give freedom of speech". Listen, there’s no question that there are a few people who do that. But what about the majority? What they’re going to suﬀer? The immigration thing “It has to be my way or otherwise I don’t want you to come" sending the message that they’re going to have to say that this party. People are going to start looking at a diﬀerent angle and say “wait a minute, this party wants to tear Canada apart. They want to make so many drastic changes, I don’t think that I’m ready for that". 22

There is a dichotomy of thought between respondents. While some were simply focused on so- liciting former members or supporters. Others were well aware of the fact that some candidates were giving the party a negative image. In turn it would aﬀect the party’s chances of appealing to Canadians during the leadership campaign and at the next election. And of those candidates that Canadians are aware of, according to Respondent 3 (quoted above) and Respondent 1523, are the candidates giving the party a negative image. Respondent 8 also suggested that the Lib- eral Party of Canada is taking notes during this leadership change process so as to prepare for the 2019 election.24 Which aligns with what Respondent 15 asked: “are you going to go to the election with your leadership campaign platform"? Meaning that the Respondent thought some candidates were using sensationalism to get attention. And that they did not want to actually implement their polarizing platform. As we saw in the last chapter the new leader still has to go through the process of the upcoming policy convention. Although only members could vote in the leadership primary, respondents were well aware of the spillovers into the broader Cana- dian political arena. This is evidenced by the unease towards polarizing platforms and the fact that only a few of the fourteen candidates were getting media attention. Thus, respondents were adamant on two things. That even if they were not elected, that if they recruited enough members, then they will have a voice at the negotiation table.25 The second, is that if Canadians were not aware of the primary, other parties certainly were. Another respondent’s perspective demonstrates this very well. Which means that if polarizing policy proposals have a positive impact on new memberships, then other parties will be able to frame the Conservatives as a party that may not be in the best interest of all Canadians. They suggested that regardless of who is chosen,

[t]he new leader is going to see all of these numbers, and the new leader can’t move the party left. Because he’ll go “if we do we will jeopardize 40,000 members. There are

22Respondent 3, interviewed in Quebec City April 20th 2017 23Interviewed in Toronto May 27th 2017 24Interviewed in Quebec City, April 22nd 2017 25Respondent 14, interviewed in Toronto May 27th 2017

44 40,000 members who voted for [the campaign which the respondent worked on], like there are 40,000 votes running on that. We can’t lose those members. We’ll lose their donations, we’ll lose their volunteerism and their help in the next campaign. All of that." So we can make our voices heard whether [we] win or not, and that’s why you need to buy a party membership because you need make your voice heard.26

Which means that candidates which had successful campaigns on social conservative proposals, such as abortion and same sex marriage, will be able to have a strong inﬂuence at the policy convention the year following the primary. That is if the membership base is strong after the leadership primary.

Consequently, recruitment during a primary is more than just for numbers, it is also about recruiting troops for the next election. Although some individuals still volunteer for a party without being a member (see van Biezen et al., 2014) the party still needs a substantial membership if it is to have volunteers for the next electoral campaign. In addition, because of that, it may lead the party to decentralize other decision making mechanisms.27 For example, the campaign which Respondent 1128 and Respondent 1429 worked on recruited members that shared the candidate’ ideas, because the candidate in question had a very strong and polarizing policy platform. For example, Respondent 14 knew that with their candidate’s platform it would be difficult to get endorsements. Which is why that team emphasized going outside traditional membership circles in order to sell membership to Canadians that are susceptible to support the candidate. Endorse- ments means that you have the support of the currently elected members of parliament. That the current team is ready to work with you.30 This can be beneficial for the next election, assuming that your party is popular with the electorate at that point in time. Which can benefit the candidates with the most endorsements. On the other hand some Members of parliament may attempt to choose the winner. As one Respondent suggests:

[t]here are multiple reasons why an MP um... decides on what leader. Of course, it is with their policy but it’s also uh... they look at other things as well. They look at how many other MPs are supporting whoever. They look at selﬁsh reasons as well. Um... they may choose to support somebody who may not have a lot of support but who has a potential of winning. Um in order to further their careers. Do you know what I’m saying?31

Meaning that candidates looking for and getting endorsements are looking at higher posts within the party. This can be actually being the leader or working closely to him or her.

26Respondent 4 interviewed by phone May 5th 2017 27Respondent 14, Interviewed in Toronto May 27th 2017 28Interviewed in Toronto May 25th 2017 29Interviewed in Toronto May 27th 2017 30Respondent 1, interviewed in Quebec City April 8th 2017 and Respondent 7, interviewed in Quebec City April 22nd 2017 31Respondent 5, interviewed in Ottawa May 10 th 2017

45 As such, some candidates were using the primary to advance their own political agendas. This is especially important for candidates with strong policy platforms and that recruited or renewed higher quantities of members. In addition, the new leader will have incentives to collaborate with former candidates that had platforms similar to their own. The leader will have no choice but to negotiate with all groups with an important membership weight. If the leader does not work with these groups it may lead to fragmentation within the grassroots (Carty and Cross, 2006). Runner- ups can acquire exposure for a subsequent campaign or potentially advance their political careers by working directly with the new leader (see Carty, 1989). Or the candidates in question could fragment the party because of their proposals. It could create tensions with some groups in the party because some respondents thought that only serious leadership candidates should campaign to be a leader.

Hence, candidates, signed up many new members, especially those that wanted to keep supply management.32 Therefore, these candidates were taking advantage of their opponent’s polarizing policy proposal. Indeed, the abolition of supply management proposed by Maxime Bernier was creating tension not only within the party but also in rural areas of the country. Which is why some campaigns solicited the support of farmers. Although it is impossible to know the inﬂuence of these new members on the vote, the fact that Bernier’sopponents used his platform to their advantage is interesting. In short, the target audience of a leadership race are potential supporters and activists who are recruited.33 Individuals with an incentive to join.

6.4 Campaign messaging during the leadership primary

The closed primary selection method means that only eligible party members are allowed to vote (see Kenig, 2009b). In an open-house party this reality is more nuanced. Indeed, due to the length of the actual campaign candidates doubled the party’s membership over the course of the process. And whilst typical Conservative supporters adhered during that period there is a high probability that other types of Conservative supporters joined the party. Todetermine what objectives candidates had during this campaign we look at what messages they were communicating on social network. This section provides a brief overview of where candidates were transmitting their message. Followed by their Twitter messages, which were determined using Latent Dirichlet allocation topic modelling.

6.4.1 Message transmission strategies

Thirteen candidates had ten provinces and three territories to cover in 445 days—if they pre- pared their campaign prior to the publication of the leadership selection rules on March 8th 2016. Firstly, candidates did not possess the same resources as a party leader would during a general

32Respondent 13, interviewed in Quebec City, May 5th 2017 33Respondent 7, interviewed in Quebec City April 22nd 2017, and Respondent 8, interviewed in Quebec City April 22nd 2017

46 election. Secondly, not all candidates had the potential to have the same impact on the party if their aim was to become leader. Respondent 4 provides a good example of the reality of candidates with less name recognition, that actually wanted to be elected as leader:

And so you know, that we’re out on the ground to meet people. It is the most effective way to win hearts and minds. And to win people’s confidence so that they place you first on their ballot. But you got to use a lot of other tools to compensate for the fact that it’s very hard to meet everybody from Canada in a leadership race. So you rely very heavily on social media. You rely very heavily on emails. I would say that those are the two most preferred methods of communication in this race. 34

As Respondent 4 suggests, because of the scope of a closed leadership primary candidates have to rely on cost-eﬀective means of communication during their campaign. This is especially true of candidates with less name recognition and less resources overall. One might also suppose that the quantity and quality of volunteers might also mirror this reality.

A leadership race of a federal party is absolutely essential to our politics. This is per- haps the most creative moment in our political cycle, because we have the right to put forward ideas without compromise. We have the right to review what has been done. Our news and our future as a country. So for me to choose a new leader is not very important. Recruit new members yes, it’s important, but it’s not the most important goal. What is most important is to develop this vision, this plan for Canada and to be ready to present it to a much wider audience. Because democracies live through our political parties, that’s what people underestimate. Sadly, they criticize the Members of parliament, the already elected governments. But governments as soon as they are elected have no room for maneuver or to revise, to revive their policies in this or that area. They are really occupied with the duty of governing. And if we want to do something again. If you want to change something, if you want to merge, or dismantle something. If we want to reform anything, issues must be raised during a leadership race. There is an awakening to be had. Hence the importance of a race. People are cynical. People think that politics is done in other ways. That’s true social media, etc. It’s not just the political parties that are the key players in this. But it is through these bodies of support, if you will, that the voices of everyone, of all sectors, of all our institutions come together.35 36

Respondent 2 best explains the general position of most respondents. During a prominent process of intra-party democracy, politicians and party members have a duty to respond to the political climate. As Leduc(2001), Goldstein(2002), and Pilet and Cross(2014) have proposed in

34Respondent 4, interviewed by phone May 6th 2017 35Respondent 2, interviewed in Quebec City April 20th 2017 36Translated from French

47 their studies, political parties will redeﬁne themselves following an electoral loss. According to the above passage, political actors have a duty to respond to the cynicism regarding modern politics. Hence, the campaign allowed the party to test potential messages. Indeed, this is also re- ﬂected by who candidates were selling membership cards to. Thus, depending on the number of votes for each candidate we may have an idea of what the policy platform will look like at the next election. Candidates shared their messages on social media. And they also campaigned with the tested ground war.37 One respondent describes the ground war as such:

So we do [get out the vote practices] in ridings, there it counts because you can... you bring out ﬁve or ten people from their home, and then you know you can win the ridding you know. But in general, it’s a lot of eﬀort and focus in there, and often the dice are already played. But then everyone does it... everyone... you would say it’s done by habit, and for... like keeping volunteers busy, but I sometimes feel like it’s not so much... it’s helpful but it is not so useful as that either. You know it’s like, it’s part of the game so everyone does it, because everyone has to do it. But we spend a lot of time on it... but in the end it’s already decided.38,39

Indeed, many respondents conﬁrmed that there was door-to-door campaigning during the primary.40 But, as Respondent 13, quoted above, highlights, because members most likely have already chosen who they are voting for, it may be a lot of work for nothing. And that individual campaigns may be giving their volunteers a purpose by making them get out the vote during the second stage of the campaign.

On the other hand, candidates were also communicating using social media. With these platforms candidates are sure that their message is not framed by the media. By using social networks, candidates can be sure that the campaign message will not be framed by the media. Indeed, respondents use these platforms for that very reason. In addition, it also takes up less resources (ﬁnancial and labour) to use the internet as a campaign tool. As respondents put it:

So if I post something on Facebook I do it... I do a Tweet or I uh send an email to 125000 Conservative members across the country, that’s my message. I worded it the way I want it. The title’s the way I want it. If I’ve included a video it’s exactly the way I want it. [...] So that’s another challenge because if people don’t open their emails, and they don’t always. And if they don’t subscribe to your Facebook, and that’s very possible to, then where are they getting their information? Well they’re getting some from the national media. But the national media is only talking about ﬁve people, then, then that’s who they get to know about.41

37See Nielsen(2012) 38Respondent 13, interviewed in Quebec City, May 3rd 2017 39Translated from French 40Respondent 2, Respondent 4, Respondents 6-11, and Respondent 13 41Respondent 4, interviewed by phone, May 6th 2017

48 It’ s a little bit of both. Like euh, one of the nice things about modern day technology is that, I’ m sure 30 years ago to sell memberships you really had to prioritize who are you going try and sell to, because you had limited time, limited resources. But with, online tools, social media, we can do mass communications, where we can go after lots of diﬀerent kinds of people, and, it doesn’t take up resources from other things that we’ re doing. We just add to capacity. So, we obviously start with people who have had memberships in the past, a list of expired memberships from the party, that’ s kind of low hay food anyone who’ s bought a membership in the past ﬁve years, has better probability of getting them to buy this time.42

Respondents are aware that not every one reads their emails or checks their social media fre- quently. That is when one is subscribed to any given platform of the party. It is thus diﬃcult to get your message across in the ﬁrst place. The second communication problem is that if you cannot reach your voter base as a leadership candidate, then the only information that members get are from the news. This places barriers on how many candidates can access all eligible leadership race voters. Moreover, by using the expired membership list candidates may not be able to contact everyone for two reasons: resources and the fact that the contact information is no longer valid.

We do see that candidates are creating, through membership recruitment a centripetal force for the multi-speed political party with the who is their target audience. In a leadership campaign, candidates get to go beyond party lines and express policy ideas.43 Indeed, as Respondent 244 suggested, the reason why their campaign is exited to participate in the Conservative Party’sleadership race is that it gives candidates the opportunity to be creative. As the previous section noted, that is the very reason why some candidates threw their hat in the ring. The question, then, is do these said creative messages transcend to their social media accounts? Out of the 47 salient Twit- ter topics, only four relate explicitly to policy propositions.

Table 6.1 to Table 6.3, show the word clusters with the highest distribution probability within each candidates’ respective Twitter corpus. In other words, they were the word combinations which were most strongly associated to each candidate. The label given to each cluster (topic) was inferred based on two factors: the words contained in the topic and their frequency within said topic; and based on the author’s own knowledge of the campaign (news reports and semi- structured interviews). A limit to this approach, is that some word clusters were too varied, and could have been associated with any potential topic. Some candidate’stopics were easily labelled. These happen to be the candidates that tweeted the most (See Figure 4.1). Saliency is determined by looking at the gamma spread for each individual model. The scores closest to 1 are the topics

42Respondent 1, interviewed in Quebec City April 8th 2017 43Respondent 2 interviewed in Quebec City April 20th 2017 and Respondent 13, interviewed in Quebec City on May 3rd 2017 44Interviewed in Quebec City April 20th 2017

49 which best represent the corpus, and they are referred at salient topics herein.

Table 6.1 – Salient topics

Candidate Salient topics Words in topic Alexander, Chris Unclear 4 need, thank, govt, pmharper, peopl, today, polici, canadian, support, mani Unclear 8 forc, justintrudeau, marriage, great, refug, pmharper, peopl, today, canadian, support Unclear 10 justintrudeau, need, thank, govt, refug, pmharper, peopl, today, polici, many Bernier, Maxime Policy 1 must, free, econom, immigr, justintrudeau, campaign, team, good, speak, trump Kevin O’Leary like, debat, kevinolearytv, say, right, dont, sign, year, help, come Policy 3 manag, suppli, make, ballot, membership, team, good, liber, come, quebec Blaney, Steven Unclear 7 thank, terrorist, blaney, today, great, canadian, victim, ministevenblaney, merci, lévis Unclear 8 coré, plus, steven, blaney, canadien, veteran, vétéran, ministevenblaney, lévis, pensé Unclear 9 coré, terrorist, great, canadian, victim, veteran, ministevenblaney, merci, lévis, pensé Chong, Michael Event 2 mc, thereformact, meet, time, need, merci, next, debat, read, tonight Policy-Event plus, mc, thereformact, meet. canadian, merci, next, read, make, tonight Leitch, Kellie Unclear 1 honour, leitch, discuss, canadacfc, work, speak, ottawa, canvas, labour, time Campaign 2 volunt, visit, congrat, pleas, work, event, friend, conserv, labour, time Membership come, help, happi, enjoy, canadacfc, awesom, proud, congratul, conserv, year Campaign 3 candid, cpchq, leitch, work, famili, join, canvas, morn, tonight, congratul

There are on average three salient topics per candidate. With two exceptions: Kevin O’Leary and Brad Trost. Kevin O’Leary did not tweet enough about the campaign for anything related to the leadership campaign or to politics more generally, emerge out of the analyses. As for Brad Trost, his campaign tweets were principally retweets of his campaign manager’s account. These retweets were YouTube videos, where his manager would talk about Brad Trost’s positions on given issues.45 This poses a limit insofar as we do not analyze the policy positions contained in the videos.

45The videos are no longer available on the YouTube platform. However, they remain accessible through Mike Pat- ton’s Twitter account at the following link: https://twitter.com/Mike__Patton

50 Table 6.2 – Salient topics (cont’d)

Candidate Salient topics Words in topic Lemieux, Pierre Campaign 3 cdnpoli, support, pierr, thank, speech, lemieux, conserv, today, free, leadership Campaign 10 famili, cdnpoli, pierr, thank, speech, democraci, conserv, today, free, leadership Obhrai, Deepak Campaign 2 deepak, elxn, obhrai, today, support, best, right, debat, conserv, happi Campaign 3 deepakag, famili, need, elxn, today, support, best, debat, conserv, happi Event 2 meet, deepakag, need, obhrai, today, support, right, debat, conserv, happi Campaign 8 must, deepakag, need, elsn, obhrai, today, support, right, conserv, happi O’Leary, Kevin Not applicable Not applicable O’Toole, Erin Event 3 cdnpoli, event, great, candid, jointhemiss, thank, otool, campaign, friend, good Event 5 cdnpoli, support, team, great, jointhemiss, polici, debat, otool, endors, race Campaign cdnpoli, leader, support, great, conserv, candid, jointhemiss, friend, today, race Event 7 vote, great, candid, jointhemiss, polici, thank, debat, endors, meet, good Peterson, Rick Campaign 2 today, great, conserv, leadership, candid, look, vote, work, vancouv, canadian, Membership 2 peterson, rick, leadership, candid, look, member, news, vote, vancouv, canadian Membership 3 peterson, support, conserv, leadership, candid, member, news, vote, work, canadian Campaign 3 peterson, today, great, support, leadership, candid, look, work, vancouv, canadian Campaign 4 rick, today, support, conserv, leadership, candid, look, news, vote, canadian Membership 5 today, great, leadership, candid, look, member, vote, work, vancouv, canadian Membership 6 week, rick, great, support, candid, look, member, vote, work, vancouv

Four topic trends were prominent in the Twitterfeed. The ﬁrst is membership. There are 10 salient topics about membership. Kellie Leitch had one out of four topics be about membership. Four out of seven topics for Rick Peterson were about membership. That is more than half of his salient topics. Lisa Raitt had a similar tweeting pattern with three out of six topics. Finally, both Andrew Scheer and Andrew Saxton had one membership related topic each.

51 Table 6.3 – Salient topics (cont’d)

Candidate Salient topics Words in topic Raitt, Lisa Campaign 3 trudeau, work, team, support, join, make, tonight, people, famili, look Membership 2 parti, support, last, join, liber, time, year, peopl, famili, look Membership 4 team, support, last, join, liber, just, time, year, peopl, look Trudeau 1 parti, best, liber, tonight, just, time, year, peopl, famili, look Trudeau 2 trudeau, milton, join, liber, tonight, just, year, peopl, famili, look Membership 5 best, team, support, milton, join, make, just, time, famili, look Saxton, Andrew Policy busi, andrew, creat, job, small, great, tax, right, today, news Membership dream, member, annouc, help, canadia, candid, meet, north, grassroot, vancouv Scheer, Andrew Campaign 3 andrew, candid, leadership, cpchq, leader, scheer, liber, time, friend, denisebatt Membership & Trudeau andrew, leader, scheer, canadian, liber, time, justin, denisebatt, join, campaign Policy budget, just, cpchq, parti, canadian, good, liber, friend, join, campaign Trost, Brad Information relay Account was retweeting campaign manager’s videos

The second, is event promotion or recapitulation. There are six event related topics. Michael Chong had all his salient topics refer to events in some way shape or form. Lastly, Erin O’Toole, who had three out of four topics be on event promotion. His fourth topic, was generally related to campaigning but not speciﬁcally related to anything else.

The third, is policy messaging. Five salient topics were attributed to this heading. Maxime Bernier who campaigned on supply management, had two of the ﬁve overall policy topics, which were 2 out of 3 salient messages on Twitter. Michael Chong, Andrew Saxton, and Andrew Scheer, each had one policy related topic. However, Maxime Bernier and Michael Chong who were at the up- per tier of the pack had an important part of their tweets be on policy, yet were not elected leader. It can be because of supply management, the locus of Maxime Bernier’s platform, which dairy farmers across the country could reject at a general election. As well as the carbon tax, proposed by Chong, would have potentially cooled Conservative voters, who tend to prefer less government intervention.

The fourth, and ﬁnal trend, is a Trudeau topic. This message, is about campaigning against Justin

52 Trudeau, the current prime minister of Canada. Lisa Raitt had two such topics and Andrew Scheer had one. Now seeing there were only three such topics out of a possible 140 analyzed that refer to this subject matter, that does not say much. Nonetheless, Andrew Scheer Campaigned on not “letting Justin Trudeau do to [his] kids what his father did"(Geddes, J., 2017) to his own generation. Raitt also called out the sitting prime minister on many occasions. She, also made it a point early in her campaign that it was out of the question to have Justin Trudeau be prime minister for more than one mandate (Raitt, 2017). Notably, after Scheer was selected as leader he appointed Raitt as his deputy leader (Payton, L., 2017). This is simply a correlation, but an interesting one nonetheless.

Finally, the bulk of messages were abstract and were principally general campaign messages. In other words, the tweets had a “I’m a leadership candidate" or a “Vote for me" type of message. The bulk of the topics for candidates that tweeted less are abstract. In addition, candidates such as Brad Trost, did not use Twitter in a traditional campaign manner. The candidate’s account was simply re-tweeting videos posted on his campaign manager’s account about his leadership campaign. Because of this limitation, we cannot infer any campaign message from the content of his tweets. Which is a limit due to the fact that the videos contained certain policy positions. Finally, because O’Leary was a candidate for a short period of time and barely campaigned in the traditional sense of the term, we cannot infer any topics from his account. Which means that his corpus reﬂects the message which he was putting forward during the campaign, which is nothing.46 What the Twitter analysis shapes is that the most frequent theme is membership. Meaning that candidates talked the talk and walked the walk. They cumulatively doubled the party membership, and it shows in their social media communications.

6.5 Conclusion

The leadership selection rules of the Conservative Party of Canada encouraged candidates to campaign more broadly in two ways. The ﬁrst is by adapting their platforms to a public that falls outside the party‘s traditional base. The second, by recruiting as many members as possible. Consequently, because of who candidates were recruiting, we do see a centripetal eﬀect of the multi-speed party.

It also created other eﬀects. Indeed, the actors of the Conservative Party of Canada’s leadership race were looking to ascend to power in two ways. The ﬁrst, is by recruiting as many members to the party as possible. This allows them to broaden their support base as well as to create lever- age for adding new policies to the party’s agenda. The second, is by endorsing a candidate so that they have better chances of leaving the backbenches of parliament once the new leader an- nounces their shadow cabinet. While campaigning to Canadians susceptible to partake in the

46Respondent 1, interviewed in Quebec City April 8th 2017 and Respondent 7, interviewed in Quebec City April 22nd 2017

53 Open-House can have a positive inﬂuence for the party, it may not be the case for candidates whose objective was to put policies on the party’s agenda.

This could have negative internal and external effects for the party. Internally, some policies could be divisive for the party. Indeed, the social conservative issues which was on the agenda of certain candidates could strengthen already existing factions. The very same factions which the party set aside following the merger in the mid-2000s. Externally, the party could also be affected by its internal policy discord. In addition, even if there are no internal effects, the other parties could use what was said by certain candidates at the next election. In sum, although it has some drawbacks, the Open-House party can provide many benefits. However, unless one is equipped to deal with the aftermath of the event, then one should be cautious of how and who is invited to the party.

54 Chapter 7

All the World’s a Stage: Newspaper coverage of the campaign

Media does not go to the deserving. Media goes to Kim Kardashian.1

Newspaper coverage of the leadership primary is of candidates’ personalities or character as opposed their platforms. However, it is not the case for every candidate. This is shown by looking at whether or not newspapers discussed policy in their coverage of the leadership campaign. The policy-personality distinction is also considered by looking at which candidates received what kind of coverage. In addition, the first section of this chapter nuances these results by demonstrating how the media coverage was experienced by respondents. These nuances are threefold. Firstly, they felt that only certain candidates were getting news coverage. Secondly, the French news differs from the English news in quantity and type of reports. Finally, respondents also thought that, regardless of language, that the media tends to be volatile towards their party. The chapter first begins with respondents’ perspective of the news and it concludes with the policy versus personality analysis.

7.1 Behind the Scenes: Perspectives on the news

Respondents broadly agreed that the mainstream media favoured two candidates: Maxime Bernier and Kevin O’Leary. In addition, respondents also felt that the coverage was of candidates as opposed to their platforms. Many articles contained a mention to Donald Trump. Indeed, this was mentioned by Respondent 22 who thought that during the leadership campaign "the only crite- ria that matters is do you look like Donald Trump".3 It has been called the Trump eﬀect, where "it doesn’t pay to be reasonable".4 Suggesting that candidates should create sensationalism. Fur-

1Respondent 12, interviewed in Toronto May 26th 2017 2Interviewed in Quebec City, April 20th 2017 3Translated from French 4Respondent 12, interviewed in Toronto May 26th 2017

55 thermore, although respondents were ﬁrm on the fact that a leadership primary is a family aﬀair, they thought that the Canadian media was not giving them enough coverage. Indeed, one respondent described the negotiations between the party and the media for the coverage of the leadership convention of May 27th 2017:

Because of the Stanley Cup Playoﬀs, I don’t really know what. All national television stations have told us that as of 7:30 pm there will be no more coverage. So between 6:00 pm and 7:30 pm everything has to be done. The result has to be announced, the leader’sspeech has to be done, and the whole show... We’re going to be about 2000, all comments and all interviews must be completed by 7:30 pm. We’re going to celebrate and Canadians will change their channels to the Stanley Cup.5,6

Lucky for the party, the following Stanley Cup game was the Monday following the leadership convention.7 Nonetheless, it means, ﬁrstly, that the Canadian media put greater emphasis on hockey, Canada’s stereotypical religion, than on politics. Secondly, that the reason they do so is most likely because that is what they believe Canadians prefer. Another issue respondents have with the mainstream media’s coverage, of Canadian politics more generally, is that the news favours American Politics.8 Respondent 1 best describes this:

For example, CBC news, CBC news, during our Edmonton leadership debate, cut away to show the American state of the Union, halfway through the debate. And I ﬁnd my- self frustrated about that because, this is our state broadcaster, with a mandate to show Canadian content. We are the oﬃcial opposition. The government in the wait- ing. It’ s very likely that the next leader of the party is going to be the next prime minister at some point. And, you know, they cut away to show the same news as every other network was showing, so. I think that’ s frustrating. 9

Arguably we can say that the party wants Canadians to be aware of the leadership change process. Nonetheless, this phenomenon is notable and has implications beyond this research project. Indeed it is understandable that Canadian news outlets prefer to cover other aspects of Cana- dian politics. To favour American content is concerning. However, Donald Trump was sworn into oﬃce shortly before the leadership campaign. Due to his uncanny character, the American President permeated the Conservative leadership campaign’s coverage. Kellie Leitch and Kevin O’Leary were compared to him on multiple occasion. This is due to Leitch’s values test proposal and Trump’s stance on immigration. As well as the fact that Kevin O’Leary is a public businessman that attempted to launch his political career, just like Trump. However, as this project studies a Canadian political process, the weight of this crossover into Canadian politics will not be given

5Translated from French 6Respondent 9, interviewed in Quebec City May 23rd 2017 7Respondent 10, interviewed in Quebec City May 23rd 2017 8Respondent 9, interviewed in Quebec City May 23rd 2017 9Respondent 1, interviewed in Quebec City April 8th 2017

56 any further consideration hereafter.

As noted in Chapter4, there were only 416 French language articles collected for this project. This limits the party’s exposure to French Canadians. Indeed, Respondent 1010 and Respondent 1211 suggested that it did not matter whether the coverage was positive or negative. The party just wants to be seen in French Quebec. This is best explained by Respondent 1312 who worked out of the province of Quebec, and who thinks that

[i]t’s much harder to reach people in a leadership race than in a general election. Be- cause in a general election the media are focused on you. While in a leadership race, if you’re not the [Parti québécois] the media covers you less. You know, it’s like that, but you know... It’s really like that. The media have less interest. In general, there is less interest in federal politics. As opposed to provincial [politics] in Quebec.13

To appeal to French speaking Canadians, the party held the only unilingual French debate in Quebec City in January of 2017. Candidates were asked about their vision for the country and especially for Quebecers. Despite that,

[t]he next morning, it was all about Oh the French language was massacred. And that... well, it could have been one paragraph in any given article. But there were many topics which were covered, and I thought that it was one of the best debates. They really dealt with fundamental topics. We were given many answers on certain things. And [the media] did not talk about us at all. 14,15

The French media emphasized candidates’ linguistic shortcomings. One respondent was partic- ularly uneasy with how the Quebec media had covered the debate, especially their candidate’s performance. The respondent said that:

You know it’s the same thing, the media here in French was like, [he] did exactly what [he did]. [He] came, [he] spoke terribly, but [he] was speaking to the grassroots. [He] was speaking to the ordinary guys. And the next day the media [gave him] terrible comments. Who cares? The people [in Quebec] said: thank you for coming.16

Consequently, not only did the French papers not suﬃciently cover the campaign, according to respondents, but it also held a contemptuous review of candidates’ language skills. Respondent 917 reﬂected on the media’s role and cynicism and suggested the following:

10Interviewed in Quebec City May 23rd 2017 11Interviewed in Toronto May 26th 2017 12Interviewed in Quebec City, May 3rd 2017 13Translated from French 14Respondent 9, interviewed in Quebec City May 23rd 2017 15Translated from French. 16Respondent 3, interviewed in Quebec City April 20th 2017 17Interviewed in Quebec City May 23rd 2017

57 Often journalists say that "we are the fourth power you know?". But the legislative, judicial, and executive powers, they have responsibilities, and they must not exag- gerate certain things. They must be responsible. If you are the fourth power, maybe you should be accountable for the creation of a certain cynicism.18,19

We cannot measure cynicism within the limits of this project. However we can argue that the discrepancy between the quantity of coverage is evident in the most active part of the campaign: January 2017 to May 2017. On the other hand, Respondent 1220suggests that "[i]t’s the column inches. It doesn’t matter what they say about you". Thus, although candidates were said to have butchered the French language, at least they were getting column inches.

Figure 7.1 – Coverage by language

100 Quantity

2016−01 2016−07 2017−01 2017−07 2018−01 Date

English French

In short, the French language papers did not cover the leadership race in the same proportion as the English language newspapers. Moreover the French media made it a point, especially after the Quebec City debate to highlight the level of candidates’ language skills. This tendency is illustrated in Figure 7.1. The ﬁrst peak in the French coverage is in January 2017 when the Que- bec City debate was held. The other is at the end of May 2017, when Andrew Scheer was elected as the leader. All things being equal, the French language newspapers were indeed giving a spin to the leadership campaign by not covering it and by focusing on candidates’ bilingualism. On the other hand, it is reasonable for French speakers to have a leader of the opposition or a prime minister which can communicate to them directly.

Some respondents, also thought that the media was biased towards the party. Nonetheless some candidates gave interviews to these outlets. For example, Respondent 621 explained that Maxime

18Respondent 9, interviewed in Quebec City May 23rd 2017 19Translated from French. 20Interviewed in Toronto May 26th 2017 21Interviewed in Quebec City May 1st 2017

58 Bernier was giving interviews to popular Quebec television shows. One of them is hosted by Jean- René Dufort, it is a weekly evening show on current events with a comedic lens. As the respondent explained:

You have Maxime Bernier, and you have Jean-René Dufort, and yet Jean-René Dufort is a Liberal, almost to the bottom of his heart. Well, he was talking to him. Maxime went on the Francs-tireurs22 [television show]. Other than that, who else23 is going to see Jean-René Dufort...24

Thus, even if Maxime Bernier knew Mr. Dufort to be politically biased against him, he still provided an interview. Thereby, showing that candidates decided to go to great lengths to obtain minimal coverage. On the other hand, Maxime Bernier’s willingness to do these interviews might explain why respondents though that he received the most coverage. However, Figure 7.2 depicts a diﬀerent story. Bearing in mind that only newspapers are used in this project, Maxime Bernier did not receive the most coverage. His is the most stable, with the exception of lower tiered candidates who received relatively no coverage. Kellie Leitch and Kevin O’Leary are the candidates with the most newspaper coverage. One reason for this may be due to the fact that Leitch proposed a test of Canadian values to better screen immigrants to Canada. That

[f]or the ﬁrst month in this campaign, the media reported only controversial things or things from . attacks, things like that. Values... questions about the values of Kellie Leitch or Mad Max, things of controversial... and [the respondent’s candidate] took, an approach without controversy, so, [the respondent’s candidate] received, just a bit of reporting. 25,26

Accordingly, the media only looks for sensationalism. For example Maxime Bernier’s proposal to abolish supply management or to sell the CBC or with Kellie Leitch’s proposed values test, it is diﬃcult for moderate candidates to obtain decent coverage. 27 Respondent 6 explained that his campaign was often told "hey your candidate is not in the media".28 To which the respondent would reply "Yes, but, it’s just that he does not make the headlines in La Presse".29 Furthermore, Kevin O’Leary’s coverage also made respondents uneasy, because,

[f]or example, Kevin O’ Leary will get a lot of attention for something that he says. Be- cause he’ s Kevin O’ Leary. Not because what he said is interesting, or new, or diﬀerent, but just because it’ s him saying it. And I know that’ s because celebrity drives ratings,

22Weekly Quebec news television show often dealing with the week’s hot topics. 23What other candidate. 24Translated from French. 25Respondent 6, interviewed in Quebec City, April 22nd 2017 26Translated from French. 27Respondent 8, interviewed in Quebec City, April 22nd 2017 28Translated from French 29Translated from French.

59 Figure 7.2 – Candidate Mention Frequency

Alexander Bernier Blaney Chong 100

Leitch Lemieux O'Leary O'Toole 100

Obhrai Peterson Raitt Saxton 100 Quantity

Scheer Trost Withdrawn Candidate NA 100

2016−01 2016−07 2017−01 2017−07 2018−01 2016−01 2016−07 2017−01 2017−07 2018−01 2016−01 2016−07 2017−01 2017−07 2018−01 2016−01 2016−07 2017−01 2017−07 2018−01 Date

English French

and you know. Because it’ s very cyclical, it’ s self-fulfilling. It’s very frustrating, um, there are some publications, iPolitics is one, that, you know will actually cover policy announcements. [We] can issue a policy announcement and it gets zero attention from the mainstream media. They tend to uh, so... In some ways, in fairness to the media, with 14 [candidates], it can be impossible on CTV nightly news, to cover every single leadership candidate policy announcement. So, I would not put the blame en- tirely on them, but I do find that it is rather superficial. That we don’ t really get into the in-depth analysis. 30

30Respondent 1, interviewed in Quebec City April 8th 2017

60 Which goes back to how candidates were campaigning during this process. This leadership race, "it’s a race on the ground, not just in the media, as Kevin O’Leary [chuckles] is trying to do".31,32 Thereby, despite the media malaise felt by respondents, most campaigns were not built around the media. That is, campaigns which were not presenting star candidates. Consequently, we can ask the question: why did the party work hard to have well covered public debates, if the news only covers controversial or favorite candidates? In addition, we see a paradox. Respondents were uneasy with the little coverage which their candidates received. Yet they think that the campaign is targeted only to party members and that the ground war33 is more important than news coverage.

7.2 Center Stage: Type of Coverage

In Chapter4 the fourteen candidates were divided into three sub-groups based on the results of the ﬁrst round of voting (i.e. members’ ﬁrst choice for leader):

Tier 1 candidates were the top two on the ﬁrst ballot getting more than 20% of the votes each. Tier 2 candidates received between 7% and 11% of the votes each, whilst Tier 3 candidates received less than 4% of the votes each. At ﬁrst glance, Figure 7.2 shows that unlike the argument made by Trimble(2007) the stronger candidates did not necessarily obtain more coverage than their opponents. Indeed, the two candidates with the most coverage are the three who had the most controversial proposals: Maxime Bernier (supply management), Kellie Leitch (Canadian Values) and Kevin O’Leary (no actual proposals34). Notably, Maxime Bernier did not get the most coverage. However, his is the most stable and arguably more prominent than his contenders, including Andrew Scheer, the current leader.

To measure whether newspapers covered candidates’ proposed policies, Issue Discussed 1, Issue Discussed 2, and Issue Discussed 3 variables from the coded media content are used.35 All three of these variables had the same possible values, such as: policy, favorite, potential candidate, rules, ﬁnance, and a few others. From these three variables three more were created: Reference to 2019 election, Policy, and Favorite. The item we are measuring is the mention of election 2019. Often times there was emphasis on the fact that a national party leader had to be bilingual to be able to properly communicate with all Canadians (French and English Speaking). This is one of the per-

31Respondent 7, interviewed in Quebec City April 22nd 2017 32Translated from French. 33See Nielsen(2012) and Chapter6. 34Respondent 9, interviewed in Quebec City May 23rd 2017 35See AppendixA.

61 sonality measures. This measure suggests that journalist were putting emphasis on the need for a leader to be accessible to all voters, and this regardless of the language of the newspaper. Thereby suggesting that to be competitive at a general election, a leader must be bilingual. Another topic which was included in this variable is a reference in the article about who is better suited to beat Justin Trudeau, the sitting Prime minister, at the next election. Thus, any comparison to Justin Trudeau was coded as an election topic. The second variable analyzed is the Favorite. Any mention of a given candidate being a favorite candidate for the leadership was coded under this label. Finally, any mention of Policy, whether they were abolishing supply management, the carbon tax, or screening immigrants for Canadian values was coded under the Mention of Policy variable.

Figure 7.3 – Personality vs. Policy Coverage

100

50 Quantity

2016−01 2016−07 2017−01 2017−07 2018−01 Date

Favorite Policy Reference to 2019 NA

Interestingly the personality coverage really began in January 2017, almost one year after the start of the primary. In addition, we see in Figure 7.3 that the reference to the 2019 election takes prece- dence over favoritism. Suggesting that emphasis on personality is about opposition. It is about being able to compete against the current government. Meaning that successful leadership candidates should have desirable attributes as Michels(1915b) suggested. In this case the newspapers’ overall coverage of this primary is about character.

Dividing this coverage by candidate type paints a diﬀerent picture. Tier 1 candidates were overwhelmingly mentioned as a favorite in newspaper articles, but towards the end of the campaign only. As Figure 7.4 shows, the reference to favorite was done earlier in the leadership primary. In- deed, prior to January 2017 when all oﬃcial candidates were announced, newspapers were referring to other candidates as being a favorite. Newspapers were actually referring to other potential

62 Figure 7.4 – Personality vs. Policy: Candidates Types

No ballot candidate Tier 1 60

Tier 2 Tier 3

Quantity 60

2016−01 2016−07 2017−01 2017−07 2018−01 2016−01 2016−07 2017−01 2017−07 2018−01 Date

Favorite Policy Reference to 2019 NA

leadership candidates up until the end of December 2016. On the other hand, newspapers also covered Tier 1 candidates’ policy proposals as much as they covered the candidates’ personalities.

Figure 7.4 shows that Tier 2 candidates were overwhelmingly mentioned in a news article that talk about policy. This is most likely due to the fact that there were two strong policy candidates in this Tier, Michael Chong and Kellie Leitch. Chong proposed to implement a tax on carbon which Conservative Party Supporters tend to oppose. Whilst Leitch campaigned on the controversial Canadian Values, where she proposed that immigrants be subjected to a stronger screening process. Figure 7.4 shows that Tier 2 candidates received little to no mention of being a favorite for the position of Conservative Party leader. This might be due to the fact that out of the five candidates in Tier 2, only two were fluent in both French and English, while the others struggled with the grasp of the French language. Moreover, we can also conclude that due to the controversial policies proposed by Chong and Leitch may be why they were not seen as a favorite. Thus, candidates with less than 20% of the vote in the first round were not mentioned as favorite. Not even

63 Figure 7.5 – Personality vs. Policy: All Candidates

Alexander Bernier Blaney Chong

Leitch Lemieux O'Leary O'Toole

Obhrai Peterson Raitt Saxton Quantity

Scheer Trost Withdrawn Candidate NA

0 2016−01 2016−07 2017−01 2017−07 2018−012016−01 2016−07 2017−01 2017−07 2018−012016−01 2016−07 2017−01 2017−07 2018−012016−01 2016−07 2017−01 2017−07 2018−01 Date

Favorite Policy Reference to 2019 NA

when looking for a reference to the 2019 election.

Interestingly, Tier 3 candidates appeared in articles projecting this primary to the 2019 election. This can be explained by the fact that O’Leary is in this group. He has the most mentions in newspapers (see Figure 7.2). There was often unease regarding his candidacy in newspapers. This is because the candidate in question did not speak French. In fact the main criticism journalists and his opponents had of O’Leary was just that: he does not speak French; thus how do you expect him to be competitive in a debate against Justin Trudeau should he be chosen as leader. Hence, although O’Leary was seen as an early favorite, even before he announced his candidacy, he was not seen as being competitive against Justin Trudeau.

64 Finally, as it was the case for overall coverage for each candidate, we see that Maxime Bernier, Kel- lie Leitch, Kevin O’Leary, and to some regard Andrew Scheer are the only ones with substantive newspaper coverage. Kellie Leitch and Brad Trost received almost exclusively policy coverage. As of January 2017 Kevin O’Leary dominated the personality coverage (both favorite and 2019 election). Andrew Scheer’s personality became newsworthy when he was elected as leader. Lastly, the emphasis on favorite to be leader early in the primary was on withdrawn candidates. What should be noted in the news coverage of individual candidates with regard to policy versus personality, is the absence of said coverage for Tier 3 candidates: Chris Alexander, Stephen Blaney, Pierre Lemieux, Deepak Obhrai, Rick Peterson, Lisa Raitt, and Andrew Saxton. With regards to Tier 2 candidates, notably Michael Chong and Erin O’Toole who did well fairly well on the ﬁrst ballot, they received little to no substantive newspaper attention. In light of that, Respondent 1236 had a point when he said that many interesting and respected candidates, with something to say received little to no important news attention. It should be reiterated that this analysis does not consider whether the language used in the newspaper was positive or negative. It just looks at whether the newspaper emphasized candidates’ personalities as opposed to their policies.

7.3 Conclusion

Newspapers gave more or less equal policy and personality attention to Tier 1 candidates, giving slightly more attention to their personality towards the end of the campaign. Newspapers focused on leader’s personalities or character as opposed their platforms for Tier 1 candidates and Tier 3. The opposite is true for Tier 2 candidates who received much policy coverage. Indeed, we see that the coverage of Tier 2 candidates, the policy candidates, was focused on their policy proposals. In turn, this may have influenced why they were not mentioned as being a favorite in the newspaper articles about the primary. Moreover, we see that Tier 3 candidates were often mentioned as being a favorite for the 2019 election. But, this may be due to Kevin O’Leary’s candidacy being in this final group of candidates. Finally, there is a paradox which respondents bring forward. They want more media coverage for their respective candidates so that they can be heard by all Canadians. However, in a previous chapter, many respondents attested that this leadership primary was about bringing old members back-in. That the primary was a family discussion. Lastly, respondents were also uneasy about competing for attention when the media favours American politics and the Stanley Cup playoffs.

36Interviewed in Toronto May 26th 2017

65 Conclusion

The Conservative Party of Canada’s leadership campaign is not a dress rehearsal for the general election. The reason is that once the leader is chosen his or her platform, team, and vision for the party and for Canada still have a few more tests to go through. The ﬁrst being the policy convention that will be held one year following the primary. Instead this leadership primary is more like an audition. It is about choosing who will be the key players at the election, no dress rehearsal needed. It is about setting the scene, writing the plot and choosing who will lead the party at the dress rehearsal. Which will really begin during the policy convention that follows the leadership selection in the summer of 2018.

The rules of the primary influenced the dynamics in three key ways. The first two are internal and the third is external. All three have implications for the future of the party. Internally, the rules emphasized the already existing divisions within the party, firstly. Chapter6 shows that the rules allowed candidates to be creative. Which facilitated the promotion of certain policies which members were likely to support, but gives the party a bad image with regards to all Cana- dians. An example of such policies is the abolition of supply management proposed by Maxime Bernier, the Canadian Values test for immigrants to Canada proposed by Kellie Leitch, and the social conservative policies such as opposition to abortion and same sex marriage supported by Pierre Lemieux and Brad Trost. The rules allowed candidates who wanted to be leader but did not have what Michels’ would call the psychology of the leader. That these candidates may not be seen as Prime minister material by members, supporters, or all Canadians. Which is why some respondents thought that the primary was “too democratic”. This is because anyone who is a member in good standing for at least six months, can collect 300 signatures, and provide 100,000$ can be a candidate.

Secondly, the rules created a centripetal force which brought all supporters and potential supporters to the Open-House party. Chapter6 shows that candidates renewed as many lapsed memberships as possible. In addition, candidates took and advantage of their opponents’ polarizing policies to encourage individuals who stood against those policies to adhere to the party. Not to mention that candidates with polarizing platforms were also more likely to campaign to their support base, regardless of whether or not they are party supporters. This does two things: it gives a voice to Canadians who support these policies; and it may also create tensions within the party

66 because said policy is not electorally viable. The rules facilitated the Open-House party, which is good for membership. On the other hand, like any party with many attendees, if not everyone wants the same thing, then the aftermath of the party is uncertain. All might agree to disagree and stay with the party. Otherwise because of multi-speed party membership it is likely that there will be an Open-House somewhere else. After all, in some cases candidates campaigned to Canadians who supported Conservative policies but are more likely to vote Liberal.

The third and ﬁnal eﬀect has external implications. Chapter7 showed that Maxime Bernier and Andrew Scheer were often mentioned in a news article about being a favourite candidate as well as referring to their competitiveness against sitting Prime minister, Justin Trudeau. On the other hand, second Tier candidates, those with 7% to 11% of the vote each were more likely to have their policies emphasized. Third tier candidates who had less than 7% of the vote were likely to be mentioned in the same articles as those referring to the 2019 election. A caveat is that Kevin O’Leary, the only withdrawn candidate, was in this tier of candidates. Which might explain why there are mentions of the 2019 election. Kevin O’Leary was unable to speak French. And this was repeatedly mentioned as limiting for the party if he was elected leader.

Oligarchization in context

These results suggest that the model outlined in Chapter2 needs to have an extra step added to the process of oligarchization of political parties. This node should include agenda-setting and message-control. It will occur prior to the election node. The reason being that this primary is an audition more than a dress-rehearsal. Let us go over how the model reﬂects the leadership primary so that we can show how it should be updated to reﬂect the reality of the Conservative Party.

We saw that multi-speed political participation changes how parties organize their internal democracy. Although actors within the Conservative Party of Canada are well aware of the fact that political parties are no longer membership organizations in the traditional sense, they have to operate in a world that still sees traditional disengagement as a democratic ailment. The membership organization is beneﬁcial for two reasons: image and fundraising. The image of the party gets a boost when they say that membership has doubled during the leadership campaign. Yet, as past research and our respondents attest, it is diﬃcult to keep traditional members adhered to the party in the stricter sense. However, the primary should be a good way to raise funds for the party as Crotty et al.(1999) and Montigny and Tessier(2017) have proposed. It is a good way to fundraise which is why candidates were recruiting as many members as possible. All fourteen candidates were fundraising for their campaigns at the same time as the Party is trying to fundraise for the primary and for its other operations. Meaning that they were all competing each other for funds. Which is strenuous for the party and its supporters during that period.

The second step towards oligarchization where candidates do campaign to a broader audience,

67 Figure 7.6 – Oligarchy in the Canadian Context

Ideal IPD Candidates

Multi-Speed * Membership Election

Leadership Leader Primary Eﬀects

Election loss

*The election result would be oligarchic if a parties’ practices remain the same as when it was attempting to gain power. confirms the first hypothesis. This was done in Chapter 5 by looking at what were the rules on voting method and the candidacy requirements. In addition, we saw that membership is the most frequent topic of candidates’ Tweets. Meaning, that the broader audience was a central objective for candidates. Furthermore, respondents confirmed that membership was a way of collecting votes. For example, selling membership in ridings where there were less Conservative members or selling membership to gather support for your proposals or to oppose their opponents’ proposals, were membership adherence strategies used by leadership candidates. We also see a very small trend in the topics extracted from Twitter. A message that was critical of Justin Trudeau from Andrew Scheer and from Lisa Raitt. This reflects the criticism aspect of the first part of the Iron law of oligarchy which was discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. "[T]he ideological tendency of democracy [is directed] towards criticism and control" (Michels, 1915b, 245) could be true in the case of the Conservative intra-party democracy. However, the control part still needs to be tested at the policy convention that is scheduled a few months from the time of writing. That is one reason why an extra step to the model is necessary. The node should include agenda-setting and message control. Unfortunately, because of the time-frame studied in this project we cannot measure how this step will affect the party’s internal dynamics. It limits the inferences which can be made based on this case study.

Thus the primary creates the necessary conditions for leader effects and ideal candidates. It is why the media put the emphasis on a type of politician: which candidate is likely to be the party leader. In that case, we can assume that the candidates who were referred to as favourite were subjected to the presidentialization effect (Webb and Poguntke, 2005). Meaning that within the context of this research project newspapers are responsible for creating the leader effects. On the

68 other hand, if we want to be conservative about it we can say that newspapers are predicting who would be eligible for leader eﬀects during the 2019 Canadian general election. In both cases, during this leadership primary newspapers are the ones building the momentum of leader. Although Michels proposed, that the leader has to be appealing to the electorate, he did not predict that the media would propel the appeal of worthy candidates and diminish the appeal of the unworthy. That is strictly referring to candidates suitable to be a party leader. A phenomenon that Michels could not foresee is the leadership candidates that are not aiming for the post which they are campaigning for. Which is why we see adverse leader eﬀects for Tier 2 and Tier 3 candidates. Tier 2 candidates were principally agenda setting candidates. Furthermore, depending on the motivations of these candidates it can create volatility in the control step of oligarchization. Which in turn may be one of the drivers of voter disenchantment outlined in Chapter1.

Looking forward, it is diﬃcult to determine whether or not political parties will continue to uti- lize primaries to select their leaders. What is certain however, is that primaries divide the organizational structure of the party in an attempt to perpetuate the ideal of the membership based organization. In light of candidates’ motivations to participate in this primary, it is essential to rethink the true representativeness of political parties. Marland and Giasson(2016) proposed that political parties are now Boutique-Parties. That parties engage in micro-targeting of the electorate to get votes. If candidates did indeed recruit political party members by using polarizing issues, then, the Conservative Party will not only have to manage its supporters but also what they want. That in itself is diﬃcult. Also, this primary is a very public event. Thus other parties took notes of the process in order to be able to campaign against the Conservatives at the next election. Consequently, this primary was an audition for the Conservatives but may have been market research for the New Democratic Party, the Liberal Party of Canada, the Greens, as well as the Bloc québécois in some regards.

Scientiﬁc contribution and limits

What limits our broader understanding of leadership primaries is that we do not have an account of what other Canadian political parties were doing while the Conservatives were changing their leader. Indeed, although the Liberals were governing, the New Democrats were also having a leadership primary of their own. A primary where every member also had one vote. However, their members voted online, as opposed to mail-in voting like the Conservatives. This leads to three questions: what were the internal dynamics of their leadership race; how did the external dynamics of both leadership primaries interact; how does it change the Canadian party system for the 2019 election, if at all? Although this case study contributed to the ﬁelds of research on political communication, party membership, and electoral politics more generally, it only provides one case study. Indeed, this thesis provides an in-depth analysis of the eﬀects of changing intra- party democracy on the party. Furthermore, because we looked at the process of the primary as opposed to just its result, we now have a better understanding of the limitations of this kind of

69 procedure. For one, some respondents actually preferred the convention. Suggesting, that active party members have a nostalgic ideal of the elite dominated party, at least with regards to leadership selection. Another, is that in an attempt to maintain the ideal of the party as a membership organization, party organizers Open-House to encourage their support base to purchase a membership. We are limited with the inference which we can make based on the result of this thesis, because we do not know why those who purchased a membership during the primary did so. Nor do we know how this process will aﬀect their relationship to the party or their vote for that matter.

Which is why scholars will have to complete longitudinal and comparative studies of leadership primaries. Comparative studies can be done within the same country. For example, in the Cana- dian case we can compare how all national and provincial parties select their leader and its eﬀect on the broader party system. Another comparative study should be international. At the outset it is mentioned that the countries that have had many leadership selection studies are Canada and the United-Kingdom. What about comparing these cases with countries who have yet to decentralize their selection mechanism? What are the eﬀects of these processes on the electorate? On membership? These studies can build on the model that was tested in this project. Indeed, Figure 7.6 provides a starting point for scholars of primaries.

In addition, it is shown in Chapter1, that the positive effects of leadership selection do not last. Nor is leadership change necessarily triggered by an electoral loss, although it was the case for the Conservatives. Why are there no long-term effects of leadership selection? Are there any effects? Because past studies have shown by looking at leader effects and public opinion polls, they are not looking at the mechanisms that occur in between elections within the political party. Hence, scholars have yet to show the differences in partisan mobilization between parties that open their organizations during a leadership change and those that do not. The scholarship on leader selection has been consolidated in recent years. Nonetheless, three limits require scholarly attention. There is a deficit of comparative studies. Parties have received too much attention from scholars whilst party supporters and voters has been neglected. Finally, new types of data need to be included as well as to integrate different types of methodologies.

We do not know how members’ expectations of leaders are formed, and eventually become votes. We also know that a leader is replaced to increase a party’s positive branding, regardless of the method used. Yet researchers cannot explain why the positive effects associated with the change disappear by the next election, despite the inclusivity or exclusivity of the selection method. Put simply, it is difficult to be all for or all against the use of primaries to select a leader. In this case, if Andrew Scheer can juggle the requirements of party members through the policy convention to the 2019 election, then this primary will have been beneficial for him and the Conservatives. However, what about the runner-ups? Other than the candidates that are now part of the leader’s close circle such as Lisa Raitt, how will their political careers be affected? More importantly, what do the changes in political party organization mean for electoral politics more generally? This thesis offers a stepping stone for further research on the internal dynamics of political parties.

70 Despite some methodological limits, by showing the consequences of primary rules on parties, it is now possible to build on this study. Because the model tested herein may apply to more than one political party.

71 Appendix A

Media Analysis Code-book

This media content analysis protocol sorts out the types of coverage of the leadership race from October 20th 2015 until June 27th 2017, inclusively. It tracks the moments leading up to the race as well as its aftermath. The articles analyzed are organized by month leading up to February 2017, after which the coverage is analyzed by week in order to better track tendencies in the final weeks of the campaign. This choice was made due to some interview participants stating that for the most part they were concentrating their efforts in those final weeks of the campaign.

The following outline the variables that were used to analyze sources from Factiva as well as Eu- rekka c.c. from the Université Laval French and English news databases. The focus is not on the quantity of the coverage, but rather on the content of the coverage. Using these search parameters: The doubles function was turned on, therefore limiting the size of the corpus to be analyzed. Also transcripts from television shows were excluded.

• Candidate mentioned in article (Multiple selections available). Each candidate is listed as a variable 1. Alexander 2. Bernier 3. Blaney 4. Chong 5. Leitch 6. Lemieux 7. Obhrai 8. O’Leary 9. O’Toole 10. Peterson 11. Raitt 12. Saxton 13. Scheer

72 14. Trost 15. Other 16.NA • Issue Discussed 1, 2, & 3 1. Harper: Comparison to Stephen Harper 2. Mention of favorite 3. Immigration 4. Canadian values 5. Supply management 6. Conservative Values (Abortion, LGBT rights) 7. Trudeau: mention of beating him; mention of 2019; comparison of proposed policies to those of Trudeau 8. New candidate 9. Withdrawn candidate 10. General policy 11. Mention of Bilingualism 12. Potential Candidate 13. Rules 14. New Candidate 15. Membership 16. Fundraising 17. Result 18. Branding • Poll within unit 1. True – Favours candidate a) Alexander b) Bernier c) Blaney d) Chong e) Leitch f) Lemieux g) Obhrai h) O’Leary i) O’Toole j) Peterson k) Raitt l) Saxton m) Scheer

73 n) Trost 2. False • Language 1. English 2. French • Date published (Continuous variable)

74 Appendix B

Interview Questions

1. Can you tell me about your political career? 2. How do you feel about the way in which the party oversees the process of selecting a new leader: campaign rules, fees, voting method? • What is your campaign organization like (field offices, staff etc)? 3. If the leadership change was undertaken in a more restrictive process (convention), would you still be running for leadership? 4. What is your opinion about the way in which the leadership campaign is reported? 5. What compromises have you had to make to be part of this process: it can be both practical or ideological? How do you think it is going to affect your campaign? 6. With regards to membership renewals and recruitment, how is your team approaching it? Are you trying to sell as many cards as possible or is it more of a question of who would normally support the party and more specifically your campaign? 7. Beyond changing the political leader of the party, what other effects or purpose, indented or not, do you think this process has on: the party and the electorate? 8. How does this leadership campaign differ from a general election, in your opinion?

75 Appendix C

Latent Dirichlet Allocation Topic Modeling: Results and robustness tests

C.1 Chris Alexander

Figure C.1 – Chris Alexander Perplexity

Evaluating LDA topic models Alexander Optimal number of topics (smaller is better) 1750

●

1500

●

1250 Perplexity

●

1000

●

0 25 50 75 100 Number of topics

76 Figure C.2 – Chris Alexander Topics

Alexander 1 2 3 4

justintrudeau forc justintrudeau need

cdnpoli cdnpoli marriag thank

thank thank thank govt

great great great pmharper

pmharper refuge peopl peopl

peopl pmharper today today

today polici polici polici

canadian canadian canadian canadian

support support support support

mani mani mani mani

0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 5 6 7 8

justintrudeau conserv conserv forc

need forc forc justintrudeau

cdnpoli need cdnpoli marriag

thank marriag great great

govt thank refuge refuge

term great great pmharper pmharper

pmharper today today peopl

today canadian polici today

support support canadian canadian

mani mani mani support

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 9 10

justintrudeau justintrudeau

need need

cdnpoli thank

marriag govt

govt refuge

great pmharper

pmharper peopl

today today

polici polici

support mani

0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.0 0.1 0.2 beta

Table C.1 – Chris Alexander Topic Summary

Topic Words in topic Unclear 1 justintrudeau, cdnpoli, thank, great, pmharper, peopl, today, canadian, support, mani Unclear 2 forc, cdnpoli, thank, great, refug, pmharper, polici, canadian, support, mani Unclear 3 justintrudeau, marriag, thank, great, peopl, today, polici, candian, support, mani Unclear 4 need, thank, govt, pmharper, peopl, today, polici canadian, support, mani Unclear 5 justintrudeau, need, cdnpoli, thank, govt, great, pmharper, today, support, mani Unclear 6 conserv, forc, need, marriag, thank, great, today, canadian, support, mani Unclear 7 conserv, forc, cdnpoli, great, refug, pmharper, today, polici, canadian, mani Unclear 8 forc, justintrudeau, marriage, great, refug, pmharper, peopl, today, canadian, support Unclear 9 justintrudeau, need, cndpoli, marriag, govt, great, pmharper, today, polici, support Unclear 10 justintrudeau, need, thank, govt, refug, pmharper peopl, today, polici, many

77 Figure C.3 – Chris Alexander Topic Spread

Distribution of probability for each topic

1 2 3 4 5

100

6 7 8 9 10 Number of documents

100

0.0975 0.1000 0.1025 0.1050 0.1075 0.0975 0.1000 0.1025 0.1050 0.1075 0.0975 0.1000 0.1025 0.1050 0.1075 0.0975 0.1000 0.1025 0.1050 0.1075 0.0975 0.1000 0.1025 0.1050 0.1075 γ

78 C.2 Maxime Bernier

Figure C.4 – Maxime Bernier Perplexity

Evaluating LDA topic models Bernier Optimal number of topics (smaller is better)

●

4000

3000

● Perplexity

●

2000

●

1000 ●

0 25 50 75 100 Number of topics

Figure C.5 – Maxime Bernier Topics

Bernier 1 2 3 4

time market must like

cpchq say free debat

endors ballot econom kevinolearytv

say membership immigr say

make best justintrudeau right

campaign race campaign dont

next govern team sign

good plus good year

peopl corpor speak help

justin explorecanada trump come

0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.100 0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.100 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 5 6 7 8

freedom manag welcom cpchq

pleas suppli idea choic

kevinolearytv time futur respons

endors immigr meet right

countri dont countri first

term govern plus campaign fair

plus propos next team

speak trump govern youthberni

help come team plus

peopl back member year

0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.100 0.125 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 9 10

talk manag

provinc suppli

make make

sign ballot

meet membership

campaign team

best good

race liber

govern come

help quebec

0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.10 beta

79 Figure C.6 – Maxime Bernier Topic Spread

Distribution of probability for each topic

1 2 3 4 5

1000

6 7 8 9 10

1000 Number of documents

0.095 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.115 0.120 0.1250.095 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.115 0.120 0.1250.095 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.115 0.120 0.1250.095 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.115 0.120 0.1250.095 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.115 0.120 0.125 γ

Table C.2 – Maxime Bernier Topic Summary

Topic Words in topic Unclear 1 time, cpchq, endors, say, make, campaign, next, good, people, justin Membership market, say, ballot, membership, beat, race, govern, plus, corpor, explorecanada Policy 1 must, free, econom, immigr, justintrudeau, campaign, team, good, speak, trump Kevin O’Leary like, debat, kevinolearytv, say, right, dont, sign, year, help, come Endorsement freedom, please, kevinolearytv, endors, countri, govern, plus, speak, help, peopl Policy 2 manag, suppli, time, immigr, dont, plus, propos, trump, come, back Campaign 1 welcome, idea, future, meet, country, campaign, next, govern, team, member Unclear 2 cpchq, choc, reapons, night, ﬁrst, fair, team, youthbernier, plus, year Campaign 2 talk, provinc, make, sign, meet, campaign, best, race, govern, help Policy 3 manag, suppli, make, ballot, membership, team, good, liber, come, quebec

80 C.3 Steven Blaney

Figure C.7 – Steven Blaney Perplexity

Evaluating LDA topic models Blaney Optimal number of topics (smaller is better)

●

1750

1500

● Perplexity

1250

●

● 1000

●

0 25 50 75 100 Number of topics

Figure C.8 – Steven Blaney Topics

Blaney

1 2 3 4 steven plus today great terrorist blaney canadien canadien blaney canadian canadian canadian today veteran veteran veteran canadian vétéran vétéran vétéran victim bravo bravo bravo bravo minstevenblaney minstevenblaney minstevenblaney minstevenblaney merci merci merci merci lévis lévis lévis pensé pensé pensé pensé 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 5 6 7 8 steven minpetermackay thank coré blaney canadian terrorist plus canadien victim blaney steven canadian veteran today blaney veteran vétéran great canadien

term bravo bravo canadian veteran minstevenblaney minstevenblaney victim vétéran merci merci minstevenblaney minstevenblaney lévis lévis merci lévis pensé pensé lévis pensé 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 9 10 coré blaney terrorist today great great canadian canadien victim victim veteran veteran minstevenblaney bravo merci minstevenblaney lévis lévis pensé pensé 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 beta

81 Table C.3 – Steven Blaney Topic Summary

Topic Words in topic Unclear 1 steven, terrorist, blaney, today, canadian, victim, bravo, ministevenblaney, merci, pensé Unclear 2 plus, blaney, canadian veteran, vétéran, bravo, ministevenblaney, merci, lévis, pensé Unclear 3 today, canadien, canadian, veteran, vétéran, bravo, ministevenblaney merci, lévis, pensé Unclear 4 great, canadien, canadian, veteran, bravo, ministevenblaney, merc, lévis, pensé Unclear 5 steven, blaney, canadien, candian, veteran, bravo, ministevenblaney, merci, lévis, pensé Unclear 6 minpertermackay, canadian, victim, veteran, vétéran, bravo, ministevenblaney, merci,lévis, pensé Unclear 7 thank, terrorist, blany, today, great, canadian, victim, ministevenblaney, merci, lévis Unclear 8 coré, plus, steven, blaney, canadien, veteran, vétéran, ministevenblaney, lévis, pensé Unclear 9 coré, terrorist, great, canadian, victim, veteran, ministevenblaney, merci, lévis, pensé Unclear 10 blaney, today, great, canadien, victim, veteran, bravo, ministevenblaney, lévis, pensé

Figure C.9 – Steven Blaney Topic Spread

Distribution of probability for each topic Blaney

1 2 3 4 5

100

6 7 8 9 10 Number of documents

100

0.100 0.105 0.110 0.115 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.115 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.115 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.115 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.115 γ

82 C.4 Michael Chong

Figure C.10 – Michael Chong Perplexity

Evaluating LDA topic models Chong Optimal number of topics (smaller is better)

●

2000

●

1500 Perplexity

●

1000 ●

●

0 25 50 75 100 Number of topics

Figure C.11 – Michael Chong Topics

Chong

1 2 3 4 plus ballot leader leader mc leader meet reform reform reform canadian thereformact meet meet time canadian canadian time need time time need reformact need need merci merci reformact reformact next next merci merci make debat debat debat tonight read tonight 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 5 6 7 8 carbon mc mc carbon leader thereformact leader ballot reform meet reform leader thereformact time canadian thereformact canadian need need merci

term next merci reformact next debat next next debat read debat debat read make read read make tonight tonight make tonight 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 9 10 plus ballot mc reform thereformact thereformact meet meet canadian canadian merci time next need read reformact make debat tonight tonight 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 beta

83 Table C.4 – Michael Chong Topic Summary

Topic Words in topic Policy 1 plus, mc, reform, meet, canadian, time, need, reformact, merci, debat Event 1 ballot, leader, reform, meet, time, need, merci, next, make, tonight Event-Policy leader, meet, canadian time, need, reformact, merci, next, debat, read Policy 2 leader, reform, thereformact, canadian, time, need, reformact, merci, debat, tonight Policy 3 carbon, leader, reform, thereformact, canadian, next, debat, read, make, tonight Event 2 mc, thereformact, meet, time, need, merci, next, debat, read, tonight Policy 4 mc, leader, reform, canadian, need, reformact, next, debat, read, make Policy 5 carbon, ballot, leader, thereformact, merci, next, debat, read, make, tonight Policy-Event plus, mc, thereformact, meet. canadian, merci, next, read, make, tonight Policy 6 ballot, reform, thereformact, meet, canadian, time, need, reformact, debat, tonight

Figure C.12 – Michael Chong Topic Spread

Distribution of probability for each topic Chong

1 2 3 4 5

100

6 7 8 9 10 Number of documents

100

0.100 0.105 0.110 0.115 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.115 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.115 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.115 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.115 γ

84 C.5 Kellie Leitch

Figure C.13 – Kellie Leitch Perplexity

Evaluating LDA topic models Leitch Optimal number of topics (smaller is better)

2500 ●

2000

● Perplexity ●

1500

●

1000

●

0 25 50 75 100 Number of topics

Figure C.14 – Kellie Leitch Topics

Leitch 1 2 3 4 come candid congrat collingwood announc cpchq discuss simcoegrey congrat help work visit work announc event enjoy event happi join pleas famili ottawa speak join join friend host friend entrepreneur look proud host proud proud morn tonight tonight morn labour time 0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.100 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.09 5 6 7 8 honour volunt come event leitch visit help famili discuss congrat happi ottawa canadacfc pleas enjoy entrepreneur work work canadacfc look

term speak event awesom morn ottawa friend proud tonight canvass conserv congratul conserv labour labour conserv year time time year time 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.100 9 10 candid announc cpchq happi leitch event work friend famili entrepreneur join morn canvass tonight morn congratul tonight conserv congratul labour 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.0000.0250.0500.0750.100 beta

85 Table C.5 – Kellie Leitch Topic Summary

Topic Words in topic Event 1 comme, anounc, congrat, work, event, famili, join, entrepreneur, proud, tonight Campaign 1 candid, cpchq, help, annouc, happi, ottawa, friend, look, proud, morn Event 2 congrat, discuss, work, event, join, speak, host, proud, morn, labour Event 3 collingwood, simcoegrey, visit, enjoy, pleas, join, friend, host, tonight, time Unclear 1 honour, leitch, discuss, canadacfc, work, speak, ottawa, canvas, labour, time Campaign 2 volunt, visit, congrat, pleas, work, event, friend, conserv, labour, time Membership come, help, happi, enjoy, canadacfc, awesom, proud, congratul, conserv, year Event 4 event, famili, ottawa, entrepreneur, look, morn, tonight, conserv, year, time Campaign 3 candid, cpchq, leitch, work, famili, join, canvas, morn, tonight, congratul Event 5 announc, happi, event, friend, entrepreneur, morn, tonight, congratul, conserv, labour

Figure C.15 – Kellie Leitch Topic Spread

Distribution of probability for each topic Leitch

1 2 3 4 5

100

6 7 8 9 10 Number of documents

100

0.096 0.100 0.104 0.108 0.096 0.100 0.104 0.108 0.096 0.100 0.104 0.108 0.096 0.100 0.104 0.108 0.096 0.100 0.104 0.108 γ

86 C.6 Pierre Lemieux

Figure C.16 – Pierre Lemieux Perplexity

Evaluating LDA topic models Lemieux Optimal number of topics (smaller is better)

● ●

140

●

130

120 Perplexity

110

●

100

●

0 25 50 75 100 Number of topics

Figure C.17 – Pierre Lemieux Topics

Lemieux 1 2 3 4 cdnpoli cdnpoli cdnpoli famili support support support cdnpoli pierr pierr pierr support thank thank thank pierr speech speech speech thank lemieux democraci lemieux democraci conserv lemieux conserv lemieux today conserv today conserv free today free today leadership leadership leadership free 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 5 6 7 8 cdnpoli famili cdnpoli cdnpoli support cdnpoli support support pierr support pierr pierr thank pierr thank thank speech thank speech speech

term democraci speech democraci democraci lemieux lemieux lemieux conserv conserv conserv conserv today free free today free leadership leadership leadership leadership 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 9 10 cdnpoli famili support cdnpoli pierr pierr thank thank speech speech democraci democraci lemieux conserv today today free free leadership leadership 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 beta

87 Table C.6 – Pierre Lemieux Topic Summary

Topic Words in topic Campaign 1 cdnpoli, support, pierr, thank, speech, lemieux, conserv, today, free, leadership Campaign 2 cdnpoli, support, pierr, thank, speech, democraci, lemieux, conserv, today, leadership Campaign 3 cdnpoli, support, pierr, thank, speech, lemieux, conserv, today, free, leadership Campaign 4 famili, cdnpoli, support, pierr, thank, democraci, lemieux, conserv, today, free Campaign 5 cdnpoli, support, pierr, thank, speech, democraci, lemieux, conserv, free, leadership Campaign 6 famili, cdnpoli, support, pierr, thank, speech, lemieux, conserv, free, leadership Campaign 7 cdnpoli, support, pierr, thank, speech, democraci, lemieux, conserv, today, leadership Campaign 8 cdnpoli, support, pierr, thank, speech, democraci, conserv, today, free, leadership Campaign 9 cdnpoli, support, pierr, thank, speech, democraci, lemieux, today, free, leadership Campaign 10 famili, cdnpoli, pierr, thank, speech, democraci, conserv, today, free, leadership

Figure C.18 – Pierre Lemieux Topic Spread

Distribution of probability for each topic Lemieux

1 2 3 4 5

6 7 8 9 10 Number of documents

0.1000 0.1025 0.1050 0.1000 0.1025 0.1050 0.1000 0.1025 0.1050 0.1000 0.1025 0.1050 0.1000 0.1025 0.1050 γ

88 C.7 Deepak Obhrai

Figure C.19 – Deepak Obhrai Perplexity

Evaluating LDA topic models Obhrai Optimal number of topics (smaller is better)

1600 ●

1400

● 1200 Perplexity ●

1000

●

800

●

600 ●

0 25 50 75 100 Number of topics

Figure C.20 – Deepak Obhrai Topics

Obhrai 1 2 3 4 deepak deepak meet deepakag elxn elxn deepak famili obhrai obhrai deepakag need today today need elxn support support obhrai today best best today support right right best best debat debat right debat conserv conserv debat conserv happi happi happi happi 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 5 6 7 8 good deepak good deepak deepakag deepakag famili good famili famili obhrai deepakag elxn elxn today need support today support obhrai

term best support best today right best right support debat right debat best conserv conserv conserv debat happi happi happi conserv 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 9 10 meet must deepakag deepakag need need obhrai elxn today obhrai support today right support debat right conserv conserv happi happi 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 beta

89 Table C.7 – Deepak Obhrai Topic Summary

Topic Words in topic Campaign 1 deepak, elxn, obhrai, today, support, best, right, debat, conserv, happi Campaign 2 deepak, elxn, obhrai, today, supprot, best, right, debat, conserv, happi Event 1 meet, deepak, deepackag, need, obhrai, today, best, right, debat, happi Campaign 3 deepakag, famili, need, elxn, today, support, best, debat, conserv, happi Campaign 4 good, deepakag, famili, elxn, support, best, right, debat, conserv, happi Campaign 5 deepak, deepakag, famili, elxn, today, support, best, right, conserv, happi Campaign 6 good, famili, obhrai, today, support best, right, debat, conserv, happi Campaign 7 deepak, good, deepakag, need, obhrai, today, support, best, debat, conserv Event 2 meet, deepakag, need, obhrai, today, support, right, debat, conserv, happi Campaign 8 must, deepakag, need, elsn, obhrai, today, support, right, conserv, happi

Figure C.21 – Deepak Obhrai Topic Spread

Distribution of probability for each topic Obhrai

1 2 3 4 5

100

6 7 8 9 10 Number of documents

100

0.100 0.105 0.110 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.100 0.105 0.110 γ

90 C.8 Kevin O’Leary

Figure C.22 – Kevin O’Leary Perplexity

Evaluating LDA topic models O'Leary Optimal number of topics (smaller is better)

●

1200

1000

●

● Perplexity

800

●

600

●

0 25 50 75 100 Number of topics

Figure C.23 – Kevin O’Leary Topics

O'Leary

1 2 3 4 shark shark thank shark thank thank abcsharktank live abcsharktank canadian canadian cdnpoli live live cdnpoli canada cdnpoli canada canada like canada tonight time time like time cant cant tonight wine wine wine time make make make wine busi busi busi 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 5 6 7 8 abcsharktank thank thank shark live canadian abcsharktank thank cdnpoli cdnpoli canadian cdnpoli canada canada live canada tonight like cdnpoli like

term time tonight canada tonight cant cant like time wine wine wine wine make make make make busi busi busi busi 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 9 10 thank thank abcsharktank abcsharktank canada canadian like cdnpoli tonight canada time tonight cant time wine cant make make busi busi 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 beta

91 Table C.8 – Kevin O’leary Topic Summary

Topic Words in topic Unrelated 1 shark, tank, abcsharktabl, live, cdnpoli, canada, like, tonight, time, wine Unrelated 2 shark, tank, canadian, live, canada, tonight, time, wine, make, busi Unrelated 3 thanks, abcsharktank, canadian, cdnpoli, canada, time, cant, wine, make, busi Unrelated 4 shark, live, cdnpoli, canada, like, time, cant, wint, make, busi Unrelated 5 abcsharktank, live, cdnpoli, canada, tonight, time, cant, wine, make, busi Unrelated 6 thank, canadian, cdnpoli, canada, like, tonight, cant, wine, make, busi Unrelated 7 thank, abcsharktank, canadian live, cdnpoli, canada, like, wine, make, busi Unrelated 8 shark, tank, cdnpoli, canada, like, tonight, time, wine, make, busi Unrelated 9 thank, abcsharktank, canada, like, tonight, time, cant, wine, make, busi Unrelated 10 thank, abcsharktank, canadian, cdnpoli, canada, tonight, time, cant, make, busi *Cannot infer models because candidate was principally tweeting about his television show

Figure C.24 – Kevin O’Leary Spread

Distribution of probability for each topic O'Leary

1 2 3 4 5

100

6 7 8 9 10 Number of documents

100

0.100 0.104 0.108 0.112 0.100 0.104 0.108 0.112 0.100 0.104 0.108 0.112 0.100 0.104 0.108 0.112 0.100 0.104 0.108 0.112 γ

92 C.9 Erin O’Toole

Figure C.25 – Erin O’Toole Perplexity

Evaluating LDA topic models O'Toole Optimal number of topics (smaller is better)

●

210

●

200

● Perplexity

190

● ●

180 ●

0 25 50 75 100 Number of topics

Figure C.26 – Erin O’Toole Topics

O'Toole 1 2 3 4 cdnpoli cdnpoli cdnpoli cdnpoli support event support event team great great great great conserv conserv candid conserv candid jointhemiss jointhemiss candid jointhemiss debat thank jointhemiss thank otool otool thank debat endors campaign debat campaign today friend today friend race good 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 5 6 7 8 cdnpoli cdnpoli cdnpoli cdnpoli leader support support support support candid team great great thank great jointhemiss jointhemiss campaign jointhemiss polici

term thank endors polici thank debat today debat debat endors canada otool today today good endors canada meet race race meet 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 9 10 cdnpoli vote leader great support candid great jointhemiss conserv polici candid thank jointhemiss debat friend endors today meet race good 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.0 0.1 0.2 beta

93 Table C.9 – Erin O’Toole Topic Summary**

Topic Words in topic Event 1 cdnpoli, support, team, great, conserv, candid, jointhemiss, thank, debat, today Event 2 cdnpoli, event, great, conserv, candid, jointhemiss, thank, debat, campaign, friend Endorsement 1 cdnpoli, support, great, conserv, jointhemiss, debat, otool, endors, today, race Event 3 cdnpoli, event, great, candid, jointhemiss, thank, otool, campaign, friend, good Event 4 cdnpoli, leader, support, great, jointhemiss, thank, debat, endors, today, meet Endorsement 2 cdnpoli, support, candid, thank, campaign, endors, today, canda, good, race Event 5 cdnpoli, support, team, great, jointhemiss, polici, debat, otool, endors, race Event 6 cdnpoli, support, great, jointhemiss, polici, thank, debat, today, canada, meet Campaign cdnpoli, leader, support, great, conserv, candid, jointhemiss, friend, today, race Event 7 vote, great, candid, jointhemiss, polici, thank, debat, endors, meet, good **This account’s privacy settings limit the amount of tweets which could be collected

Figure C.27 – Erin O’Toole Topic Spread

Distribution of probability for each topic O'Toole

1 2 3 4 5 100

6 7 8 9 10 100 Number of documents

0.0975 0.1000 0.1025 0.1050 0.1075 0.0975 0.1000 0.1025 0.1050 0.1075 0.0975 0.1000 0.1025 0.1050 0.1075 0.0975 0.1000 0.1025 0.1050 0.1075 0.0975 0.1000 0.1025 0.1050 0.1075 γ

94 C.10 Rick Peterson

Figure C.28 – Rick Peterson Perplexity

Evaluating LDA topic models Peterson Optimal number of topics (smaller is better)

1500

●

1200

● 900 Perplexity

●

600

●

300 0 25 50 75 100 Number of topics

Figure C.29 – Rick Peterson Topics

Peterson 1 2 3 4 today today today peterson great great great rick conserv conserv conserv leadership leadership leadership leadership candid candid candid candid look member look look member news news vote news work work work vote vancouv vancouv vancouv vancouv canadian canadian canadian canadian 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 5 6 7 8 peterson peterson peterson rick support rick today today conserv conserv great support leadership leadership support conserv candid candid leadership leadership

term member member candid candid news news look look vote vote work news work vancouv vancouv vote canadian canadian canadian canadian 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 9 10 today week great rick leadership great candid support look candid member look vote member work vote vancouv work canadian vancouv 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 beta

95 Table C.10 – Rick Peterson Topic Summary

Membership 1 today, great, conserv, leadership, candid, member, news, work, vancouver, canadian Campaign 1 today, great, conserv, leadership, candid, look, news, work, vancouv, canadian Campaign 2 today, great, conserv, leadership, candid, look, vote, work, vancouv, canadian, Membership 2 peterson, rick, leadership, candid, look, member, news, vote, vancouv, canadian Membership 3 perterson, support, conserv, leadership, candid, member, news, vote, work, canadian Membership 4 peterson, rick, conserv, leadership, candid, member, news, vote, vancouv, canadian Campaign 3 peterson, today, great, support, leadership, candid, look, work, vancouv, canadian Campaign 4 rick, toaday, support, conserv, leadership, candid, look, news, vote, canadian Membership 5 today, great, leadership, candid, look, member, vote, work, vancouv, canadian Membership 6 week, rick, great, support, candid, look, member, vote, work, vancouv

Figure C.30 – Rick Peterson Topic Spread

Distribution of probability for each topic Peterson

1 2 3 4 5

100

6 7 8 9 10 Number of documents

100

0.100 0.104 0.108 0.100 0.104 0.108 0.100 0.104 0.108 0.100 0.104 0.108 0.100 0.104 0.108 γ

96 C.11 Lisa Raitt

Figure C.31 – Lisa Raitt Perplexity

Evaluating LDA topic models Raitt Optimal number of topics (smaller is better)

●

2000

●

1600 ● Perplexity

●

1200

●

0 25 50 75 100 Number of topics

Figure C.32 – Lisa Raitt Topics

Raitt 1 2 3 4 team work work trudeau support best team work milton support last team last milton join support join join make join make make liber make tonight tonight tonight tonight just year just peopl time famili year famili year look peopl look 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 5 6 7 8 parti team team parti support milton support best last join last liber join make join tonight liber liber liber just

term time just just time year time time year peopl year year peopl famili famili peopl famili look look look look 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 9 10 trudeau best milton team join support liber milton tonight join just make year just peopl time famili famili look look 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 beta

97 Table C.11 – Lisa Raitt Topic Summary

Topic Words in topic Membership 1 team, support, milton, last, join, make, tonight, just, time, year Campaign 1 work, best, support, milton, join, make, tonight, year, famili, look Campaign 2 work, team, last, join, make, liber, tonight, just, year, peopl Campaign 3 trudeau, work, team, support, join, make, tonight, people, famili, look Membership 2 parti, support, last, join, liber, time, year, peopl, famili, look Membership 3 team, milton, join, make, liber, just, time, year, famili, look Membership 4 team, support, last, join, liber, just, time, year, peopl, look Trudeau 1 parti, best, liber, tonight, just, time, year, peopl, famili, look Trudeau 2 trudeau, milton, join, liber, tonight, just, year, peopl, famili, look Membership 5 best, team, support, milton, join, make, just, time, famili, look

Figure C.33 – Lisa Raitt Topic Spread

Distribution of probability for each topic Raitt

1 2 3 4 5

100

6 7 8 9 10 Number of documents

100

0.100 0.104 0.108 0.100 0.104 0.108 0.100 0.104 0.108 0.100 0.104 0.108 0.100 0.104 0.108 γ

98 C.12 Andrew Saxton

Figure C.34 – Andrew Saxton Perplexity

Evaluating LDA topic models Saxton Optimal number of topics (smaller is better)

●

600

500 ● Perplexity

●

400

●

0 25 50 75 100 Number of topics

Figure C.35 – Andrew Saxton Topics

Saxton 1 2 3 4 cdnpoli cdnpoli say friend job thank cdnpoli thank conserv announc support andrewsaxton canadian meet canada north today today elxn balanc tonight playlist thank need andrewesaxton addedvideoyoutub andrewsaxton good need andrewesaxton conserv famili young fund andrewesaxton vancouv liber northvancouv debat debat 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 5 6 7 8 say andrew busi canada andrew cdnpoli andrew elxn support canada creat great canada elxn job thank saxtontour great small campaign

term today thank great northvancouv north andrewsaxton tax debat vancouv saxtontour right benefit best conserv today come parti budget news work 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.0000.0250.0500.0750.100 0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075 9 10 dream northvan member cdnpoli announc elxn help great canadian andrewsaxton candid canadian meet today north good grassroot benefit vancouv work 0.000.010.020.030.040.05 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.09 beta

99 Table C.12 – Andrew Saxton Topic Summary

Topic Words in topic Campaign 1 cdnpoli, job, conserv, canadian, today, tonight, andrewesaxton, need, young, liber Info. relay cdnpoli, thank, announc, meet, today, playlist, addedvideoyoutube, andrewesaxton, fund, northvancouv Campaign 2 say, cdnpoli, support, canada, elxn, thank, andrewsaxton, conserv, andrewesaxton, debat Campaign 3 friend, thank, andrewsaxton, north, balanc, need, famili, vancouv, debat Campaign 4 say, andrew, support, canada, saxtontour, today, north, vancouv, best, parti Campaign 5 andrew, cdnpoli, canada, elxn, great, thank, andrewsaxton, saxtontour, conserv, budget Policy busi, andrew, creat, job, small, great, tax, right, today, news Campaign 6 canada, alxn, great, thank, campaign, northvancouv, debat, beneﬁt, come, work Membership dream, member, annouc, help, canadia, candid, meet, north, grassroot, vancouv Campaign 7 northvan, cndpoli, elxn, great, andrewsaxton, canadian, today, good, beneﬁt, work

Figure C.36 – Andrew Saxton Topic Spread

Distribution of probability for each topic Saxton

1 2 3 4 5

100

6 7 8 9 10 Number of documents

100

0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 γ

100 C.13 Andrew Scheer

Figure C.37 – Andrew Scheer Perplexity

Evaluating LDA topic models Scheer Optimal number of topics (smaller is better)

●

2000

1600 ● Perplexity

●

1200 ●

●

800

0 25 50 75 100 Number of topics

Figure C.38 – Andrew Scheer Topics

Scheer 1 2 3 4 andrew proud andrew candid just cpchq leadership cpchq scheer leader just leader good parti proud good meet scheer leader liber time time parti meet team friend scheer team justin team canadian justin denisebatt denisebatt meet denisebatt join campaign campaign join 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 5 6 7 8 andrew just andrew budget candid leader leader just leadership parti scheer cpchq cpchq scheer canadian parti leader canadian liber canadian

term scheer team time good liber justin justin liber time denisebatt denisebatt friend friend join join join denisebatt campaign campaign campaign 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 9 10 andrew leader candid parti leadership canadian proud good scheer liber canadian meet liber team meet denisebatt friend join justin campaign 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 beta

101 Table C.13 – Andrew Scheer Topic Summary

Topic Words in topic Event andrew, just, scheer, good, meet, time, team, justin, denisebatt, join Campaign 1 proud, cpchq, leader, parti, scheer, time, friend, team, denisebatt, campaign Campaign 2 andrew, leadership, just, proud, leader, parti, scheer, canadian, meet, campaign Trudeau 1 candid, cpchq, leader, good, iber, meet, team, justin, denisebatt, join Campaign 3 andrew, candid, leadership, cpchq, leader, scheer, liber, time, friend, denisebatt Trudeau 2 just, leader, parti, scheer, canadian, team, justin, denisebatt, join, campaign Membership & andrew, leader, scheer, canadian, liber, time, justin, denisebatt, join, Trudeau campaign Policy budget, just, cpchq, parti, canadian, good, liber, friend, join, campaign Trudeau 3 andrew, candid, leadership, proud, scheer, canadian, liber, meet, friend, justin Membership leader, parti, canadian, good, liber, meet, team, denisebatt, join, campaign

Figure C.39 – Andrew Scheer Topic Spread

Distribution of probability for each topic Scheer

1 2 3 4 5

100

6 7 8 9 10 Number of documents

100

0.100 0.104 0.108 0.112 0.100 0.104 0.108 0.112 0.100 0.104 0.108 0.112 0.100 0.104 0.108 0.112 0.100 0.104 0.108 0.112 γ

102 C.14 Brad Trost

Figure C.40 – Brad Trost Perplexity

Evaluating LDA topic models Trost Optimal number of topics (smaller is better)

● 450

400

● 350 Perplexity

●

300

250 ●

● ●

0 25 50 75 100 Number of topics

Figure C.41 – Brad Trost Topics

Trost 1 2 3 4

updat updat updat updat

campaign campaign campaign campaign

mikepatton mikepatton mikepatton mikepatton

cdnpoli cdnpoli cdnpoli cdnpoli

canpoli canpoli canpoli canpoli

0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 5 6 7 8

updat updat updat updat

campaign campaign campaign campaign

mikepatton mikepatton mikepatton mikepatton term

cdnpoli cdnpoli cdnpoli cdnpoli

canpoli canpoli canpoli canpoli

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 9 10

updat updat

campaign campaign

mikepatton mikepatton

cdnpoli cdnpoli

canpoli canpoli

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 beta

103 Table C.14 – Brad Trost Topic Summary

Topic Words in topic Info. Relay 1 updat, campaign, mikepatton, cdnpoli, canpoli Info. Relay 2 updat, campaign, mikepatton, cdnpoli, canpoli Info. Relay 3 updat, campaign, mikepatton, cdnpoli, canpoli Info. Relay 4 updat, campaign, mikepatton, cdnpoli, canpoli Info. Relay 5 updat, campaign, mikepatton, cdnpoli, canpoli Info. Relay 6 updat, campaign, mikepatton, cdnpoli, canpoli Info. Relay 7 updat, campaign, mikepatton, cdnpoli, canpoli Info. Relay 8 updat, campaign, mikepatton, cdnpoli, canpoli Info. Relay 9 updat, campaign, mikepatton, cdnpoli, canpoli Info. Relay 10 updat, campaign, mikepatton, cdnpoli, canpoli

Figure C.42 – Brad Trost Topic Spread https://www.sharelatex.com/project/5911c443cbf2cb101d1dcfea/output/output.pdf?compileGroup=standardclsiserverid=clsi2- 43popupDownload=true Distribution of probability for each topic Trost

1 2 3 4 5

100

6 7 8 9 10

Number of documents 100

0.09950 0.09975 0.10000 0.10025 0.10050 0.09950 0.09975 0.10000 0.10025 0.10050 0.09950 0.09975 0.10000 0.10025 0.10050 0.09950 0.09975 0.10000 0.10025 0.10050 0.09950 0.09975 0.10000 0.10025 0.10050 γ

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