DENNIS M. GORMLEY
The Neglected Dimension: Controlling Cruise Missile Proliferation
DENNIS M. GORMLEY
Dennis M. Gormley is a Consulting Senior Fellow for Technology and Defence Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, United Kingdom.
he renowned American strategist Albert Wohlstetter nuclear programs, indicated that the next National Intelli- often analyzed neglected issues in strategic affairs, gence Estimate (NIE) on the ballistic missile threat is ex- Ttermed “lesser-included cases.” His intention, of pected to include more infomation about threats from course, was to elevate such cases to a higher level of stra- land-attack cruise missiles and unmanned arial vehicles tegic consciousness, deserving of separate attention. In (UAVs). In questioning, Walpole observed that the rea- late 1994, in a foreword to a monograph about control- son for scant past public attention to cruise missiles and ling the spread of land-attack cruise missiles, Wohlstetter UAVs had less to do with their lack of importance than wryly warned of the tendency of decisionmakers to re- with the fact that they merit a separate esimate, which gard so-called “lesser-included cases”—in this case, the has not been given the degree of public exposure that the emerging spread of cruise missiles—as problems that could ballistic missile threat to the United States has attracted. readily be taken care of by larger policy thrusts. As he put The events of September 11, 2001, appear to have it: “the dog that could deal with the cat could easily handle changed such separate treatment of missile threats, how- the kitten.”1 ever. Future NIEs, according to Walpole, will connect all the estimates to give appropriate attention to the full range Eight years later, Wohlstetter’s prescient admonition is of missile threats to the United States.3 In addition, the finally beginning to register in appropriate places. On Feb- subcommitttee conducted a third hearing on “Cruise Mis- ruary 12, 2002, the Subcommittee on International Secu- sile and UAV Threats to the United States,” in which gov- rity, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the U.S. Senate ernment and outside experts addressed both the impact Committee on Governmental Affairs held the first of sev- of the threat and ways to improve existing nonprolifera- eral planned hearings probing the effectiveness of exist- tion mechanisms to deal with it.4 Optimistically speaking, ing multilateral nonproliferation regimes, including the the era of viewing cruise missiles and UAVs as merely a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), in stem- lesser-included case may be coming to a close. Acting on ming the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) the matter to improve export controls, however, remains and their delivery means to terrorist groups.2 In a second a more difficult challenge. hearing by the same committee on March 12, 2002, a CIA official drew additional attention to the need for a more balanced intelligence appraisal of missile threats. Robert Walpole, national intelligence officer for strategic and
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 21 DENNIS M. GORMLEY
THE EMERGING CRUISE MISSILE THREAT The second reality driving the spread of cruise missiles Concern about the spread of land-attack cruise missiles is the weakness of export controls on the necessary equip- is driven by two realities: first, the quantum leap in dual- ment and technology. Founded in 1987 by the United use technologies supporting cruise missile development States and its Group of Seven (G-7) partners, the MTCR (including satellite navigation and guidance, high-resolu- is a politically rather than legally binding agreement among tion satellite imagery from commercial vendors, unregu- member states aimed at restricting the proliferation of rock- lated flight management systems for converting aircraft ets, UAVs, and related technologies capable of carrying a into UAVs, and digital mapping technologies for mission payload of at least 500 kilograms (kg) for at least 300 km. planning); and second, the fact that the 33-nation MTCR In 1993, the MTCR guidelines were expanded to include is much less effective at controlling the spread of cruise all missile delivery systems capable of carrying biological missiles and UAVs than ballistic missiles. and chemical warheads regardless of payload. The MTCR is much more effective in controlling bal- The two primary barriers to developing land-attack listic than cruise missiles for several reasons. First, there cruise missiles are access to navigational guidance and is a reasonably solid consensus among members for re- propulsion systems. In the former regard, as long as highly stricting ballistic missiles, while the same does not yet hold sophisticated guidance and control technology—such as for cruise missiles and other UAVs. Second, loopholes terrain contour matching (TERCOM) and digital scene created by systematic exemptions for all civilian and mili- matching area correlation (DSMAC) systems—repre- tary aircraft can be used to circumvent many of the sented the state of the art, there were three important bar- MTCR restrictions on UAVs. Third, the inherent modu- riers to proliferation. First, the functionality of these larity of cruise missiles makes determining their true range technologies depended on maps derived from highly clas- and payload, and trade-offs between the two, difficult sified overhead reconnaissance satellites. Second, devel- (though by no means impossible). In particular, variations oping a dedicated mapping infrastructure was prohibitively in cruise missile flight profiles—especially those taking expensive. Third (and perhaps most important), TERCOM advantage of more fuel-efficient flight at higher altitudes— and DSMAC were subject to strong export controls. The can lead to substantially longer ranges than manufactur- advent of the global positioning system (GPS) has had ers and exporting countries advertise. Finally, and perhaps the most profound impact on cruise missile proliferation more important, the provisions of the MTCR equipment by essentially obviating the need for such advanced navi- and technology annex—particularly as it applies to cruise gational guidance systems. Consider that an accurate stand- missiles and UAVs—simply have not kept pace with the alone inertial navigation system (INS) for commercial extraordinarily rapid expansion in commercially available aircraft costs roughly $150,000. Less accurate stand-alone technology facilitated by the contemporary globalized INS cost a third of this price, but adding embedded GPS economy. To take the most egregious example: small aero- receivers makes them far more accurate than the most space companies are now being formed specifically to expensive stand-alone INS. Thus, for a fraction of the provide fully integrated flight management systems, along cost, GPS integrated with cheap INS permits the acquir- with an array of support services, which can enable the ing state to leap ahead 15 years in navigational guidance transformation of manned aircraft into entirely autono- systems. mous UAVs.5 As for propulsion requirements, advanced highly effi- cient propulsion systems, such as turbofan engines, still A variety of sources thus exist to acquire land-attack remain tightly controlled. But there are ways to work cruise missiles: around such controls by using unrestricted turbojet en- • Direct purchase from industrial gines available from around ten manufacturers in indus- suppliers. In some ways this avenue is the easi- trial nations. Moreover, some countries may wish to est, and certainly the most worrisome, way to convert unarmed UAVs into armed cruise missiles. Such acquire highly sophisticated land-attack cruise UAVs do not require anything like an advanced gas-tur- missiles from a growing list of industrial-world bine engine. With simple reciprocating engines, many of suppliers, now numbering at least nine. This area these systems are capable of one-way ranges of over is where the ground rules for determining the 1,000 kilometers (km). true range and payload of cruise missiles are so essential.
22 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 DENNIS M. GORMLEY
• Conversion of short-range anti-ship as potential targets. Thus, the small airplane av- cruise missiles into land-attack missiles. Fre- enue may well represent the “poor man’s cruise quently cited as a major concern because of the missile arsenal” of the future. huge worldwide inventory of roughly 75,000 • Indigenous cruise missile development. anti-ship cruise missiles, this avenue may have Indigenous development is not only the longest much lower potential than first meets the eye. route to acquiring militarily significant cruise Only a small fraction of these missiles—fore- missile capabilities; it is also unlikely to lead most the Chinese Silkworm and its deriva- developing states to true autarky or anything tives—may have the potential for transformation beyond low-tech designs. Foreign assistance is into land-attack cruise missiles with ranges over a critical variable affecting the pace and quality 300 km. of indigenous development.7 • Conversion of unarmed UAVs, target and reconnaissance drones into land-attack UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE EMERGENCE OF cruise missiles. These are increasingly being THE CRUISE MISSILE THREAT used not only in tactical military systems but Complicating predictions about the evolution of the also in non-military commercial, civic, and sci- cruise missile threat is a diverse set of crosscutting moti- entific applications. Of the 40 nations indig- vations and constraints facing proliferating states. Perhaps enously producing UAVs today, only 22 are the strongest motivating factor is the decided advantage members of the MTCR. of land-attack cruise missiles over ballistic missiles and • Conversion of small manned kit airplanes even manned aircraft in achieving military objectives. In- into weapons-carrying, fully autonomous deed, their capacity for precise delivery makes them the cruise missiles. There is a dizzying array of kit weapon of choice not only for biological and chemical airplanes in today’s marketplace (by one recent attacks, but also for conventional ones. Regional states count, nearly 100,000 copies of 425 systems facing any U.S.-led coalition cannot expect to see their produced by worldwide manufacturers).6 On aircraft survive much beyond the first blow of any cam- average, the characteristics of this sample in- paign. Yet cruise missiles launched from a variety of sur- clude a cruising speed of around 75 knots, a vivable platforms would enable such a state to mount a range of 500 km, a maximum weight of just less strategic air campaign with cruise (and ballistic) missiles than 900 pounds (400 kg), fuel and payload without achieving air superiority. In this connection, mili- capacity of 450 pounds (200 kg), a very short tary effectiveness interacts closely with the growing vul- takeoff distance of 75 meters, and a beginner nerability of Western-style force projection, especially its build time of around 260 hours. The biggest dependence on short-range aircraft operating out of a few challenge to converting such manned airplanes forward bases. The fact that the cost of even advanced into autonomous unmanned systems is flight cruise missiles is less than that of ballistic missiles, and navigation, but, as noted above, fully autono- that large numbers of converted kit airplanes and UAVs mous flight management systems are now avail- could conceivably become affordable for proliferating able to convert manned aircraft into UAVs. But states, adds to their attraction. what makes this option most attractive are the low cost (perhaps no more than $50,000 for ac- Third world motivations for acquiring large invento- quisition of the kit airplane, reciprocating en- ries of anti-ship cruise missiles, beginning in the 1960s, gine, and autonomous flight controls) to achieve may shed light on what may occur in the future with their such a capability, and the difficulty of detecting land-attack brethren. Despite their significant expense such slow-flying planes. The sophisticated look- (typically around $800,000), about 40 developing nations down radars of modern air defense systems came to see such missiles as yielding a high payoff in the eliminate slow-moving targets on or near the absence of the prestige and operational utility of large ground to prevent their data processing and dis- military establishments. One accurately placed anti-ship play systems from being overtaxed. This means cruise missile potentially could achieve strategic results even that large numbers of propeller-driven kit air- against a major industrial power. The use by Argentina of planes flying at under 80 knots would be ignored only a few French Exocet cruise missiles against the Brit-
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 23 DENNIS M. GORMLEY ish Royal Navy during the Falklands War furnishes but THREAT IMPACT one example. On its own, the emergence of the cruise missile threat But these strong motivations must be tempered by confronts American military forces with enormous chal- an equally compelling set of constraints. However much lenges. The effectiveness of both airborne and ground- the prestige value of cruise missiles may have risen since based surveillance radars is being undermined by missile the 1991 Gulf War, acquisition of ballistic missiles starts a designs that are increasingly sleek and aerodynamic, and proliferating state down the path toward possessing an have lower radar cross-sections. Reduced radar intercontinental-range missile. Although a regional adver- observability means that the defense has less time to re- sary of the United States could, without detection, use act. Also, many missiles have very low flight profiles and cruise missiles earmarked for regional warfighting to at- employ terrain features to avoid detection. Low flight tack U.S. territory from an offshore vessel, the deterrent impedes airborne surveillance, owing to radar “clutter” value of such an option pales in comparison to posses- from ground objects other than the target, which makes a sion of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). An- land-attack cruise missile difficult to detect. other possible constraining factor is the doctrinal and Some existing air defenses—consisting of fighter-based bureaucratic difficulty of fully integrating cruise missiles air-to-air missiles, airborne surveillance aircraft, surface- into third world force structures dominated by aircraft, to-air missiles and battle-management command, control tanks, and ships. Moreover, the underlying dual-use tech- and communications—have substantial capability against nologies supporting either indigenous or conversion pro- large land-attack cruise missiles flying relatively high flight grams are relatively new: cheap and widely available GPS/ profiles. But once cruise missiles fly low or, worse, add INS systems are less than a decade old; the commercial stealth features or employ endgame countermeasures (de- market for high-resolution satellite imagery is just begin- coys or jammers), severe difficulties arise. Indeed, even ning to mature; and subsidiary aerospace industries spe- defending against easily observable cruise missiles flying cializing in autonomous flight management systems for relatively high is problematic. Radars could mistake friendly manned aircraft are a recent phenomenon. But perhaps aircraft returning to their bases for these targets and inad- the most important reason why cruise missiles have yet vertently shoot them down. The emergence of large num- to spread widely is the absence of effective layered de- bers of weapons-carrying UAVs or converted airplanes fenses, including counterforce capabilities, against ballis- flying at very slow speeds also threatens the utility of tic missiles. Not until after 2007 will the United States modern air-defense systems because, as noted above, they begin to deploy such defenses effectively. eliminate slow-flying objects from radar processing. How might the cruise missile threat change or evolve Significant numbers of land-attack cruise missiles in the over the next five to 10 years? Conventional wisdom hands of state adversaries would have profound implica- would suggest that the cruise missile threat will evolve over tions for U.S. interests and regional security balances. The time, from relatively few highly observable missiles in the emergence of land-attack cruise missiles to complement near-term (one to five years), via higher numbers of lower ballistic missile strike systems could conceivably bolster observable, terrain-hugging missiles in the mid- term (five an adversary’s willingness to oppose U.S.-led interven- to 15 years), to larger numbers of stealthy missiles with tions in strategically important ways. Adding cruise mis- endgame countermeasures in the long-term (more than siles to the threat picture gives states that wish to deter or 15 years). But major features of the long-term threat could affect the outcome of such interventions not just political materialize much sooner if MTCR handling of cruise mis- but also important new military leverage. Not the least of sile transfers does not improve, or if U.S.-Russian and the military advantages is the capacity of cruise missiles U.S.-Chinese relations worsen. In either case, it is con- to greatly enlarge the effective lethal area of chemical and ceivable that modest numbers of stealthy cruise missiles biological attacks compared to ballistic missiles. Moreover, with countermeasures, accompanied by large numbers of the potentially high accuracy of land-attack cruise mis- cheap, slow-flying UAVs or converted kit planes, could siles means that even conventionally armed systems may emerge in five to 10 years. be able to achieve significant damage against exposed area targets. Finally, the low cost of cruise missiles, most no- tably modified airplanes, makes the cost-per-kill arithmetic
24 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 DENNIS M. GORMLEY of cruise missile defense stark. Whether a Patriot (PAC- jet, which holds 60 metric tons of fuel. Still, because gaso- 3) missile costs $5,000,000 or the desired $2,000,000 per line, when mixed with air, releases 15 times more energy copy, the figure compares unfavorably with either a than an equal weight of TNT, even relatively small air- $200,000-per-copy cruise missile or large saturation at- craft converted to cruise missiles could do significant dam- tacks of $50,000-per-copy modified kit airplanes. Quite age to certain civilian and industrial targets. 9 Such simply, because ballistic and cruise missile defenses de- platforms would also be an effective means of delivering pend largely on the same high-cost air-defense intercep- biological weapons. tors, complementary cruise and ballistic missile attacks, As Bush administration officials contemplate significant especially saturation ones and those delivering WMD pay- investments in modest defenses against the familiar sce- loads, will present enormous challenges for any defense. nario of attacks involving a few ICBMs, they should con- Several features of cruise missiles, not least their com- sider four examples of small manned aircraft that pact size and ease of maintenance, have suggested to some successfully managed to reach critical political or military analysts that they may become an attractive alternative targets either undetected or without interference. In 1987, for states or terrorist groups lacking the resources or tech- a 19 year-old German boy, Mathias Rust, flew his Cessna nical skills to build and deploy ICBMs. Various NIEs have aircraft undetected from Hamburg, Germany to the heart drawn attention to the covert conversion of a commercial of Red Square in Moscow, notwithstanding the Soviet container ship as a launching platform for a cruise mis- Union’s enormous investment in a multi-layered national sile. There are thousands of commercial container ships air defense system.10 In September 1994, a deranged pi- in the international fleet, and U.S. ports alone handle over lot flew his commandeered Cessna onto the White House 13 million containers annually. Even a large, bulky cruise grounds, eventually crashing just below the President’s missile like the Silkworm—converted for land attack— bedroom. Although the Cessna was picked up on radar at could readily fit inside a standard 12-meter shipping con- Washington National Airport, Secret Service agents were tainer equipped with a small internal erector for launching. not warned of the approach of the aircraft.11 In early Janu- Such a ship-launched cruise missile could be positioned ary 2002, a 15-year-old student pilot flying a stolen Cessna just outside territorial waters to strike virtually any im- flew undetected over MacDill Air Force Base—home of portant capital or large industrial area anywhere on the the U.S. Central Command fighting the war against ter- globe. And, because a cruise missile is an ideal means for rorism in Afghanistan—before slamming his aircraft into efficiently delivering small but highly lethal quantities of a downtown Tampa, Florida office building. Reportedly, biological agent, a state or terrorist group could forgo ac- Central Command authorities at MacDill did not learn of quiring or building a nuclear weapon without sacrificing the flight until after the plane crashed. Most recently, a the ability to cause catastrophic damage. light single-engine Cessna, innocently flying off course, Indeed, the latest NIE—no doubt influenced by the entered restricted airspace over Washington, D.C., close events of September 11—argues that among several other enough to the White House to hit the building had the attack options cruise missile attacks on the United States pilot wished to do so. The incident occurred before two F-16 fighters arrived on the scene from nearby Andrews are more likely than attacks with long-range ballistic mis- 12 siles.8 The NIE reaches this conclusion because such al- Air Force Base. ternatives are less costly, easier to acquire, and more reliable These incidents should not be taken to suggest that trans- than using an ICBM. While this scenario and other non- forming a kit or small private aircraft into a weapons-car- ICBM threats deserve close scrutiny, the conversion of rying autonomous attack system is technically simple. small manned airplanes into weapons-carrying, fully au- Certainly, states of concern are fully capable of such trans- tonomous cruise missiles ought to equally concern us. formations. Iraq has demonstrated that with the conver- Terrorist use of large commercial airliners on September sion of a number of Czech L-29 manned trainer aircraft 11 came as a complete shock to American planners. To into UAVs capable of delivering a payload of nearly 500 be sure, September 11 prompted a whole rash of reforms pounds (225 kg) to a range of over 600 km. The most to cope with a repeat of just such an attack. But these challenging feature of such a transformation is develop- reforms deal largely with commercial aircraft security ing and integrating a fully autonomous flight management rather than private aviation. Small converted aircraft can- system into the aircraft. However, now that small aero- not begin to approach the carrying capacity of a jumbo space companies have begun to sell fully autonomous flight
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 25 DENNIS M. GORMLEY management systems, along with all necessary support IMPROVING CONTROLS ON LAND-ATTACK services to help with system integration, to enable the CRUISE MISSILES AND UAVS transformation of manned aircraft into entirely autono- Certainly, these proliferation challenges demand a va- mous UAVs, the most difficult transformation roadblock riety of different nonproliferation and counterproliferation has been eliminated. Existing loopholes in the MTCR tech- responses. Nonproliferation policy is the first line of de- nical annex mean that there are no restrictions (for ex- fense. At present, however, it is perhaps the least effec- ample, even case-by-case review of transfers) constraining tive one. Missile nonproliferation policy focuses almost foreign acquisition of these flight-control systems. Such entirely on controlling the spread of ballistic missiles. The an autonomous delivery system in the hands of a terrorist best evidence of a continuing failure on the part of the means that launches could take place from hidden loca- MTCR partnership, including the Bush administration, to tions in close proximity to their intended targets. address the cruise missile threat lies in the time and effort Decisions could be made to erect some level of modest spent on developing an international code of conduct defenses against off-shore cruise missile launches. The against ballistic missile proliferation. The code is the lat- North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) est manifestation of the longstanding quest by various is currently studying the idea of an unmanned airship op- states to establish a universal, legally binding treaty cov- erating at 70,000 feet altitude and carrying sensors to moni- ering missile proliferation.13 Beginning in 1999, the MTCR tor low-flying cruise missiles and aircraft. Several airships membership undertook the drafting of a politically (though would be needed together with quick-reacting intercep- not legally) binding code that calls upon signatories to de- tors to react to perceived threats. Alternatively, perhaps clare their ballistic missile programs annually and alert all on the order of 100 aerostats flying at an altitude of 10- signatories before conducting all ballistic missile tests. Af- 15,000 feet could act as a system of surveillance and fire ter the MTCR membership approved a draft text in Sep- control for quick-reacting interceptors. Still, numerous tember 2001, more than 80 nations, including the 33 challenges exist, including the problem of furnishing warn- MTCR member states, met in Paris in early February 2002 ing information on potentially hostile ships embarking from to review and approve a draft document outlining the pro- ports of concern (to make the Coast Guard’s monitoring visions of the code.14 Putting aside concerns about the function feasible), as well as developing the very high nature of the technology carrots needed to lure states like quality combat identification information needed to jus- Iran and North Korea into code membership, the most tify shooting down an air vehicle. It is safe to say that egregious shortcoming in the draft code is the absence of even a limited defense of the entire U.S. homeland against any mention of cruise missiles and UAVs, in spite of the off-shore cruise missiles would cost at least $30-40 bil- fact that the MTCR—at least nominally—covers both lion—an unspoken fact when the cost of national missile classes of missiles. However noble such a code of con- defense is discussed publicly. Moreover, any effort to duct might be, its neglect of cruise missiles will reinforce construct a homeland defense against cruise missiles hinges their status as a second-class threat at exactly the wrong on progress in programs of the individual U.S. military time—before such systems have spread widely to affect services. But such programs lack the necessary funding regional and international security. and face enormous service interoperability, doctrinal, and To be sure, ballistic missiles receive top priority because organizational challenges that stand in the way of truly they are already widely proliferated, while land-attack joint cruise missile defenses. In addition, defending against cruise missiles have only begun to emerge as a threat. But converted aircraft originating from within the United States that is precisely the reason why improved controls on and aiming at nearby targets represents a wholly different cruise missiles are so crucial now. However imperfect it national missile defense challenge, dictating difficult tech- has proven, the MTCR has still achieved notable success nical and political choices. In sum, missile defense op- in controlling the spread of advanced ballistic missiles. It tions alone are likely to be financially taxing, operationally has blocked the export of hundreds of components, tech- challenging, and too late in coming to cope with the emerg- nologies, and production capabilities, and succeeded in ing threat. dismantling the Condor missile program sought by Argen- tina, Iraq, and Egypt—a missile that reportedly included sophisticated technology on the level of the U.S. Pershing II missile. As a result of the success of the MTCR, the
26 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 DENNIS M. GORMLEY ballistic missile technology that has spread thus far is payload capability of cruise missiles and other largely derived from 50-year-old Scud technology, a de- UAVs. However complex these factors may rivative itself of the German V-2 missile program of World appear individually and in combination, they War II. Missile defenses can exploit many of the weak- comprise a workable set of inputs for consis- nesses of this technology. Yet, perhaps because they fear tent implementation of MTCR controls on cruise undermining their position, few strong supporters of bal- missiles and UAVs. The MTCR membership has listic missile defense are willing to admit that missile pro- examined the issue in the past, particularly in liferation can be effectively controlled. This tendency to the aftermath of the Anglo-French decision to view the MTCR glass as half empty has fostered a reluc- transfer the Black Shaheen cruise missile to the tance to adapt the regime to cope with its major short- United Arab Emirates. Thus far, however, it has comings in addressing cruise missile proliferation. failed to arrive at a consensus on appropriate Were the gaping deficiencies in the way current MTCR ground rules. Without uniform standards, the provisions handle cruise missile transfers eliminated, the danger is that others might decide to take ad- MTCR could conceivably do as well with cruise missiles vantage of the current confusion to consummate as it has with controlling the spread of highly sophisticated unwanted transfers of similarly sophisticated ballistic missiles. Effective controls on the spread of cruise cruise missiles. missiles and related technologies that greatly improve per- • Tighter controls on stealthy cruise mis- formance would make the threat more predictable and slow siles. The application of stealth technology to its emergence. Such controls would also greatly reduce cruise missiles gives them the same character- the cost of missile defenses—against both cruise and bal- istics of ballistic missiles that inspired the MTCR: listic missiles. Ultimately, letting cruise missiles prolifer- difficulty of defense, short-warning time, and ate will not only present its own set of unique demands, shock effect. Calls for tighter controls on but will make effective ballistic missile defenses more stealthy cruise missiles are longstanding, but the costly and demanding, too. membership has struggled to reach consensus on precisely what level of control to impose. To have any positive effect on controlling the spread Because of their inherent risk, Category I sys- of land-attack cruise missiles, the MTCR membership tems are automatically subject to a strong pre- should, without delay, strengthen the provisions of the sumption of denial. The best approach to regime in the following areas: controlling stealthy cruise missiles would be to • Uniform standards for determining subject those missiles with greater than 300 km cruise missile range and payload. If consis- range, which are presently covered by Category tent national implementation of MTCR controls II controls, to the same presumption of denial is to occur, the most urgent priority is for MTCR as Category I missiles. Cruise missiles capable members to strengthen the ground rules deter- of such ranges need not carry 500 kg payloads mining cruise missile range and payload. As to to represent an extremely dangerous prolifera- range, the existing rules were written primarily tion threat. Indeed, they are significantly more with ballistic missiles in mind. They involve a effective in delivering small biological payloads straightforward calculation of the maximum than even Category I ballistic missiles. Cover- range trajectory of a ballistic missile. Cruise age should be tightened on such stealthy cruise missile manufacturers frequently state the range missiles. of their products using low flight profiles. But • Controls on UAV flight management sys- the truth is that cruise missiles need not fly their tems. There are no controls governing the entire distance using such low flight profiles. transfer of very light, manned kit aircraft. This They can be launched at or reach a range-maxi- gap is all the more reason for the MTCR mem- mizing altitude and then drop to a terrain-hug- bership to consider how to bring commercially ging profile when they become more susceptible available UAV flight-management systems un- to detection. There are several other factors that der case-by-case review. The MTCR coverage contribute to determining the true range and of flight-control systems and technology is pro-
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 27 DENNIS M. GORMLEY
vided under Item 10 of its equipment and tech- monitor the diversion of jet engines to cruise nology annex, but it constrains only those sys- missile applications with Category I capabilities. tems “designed or modified for the systems in During the Cold War, arms control and military deploy- Item 1” (meaning complete rockets and UAVs ments played complementary roles in maintaining nuclear capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload stability. Today the two policy domains also have useful to a range of at least 300 km). The original 1987 and mutually reinforcing roles to play. Without reform of version of Item 10 applied the more liberal lan- the MTCR, cruise missile threats are certain to spread and guage—“usable in the systems in Item 1”—that inevitably make missile defenses more expensive and prob- would likely capture such systems for case-by- lematic. To borrow Albert Wohlstetter’s metaphor, the cur- case review. Reverting back to the 1987 lan- rent provisions of the MTCR dealing with cruise missiles guage would make good sense. and UAVs show that this particular dog cannot even be- • Controls on specially designed counter- gin to handle the kitten. But if the MTCR can become as measure equipment. The addition of end-game effective in limiting the spread of cruise missiles as it has countermeasure equipment, such as towed de- been with ballistic missiles, missile defenses can conceiv- coys or terrain bounce jammers, can greatly ably keep pace with evolutionary improvements in both complicate cruise missile defenses. Since the missile categories. The necessary reform of the MTCR effectiveness of countermeasures increases as will not happen, however, without the committed leader- missile radar signature diminishes, incentives for ship of both the U.S. Congress and executive branch. It using countermeasures will rise as radar cross- will also require increases in the resources and personnel section values for cruise missiles fall lower and within the State Department, Pentagon, and intelligence lower. Because such countermeasure equipment agencies charged with responsibility for missile nonprolif- is used to enhance manned aircraft survivabil- eration policy. No more effective allocation of resources ity, at first glance it would appear that such items could be made to complement the huge but nonetheless might be exportable under Category II controls essential investments in missile defense that will be made as part of manned aircraft. But to achieve their to protect the future security of the United States. intended synergistic effect with stealthy cruise missiles, countermeasure devices must be spe- 1 K. Scott McMahon and Dennis M. Gormley, with a Foreword by Albert cially designed or modified to fit their compan- Wohlstetter, Controlling the Spread of Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (Marina ion vehicle. This requirement suggests that such del Rey, CA: American Institute for Strategic Cooperation, 1995), p. v. devices could perhaps be captured under the 2 David Ruppe, “U.S. Response I: Shore Up Multilateral Regimes, Experts Testify,” Global Security Newswire, February 13, 2001,
28 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 DENNIS M. GORMLEY missile defenses, see Dennis M. Gormley, “Enriching Expectations: 11 12 Steve Vogel and Allan Lengel, “Plane Flew Close to the White House,” September’s Lessons for Missile Defence,” Survival 44, (Summer 2002), pp. Washington Post, June 21, 2002, p. B1. 19-35. 13 The most persuasive case against such formal treaty approaches is made by 9Richard A. Muller, “The Cropdusting Terrorist,” Technology Review, March Richard Speier, “Can the Missile Technology Control Regime Be Repaired?” in 2002,
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