Hegemonic Party Rule in Singapore and Taiwan

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Hegemonic Party Rule in Singapore and Taiwan ACCESS TO POWER: HEGEMONIC PARTY RULE IN SINGAPORE AND TAIWAN by Netina Clara Tan M.A., The University of Regina, 2004 M.A., The National University of Singapore, 2000 B.A., The National University of Singapore, 1992 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in The Faculty Of Graduate Studies (Political Science) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) December 2010 © Netina Clara Tan, 2010 ABSTRACT My dissertation investigates the sources of hegemonic party resilience. I ask why do some hegemonic party regimes persist, while others concede to multipartism? Building on party politics and electoral authoritarianism literature, I develop a mid-range theory based on the concepts of strategic coordination and institutionalization to explain why elites unite and oppositions fail to pose a credible threat. To demonstrate the utility of my explanation, I compare two similar hegemonic parties of different outcomes: the People’s Action Party (PAP) in Singapore and the Kuomintang Party (KMT) in Taiwan. I posit three factors to account for hegemonic party resilience. First, I contend that a hegemonic party that is adept in strategic coordination – by providing public goods and withdrawing political, civil liberties and media freedom – is more likely to win mass support and deter opposition coordination. Both the PAP and early KMT were high performing, strategic regimes that enjoyed growth and forestalled democratization. While the PAP remained the ruling party in Singapore, the KMT controlled the pace of liberalization during its long decade of transition, losing power after a party split. Second, I argue that the PAP is better than the KMT in keeping the ruling elites united because of its institutionalized leadership succession system. I develop a model to explain how a centralized, oligarchic and exclusionary leadership selection method fosters elite unity. My findings based on elite interviews, party publications and survey data support the counter-intuitive theory that the more intra-party democracy, the less party cohesion. Finally, in hegemonic party regimes, survival means increasing the certainty of winning. Through electoral engineering, the incumbent is able to institutionalize an uneven playing field that systematically disadvantages the opposition. By analyzing the mechanical and psychological effects of electoral reforms, I offer new empirical evidence to show how the PAP “manufactured” its legislative supermajority to rescue its declining popular votes. The contrasting study of the KMT highlights how a former hegemonic party transforms and adapts as a dominant party to survive the uncertainty of elections. ii PREFACE The UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board (BREB) approved the elite interviews involving human subjects conducted for my dissertation. The Certificate of Approval, Ethics Certificate Number (H06-03753) to conduct research in Singapore and Taiwan is enclosed in Appendix Q: UBC BREB Certificate of Approval. Parts of Chapter 3 and 6 will appear as a book chapter entitled “Institutionalized Hegemonic Party Rule in Singapore” for Party and Party System Institutionalization in Asia, edited by Allen Hicken and Erik Kuhonta, supported by the Institute for the Study of International Development, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, Singapore’s Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan and the Department of Political Science at McGill University. Parts of Chapter 7 will be revised as a book chapter entitled “Hegemonic Party Stability and Opposition Party Failure In Singapore” in Party Stability and Party Performance in Southeast Asia edited by Wolfgang Sachsenroeder, funded by Friedrich Naumann Foundation and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... ii! Preface ...................................................................................................................................... iii! Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................... iv! List of Tables .......................................................................................................................... vii! List of Figures .......................................................................................................................... ix! List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................................x! Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................. xii! Dedication .............................................................................................................................. xiv! 1! Introduction ........................................................................................................................15! Implications ......................................................................................................18! Case Selection ..................................................................................................21! Plan of the Dissertation ....................................................................................23! 2! Strategic Coordination, Institutionalization and Electoral Engineering ............................25! A Typology of Single-Party Regimes ..............................................................25! Theories of Authoritarian Durability ...............................................................29! Problems and Gaps ..........................................................................................32! Theoretical Framework ....................................................................................35! Part I: Origins, Organization and Coordination .......................................................................52! 3! The PAP: Organization Transformation and Strategic Coordination ................................53! Origins of the PAP ...........................................................................................55! Organizational Changes in 1958 ......................................................................63! Party Adaptation After 1963 ............................................................................65! Strategic Coordination: Dismantling Cleavages ..............................................67! 4! The KMT: Organizational Adaptation and Coordination Dilemmas ................................82! Origins of the KMT .........................................................................................83! Party Membership, Taiwanization and Co-optation ........................................97! Implications of Taiwanization .......................................................................102! Coordination Dilemmas .................................................................................105! Conclusion .....................................................................................................111 iv ! Part II: Leadership selection and party cohesion ...................................................................113! 5! The PAP: Institutionalized Charisma and Party Cohesion ..............................................114! Westminster Parliamentary System and Party Cohesion ...............................115! Rules of the Game in Singapore ....................................................................117! Institutionalization, Leadership Selection and Party Cohesion .....................124! Key Features of the PAP’s Candidate Selection ............................................131! Implications and Potential Problems .............................................................138! Conclusion .....................................................................................................141! 6! The KMT: Un-Institutionalized Charisma and Factionalism ..........................................144! Selection of Chiang Ching-kuo as Party Chairman and President ................144! Intra-Party Democratization ...........................................................................152! Rules of the Game in Taiwan .........................................................................159! Implications for Party Cohesion ....................................................................166! Re-Centralizing Leadership Selection ...........................................................177! Conclusion .....................................................................................................179! Part III: Elections, electoral engineering and party system ...................................................181! 7! Singapore: Electoral Engineering and Institutionalizing Certainty .................................182! Role of Elections in Hegemonic Party Regimes ............................................183! Why Elections in Singapore? .........................................................................184! Electoral Engineering in Singapore ...............................................................187! Mechanical and Psychological Effects ..........................................................198! Institutionalized Hegemonic Party System in Singapore ...............................208!
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