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Special Information Bulletin the Influence of the Legacy of Global

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Special Information Bulletin the Influence of the Legacy of Global Special Information November 2004 Bulletin Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S) The influence of the legacy of global jihad on Hamas: glorification of the image and Islamic-political doctrines of Dr. ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam, a Palestinian from Silat al-Harithiya (in the Jenin district). He was a charismatic figure, Al-Qaeda’s ideologue and until his death, Osama bin Laden’s spiritual mentor. His doctrine focused on global jihad and the personal responsibility of every Muslim to liberate the lands of Islam from “infidel control” “The love of jihad [holy war] took over my life, my soul, my sensations, my heart and my emotions. If preparing [for jihad] is terrorism, then we are terrorists …” (Dr. ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam quoted on a small commemorative poster found in the offices of the Tulkarm Charitable Society, affiliated with Hamas). 1 A concise biography of Dr. ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam 1. For a more detailed biography see Appendix A. 1. Dr. ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam (Abu Muhammad) was born in 1941 in the north Samarian Palestinian village of Silat al-Harithiya. As a child he was influenced by the stories of the courage of sheikh Izzedine al-Qassam, a religious leader born in Syria who fought and was killed by the British near Jenin in 1935 (the Hamas terrorist-operational wing is named after him). While studying at Al-Azhar University in Egypt he joined the Muslim Brotherhood; he graduated with honors and received a doctorate in Islamic law. 2. ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam met Osama bin Laden when he was lecturing at the College for Preaching and Jihad in Peshawar ( Pakistan, close to the Afghanistan border). The college graduated many mujahideen (warriors in a holy war) who participated in the fighting in Afghanistan against the Soviet army. While bin Laden invested most of his time in logistics (funding the arrival of volunteers, setting up training camps), ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam dealt mostly with inculcating the volunteers with the ideology of radical Islam , many of whom he recruited himself from all over the world. He was killed when his car exploded in 1989 in Peshawar, apparently the work of Soviet intelligence agents. 3. ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam, bin Laden’s “spiritual mentor,” is adulated to this day both in the Palestinian arena -- where he became one of Hamas’ sources of inspiration and a role model – and among al-Qaeda’s proponents of a global jihad [holy war] . He expounded his doctrines in a book called The Defense of Muslim Lands, the Most Important Personal Duty, which has become canonical and is distributed by Hamas in the Palestinian Authority (PA)-administered territories (See Appendix C (3) ). According to the book, all the land of Islam previously under Islamic control, including Palestine, must be returned to Islamic control but solely by Dr. ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam and his political Islamic doctrine as a source of inspiration for Hamas 4. ‘Azzam’s doctrine deeply impressed bin Laden, the most influential figure in the current global jihad, and Hamas, which works to inculcate it into the minds of its followers and operatives in the PA-administered territories . That influence is manifested by the poster found in the offices of the Hamas-affiliated Tulkarm Charitable Society (See Appendix B(2) ), which shows a picture of ‘Azzam next to the following quotation: “If preparing [for jihad] is terrorism, we are terrorists. If defending our honor is extremist, we are extremists. If jihad against our enemies is fundamentalism, we are fundamentalists.” In addition, his doctrine is spread through books, pamphlets and cassettes, and even the mosque in the Jenin refugee camp, whose imam is a Hamas activist, is named after him. 5. An analysis of the posters on which ‘Azzam’s protrait appears reveals that he is perceived by Hamas as one of the four “outstanding figures” of the Islamic “struggle” in Palestine and around the world . Those four are Hamas’ founder Ahmad Yassin (who is featured most prominently on the posters), Hassan al-Bana , who founded the Muslim Brotherhood (from which Hamas sprang), sheikh Izzedine al-Qassam (the source of inspiration for the movement’s terrorist-operational wing) and Dr. ‘Azzam himself (with whose radical Islamic doctrine, which centers around jihad, the movement identifies). 6. Dr. ‘Azzam is a prominent source of inspiration for global jihad . By glorifying him and turning him into a role model, Hamas exceeds its Palestinian-national aspect and positions itself ideologically in the global jihad camp , although in fact at this time its terrorist-operational activities are focused only on Israel and the PA-administered territories. Appendix A Milestones in the life of Dr. ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam2 2. Based on two main sources: the first is the summary of Assaf Maliah’s doctoral dissertation, entitled “’Abdallah ‘Azzam – the ideological sources of Osama bin Laden’s global Islamic terrorism,” to be submitted to the Department of Middle Eastern History of Bar Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel, advised by Dr. Rami Ginat. We are grateful to the author for his permission to make the information available for inclusion in this bulletin. The second is Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism by Dore Gold (Regency Publishing, Washington DC, 2004, pp. 94-103). 1. ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam (nicknamed Abu Muhammad) was born in 1941 in a village in the Jenin district called Silat al-Harithiya. As a child he was deeply influenced by the stories of the courage of sheikh Izzedine al-Qassam, (a Syrian sheikh who was killed by the British near Jenin in 1935 and is revered by Hamas) and by the defeat of the Arabs in Israel’s War of Independence and in the Sinai Campaign. 2. Shortly after the Six Day War his family moved to Jordan. In 1969 he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and participated in the guerilla war conducted by terrorists against the Israeli army in West Bank and the Jordan Valley. He was a commander at one of the bases in Zarqa, Jordan, called “the bases of the honorable” where Muslim Brotherhood operatives trained and acted independently – although under the Fatah flag – against Israeli forces. 3. Academic education and pursuits: a. In the early 1960s ‘Azzam left for Syria to study at the University of Damascus. He studied Islamic law and received a BA in 1966. b. In 1968 he received an MA in Islamic law from Al-Azhar University in Egypt . c. In 1973 he also received a PhD in Islamic law (with honors) from al-Azhar University. d. In the same year he began lecturing on Islamic law at the University of Jordan in Amman . He was fired because of his involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood and like other members of the organization, left for Saudi Arabia . e. In 1981 he began lecturing in Islamic theology at the King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz University in Jeddah , Saudi Arabia, (contrary to popular misconception, he was not one of bin Laden’s instructors and did not meet him at the university, since bin Laden graduated two years before ‘Azzam arrived). 4. Shortly thereafter he volunteered to teach at the International Islamic University in Islamabad, Pakistan. That was because he wanted to participate in the jihad in Afghanistan which was at that time being waged the against the Soviet army which had invaded the country in 1979. (According to another version, he left Jeddah for the International Islamic University in Islamabad, because the Muslim World League (MWL)3 sent him there.) 3. Dore Gold, p. 97. The MWL is an important tool in the hands of the Saudi Arabian government in the active spread of Radical Islam (Dore Gold, p. 99). 5. In 1984 he left the University in Islamabad when the Saudis refused to renew his contract because the local Pakistanian authorities were not pleased that his participation in the jihad in Afghanistan took place during hours when he should have been teaching. He therefore moved to Peshawar (a city on the Pakistani-Afghan border) and began teaching at the College (eventually University) for Preaching and Jihad , which graduated many mujahideen who participated in the fighting in Afghanistan. At the same time he ran the offices of the MWL and the Muslim Brotherhood in Peshawar and was officially 4 responsible for sending teachers to schools preaching jihad. 4. Ibid., p. 97. 6. It is generally accepted that he and Osama bin Laden met at the College for Preaching and Jihad, however, the story has two versions: a. According to Hadifah, ‘Azzam’s son, he met bin Laden by chance in Jordan in 1984. They agreed to meet in Afghanistand after the haj (pilgrimage to Mecca) in Saudi Arabia. b. According to ‘Abdallah Annas, ‘Azzam’s son-in-law, they met in Islamabad in 1984 before ‘Azzam left his teaching position at the university. 7. In any case, bin Laden was influenced by ‘Azzam’s rhetoric and charisma and the two began a partnership in both logistics and actual operations. Their cooperation was manifested in four institutions and mosques , established one after the other which, when some of them united, eventually turned into the support infrastructure of al-Qaeda : a. “The House of the Supporters” (Bayt al-Ansar): The first institution established to support the infrastructure and to provide logistical support (food, accommodation, shelter, etc.) for the mujahideen who came to Pakistan to fight the Russians. b. “The Office of Mujahideen Services” (Maktab Khadamat): The name given to the aforementioned institution after it was expanded to support the large number of incoming mujahideen. It was financed by Saudi intelligence, the Saudi Red 5 Crescent, Saudi princes and King Feisal’s MWL. 5. Ibid., p. 97. c. The construction of training camps : During their stay in the training camps, the mujahideen continued to receive their logistical support from the Office of Mujahideen Services.
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