Summer Readings • a Tour of Space Doctrine • Planning for the Unknown M Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donald B

Summer Readings • A Tour of Space Doctrine • Planning for the Unknown M Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donald B. Rice

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col John B. Sams, Jr.

Editor Lt Col Richard B. Clark

Associate Editor Capt John J. Doherty

Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin VV. Bassett, Contributing Editor Dorothy M. McCluskie, Production Manager Steven C. Garst. Art Director and Illustrator

The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line. JOURNAL Summer 1991, Vol. V, No. 2 AFRP 50-2

Editorial 2

Trends in the Development of the Soviet Air Defense Forces Gregory T. Hooker

Defense Planning for the Mystery Tour: Principles for Guidance in a Period of Nonlinear Change Dr Colin S. Gray 1 8

Toward Operational-Level Doctrine for Space: A Progress Report Capt James R. Wolf, USAF 2 8

Tactical Aircraft and Airfield Recovery Capt Peter C. Bahm, USAF Capt Kenneth W. Polasek, USAF 4 2

VSTOL and Power Projection: A Leap in Faith Maj Jeffrey C. Prater, USAF 5 4

Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 7 6 Notams Notices of Interest 9 3 Contributors 9 5 EDITORIAL

Have You Hugged Your IP Lately?

N JULY 1990 I attended the wedding of in actual combat—in some cases only a my brother-in-law, a lieutenant sta- few months after the final textbook was tioned at Bitburg Air Base, Germany. This closed and the last check ride was passed Ioccasion allowed me to become reac- in their respective aircraft. quainted with several of his buddies who The technical competence displayed just over one year before had graduated and the success enjoyed by these flyers— from the same undergraduate pilot training in what was one of the most impressive (UPT) class at Columbus Air Force Base, exhibitions of air power in history—are Mississippi. I can recall their faces and air- tributes to the men and women of the Air planes better than I can their names. The Training Command (ATC) who first intro- A-l0, OV-10. T-38, F-15, B-52, KC-135, duced them to and then taught them to C-141, and, of course, C-130 were each master jet aircraft. The various major com- represented bv their enthusiastic new mand programs that are geared to training custodians. new pilots in specific weapons systems are While thousands of miles away Saddam built on an already solid foundation, cour- Hussein’s army massed at the border be- tesy of some anonymous ATC instructor tween Iraq and Kuwait, talk at the wed- pilot (IP). ding was about squadron qualification Like all trainers during wartime, these (earning “mission ready" status) and fly- IPs watched the war develop from afar— ing. The near future would be a time for not up close as did their recent students. training, exercises, building up hours in Such is the lot of an IP. the aircraft, and eventually becoming less As attention turns to welcoming home of a “new guy" and more of an "old hand” and honoring the veterans of Operation in the unit. The Iraqi threat to Kuwait Desert Storm, consider for a moment the seemed a routine disturbance in an already small, two-place aircraft with their atten- troubled part of the world. The real dimen- dant high-pitched wails. Will their student sions of what may possibly (hopefully?) pilots be in the middle of a war shortly af- have been the major conflict of their gener- ter graduation? Who knows? The only ation had yet to take full form. thing certain is that their instructors will, The events of early August 1990 in a sense, be with them every time they changed everything. In the weeks and climb into a cockpit, whether it be in the months that followed Saddam’s invasion skies of Mississippi or in the midst of anti- of his neighbor, a sizeable number of grad- aircraft fire over Iraq. Consequently, if war uates from this particular UPT class were does arrive, those "new" pilots will be deployed in support of what would be- ready—as were the lieutenants in the wed- come Operation Desert Storm. Considering ding party—and in that context, one need the size of the operation, the fact that so only look to the nearest UPT base to dis- many were called is no real surprise. Wha* cover a significant factor in the success of amazes, though, is the speed with which Operation Desert Storm. JJD these pilots put their recent training to use

2 ricochets

Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre- to the theater component commander. To have spondence should be addressed to the Editor. adequate ‘‘control by denial"—as the Navy A i r p o w e r J o u r n a l , VV'alker Hall, Bldg. 1400. does—of detailed plans in a timely fashion, the Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the overall commander will need an effective C2 right to edit the material for overall length. system. General McPeak has given us much to work and to resolve with the composite wing con- COMPOSITE WINGS cept. As with any change, we must work to understand all its aspects and resolve the issues to Gen Merrill A. McPeak's article recommending improve our application of air power for con- composite wings (Fall 1990) offers us much to tinued national defense. consider for the future of the Air Force. As an opportunity for creativity and innovation. 1 be- Lt Col Timothy H. Courington, USAF lieve that composite wings are an excellent Maxwell AFB. Alabama concept. Building teamwork, cooperation, and esprit could well be done through such a wing structure. However, as a solution to tactical You might want to know that your magazine is command and control (C-) problems. I believe actually being used by the cadets at the Air that the composite wing will less than ade- Force Academy. After the third sophomore in quately meet our needs. my squadron came in to interview me about While 1 find the idea of mission orders for a General McPeak's article on the composite composite wing commander to be an exciting wing, it dawned on me to ask what class was concept. I do not believe that composite wings studying this. I was happy to hear it was a man- would reduce in any way our need for effective agement class. I figured that our courses in pro- C- systems to orchestrate air campaigns. We all fessional military studies, military history, and recognize that most of our efforts in future re- military strategy would use the Airpower Jour- gional conflicts will involve operations that nal. but I had no idea that our Management De- will not fit any single composite wing. Detailed partment did too. Apparently, they do this ev- planning and synchronization of air assets, in- ery month. 1 remember studying how to better cluding joint operations, beyond any single run a factory when I was a management major composite wing most certainly will be required. here in the seventies and would like to thank In these instances, modern command, control, you for helping inspire this change. communications, and intelligence capabilities The cadets and I came to a couple of conclu- are essential, speeding the planning and insur- sions in our discussions that I would also like ing the synchronization. Some of the problems to pass along. First, we might want to think of which General McPeak highlights to support composite wings as just a stepping-stone to the need for composite wings are due. in part, composite forces that integrate conventional to the Air Force's piecing together "Band-Aids" aircraft, helicopters, ground-combat units, and to our tactical C2 systems over the years. Per- naval and space assets into fighting units. Spe- haps we should address a comprehensive cial operations and rapid-deployment forces "cure” to our C- requirements, for the com- seem to have begun to go in this direction. posite wing alone will not solve the problems Also, Operation Desert Storm may have vali- our chief raises. dated the composite wing/force idea: we were Furthermore. 1 wonder what the true impact lucky to have had time to build our forces to- of 'mission type" orders are to our doctrine of gether and do some practicing and planning for centralized control and decentralized execu- six months before the fighting began. This lux- tion. As wing commanders attempt to coordi- ury of time will probably not be available in nate the details and meet their mission needs, most future conflicts. Finally, as a tanker pilot, might "penny packets" of air power be used? I saw t he val ue of co m p o s i t e wi ngs — a l b e i t on a By this I mean that the wing commanders be- small scale—firsthand. When we flew large for- come essentially force-level determiners, based upon their own detailed planning, as opposed continued on page 71

3 TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Gregory T. Hooker

IKE many institutions in Soviet society, the Soviet Air Defense Forces (Voiska Protivovozdushnoi Oborony—VPVO) are undergoing Lchange. The principles of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) have altered many of the factors which directly and indirectly affect the Soviet air defense mission. The continuation of present trends may greatly complicate the ability—or the desire—of the Soviet Union to defend its aerial borders. Changes in the Soviet military seem to be making it much less threatening than it

toe* ■ Wfm SOVIET Ain DEFENSE FORCES 5 was in the recent past. The exact nature viet territory, including large industrial and scope of these changes are not clearly centers and installations. Tactical air de- understood. What is the evidence of fense of troops on the battlefield was not changes in the Soviet military? How is the the responsibility of VPVO. In the 1950s new defensive doctrine reshaping the So- and 1960s, air defense assumed consider- viet military services? What are the mecha- able depth, and mass production of nisms and forces contributing to the surface-to-air missiles (SAM) began. When changes? What will be the ultimate result? the US shifted to ballistic missiles as its This article considers these questions as principal means of nuclear delivery, VPVO they pertain to the Soviet Air Defense kept pace by deploying antiballistic mis- Forces by briefly reviewing the history of siles (ABM) during the early 1960s.1 those forces, addressing the major players Prior to 1980 VPVO had been a unified in the USSR who affect Soviet defense pol- command in both war and peace, without icy, and examining the major issues facing subordination to a geographic command VP VO. such as a front or military district (MD).2 In the early eighties, however, VPVO was reorganized, and many of its assets were Soviet Air Defense Forces subordinated to the MDs; the mission of tactical air defense was also transferred to The Soviet air defense function can be VPVO.3 The result was a serious dilution traced back as far as 1917, although it did of VPVO’s mission. This trend was re- not attain the status of a military service versed in 1986 when the subordinated until much later. During World War II, strategic assets were returned to VPVO and radar was in its early stages of develop- tactical air defense was returned to the ment, and the principal air defense Ground Forces.4 weapons were fighter aircraft and ground- based antiaircraft guns. After the war, the United States began developing long-range bombers to deliver nuclear weapons, thus Competing Views spurring continued Soviet support of a of the Future large system of nationwide air defense. VPVO officially became a separate service The formulation of Soviet military pol- in 1948, and in 1954 its top officer was icy and doctrine has changed drastically in elevated to commander in chief (CINC)— the past several years, but the new system equal to the heads of the other services. is not yet completely understood. Many VPVO originally had the strategic mission more groups and organizations are in- of being responsible for the defense of So- volved now, and each has the ability—to lesser and greater extents—to affect the future shape of VPVO. These groups, organizations, and individuals fall into three categories—civilian, military, and political—although these groupings are somewhat arbitrary. Categorizing the wide variety of opinion expressed in the present debate over military policy is difficult.5

Civilian Glasnost and perestroika have created a new and vocal group of nonofficial military commentators and analysts in the Soviet Union: the institutchiki.6 Found in 6 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

the academic spheres of Soviet life, they waste of money and should be largely are civilians who have begun to comment abolished. This view is not necessarily in- on military subjects, much like civilians compatible with his advocacy of defensive employed by Western think tanks and uni- sufficiency. Arbatov voices three crit- versities. Working at Soviet universities icisms with regard to maintaining a large and institutes, they publish their views in system of air defense against strategic nu- journals which have been freed by clear weapons. First, air defense would not glasnost. Although the Soviet military of- make a meaningful difference against a ficially accepts the new emphasis on de- massed strike by strategic bombers and fense, the institutchiki have explored the cruise missiles. Arbatov describes this task concept of defensive sufficiency and sug- as countering “many thousands of gested interpretations that the military Rusts,’” a reference to VPVO’s failure in finds alarming. 1987 to stop amateur pilot Mathias Rust One civilian has suggested major modi- fications to the Air Defense Forces. Alexi Arbatov, a scholar at the Institute of the The Scn'iet Pill Box phased-array radar (helinv) is part of the USA and Canada, questions the structure, Moscow antihallistic missile (ABM) system. Arms-control organization, and emphasis of the Soviet agreements have placed new restrictions on the Soviet Air military—including VPVO. Arbatov argues Defense Forces (VPVO) and have led to the dismantling of a that the national system of air defense is a similar ABM site at Krasnoyarsk. SOVIET AIR DEFENSE FORCES 7

Critics argue that the VPVO is an unnecessary drain on the though, if the defense against strategic nu- Soviet economy. Furthermore, the inability of the VPVO to clear threats were largely abandoned, the detect a single light aircraft in the 1987 Rust incident has primary mission of VPVO would fostered doubt that it could counter a strike from a strategic bomber such as the USAF's B-l (above). disappear. The ultimate role of the institutchiki in shaping the Soviet military is unknown. from flying a Cessna to Moscow. Second, The military takes a dim view of civilian the radars, SAM sites, and fighter airfields analysis, publishing sharp rebuttals and of VPVO are vulnerable to strikes by ballis- criticisms of their articles and questioning tic missiles. In the event of nuclear war, their competence to comment on military they would probably not survive the initial matters.8 The political leadership, how- exchange of nuclear ballistic missiles. ever, may be more sympathetic to the in- Third, US bombers are not nearly as stitutchiki. But the strength of any connec- threatening as ballistic missiles, yet de- tion between the actions of policymakers fending against bombers significantly and the opinions of civilian analysts re- drains Soviet resources. Arbatov does not mains unclear.9 wish to totally dismantle VPVO. He be- The growing democratization in the lieves that a smaller force could still fulfill USSR has yielded a large number of popu- a mission of providing “early warning of larly elected officials, many of whom are attack, controlling air space in peacetime very critical of the government. An in- and safeguarding the country against pos- formed. independent analysis of military sible terrorists.” He also advocates retain- affairs could allow them to raise issues, set ing tactical air defense for the purpose of agendas for reform, and force reevaluation protecting troops.7 This reduction in mis- of matters which previously were only un- sion might suggest that the Soviet Union der the purview of the military. The avail- no longer needs a separate service for air ability of analysis to Soviet legislators may defense, although Arbatov does not sug- make the institutchiki much more impor- gest that VPVO be eliminated. Obviously, tant in the future. 8 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

In addition to writing, these intellectuals Military are beginning to take practical actions in support of their views. In April 1989 the The Soviets rank VPVO third in impor- institutchiki formed a nongovernment or- tance among the five services in the Soviet ganization known as the Group for Public military—behind the Strategic Rocket Monitoring (GON). This group attempts to Forces and the Ground Forces but ahead of monitor unilateral withdrawals of Soviet the air force and the navy. This arrange- troops from East Europe and Mongolia, as well as reductions of troops and equip- The Soviet ICBM launch-detection satellite network is ment within the USSR. Although GON supposed to provide warning of an incoming missile 30 must rely largely on information from the minutes before impact. Analysts note that Soviet air defense Soviet General Staff, it could represent the forces might not have the ability to survive an initial beginnings of nongovernmental watchdog exchange of ICBMs. Below, a US Minuteman missile groups for defense policy.10 emerges from an underground silo. SOVIET AIH DEFENSE FORCES 9

ment differs from that of most Western banded and that a total of 60 air defense countries, whereby the strategic and tacti- units will be either demobilized or cal air defense mission is divided among reduced.19 the air force, army, and navy. The Soviet General Tret’yak is a spokesman for the division of labor was altered somewhat most conservative school of thought during 1980-86, when some VPVO assets among Soviet military leaders in the pres- were transferred to the air force.11 ent strategy debate concerning defensive The Soviets reversed this policy, but the sufficiency.20 His stance has been charac- fate of VPVO may presently be under dis- terized as the “traditionalist” view, which cussion in the USSR. Several months after emphasizes that “the ‘new’ defensive doc- the publication of Arbatov’s attack on trine is nothing new, as Soviet doctrine VPVO, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev com- has always been defensive in nature.’’21 mented on possible changes in the struc- This hard-line position is contrary to the ture of the armed forces, citing reasons to prevailing trend, which is radically chang- justify the existence of VPVO as a separate ing the Soviet military for the purpose of military service.12 The military is probably remaking it into a defensive force. The out- very much in favor of keeping the Air De- look for traditionalists may not be good.22 fense Forces alive and independent. Perestroika is often mentioned in mili- The military may view defensive suffi- tary writings in connection with VPVO. ciency as a justification for increased The term is usually invoked to criticize emphasis and expenditure on air defense. and point out problems: absence of disci- The Soviet general in charge of weapons pline, corruption, favoritism, formalism procurement has stated that the applica- (unrealistic training), lack of initiative, low tion of defensive doctrine will result in in- combat readiness, and so forth. Signifi- creased spending on air defense, intel- cantly, however, General Tret’yak has ligence gathering, and treaty-verification cited another aspect of perestroika which measures.13 Gen I. M. Tret’yak, VPVO he considers important to VPVO— CINC, has also pointed out a connection specifically, its role in increasing the between defensive doctrine and support of USSR’s technological base and providing the Air Defense Forces: “The necessity of the military with increasingly modern air constantly strengthening air defense stems defense weapons.23 logically from the military doctrine . . . which by its nature is defensive.’’14 Gen Political Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff, has indicated that Ground Forces’ The third and most important view of tactical “air defense means will increase VPVO is that held by the country’s politi- by a factor of 1.5 to 2.”15 cal leadership. Movement toward democ- Although the military wants to retain an ratization has opened up the political independent VPVO and possibly augment arena to a growing number of individuals. it, the reverse process may be under way. The nature of Soviet politics is changing, The new emphasis on defense apparently but its future course is uncertain. It is not has not insulated VPVO from reductions. yet clear if the old system of highly cen- Comments from the VPVO CINC and bat- tralized decisions will prevail or if politi- talion commanders alike indicate that uni- cal power will shift toward legislative lateral reductions have affected the Air De- bodies. f e n s e F o r c e s . 16 G e n e r a l T r e t ’ y a k c l a i m s t o The performance of VPVO is often the have lost 50,000 troops and suggests that source of great embarrassment for Soviet he may lose more.17 If correct, this figure leaders. All of the VPVO CINCs since the would represent approximately 8 percent early 1960s have probably been forcibly re- of VPVO manpower.18 To date, Soviet moved from their position. Marshal V. A. Ministry of Defense statements indicate Sudets (1962-66) was replaced after the that four VPVO divisions have been dis- mediocre performance of the Soviet- 10 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

designed North Vietnamese air defense A defensive-oriented Soviet military would make more system. Marshal P. F. Batitskiy (1966-78) extensive use of tactical air defense systems. Above is a Soviet-made Two Spot Par radar unit manned by US troops was replaced after a Korean Airlines (KAL) during the Bright Star exercise of1985. Boeing 707 violated Soviet airspace in 1978 and was forced down.24 Marshal A. I. Koldunov (1978-87) was replaced when Mathias Rust penetrated Soviet airspace in a Cessna and landed in Red Square. Troops. Elsewhere in the world there exist Political oversight of the military is the three armed services: land troops, air changing dramatically in the Soviet Union. force, and navy. . . . Thi s could have been For example, the debate concerning the one of the reasons for Mathias Rust landing separate status of VPVO has reached the on Red Square.25 Soviet legislature. Some Soviet deputies In June 1989 members of the Supreme are not convinced that the current method Soviet, an elected body, formed the Com- of organizing the Soviet armed forces is mittee for Defense and State Security efficient. During general debate in the Su- (KOGB). The KOGB will oversee the ac- preme Soviet, Col V. Podziruk—minister tivities and budgets of the Soviet military of Parliament—is quoted as saying, and the Committee for State Security Here in this country we have for some rea- (KGB).26 In theory, the KOGB will be simi- son five armed services, not three as lar to US congressional committees on elsewhere in the world. In addition to the armed services and intelligence. A group usual three we have the Air Defense Forces of US congressmen has visited the Soviet of the Country, and the Strategic Missile Union at the invitation of the KOGB, and SOVIET AIR DEFENSE FORCES 11

members of the Soviet committee paid a and equipment shortages.30 The manpower return visit to the US in early 1990. crunch can delay or make impossible the It is not yet clear, however, exactly what switch to new technologies. On the other power the KOGB will have or how readily hand, newer technologies may be a means it will exercise that power.27 Debate within of overcoming manpower problems. For the Supreme Soviet has criticized the example, the Soviets claim that the Su-27 KOGB for having too many members of the fighter is easier to repair because its tech- military-industrial complex who will not nology is more reliable and is modular in properly represent the public. The first design, thus greatly easing the task of chairman of the committee, Vladimir maintaining the aircraft.31 Lapygin, countered by asserting that the Second, the nature of VPVO’s mission number of members with defense-related imposes unusual difficulties on its man- backgrounds is not extraordinarily high power system. Three mission requirements and that knowledgeable committee mem- in particular complicate the manning of bers are desirable.28 However conflicting strategic air defense units: These units the interests of the committee members must be constantly deployed, physically may be, differences are emerging between spread apart from each other, and located the KOGB and the military. Lapygin pub- in remote areas. The air defense of the na- licly stated his support for a professional tion requires constant readiness 24 hours a (volunteer) military, fewer student draf- day. Unlike some services whose troops tees, and greater glasnost to combat “un- deploy from permanent installations to justified secrecy.”29 None of these pro- conduct operations or exercises, VPVO has posals is particularly popular with the personnel who stand combat-alert duty— military. constantly at work and deployed for battle.32 Further, its troops do not agglomerate to take advantage of mass, a classic principle of warfare. Rather, they must deploy to Future Issues cover a large area and ensure complete and A number of issues presently confront unbroken coverage of territory unprotected VPVO. Although some of them are new, by the limited ranges of radars and many are long-standing problems which SAMs.33 Last, constantly maintaining have been exacerbated in the last several troops at readiness and spreading them out years. The resolution of these dilemmas— results in the permanent remote basing of and the difficult choices involved in that many troops. General Tret’yak has identi- process—will greatly affect the future of fied this requirement as a significant prob- VPVO. lem for VPVO, calling the “social conditions” of many units unacceptable.34 Poor Manpower housing and facilities, food shortages, and isolation are all serious problems for Ironically, the switch to a defensive strat- VPVO personnel. egy will not necessarily benefit VPVO. and it may actually lead to a decline in the service’s mission and resources. The uni- Arms Control lateral reduction in Soviet troops by The strategic nuclear aspect of VPVO's 500,000 men presents a particularly diffi- mission may make it a target for future cult problem for the Air Defense Forces for changes. The Strategic Arms Limitation two major reasons—technology and mis- Talks (SALT) I ABM treaty restricted the sion requirements. Air Defense Forces by limiting ABM First, the Soviets have trouble support- weapons and the placement of ABM ing their present level of technology, not to radars. This treaty still curtails the VPVO, mention new and advanced systems. They as demonstrated by the announcement in have chronic problems with spare parts October 1989 that the large phased-array 12 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk sance would change the way that VPVO would be dismantled. regarded aircraft engaged in this activity. The Krasnoyarsk decision also points Even if the agreement allowed only very out a difficult dilemma for Soviet arms limited flights over prescribed corridors control in the future. The Soviet leader- (such as flights allowed under the Conven- ship has long been very critical of the US tional Forces Europe treaty), the result Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—an at- would still be a change in the mind-set of tempt to create technologies capable of de- the Soviets concerning the treatment of re- fending against ballistic missiles. How- connaissance aircraft. According to the So- ever. the Soviets’ desire to halt SDI puts viets themselves, the threat of a reconnais- their negotiators in a bind: Can they decry sance aircraft penetrating Soviet airspace US research and development on strategic resulted in the shootdown of KAL flight defense while they have the world’s only 007 in 1983. At the time, Soviet spokes- operating ABM system and a massive sys- men argued that KAL was on an intel- tem of air defense against bombers? Can ligence mission. In Soviet minds, this fact they support and encourage more rigid alone was justification enough for the controls on nuclear defense (like the ABM shootdown.39 treaty) while continuing to make an artifi- VPVO would have to accept new rules cial distinction between space-based and and a new outlook toward reconnaissance earth-based nuclear defenses? Some Soviet (i.e., perceiving it as a confidence-building officials have indicated that in Strategic measure, as opposed to an activity associ- Arms Reduction Talks (START) II treaty ated with preparing for and fighting war). negotiations they may be willing to com- This outlook would be especially true if pletely abandon the Soviet ABM system.35 the flights were organized in association The Krasnoyarsk reversal may be the first with, or as a specific aspect of, an arms- of many for VPVO if US and Soviet nego- control verification regime. Hostile reac- tiators work to limit strategic defense of all tions to such overflights would have grave types. diplomatic consequences.

Open Skies A diplomatic initiative of the Bush-admin- Agreement on the Prevention istration known as “open skies’’ may of Dangerous Military Activity change the nature of VPVO’s mission. Originating with proposals made by the The Agreement on the Prevention of Eisenhower administration in the 1950s, Dangerous Military Activity, signed by the the open skies concept was reintroduced US and the Soviet Union on 12 June i989, by President George Bush in a 1989 is designed primarily to avoid misunder- speech.36 The Soviets have expressed in- standings and confrontations between the terest, agreeing in principle to the idea and two countries and has probably caused t o t a l k s o n t h e s u b j e c t . 37 A l t h o u g h n o c o m - major changes in VPVO. This agreement monly accepted definition exists, the con- has almost certainly affected the rules of cept generally calls for greater access to a engagement used by the Air Defense nation’s airspace for the express purpose Forces when an unidentified foreign air- of conducting surveillance. The con- craft enters Soviet airspace. Whereas the sequences of such an agreement could be impulse of the Soviets in 1983 was to at- extraordinary for VPVO. tack and destroy an aircraft believed to be A high-priority peacetime mission of So- on a reconnaissance mission, this agree- viet air defense is the interception of US ment will require them to withhold fire and European reconnaissance flights near even if they can positively identify the air- the USSR’s borders.30 An open skies agree- craft as a US reconnaissance flight. The ment which legitimized aerial reconnais- agreement requires the armed forces of the SOVIET AIR DEFENSE FORCES 13 country whose border is violated to ‘‘con- necessarily cover the problem of determin- tinuously attempt to establish and main- ing intentions. That is, the USSR could tain communications” for the purpose of justify a hostile reaction to a border viola- determining the intruder’s intent or even tor if it claimed to have evidence which rendering assistance to the violator (call proved the violation was intentional and, signs and frequencies are provided in the therefore, beyond the bounds of the agreement).40 Only intentional intrusions treaty.4- The requirement to establish com- into Soviet airspace are not covered by the munications. however, represents an im- agreement. portant modification to VPVO rules of Since it would be difficult to distinguish engagement. The KAL shootdown in 1983 between intentional and unintentional vio- may have occurred without any attempt to lations of borders, the First Agreed State- make radio contact with the 747, which ment was added to the agreement in an at- the Soviets later claimed was on a US re- tempt to clarify this ambiguity.41 This connaissance mission.43 statement prohibits the party whose territory is violated from assuming an inten- Low Observables tional violation in the absence of an explanation about the circumstances of the The US has done extensive research on a unauthorized entry. range of low observable (LO) or "stealth” A US military representative involved in technologies, whose purpose is to impede negotiations over the agreement argues detection of targets, and has built two that the First Agreed Statement does not types of aircraft—the F-117A and the B-2—that make extensive use of these technologies. The effectiveness of the new The SA-8—a short-range, low-altitude tactical surface-to-air LO aircraft is not yet known. They are not missile—replaced the Soviets' 57-mm antiaircraft gun. actually invisible to radars, although pop- 14 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

ular accounts of LO technology sometimes of Defense, advocates the development of give this impression. Actually, these air- technologies that would require the USSR craft may become visible to existing radar to expend vast sums of money in develop- systems at ranges as great as 30 miles.44 ing counterprograms. LO is just such a Furthermore, some commentary on LO air- technology, according to Sen Sam Nunn, craft does not suggest that the USSR is since it will “render obsolete billions of very impressed; rather, the Soviets empha- dollars of Soviet investment in their cur- size the “hype” associated with the air- rent Air Defense, and cause them to spend craft and have suggested that their existing billions more in an attempt to cope.”49 The air defense systems would still be capable Soviets’ answer to competitive strategies is against this new threat.45 One Soviet writer “asymmetrical response,” which advo- cites “foreign military specialists” to make cates the development of inexpensive pro- the point that “with reliable detection and grams to counter new US weapons.50 Both tracking they [LO aircraft] can be de- institutchiki and Marshal Akhromeyev cite stroyed . . . by existing and future surface- this idea as the proper guiding principle in to-air missile weapons.”46 finding solutions to the challenge pre- No doubt, new weapons systems will be sented by LO technology.51 The Soviet ap- developed to counter LO aircraft. One no- plication of the logic of asymmetrical re- table example of a Soviet technological response could make negotiations a more sponse to a US weapon is the MiG-25 Fox- realistic alternative to fashioning an inex- bat, an aircraft developed for VPVO in the pensive military solution. 1960s to counter the XB-70 bomber then being prepared for the USAF.47 Although Civil Aviation the bomber was never built, the Soviets did build a large number of Foxbats, Civil aviation in the USSR greatly compli- which represented a quantum leap in So- cates VPVO’s mission. To maintain control viet technology at the time. The aircraft set of the USSR’s airspace, VPVO must moni- a number of world records, including ab- tor aircraft flying over the Soviet Union solute speed, closed-circuit speed, time to and classify them as friendly, unfriendly, height, and absolute height. The Foxbat's unidentified, and so forth. However, powerful radar, enormous speed, and. very VPVO has difficulty making such identi- high-altitude capabilities were significant fications because of the lack of cooperation technological advances in response to the and coordination between VPVO and the US threat. A similar program could now be Unified System for Air Traffic Control under way to improve VPVO’s sensor and (YeS UVD), the agency responsible for weapon technology for use against the civil air traffic control in the USSR.52 An latest USAF bomber. object of criticism in the Soviet press, YeS Further, LO aircraft may elicit a political UVD was described during earthquake dis- response in addition to—or in place of—a aster relief flights as backward in its tech- military-technical response. That is, the nology and organization.53 Thus, many un- Soviets may be willing to enter into nego- identified aircraft operate in border areas, tiations designed to limit the production of and procedural violations and the lack of these aircraft. The cost of persuading the radio transponders in aircraft make radar US to accept such limitations, however, identification impossible. The military has could be reductions in VPVO,48 a trade charged that YeS UVD has no interest in that may be acceptable to Soviet leaders maintaining close control of the air be- but one that could result in a significant cause this activity provides no (monetary) loss of VPVO effectiveness. bonuses for its personnel.54 Critics remain Such a scenario is bolstered by the fact pessimistic that these problems will ever that the Soviets clearly understand the US be solved because of the sheer number of concept of competitive strategies. This separate agencies and departments idea, which originated in the Department involved.55 SOVIET AIR DEFENSE FORCES 15

VPV'O’s problems with civil aviation dications are that the Soviets will be less will probably increase dramatically in the likely to risk future KAL incidents, which near future because of the great demand wouid incur the same kind of condemna- for domestic and international service. The tion and suspension of flights that oc- Soviets are working to meet this demand curred in 1983. This progressive integra- by establishing a competitor to Aeroflot, tion of the Soviet Union into the the official airline.56 Not only will this ini- worldwide civil air system, as well as the tiative increase tourism, but also it will previously mentioned developments in enhance economic perestroika. That is, the civil aviation, will further erode VPVO’s inefficient Soviet distribution system capability to monitor air traffic—hostile or could profit from improvements in air otherwise—in the Soviet Union. Thus, we transport that provide more connections can anticipate a more relaxed treatment of through the vast Soviet landmass. Further, civil aircraft by VPVO. the US aircraft manufacturer Piper and the Soviet design bureau Sukhoi are engaged in a joint project to produce a light aircraft intended for both domestic use and inter- Conclusion national sales. Such ventures are important steps in the conversion of the aircraft As we have seen, VPVO is changing, in industry to civilian production57 and are large part because of the new political cli- evidence of civil aviation’s role in mate in the Soviet Union. The effect of economic perestroika. perestroika and glasnost has been signifi- The Soviet Union will also realize an in- cant and direct. Unilateral troop reduc- crease in international air service as a tions are an interesting example of these greater number of Soviet and non-Soviet principles at work under the auspices of commercial aircraft begin to routinely en- defensive strategy. Although defensive in ter Soviet airspace. Pan American World nature, VPVO has not escaped these reduc- Airways, presently the only US airline to tions. In fact, the very survival of VPVO as fly to the USSR, expects to significantly in- a separate service of the Soviet military crease the number of these flights, which may now be under debate. Glasnost and are presently constrained only by the lack perestroika have also had an important in- of hotel accommodations in major Soviet direct effect on the Air Defense Forces in cities. Soviet officials are taking steps to that they have given rise to new groups of remedy this problem.58 The USSR has also people who will shape the future of the expressed a willingness to allow over- military. Moreover, they have fostered flights of civil air traffic traveling between treaty negotiations which will affect the air Europe and Asia.59 As was the case with defense mission. Further, economic pere- domestic aviation, increased international stroika will complicate VPVO’s mission by air service to the USSR will play a role in depriving it of manpower and increasing economic perestroika by encouraging tour- air traffic to the Soviet Union. Finally, is- ism, foreign investment, foreign informa- sues involving the US, such as stealth tion, and technology transfer. technology, ongoing arms-control treaties, The Soviet promotion of civil aviation verification and confidence-building mea- has been accompanied by increasing par- sures, and bilateral agreements will all af- ticipation in organizations like the Flight fect VPVO. Safety Foundation and the International It is difficult to tell exactly where these Air Transport Association. The shootdown trends will lead. The many issues facing of KAL 007 in 1983 led to condemnation VPVO and the growing number of people by one such group (the International Civil who can conceivably affect defense policy Aviation Organization), as well as an inter- tend to complicate analysis. Regardless of national boycott by pilots and the closure the decisions made or the contributions of of Aeroflot offices in the United States. In- certain groups to policy-making, Soviet air 16 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991 defense is becoming a much more difficult mission mandate will make air defense task, and a decline in both resources and even less viable in the future. □

Notes 1. General and historical information can be found in the 75; see also "Organization of the Soviet Armed Forces," Air following books: Kenneth R. Whiting, Soviet Air Power Force Magazine, no. 3 (March 1990): 67. (Boulder. Colo.: Westview Press, 1986). 123—49; Harriet Fast 19. Moscow Tass International Service. 1344 GMT, 19 Oc- Scott and William F. Scott. The Armed Forces of the tober 1989, in FBIS-SOV-89-201, page 1: and "New Thinking U.S.S.R., 3d ed. (Boulder. Colo.: Westview Press. 1984). 159- and the Contemporary World,” Japanese television program 64; and Viktor Suvorov. Inside the Soviet Army (New York: 1000 GMT. 16 October 1989, in FBIS-SOV-89-204, page 1. Berkley Books, 1982), 73-81. 20. Dietrich and Hitchens, 8-14; see also Nichols and 2. Suvorov. 62, 73. Karasik, 33. 3 Department of Defense. Soviet Military Power: An As- 21. Dietrich and Hitchens, 9. sessment of the Threat. 1988 (Washington. D.C.: Government 22. Ibid., 12-13. Printing Office. 1988). 80. 23. "On the Level of Today's Demands," 1. 4. Ibid. 24. Harriet Fast Scott, "Deadly Guardians of Soviet Air- 5. A good examination of the variety of views on defensive space.” Air Force Magazine, no. 3 (March 1984): 77-82. doctrine, even among Soviet military leaders, is in Thomas 25. Aleksey Pakin, "Army for the People, or for Generals. M. Nichols and Theodore William Karasik, "The Impact of Soviet Armed Forces: MPs' Views," Moscow News, no. 30 (23 'Reasonable Sufficiency' on the Soviet Ministry of Defense,” July 1989), 13. in FBIS-SOV-89-147. page 100. Naval War College Review 42. no. 4 (Autumn 1989): 22-36. 26. S. Taranov, "Glasnost and State Security," Izvestiya, 6 Edward L. Warner III. "New Thinking and Old Realities 27 June 1989, 2. in FBIS-SOV-89-124, pages 43—44. in Soviet Defense Policy,” Survival 31, no. 1 (January- 27. Lt Col V. Kosarev, “From Positions of New Thinking." February 1989): 18-20. Krasnaya zvezda. 22 June 1989, 1-2, in FBIS-SOV-89-120, 7 Alexei Arbatov. "How Much Defence Is Sufficient?" In- pages 42-43: see also "Defense Budget under Examination.” ternational Affairs (Moscow), no. 4 (April 1989): 38-40. Krasnaya zvezda, 6 October 1989. 1. in FBIS-SOV-89-194. 8. For example, see Lt Gen Avn. V. Serebryannikov, "The page 56. Army—How Should It Be?" Krasnaya zvezda, 12 February 28. Moscow Domestic Service in Russian. 1923 GMT, 28 1989. 2. in Soviet Press Selected Translations, 7 July 1989. June 1989, in FBIS-SOV-89-124, pages 37-38. 81-83: Gen D. T. Yazov. "On the Basis of New Thinking,” 29. Taranov. 43—45. Krasnaya zvezda, 13 April 1989, 1-2, in Soviet Press Se 30. Lt Col O. Falichev. "Restructuring at the Regimental lected Translations. 7 July 1989. 73: "Responsibility for Level: A Thin Thread.” Krasnaya zvezda. 10 October 1987, 2. One's Word," Krasnaya zvezda, 26 December 1989, 2, in For- in JPRS-UMA-88-002. page 2: see also Col 1. Varfolomeyev. eign Broadcast Information Service Soviet Union (FBIS- “The Zone of Responsiblity," Krasnaya zvezda, 1 August SOV)-89-248. page 36; and "View," Moscow Television Ser- 1987. 2, in Soviet Press Selected Translations, 30 December vice. 2040 GMT, 15 December 1989. in FBIS-SOV-89-241, 1987, 209-12; and Col I. Varfolomeyev. "The Zone of Re- pages 121-22. sponsibility," Krasnaya zvezda, 4 August 1987. 2, in Soviet 9. Stephen R. Covington. "The Soviet Military? Prospects Press Selected Translations. 24 February 1988, 25-27. for Change." Journal of Soviet Military Studies 2, no. 2 (June 31. V. Moroz, "Su-27: The Aircraft and the People,” 1989): 243; see also David V. Dietrich and Ralph M. Krasnaya zvezda, 21 April 1989, 1-2, in JPRS-UMA-89-012. Hitchens. "The Soviet Strategy Debate: Striving for Reason- pages 43—44. able Sufficiency." Journal of Soviet Military Studies 2. no. 1 32. Astafev. 14-15. (March 1989): 8. 33. Lt Col V. Bogatyuk, "Fire Cooperation between Bat- 10. Sr Lt S. Sidorov. "Under Public Monitoring." Krasnaya talions," Vestnik Protivovozdushnoi Oborony. no. 5 (1988): zvezda. 16 May 1989. 3. in FBIS-SOV-89-097. pages 3-4. 19-21, in Soviet Press Selected Translations, 15 November 11. Soviet Military Power, 80. 1989, 18-20. 12. Special edition of "View." Moscow Television Service, 34. Gorokhov, 29. 1700 GMT. October 1989, in FBIS-SOV-89-197, page 98. 35. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Soviets Press U.S, for Deeper Reduc- 13. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Arms Budget Cut, Soviet Says.” tions in Strategic Weapons,” Washington Post, 25 February Washington Post, 27 July 1988. A18. 1990. A14. 14. "On the Level of Today’s Demands.” Voyennyy 36. R. Jeffrey Smith. "Bush Plan Predates Satellites." Vestnik, no. 2 (1988): 11-13. in Joint Publication Research Washington Post. 13 May 1989, A14. Service (JPRS)-UMA-88-016, page 1. 37. "Baker-Shevardnadze: Joint Statement on Arms Con- 15. Gen M. Moiseyev. "Standing Guard over Peace and So- trol.” Arms Control Today. October 1989, 22. cialism,” Krasnaya zvezda. 23 February 1989. 2, in FBIS- 38. A. Gorokhov, "The Main Console," Pravda. 10 April SOV-89-035, pages 102-3. 1988, 1, 3, in Soviet Press Selected Translations, December 16. See. for example, Lt Col V. Astafev, "Topic of the Day: 1988. 167-69. Which Personnel Will Remain?” Krasnaya zvezda. 21 Sep- 39. "Marshal Ogarkov: 'Termination of the Flight Was Not tember 1989, 2. in JPRS-UMA-89-025, pages 14-15; see also an Error,'" Washington Post, 10 September 1983, A ll. A. Gorokhov. "Far from Moscow: Report from the Air De- 40. "Text of the Agreement on the Prevention of Dan- fense Forces." Pravda. 9 April 1989, 3, in JPRS-UMA-89-013. gerous Military Activities," Arms Control Today. August page 28; and Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 0630 1989. 17. GMT, 9 April 1989. in FBIS-SOV-89-068, page 74. 41. Burrus M. Carnahan, "Decreasing the Danger in Mili- 17. Moscow International Service, 1700 GMT. 8 April tary Activities: The Meaning of the New U.S.-Soviet Agree- 1989. in FBIS-SOV-89-068, page 73. ment." Arms Control Today, August 1989, 14. 18. VPVO manpower strength figures available in Suvorov. 42. Ibid. SOVIET AlH D E F E N S E FORCES 17

43. Michael Dobbs. "Soviet Pilot Asserts He Sent Warn- 1989, 3. in FB1S-SOV-89-149, page 6; and "Studio 9." ings." Washington Post. 11 September 1983, A13. Moscow Television Service, 0443 GMT, 25 February 1989. in 44. Robert Kavlor. "The Brave New World of Stealth War- FBIS-SOV-89-037. page 18. fare." U.S. News Sr World Report, 28 November 1988. 20-28; 52. Lt Col O. Falichev, "How Many Airspace Managers?" see also Bill Sweetman. Stealth Bomber (Osceola, Wis.: Krasnaya zvezda, 29 September 1988, 1-2, in JPRS- Motorbooks International, 1989). 88-90. UMA-88-030. pages 22-23 45. Maj Gen Yu Lyubimov. "Stealth: What Is the Plan?" 53. Col A. Garavskiy, “The Air Bridge: From the Whole Krasnaya zvezda. 13 July 1989. 3. in FB1S-SOV-89-139, page World to Armenia." Krasnaya zvezda, 17 December 1988, 4. 2. in JPRS-UMA-88-030. pages 22-23. 46. Lt Col A. Bokov. "The Problem of Detecting Stealth 54. Falichev, 51. Airborne Vehicles." Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye. 55. Ibid., 54. no. 7 (July 1989): 37-12. in JPRS-UFM-89-011. page 22. 56. James T. McKenna. "Soviets Attempt to Set Up Com- 47. John Barron. MiG Pilot (New York: Avon. 1981), 177— petitor for Aeroflot." Aviation Week Sr Space Technology, 11 79. December 1989, 42. 48. John W. R. Lepingwell, "Soviet Strategic Air Defense 57. V, Chebakov, “Top Secret: Piper-Su in Smolensk," and the Stealth Challenge.” International Security 14. no. 2 Pravda, 11 January 1990, 8, in FBIS-SOV-90-010. pages 22- (Fall 1989): 97-98; see also "Repercussions," Moscow Televi- 23. sion Service. 1857 GMT. 22 December 1988. in FB1S- 58. James T. McKenna. "Aeroflot Pursues Leases for Five SOV-88-251. pages 13-14. A310s. Signs CRS and Hotel Pacts." Aviation Week Sr Space 49. Quoted in Kavlor. 21. Technology, 30 October 1989. 55; and Thomas Plaskett. 50. A. Vasil'yev. M. Gerasev. and A. Kokoshin, "Asym- “From Moscow to New York by Boeing 747." International metrical Response: Possible Countermeasures to SDI," Affairs (Moscow), no. 6 (June 1989): 86-93. SShA—Ekonomika. Politika. Ideologiya, no. 2 (1987): 26-35. 59. 1. Irtyshova, "To Seoul—From Khabarovsk," fzvestiya. in Soviet Press Selected Translations, 30 June 1987. 78-79. 1 March 1990, 4, in FB1S-SOV-90-047, page 4; and "Airline 51. Yu Kornilov, “Marshal Akhromeyev: 'I Left the White Observer: Soviet Overflights,” Aviation Week Sr Space Tech House Feeling Good . . Sovetskaya Rossiya, 3 August nology, 2 October 1989, 17. DEFENSE PLANNING FOR THE MYSTERY TOUR PRINCIPLES FOR GUIDANCE IN A PERIOD OF NONLINEAR CHANGE

Dr Colin S. Gray

HE political sustainability of de- however, the relevant question is, What do fense effort is not an independent we plan for or against in a period wherein variable. It is dependent on the old certainties appear to be expiring on a quality of strategic rationale. The weekly basis? T1990s are shaping up to be a very uncom- fortable decade for defense professionals. Erstwhile standing operating procedures Threat-Driven, are being undermined by reactions to the course of political events. In planning, it is Uncertainty-Pulled (always) important to ask the question, It may be helpful to approach the tasks What is true? Do/Will the Soviets need de- of defense planning in the 1990s from the terring, and so forth? Since confident starting point of a basic distinction be- identification of truth likely will elude us, tween defense activity that is threat- DEFENSE PLANNING FOR THE MYSTERY TOUR 19 driven and defense activity that is uncertainty-pulled. Specific threat-driven Seven Principles for Defense Planning defense preparation is the only US strategic condition with which contemporary 1. Face facts, recognize ignorance. Americans are familiar. Defense life with- 2. Apply geostrategic priorities for fault- out an overshadowing and multifaceted tolerant planning Soviet threat has been all but unthinkable. 3. Recognize that the long term is a succes- However, the endurance, stability, sim- sion of short terms. plicity. and intensity of the Soviet military 4. Sustain or acquire flexibility to adjust to threat stand out very much as a historical changing circumstances. aberration among the strategic histories of great powers. The post-cold-war world is 5. Learn from the past. shaping up for US defense planners as a 6. Play to American strengths. dynamic context characterized by great 7. Reexamine assumptions, reshape ra- uncertainty over the leading threats. US tionales. defense planning will be pulled towards preparation for rather generic kinds of challenges—intervention in regional conflict an ocean away, for example—rather Principle No. 1: than driven by confident recognition of Face Facts, specifically detailed threats. Recognize Ignorance A situation wherein rival polities bear watching and just might emerge as Much that the professional defense enemies in surprising combinations is planner would like to know is simply un- rather more common, historically, than is knowable. Ignorance of the future in detail a phenomenon of bipolar military stand- is not a problem for, or a weakness in, off. Of course, defense planners must de- planning. Rather it is simply a permanent fine "threats” as they conduct their regu- condition for which no apology is neces- lar defense planning and military training sary. Particular events rarely can be pre- activities. Nonetheless, an uncertainty- dicted. Wisdom begins with frank recogni- pulled (though disciplined) approach to tion that detailed ‘‘future history” is defense planning is far more likely to beyond research. serve the nation well—including the abil- Good defense planning, therefore, can- ity to attract the necessary domestic politi- not be a quest after the unattainable. The cal support—in the 1990s than is a con- challenge is to plan intelligently and ra- tinuing endeavor to "fight the problem” of tionally in the face of massive uncertain- the declining political credibility of a ma- ties. Military history does not even show jor threat. that the crises and wars that are planned The body of this article seeks to identify and then launched deliberately (at times, seven broad principles as candidates for in places, and with a character carefully the guidance of defense planning in a de- preselected) tend to be conducted suc- cade (or more) of nonlinear change. Fur- cessfully. Witness the disastrous con- ther, this article contends that sequences of German, Italian, and Jap- uncertainty-pull should inform the spirit anese grand-strategic choices in the period of contemporary planning. 1939-42. 20 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

No less important than recognition of ig- Defense planning in the post-cold war world is characterized norance over the detail of “future history” hy massive uncertainty. If US defense planners use a is appreciation of what is known about fu- deliberate approach to their analyses, they may he able to minimize the "anxiety that flows from uncertainty" and ture (in)security environments. How long present well-reasoned options to the national command Mikhail Gorbachev will endure as presi- authorities. dent of a terminally sick USSR is the realm of educated guesswork only. But the United States requires an adjustable military framework for the rapid generation of Defense planners confronting the awe- deterrent or actual war-fighting effect, re- some, potentially paralyzing, fact of their gardless of who is up or down in the do- detailed ignorance of the future should be mestic politics of important foreign coun- encouraged to develop two lists: the tries. Defense planners are able to proceed knowns and the unknowns (and unknow- prudently and usefully from the enduring ables). Even in a context of seismic-scale fact that their glass of relevant knowledge political shock—a la 1989-90—US de- will always be half—or more—full. What fense planners will find, possibly to their they know about the structure, or probable surprise, that they know a very great deal structure, of future US defense needs typ- about the kinds of demands that foreign ically will be more than adequate as a policy is likely to lay upon the military basis for the framing of recommendations. establishment. DEFENSE PLANNING FOFt THE MYSTERY TOUR 21

One hardly needs to be a professor of Principle No. 2: geostrategy in order to appreciate the ne- Apply Geostrategic cessity for the United States to sustain, Priorities for even enhance (as overseas bases fall away), its long-range air power. Although Fault-Tolerant Planning one can be certain that the next decade US defense planners do not need a crys- will witness a US need for the strategic tal ball (which is fortunate, since crystal effectiveness provided by long-range air balls are out of stock). Instead, they need a power, one cannot exactly predict at what gold-embossed plaque on their desks time, over what issues, and against which which reads as follows: aggressor that demand will arise. The potential for the policy demand is locked • First Priority: Strategic (nuclear) and into the logic of US foreign policy and space forces. strategic geography. • Second Priority: Long-range maritime and air forces. • T h i r d Priority: Ground and tactical-air forces. Principle No. 3: These “priorities” are not a matter for choice. They are, literally, objectively true Recognize That the Long for the United States, given the national Term Is a Succession geography and state of the art of modern of Short Terms technology. Various politicians and defense planners may deny these priorities Long-term hopes for a less bellicose by ill-considered actions, but that ever- world, in common with visions of a truly present possibility does not vitiate the ob- all-Eurasian balance of power for those jective nature of the truth which they continents, are exactly that—hopes and vi- affront. sions. In the long run most things are pos- Having some way to be certain that de- sible, if not equally likely. Meanwhile, fense plans were “right" would be very professional US defense planners are agreeable. Recognizing the unpredict- obliged to attempt to write plans for cop- ability of events, however, and being duti- ing with a rather more disorderly world ful students of Carl von Clausewitz1 (and than has been familiar in recent decades. Murphy with his Law), it is instructive to Common sense, historical reflection, ask—brutally perhaps—about the negative and even the headlines tell us day by day consequences of a range of different errors that the fuel for international (and inter- in US military policy. For an effectively communal, interethnic, interreligious) (all but) insular—if continental-scale— conflict is increasingly abundant. The bi- country in a nuclear age, the priorities zarre notion that the 1990s and beyond specified above should appeal to common somehow will see the elevation in signifi- sense. In support of that common sense, cance of the politics of international the three priorities incorporate, in toto, a economics—but not of military force to genuinely unified vision of military policy backstop or advance asserted economic and—logically and practically—a de- interests—should not be accorded great re- scending critical dependence. In descend- spect.2 In short, even though a sharply de- ing order, the three priorities pertain to (1) clining credibility attaches to the canoni- the protection of the United States in the cal major threats of the cold war, the most basic ways vis-a-vis the most awe- world is probably becoming a more dan- some of dangers, (2) the ability to wage gerous place. war at long distance abroad, and (3) the The US ability to shape its future se- ability to conduct large-scale regional mil- curity environment is real but only partial. itary campaigns. A long-term future goal for the United 22 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

States must be to encourage the emergence conventional, or unconventional) against of a new security order in Europe and Asia threats of attack by weapons of mass de- wherein local polities would ensure a bi- struction (nuclear, biological, or chemi- continental balance. In this equation, the cal); (2) wage and sustain war over very United States would play the classic role great distances; (3) typically fight of "balancer,” which sometimes was avail- alongside friends and allies but possibly able to Britain in centuries past. For the effect a forced regional entry; and so forth. time being, however, such a future condi- Of course, it is difficult to size forces for tion is strictly a matter for speculative en- a world wherein plausible and semiplaus- quiry; it will need to be constructed brick ible threats are diffuse. But the very by brick, short run by short run. It is at marked increase in uncertainty over future least as likely as not that out of the current dangers (the absence of self-evident "dom- turmoil in European politics a superpolity inant scenarios” as candidates for force will emerge which will menace the bal- planning), as noted already, means that ance of power in Europe and Asia (yet US defense planning has to be again). uncertainty-pulled—rather than (specific) If the United States is to learn from its threat-driven. What should discipline the three twentieth-century interventions in process of defense planning/budgeting in European security politics (1917-18; the new era of the 1990s is not so much 1941-45; 1947-early 1990s(?l), it will the identified, or readily predictable, draw the conclusion that the time to shape military capabilities of particular states— the future (and the most economical presumed to be usable in particularly in- method for effecting the same) is as that imical ways—but a more general future is unfolding. If the United States prudence. elects in essence in the 1990s to stand Given the geography of interstate se- down much of its 1991-extant military curity relationships, the character of US posture, it will be repeating past errors foreign policy (the classes and potential and choosing to reduce radically its im- quantities of demand for military backing), pact upon the course of Eurasian political and a history-derived prudential wisdom, history. the United States should have little difficulty specifying, interrelating, and pri- oritizing among the kinds of military capabilities that it should maintain and Principle No. 4: modernize. Above all else, the United Sustain or Acquire States will need the ability to adjust flexi- bly to circumstances which are unex- Flexibility to pected in detail (though not in nature). Adjust to Flexibility has many components, in- Changing Circumstances cluding an openness of mind, an ex- cellence in doctrine (or in provision for US defense planners cannot know today doctrinal revision), and a suitable what policy demands will be placed upon elasticity of organizational framework. the armed forces five to 10 years hence. Also, however, flexibility is a matter of But they do know the kinds of demands money and time. Almost paradoxically, that could be forthcoming, and they do the basis for flexibility in strategic nuclear know the character of military capabilities employment resides in meticulously de- that the United States will require. For tailed (single integrated operational plan— only the briefest of possible sets of exam- SIOP) mission planning which is already ples, US defense planners know that their in the computer and has been trained for. country must be able to (1) deter and pre- Similarly, flexibility tomorrow' in the use ferably defend (with offensive and/or de- of military power of all kinds must defensive counterforce—whether nuclear, pend upon decisions made today. Military DEFENSE PLANNING FOR THE MYSTERY TOUR 23

investment (and related) decisions in the process of vanishing from the political early 1990s will determine the military ca- radar screens of most US federal legisla- pabilities of the year 2000 or—at the level tors. That is not the issue and should not of technology base and human resources— be allowed to become the issue. The ques- the speed with which the United States tion is not whether the Soviet “threat” is could proceed in the late 1990s to imple- in full political retreat at the present time, ment some kinds of defense mobilization. but what sort of capabilities are implied The case for the B-2—indeed for truly by the uncertainty-pull of a challenging long-range air power in general—has to be future. crafted w'ith a view to the kinds of arguments specified or implied here and not with heavy specific reference to residual Soviet dangers. Unquestionably, on the Principle No. 5: “political velocity” side—though not with Learn from the Past regard to actual military capabilities—the Soviet long-range nuclear threat is in the History cannot tell us what will happen in the 1990s, but it can tell us what could happen. The past is the repository of ex- Civil unrest in Liberia compelled the United States to send in perience which should alert us to the the Marines to augment security at the US Embassy as part of Operation Sharp Edge. August 1990. The ability to questions that may need answers. History project power over great distances has long been a major does not repeat itself in detail, but the strength of the US military. Looking to the future. US same kinds of problems and opportunities defense planners must consider both the strengths and do arise, regardless of changing state weaknesses of the American armed forces. players, political leaders, levels of tech- 24 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991 nology, and so forth. Moreover, statesmen theless, a little reflection upon American and defense planners are prone to commit (or indeed, any country’s) history yields old errors in new ways. It so happens, for the insight that Americans and their polity example, that the principal “lessons” that are better at some kinds of military tasks stand out from the very extensive (14-plus than at others. This point should occasion years) experience of the 1920s and 1930s no surprise. For good and for ill, each on negotiated “strategic” (in that period, country’s armed forces are an expression naval) arms limitation fit nearly perfectly of the society and political system which the 1970s and 1980s history of the Strate- they serve. For example, following the gic Arms Limitation Talks.3 military disasters of 1940-42, Gen Alan The challenge of the 1990s to US de- Brooke, chief of the Imperial General Staff, fense planners is to cope with a context believed that “we [British] are undoubt- wherein “yesterday’s enemy” remains edly softer as a nation than any of our militarily very much still in the field (with enemies except the Italians.”7 Typical Ger- regard to strategic nuclear forces), albeit man evaluation of the physical and moral with political Balkanization threatening. resilience of the American soldier in 1942 But today’s well-settled certainties have a (and later) similarly was unflattering.8 way of being overturned suddenly. Speak- Nazi German society in the 1930s—not to ing in the House of Commons in 1792, just mention the years of combat experience a year before Britain was obliged to em- (in Poland, France, the Soviet Union, and bark upon a 20-year war with France, North Africa)—had provided hard schools Prime Minister William Pitt (the Younger) for the German soldier of 1942-43. observed—without contradiction from the National geography and historical ex- floor—that “unquestionably there never perience forge what is known as a strategic was a time in the history of this country culture. From this culture one can talk of when, from the situation of Europe, we an “American way” in defense prepara- might more reasonably expect fifteen years tion and in war. Americans, of necessity, of peace, than we may at the present mo- have been excellent at conquering great ment.”4 Pitt was unlucky, not foolish. distances (though mobility can translate Many defense planners in history have into “mere motion” rather than effective faced uncertainties on the scale which fighting power at the sharp end) and at confronts Americans in the 1990s. Today’s substituting machines of all kinds for details are unique; the situation is not. scarce or militarily inefficient manpower. Even for great powers—to narrow the As US defense planners consider their op- mandate—absence of a dominant, specific tions for the 1990s, they should reflect external threat is far from an unusual state honestly upon those activities which the of affairs. The past is there for our American armed forces tend to conduct education—let us use it. well or poorly. Countries specialize militarily. The priorities specified under principle no. 2 happen (not by accident) to match tolerably accurately—in descending Principle No. 6: order—the kinds of military power at Play to American Strengths which Americans excel. Self-knowledge, as Sun Tzu advised, is critical for success in strategy and statecraft.5 Freedom of choice is somewhat Principle No. 7: constrained among means and methods in Reexamine Assumptions, national security policy. Nationally pre- Reshape Rationales ferred approaches to security problems simply may fail to deliver the requisite The size and character of the current US amount of strategic effectiveness.6 None- defense posture are the products of strate- DEFENSE PLANNING FOR THE MYSTERY TOUR 25

As the cold war thaws, widespread a\ailability of occasional fine-tuning of the extant con- sophisticated weapons systems tends to make the world an cept or approach imposes substantial op- even more dangerous place. Here, a Soviet MiG-29 Fulcrum trainer is shown on display at the Farnborough portunity costs. In accordance with the (England) Air Show with a Soviet An-]24 Condor transport paradoxical logic of strategy,9 success can aircraft looming in the background. breed failure and—following Clausewitz— there is a “culminating point of victory.”10 Quantitative change eventually compels gic assumptions and beliefs that are now qualitative change. between 30 and 40 years old—the age of Much of what the United States mili- the foreign policy and grand strategy tarily has planned to be able to perform for which US military power serves. Policy the past 30 years remains relevant for the and strategy assumptions are not invalid 1990s. But the political framework for because they are old. Indeed, it can be use- those contingent actions is changing and ful to remember that nothing ages so so must the rationales both understood for rapidly as yesterday’s (or even this morn- planning purposes and advanced for the ing’s) news headlines. US defense policy garnering of the necessary public support. cannot, and should not, be remade in ac- Strategic wisdom bereft of public support cordance with instant judgments on the in a democracy is just a set of ideas. ebb and flow of current events (or of “trends” that are only days, months, or perhaps a year old). Conclusions Policy and strategy which essentially were set in the 1950s and which accom- An important value of the seven broad modated many changes at the margin in principles advanced in this article is that, subsequent decades eventually come to as- if followed in practice, they would help to sume an “existential” dignity and au- reduce the burden of anxiety that flows thority. In other words, there may still be from uncertainty. One must assume that excellent reasons for maintaining a strate- on many matters of detail, statesmen and gic forces triad, for approaching nuclear defense planners will be more or less targeting via the big-war framework of wrong. That notion is a given for this dis- SIOP planning, or for adhering to a NATO cussion. The challenge is to find an ap- strategic concept of flexible response. But proach to defense planning that provides a 1 a period can arrive wherein constant or high level of insurance against the bad 26 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

consequences of unpleasant surprises. On 3. Colin S. Gray. House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail, forthcoming, chap. 4. the positive side, if the United States 4. The War Speeches of William Pitt the Younger (Oxford: plans for defense in the spirit of this arti- Clarendon Press. 1914). 16. cle, it would very likely be as ready as it 5. Sun Tzu. The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Ox- ford: Clarendon Press. 1963). 84. could be to exploit opportunities for the 6. Colin S. Gray, War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and advancement of a compatible international Statecraft for the Next Century (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990). 20-21. order. On the negative side, application of 7. Quoted in Charles Whiting. The Poor Bloody Infantry, these principles should help noticeably to 1939-1945 (London: Arrow Books. 1989). 176-77. limit the damage that future insecurity 8. Ibid., 251-54. 9. The central theme in Edward N. Luttwak. Strategy: The conditions could wreak upon US Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard Univer- interests. □ sity Press. 1987). 10. Clausewitz argues that there is a culminating point to success or victory beyond which the victorious side both reduces its gains and indeed sets itself up for a devastating Notes counterstroke. The winning side, for example, can register 1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael great but fatally incomplete success with the capture of far Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton. N.).: Princeton Univer- more enemy territory than it can hold comfortably. Beyond sity Press. 1976), 119-21. Clausewitz's culminating point of victory, boldness becomes 2. For an optimistic view, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Reflec- imprudence and logistical nightmares lurk for the unwary. tions on the German Question." Survival 32, no. 4 (July- Readers may amuse themselves speculating where and when August 1990): 291-98. Hitler’s Third Reich passed its culminating point.

Although history alone cannot act as a predictor of events, it can steer defense planners toward the right questions to ask in determining what will happen in the future. Here, the remains of a B-18 lie on the ramp at Hickam Field, Hawaii, shortly after the Japanese attack of 7 December 1941. Spring 1991 IRA C. EAKER AWARD WINNER

Capt Brian P. Tice, USAF

for his article

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: The Force Multiplier of the 1990s

Congratulations to Capt Brian P. Tice on his If you would like to compete for the Ira C. selection as the Ira C. Eaker Award winner for Eaker Award, submit an article of feature the best eligible article from the Spring 1991 is- length to the Airpower Journal, Walker Hall, sue of the Airpower Journal. Captain Tice re- Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. The award is for ceives a $500 cash award for his contribution the best eligible article in each issue and is to the Air Force’s professional dialogue. The open to all US military personnel below the award honors Gen Ira C. Eaker and is made rank of colonel or equivalent and all US gov- possible through the support of the Arthur G. ernment civilian employees below GS-15 or B. Metcalf Foundation of Winchester, equivalent. Massachusetts.

27 TOWARD OPERATIONAL-LEVEL DOCTRINE FOR SPACE A PROGRESS REPORT

Capt James R. Wolf, USAF

28 our space program to wait for doctrine, we should make every effort to agree on space doctrine as soon as possible. Sound doctrine combined with national policy, fiscal reality, and other constraints can lead to strategies and plans that would allow us to acquire and employ space forces most effectively in support of national objectives (fig. 1). The purpose of this essay is to review the current status of Air Force space doctrine, to comment on the necessary ingredients that will result in publication of a useful doctrinal manual, and to report on progress being made toward that HE United States has had a dedi- publication. cated military space program for more than three and a half decades.1 For most of that time, the Current Status TAir Force has struggled to come to grips with the potential of this “new” medium Until recently, Air Force space doctrine of space and to incorporate it into Air has received modest mention in Air Force Force doctrine. Since the first doctrinal ac- Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doc- knowledgment of space was made in trine of the United States Air Force, pub- 1959,2 efforts to publish usable and widely lished in 1984,3 and AFM 1-6, Military acceptable space doctrine have been Space Doctrine, published in 1982 (fig. 2).4 largely futile. The latter document, although it makes The reasons for this failure are complex some good points, has never been very but generally stem from two sources—a useful to the Air Force space community.5 number of reorganizations and resulting A new edition of Air Force Regulation reassignment of responsibilities for the (AFR) 1-2, Assignment of Responsibilities employment of space forces, and the rapid for Development of Aerospace Doctrine, growth of technology that allows us to eliminates AFM 1-6 and proposes a new constantly envision new possibilities for publication—AFM 2-25, Space Opera- the exploitation of space to perform Air tions.6 At the same time, a new version of Force missions. Added to these is the long- AFM 1-1 that incorporates space into standing difficulty in obtaining agreement basic doctrine to a greater extent is cur- on many of the basic tenets of military rently being coordinated.7 space doctrine. The Air Force doctrine hierarchy and These factors have led to a situation in the placement of space doctrine within it which we (the military space community) reflect a conscious decision by the Air are charging off in many directions at once Force not to separate air and space doc- without good centralized planning and trine but rather to promote the concept of without basing our decisions on integrated aerospace power. This is one of established doctrine and sound strategy. the most divisive issues facing scholars of This is not necessarily bad—after all, the doctrine and one of the greatest obstacles Air Force is accomplishing its space mis- to publishing Air Force doctrine for space. sions successfully and our capabilities are Regardless of how one feels about whether increasing at a respectable rate—but it is this is the proper long-term approach, it also not the best way to do business. does reflect the current reality in which In fact, the actual process is backwards. the Air Force exercises responsibility in While we cannot and should not suspend both mediums. Furthermore, it is a work-

29 30 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

able method for publishing new space doc- ln conjunction with the Air Staff, doctrine analysts at the Air trine in the near future. University Center for Aerospace Doctrine. Research, and Education (AUCADRE) incorporate space operations in The problem is in the timing of the pub- AFM 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air lication of all these new manuals. AFM Force. Pictured are (left to right) Maj David Booker. Lt Col 1-6 has already been eliminated, yet the William F. Furr. John F. Jordan. Col John B. Sams. Jr. publication of a new AFM 1-1 is probably (commander). Col Dennis M. Drew. Jerome W. Klingaman. more than a year away and a first draft-of Lt Col Price T. Bingham, and Lt Col Charles M. Westenlwff. AFM 2-25 has only recently been released for commept. This means that we are in for a period with practically no approved space doctrine “on the street.” ing successors to avoid repeating the same old mistakes. Third, it provides guidance for future actions and allows for a commonality of understanding between supe- Air Force Space riors and subordinates that is essential during conflict.8 Doctrine The Air Force attempts to capture a lot Doctrine, in general, has three purposes. of material in a single basic doctrine First, it provides the working medium for manual—AFM 1—1. With the elimination a thorough analysis of past experience— of AFM 1-6, the next version of AFM 1-1 the ultimate distillation of lessons learned. must also include basic doctrine for space. Second, it provides the means of passing Although no small task, it must clearly ar- on this experience by educating and allow- ticulate the similarities and differences be- OPERATIONAL-LEVEL DOCTRINE FOR SPACE 31 tween the air and space environments, as of these documents must fulfill the three well as between air and space forces, and functions of doctrine stated above, and fit all this within the concept of integrated they have to be consistent with each other. aerospace power. Other, lower-level, more specialized space At the same time, AFM 2—25, Space Op- doctrine manuals will be required as our erations, should be published as soon as space capabilities mature, but these are not possible. As the highest level manual even in the planning stages. speaking strictly for space, it should derive The effort to publish an operational from and expand on the space portions of level doctrine manual for space was begun AFM 1-1; yet. to some extent, it must be at Headquarters, Air Force Space Com- able to stand alone as a self-contained ex- mand (AFSPACECOM) in 1985. An Air pression of Air Force space doctrine. Both Force space doctrine symposium was held

Effective acquisition and employment of space forces depends on balanced strategies and tactics developed from established doctrine and real world constraints Doctrine and constraints such as policy and cost influence both strategy and tactics, but doctrine itself is unconstrained. 32 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991 SPACE IN AF DOCTRINE: 1982-90

Figure 2. Until recently, Air Force space doctrine received modest mention in AFM 1-1 (1984) and AFM 1-6 (1982). AFM 1—6 was not a very useful document and has been rescinded. in November of that year with the primary three of which directly apply to Air Force purpose of defining the content and scope doctrine. Task 2 is to “revise space doc- of the new document. The effort culmi- trine publications to better describe the nated in the release of a for-comment draft Air Force role in space.” Task 3 is to “de- to major commands and separate operating velop proposals for addressing national agencies in the summer of 1987. space programs in Air Force doctrine and In May 1988 the project was put on in- education and training publications and definite hold to await the recommenda- programs.” This is an attempt to provide tions of the Air Force Blue Ribbon Panel the widest possible understanding and ap- on Space, a senior-level review group preciation for the roles national programs whose purpose was to evaluate the future play in Air Force operations. They should role of the Air Force in space. The panel be referenced in doctrine and other pub- ultimately identified 28 tasks that are nec- lications in accordance with the classifica- essary to implement its recommendations, tion of the individual publication. Task 11 OPERATIONAL-LEVEL DOCTRINE FOR SPACE 33

is to "integrate, consistent with treaty con- the basic doctrine manual. This will cause straints, the concept of space-based some blurring of the dividing line between weapons into the Air Force’s doctrine. As the Air Force categories of basic and technology developments permit deploy- operational-level doctrine, but the blurring ments, integrate space-based weapons into is justified in this case. Not only will it fill the Air Force’s force structure.”9 in any gaps where space coverage in AFM Since early 1989, the Air Staff and the 1-1 is incomplete, but it will create a Air University Center for Aerospace stand-alone document for space, complete Doctrine. Research, and Education at the operational level but containing (AUCADRE) have incorporated this guid- enough higher-level background material ance into their ongoing effort to update to ensure that important distinctions be- AFM 1-1. The AFM 2-25 trail was picked tween air and space environments and up in January 1990 by a more mature forces are highlighted. Figure 3 shows AFSPACECOM, and a new version of the where AFM 2-25 will fit into the Air Force manual is currently being drafted for doctrine hierarchy. wider Air Force review. The remainder of this article is devoted to describing the premises and philosophy that are going Premises into the new operational-level document. AFM 2-25 will contain several philo- sophical premises, some that apply to all AFM 2-25, Space Operations Air Force doctrine and others that are unique to space doctrine. The first premise As stated previously, space operations concerns the extent to which space opera- doctrine must be consistent with Air Force tions doctrine should attempt to anticipate basic doctrine. The first draft of AFM 2-25 future capabilities and modes of operation. is being put together on the assumption The initial draft of the manual takes a that a new basic doctrinal manual will in- strong position in favor of futuristic doc- deed be published first and that it will in- trine for three reasons. First, one of the clude basic doctrine for space. The basic stated purposes of operational-level doc- doctrinal manual—AFM 1-1—will present trine is to anticipate change, particularly fundamental doctrine, environmental doc- advances in technology.11 Second, space trine for both air and space, and high-level forces have little choice but to anticipate organizational doctrine for Air Force air the future since operational experience in and space forces, all in the context of inte- space, particularly in a conflict situation, grated aerospace power.10 This is fairly is extremely limited. And third, the rapid ambitious and will require a significant evolution of space technology, and thus departure from the current (1984) version the capabilities of space forces, requires of AFM 1-1. Progress is being made, how- that space doctrine be futuristic to some ever, and the latest draft of the new man- degree in order not to become immediately ual (August 1990) incorporates space fairly obsolete. well. The second premise concerns the sepa- Nevertheless, the next AFM 1-1 will not ration of space doctrine from air doctrine. be all it could be with regard to space. It is, As previously stated, the Air Force has after all, being written for the entire Air taken the position that it is integrated aero- Force, of which the space community is a space power that most effectively accom- minority, and it is not being written pri- plishes Air Force missions—not indepen- marily by ‘‘space people.” Thus, AFM dently operating air and space forces—and 2-25 must reach back and cover in detail AFM 2-25 will toe the party line on this those areas of environmental space doc- issue. The organizational argument—the trine and high-level organizational doc- fact that the Air Force employs both air trine for space not adequately covered in and space forces to perform Air Force- 34 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

assigned missions—combined with the rel- The four broad mission areas of space forces—force ative immaturity of space forces’ ca- enhancement, space support, space control, and force pabilities across the spectrum of conflict, application—are key to the draft of AFM 2-25. Space Operations. In a "satellite-hunter" mode. F-15s married outweighs (for the present) the argument with antisatellite weapons (above) could play an important that space ought to be treated within Air role in the area of "space control." Force doctrine as a separate operating environment, coequal with land, sea, and air. At the same time, there are fundamental and policy lead to the development of differences between the air and space en- strategy, and it is strategy—not doctrine— vironments and between the characteris- that should be constrained (fig. 1). Since tics and employment concepts of air and policy constraints are a fact of life, how- space forces. These differences must be ever, the operational commander must be clearly recognized and articulated. AFM aware of them, and it is appropriate that 2-25 will be written from the point of they be mentioned in an operational-level view and for the benefit of the operational doctrinal manual. AFM 2-25 will make space forces commander. reference to policy considerations in sev- A third premise, and one more general eral places. in nature, has to do with whether or not Finally, the new manual will explicitly doctrine ought to be constrained by policy. state that no entirely new missions have AFM 2-25 is written under the assump- been assigned to space forces. Rather, use tion that it should be unconstrained. Tying of the space medium enhances and doctrine to current policy is a good way to provides flexibility to the performance of make it obsolete in a hurry. Doctrine the basic Air Force missions and support- should articulate our views about the most ing tasks identified in AFM 1-1. This effective ways to employ military forces; it meets the requirement that operational should take somewhat of an “ideal world” doctrine be derived from basic doctrine view in this respect. Policy represents the and reinforces the Air Force’s point of “real world” and, more often than not, view that, though war may be conducted policy puts constraints on the employment in space in the future, the focus of conflict of military force. Taken together, doctrine will remain on earth. AFM 2-25 will de- % the “force enhancement" mission area of of space “forcemissionarea forces. the enhancement" comprise communications or navigation, surveillance,air groupings of basic Air Force missions and missions Force Air of groupings basic improve terrestrial-based or space-based operations such as such terrestrial-basedimproveoperations space-based or to designed Activities in 1985. bay of shuttle a space will describe them as or extensions larger space control, and force application—and spaceand control, force application—and forces—forcesupport,space enhancement, TheMorelos-B communications satellite the emerges from of space areas missions broad four the fine OPERATIONAL-LEVEL DOCTRINE OPERATIONAL-LEVEL

trine in-trine material previously, mentioned 2-25 provides 2-25 the overlapping basic doc- edition. and the August1990 draft of anew with both the of current edition 1-1 AFM is consistent format This tasks. supporting The introductory sectionof draftAFM Content FOR FOR SPACE 35 36 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

eluding definitions of aerospace power With the ability to cover the entire earth simultaneously, and space power, and some text on the na- space assets provide a unique global presence not possible ture and purpose of doctrine. Some of the with terrestrial forces. premises of the manual are reiterated in this section to provide context for what follows. The manual describes space Lupton’s excellent book, On S pace War- power as “that portion of aerospace power fare: A Space Power Doctrine.13 The that exploits the space environment forthe characteristics of space forces are divided enhancement of terrestrial forces and for into three sections—environmentally in- the projection of combat power to, in, and fluenced characteristics, logistically influ- from space to influence terrestrial con- enced characteristics, and politically/ flict.’’12 This section of the draft also dis- legally influenced characteristics. cusses the roles and responsibilities of the Environmentally influenced characteris- Air Force in the conduct of space opera- tics of space forces include the following: tions and briefly defines several distinc- • Global presence. Constellations of sat- tive terms necessary to clearly distinguish ellites can “cover” the entire earth and between the various military operating thus provide an instantaneous global pres- environments. ence not possible with terrestrial forces. Next is a section on the characteristics of • Position or quasi-position. The posi- space forces. The list of characteristics as- tion of unpowered spacecraft is predict- cribed to space forces has been one of the able over short periods, thus giving these lesser obstacles to agreement on space doc- vehicles more of the attributes of fixed for- trine for a long time. This section of AFM tifications whose position is known than 2-25 is adapted largely from Lt Col David those of maneuvering forces. OPERATIONAL-LEVEL DOCTRINE FOR SPACE 37

• Cluster areas. Because certain areas of Logistically influenced characteristics space and specific orbital paths are used are based on the fact that space is the most more heavily than others, space vehicles difficult, in terms of both energy and extend to be clustered in those areas and pense, of the military operating environ- orbits. ments to reach and that space forces are • Weapon effects. There are significant usually deployed only when their opera- differences in the effects and effectiveness tional advantages outweigh this inherent of nuclear, directed-energy, and kinetic difficulty. These characteristics include: energv weapons in the vacuum of space. • Vast operating arena. The space en- • Remote command and control. Space vironment presents a vast and potentially forces are rarely manned and must be em- infinite arena for military operations in ployed and maintained remotely from the which space forces are rarely in physical earth. proximity, at least by terrestrial standards. • Altitude/security tradeoff. Within the

SPACE IN AF DOCTRINE (PLANNED)

Figure 3. The next AFM 1-1 will belter incorporate basic doctrine for space. AFM 2-25 will be primarily operational-level doctrine but will overlap AFM 1—1 somewhat in order to make sure there are no gaps in space doctrine. 38 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991 constraints of mission coverage require- surveillance mission, supporting tasks such ments, space forces can gain security as weather and command and control, and against terrestrial-based threats by deploy- other enhancement capabilities such as coming to higher altitudes. munications and navigation. The politically/Iegally influenced Force application entails combat operations characteristics of space forces include: conducted from space for the purpose of affecting terrestrial conflicts. It encompasses • Legal overflight. Space vehicles can le- the Air Force basic missions of strategic gally overfly sovereign territory in a man- aerospace offense, strategic aerospace de- ner analogous to the right of free passage fense, counter air, air interdiction, and close on the high seas. air support.14 • Ve h i c u l a r s o v e r e i g n t y . T h e s o v - These four terms are not universally ac- ereignty of space vehicles resides with the cepted, but they have become well- vessel itself, not with its location. This im- ensconced in Air Force documentation plies that space forces cannot rely on pro- over the last few years and have been tected borders of sovereign areas for warn- “blessed” by inclusion in national, Depart- ing and defense. ment of Defense (DOD), and Air Force • Weapon restrictions. Weapons of mass space policy documents.15 destruction are barred by international Having set the background and de- treaty from deployment in space. This scribed the characteristics of space forces point is probably more a statement of pol- and the nature of space operations, the icy than a “characteristic” of space forces, AFM 2-25 draft turns to its primary but it has proven to be long lasting enough business—employment principles for to be included in AFM 2-25 for complete- space forces. First, the Air Force basic mis- ness (fig. 4). sions and supporting tasks defined in The next section, “Space Operations,’’ AFM 1-1 are individually examined in the provides definitions of the four space mis- context of the characteristics and ca- sion areas mentioned previously: pabilities of space forces and the four mission areas for space operations. Certain of Space control is analogous to the terrestrial these missions and tasks are not within the counter air mission and entails operations capabilities of current space forces, par- designed to ensure freedom of action in ticularly in the areas of space control and space for friendly forces while, when di- force application, and AFM 2-25 attempts rected, limiting or denying freedom of action to link the present to the future in these to an enemy. Space control includes the cases by providing that amount of em- broad aspects of protecting US and allied ployment doctrine that is already clear or space systems, protecting friendly terrestrial can be extrapolated from other space and areas and assets from enemy forces operating in or through space, and negation of enemy air experience. space systems. The manual continues with a section on the organization of Air Force space forces Space support entails operations required to and the responsibilities, respectively, of deploy and maintain military equipment the commander in chief. US Space Com- and personnel in space, including launch- ing, deploying, recovering, maintaining, and mand (USCINCSPACE), other combatant sustaining space vehicles. Space launch is commanders, COM AFSPACE (US- an extension of the airlift mission while CINCSPACE’s Air Force component com- other areas of space support encompass sup- mander), and subordinate commanders porting tasks such as combat support, com- and units. The majority of this section is bat airspace control, and search and rescue. spent on COMAFSPACE—the operational Force enhancement entails space-related op- hat worn by the commander of Air Force erations conducted to improve the effective- Space Command. COMAFSPACE is nor- ness of both terrestrial-based and space- mally delegated operational control of Air based forces. It encompasses the aerospace Force space forces at all levels of conflict OPERATIONAL-LEVEL DOCTRINE FOR SPACE 39 ATTRIBUTES OF SPACE FORCES

Environmentally Logistically Politically/Legally Influenced Influenced Influenced Characteristics Characteristics Characteristics

• Global Presence • Remote Command and • Legal Overflight Control • Position • Vehicular Sovereignty • Altitude/Security • Cluster Areas Tradeoff • Weapons Restrictions

• Weapons Effects

• Vast Operating Arena

Figure 4. The list of characteristics ascribed to space forces has been a moderate obstacle to agreement on space doctrine for some time.

and has responsibilities for the planning, tenets of our basic doctrine and, since allotting, coordinating, and tasking of AFM 2-25 declares itself to be uncon- space forces based on USCINCSPACE’s strained by policy issues, better articulates campaign plan. our ideas of the best way to employ mili- The next section is titled “Principles for tary space forces.16 Employing Space Power.” These princi- Next is a discussion of the space cam- ples are adapted from historical guidance paign, stressing the responsibilities of and for the employment of military forces and important considerations for the opera- are discussed in the context of space oper- tional space forces commander. This is ations. This is another example of where one of the more lengthy sections of the AFM 2-25 must overlap basic doctrine to document, and most of it is devoted to the compensate in an area where AFM 1-1 practicalities of conducting space control, does not adequately incorporate the space space support, force enhancement, and point of view. force application operations. It also covers Briefly, the principles of employment joint and combined space operations. are to gain and maintain control of space, A number of paragraphs on preparation centralize control and decentralize execu- of forces follow, broken down into section, attack the enemy’s centers of gravity, tions on organizing, training, equipping, seize the initiative, execute concentrated and sustaining space forces. It closely par- and persistent attacks, and maintain suffi- allels a similar chapter in the current edi- cient reserves. Each of these principles is tion of AFM 1-1 but expands on the space shown to be applicable to the employment forces commander’s concerns and view- of space forces and together they give the points. “Organization,” the longest of document a decidedly offensive flavor. these sections, deals with the operational The concept of offensive rather than action and support chains of command for Air by defensive, reactive space forces needs Force space forces. to be stressed. It is more in line with the The manual concludes with a section in- 40 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991 tended to reinforce the points that doctrine In the meantime, there will be plenty of cannot remain static, that the technology opportunity to comment on the document, and capabilities of space forces continue to both formally and informally. Information evolve rapidly, and that it is one of the re- copies have been forwarded to several sponsibilities of the operational space members of the space and doctrine com- forces commander to actively contribute to munities who are known to be interested. the currency of space doctrine. This sec- Many of the most valuable comments are tion also stresses the concept of integrated expected to come back through these infor- aerospace power by stating that mal channels, and every attempt will be made to work them in, for there will cer- air and space systems have complementary rather than redundant capabilities and are tainly be room for improvement in the first moving toward rather than away from draft of this manual. greater coordination and integration as space It is important to remember, however, forces’ capabilities evolve across the full that it will be impossible to achieve per- spectrum of military conflict. Space power fect agreement, and there is considerable contributes an ever greater amount to the argument for accepting imperfection in ability of integrated aerospace power to order to get something published to fill the fulfill all Air Force basic missions and sup- current doctrinal void. There are several porting tasks.17 widely separated schools of thought on space doctrine, particularly in the area of separation of space doctrine from air doc- Conclusion trine. Proponents of these schools are At this writing, the first draft of AFM urged to accept the Air Force doctrinal 2-25 has been approved by scheme proposed by the new AFR 1-2 for AFSPACECOM and forwarded to the Air the reality that it is, to recognize that any Staff, where it will be reviewed and sent official space doctrine publication accom- out to the Air Force at large for further re- plished in the next few years must fit into view and comment. This cycle will proba- this scheme, and to support the compro- bly have to be repeated at least once, mak- mises that must be made in order to come ing it unlikely that the manual will be to an agreement. □ published before late 1991.

Notes 1. Paul B. Stares. The Militarization of Space: US Policy, 9. Implementation Plan for Space (Washington, D.C.: De- 1945-1984 (Ithaca. N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), 22. partment of the Air Force. 3 February 1989). 2. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-2, United States Air Force 10. Drew and Snow, 91-97. Basic Doctrine, 1 December 1959. 11. AFM 1-1, 5 January 1984. vi; and AFR 1-2, 3. 3. AFM 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United 12. AFM 2-25, "Air Force Operational Doctrine: Space Op- States Air Force. 5 lanuary 1984. erations," (draft), 6 June 1990, 4. 4. AFM 1-6, Military Space Doctrine, 15 October 1982. 13. Lt Col David E. Lupton. On Space Warfare: A Space 5. Maj Robert H. Chisholm, On Space Warfare: Military Power Doctrine (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press, Strategy for Space Operations (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Uni- June 1988), 19-28. versity Press. )une 1984), 15-17. 14. AFM 2-25, 9. 6. Air Force Regulation (AFR) 1-2. Air Force Basic Doc 15. National Space Policy (Washington, D.C.: The White trine: Assignment of Responsibilities for Development of House, 2 November 1989): Department of Defense Space Pol Aerospace Doctrine, 10 September 1990, 7. icy (Washington. D.C.: Department of Defense, 10 March 7. AFM 1—1, "Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United 1987|: Air Force Space Policy (Washington. D.C.: Department States Air Force," (draft). August 1990. of the Air Force, 2 December 1988). 8. Lt Col Dennis M. Drew and Dr Donald M. Snow. Intro- 16. Lt Col Alan J. Parrington. "US Space Doctrine: Time duction to Strategy. 3d ed. (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Com- for a Change?" Airpower fournal, Fall 1989. 58-59. mand and Staff College, 1983), 89-90. 17. AFM 2-25. 25. Basis of Issue

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41 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT AND AIRFIELD RECOVERY

Capt Pet er C. Bahm, USAF Capt Ken n et h W. Polasek, USAF

ate from their bases, then the advantages of The sky is about to become another battlefield no air power will be lost. Our aircraft no less important than the battlefields on land and longer have the ability to operate from the sea. ... In order to conquer the air, it is necessary rough pastures, dirt fields, or even simple, to deprive the enemy of all means of flying, by striking at him in the air, at his bases of operation, paved airfields that were typical of earlier or at his production centers. We had better get ac conflicts. Modern aircraft require long, customed to this idea, and prepare ourselves. hard, smooth runways that are free of dirt —Giulio Douhet and debris. Unfortunately, today’s air bases are more vulnerable than the British aerodromes during the Battle of Britain. In ROM World War I to Operation Des- the event of war, the enemy will undoubt- ert Storm, air power has been a deci- edly attack US air bases overseas and ex- sive factor—if not the decisive tensively damage their runways and taxi- factor—in conventional conflicts be- ways. This article examines the Ftween mechanized adversaries. Control ofimportance of airfield operating surfaces to the air has influenced operations in the the effective, sustained projection of US air, on land, and at sea. To control the air, air power in future conflicts by reviewing one must have airfields from which to the lessons of history, assessing existing launch aircraft. During the Battle of Brit- threats to airfields, explaining how air ain. Winston Churchill recognized the base operability (ABO) is designed to “value of maintaining this fighting vantage counter those threats, determining the re- ground |i.e., airfields]” by keeping them lationship between the recovery ca- operational.1 If aircraft are unable to oper- pabilities of ABO and the needs of modern TACTICAL AIRCRAFT AND AIRFIELD RECOVERY 43

aircraft, and noting Soviet views on operat this point in the evolution of air power, ating from damaged/repaired surfaces. some tactical aircraft (those needing airfields close to the front line) still operated quite well from unsophisticated surfaces— oftentimes only grass or dirt fields. If a Historical proposed airfield were to handle heavier Importance of Airfields aircraft or if soil at the construction site were poor, engineers used pierced steel Prior to World War II, airfield con- planks (PSP) to build the landing surfaces. struction amounted to little more than Repairing damaged PSP surfaces was a finding an open field or pasture suitable as simple matter (by today’s standards), and a platform for takeoffs and landings. aircraft could quickly resume their Aircraft—especially tactical aircraft— seldom required smooth surfaces made of operations. concrete or asphalt. In the First World War, airfields rarely suffered damage; Korea when they did, it was usually caused by the failed landing attempts of friendly air- By 1950 the USAF was “exploit[ing) jet craft. “In any event, damage to these first engine technology to achieve increased airfields was minor and could be repaired (tactical) airborne performance in its in a very short time with a few men with fighters”—specifically, the F-80 Shooting picks and shovels.”2 Thus, one could con- Star.4 In terms of its performance in aerial struct airfields that exceeded the require- combat, the F-80 was superior to World ments of aircraft and that were relatively War II propeller aircraft like the P-47 and simple to repair. P-51. When North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950, however, the F-80’s aerial superiority was compromised by its World War II need for longer, wider runways that were In World War II, the distances within and durable enough to handle the weight of the between theaters required the construction heavy jet.5 of many airfields. This was clearly the case When the only airfields in Korea capable in the Pacific, where engineers carved air- of supporting F-80s were lost to the ad- strips out of island jungles so that our air- vancing North Koreans, the Air Force was craft could operate within striking dis- forced to fly the jets from bases in Japan. tance of the enemy. Moreover, the front Unsurprisingly, operating from such a dis- lines of World War II were not static, as tance reduced the aircraft’s responsive- they were in the First World War. Rather, ness, persistence, and payload, thereby the forward movement of front lines re- greatly diminishing their combat effective- quired the continual construction of more ness. Even in Japan, only four airfields had airfields and the repair of captured fields “runways which met the operational re- to keep up with the war. Airfield con- quirements of combat-loaded jet fighters.’’6 struction became a neverending task and Confronted with these realities and the was considered “one of the world’s most need to base aircraft closer to the fighting, dangerous occupations . . . in the Pacific Far East Air Forces (FEAF) leaders decided campaigns of 1942-1943’’ due to the to convert six F-80 squadrons to F-51 workers’ exposure to the enemy.3 squadrons only two weeks after the fight- In this war, airfields and associated fa- ing began. The F-51 (formerly P-51) Mus- cilities became primary targets. However, tangs had to be taken out of storage or re-

.*4 * 'UV#'

• i I 44 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991 called from the Air National Guard. Unlike Vietnam the F-80, this relatively light World War II- Between the Korean War and the Vietnam era aircraft “could operate from short, War, the Air Force again neglected the crit- rough surfaces like the 3,800-foot long clay ical role of runways and air bases. “Thus, and gravel runway at Taegu [Korea]” and in continuing to develop fighter aircraft would therefore be closer to the fighting maximized for improved airborne perfor- and be able to provide more sorties with mance, the Air Force also continued to greater effectiveness.7 Thus, FEAF ad- significantly increase aircraft runway vanced fighters were virtually ineffective requirements.”9 during a crucial phase of the war because Although Vietcong and North Viet- they depended on longer, harder runways. namese attacks targeted vulnerable aircraft If the United Nations and the United and facilities at US air bases rather than States had faced an enemy with the ca- runways and pavements, the latter suf- pability to attack airfields from the air, fered collateral damage from mortar and their few operational jet bases could have been critically damaged. Backfilling or laying PSP may not have been enough to re- Commanders quickly realized that sophisticated aircraft of pair runway craters. For the first time in the day. such as these F-80 Shooting Star jets in South Korea its history, the Air Force learned (but soon in 1951. required harder and cleaner runway surfaces than forgot) that increased airborne perfor- did the premier fighters of World War II. The primitive mance alone will not guarantee the combat condition of runways like the one pictured invited foreign effectiveness of an aircraft.8 object damage. TACTICAL AIRCRAFT AND AIRFIELD RECOVERY 45

rocket fire. “The resultant spalls or small weapons may be antirunway munitions or craters were easily repaired with epoxy fuel-air explosives. The antirunway muni- resins and high early strength concrete tions are specifically designed to cause components with minimal impact on fly- maximum destruction to airfield pave- ing operation[s]. 10 We should note, how- ments. Our bases might also be hit by ever, that the damage was caused by delayed-detonation air-scatterable mines, ground-attack weapons, which did not which will make airfield recovery haz- have the same effect that aerial attacks ardous and time-consuming. would have on operating surfaces. One Other threats to our aircraft and air bases consequence of these incidents was that include Soviet Spetsnaz forces, airborne the Air Force hardened its air base facili- troops, helicopter assaults, and saboteurs. ties and sheltered its aircraft, not only in The Spetsnaz threat is especially serious. Vietnam, but also in many other opera- The objectives of these special forces tional theaters. include the capture of key airfields and ports to prevent reinforcement or redeployment, particularly by the United States; the destruc- Current Threats tion or neutralization of airfield and port to Airfields facilities not required intact by the USSR.1'1 In 1921 Giulio Douhet said that “it is Furthermore, more effective to destroy the enemy’s in the wake of the Intermediate-range Nu- aerial power by destroying his nest and clear Forces Treaty (INF) signed in Decem- eggs on the ground than to hunt his flying ber 1987, allied air assets and air bases birds in the air.”11 That observation has would likely become a much higher priority lost none of its perceptiveness. Until the target for Spetsnaz forces after ground-based late 1960s, US air bases in overseas the- (nuclear] assets have been dismantled.15 aters were considered sanctuaries, and In light of recent events in Eastern Europe, general opinion held that they were invul- the Spetsnaz threat has probably dimin- nerable or immune to conventional and ished, but we must assume that our air chemical attack. However, following Is- bases will always remain high-priority tar- rael’s extremely effective air base attacks gets for special forces. Furthermore, tech- in the Six-Day War of 1967, the desir- nological advances by potential enemies ability of providing hardened shelters for constantly intensify the severity of all aircraft became more apparent. By 1980 threats. Soviet offensive capabilities had improved In the past two decades, many critical in both accuracy and range to the extent facilities at US air bases overseas have that our bases were increasingly consid- been hardened so that they are more likely ered to be at serious risk.12 Even in today’s to survive an attack. They include aircraft post-cold war atmosphere, the possibility shelters, operations facilities, command of an attack on one of our air base com- posts, and communication and control sys- plexes overseas by an enemy equipped tems. Despite these precautions, Soviet with modern weapons is not unrealistic. (and other) planners are well aware of two Considering the ever-increasing pace with key facts: (1) most high-performance US which weapons of greater lethality and ac- aircraft require long, smooth, clean, paved curacy are being created, “even third operating surfaces, and (2) runways and world countries are likely to possess sig- taxiways are easier to successfully attack nificant air base attack capabilities.’’13 than aircraft in shelters. Thus, the enemy’s Such attacks will involve long-range immediate goal is not necessarily to de- fighter-bombers with “smart" and special- stroy our aircraft but to prevent them from purpose weapons, or possibly surface-to- flying. As Maj Gen George E. (“Jud”) surface missiles. Some of the specialized Ellis—former director of Engineering and 46 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

Services, Headquarters USAF—observed. Air Force hoses came under attack throughout the Vietnam “Aircraft armed to the gills sitting on the War. Most damage was inflicted by infiltrators armed with mortars or rockets. The Air Force responded, in part, by ramp or in shelters don’t win battles.”16 constructing hardened aircraft shelters to minimize the damage caused by these strikes. Above, an F-4 exits the runway at Da Nang Air Base, South Vietnam, while the remnants of another Phantom blaze in the distance (this Air Base Operability particular loss was not caused by the enemy). These threats suggest that it will be nec- magnitude of the threats that our air bases essary to perform emergency airfield oper- face, however, no one can dispute the im- ations during a conflict with a capable portance of the ABO mission.18 enemy. In the early 1980s, therefore, the ABO seeks to (1) reduce the magnitude Air Force developed the concept of air of an enemy attack, (2) minimize the im- base operability in response to the poten- pact of the attack on sortie generation, and tial danger to its overseas bases.17 Admit- (3) recover from the attack in minimum tedly, the mundane tools of ABO (e.g., ar- time. In short, ABO’s critical concerns are mored bulldozers, runway-repair matting, as follows: etc.) do not have the appeal of the USAF’s high-tech aircraft and munitions—the so- • d e f e n s e called sexy weapons systems. No doubt, • s u r v i v a l that is one of the reasons that ABO does • r e c o v e r y not occupy first place on the Air Force’s • g e n e r a t i o n list of priorities. Considering the sheer • s u p p o r t . 19 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT AND AIRFIELD RECOVERY 47

The Air Force civil engineering (CE) CE's RRR capabilities depend upon and community, charged with providing the are limited by a number of factors: “necessarv assets and skilled personnel to • expertise and training levels of repair prepare and sustain global installations as stationary platforms for the projection of teams, aerospace power in peace and war,”-0 • use or threat of chemical weapons, plays an important role in ABO. Prin- • m a n p o w e r le v e l s , cipally, CE must “perform emergency re- • availability and survivability of heavy pair of war damage to air bases.”21 equipment, To these ends, CE and the support com- • unexploded ordnance, munity have developed plans and proce- • availability of repair materials, dures to deal with base recovery after at- • possibility of attack during repair op- tack. Specifically, after assessing airfield erations (including harassment or damage, CE undertakes rapid runway re- sniper fire by special forces or pair (RRR) to provide a minimum operat- irregulars], ing strip (MOS) and a sufficient number of • type of aircraft using the airfield, taxiways and other surfaces for aircraft op- • w e a t h e r , an d erations. A "generic” MOS is 50 feet wide • t i m e of da y . and 5,000 feet long, with a roughness that is commensurate with the requirements of Training for RRR is only a rough approx- the aircraft using the surface.22 imation of actually performing it in combat. As General Ellis noted, “We have yet to be tested in a war-fighting environment Runways such as the one at Ramstein Air Base, Germany (below), appear vulnerable to incoming enemy missiles or where our basing support structure is se- fighter-bombers. The Air Force developed the concept of air riously damaged and we have to generate base operability to counter the threat that its bases in sorties while continuously under attack.”23 operational theaters would probably face in time of conflict. RRR is an exhausting task for trained personnel, even under favorable conditions. Certainly, the stress resulting from the dangers of war will multiply the difficulties of RRR, as indicated during the Salty Demo exercise at Spangdahlem Air Base, West Germany, in 1985. The pros- pect of doing RRR under chemical attack is especially sobering. Experience has shown that only personnel in excellent physical condition were able to complete RRR exercises while wearing chemical warfare gear in moderate temperatures. Even they would not have been able to finish without the help of personnel not wearing chemical gear.24

Air Force civil engineering learns practice to hone their runway-repair skills. To simulate war damage, engineers blow a hole in a runway (left); then they survey the site and fill it as part of the recovery effort (below).

48 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT AND AIRFIELD RECOVERY 49

certain requirements on MOS length and Air Base Operability the quality of repairs. and Aircraft Requirements Civil Engineering’s runway repair re- Experience quirements are driven by the needs of the Although European tactical-fighter bases aircraft that will be using the airfield. are generally considered the best-equipped Thus, numerous factors may become lia- sites for carrying out wartime operations, bilities during future conflicts. First, mod- our pilots rarely—if ever—practice landing ern US pilots and aircraft have never had on these bases’ taxiways, alternate landing to operate from heavily damaged airfields. surfaces, or marked MOSs because of Second, the Air Force is moving toward safety considerations.25 One wonders how aircraft commonality—that is, using fewer well they would do in an actual wartime types of aircraft. Third, the design of US environment. Indeed, these pilots might aircraft, including the capabilities and lim- very well be unaware that expedient war- itations of landing gear and engines, places time repairs may provide them with relatively short, bumpy, dirty operating surfaces that are just 50 feet wide. Laying runway -repair mailing of folded fiberglass is the Pilots have a great deal of influence with final step in this particular exercise (below). Although rapid regard to the design of aircraft, as well runway repair is not the most glamourous of endeavors, it is they should. After all, they have to fly absolutely vital to air base operability. them. However, these same pilots are 50 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

likely to lack experience operating from al- and strength) the aircraft can safely oper- ternate or repaired airfield surfaces. There- ate on. Structural integrity is also impor- fore, it is quite possible that the design of tant. Theoretically, an aircraft moving over future aircraft may not take into considera- the irregular surface of a repaired runway tion the wartime air base environment could reach its natural resonance fre- from which aircraft will have to operate. quency and suffer serious structural damage. Controlling the aircraft can be a problem Commonality when a pilot tries to land on a short, nar- In the 1950s and 1960s, the USAF had row MOS. The speed of the aircraft during many types of “century series” fighters. Of final approach (generally in excess of 140 these, only the F-4 (first designated the knots) and crosswinds are critical factors F-110) and the F -lll remain in our front- affecting aircraft control, especially if the line fighter inventory. The USAF now de- pilot is trying to land on a MOS that is not pends principally on two fighter types— parallel with the existing runway and the F-15 and the F-16 (along with the A-10 markings (as may be the case during a con- and the Air National Guard A-7 to conduct tingency situation). Speed and crosswinds close air support). Using fewer types of air- also become critical if the MOS’s threshold craft was both an economic and logistical is displaced significantly (several thou- decision. Buying more of one or two types sand feet) from the runway’s threshold. of aircraft is more cost-effective than buy- Even for “normal” landings, the difficulty ing fewer numbers of a variety of aircraft of maintaining control is evident in the and reduces logistical problems associated fact that the number of accidents involving with the inventory of spare parts. land-based aircraft increases in proportion Indeed, the Air Force may soon restrict to the square of the approach speed.28 itself to just one type of fighter—the ad- A related controllability factor is the vanced tactical fighter (ATF). The disad- effect of flaring. Because of the low sink vantage to such a decision is that any oper- rates that current Air Force tactical aircraft ating vulnerabilities and limitations of the are capable of, the pilot must flare the air- ATF would affect a large portion of the Air craft before touchdown. Flaring involves Force’s inventory. Since the ATF.is due to decreasing the aircraft’s rate of descent just become operational in the late 1990s and before it touches down. Flaring, as well as will reach maximum production rate only the previously mentioned landing-related in the next century, the Air Force ,will factors, causes both lateral and longitudi- have to live with any airfield operating nal dispersion of the touchdown point, limitations of the ATF for a long time.26 both of which can cause significant problems—especially when aircraft land on a MOS. Longitudinal dispersion re- Design duces the usable length of a MOS (already Several factors come into play during short), just as lateral dispersion reduces landing and takeoff that place require- the usable width of the 50-foot-wide oper- ments on the condition and size of airfield ating surface.29 surfaces. These include an aircraft’s land- Finally, critical systems such as engines ing gear and structural integrity, as well as affect the operating-surface requirements its controllability and engines; these fac- for takeoff and landing. On the one hand, tors must receive consideration during air- aircraft engines providing short takeoff craft design.27 and vertical landing (STOVL) capabilities The capability of landing gear is of crit- or engines equipped with thrust reversers ical importance because it determines the can shorten the length of airfield surface aircraft’s allowable sink rate (vertical de- that is required to take off or land safely. scent) and the types of surfaces (roughness On the other hand, engines may be TACTICAL AIRCRAFT AND AIRFIELD RECOVERY 51

damaged by the ingestion of debris or formance. For example, thrust reversers, other loose matter. This leads to foreign STOVL capability, better landing gear, and object damage (FOD)—a likely occurrence improvements to structural integrity can in the extremely dirty environment of a increase the aircraft’s weight—the dread of damaged airfield. tactical-aircraft designers. (The increase in Thus, aircraft requirements directly af- weight due to improved landing gear may fect the time and effort CE must expend to not be as great as previously thought.) Ex- provide an adequate MOS for aircraft to tra weight can decrease an aircraft’s operate from: payload, range, and maneuverability, thereby diminishing its performance.34 [The] extreme sensitivities to runway surface roughness of virtually all current tactical aircraft implicitly demand very high-quality, smooth, level repair of runway damage, which greatly extends the time required to restore runway operations after attack.30 That is, the higher the quality of surface repair required by aircraft, the longer the time needed to make the repair. However, by decreasing aircraft requirements (e.g., by using a more durable landing gear or by shortening the required MOS length), CE could reduce its repair time and aircraft could launch sooner. Aircraft requirements can also affect enemy operations. For example, “the number of [enemy] sorties required to close a runway increases exponentially with a lin- ear decrease in required runway length.”31 An enemy has to cut an 8,000- to 10,000- foot runway only once or twice to deny an undamaged MOS (assuming MOS criteria dictated by current aircraft) but would need four to six successful sorties if our aircraft required only a 1,500- to 2,000-foot MOS.32 Finally, as the runway-length requirements of tactical aircraft decrease, the number of available runways within a given theater that are usable by those aircraft is sure to increase.33 One must note that some people have the perception that improving aircraft systems to facilitate operations from repaired airfields would diminish an aircraft’s per-

The already labor-intensive nature of rapid runway repair is heightened in a chemical-warfare environment, here simulated in the 1985 Salty Demo exercise at Spangdahlem Air Base, West Germany. The chemical gear worn hy participants proved stiping. Only engineers in the best physical condition could avoid exhaustion and complete the exercise. 52 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

Such improvements also increase man- instance, Marshal of Aviation Aleksandr ufacturing costs. Perhaps for these reasons, Yefimov, commander of the Soviet air demands for such changes have not been force, declared that “much attention is forthcoming, despite the fact that much of being given to developing short take-off the technology exists to implement them. and vertical landing aircraft capable of operating from damaged airfields.” He further emphasized that aircraft operations Soviet Perspective should not be affected by damaged run- By way of comparison, the Soviets are ways.38 Thus, because the Su-27 and the incorporating rough-field capability and MiG-29 will be found in the air arsenals of protection from foreign object damage into many non-Soviet nations for years to their latest aircraft designs, such as the come, the threat from these aircraft prom- Su-27 Flanker and the MiG-29 Fulcrum. In ises to become even more formidable. an article on the Flanker, fane’s Defence Weekly reports that Conclusion the landing gear is remarkably sturdy, designed for high-rate-of-descent touchdowns Recent events show us that we must be on poor runways. The nosewheel leg is rein- prepared for all contingencies and that the forced by a large trailing link and the main reduction in one type of threat does not legs are fitted with distinctive locks, which, mean that the other threats go away. Our on extension, mate with fittings at the lower aircraft need to operate on the ground (air outside corners of the engine nacelles. . . . base operability) as well as in the air Like the MiG-29 “Fulcrum,” the Su-27 is fitted with a system to keep foreign objects out (aerial performance). Because the number of low-slung inlets and the suction-relief of air bases and usable airfields available louvres, which are underneath the inlets. to the Air Force worldwide is diminishing, These are metal screens, hinged to the bot- we can no longer simply assume that our tom of the duct and rising into an oblique aircraft can use other bases if their home position when the gear is down.35 bases are damaged. Not only must we be prepared to use a limited number of air- Obviously, the Soviets have designed fields and runways that are less than ideal, the Flanker and Fulcrum to operate in a but also we must be prepared to operate foreign-object-infested, roughTield en- from these surfaces after they have been vironment. Furthermore, this ability helps damaged. In order to utilize what is avail- operations on repaired surfaces: “It is a able to us, we may have to change the ca- happy coincidence that if you can operate pabilities, requirements, and designs of from fields that have been quickly built, our aircraft—perhaps even penalize aerial those aircraft can also operate from fields performance for the sake of increased air- that have been quickly repaired.”36 field operability. (At the same time, we The Soviets believe that designing their should keep in mind that not all such aircraft to operate from forward locations changes need necessarily reduce aerial will work to their advantage: performance. The technology exists, but They believe [USj Air Force aircraft are “too does the requirement?) History has shown heavy and sluggish” to be based near the us that improved aerial performance does front—a factor that will cause the Air Force’s not always lead to a proportional improve- reaction time to be too slow to “meet the ment in air power. After all, the mission of norms.”37 the Air Force is the projection of air They are aware of the consequences of at- power—not aerial performance. Paying tacks on their bases during any future war more attention to the practical necessities and evidently intend to make aspects of of operating our aircraft from damaged aircraft design like those mentioned above airfields could help us fulfill that the focus of long-term development. For mission. TACTICAL AIRCRAFT AND AIRFIELD RECOVERY 53

Notes 1. Quoted in Col Darrell G. Bittle. "A ir Base Sur- 18. Boyles and Mittelman, 30-31. vivability." Engineering 6- Ser\’ices Quarterly, Spring 1982. 19. "ABO/Base Recovery," class handout distributed in 13. ENG 485, Air Base Combat Engineering. Air Force Institute of 2. Col Roger C. Strom and Col John M. Morgan. "The Im- Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB. Ohio. July 1988, DD 1-2: pact of Airbase Damage Repair Missions on Airbase Sur- briefing on air base operability: and Bittle. 8. vivability in the Federal Republic of Germany.” Research Re- 20. Department of the Air Force. Engineering and Services port no NDU-ICAF-86-N4 (Washington, D C.: National War and Mobilization Plan, vol. 1. annex S (Headquarters Defense University. February' 1986), 2—3 through 2-5. AFESC/DEOP. July 1988). S-5. 3. Col Edward M. Smith. "Civil Engineering Combat Sup- 21. Ibid. port: Are We Ready? Have We Learned?" Air Force Journal of 22. MOS characteristics depend on local factors such as air Logistics 11 (Spring 1987): 11. density, surface conditions (e.g., dry, wet. icy), and type of 4. Lt Col Price T. Bingham. "Air Bases and Runways: Doc- aircraft operating from the MOS. Thus, the MOS may be trinal Orphans of Operational Art" (Paper presented to Tri- greater than or less than 5,000 feet long. angle Universities Security Seminar Symposium on Chang- 23. Ellis, 7. ing Technologies and New Weapons Systems in Recent 24. Maj John A. Centrone, "Triple R in a Chemical En- History. 2-3 February 1990], 12. vironment," Engineering Sr Services Quarterly. Spring 1982. 5. Lt Col Floyd A. Ashdown. “A History of the Warfighting 20-21; Capt Kenneth W. Polasek. director, Combat Engineer- Capability of Air Force Civil Engineering." Research Report ing Course. Air Force Institute of Technology. Wright- no. AU-AWC-84-011 (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air War College. Patterson AFB. Ohio, interview with Capt Peter C. Bahm. May 1984). 15. 2 July 1990; and James R. Van Orman and Clarence E. 6. Robert F. Futrell. The United States Air Force in Korea, Langford, "Can We Survive and Win?" Engineering & S e r - 1950-1953 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History. vices Quarterly, Spring 1982, 14—18. 1983). 59. 25. Lt Col James R Holt, director. USAF Graduate 7. Bingham. 14. Engineering Management Program, Air Force Institute of 8. For additional information on operations in the Korean Technology. Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, interview with War. see Ashdown, 15: Bingham. 12-14: idem. Operational Capt Peter C. Bahm, 2 January 1990. In 1988 and 1989, Colo- Art and Aircraft Runway Requirements. Report no. AU-AR1- nel Holt visited Bitburg AB. West Germany, to help prepare CP-89-4 (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press, December for the proposed Constant Demo air base operability exercise, 1989), 4; Futrell, 68; Maj Roger F. Kropf, “The US Air Force which has since been canceled. During his visit he discussed in Korea: Problems Which Hindered the Effectiveness of Air- these issues with base personnel, including members of the power." Report no. 89-1430 (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air Com- operations community. mand and Staff College. April 1989), 35-38. 26. Lee Ewing. “ Secrecy Drawn Back from ATF Pro- 9. Bingham. "Air Bases and Runways." 14. totypes," Air Force Times 50 (28 May 1990): 18. 10. Ashdown. 77. 27. Capt Peter C. Bahm. “The Relationship of Civil 11. Quoted in Bittle. 9. Engineering's Emergency Airfield Repair Operations and 12. Lt Col Price T. Bingham, "Air Base Survivability and Tactical Aircraft Design and Development" (Master's thesis. V STOL Aircraft: A Gap in Air Force Doctrine?” Air Univer- Air Force Institute of Technology, September 1990). sity Review 37 (January-February 1986): 52-53; Maj Stephen 28. Ray Whitford. Design for Air Combat (Surrey. United C Hall. "Air Base Survivability in Europe," Air University Kingdom: Jane's Information Group Limited, 1989). 67. Review 33 (September-October 1982): 38: and Lon Nordeen. 29. Lt Col Price T. Bingham, chief, Airpower Doctrine Di- "Air Base Survivability—A Threat to NATO Airpower." Na- vision, Airpower Research Institute. Maxwell AFB. Ala., tele- tional Defense 73 (September 1988): 31-32. phone interview with Capt Peter C. Bahm, 24 May 1990. For 13. Lt Col Price T. Bingham. "Doctrinal Implications: The other detailed statistics, see Capt Stephan J. Pitotti and 2d Lt Air Base of the Future" (Point paper presented to Air Force James J. Gudaitis, "Minimum Operating Strip (MOS) Landing Doctrine Conference, 19 April 1990), 2. Study." Technical Report no. AD-TR-85-88 (Eglin AFB, Fla.: 14. Capt Erin E. Campbell, "The Soviet Spetsnaz Threat to 3246th Test Wing. Air Force Systems Command. December NATO." Airpower /ournaJ 2. no. 2 (Summer 1988): 64. 1985). One may conclude that the results of this study were 15. Ibid. less than positive. 16. "Airman’s Interview with Maj. Gen. Ellis." Airman 32 30. Lt Col John S. Choate. "Implications of Runway Sur- (June 1988): 8. vivability upon Future Air Force TACAIR Doctrine and Force 17. At first, air base operability was known as air base sur- Structure," Research Report no. AU-AWC-84-047 (Maxwell vivability |ABS|. The term was changed because the air base AFB, Ala.: Air War College, May 1984), 7. needs to remain operational, not just survive. For additional 31. David R. Selegan. STOL Fighter Technology Program. information about ABO. see briefing. Directorate of Engineer- American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Papers, ing and Services. Headquarters USAF/LEEX, subject: Air no. 83-GT-243 (New York: ASME. 1983), 2. Base Operability. September 1987; Lt Col Price T. Bingham, 32. Ibid. "Air Base Survivability: An Essential Element of Theater Air 33. Bingham interview. Power." Air Force Journal of Logistics 11 (Winter 1987): 2. Lt 34. Bahm. 79-111. Col )oe Boyles and Capt Greg K. Mittelman. "Paradox of the 35. "Soviets Brief the USA on ’Flanker."' Jane's Defence Headless Horseman," Airpower Journal 3, no. 1 (Spring Weekly 11 (24 June 1989): 1293; see also John W. R. Taylor. 1989): 30; Maj Gen George E. Ellis. "In Search of a Better "Gallery of Soviet Aerospace Weapons." Air Force Magazine Eagle’s Nest,” Air Force Journal of Logistics 10 (Summer 73 (March 1990): 74. 1986): 7-10; Dana Lombardy and Robert Paterson. "Forward 36. Bingham interview. Airbases." NATO’s Sixteen Nations 32 (April 1987): 83-86; 37. Bingham, "Air Bases and Runways.” 18. Tidal W. McCoy. "Task One: Air Base Operability." Armed 38. "A 'New Generation of Combat Aircraft' Expected.” Forces Journal International. September 1987. 54; and Nor- Jane's Defence Weekly 9 (13 February 1988): 279. deen. 32. AND POWER VSTOL PROJECTION A LEAP IN FAITHI

M aj Jeffrey C. Prater, USAF

I have sometimes reflected that it was an advantage to the Royal Air Force that we had no long Service tradition behind us, no set ways of tackling our job. Improvisation, which saved us in the Middle East, came the more easily to us, I think, than to our contemporaries in the Army and the Royal Navy. —Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder

54 VSTOL AND POWER PROfECTION 55

UCCESS in war is often measured event of hostilities in Europe or elsewhere. by what warriors and societies do This concept of rapid, worldwide force between wars. We Americans have projection for the Air Force is captured in traditionally used the interwar the appellation Global Reach—Global yearsS to disproportionately cut our mili- Power. Senior Air Force leaders envision tary forces. This tendency stems largely conventional air power as the essential from a sense of postconflict euphoria and force for this power projection.2 Ideally, partly from an earnest desire to curb fed- conventional air power should be of the eral spending. Today, we find ourselves in appropriate size and mix to easily inte- much the same situation following the “of- grate into a joint force structure. Many ficial demise" of the cold war. Regardless people in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill of one’s confidence in the longevity of the feel it is in the Air Force’s interest to field current political thaw, tensions between smaller organizations that are agile, flex- the superpowers have significantly ible, responsive to short-notice tasking, lessened. As a matter of fact, the recent and capable of operations across the entire dramatic changes in Europe afford us a spectrum of conflict.3 According to one rare opportunity. For the first time in Air Force study, however, the prospects many years, we can structure our military for leaner, more flexible forces are remote forces based upon our doctrine, instead of without “fundamental restructuring of se- rushing headlong into programs designed lected Air Force units to make us more to counter the most urgent Soviet threat. nimble.”4 While this seems a tall order, To that end, this article revisits the con- the goals sought are achievable. One solu- cept of using vertical and/or short takeoff tion presents itself through a redefinition and landing (VSTOL) aircraft for Air Force of the role and makeup of our present tac- tactical air operations. Why does VSTOL tical fighter wing (TFWJ. Let us look at merit yet another look? Simply because it how a new organization could meet these still offers long-term economic and mili- expectations. tary solutions to dwindling force-structure capabilities. To accept these solutions, one is asked to embrace only new organizational and basing schemes, not “ new A New Organization science.”1 An important characteristic of our notional organization is its composition. Compared to existing tactical fighter wings The Problem composed of approximately 72 aircraft of the same mission design and series (MDS) While Congress charts a well-worn performing a single mission, our new orga- course for reductions, the Joint Chiefs of nization would be able to perform several Staff are struggling to adjust American mil- missions using different MDS aircraft. The itary forces to meet future challenges. The idea of “composite” air units is not a new chiefs are faced with the problem of max- one. Tactical Air Command created a com- imizing a smaller force structure to meet posite air strike force (CASF) in the 1950s enduring national security objectives. that included ground-attack and counterair Make no mistake—this is not a level-of- fighters, among others. The CASF was de- effort reduction: it is an asset reduction. In signed to respond to contingencies world- Europe, for example, the Army and Air wide on short notice; a crisis in the Middle Force will have to abandon a robust East prompted one such deployment to forward-based military presence for an as- Lebanon in the late fifties.5 In July 1989 yet-undetermined troop ceiling. The hope the Air Staff’s deputy director for war- is that we are able to deploy large forces fighting concepts sponsored papers and quickly enough to make a difference in the briefings on a similar concept called the 56 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

Air Legion. The legion’s mix of tactical air (CAS); delaying, disrupting, diverting, or assets offered many benefits, among them destroying an enemy’s military potential better training and force employment. The before it can be brought to bear effectively legion’s resulting combat capability would against friendly forces (interdiction); and have surpassed that of a naval carrier air suppressing enemy air defenses (SEAD). group. In actuality, our new organization • Electronic-combat aircraft—Control and the Air Legion have many qualities in selected parts of the electromagnetic spec- common.6 For the purposes of further dis- trum in support of strategic and tactical cussion and to eliminate any confusion operations. Include elements of command, with the Air Legion, we will call our pro- control, and communications counter- posed organization a tactical air group measures (C3CM) and SEAD. (TAG). • Reconnaissance aircraft—Use tactical Our notional TAG would consist of ap- airborne sensors to collect intelligence proximately 54 air-to-air; surface-attack; information. electronic-combat (EC); reconnaissance; • Surveillance, command, control, and surveillance, command, control, and com- communications aircraft—Provide opera- munications (SC3); tactical-airlift; rescue/ tional field commanders warning of attack special-operations; and security aircraft. as well as the ability to communicate with Their characteristics and missions are and control friendly forces. briefly summarized as follows: • Tactical-airlift aircraft— Deploy, em- • A i r - t o - a i r aircraft—Gain control of the ploy, and sustain military forces. aerospace environment, thus ensuring protection of friendly forces. Conduct both of- Because Harriers have a vertical and/or short takeoff and fensive and defensive operations. landing (VSTOL) capability, their bases can be located close • Surface-attack aircraft—Directly sup- to the battle. Forward basing allows for a quicker port surface operations by attacking targets turnaround time, which results in an increased number of in close proximity to friendly troops combat sorties. VSTOL AND POWER PROJECTION 57

• Rescue/special-operations aircraft— Without considering the A-10 for the Conduct low-visibility, covert, or clan- CAS role, some combination of F-15Es, destine military operations and/or rescue F-16Ds, and F-lllE/Fs would satisfy the efforts. CAS/interdiction requirement. Although • Security aircraft—Contribute to “air the F-15, F-16, F-4, or F -lll airframes base” security as well as protection of a could satisfy two mission roles, logic has ground force’s rear area. Closely related to us replacing the aging RF-4C, F-4G, and CAS.7 F-lllE/F before the other airframes listed. Although capable of more missions, the This would leave the F-15 and F-16 as our TAG would have 18 fewer aircraft than to- fighter candidates. The C-130H lends itself day’s tactical fighter wing and a smaller nicely to several mission areas. The infrastructure. The commander, however, EC-130H Compass Call, MC-130H Combat would have a greater war-fighting ca- Talon, AC-130H/U Spectre gunship, and pability simply because of the group’s EC-130E airborne battlefield command and force mix.8 In the course of our discussion, control center (ABCCC) aircraft are all de- we will see how to enhance agility and rivatives of the venerable C-130 Hercules, flexibility by using air-transportable still in service as a tactical airlifter. Under ground-based elements and by decreasing our current system, however, decentraliza- our logistical requirements. We will also tion of this many aircraft types to form a see how to dramatically enhance sur- new tactical air organization would be a vivability by using new (at least to the Air costly, logistical nightmare. Force) tactical-basing operations. With all these benefits, one must assume the application of some new leading-edge technology, right? Not at all. We simply incor- The Cost and Value Added porate existing technologies into new In many respects, affordability is Amer- weapon systems. Needless to say, we can- ica’s real military enemy. For the past not accomplish drastic restructuring of our three decades we have increasingly priced tactical fighter forces into TAGs overnight. ourselves out of combat power. We have The prudent approach suggests using ex- failed to realize economies of scale in air- isting aircraft to form a TAG in the mid- craft production because we try to field too term as a transition to long-term composi- many unique, specialized systems. Cou- tion. To illustrate how we might effect this pled with our insistence upon new designs transition, let us start by looking at a no- (and manufacturers) every 15 years or so, tional TAG using today’s force structure we find that we can’t afford to procure the (table 1). minimum number to meet requirements! Sen Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Table 1 Armed Services Committee, described the Tactical Air Group: Near Term problem in a 1987 television interview: Mission Aircraft Number We’ve got too many weapon systems being Air Superiority F-15D 12 produced, and we're not producing any of CAS/tnterdiction F-15E/F-16D/F-111E(F) 12 those weapon systems—or many of them—at Reconnaissance RF-4C/RF-16D 4 efficient rates. That is colossal waste. When Electronic Combat you take all the coffeepot scandals and all Lethal Suppression F-4G 4 the hammers and all of those things we read Radar Jamming EF-111A 6 about and worry about and add them all to- Communications Jamming EC-130H 3 gether and multiply them by 10,000, you Tactical Airftt C-130H 4 don’t have the kind of waste in dollars that Special Operations MC-130H 3 you do when you stretch too many weapon Security AC-130H(U) 3 C3 systems and, therefore, don't produce any of EC-130E 3 them—or many of them—at efficient rates. Total 54 That’s where the real waste and fat is.9 58 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

Too many weapon systems for limited The McDonnell Douglas C-17 will airlift outsize combat equipment, currently accommodated only by the C-5. The funding in turn causes Congress or the De- new airlifter would also offer STOL performance now partment of Defense (DOD) to direct low- provided only by the C-130. Such an aircraft would play an rate production so that we can afford all important role in the proposed tactical air grotq> (TAG) of the systems. Another form of program the future. stretch-out. low-rate production helps to ensure that we can maintain an active in- but if it never flies because it is not dur- dustrial base (in-place production ca- able, then that system is worthless.10 pability). Unfortunately, the only thing This brings us to the second important that uneconomical production rates ensure facet of our proposal: The key to reducing is a loss of productivity and an increase in TAG logistics and cost is the requirement unit cost. In those rare cases in which we for commonality of airframes. Put another have kept assembly lines open (manufac- way, we use the minimum number of air- ture of the C-130 being the best example), craft types to perform a variety of mis- we still failed to appreciate the benefits of sions. Airframe commonality would re- product improvement vis-a-vis new duce engineering, production, parts, design/acquisition. While leading-edge contracting, and recurring maintenance technological breakthroughs are welcome, and training costs. Air Force and DOD sav- and in many cases necessary, we must not ings could be enormous. Use of common, deny the advantages of applying mature multirole airframes by all the services technologies to improve reliability and would reduce maintenance time and sustainability. One may have the most so- enhance spares support on the battlefield phisticated weapon system in the world. and at sea. Critics argue that the Defense VSTOL AND POWER PROJECTION 59

Department tried to do just this sort of duces the number of different aircraft, that thing in the past and failed. In actuality, number is still far from optimum. The next the McDonnell Douglas F-4, the LTV A-7. option, on the other hand, would increase the North American Rockwell OV-10, the airframe commonality and could be Lockheed C-130. the Rockwell CT-39. the fielded in the midterm (table 2). Notice Northrop T-38 and F-5, the General Dy- that we have reduced our basic airframe namics F-16, the Bell UH-1, and the de requirements to two. The F-15 becomes Havilland C-7—among others—have per- the de facto fighter aircraft. Using the formed superbly for at least two services. Eagle as a multirole aircraft allows us the Critics proudly point to the much ma- flexibility to swing the aircraft to the air- ligned F-lll (TFX) program in making their case for the lack of airframe com- Table 2 patibility between services. In fact, the Tactical Air Group: Midterm Navy’s version of the Air Force fighter— the F-lllB—performed very well during Mission Aircraft Number carrier trials. Even a cross-service require- Air Superiority F-15D 12 ment as stringent as the capability to oper- CAS/Interdiction F-15E 16 ate from an aircraft carrier, however, be- Reconnaissance RF-15E 4 comes a nonissue for reasons soon Electronic Combat revealed.11 Lethal Suppression F-15E Radar Jamming EC-130H/EF-15E 3/3 Although the previous discussion re- Communications Jamming EC-130H 3 Tactical Airfift C-130H 4 Advances in aerial refueling make nearly all military aircraft Special Operations MC-130H 3 capable of fulfilling a “strategic" mission, thus offsetting Security AC-130H 3 commonly cited weaknesses in the Harrier—specifically, C3 EC-130H 3 combat radius and range. Total 54 60 AIRPOW ER JOURNAL SUM M ER 1991

to-air role tor air superiority.12 Modifica- The author's midterm TAG scenario utilizes the F-15 tions to the E model (Strike Eagle) would airframe in air-to-air. CAS/interdirtion. reconnaissance, and lethal suppression (electronic combat) roles. This minimizes satisfy the reconnaissance and_lethal- the number of different types of aircraft in the TAG and suppression missions. Closerin and reduces logistical requirements and cost. penetration-escort radar jamming would rely upon the F-15 airframe once again; increased maneuverability and air-to-air .ord- approach. No matter how we restructure nance would greatly improve survivability our present capabilities, however, one lia- in high-threat areas. The rest of our mis- bility remains obvious: we require long sions featu-re the C-130 airframe. Notice runways for flight operations. A TAG of that the EF-111 in a standoff jamming role the future would, by necessity, require air- has also been replaced in this instance by craft with VSTOL technology (table 3). a suitably modified C-130. The ABCCC aircraft in the previous example has been modified to accept an airborne sur- A Lingering Affair veillance radar similar to that of the Navy’s E-2C Hawkeye, as well as addi- The corporate Air Force has had a lin- tional ground-surveillance sensors.13 This gering affair with VSTOL technology since version of the C-130 could very well be a at least 1963, when Gen Curtis LeMay, Air lower-cost alternative to the joint sur- Force chief of staff, authorized Project veillance target attack radar system Forecast. The task of Air Force Systems (J-STARS) and could provide ground com- Command (AFSC) was to forecast Air manders the same support.14 Keep in mind Force missions five to 10 years in the fu- that this is one possible approach—not the ture, linking those missions to available VSTOL AND POWEH PROJECTION 61

The C-J30 airframe accomplishes the remainder of the advances in “materials, propulsion, flight midterm TAG's electronic combat requirements, as well as dynamics, guidance, and computer tech- its airlift: special operations. security: and command, nology.”15 Looking back on his close asso- control, and communications missions. ciation with Project Forecast, then Secre- tary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert Table 3 described an environment that still rings Tactical Air Group: VSTOL true: Misson Aircraft Number It took some time for some of our old atti- Air Superiority F-xxA 12 tudes and outlooks to change: adjusting to C AS/Inlerdiction FxxB 16 new hardware still seems to be easier than Reconnaissance RF-xxC 4 adjusting to new ideas and new methods. Electronic Combat New hardware was welcomed with more Lethal Suppression F-xxB enthusiasm than were new ideas in the Radar Jamming EC-yyyR 6 realms of strategy, concepts, and doctrine.16 Communications Jamming EC-yyyC 3 Tactical Airiitt Cyyy 4 Although unexpected events scuttled the Rescue/Special Operations MC-yyy 3 establishment of a VSTOL program in the Security AC-yyy 3 s i x t i e s , t h e c o n c e p t l i v e d o n . 17 I n A p r i l C3 CC-yyy 3 1978. the under secretary of defense for re- Total 54 search and engineering established a De- fense Science Board Task Force on VSTOL Aircraft. The task force’s charter was to technologies. This project indicated that “evaluate the potential of V/STOL technol- significant advances in VSTOL were possi- ogy for future replacement of our present ble in the 1970-75 time frame, based upon conventional (CTOL), land-based and sea- 62 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

based, supersonic tactical fighter aircraft.” A task force on VSTOL aircraft sponsored hy the Office of the Secretary of Defense recommended the "timely Two general conclusions and recommen- introduction" of the Harrier and its derivatives into the dations having general applicability to all military aircraft inventory. Here, a Marine Corps AV-8 of the armed services bear repeating: participates in flight operations over the Atlantic Ocean.

1. The ability of the Military Services to significant improvements in those aircraft conduct their respective missions can be configurations that are not radical depar- enhanced by the timely introduction of tures from existing classes of V/STOL air- V/STOL aircraft. The number of potential craft, notably variants of the helicopter and mission improvements, coupled with the of the subsonic combat aircraft, the Harrier.18 need for increased survivability and operational flexibility, provides a convincing case The task force’s recommendations fell for the accelerated development of an on deaf Air Force ears, however. With so enhanced V/STOL capability. many good reasons to do so, why has the 2. The technology will currently support Air Force been so reluctant to exploit this VSTOL AND POWER PROJECTION 63

new capability? The reasons are nu- The requirement for true mobility of the merous. Even from the beginning, Air entire combat unit—not just the aircraft— Force leaders viewed the early vertical cannot be overstated. The face of the bat- takeoff/landing demonstrators tested at Ed- tlefield is changing, and we must change wards AFB, California, as just that— with it. What were once static lines on the demonstrators. Imagine using a seemingly ground are becoming fluid. The concept of ungainly, unattractive aircraft as a tactical a forward line of own troops (FLOT) and fighter! Even after the British perfected our procedures to protect that line from their Harrier jump jet in the 1960s, it was the air must give way to a rapidly moving, the Marine Corps—not the Air Force—that constantly changing environment of vio- realized the applicability to tactical opera- lence and speed. The Army saw this tions.19 This new technology, argued the change and restructured its doctrine to ac- Air Force, would limit the combat radius count for it. Called AirLand Battle, this and range of its aircraft; a full load (con- Army doctrine relies upon tactical air sidered small by Air Force standards) of power to attack throughout the depth of ordnance wrould decrease that radius even the battlefield at the appropriate time to more. Complicating the issue was the fact help seize the initiative. Thus, air power that strategic, not tactical, air power was must be able to strike more quickly and receiving most of the Air Force budget ap- more often. Air power can meet those re- propriations at that time. quirements only if it is based closer to the battle and if its support base is mobile enough to survive.22 Even before the raising of the iron cur- An Operational Philosophy tain, there was a consensus that availability of overseas bases would decline. While Air Force concerns were valid, The White House Commission on Inte- they were also entrenched in the concept grated Long-Term Strategy reported in that all tactical fighters be capable of oper- 1988 that ating great distances from their home fields. By definition, theater-based aircraft the United States must develop alternatives had to have “long legs” to reach their tar- to overseas bases. In some contexts, to be gets from bases located well behind sure, bases will continue to be critically friendly forces.20 Why were the bases so important—especially when our problem is far back? Primarily to ensure survivability to defend against possible Soviet aggression. and mitigate vulnerability. What has But we should not ordinarily be dependent changed since then to warrant a change in on bases in defending our interests in the Third World. We have found it increasingly operational philosophy? First, aerial- difficult and politically costly to maintain refueling techniques have been refined to bases there.23 enable virtually all of today’s Air Force assets to fly “strategic” distances.21 Second, The commission's recommendations cre- advances in VSTOL and other tech- ated yet another persuasive argument for nologies offer potential mobility heretofore bare-base (VSTOL) capability. Many of to- undreamed of for wing-sized units. These day’s Global Reach—Global Power advo- advances permit the Air Force to abandon cates project their combat power from the the archaic concept of hardening air bases United States. This basing scheme might deep in the theater rear area for sur- be possible for large, multiplace aircraft, vivability. while at the same time putting but the idea is impractical for fighter-sized the machines of war closer to the battle. aircraft. Even with air-to-air refueling, pi- These two capabilities of aerospace lot endurance becomes the limiting factor forces—mobility and survivability—are in staging fighter attacks from 6,000 miles embedded in our doctrine and underpin away. El Dorado Canyon, the American this proposed operational-basing scheme. military raid on Libya in 1985, is but one 64 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

example of crew fatigue associated with initiative. If we lose the initiative, we long-distance operations. For tactical air could very well lose the war.26 Our fixed- forces, the key is not. as one Defense Sci- wing technology has driven our opera- ence Board member put it, “our ability to tional procedures to a defensive attitude project power without being there.” To symbolized by hardened airfields. effectively employ tactical forces at inter- Since current operations require very continental distances from bases in the large, open areas for runways, aircraft have United States and return them safely will very little cover or concealment. As a re- require significant advances in hypersonic sult, we build an HAS for protection. Take flight. Mature VSTOL technology is in away the requirement for a long runway hand—hypersonic flight is not.24 and a new set of options becomes available. One such Allied experience during World War II serves to illustrate the point. To ensure survival of the Red Air Force af- Protecting a Smaller Force ter 1941, the Soviets prepared hundreds of makeshift airfields to increase mobility. In the face of shrinking force structure, The extensive use of concealment and de- the issue of survivability becomes acute. coys tremendously complicated the Luft- Contrary to what supporters of hardened waffe’s targeting problems. According to airfields say about the difficulty of killing Kreis, “The crude nature of the landing them, John Kreis in his book Air Warfare fields, the hundreds of sites from which to and Air Base Air Defense encapsulates the fly, and the emphasis on mobility created historical changes that lead us to the need an air base system with built in for VSTOL: defenses.”27 Since [the World War II] era. faster planes, VSTOL technology allows flight opera- technologically improved ordnance of in- tions in relatively small, open areas that creased destructiveness, permanent concrete take advantage of natural cover and runways, and the presence of fixed, complex concealment—particularly in forested service and support establishments made areas. The US Army, Marine Corps, and airfields ever more vulnerable to the Royal Air Force (RAF) have conducted destruction.25 such operations for some time using Har- The need for increased survivability be- riers and helicopters. Their experiences in comes most apparent when we examine forward basing point to several advan- our tactical basing in Europe, for example. tages. First, the ability to change operating These airfields have, at tremendous cost, locations at will greatly enhances sur- been “fortified” by constructing hardened vivability and increases targeting diffi- aircraft shelters (HAS) and operations fa- culty, as the Soviets demonstrated in cilities. This hardening is not cost- World War II. Second, combat-radius effective for two major reasons. First, these shortfalls can be decreased with forward bases are fixed and easily targeted. Sec- basing. Third, being closer to the bat- ond. and perhaps most importantly, the tlefield allows for a quicker turnaround enemy does not have to destroy a single time, resulting in more sorties to deliver HAS to stop air operations—he only has to ordnance. Fourth, one now has the ca- crater the runway. While we are occupied pability to operate from ships and from lo- with the time-consuming job of runway re- cations ashore. Finally, the ability to pair, the enemy could gain air superiority launch or land under weather conditions and conduct offensive operations at will. unsuitable for fixed-wing aircraft increases Much of the success of tactical air power is available combat sorties. Taken as a whole, based upon timing and tempo. If we sur- these capabilities create a force-multiplier render the ability to engage the enemy effect—so very important in light of when and where we choose, we lose the planned force-structure reductions.28 Tear Out and Remove PLEASE PRINT PLEASE PRINT FEEL LIKE UP?SPEAKING Fill andcards out one ofcomment the attached card to on comment thisissue use this ininterested Please always hearingfrom are our readers. We AIRPOWER JOURNAL AIRPOWER COMMENT CARD COMMENT CARD COMMENT AIRPOWER JOURNAL adt omn nti su______. on card tothis issue______comment interestedin usealways are thishearing We Please from our readers. RarfcTOe First name initial Last Last name initial First RarfcTOe name tet iy tt onr Zip Code Country State City Street Rank/TiOe First name Initial Last name Last Initial name First Rank/TiOe tet iy tl/onr Zip Code Stale/Country City Street drop it in any mail box. it mail in drop any ______

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AIRPOWER JOURNAL Airpower Research Institute Walker Hall Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5532 VSTOL AND POWER PROJECTION 65 True Flexibility F-16, a vertical capability is the key to maximum flexibility.29 During the Falk- For air-to-air combat, VSTOL technology lands conflict in 1982, for example, Har- would add the advantage of vectored ma- riers landed on small auxiliary ships for neuvering and abrupt speed changes—in refueling. Once a bridgehead was other words, the ability to fight in flight re- established near Port San Carlos, the Har- gimes not now available to the Air Force. riers were based ashore, closer to the fight- In the air-to-ground arena, this technology ing.30 This procedure is also used by the would allow the pilot to better evaluate Marine Corps. Marine operations in the the battlefield visually, as well as afford Persian Gulf (Operation Desert Storm) in- better in-flight concealment through hover clude using the helicopter carrier USS capability. Even though the Air Force is Nassau for Harrier operations.31 This kind testing STOL updates for the F-15 and of flexibility is as valuable to a fast- moving, mobile AirLand Battle scenario as it is to low-intensity conflict (LIC) opera- The TAG infrastructure calls for a relatively austere basing tions from austere bases. The implications setup for VSTOL tactical aircraft, as well as the utilization of lightweight, mobile support facilities. This arrangement for joint operations are obvious. precludes the need for expensive, fixed and hardened air The TAG would have a small, organic bases (such as the one below) from which to launch aircraft tactical airlift capability, as reflected in the into the fray. previous tables. For use primarily during 66 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991 unit relocation, these assets would revert stand to save billions of dollars on runway to theater-level control only to satisfy crit- construction, maintenance, and associated ical airlift shortfalls. In the midterm, these airfield hardening alone. airlifters should be capable of operating Even so, these incentives do not warrant from unimproved operating strips of an immediate jump to VSTOL; a phased 1,000-1,500 feet. As unit equipment loads approach based upon viable, long-range become smaller and lighter, the airlifters planning and acquisition strategies is the will be able to operate in smaller areas best course of action. We must first con- using VSTOL technology.32 Whether the ceptually embrace the new basing scheme new tactical airlifter is a rotary-wing de- and fully adopt the technology. In the mid- sign (a helicopter or a tilt-rotor aircraft like term, STOL from austere bases is an attain- the V-22 Osprey) or a fixed-wing airframe able goal; we are already exploring this ca- (C-17 or derivative), most people agree that pability using the F-15. Now is the time to it must have certain attributes. Two of the step forward and craft a grand design for most important are exceptional takeoff and future systems. Today, AFSC is soliciting landing performance from short runways more operator input in shaping the Air or rugged airstrips, and quick and efficient Force’s science and technology investment cargo handling.33 One cannot overempha- strategy. As Maj Gen Thomas R. Ferguson, size the capability for logistic support AFSC’s deputy chief of staff for technol- using VSTOL assets. VSTOL aircraft can ogy, put it, “We can’t just push our tech- deliver supplies faster, more often, and to nology into the operational world. There’s areas inaccessible to w'heeled vehicles. got to be a pull from the other end.”35 A VSTOL speed and independence from coherent plan to restructure our TFWs to road systems allow for many more in- TAGs in the midterm should be the foun- stances of throughput supply distribution dation for future acquisition and budgeting and better support to a highly mobile force approaches. Despite the initial investment on a fluid battlefield. This technology has to restructure our forces, monetary savings proven its value on the mountains of for the Air Force could be very high; sav- Korea and in the rice paddies of Vietnam ings could be even higher, depending by facilitating rapid casualty evacuation. upon how the concept of aircraft commonality is applied across DOD. With the right operational pull, we can serve our doctrine with our technology instead of A Measured Approach the other way around. Progress in other aerospace disciplines makes VSTOL much more viable today than even 10 years ago. Advances in vec- A New Mobility toring nozzle engines to redirect thrust; cross-ducted propulsion systems to elimi- Mobile airfield operations are already nate hot-gas reingestion: plenum-chamber standard practice for the Harriers and heli- burning to produce more thrust; the use of copters of the Army, Marine Corps, RAF, composite materials to reduce weight; and and Royal Navy.36 In other words, we al- “stealth” or low-radar-observable designs ready have a wealth of information upon and coatings are either being examined for, which to base our new TAG infrastructure or incorporated in, future-generation air- (table 4). The TAG command post would craft.34 With these advances in technology, retain the same basic functions it performs VSTOL aircraft will be at least as capable today; specific functional-area cells would as today's fixed-wing aircraft. Airframe perform the necessary coordination for commonality could reduce engineering, group operations. The mission-area opera- production, parts, contracting, and recur- tions facilities would be similar to our cur- ring maintenance and training costs. We rent squadron operations facilities. Notice, VSTOL AND POWER PROJECTION 67

Table 4 ing trailers could easily accommodate four Tactical Air Group Infrastructure people and be towed by organic vehicles (such as the high-mobility multipurpose TAG Command Post wheeled vehicles—HMMWV) or be easily Fjkjht Operations airlifted.37 Dispersal of these independent personnel units would also increase the Operations Plans enemy’s targeting problem as well as de- Air Base Security crease casualties from air attack. Self- contained liquid-petroleum stoves and re- Mission-Area Operations Faafties frigerators in each unit would also reduce Surveillance/Command and Control (C2) the size and complexity of field kitchens. Reconnaissance Regardless of our equipment configura- Surface AttacK/Airtjome Security Electronic Combat tion. in no case should we create the need AirSft to transport outsized TAG equipment or Air-to-Air cargo. This kind of inefficiency would not Rescue/SpecialOpe rations be worth the cost in additional airlift sorties.38 Combat Support Facility VSTOL operations would also allow us Supply to divorce ourselves from heavy support Transportation equipment such as “portable” arresting Personnel Alternate C2 gear, rapid-runway-repair equipment, runway sweepers and plow's, and so forth. In- stead of heavy construction materials, we could carry light camouflage materials for aircraft, vehicles, and personnel. Limited however, the break from a single facility to quantities of steel matting for aircraft oper- support a single squadron flying a unique ations would substitute for heavy runway- airframe. The combat-support facility construction materials in the midterm. We would provide the necessary support for have extensive experience using this sort group and air base operations. It would of matting, dating back to World War II; also serve as the alternate TAG command post. airfields in Southeast Asia were conspic- uous by their use of matting. The greatest Becoming a truly mobile tactical air op- difference for VSTOL operations w'ould be eration hinges on the type and use of main the relatively small quantity of matting jor equipment. The goal here should be to required, if indeed it is needed (not all get lighter and move quicker. Recent im- VSTOL operating locations would require provements in expandable shelters for the matting). As in the case of airframes, we Army and Air Force underscore our ability can also realize greater economies of scale to make lighter, easily transportable facili- through the concept of commonality of ties. Truck-mounted equipment or in- support equipment between the services.39 strumentation-van arrangements lend themselves nicely to smaller functional operations such as navigation-aid control, aircraft flight-operations control, and so Conclusion forth. The RAF, for example, currently uses mobile runway supervisory units The thawing of the cold war provides a (RSU) in vehicle-mounted configurations. marvelous opportunity to reevaluate our Setup and relocation times for air base op- military force structure. If we plan prop- erations could also be greatly reduced by erly, we can craft a cogent program to de- moving away from large, canvas “ tent sign, build, and operate tactical air forces cities." Small, modular, wheeled living that are capable of being truly flexible— quarters similar to current pop-up camp- both in the air and on the ground. This ar- 68 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

tide has explored the problem of meeting risk technology that offers payoffs in air- enduring national security objectives with combat maneuvering and battlefield sur- a smaller military force structure. We have veillance and attack. Airframe com- seen, using a notional organization called monality would reduce maintenance and a tactical air group, how force restructur- parts support, resulting in increased sortie ing coupled with VSTOL technology can generation and mobility. Using VSTOL to solve much of that problem. Using com- lift and then supplement unit resupply mon airframes in multiple mission roles efforts would increase throughput and de- obviates the fiscal and logistical con- crease delivery time. straints we now face—without holding To realize these benefits, Air Force lead- doctrine at risk. ership must embrace a new operational To support the Army’s battle doctrine, concept, unencumbered by previous atti- as well as our own, we must be able to op- tudes. Facing increasingly capable foes, we erate tactical aircraft in a lethal, fast-paced, can no longer afford to tailor our war- fluid environment. Fixed, hardened air- fighting doctrine to outmoded operational fields have become a by-product of out- procedures. In the final analysis, restruc- dated, defensive thinking. Mobile, forward turing today’s tactical fighter wings into basing would enhance force survival, com- tomorrow’s tactical air groups would most plicate targeting, and increase sortie avail- certainly be a leap in faith—but not in ability. Today, VSTOL is a mature, low- technology. □

Noles 1. Whether the cold war can finally be laid to rest remains tunately. the majority of the aircraft carried aboard today's to be seen. What is tangible, however, is Soviet economic re- supercarrier is dedicated to CVBG defense. The ability to de- form of its domestic and military industrial infrastructure, liver firepower ashore is thereby greatly reduced. Lacking a troop reductions in Eastern Europe, and increased warning better tactical air power projection scheme, however, the time of military escalation. A fuller explanation of America's Navy's doctrine and funding have continued without serious postwar reductions can be found in Russell F. Weigley, The opposition. See Edward N. Luttwak. The Pentagon and the American Way of War: A History of United States Military Art of War (New York: Simon and Schuster. Inc.. 1985), 220- Strategy and Policy (Bloomington. Ind.: Indiana University 22. 262. Press. 1973). 373. 400-401. 447^19. 7. None of these missions break with current Air Force 2. Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice is the ac- doctrine. All (with the exception of security) are fully ex- knowledged standard-bearer for Global Reach—Global plained in AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United Power. Briefing, Headquarters USAF/XOXWP, subject: The States Air Force, 16 March 1984, 3-1 to 3-8. At this writing, Air Force and US National Security: Global Reach—Global the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine. Research, Power, 1990. and Education was circulating a new draft AFM 1-1 for com- 3. Gen Michael ). Dugan. Air Force chief of staff, to Sen ment. According to the draft reviewed by this author, the Sam Nunn, chairman. Senate Armed Services Committee, let- same holds true for the future doctrinal publication: SC3 air- ter. 11 June 1990. craft also offer the advantage of airborne communications re- 4. lames W. Canan, "Back to the Future." Air Force Maga- lay. The mobile basing scheme that is advocated should help zine. October 1990. 36. minimize direct threats to the TAG. In the event active de- 5. Ibid., 34. In response to a leftist military coup in Iraq in fense becomes necessary, however, organic airborne defense 1958. Composite Strike Force Bravo deployed and was on the assets would augment ground-based defense forces. Security ground in Lebanon within 12 hours. aircraft could also be used for rear-area operations of friendly 6. John Piazza, Point Paper on Air Legion Concept. Wash- ground forces. Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) ington. D.C., 24 July 1989. Sponsoring this concept was no 100-5. Operations, 1986. 20. mean feat, given the historical intransigence of military bu- 8. The special qualities required of a TAG commander be- reaucracies to consider radical new ideas. After all. tailoring come readily apparent. He or she must be a true air-battle our tactical fighter forces to mirror the capabilities of naval commander—that is, well versed in the art and science of air air is a large parochial pill to swallow. For decades now, the operations and combat. Technical skills in a single weapon US Navy has successfully championed the building of carrier system will not substitute for this expertise. battle groups (CVBG) as America's best solution to projecting 9. Quoted in ). Ronald Fox and James L. Field. The De military force abroad. The weight of their arguments has fense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition (Boston: rested upon the ability to employ tactical air power from Harvard Business School Press, 1988), 66. floating "air bases” independent of a shore-based airfield. A 10. According to Fox and Field, one example of leapfrog- supercarrier, they argued, could carry a host of aircraft to ging program costs was F-14A procurement. A Comptroller fully exploit the complete capability of air power. Unfor- General study in 1979 concluded that a reduction of 66 Tom- VSTOL AND POWER PROJECTION 69

cats from the original buy coupled with a program stretch-out ("Tooey”) Spaatz and his crew flew the Question Mark for a raised the estimated program cost by $2.3 billion—a 38- record 150 hours and 40 minutes. Maurer Maurer. Aviation percent increase! (page 40) in the U.S. Army. 1919-1939 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air 11. )ay Miller. General Dynamics F -lll " Aardvark" (Fall- Force History. 1987). 260-65. The capability as we know it brook. Calif.: Aero Publishers. Inc., 1982). 49-55. today was developed by Strategic Air Command in the 1950s 12. For a fuller discussion of air superiority, see |ohn A. to offset the short range of its B-47 bomber. Richard H. Kohn Warden III. The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Wash- and Joseph P. Harahan. eds., Strategic Air Warfare: An Inter ington. D.C.: National Defense University Press. 1988). chap. view with Generals Curtis E. LeMay, Leon W. Johnson, David 1. A. Burchinul, and lack J. Catton (Washington, D.C.: Office of 13. The Marine Corps's use of a modified C-130 as an air- Air Force History. 1988). 104-8. borne early warning (AEW) aircraft has favorably impressed 22. AFM 1-1. 2-3. The success of the Army's AirLand Bat- Congress and shows promise for long-term drug-surveillance tle doctrine to win in the offense is based upon four basic force structure. House, Department of Defense Appropria- tenets: initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization. FM tions Bill. 1991. 101st Cong.. 2d sess.. October 1990. 245. 100-5, 15. 14. [-STARS is a joint Air Force/Army program to integrate 23. Quoted in James W. Canan. "Global Power from Amer- a side-looking multimode radar into an E-8A aircraft. The ican Shores." Air Force Magazine. October 1989. 42. 44. The system should allow detection of stationary or moving advantages of being able to "get in and out” of other coun- ground-based objects in support of the Army's AirLand Battle tries’ affairs quickly are widely appreciated by both diplo- doctrine. Susan H. H. Young and John W. R. Taylor. "Gallery matic and military leaders. In the event of military action. of USAF Weapons," Air Force Magazine, May 1990. 148. VSTOL bare bases would allow us to do exactly that. 15. Robert Frank Futrell. Ideas. Concepts. Doctrine: A His- 24. The remark was attributed to Gen Russell E. Dough- tory of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force. 1907- erty, USAF. Retired, in Canan. "Global Power.” 42. Although 1964 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University. 1971), 438-40. beyond the scope of this article, the Air Force tendency to 16. Quoted in ibid.. 439. procure more and more single-seat fighters puts pilot fatigue 17. The fiscal adjustments recommended by Project Fore- into sharper focus. Unlike the Navy concept of work-load cast were favorably received by Secretary of Defense Robert sharing between two or more crew members, the Air Force McNamara. Unfortunately, those adjustments reached his feels it can lessen pilot task saturation with improvements in desk the day President Kennedy was assassinated and were cockpit avionics. In the absence of auxiliary crew members, never made to the fiscal year 1965 budget. Michael H. Gorn. pilots would be forced to take strong stimulants to be effec- Harnessing the Genie: Science and Technology Forecasting tive. and then for only short periods of time. The efficacy of for the Air Force. 1944-1986 (Washington. D.C.: Office of Air crew members' using stimulants over a long period of time is Force History, 1988), 94-105. highly questionable. 18. During phase 1. the task force was asked to review pre- 25. John F. Kreis, Air Warfare and Air Base Air Defense vious and current VSTOL concepts, report on the status of (Washington. D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1988). xv. current VSTOL technology, perform a risk assessment, and 26. Warden, chap. 1. recommend appropriate technology demonstrations. Phase 2 27. Kreis also notes that even the efficient German air of this effort began in March 1979. This time the group was commanders "described Russian camouflage and deception tasked to review past VSTOL programs that failed to increase accomplishments as masterful" (pages 185-88). Our proposal military capabilities: review service missions “traditionally directly enhances three of Kreis’s four facets of air base de- associated with CTOL aircraft and determine how V/STOL fense: passive defense, dispersal, and attack recovery (pages type aircraft could enhance their capability"; determine xvi-xvii). which fields of emerging technologies might benefit from 28. Don Linn. Harrier in Action (Carrollton. Tex.: VSTOL applications; and recommend an optimum mix of Squadron/Signal Publications, Inc.. 1982), 11-12, 28-29. The CTOL and VSTOL aircraft for the 1985-2000 time frame. 1979 Defense Science Board report on VSTOL includes four While undecided about naval capability, the task force was pages listing the proven advantages of VSTOL attack aircraft more positive about the newest version of the Harrier: "This (pages 67-70). In one Harrier surge operation in 1980, the airplane (AV-8B) lies within today's state of the art and with Marine Corps averaged 6.4 minutes per aircraft for servicing even further capability improvement could be an extremely and rearming. Trotti. 99-100. flexible weapon system for real military requirements." Of- 29. Bill Gunston. An Illustrated Guide to Future Fighters fice of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and and Combat Aircraft (New York: Area Publishing. Inc., Engineering. Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task 1984). 24-29. Force on V/STOL Aircraft (Washington. D.C.: Government 30. Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price, Air War South Atlantic Printing Office, November 1979), 3-4. 40-43. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1983). 180. 19. Early American VSTOL efforts centered around the 31. Washington Post, 22 September 1990. A20. Ryan X-13 and Bell X-14 experimental aircraft. The forerun- 32. Even with the considerable capability of the C-130. tac- ner of the Harrier was the British Hawker Siddelev P.1127 tical airlift STOL capability has not improved in 20 years. Kestrel. By 1965 the United States and Germany had become Lawrence J. Faessler, Transportation Dependence and Tacti interested in the Kestrel, but after evaluating six Kestrels in cal Airlift (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University. 1980). 12. this country, the US lost interest and dropped the program. 33. Jeffrey Record. Determining Future U.S. Tactical Air John Trotti. Marine Air: First to Fight (Novato. Calif.: Pre- lift Requirements (Washington. D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's In- sidio Press. 1985), 98. ternational Defense Publishers, 1987), vi, 27-28. 20 A fighter used in a tactical nuclear role would nor- 34. Gunston. 47; and F. Clifton Berry, Jr., "The Push for mally have targets at the extreme limit of its combat radius. Fighter Engines.” Air Force Magazine. January 1990, 76-77. The range of our early jet fighters was extremely limited. As a 79. matter of fact, F-84Es had to be ferried to Korea in 1950 35. Quoted in John T. Correll, "Partners in Technology." aboard ship. J. C. Hopkins. The Development of Strategic A ir Air Force Magazine, January 1990, 16. Command. 1946-1981 (Headquarters Strategic Air Com- 36. Department of the Army FM 1-111, Aviation Brigade. mand: Office of the Historian. 1 July 1982). 22-23. 1986. chap. 2: and Trotti, 93-96. 21. Aerial refueling was first demonstrated in this country 37. The HMMWV has replaced the venerable jeep as the in the 1920s. The most noteworthy early flight incorporating services' multipurpose vehicle. aerial refueling occurred in January i929 when Maj Carl 38. We seem to be making headway in the airlift required 70 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991 to support fighter operations. Gen Larry Welch, former Air pounds. Holes punched into each of the three channels re- Force chief of staff, pointed out how we had progressed from duced weight by 17.5 percent, controlled dust, and allowed using aircraft carriers (mentioned earlier) to using airlift. drainage. In Southeast Asia, the mat was known as pierced General Welch further stated that 28 sorties were required to steel planking. Richard K. Smith. "Marston Mat." Air Force deploy one squadron of F-4 fighters to Southeast Asia; today Magazine, April 1989, 84-88. Recent advances in high- we can deploy a squadron of F-16s with half those sorties. strength composite materials could conceivably reduce James W. Canan. "The Watchword Is Flexibility," Air Force weight even more. Reversible mat with a woodland- Magazine. February 1990. 59. camouflage paint scheme on one side and a desert scheme on 39. During World War II. American combat aviation used the other could be interchangeably mixed and matched to temporary runways constructed of "Marston mat." One sec- provide excellent concealment for any location. tion of steel mat was 10 feet by 15 inches and weighed 66.2

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Ricochets area, the military chain of command would de- continued from page 3 cide what type of forces to send—including the type of provisional composite wings to activate. 4. The plans for composite combat air wings mations with our collocated bombers, we were would be on the shelf, ready to go when acti- able to do some fairly complicated things while vated. Specific squadrons—both support and emitting very little electronic energy because flying—from the tactical training wings would we could brief and practice together. In com- be designated as components when the plan parison. while we were flying with forces from was activated. The commanders and staffs of Military Airlift Command and Tactical Air the composite wings would be designated Command, the radio calls, radar usage, and ahead of time but wouldn’t have direct opera- navigation-aid transmissions made us look like tional control of their forces until the provi- Christmas trees to sensors lurking below. sional wings were activated for training ex- Maj Brian T. Kelly. USAF ercises, operational inspections, or combat. (In USAF Academy. Colorado the majority of cases, for reasons of unity of command, a provisional combat wing commander will be one of the tactical training wing commanders.) Composite wings are a good idea, and it is re- 5. Obviously, the provisional composite freshing to see someone else who thinks so combat wings would have to practice and train move into a position of authority. Over my last together often. The way to do that is through 20 years in the Air Force. I can remember nu- exercises such as Red Flag and Cope Thunder. merous times discussing that issue with other For a Red Flag, one or more composite wings officers and always coming to the same conclu- would be activated, bring all its slices together, sion: it makes a great deal of operational sense. and be in the exercise as an entity. Provisional But then some maintenance or logistics type composite wings, rather than the tactical train- would throw cold water on the idea with nu- ing wings, would receive operational readiness merous reasons why it couldn't or wouldn't inspections (ORI). The object of an ORI would work. Unfortunately, in peacetime their views be to see how quickly and efficiently the com- dominated. But at last it appears that might posite wing could assemble and deploy, and change. how effectively it could fight upon arrival. As we start to plan for and form composite Composite battlefield-support wings would wings. I offer some thoughts for consideration: routinely bring all their slices together and de- 1. Unless we expect relations with Canada or ploy to support the major Army ground- Mexico to deteriorate rapidly, we don’t need training exercises that are held at the National composite wings inside the continental United Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and at States. The maintenance and logistics expense the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort of several permanent composite wings inside Chaffee, Arkansas. the US would be prohibitively high. It would 6. The practice of assembling slices to build be both impractical and expensive to put F-4G a task force or combat team is not new. The Wild Weasel, RF-4. EF-111, aircraft warning Army and Navy have always operated that way. and control system, and other special aircraft I have been air liaison officer with Army units detachments at several composite wing bases. for seven years of my time in the Air Force and 2. The answer is to leave most of the state- have seen how the Army brings slices together side wings as they are and to consider them to assemble division, brigade, regiment, and solely as training wings whose mission is to battalion combat teams for the threat they ex- provide trained aircrews, support people, and pect to face. A corps or Army group task force aircraft for provisional composite combat going to Saudi Arabia to face Iraqi armor would wings. The composite combat wings would obviously be much different than a brigade pull "slices" from the tactical training wings, as combat team going to Honduras to flush needed, to tailor themselves for the type of war guerillas out of the jungle. One might be heavy they were about to enter. in armor, artillery, and attack aviation, while 3. There could be provisional composite the other would emphasize light infantry, wings for power projection, full-scale general social-action teams, and special forces. The war. low-intensity conflict, battlefield air sup- point is that as we start forming provisional port, and so on. Once the National Command composite wings, we can learn a lot by study- Authorities decided to commit US forces to an ing what the Army has done. 72 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

7. One type of composite wing requiring spe- AIR CAMPAIGN COUNTERPOINT cial attention is the battlefield-support or air- I read with interest Maj Richard Taylor’s letter support wing—designed to work closely with (Fall 1990) about Col John A. Warden’s book and operate alongside the Army in both peacetime and combat. Out of necessity it will have The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat. Al- to be closely aligned with both the Army and though the author of the book is far better equipped than I to reply to Major Taylor’s que- the provisional composite wing headquarters. It ries, he is probably heavily engaged at the mo- may even be collocated with a major Army ment. so I’m taking the liberty of joining the headquarters. The ideal Army headquarters discussion—not as an expert, but as another in- candidate is the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort terested reader. Bragg, North Carolina. This corps is the United First, a recap of Major Taylor’s main points: States' primary strategic ground force—kept on constant alert to go anywhere in the world— 1. Colonel Warden omits several Air Force mis- and is the main component of the US Central sions that are absolutely essential to any air cam- Command. Because it is primarily a light force, paign. There is no mention of strategic bomb- it is much more dependent upon Air Force fire- in g . . . . T h e r e i s n o t a w o r d o n a i r l i f t . ( T h e r e are] n o w o rd s o n c o m b a t s u p p o r t. . . . W h e r e is e l e c - power than other and heavier Army ground tronic combat? forces. Also, going back to its formation in World War II. there has been a strong sense of 2. The Air Cam paign: Planning for Combat flies cooperation and interdependence between the in the face of current Air Force doctrine. Colonel W a r d e n ’s t h e s i s . . . r e s t s o n n u m e r i c a l s u p e r i - Army airborne forces and the Air Force. o r i t y . . . . W e h a v e sp e n t 2 0 y e a r s b u i l d i n g an A i r 8. In fact, the alignment of a composite Force that is technologically superior but numer- battlefield-support wing with the XVIII Air- ically inferior. . . . Colonel Warden never m en- borne Corps might lead to a new category of tions low-intensity conflict, AirLand Battle |and military force: an Aerial Marine Corps. (The re- so forth). lationship of the Army's airborne forces to the 3. Colonel Warden's lessons from history are out Air Force has always been very much like the of date and are often contradictory. Marine Corps’s relationship to the Navy.) The battlefield-support composite wing would have I stress that the following comments are my the transport aircraft to carry the airborne very own and that the author of The Air Cam- forces into battle (just as the Navy provides am- paign may well disagree. Colonel Warden’s phibious vessels to carry the Marine Corps), as emphasis is on the pointed end of the sword. well as the fighters and special aircraft to gain He does not pretend to talk about the hilt, the air superiority and provide battlefield support sword-bearer, or even the rest of the blade. No for the airborne forces once on the ground (just one will deny that logistics is important (per- as Navy and Marine Corps air now supports the haps even primary) and that many collateral Marine Corps after an amphibious landing). missions are essential: however, that’s not what the book is about. The core of the book tries to The time for composite air wings is not only answer a fundamental question: What should ripe, but seriously overripe. Situational and op- be the basic strategy (doctrine, employment) for erational pressures indicate that we should air power? have done it.long ago. It is interesting to note I agree that Colonel Warden’s book is not ex- that one of the reactions to the invasion of actly synchronized with current US Air Force Kuwait was to form ad hoc composite wings in doctrine, but it does not deviate in the way that Saudi Arabia and Turkey. I am not aware of any Major Taylor suggests. When Colonel Warden stateside wing that deployed to Southwest Asia talks about outnumbering the enemy as a pri- as an entity, let alone fought as such. The mary goal, he is speaking about the point of at- stateside wings provided slices that went into tack and not about absolute numerical superi- composite wings. Often, a third of the aircraft ority. Perhaps Major Taylor will agree that in a stateside wing stayed back to take care of while an air force may be at an overall numeri- training, fillers, the sick and lame, permanent- cal disadvantage, it may very well (through change-of-station transfers, and so on. The next planning and execution) be numerically supe- step is to codify what happened and to make it rior for a given engagement. I think this follows standard operating procedure. But as we do, we very closely the classic principle of concentra- must remember that we can learn much from tion of forces. He also maintains that air superi- how the Army and Navy have already done it. ority is paramount. Where Colonel Warden de- Lt Col Gary L. Dikkers, USAF parts from current doctrine is in his increased Sembach AB, Germany emphasis on targeting the enemy’s support for RICOCHETS 73 the war effort and his decreased emphasis on tions that the “concept is . . . designed to face-to-face, or gun-against-gun, solutions. His produce an emotional as well as an intellectual argument is that an aircraft killing a tank is not response” (p. 31). LPDP. as does most profes- as effective as an aircraft destroying petroleum, sional military education, not only reminds us oil. and lubricants or a tank-tread factory— why we are blue-suiters, but also exposes w’hich may disable hundreds of tanks. While young officers to challenging questions and an- this may be patently obvious, there is a very swers gained only through experience both on definite tendency to hold all Air Force missions and off the battlefield. to be equally important: counterair (air to air), Colonel Ullman was correct in recommend- close air support, long-range interdiction, and ing that the Air Force implement LPDP. Why? so forth. Colonel Warden's point is that the More than anything else, it gives our junior of- very best close air support, for example, does ficers a professional reference point that they not entail killing the enemy in the trenches, but can use in their decision making. We can't ex- insuring that the enemy does not have food, pect our officers to always do things right, but water, ammunition, gasoline, and other neces- we do expect them to do the right thing. LPDP sary items for the conduct of the war. Long- can help them do just that. range interdiction or strategic bombing (cutting Capt James B. Rake. USAF out the heart of the enemy’s war machine or Spangdahlem AB. Germany whatever you choose to call it) is the purpose of air power in the long run. He concedes that the results may not be felt immediately and that the situation may not allow you to devote your en- 1 read with great interest the article "Officer tire effort. The central issue is one of aim and Professional Development for Lieutenants.” emphasis, not exclusivity. This program did not exist during my newly I'm almost certain that when Major Taylor commissioned years. The first opportunity for whites that “lessons from history are out of professional education was Squadron Officer date.” he really means “inappropriate.'' I dis- School. This meant that most of us did not get agree. but without specifics the question is any formalized training as professional officers tough to address. 1 do think that the detailed until the fifth or sixth year of service. I’m study of military history is absolutely essential happy to see that the Air Force has now recog- for any and all professional officers and that nized and filled this gap. lessons from even ancient battlefields may be Many of the points made concerning “institu- germane to today's air war. tion” versus "career or occupation” are well Major Taylor further wishes that Colonel taken. I can remember several times hearing Warden would submit future manuscripts to statements like, “You have to get yourself a Air University (AU) to be critiqued for sub- sponsor or rising star and latch on for the ride." stance and doctrine. I take nothing away from There was little or no mention of developing my fellow officers at AU. They are learned and your skills as an officer or of duty to country. in most cases far more capable than I. However, Too many times you heard officers refer to the creative process is in some ways rigorous themselves in occupational terms such as mis- and in others fragile. It can heartily withstand a sileer, pilot, navigator, and so forth. flood of just and unjust criticisms yet be This brings me to my one definite contention washed away in the committee room. with this article. Colonel Ullman clearly points out that the top Air Force leaders developed the Lt Col William P. Stroud III, USAF ideas behind officer development and a direc- Langley AFB. Virginia tion away from careerism. However, at the same time, these leaders are nurturing and developing that same occupational concept by in- EDUCATING LIEUTENANTS creasing pilot—and other specialty—bonuses. I read with avid interest Lt Col Bruce Ullman's With specific reference to the pilot bonus, the article “Officer Professional Development for Air Force is doing nothing except bribing those Lieutenants" (Fall 1990). Having been both a officers not to seek outside employment with student in and an instructor of a lieutenants the air carriers. In essence, we are resorting to professional development program (LPDP), I the appeal of dollar-driven behavior that we so heartily endorse his recommendation that the desperately claim to avoid. This does not instill Air Force adopt the program universally. devotion to duty and country. This does not Much of the courseware—from program to foster the development of officers and leaders. program—is similar in content. Ullman men- It violates the basic premise of good officership. 74 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

Our leadership needs to rethink this area ex- tect his career and build on the excellent start tensively. Many officers who are turned away he had made in the Air Force. The lieutenant from pilot or specialty training are dedicated was not about to let an incompetent captain get professionals. Many of us are nonbonus avia- in the way of promotion opportunities. tors and proud of this fact. If the Air Force Why would any lieutenant make such an at- wants to develop an officer corps that exudes tack? Why would someone be so concerned dedication and provides leadership, then it about keeping a position—about not becoming should rid us of such flagrant contradictions. If a deputy? What made the lieutenant think the not, then it should start educating our younger job title was so critical to promotion? officers on the protocol of how to get ahead and The answer is not a lack of officer profes- latch onto that rising star once again. sional development for lieutenants. The answer lies with senior officers who have taught junior Maj Michael G. Cozort, USAF officers that certain jobs are a “must” for pro- Malmstrom AFB, Montana motion; other jobs are “too easy" and should be avoided if the officer is serious about promotion. I agree with Colonel Ullman’s conclusion and I support Colonel Ullman’s recommendations recommendations in “Officer Professional De- for fighting careerism early in officer develop- velopment for Lieutenants” and have some- ment. However, they won’t get very far if we thing to add. A few years ago I was substituting continue to divide assignments into promotable for my commander while he was on leave. and nonpromotable categories. A system that While checking the commander’s in-basket, I forces officers to jockey for promotable posi- found a computerized assignment notice for an tions communicates the wrong message about inbound captain slated for an opening in our emphasizing performance over square filling. If squadron as the squadron section commander. we have certain jobs that are too easy or not Stuck to the printout was a note from the lieu- worth counting as indicators of potential, let’s tenant currently acting as section commander. get rid of them! Some jobs will always be more The lieutenant’s note very forcefully stated that challenging than others, but as long as jobs are “we need to get rid of this person." The note worth doing, they’re worth doing well. The way went on to say that the first sergeant knew the to get that across to lieutenants is to measure captain from a previous assignment. Feeling potential and promote officers according to that the captain was incompetent, he refused to how well they accomplish the things they are work with this person ever again. The first ser- charged with doing. De-emphasizing the infor- geant said he would ask for a transfer to an- mal comparison of one job to another will al- other squadron if the captain was assigned as low officers to concentrate on the profession of squadron section commander. The lieutenant arms as opposed to the pursuit of career urged the commander to divert the captain to a stepping-stones. Officer professional develop- different squadron so that we wouldn’t lose our ment for lieutenants needs to start with those first sergeant, who was unquestionably a supe- who sit on promotion boards. By the way, I per- rior performer. suaded the lieutenant to withdraw the note, but I decided to talk to the lieutenant. I recom- he remained convinced of the need to hold mended staying out of the situation. Although onto the position at the expense of the captain. the lieutenant was doing a very good job, the The first sergeant told the commander about his squadron was authorized two officers—a cap- experience with the captain, and the captain tain and a lieutenant. Since the assignment was diverted to another squadron. would make the captain the boss, the note Maj Leonard S. Olson, USAF made it appear that the lieutenant was attempt- Crane Army Ammunition Activity. Indiana ing to hold onto the position by stabbing the captain in the back. I said that any obvious support the lieutenant gave to the first sergeant could be perceived as maneuvering to keep the section commander title. PONDERING PRIORITIES The lieutenant’s response showed he was at- Lt Col Phillip Meilinger’s article on the future tempting exactly that. The lieutenant main- Air Force (“The Air Force in the Twenty-first tained that working as a deputy to a captain af- Century: Challenge and Response, Winter ter holding the captain’s position and reporting 1990) is perhaps the most comprehensive dis- to a lieutenant colonel would show career re- cussion of Air Force issues since the publica- gression. This person was determined to pro- tion of the white paper on global reach-global RICOCHET S 75

power. It superbly advocates a service respon- operations against Japan were almost pure sive to the present and focused toward the fu- Douhet—incendiary rather than gas. The Strate- ture, and stresses the need for incorporating a gic Bombing Survey stated that more clearly defined sense of purpose into Air the bombing offensive was the major factor which Force planning. secured agreement to unconditional surrender Colonel Meilinger’s discussion of composite w ithout an invasion. . . . The dem onstrated wings (organizations based on combat ca- strength of the United States in the B-29 attacks pability instead of peacetime streamlining) fol- contrasted with lapanese lack of adequate defense, lows a section on force structure which empha- made clear to the Japanese people and to the gov- sizes the need for “range, secrecy, speed, ernment the futility of further resistance. . . . The power, precision, and cost-effectiveness” (p. atomic bomb and Russia's entry into the war speeded the process of surrender already realized 44). Composite wings with systems which in- as the only possible outcome. corporate these attributes will certainly provide a combat force that will strengthen conven- One need not espouse area—or morale— tional deterrence. bombing to give Douhet his due. I for one do What I find disconcerting is his list on pages not—even for nuclear applications. Estes’s un- 44—15 of “weapons systems that meet these cri- derlying point that mass destruction from the teria, in order of importance” (e.g.. deterrent air may not inevitably cause defeat is a fair ap- forces, reconnaissance systems, fighters, praisal. But the aim of war is still the enemy’s tankers, bombers, transports, standoff weapons, will. The real argument is not that massive and medium strike forces). Such a list seems to countervalue attack won’t lead to collapse of argue for spending our first budget dollar on his will, but that precise strategic application of ICBM-centered deterrence and then continuing air power—as attempted by the Army Air down the list until the money runs out. Forces in the European theater and demon- I sincerely doubt that our force structure can strated in Operation Desert Storm—is a much be—or should be— aligned in a way that sug- preferable approach. gests reconnaissance systems are more impor- Keep up the good work. Make us think! tant than fighters and that bombers are more Col Haywood S. Hansell, USAF, Retired important than airlifters. Rather, we should San Antonio, Texas seek a force structure whose elements embody the desired characteristics listed by Colonel Meilinger. In this way synergism will truly produce combat effectiveness. EDITOR'S NOTE: To set the record straight and to absolve Colonel Estes, we should reveal that Lt Col Thomas M. Kearney, USAF article captions are usually written here at the Pentagon. Washington, D.C. Airpower Journal. The caption in question was written with the German bombing of Great Brit- ain in mind—an effort that did more to steel CAPTION CONTROVERSY British resolve than it did to weaken morale. In I call attention to a small but insidious flaw in that context, the caption was "on target." How- Lt Col Richard Estes's otherwise fine article ever, we should have identified the caption’s “Giulio Douhet: More on Target Than He setting more clearly. We’ll do better. Knew” (Winter 1990). It is insidious in that it states as unqualified fact something that "ain’t so" and—worse—can lead to other flawed conclusions about air power. The caption to the AIR SUPERIORITY BOMBER picture on page 74 reads, "World War II dis- In the past, diverse and deadly effective enemy proved [italics added] Douhet’s theory that defenses pushed air superiority to the forefront massive raids on cities and industry would un- of air power planning considerations. The re- dermine the enemy’s morale and lead to his sult was a doctrinal emphasis on the primacy of surrender. Nuclear warfare, though, has given air superiority that subordinated all other con- new life to his conjectures." The Airpower siderations. This emphasis obscured the essen- Journal knows better—I hope. tial truth that air superiority is a means to an At best. World War II failed to prove con- end and not an end in itself. The desired end clusively that such raids would inevitably lead must always be strategic attack against the to enemy surrender. But in fact—on balance— enemy’s centers of gravity. the weight of evidence comes closer to proving The precise lethality of the F-117, as evi- Douhet right than wrong. The later stages of air denced in Operation Desert Storm, has ushered 76 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

in a new era of strategic air attack. Its excep- way negates the need for the air superiority tional performance has conclusively demon- fighter. However, it does provide a springboard strated the effectiveness of stealth and has be- for refining air power doctrine and for develop- gun to redefine the meaning of air superiority. ing air campaigns that exploit the US tech- By capitalizing on its stealth characteristics, the nological edge provided by the F-117 and, F-117 surrounded itself with an envelope of air hopefully, the B-2. superiority. The combat success of stealth bombing in no Lt Col Thom as M. Kearney, U SA F Pentagon. Washington, D.C. net assessment

The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of The theme that unifies the book’s four major Naval Warfare by John Keegan. New York sections centers on the technological revolu- 10014: Viking Penguin, 1989, 368 pages, tions that have shaped naval warfare. The first $21.95. of these revolutions was the development of long-range guns firing explosive projectiles, an The past 15 years have seen John Keegan rise innovation that changed the focus of battle to a position of eminence among Western mili- from the enemy crew to the enemy ship. At tary historians. For years he was the senior lec- Trafalgar, for example. Nelson's guns were turer at the Royal Military Academy at Sand- man-killers: the intent was to incapacitate the hurst, England, and is now the defense enemy crew and capture their ship. By Jutland, correspondent for the Daily Telegraph. His rep- however, the guns were designed to sink the utation rests on several well-deserved supports: enemy ships: no one there envisioned trying to his books read easily and smoothly synthesize capture the enemy. large amounts of material, and—possibly most A second technological revolution occurred important—he is able to spark the imagination in ship mobility, in that the advent of oil- and put the reader in the shoes of the burning, turbine-driven ships meant longer participants. range and higher speeds. The impact of extend- The Price of Admiralty uses the same meth- ing mobility into what could be termed the sec- odology as several of Keegan’s other books (The ond dimension (underwater/submarines) and Face of Battle, Six Armies in Normandy, and third dimension (air power) was so drastic as to The Mask of Command). That is. the author se- be revolutionary rather than evolutionary. lects a single battle as a paradigm for an era or Thus, seamen were forced to radically rethink campaign. Thus, Keegan examines four dif- (sometimes grudgingly) the nature of naval war- ferent naval technologies through the spyglass fare. Finally, other technological advances—in of four battles: Trafalgar (1805) for the era of electronics, standoff missiles, underwater lis- sail: Jutland (1916) for the era of the big-gun, tening devices, and so forth—have made sig- dreadnought-style battleship; Midway (1942) nificant changes in how these major technologi- for aircraft carrier warfare: and German U-boat cal revolutions have altered the conduct of attacks on Allied convoys SC112 and HX229 maritime warfare. (March 1943) for submarine and antisubmarine The most controversial parts of the book are warfare. In each case Keegan succinctly out- its nine-page conclusion entitled “An Empty lines the factors that shaped those engage- Ocean" and its thesis: “Command of the sea in ments: naval strategy and tactics, technology, the future unquestionably lies beneath rather doctrine, leadership, and so forth. As always, than upon the surface" (page 272). From the he paints a vivid picture of what battle was like Falklands War, which he calls the only naval for the participants, from the carnage ex- campaign fought since 1945, Keegan draws the perienced by Adm Horatio Nelson's gunners to critical conclusion that surface ships cannot de- the terror of being under torpedo or depth- fend themselves against modern jet aircraft or charge attack. submarines. He asserts that the submarine is NET ASSESSMENT 77 now the ultimate capital ship—the successor to In The Art o f Wargaming, Peter Perla system- the ship of the line (Trafalgar), the dreadnought atically surveys modern professional and com- battleship (Jutland), and the aircraft carrier mercial wargaming with the critical yet non- (Midway). judgmental eye of one who well knows both the Keegan’s conclusion, however, is nothing strengths and limitations of his subject. (Perla more than an assertion based on the rather slim uses wargame/wargaming to denote the inte- supply of historical evidence provided by the grated process of realistically simulating war, events of the Falklands War. He has a good as opposed to the conventional spelling—war point, and he may be right. Attack submarines game/war gaming—which suggests to him a certainly pose a significant threat to anything pastime that places less emphasis on the accu- moving on or below the surface of the sea. rate depiction of warfare.) Dr Perla. a naval op- (Submariners like to say that there are only two erations research analyst and wargame special- types of ships—subs and targets.) But the evi- ist at the Center for Naval Analysis, clearly dence of the past decade, indeed since the start regards wargaming as a potentially powerful of World War II. indicates that ships exposed to tool with which to foster a keener appreciation air power are at a far graver risk than those at- of the forces and factors affecting decision mak- tacked by submarines. The damage inflicted on ing in war. However, Perla rightly considers the HMS Sheffield and USS Stark by Exocet that if the wargame is to effectively achieve this missiles highlights recent developments in end, it must be properly understood in terms of standoff missile capability. Moreover, if the Ar- what it can and cannot do. Further, it must take gentine Air Force had properly fused its con- full account of the equally important disci- ventional iron bombs, the Royal Navy would plines of operational analysis and military have lost several more ships in 1982. Even dur- history. ing World War II. more warships were lost to By initially tracing the origins and historical air power than to any other force. To this re- development of wargaming to its present incar- viewer, at least, the message of the past half nation in American military and commercial century is clear: those who go down to the sea circles, Perla provides a solid basis for under- in ships better keep an eye on the sky, for air standing modern wargaming’s potential value power is the primary threat. as well as its limitations. Three critical con- In any event, The Price of Admiralty is an- cepts emerge from his description of war- other fine book by John Keegan. Any work of gaming’s evolutionary development, which re- synthesis can contain errors of detail (such as late directly to a later discussion of wargaming this book’s statement that the US submarine principles. Nautilus torpedoed and sank the Japanese car- First, the wargame as a tool, albeit a powerful rier Soryu at Midway, which has been dis- one, has to be designed and used appropriately proven by several recent authors), but they do if it is to be beneficial (and not simply a waste not detract from its overall validity. Some mat- of time and effort). Perla cites several instances ters the author does not address, such as the in which wargaming of particular scenarios in- relevance of Adm Alfred T. Mahan’s naval volving potential adversaries proved uncannily thought or the influence of institutional resis- prescient of later operations against the same tance to new weapons and concepts, but one foes. In some cases (e.g., the development of the can pack only so much into a book of fewer US Navy’s strategic concepts of a Pacific Ocean than 400 pages. It is a highly readable study war against Japan), the lessons afforded by war- that efficiently traces the course of naval wargaming were well taken and profitably em- fare between 1800 and the 1990s, draws cogent ployed. Conversely, crucial questions and is- conclusions about the impact of technology on sues raised in wargaming have been ignored, future naval warfare, and (as always with although they could conceivably have altered Keegan) paints a vivid, gripping portrait of war the outcomes of decisive battles or campaigns at sea. Worth getting? Definitely. (e.g., the Japanese failure to fully consider US Lt Col Daniel T. Kuehl, USAF countercarrier options prior to the battle of Washington. D.C. Midway). In yet other instances, and far too fre- quently, wargaming has failed to prepare participants to consider—much less to The Art of Wargaming by Peter P. Perla. An- understand—the strategic or operational essen- napolis. Maryland 21402: Naval Institute tials of the problem being addressed. This Press, 1990, 416 pages, $29.95. failure is partly the result of wargaming’s inher- 78 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

ent limitations (such as scenario dependence, as the principles of wargame design, develop- susceptibility to the biases of sponsor and/or ment, play, analysis, applications, and its fu- designer, the inability to accurately model em- ture possibilities. He treats these subjects in a pirical reality, etc.). workmanlike and engaging style that makes Perla’s second emergent theme is that war- The Art of Wargaming both highly informative gaming is part of an ongoing attempt to better and eminently readable. Although Perla’s de- come to grips with the innate complexities of tailed treatment of US naval and commercial warfare at levels ranging from the tactical to the (or hobby) wargaming occasionally departs grand strategic. From the Prussian staff rides of from the general reader’s "path of direct inter- the early nineteenth century to today’s intri- est.” the book integrates significant historical cate, computer-assisted global-warfare simula- events and developments in wargaming with tions and sophisticated commercial varieties, objectives and concepts in a consistently stimu- wargaming has helped reinforce, for practi- lating and thought-provoking way. tioner and hobbyist alike, crucial lessons to be Further, while Perla forthrightly lists funda- gathered nowhere else but on the battlefield. It mental considerations—both structural and is in this role as a window to the human ex- operational—crucial to effective wargaming, his perience in war that Perla sees potential prom- treatment of "principle” is not restrictive in a ise as well as a not-inconsiderable danger of dogmatic sense. It is evident throughout that abuse. Perla has too high a regard for the complexity Perla’s final theme is that the potential exists of the subject (war as well as wargaming) to for wargaming to become hostage to, as well as adopt the “cookbook” approach that is all too the beneficiary of, available technologies. He common in military literature. A forgivable illustrates this concern in describing the some- weakness of the book is that it relies heavily on what less-than-dazzling succession of powerful naval wargaming for illustrative purposes, to cybernetic systems that have supported ad- the relative exclusion of air and land simula- vanced naval warfare simulation models over tions (this tendency is probably justifiable, the last several decades, an experience repli- given that much of the development of modern cated elsewhere in the professional wargaming wargaming in US military circles has been done community. While Perla considers supporting by the Navy). methodologies important to wargaming's com- All in all. The Art of Wargaming is a dispas- plete mastery of large volumes of detailed infor- sionate (but certainly not passionless) descrip- mation and of the complex interactions of mod- tion of what wargaming is, what it can be, and ern combat systems and forces, he reminds us what distinguishes it from other forms of mili- that wargaming is, first and foremost, a process tary research and analysis. It is a lucid, enter- for exploring the human dimensions of warfare. taining, and comprehensive guide to a critically Perla rightly considers the wargame’s ultimate important field of military endeavor, and a value to reside in understanding both the deci- work that deservedly should be termed sions that are made and the factors/ foundational. circumstances attending them. In the section on "Principles,” Perla makes Maj David L. Booker, USAF Maxwell AFB, Alabama perhaps his greatest contribution to wargaming as a discipline. His succinct and logical treatment of what goes into the design, develop- A Country Made by War: From the Revolution ment. play, and analysis of wargames is by far to Vietnam—The Story of America’s Rise to the most authoritative, comprehensive, and to- Power by Geoffrey Perret. New York 10022: the-point account that I have seen in wargam- Random House, 1989, 629 pages, $22.50. ing literature of any vintage (other than his previous publications). This section is essential Often touted as controversial, Geoffrey Per- reading, whether one is seeking to improve the ret’s A Country Made by War runs contrary to scope and quality of adversarial play in an in- most general histories of the United States or teractive game, better simulate the effects of the American military. In particular, it takes is- "fog and friction,” or simply develop a better sue with a thesis first proposed 100 years ago feel for what is involved in constructing and/or by Emory Upton in The Military Policy of the playing an effective wargame. United States, which held that the US usually Perla covers a lot of ground in discussing the enters into military conflicts unprepared. historical development of wargaming, as well Through nine conflicts (the Revolutionary War, NET ASSESSMENT 79

the War of 1812. the Mexican-American War. Washington would not admit a mistake, so he the War Between the States, the Spanish- would not admit defeat. By some cosmic chem- American War. World War I, World War II, the istry he was at his best when the war was at its Korean War. and the Vietnam War) and several worst" (page 69). In addition to presidents and insurrections (the Indian wars from 1865 to generals, Perret introduces the reader to com- 1898: the Philippine insurrection from 1899 to mon soldiers, inventors, and government 1902: and the 1916 Mexican campaign against officials. Pancho Villa), Perret presents a story of the US The author also addresses racial matters in at war and discusses the impact of war upon times of war. “Some 5,000 blacks fought in the the development of the US as a nation and a so- Revolution. When slave owners tried to reclaim ciety. “Since 1775 no nation on Earth has had their property at the end of the war they were as much experience of War as the United rebuffed. Their slaves were transformed by States: nine major wars in nine generations. service into free men. And hundreds of run- And in between the wars have come other away slaves had been enrolled by desperate re- armed conflicts such as the Philippine Insur- cruiters as ‘free Negroes.’ Now they were” (page gency and clashes in the Persian Gulf" (page 72). In the Civil War, 10 percent of the Union 558). forces were black—180,000 in the Army and One threat that runs throughout A Country another 20,000 in the Navy. Black soldiers of Made by War is the impact of technology on US the 9th and 10th Cavalries fought during the In- national development. In his conclusion, Perret dian wars and served with distinction against speaks of a “dual technology”—industries that the Spanish in Puerto Rico, five of them Medal serve the needs of both the military and a de- of Honor winners. True segregation, though, veloping economy. For example, Eli Whitney was implemented during the Spanish- sought to mass-produce muskets with inter- American War in accordance with a basic tenet changeable parts and thus created the first gen- of nineteeth-century imperialism that espoused eration of machine tools. The concept would be the inferiority of colored people. Thus, the US spread across the Union 60 years later in a removed blacks from all combat roles and cre- drive to produce enough small weapons for its ated an image that followed them for 50 years. armies. Other innovations (e.g., aircraft and For example, during World War I blacks served electronics) that were promoted and developed with the French rather than with the American in wartime were assimilated by civil aviation, Expeditionary Force under Gen John J. Persh- consumer electronics, and the computer indus- ing, and in both world wars, they performed a try in peacetime. Moreover. Perret shows that variety of menial duties. A presidential execu- military procurement problems are not new to tive order called for desegregation in 1948, and the post-World War II military-industrial com- the Army was successfully desegregated under plex. Whitney’s first contract came in 10 years Gen Matthew B. Ridgway. The role of blacks in after the contract due date and was plagued by the American military remains fertile ground cost overruns. Perret also identifies the small for historical research. things that came home from war with the de- This book is a very readable history—what mobilized troops—regular shaving and the de- editors of fiction call a “page turner” because it mise of powdered wigs (the Revolutionary draws the reader into its tale of war and prog- War); cigarettes and moustaches (the Mexican- ress. The fact that Perret uses a writing style ac- American War); coffee without fresh milk, regu- cessible to the general reader prevents his study lar baths, and underwear (the Civil War); safety from becoming an academic history intelligible razors, wristwatches. and perfume (World War only to other historians. The author eschews I): college education, a baby boom, consumer- documentation: his “Notes" chapter at the end ism. and the end of the Great Depression of the book is actually an annotated bibliogra- (World War II). phy. This chapter, however, is reasonably com- Because history is about people as well as prehensive and provides the reader ample sug- events. Perret provides us with anecdotes in- gestions for further study. tended to capture the essence of historical fig- Is A Country Made by War must reading? ures. George Washington’s success is attributed Perhaps. In addition to being an easy read, it to his multifaceted skills, his interest in mili- presents an interesting perspective of American tary affairs, and his refusal to accept defeat. history—that the US was shaped by war rather 'The harder the going, the more determined he than Manifest Destiny and westward expan- became to see it through to final victory. Just as sion. Perret contends that the demobilization 80 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991 after World War II followed a precedent account that clearly describes loyalty as a mo- established in the Revolutionary War, which tive for remaking a staff. explains the seductive whisper for a “peace In combat, the breadth of Smith’s vision en- dividend.” Thus, by declaring the end of the compasses more than the instrument panel and cold war. Congress is seeking the demobiliza- immediate surroundings of his B-17. Scattered tion of a military that has grown from its silent throughout the book are passages that reveal his struggle with the Soviet Union. By making grasp of tactics: the use of wing abreast and these types of connections, A Country Made for combat box formations, glide bombs, War helps put today’s changes into historical pyrotechnics, and fighter cover. The immediacy perspective. and detail of his recollections after 45 years is Capt William B. Vleck, USAF astonishing. Such scope and depth of Worcester, Massachusetts knowledge—expected of a senior officer—help lift Screaming Eagle another step above other Eighth Air Force memoirs. The principal weakness of the book is the au- Screaming Eagle: Memoirs of a B-17 Group thor’s reluctance to comment on the policies Commander by Dale O. Smith. Chapel Hill, and actions of his superiors. Winning war North Carolina 27515: Algonquin Books, through aerial bombardment remains a contro- 1990, 272 pages, $18.95. versial topic, and a discussion of the Allied force’s efforts to reduce Festung Europa by stra- Narratives of aerial combat have my library tegic bombardment could illumine that debate. shelves groaning. Jaded by the “into the meat Yet, Smith makes only conventional remarks grinder” tales of aging warriors, I found Dale about the force’s unprecedented size and its Smith’s chronicle of a year spent as an Eighth utilization of inadequately trained personnel Air Force group commander informative and who sustained horrendous losses to achieve un- engaging. Although Screaming Eagle contains certain results. Smith’s reticence on the topic I its fair share of histrionics, Smith has much to take for tacit agreement with the methods and say about leadership and the business of aerial goals of his superiors. Although a critique of combat. the subject would have been beyond his scope The emphasis that Smith places upon fear as during the war, he is quite capable of address- a by-product of anticipating combat impresses ing it now. me more than the equally sincere depictions by The best accountings by military leaders authors such as John Muirhead, John Boeman, make readers feel that they too can grab the or William Cubbins. A decade older than these reins and do a creditable job of running a com- men. he came to war as an experienced pilot, mand. Modern narratives of this quality in- inured to the hazards of ordinary flying that include General Kenney Reports and Lucian timidated and killed many of his juniors. Smith Truscott. Jr.’s Command Missions. An obser- understood the threat presented by the German vant and honest account of Dale Smith’s tour as antiair defenses far better than did the younger commander of the 384th Bomb Group, men, and his fear of those weapons almost de- Screaming Eagle pushes close to the high stroyed half a-lifetime of military conditioning. standard of those two books. Perhaps the value In November of 1943, Smith took command of this memoir will be more practical than his- of the 384th Bomb Group, whose previous com- torical, concentrating as it does on issues of mander had been relieved. Regarded as a poor continuing concern to people who practice the performer, the unit had morale problems and art of military leadership. resented its new leader. Smith's attempts to res- James H. Westenhoff urrect his new command were orthodox but Woodbridge, Virginia worthy of recounting. Commanders and military students will appreciate his institution of flying discipline, decent food, and base cleanli- Decisive Factors in Twenty Great Battles of the ness. Smith admits to paranoia concerning the World by William Seymour. New York fact that his men—particularly his staff— 10010: St. Martin’s Press, 1989, 385 pages. remained loyal to his predecessor. He was not $22.95. comfortable until he had replaced the staff with men loyal to himself. Although this practice is The status of military history has changed a common one, I do not recall reading another greatly since the days of Sir Charles Oman, NET ASSESSMENT 81

when historians could talk glibly about battles ments. The three Napoleonic battles that changed the future of the world. Since examined—Borodino (Soviet Union), Ligny then, the sociological approach to history (Belgium), and Waterloo—are all from the de- championed by the Annales school has trans- clining years of the emperor’s career, when his formed our sense of what constitutes a histor- powers were on the wane. In a similar fashion, ical turning point. The historians spawned by the chapter on the Seven Days’ Battle dwells on this movement saw change as the slow outcome Stonewall Jackson’s uncharacteristic inde- of processes affecting the underlying structure cisiveness and lethargy during the Peninsula of society. Like Georges Clemenceau. who re- Campaign. garded the fate of nations as too important to be What decisive factors has Seymour isolated? left to generals, they refused to believe that the What lessons for military science do his 20 bat- evolution of a civilization could be altered by tles reveal? Seymour notes several sources of the contingencies of character or circumstance success in battle, none of them very original. manifested in a single battle or campaign. Thus, He places surprise—both strategic and they relegated military history, along with po- tactical—high on his list and, in the tradition of litical history, to the illusory half-world of his- Englishmen, favors the indirect method so well toire eventimentielle—the mere narration of celebrated by Basil Liddell Hart. He sees unex- events. Of course, the wars and high politics of pected maneuvers on overlooked fronts as the past ages retained their popularity with ordi- key to success in a number of battles—Scipio’s nary readers, and recently there have been defeat of Hannibal at Zama (Tunisia), William signs—even among scholars—of a renewed in- the Conqueror’s triumph in 1066, and Saladin’s terest in event-oriented history. destruction of the Crusaders at Hattin amongst None of these conflicting views of the histo- them. Morale, supply, and good lines of com- rian’s craft are very relevant, however, to munications are also stressed as important. The William Seymour’s new book. His concern is list is banal, but Seymour ought not to be crit- not necessarily with battles that may have icized too harshly for it. The short, philosophi- changed the shape of history—some of those cal chapter at the end is his book's pretext, not discussed most certainly did not have such far- its real reason for being. Seymour loves provid- reaching effects. As his title states, Seymour ing short, incisive accounts of battles: at this he treats decisive factors that determined the out- succeeds brilliantly. come of 20 famous battles. A retired British of- For what it's worth, let us return in closing to ficer who served in combat with the Scots our original question, even though it is not— Guards, Seymour believes—like most military properly speaking—Seymour’s and even professionals—that past conflicts have lessons though the 20 battles in Decisive Factors are that can be applied in future wars. He attempts not really a fair sample. How deeply has the to deduce these lessons from the battles that he outcome of great battles affected the course of examines. history? Leaving aside struggles like Isandhl- The list of battles that Seymour selects for wana, where the course of history obviously analysis is eclectic and therefore difficult to re- wasn’t at stake, the answer would still have to duce to a single theme. A foot soldier, Seymour be that sometimes they do but most often they sticks to what he knows best and deals only don't. Had Richard III defeated Henry Tudor at with land conflict, but his 20 battles cover all Bosworth Field, there would never have been a periods in the history of warfare from Rome to Henry VIII or an Elizabeth I. The English Refor- Vietnam. Notable battles like Hastings and Wa- mation might never have occurred. But the terloo share space with such little-known pas- Yorkist monarchy, of which Richard III was the sages of arms as Hattin (Galilee) in 1187, which last representative, prefigured the achievements ended the first Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem, of the Tudors in concentrating royal power. and Isandhlwana (Natal, Republic of South Af- Thus, the broad shape of English political and rica), where in 1879 Zulu tribesmen annihi- social history would probably have remained lated a force of British soldiers. World War II is the same even if the Plantagenet line had sur- entirely neglected, and World War I’s only rep- vived. Hastings is a better candidate for having resentative is the Battle of Tannenberg (Po- had a uniquely fundamental impact on Eng- land), which occurred on the Eastern Front. To land’s future. The defeat of the Anglo-Saxon match his taste for important but somewhat Harold replaced an insular monarchy oriented obscure battles, Seymour also seems to prefer toward Scandinavia with expansionist Nor- studying great captains in their weaker mo- mans skilled at the manipulation of feudalism 82 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

to increase their power and open to Continental plex. There is seldom any one cause: rather, influences. As for Waterloo—that archetypal failure stems from the systemic nature of a mili- “turning point in history” sort of battle—it only tary organization itself. hastened an inevitability. France was ex- As Cohen and Gooch explain, operational en- hausted, and Napoleon was mentally and phys- vironments for warfare can change easily, yet ically in decline. Had he won, a new coalition military thinking is by nature conservative and would soon have arisen to defeat him. His own does not readily keep up with such changes. untameable aggressiveness would have brought The problem, then, becomes either lack of vi- it into existence. sion or failure to note a key piece of informa- Let me repeat, however, that these consideration at a critical time. Whether through doc- tions are irrelevant to the job that Seymour set trine, training, organizational intransigence, out to do. His goals were more modest than as- overconfidence, or some other error in percep- sessing warfare as a factor in history, so one tion, the people responsible for military opera- ought not review the book he didn’t write. He tions at some point overlook or ignore one or set himself the task of furnishing entertainingly more significant aspects of the situation they written narrative accounts of some battles that confront. The result is an inappropriate deci- interested him, pointing out the ingredients—as sion and subsequent failure on the battlefield. he saw them—of victory and defeat. His efforts To facilitate analysis of these situations, Co- were victorious, and his well-written book is hen and Gooch outline their own three-tiered also a book worth reading. typology of military misfortune. This scheme Dr Lawrence J. Kilbourne includes simple failure—the failure to antici- Wright-Patterson AFB. Ohio pate, to learn from, or to adapt to changes: aggregate failure—the combination of any two simple failures; and catastrophic failure—the combination of all three simple failures. The Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure authors discuss each type and include a corre- in War by Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch. sponding "matrix of failure” that diagrams the New York 10022: Free Press, 1990, 246 pages, flow of decisions by comparing various com- $22.95. mand levels with critical tasks or functions performed. Cohen and Gooch seem to think a great In his Age of Reason, Thomas Paine wrote deal of their matrixes, using them to help clar- that “the sublime and the ridiculous are so ify relationships and distill lessons learned. often so nearly related, that it is difficult to They also amplify their analytical notions class them separately.” The same might be said with some superbly balanced historical assess- about notions of success or failure in military ments. The failure of Israeli intelligence in operations. In their joint effort, authors Cohen 1973 illustrates the failure to anticipate enemy and Gooch attempt to clarify this distinction, actions. Failure to learn is depicted by the US eschewing the word failure in favor of the more Navy’s problems with antisubmarine warfare benign term misfortune. Misfortune connotes during 1942 (which led to a purported mas- less personal culpability on the part of com- sacre of Allied shipping, as described in Dr Mi- manders for the outcome and thus helps defuse chael Gannon’s recent Operation Drumbeat). some of the emotion that often attends The British experience at Gallipoli (Turkey) in postfailure handwringing. Having made this 1915 shows an army’s failure to adapt to point, the authors proceed to use failure almost changes in warfare. The defeat of the US Eighth exclusively. Army in Korea during the 1950s provides the Cohen and Gooch begin by reviewing a num- one example of aggregate failure, combining ber of popular approaches for assessing military failure to learn with failure to anticipate. Fi- failure. Each approach is described and then nally, the authors use the classic capitulation of dismissed in turn, including Norman Dixon’s France to the Germans in 1940 to illustrate cat- theory that all failure stems from generals who astrophic failure. They also touch briefly on the are psychologically anal-retentive. The main US military experience at Pearl Harbor but mer- reason these approaches are insufficient is that cifully do not examine the war in Southeast each looks at too narrow a piece of the ques- Asia. tion. Military failure, especially catastrophic Overall, the authors present a curious blend failure, is a complex phenomenon. Thus, the of technocrat and artist. Their typology for reasons for success or failure are equally com- failures provides a useful point of departure for NET ASSESSMENT 83

analyzing military operations, but this is less says good-bye to a 90-pound lieutenant colonel the case for the matrixes. The latter are dissimi- who is recovering from a nervous breakdown. lar, measure different elements, and enjoy less In 1934 Ramsey was a "hell-raiser, the boy than two pages of description apiece. Further, over whom neighbors wagged their heads." His since one must examine the history in some de- troubled youth seems to have been the result of tail to develop a meaningful matrix, the poten- a bitter relationship with his father, who had tial lessons emerge ipso facto. Why, then, failed the family in many ways and ultimately should the authors bother with the matrixes at took his own life after being jailed for domestic all? All this raises the question. Are the ma- violence. His mother was concerned that if Ed- trixes designed as a result of the analysis, or are win were left to his own devices, he would they built to justify the analysis? Either way, never amount to anything. Hoping to capitalize their utility escaped this reviewer, and they on his love for horses, she enrolled him in the come across as mere afterthoughts. Oklahoma Military Academy—one of the best Regardless of the intellectual engineering cavalry schools in the country. Young Ramsey necessary to create the matrixes, the authors excelled there, developing a keen interest in generate some sound historical conclusions. polo. His love of the sport eventually led to his Military misfortunes/failures inevitably provide win were left to his own devices, he would great potential for learning lessons about our posting in the Philippines, where the 26th Cav- craft. Although Cohen and Gooch promise a alry was home to one of the Army’s best teams. new means of historical analysis, their straight- Most readers will recall seeing news clips forward and comprehensive examination of which showed the polo match at Fort Stotsen- specific events makes the book worth the price berg, the Philippines, on 7 December 1941. The of admission. clips depict the genteel—almost detached— Army life which epitomized American naivete Lt Col Richard L. Davis, USAF on the eve of the war. They show cavalry of- Washington, D.C. ficers on their mounts, enjoying a colonial life- style. Ramsey was at the match, astride his horse Bryn Awryn, playing position number Lieutenant Ramsey’s War by Edwin Price three. He had no idea that the next day he Ramsey and Stephen J. Rivele. Los Angeles, would have his men load their horses onto California 90064: Knightsbridge Publishing trucks and deploy to meet the oncoming Co., 1991, 352 pages, $19.95. enemy. Nor did he suspect that a short while later he would lead a small troop of Philippine Lieutenant Ramsey's War is a personal ac- scouts in a desperate charge against advancing count of one man's struggle against the Jap- Japanese infantry, earning him the Silver Star. anese in the Philippines during World War II. Some would say he was an anachronism, while The first question that an examination of this others would call him the last cavalier. The dis- book brings to mind is. Who is Lieutenant tinction proves to be irrelevant. Ramsey? Unless readers have worked with When Bataan surrendered, Ramsey was deep Hughes Aircraft Company and remember him in the jungle on patrol. As he and his men as the vice president for the Far East area, they made their way back south, they ran into strag- have probably never heard of Edwin Price glers who told them of the surrender and the Ramsey. Even the majority of his fellow infamous death march. Ramsey’s unit found workers had no idea that in 1942 he led the last themselves alone, starving, and surrounded: cavalry charge in US history. Although cer- rather than surrender, though, they decided to tainly a distinction, this fact readily draws to continue the struggle. The resultant three-year mind a quixotic dreamer who was totally out of struggle against the Japanese, disease, and touch with the mechanized realities of World treachery is recounted as Lieutenant Ramsey’s War II. One would expect the story of a man War. with such credentials to be one of reckless Because the book is a personal account and is abandon or nostalgic remembrances of times not meant to provide historical reference, the past. Neither is the case. reader must overlook the simplistic treatment With the help of Stephen J. Rivele, Ramsey of strategies and campaigns. The only true gives an account of his coming-of-age. which shortcoming is that the writing lacks vitality began in Wichita and ended 11 years later in a and is at times wooden. However, it does suc- Topeka hospital. The reader is introduced to a ceed in removing Ramsey from the shadows of brash, oversized teenager but 300 pages later history. Indeed, one walks away from this book 84 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991 feeling that it should become a movie. Only la- to improve the chance for combat success. The ter does it become obvious that no Hollywood South Vietnamese navy had virtually no effect hero would be allowed to suffer the self-doubts on the outcome of the war. and uncertainties which plagued Ramsey. Nor Other factors influenced the poor perfor- could he do justice to the triumph of human mance of the ARVN. Desertion rates remained spirit which makes Ramsey a true hero. Lieu- high (around 10 percent) throughout the war; tenant Ramsey’s War is well worth the few draft dodging was extensive: and because of po- hours needed to read it. litical favoritism, there was—in most cases— Lt Col Thomas M. Kearney, USAF inadequate leadership at the highest levels of Washington, D.C. command, contributing to the low morale of the troops. A massive program to train ARVN soldiers beginning in 1965 produced mixed results at best. The Elephant and the Tiger: The Full Story of In comparison with the North Vietnamese the Vietnam War by Wilbur H. Morrison. Army (NVA), the ARVN seemed to hold every New York 10016: Hippocrene Books. 1990, advantage—specifically, extensive US aid in 703 pages, $24.95. arms, equipment, money, and combat ground troops. Even when President Richard Nixon re- Using the analogy that the powerful elephant linquished combat responsibilities and with- (the United States) was no match for the elusive drew US ground forces as part of the start of and cunning hit-and-run tactics of the tiger Vietnamization in 1969, ARVN soldiers still (North Vietnam), Wilbur H. Morrison argues outnumbered the NVA in the south by a two-to- unconvincingly that inept military and political one margin. In addition, the North had no air leadership in the United States was responsible force in the South yet had to contend with tac- for the loss of the war in Vietnam. The author tical and strategic strikes by US pilots. does correctly identify policy decisions that Morrison seems to change course at the end weakened the ability of the US to wage war and of his book by confirming that “despite incred- achieve victory. He criticizes President Lyndon ible losses in men and material, the North Viet- Johnson for ignoring the advice of his Joint namese emerged victorious. They did so be- Chiefs of Staff to mount a massive air campaign cause their leaders refused to admit defeat and against the lucrative targets of Hanoi. American inspired their soldiers to fight on. often against generals should have resigned in protest, Mor- impossible odds.” But he fails to adequately an- rison suggests. US military leaders also should swer the fundamental question: If the ARVN have insisted that a centralized command be fought so well, why were they unable to con- established so the US could control and coordi- sistently defeat the enemy on the battlefield? nate combat operations of South Vietnamese That is, why was the will to win so much forces. Finally, the US miscalculated by sup- greater with the NVA? Despite suffering signifi- porting the corrupt South Vietnamese regimes, cantly more combat deaths (1 million, com- a decision that contributed to the poor leader- pared to 250,000 for the South), the North re- ship in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam mained deeply committed to a protracted war (ARVN). and victory. What is frustrating about this book is the con- There were bright spots in the ARVN’s per- flicting evidence and twisted logic that lead to formance, especially the airborne and ranger a flawed thesis. Throughout, the author makes units who fought valiantly during Tet and the abundant references to the ARVN soldiers as Easter offensive of 1972. However, these were “determined” fighters who “man for man were exceptions to the norm of a long series of de- vastly superior to their adversaries.” Yet, US feats over an extended period. military leaders routinely complained about the Other aspects of this book are troublesome. ARVN's lack of inspiration and reluctance to Although the author states that he read over 10 fight. The ARVN seemed more content to de- million words and consulted numerous defend the nation’s population centers than to tailed reports, he shares none of this informa- sustain aggressive offensive operations in the tion with the reader—there are no footnotes. field and destroy the enemy army. The South The most recently published book in the bibli- Vietnamese air force—ineffective in close air ography is dated 1983; thus, Morrison leaves operations—avoided flying at night or on week- out more recent and important interpretations ends, a practice that did little to raise morale or by such writers as Gen Bruce Palmer, Jr., Lt Col NET ASSESSMENT 85

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., and Lt Gen Phillip battle with Columbia Broadcasting System B. Davidson. Morrison's claim that almost half (CBS) over its coverage of his reports on troop of US veterans who served in Vietnam were ex- strength and casualties. With the predictable posed to moderate-to-heavy combat would be bias of a longtime friend, Davidson comes to quickly challenged by infantrymen who fought Westmoreland’s defense. Although convincing, in that conflict. his argument would have been better suited to This is a provocative, well-written, and inter- a magazine article. It does not belong in a esting book that is worth reading, if only to be- treatise on lessons of Vietnam. come familiar with an apologist’s view of the According to General Davidson, the great se- South Vietnamese. Morrison has the facts right cret which ultimately led to the United States’ in this lengthy work, but his conclusions do not losing the strategic war—despite winning the follow. The US did not lose the war in Viet- tactical battles—was the inability of all levels of nam. Although many factors contributed to de- leadership to recognize the North Vietnamese feat in that country, the failure of ARVN com- strategy of revolutionary war. We failed to ap- bat operations in the field was the primary ply the lessons that should have been apparent reason North Vietnamese tanks rolled into from a decade of French defeat in Southeast Saigon in April 1975. Asia. Our leaders, both military and political, Dr Robert W. Duffner keyed on ethnocentric Western measures of Kirtland AFB. New Mexico merit (troop strength, body count, etc.) instead of properly analyzing and countering the phases of the revolution. Secrets of the Vietnam War by Lt Gen Phillip Along the way, Davidson introduces a list of B. Davidson, USA, Retired. Novato, Califor- myths, the belief in which led to US impotence. nia 94949: Presidio Press, 1990, 193 pages, With the help of President Lyndon Johnson, at $18.95. least two of the myths aspired to the status of truth and are very instructive in light of Iraq’s Put yourself in the shoes of the military com- 1990 invasion of Kuwait. First, President mander who, believing the adage History Re- Johnson incorrectly likened Communist aggres- peats Itself, reads and studies in hopes of never sion in the post-World War II era to Hitler’s ag- being surprised by the enemy’s secret inten- gression in Europe prior to World War II. tions. The latter comprise Lt Gen Phillip B. (Present-day political leaders have invoked Davidson's Secrets of the Vietnam War. Per- Hitler on more than one occasion.) Second, haps those aren’t the secrets one would expect there was a prevalent feeling that air power from Gen William C. Westmoreland’s top intel- alone could win the Vietnam War. Davidson ligence officer (from May 1967 to May 1969), cites this myth as the reason for Johnson’s and in more ways than that, the title of his book piecemeal deployment of ground troops to the is misleading. Secrets of the Vietnam War is ac- war. He acknowledges that the premise of air tually the epilogue of Davidson’s 1988 Vietnam supremacy was never really tested because of at War, in that it reads very much like what the the lack of commitment to the air power effort. author really intended as the wrap-up to that (Apparently, our current leaders—despite mammoth effort. In fact, the chapter ‘‘How We latching on to the hope that air power can "do Lost the War" is nearly identical to a chapter in it all”—have also listened to strategists and Vietnam at War titled "Why We Lost the War.” have massed an overwhelming ground force to Two-thirds of Secrets of the Vietnam War is deal with reality.) excellent and pertinent. General Davidson is a At the very least, military and political superb writer and has succeeded in drafting a leaders should read the final two chapters of very readable, useful, methodical analysis of Secrets of the Vietnam War. In just 40 gripping Ho Chi Minh’s revolutionary strategy, as well pages. Davidson convincingly tells how we lost as an account of how the US leadership at all the war in Vietnam and what we could have levels misinterpreted and badly countered that done to win it. He places the lion's share of the strategy. He follows that portion with an in- blame directly on the president’s shoulders: sightful treatment of why we lost the war and "The brutal truth is that Johnson fought the (most important for today’s warriors and Vietnam War as a secondary adjunct to his do- leaders) what we could have done to win it. mestic political aims. . . . The great strength of The remaining one-third consists of two chap- the United States lay in our massive military ters dealing with General Westmoreland's legal power. The American weakness was in our in- 86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991 ability to sustain a long, indecisive war. . . . Re- Chapter 3, “The Front Line Squadrons,” alities dictated that the United States wage a looks at the men, women, aircraft, equipment, short, savage war, using the maximum force and mission of the nine frontline squadrons of necessary." the RAF today. Chapter 4, “Squadron Leader- Secrets of the Vietnam War is must reading ship," portrays the senior officers of a fighter for students of the Westmoreland/CBS saga. Its squadron of the RAF, including the squadron information and perspective on that issue are commander, the qualified-weapons instructor, found nowhere else. For military and political the flight commander, and the squadron leaders who want a brief, incisive analysis of instrument-rating officer. Chapter 5, “Flying how we lost the war and why, there are few Support,” describes the three types of crucial treatments better than Davidson’s. complementary flying activities of a successful Maj Rick Taylor, USAF RAF: electronic-warfare squadrons with the Washington, D.C. Canberra T17, in-flight refueling squadrons with the VC10 K tankers, and airborne early To Inherit the Skies: From Spitfire to Tornado: warning squadrons with the E-3D Sentry. Chap- Britain’s Air Defence Today by R. A. Mason. ter 6, “Groundwork,” reviews the critical im- London: Brassey’s, 1990, 102 pages, $12.95. portance to the RAF of ground control (radars, communications, and data links), surface-to-air Fifty years after what Air Vice-Marshal Tony defenses, maintenance, security, engineering, Mason and many others call the ‘‘greatest air supply, and simulator training. The final chap- battle of this century and one of the most deci- ter, “United We Stand,” contains interesting sive events of the Second World War,” the pub- profiles and interviews of numerous exchange lication of To Inherit the Skies is a most appro- pilots from other nations flying with the RAF priate celebration of Britain’s victory over today. Germany in the Battle of Britain. It is an in- Air Vice-Marshal Mason’s To Inherit the sightful look into the “inheritors” of that spirit Skies is a wonderfully researched and detailed and tradition begun a half century ago—the No. look at the Royal Air Force today, but—even 11 Group of the Royal Air Force (RAF). Air more—it is historical. For every part of the RAF Vice-Marshal Mason not only describes the so- examined in this book, Mason takes the reader phisticated aircraft, equipment, and rigorous back to the RAF of 1940, not only depicting training of today’s modern RAF, but also con- those times and comparing them to today, but tinually compares the RAF of 1940 to the RAF discussing lessons learned and conveying the of 1990. Although there are incredible contrasts strong tradition and heritage felt by current in technology, tactics, and missions, he Royal Air Force members. emphatically shows that the quality.and dedication of the present RAF's men and women Capt Jeffrey Todd Travis, USAF are unsurpassed, as they were 50 years ago Homestead AFB, Florida when Winston Churchill said, ‘‘Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by Bouncing Back: How a Heroic Band of POWs so many to so few.” Survived Vietnam by Geoffrey Norman. Mason begins his book by noting that the Boston 02107: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1990, most obvious changes in today’s RAF are due to 248 pages, $19.95. the current overall strategic environment. Rea- sons for these differences today include the The Zoo, the Plantation, Dogpatch, Camp presence of NATO, changes in the threat to the Unity, and the infamous Hanoi Hilton were lo- United Kingdom, and the improved range, en- cations where American servicemen spent durance, and weaponry of today’s aircraft. years of their lives in oftentimes excruciatingly Chapter 2, “The Making of the Fighter Crew,” painful deprivation and confinement. Upon follows the current training of RAF aviators their return to freedom many were asked re- from the Initial Officers’ Training Course peatedly, “How does it make you feel to know through a flying training squadron and a tacti- that you wasted all those years?” Most of them, cal weapons unit to an operational conversion however, have been able to respond with the unit. Particularly insightful are Mason’s inter- amazing proclamation that "those years vveren t views with combat pilots and his discussion of wasted; we lived hard all the time. Norman s a primary lesson learned from the Battle of Brit- book offers insight into just how these brave ain: “Never again would novices be put into souls lived hard, draining the maximum possi- battle against hardened veterans." ble essence from each breath. NET ASSESSMENT 87

As the war recedes in our experiential mem- that some water had accumulated there”; men ory, it is good for us to read works such as buried under the shame of having been broken, Bouncing Back. When some younger service- confessing their failure to the first American men and women question the reason for our an- they encountered, only to be overwhelmed nual POW/MIA remembrance ceremonies, it with relief when they learned they were not would be helpful to share with them a small alone; and prisoners exercising with the only taste of what these patriots suffered for weeks, thing available to lift—“buckets full of human months, and years as the cost of defending free- waste.” dom. Many were sustained through the thou- One message coming through clearly is that sands of days by the belief that the war could humor can sustain people even under the most not last "more than six months longer.” vicious of circumstances. Prisoners laboriously This conviction was based upon several communicated sophisticated puns called sources of information. Most of the POWs “Aesop’s Feebles” from cell to cell in order to heard broadcasts of Hanoi Hannah. In addition, challenge each other’s minds and lift spirits. various prisoners were forced to read ‘‘local Often taking days to tap out these puns letter by news” reports over the camp’s loudspeakers letter, the POWs inevitably produced some (replete, as a form of resistance, with inten- corny twisting of a familiar proverb or saying. tional mispronunciations and grammatical er- These ‘‘feebles’’ required concentration to rors). The most accurate source of news came create, and even the poorest of them could at from recently downed pilots. least raise a smirk of disgust. This is not the account of all POWs but es- Humor possesses a healing power as well. Af- sentially of pilots downed over North Vietnam ter being “interrogated" over a period of days, a itself. Even more narrowly, it is the account of “bloody and uncomprehending” prisoner was Lt Comdr Al Stafford and those men he grew returned to his cell. Knowing that rebounding closest to during his confinement. It begins on quickly from such experiences was especially board the USS Oriskany as Stafford awakes on critical, his neighbors tapped out to him the fol- the morning of his final A-4 bombing mission. lowing. albeit somewhat crass, thought: “Re- During the course of the story, we are intro- search proves that ninety-nine prcnt of POWs duced to various other prisoners and hear por- jack off. We need your help to make it one- tions of their stories. Still, it is Stafford that we hundred prcnt." After the war, he would de- follow throughout his captivity to the eventual clare that this timely message had helped save reconstruction of his damaged life. Thus, the his sanity, if not his life. book reads much more like a novel than a study A similarly spirited message was relayed of the lives of POWs in general. across the camp to celebrate a special event and The title points to the overriding theme of the offer some of the encouragement unique to volume—the evolution of the military doctrine humor when Stafford reached to the back of his of survival known as “bouncing back.” As a re- throat and removed a six-inch parasite which sult of the horrendous treatment of POWs dur- had begun to cut off his breathing: “Congratula- ing the Korean War. the services developed a tions to Lt Comdr Al Stafford who gave birth at code of conduct for POWs. Still, those people 1630 hrs to a six-inch, five-ounce worm. Both imprisoned by the North Vietnamese found the Stafford and worm doing fine." code's resources inadequate, for they were not Few military members will be able to read even regarded as prisoners of war but as war the book without asking, subconsciously at criminals and were treated accordingly. Bounc- least, Could I make it through such traumatic ing back was forged in this torturous furnace. It circumstances? Hopefully, that question will affirmed, in essence, that even after you had remain academic for all of us. But should such been broken and had violated the code by coop- a day come, the lessons learned by these men erating in some fashion with your captors, your and offered to us in books such as this could goal was now to regain your strength and will aid immeasurably—not only in promoting our to resist tomorrow. You would bounce back survival, but even our personal growth during from this failure and strive to your utmost to the trials themselves. win the next round. The author, a former editor of Esquire, writes Bouncing Back is filled with numerous with an emotion that suggests a personal episodes that open a window through which exposure—through Stafford and others—to the outsiders can view life in these camps: a man horrors of life for the American POW in Viet- deprived of water so long that he would eagerly nam. Some readers may be distracted by a sub- "lick the floor where the tiles joined, hoping tle bias toward pilots (e.g., at the expense of 88 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

‘‘mere backseaters”). Likewise, some generali- are treated as necessary evils, volunteers are zations (e.g.. ‘‘like most pilots he had no gift for seen as quintessential soldiers—protecting introspection”) may not be helpful. Neverthe- home, family, and culture. less, the book remains well worth reading. Wallace Walker, US Army colonel and pro- The work is more than simply a biography. It fessor of public policy at West Point, has writ- touches on varied issues relating to broader ten a well-polished work on the current state of subjects: the classes they taught one another on Britain’s territorial army (TA—the equivalent of subjects as diverse as sailing and wine appre- the US National Guard). In his Reserve Forces ciation; the medical and psychological studies and the British Territorial Army, he rightly ar- of returning POWs which found, among other gues that in order to make qualified judgments things, an ‘‘increase in their IQ scores”; the ar- about the TA's future, policymakers must un- bitrary treatment of POWs and the efforts of derstand both its history and corporate culture. senior officers to direct their subordinates to re- Moreover, other institutions such as the govern- fuse any special treatment; and the actions of ment, various political coalitions, and the regu- (unnamed) collaborators who seized oppor- lar army also must be studied to see how their tunities to return to the States with delegations traditions and beliefs affect their judgment of of antiwar activists such as Daniel Berrigan and the TA system. Tom Hayden. The book offers a wealth of in- The first two chapters are scant overviews sight into numerous similar matters. which narrate the British civilian-military tra- The volume is appropriately dedicated to the dition from 1016 A.D. and describe the various men of the Fourth Allied POW Air Wing “who public agencies which interact with the TA. His endured and prevailed.” They provide a superb conclusions are not surprising. Politicians at example, worthy of study and reflection, for all the local level are more interested in the TA of us serving in our nation’s armed forces than are any of the political parties or the today. houses of Parliament. This generalization can best be understood in light of chapter 3, “Com- Chaplain, Capt. Robert Stroud. USAF bat Clans,” which categorizes the territorial RAF Greenhorn Common, United Kingdom army as a loose confederation of localized regimental-size groups who are attracted to serve out of a volunteer ethic. These groups are Reserve Forces and the British Territorial self-contained, self-regulated, and obtain a de- Army: A Case Study for NATO in the 1990s gree of self-consciousness. by Wallace E. Walker. London: Tri-Service Entrance into these clans resembles primitive Press, 1990, 203 pages. joining rituals, requiring extensive preparation At the Battle of the Chippawa during the War in understanding the group’s historical antece- of 1812. a brigade of regulars under the com- dents and mythical traditions. Those who fail mand of Winfield Scott met a contingent of pro- these “rites of passage” are usually exorcised fessional British soldiers. The British com- by the group and are reflected in the TA’s low mander, believing that Scott’s army was retention rate. Those who remain, however, comprised mainly of militia, pushed for an identify only with the local clan and usually do engagement. What was at first thought to be an not view themselves as part of a larger ter- easy British victory turned into a rout for the ritorial army. Americans. The English commander found out Later chapters demonstrate how this “unit too late that the Americans were well-trained identity” is not well understood by regulars, regulars—not the ill-equipped and poorly disci- who usually command local companies and plined militia. make manpower policies at the higher staff The dichotomy between regular army and the levels. When factoring the territorial army into militia (volunteer civilian army) is at the heart a total-force concept, officials see the TA as a of a shared Anglo-American military heritage. unified military body ready for deployment as This heritage can be described from two dif- part of a NATO force or for home defense. This, ferent perspectives. From an active duty point according to Walker, is a critical mistake. The of view, volunteer armies are neither reliable, nearsightedness of territorials, combined with efficient, nor professional. The public, on the their equipment and training deficiencies, other hand, views these volunteer soldiers as makes them more useful for home defense rooted in democratic values and as pillars of rather than for inclusion as an important leg of civilized societies. While professional armies an advanced multinational defense force. NET ASSESSMENT 89

British politicians and the regular force must Several years ago a war-gaming company was come to grips with the TA’s inadequacies and designing a "conflict simulation” of modern realistically address them. The first place to mechanized warfare in Europe between NATO start, according to the author, is to redefine the and Warsaw Pact armies. Information on the territorial army’s mission. The second is to in- Warsaw Pact armies was relatively easy to ob- stitutionalize. centralize, and standardize ter- tain. Documents released by the US military ritorial policy and culture. Using the US Na- gave a great deal of detailed, in-depth informa- tional Guard as an example, Walker advocates tion on Soviet armor, air support, fire support, full-time territorial officers, more professional and so on. Information on US forces in Europe, education, high-level representation at the however, was less forthcoming. Most of the in- general-staff level, more training time, sophisti- formation provided by official sources was cated equipment, and increased pay and bene- rather vague and fuzzy. A chance visit to the fits. Unless these things are done, he warns, the bookstore run by the Soviet Union in New York territorial army is—and will continue to be—a City and the purchase of several books pub- hollow one. lished by the Soviet Union on NATO military At times, the book is redundant and overly forces provided the war gamers with the de- rhetorical. Walker is good at pointing out para- tailed information they desired. Interestingly, doxes and ironies but rarely adequate at ex- the information in the Soviet sources on the plaining them. Additionally, the bulk of his Warsaw Pact forces was just as vague as analysis is predicated upon more than 80 tele- NATO’s had been about NATO. phone interviews with various political and The desire to be knowledgeable about the military officials, whom he does not name. I am military—given recent world events—has esca- left wondering if Walker wants his readers to lated in recent months. In Dirty Little Secrets. take his word on their representativeness and authors Jim Dunnigan and Al Nofi provide the credibility. Scholarship demands more. These general public with the "info-bite”—the literary caveats aside, this timely book deserves reading equivalent of television’s “sound-bite." Using by a broad array of staff officers and future only those open sources available to the public commanders because it not only has important and drawing upon the expertise developed over implications for all reserve forces, but also decades of designing war games ("conflict sim- teaches the value of placing military institu- ulations"), the authors have assembled over tions within their political, economic, and so- 900 info-bites of military information—the cial milieu. "dirty little secrets” alluded to in the title. Capt Mark R. Grandstaff. USAF Using seven topic areas (ground forces, air Bolling AFB. Washington, D.C. forces, naval forces, high technology, logistics, human factors, and war and society), Dunnigan and Nofi marshal a wide variety of fascinating Dirty Little Secrets: Military Information info-bites—ranging from quotations to facts and You’re Not Supposed to Know About by (often pithy) opinions—into a manageable James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi. New framework. The following are examples of the York 10016: William Morrow and Co., 1990, “secrets” found in these info-bites: 464 pages, $19.95. An old adage states, rather bluntly, that • There are 836 tanks per million people in knowledge is power. In the military, knowledge Israel, 255 per million in Iraq, and 67 per mil- is often the difference between the success or lion in the United States. failure of an operation. Unsurprisingly, then, • "The best tank terrain is that without anti- military organizations throughout the world go tank obstacles" (Soviet military doctrine). to great pains to safeguard information that • "Modern air power has made the bat- would allow any potential adversary an advan- tlefield irrelevant” (John Slessor). "Nobody has tage in a conflict. The United States military, yet found a way of bombing that can prevent for example, expends enormous resources to foot soldiers from walking” (Walter Lippmann). obtain knowledge of the capabilities and capac- • Only 5 percent of the aircraft downed dur- ities of potential opponents and to simul- ing the 1979-88 Iran-Iraq war were victims of taneously ensure that its secrets are denied to engagements with other aircraft. any unfriendly powers. In an open democratic • In Israel, 12.1 percent of the population society like that of the United States, secrets are serves the armed forces in some capacity; in anathema, yet military necessity requires them. Switzerland, 9.8 percent; in Sweden, 8.2 per- 90 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1991

cent; in the United States, 0.9 percent; and in history of battles and campaigns from World the world, 0.6 percent. War II is fairly well documented. Most of the • The Swiss army still maintains over 20,000 recent books on that war have been of the carrier pigeons to back up its electronic com- ‘‘there I was” variety of personal reminis- munications systems—“they’re cheap.” “If you cences. The Airmen is a compilation of these load a mud foot down with a lot of gadgets that stories by Edwin P. Hoyt, a respected and pro- he has to watch, somebody a lot more simply lific writer who has concentrated on the human equipped—say with a stone ax—will sneak up side of war. This book consists of short chap- and bash his head in while he is trying to read ters that take the reader through the military a vernier” (Robert A. Heinlein). life of World War II fliers from shortly before • In 1986, one decoration (counting only the the war began for the United States; through Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of their training, early attempts to enter the war, Merit, the Meritorious Service Medal, and the and combat; to the end of the war. appropriate service's Commendation Medal) This is not an oral history, although it has was awarded by the US Air Force to every 7.6 that flavor. Many of the stories are republished men and women under arms, to every 7.9 by from unit histories—which are published in the Army, to every 60.1 by the Navy, and to ev- small numbers and not well known or easily ery 86.7 by the Marine Corps. "Give me enough available to the public—such as The 390th ribbon and I’ll give you an army of heroes” Bomb Group Anthology or from unpublished (Napoleon Bonaparte). manuscripts. Still others are reprinted from While providing many amusing anecdotes more well known works. The serious military and quotations, the authors also include some historian may consider this a drawback, but the thoughtful insight into many contemporary reader who simply wants to capture the flavor military problems and are quick to comment or of combat life for airmen during this time will give an opinion about a particular subject: They find an excellent variety of experiences from propose using the B-lB as an aerial mining fighter pilots in combat as well as from airmen platform; several info-bites suggest possible fu- who never left the continental United States. ture military roles for Japan and, as a whole, Hoyt is especially noted for his work on the paint a picture somewhat at odds with the war in the Pacific, and that emphasis domi- usual image of Japan as a nonparticipant; and nates the better-known and more-often- the use of Freon—a chlorofluorocarbon—in recorded stories of the air war in Europe. Hoyt’s new Army field laundries to assist with the de- accounts of the Pacific air war are the real high- contamination of uniforms in a chemical en- lights of this book. They are more detailed, bet- vironment elicits tongue-in-cheek praise for the ter written, and less likely to be tales repeated Army’s concern for the environment. from other sources. They shed a good deal of A caution: soldiers and marines do not carry light on an often-forgotten part of World War II. umbrellas in their left hands, leaving their right European enthusiasts should not despair, hands free for saluting, because soldiers and though, because the book includes some well- marines do not carry umbrellas. The Army will told accounts of that theater of operations as allow soldiers to carry umbrellas when the Ma- well. Especially noteworthy are stories of the rine Corps allows marines to carry umbrellas, 100th Bomb Group—the “Bloody Hundredth"— and vice versa. The end result: soldiers and ma- and of life as a prisoner of war. rines will probably never carry umbrellas. How The short-story style of this book makes it a did Dunnigan and Nofi miss that one? convenient work to read in spare moments. As with most anthologies, the quality of writing M aj H ubert D. Capps, U S A rm y varies from chapter to chapter. Most are inter- Arlington, Virginia esting and exciting accounts of air combat, although a few chapters could have been short- The Airmen; The Story of American Fliers in ened without taking anything away from the World War II by Edwin P. Hoyt. New York value of the book. The World War II-era airmen have been the basis for the traditions and 10011: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1990, heritage that have developed within the United 418 pages, $22.50. States Air Force. It seems appropriate that we As the men who fought World War II grow should be familiar with their exploits as a way older and as more of them pass away, the desire of understanding where we came from as a to record their individual stories grows. The service and as airmen. The time available to NET ASSESSMENT 91

capture that heritage is rapidly passing. The Lafayette Flying Corps grew). Admittedly, Ken- Airmen assists us in fulfilling that mission. nett was quoting another author at that point— Lt Col Michael A. Kirtland, USAF but neither of them had bothered to do his Maxwell AFB. Alabama homework! For many recreational readers, these points will be only minor blemishes on a readable work. But this review addresses a professional military audience, and Professor Ken- The First Air War. 1914-1918 by Lee B. nett claims to be a military historian. Kennett. New York 10022: Free Press, 1991. I reviewed Professor Kennett’s earlier book 275 pages. $24.95. on the evolution of strategic air doctrine for Na- tional Defense magazine. Similarly enjoyable, Professor Lee Kennett’s very readable book this study covered much of the same period. on World War I aviation is intended to provide The previous book's greatest shortcoming was the reader with a balanced view of the use of an incorrect assessment of the limitations im- aviation in several roles on several fronts rather posed by the time needed for technological de- than limiting itself to the “usual" aerial duels velopment to match brilliant conceptions. That of the Western Front. That is, it tries to avoid point is critical to the military acquisition com- being another account of "Snoopy and the Red munity but has less effect on other military Baron" and almost succeeds. readers. Again, the earlier work is commend- The book undervalues Russian strategic avia- able for its pleasant readability. tion (by Sikorsky and others) and examines (but While engaged in air museum management, I understates) the tremendous documentation on was much aware of a continuing and bitter duel life in two-seater (reconnaissance and attack) between academic historians and aviation his- units. Furthermore, any commentator on mili- torians. Both of Professor Kennett’s books suffer tary subjects who derides a fellow author for a from attempting to straddle these two camps. “mysterious quality” called situational aware- He has followed the criteria of academia in ness seriously damages his own credibility endnotes, citations, and even in discussions of with the military reader, who knows that this source material. Further, he has attempted to mysterious quality is the origin of knowledge- follow the dictates of the better aviation histo- able tactical decision making. rians in seeking to place World War 1 aviation A problem with Professor Kennett's work is in its proper perspective. Despite his many in- that he is too much the academic historian, valuable insights and sound conclusions, I lost overly concerned with his source material. He faith in his accuracy and judgement. praises (rightly) the Gorell Collection of World As an aeronautical engineer and military of- War 1 US Air Service documentation in the Na- ficer, 1 have been attempting for over 30 years tional Archives but demeans the four-volume to apply the lessons of earlier conflicts to the summary of it released by the Office of Air development of air weaponry for future genera- Force History. tions. In that pursuit, historical works like Ken- This sort of thing, as well as Kennett’s lack of nett’s have been invaluable. The First Air War understanding of situational awareness, forces is an enjoyable book to read—it simply falls the professional military reader to be wary of short of what its author intended and is capable his claims and conclusions. Even though the of. book is enjoyable and even though this re- Col H. Larry F.lman, USAFR, Retired viewer might independently agree with most of Port Jefferson. New York the author's theses, these and other problems detract from the study’s readability and degrade the solid credibility one hopes for. For example. Kennett comments that thousands more people claimed membership in the Lafayette Air Guard: America’s Flying Militia by George Escadrille than could ever legitimately have Hall. Novato, California 94949: Presidio served in it; he even gives the figures. Those Press, 1990, 130 pages, $12.95. figures make legitimate historians of World War The total-force concept is now more than 17 1 aviation cringe, for they show that he has con- years old, but there is still confusion in some fused the Lafayette Flying Corps (almost all of military circles about the operation of the Air the Americans who flew for France before US National Guard. George Hall has cut through entry into the war) with the Lafayette Escadrille the "fog of war" and uncertainty about this (the single original squadron from which the component of air reserve forces, which com- 92 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUM M ER 1991 prises the fifth-largest air force in the world. He going to learn. They’re awesome.” George begins the narrative by stating that the Air Hall's unbridled enthusiasm for the Air Guard Guard is the least understood component of the is apparent throughout this book. Air Force. Given the size and missions of the The heart of the book covers the various air- Air National Guard under total force, this lack craft flown by the 91 flying units of the Air Na- of understanding may be the best reason for tional Guard and acknowledges the vital contri- readers to have Air Guard on their shelves. bution of all members of this organization. The The publication of this book comes at a time aircraft and crews may be the point of the in military history when the roles and missions sword, but the men and women who provide of the Air National Guard are changing. As mil- all the support services are the hilt—without itary budgets shrink and the drawdown over- which the point would be useless (my analogy, seas continues, the reserve components will in- not his). George Hall covers the aircraft by nick- evitably take on more responsibility for names somewhat related to missions rather defense. At the same time, the smaller active than by specific type or mission. These catego- forces will find themselves working ever more ries include the “teen fighters” like the F-16 closely with these reserve forces to accomplish and F-15: “mud movers” such as the A-10 and the missions. To this end both active and re- A-7; “ phabulous Phantoms,” “ Herks,” and serve components must have a mutual under- “Heavies” like the KC-135, C-141, and the C-5. standing of the capabilities which each Each aircraft in the Guard inventory is de- possesses. scribed by its mission tasking, as well as the Air Guard succeeds in exposing the reader to ample personal testimony of the people who operations of the Air Guard, along with some of operate, maintain, and support these aircraft. its history and total-force philosophy. The au- This book is for people who love aircraft and thor begins with a glossary of terms that are for professionals who are—or will be— very helpful to a reader who is unfamiliar with strategists in the coming decade. It is a primer the vernacular of military aviation. The list of for people who need to know the capabilities of acronyms includes a couple of rather colorful the reserve air force that will be working more and perhaps objectionable definitions, but they closely with the active forces in the future. The do not detract from the overall quality of the writing is accurate and enthusiastic, and the book. This chapter is followed by a brief gen- photography is outstanding. One must, how- eral history of the National Guard that begins to ever, add a caveat to the content of the book. dispel one of the long-standing myths about Some of the author’s anecdotes about individ- this organization—that ‘‘National Guardsmen uals and individual units are not totally accu- are perceived as a group of misfit Gomer Pyles rate with respect to current Air National Guard out playing Army on the weekends.” The au- policy or procedure—specifically, the “wild thor cites—as an example of the Air Guard's ex- and crazy guardsmen" who took the Soviet pi- pertise and professionalism—a situation he ob- lot for a ride in their F-4. This incident is in di- served during a Red Flag exercise. The example rect contrast to the professionalism discussed involves a group of obviously older Air.Guard in the rest of the book. F-4 Phantom pilots who ‘‘beat the pants off” Air Guard is a useful addition to the book- younger active duty fighter pilots flying more shelves of people who will be managing and modern F-15 Eagles and F/A-18 Hornets. The planning operational Air Force missions of the author goes on to quote a young Marine Hornet next decade. It is also invaluable for the shelves pilot: “These guys have forgotten more about of such organizations as recruiting detachments ACM [air combat maneuvering] than we’re ever and unit history offices. Lt Col W illiam I. Smith, ANG Maxwell AFB. Alabama notams

Notices of upcoming conferences, seminars, and other professional events of a noncommer- cial nature should be sent to the Editor, Air- power Journal. Walker Hall. Bldg. 1400, Max- well AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the right to edit material for length and editorial content.

Air Universityr Review Index have three to seven years of commissioned service, an outstanding military record, and im- The Air University Press has published a complete index of the Air University Review (1947- peccable military bearing and appearance. In- 87). This reference work contains an author interested individuals should consult chapter 8 of dex. a title index, and a cross-referenced sub- AFR 36-20, Officer Assignments, for applica- ject index. Any Air Force or other government tion procedures or write Capt Bob Angwin, organization, college or university library, or Headquarters USAFA/CW1S, USAF Academy similar organization with a need for this index CO 80840-5421 or call DSN 259-3257/3248. can be placed on distribution. Requests for distribution and other inquiries should be ad- Uniformed Services Medical School Training dressed to Capt John Doherty, AUCADRE RI, The Uniformed Services University of the Walker Hall, Bldg. 1400. Maxwell AFB AL Health Sciences is seeking students for its med- 36112-5532. Captain Doherty can also be con- ical training and graduate medical-education tacted at DSN 493-6629 or (205) 953-6629. programs. Medical students are commissioned as ensigns or second lieutenants and draw full USAFA Instructor Opportunities military pay and benefits. There is no tuition, and all books and equipment are provided. At The Military Studies Division at the United graduation, students are promoted to naval States Air Force Academy is seeking highly lieutenant or captain and have a seven-year qualified captains for instructor duty in the service obligation. Both civilians and military summer of 1991 and beyond. This duty in- personnel with a college degree may apply for volves motivating and teaching cadets in the four-year medical program. Applicants university-level courses that stress air power, must be no older than 27 (or 33 with prior mili- the art of war. military theory, doctrine, and tary experience) when they enter school. The force employment. Since its inception in 1980, university also has a graduate program in basic the curriculum in professional military studies medical sciences open to civilians and military. has evolved into one of the most interesting Civilians are not commissioned into the mili- and demanding areas of study at the academy. A master's degree is required of all applicants. tary Graduate students serve as teaching and research assistants. For more information, con- Preferred degrees for military studies instructors are in history, military history, political tact the Office of Admissions, Attn: PAG, Uni- science, and international relations, or in area formed Services University, 4301 Jones Bridge studies of the Soviet Union. Eastern Europe, or Road. Bethesda MD 20814-4799 or call (202) 295-3106. the Middle East Experience in tactical or strategic operations or in operationally related spe- cialties is highly desirable. The division can Historical Research Center Grants sponsor a few highly qualified applicants with The United States Air Force Historical Research the appropriate background for a master's de- Center (USAFHRC) announces the availability gree through the Air Force Institute of Technol- of research grants to encourage scholars to ogy (AFIT), with a follow-on assignment to the study the history of air power through the use Military Studies Division. Applicants should of the center's US Air Force historical docu-

93 94 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUM M ER 1991

ment collection, located at Maxwell AFB, Ala- 36112-6678. The deadline for receipt of the bama. Applicants must have a graduate degree completed application is 31 October 1991. in history or related fields, or equivalent schol- arly accomplishments. Their specialty should be in aeronautics, astronautics, or other F-4 Fighter Memorial military-related areas. Topics may include—but The commander of the 633d Air Base Wing is are not restricted to—Air Force history, military seeking information regarding the F-4 Phantom operations, education, training, administration, aircraft and its historical involvement with An- strategy, tactics, logistics, weaponry, technol- dersen AFB, Guam, during and after the Viet- ogy, organization, policy, activities, and institu- nam conflict. The gathering of information on tions. Preference will be given to those pro- the aircraft is part of the wing’s effort to build posals that involve the use of primary sources an F-4 memorial. Information, documents, and held at the center. Residents of Maxwell AFB photographs should be forwarded to Capt James are not eligible. Applicants may request an ap- Folan, 633d ABW/HO, APO San Francisco CA plication from the commander, USAF Histor- 96334-5000. All items will be copied and ical Research Center, Maxwell AFB AL returned.

I Can Write Better Than That! OK, then do it! Airpower Journal is always looking for good articles written by our readers. If you’ve got something to say, send it to us. We'll be happy to consider it for publication. The Airpoiver Journal focuses on the operational level of war, that broad area between grand strategy and tactics. We are interested in articles that will stimulate thought on how warfare is conducted. This includes not only the actual conduct of war at the operational level, but also the impact of leadership, training, and support functions on operations. We need two typed, double-spaced draft copies of your work. We encourage you to supply graphics and photos to support your article, but don’t let the’ lack of those keep you from writing! We are looking for articles from 2,500 to 5,000 words in length— about 15 to 25 pages. As the professional journal of the Air Force, we strive to expand the horizons and professional knowledge of Air Force personnel. To do this, we seek and encourage challenging articles. We look forward to your submissions. Send them to the Editor, Airpower Journal, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532.

i \ contributors

Comparative Strategy. Dr Cray has published in such journals as For- eign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and In ternational Security.

Capt Peter C. Bahm (BS, Ohio Uni- versity; MS. Air Force Institute of Gregory T. Hooker (BA. University Technology) is chief. Operations of Florida; MS. Defense Intelligence Branch, 379th Civil Engineering College) is serving overseas as a De- Squadron. Wurtsmith AFB, Michi- partment of Defense analyst. He has gan. He has attended the Graduate had previous assignments in the Engineering Management Program at Washington. D.C.. area. the Air Force Institute of Technol- ogy. Wright-Patterson AFB. Ohio, and has worked as a design engineer at Loring AFB. Maine. Captain Bahm is a graduate of Squadron Officer Capt James R. Wolf (BS, University School. of Washington; MBA. Chapman Col- lege; MS. Air Force Institute of Tech- nology) is space plans officer at Headquarters Air Force Space Com- mand (AFSPACECOM), Peterson AFB. Colorado. His previous assignment was orbital operations manager. Defense Satellite Communica- tions System Program Office. Space Systems Division. Air Force Systems Command (AFSC). Captain Wolf is a graduate of Squadron Officer School.

Colin S. Gray (DPhil. Lincoln Col- lege. Oxford University) is president Capt Kenneth W. Polasek (BS. Texas of the National Institute for Public Tech University; MS. Texas A&M Policy. Fairfax, Virginia. He has been University) is commander of the director of national security studies 6118th Combat Support Training at the Hudson Institute (Croton-on- Flight at Kadena Air Base. |apan. His Hudson. New York), assistant direc- previous assignments have been at tor of the Internationa) Institute for Ankara AB. Turkey; Sembach AB. Strategic Studies (London), and a Germany: and the Air Force Institute member of the President’s General of Technology. Wright-Patterson Advisory Committee on Arms Con- AFB. Ohio. Captain Polasek is a trol and Disarmament. A member of graduate of Squadron Officer School. the editorial boards of Orbis and

95 Maj Jeffrey C. Prater (USAFA) is an Air Staff action officer and force pro- grammer in the Electronic Combat Division of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Headquar- ters USAF, Washington. D.C. He has previously served as a weapon systems officer and operations plans officer with the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), Royal Air Force (RAF) Lakenheath, United Kingdom, and as an electronic warfare officer and operations plans officer with the 366th TFW, Mountain Home AFB, Idaho. Major Prater is a graduate of Squad- ron Officer School. Air Command and Staff College, and US Army Command and General Staff College.

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The Airpower Journal (ISSN 0897-0823), Air Force Recurring Publication 50-2, is published quarterly. Subscriptions are available from the Superin- tendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office. Washington DC 20402. Annual rates are $9.50 domestic and $11.90 outside the United States. The GPO stock number is 708-007-00000-5. The Journal welcomes unsolicited manuscripts. Address them to Editor, Air- power Journal, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. Submit double- spaced, typed manuscripts in duplicate. Journal telephone listings are DSN 493-5322 and commercial (205) 953-5322. Fall Readings Joint Doctrine Development F-117A Classification